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Foreword

I would like to offer my deepest apologies for the inconvenience and concern that the

Fukushima Nuclear Accident continues to cause the siting community, and society as a

whole, even today, six years after the accident.

On March 29, 2013, TEPCO announced its Reassessment of the Fukushima Nuclear

Accident and Nuclear Safety Reform Plan in an effort to reaffirm our commitment to

the never-ending improvement of nuclear safety, which has no bounds. Based on our

deep regret over the Fukushima Nuclear Accident we shall rid ourselves of

overconfidence and conceit about safety and continue to implement nuclear safety

reforms. The following is a report on the progress that we have made during the first

quarter of FY2017 (April through June 2017).

On June 23, I took over as president and head of the Nuclear Reform Special Task

Force. By leading through example, I shall push forward with nuclear safety reforms

and engage in efforts to improve the operation and management of TEPCO so that we

may become a nuclear operator that can boast the world’s highest levels of safety based

upon three common values: never compromising when it comes to safety and quality,

strengthening our ability to train individuals and the ability of departments to learn, and

building trust with stakeholders.

In conjunction with the handing over of the reigns to new management at TEPCO a

new management policy has been announced. The three keywords of “open,” “create,”

and “accomplish” are common to both the management policy and nuclear safety

reforms. In its handling of such issues as obscure information disclosure, its nuclear

power business, the Niiza cable tunnel fire, and the delayed invoicing of consignment

fees, TEPCO has failed to sufficiently address these issues from the perspective of its

customers and society, thereby causing distrust amongst the people. Therefore, we will

create a corporate culture based on the universal ideas of “prioritizing safety,”

“prioritizing the local community,” and “standing in the shoes of our customers,” in

order to “look at issues from the perspective of society and our customers, create

transparency and regain the trust of society.”

In TEPCO’s Revised New Comprehensive Special Business Plan (Third Plan), which

was approved on May 18, it was made clear that we shall engage in nuclear power

generation and reactor decommissioning while prioritizing safety and the local

community. We have widely conveyed our intentions to the siting community and

society as a whole and are making great efforts to restore trust in TEPCO through

repeated dialogue with stakeholders aimed at improving understanding.

The report on the findings of the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee held on

June 5 included two expectations:

“We hope to see safety culture permeate through every corner of the organization

without dependency on specific leaders or monitoring by this committee, and

become a part of the DNA of Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings.”

“We would like the new management at Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings

to continue to push strongly forward with nuclear reforms.”

I and the other members of new management at TEPCO will fulfill our

responsibilities as the main party responsible for the Fukushima Nuclear Accident and

shall meet the expectations of the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee. Furthermore,

we will listen carefully to the opinions of external review agencies, such as the IAEA,

WANO, INPO and JANSI, and examine the gap in excellence between us and other

nuclear operators both domestic and abroad while benchmarking with excellence in

other industries as we aim for even higher levels of safety. That being said, there are still

many issues that TEPCO needs to resolve, so reforms and improvements must be

accelerated even further. In order to achieve this, I shall clarify internal responsibility

and authority, and improve communication and governance, such as the way decisions

are made.

In order to prevent the experience with and the lessons learned from the Fukushima

Nuclear Accident from being forgotten and ensure that a severe accident never occurs

again, I shall promote nuclear safety reforms under the resolution to, “keep the

Fukushima Nuclear Accident firmly in mind; we should be safer today than we were

yesterday, and safer tomorrow than today; we call for nuclear power plant operations

that keeps creating unparalleled safety.”

President and He

ead of the Nuclear R

Tomoa

Reform Spe

July

aki Kobaya

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2017

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Force

Table of Contents

Foreword ..................................................................................................................................... 2

1. Progress with Safety Measures at Nuclear Power Stations ...................................................... 6

1.1 Progress of Reactor Decommissioning .............................................................................. 6

1.2 Progress with Safety Measures at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station .............. 14

2 The Progress Status of Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (Management) ........................................... 20

2.1 Initiatives to Enhance Governance by Nuclear Power Leaders........................................... 21

2.2 Measure 1 REFORM FROM TOP MANAGEMENT ....................................................... 26

2.3 Measure 2 ENHANCEMENT OF OVERSIGHT AND SUPPORT FOR MANAGEMENT .. 31

2.4 Measure 3 ABILITY TO PROPOSE DEFENSE IN DEPTH/CAPABILITY FOR

PROPOSING DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH .................................................................................. 39

2.5 Measure 4 ENHANCEMENT OF RISK COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES ..................... 50

2.6 Measure 5 ENHANCEMENT OF POWER STATION AND HEAD OFFICE EMERGENCY

RESPONSE CAPABILITIES .............................................................................................. 59

2.7 Measure 6 DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONNEL FOR ENHANCING NUCLEAR SAFETY 63

2.8 KPI/PI Performance and Assessment .............................................................................. 73

3. Status of Initiatives to Handle the Main Anti-Earthquake Problem ............................................ 76

3.1 Accelerating Nuclear Safety Reforms ............................................................................. 76

3.2 Improvement Measures to Respond to the Concerns Expressed by Residents of Niigata

Prefecture ......................................................................................................................... 78

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 80

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1.2 Progress with Safety Measures at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station

(1) Progress with safety measures

At the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS, an application has been made to modify the

installation permit based on the lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear

Accident. And, safety measures are being implemented with a focus on Units 6 and

Unit 7.

<Progress with Safety Measure Renovations> Safety Measures Unit 6 Unit 7

Preparations for tsunami and internal inundation

Tidal wall (sea wall) construction Completed

Installation of tidal walls for buildings (including flood barrier panels) For Units 1-4

Installation of water-tight doors in reactor building, etc. Completed Completed

Installation of tidal walls at switchyards* Completed

Installation of tsunami monitoring cameras Completed

Improving the reliability of flooding prevention measures (interior flooding measures)

Underway Underway

Dyke construction Completed Completed

Flooding prevention measures for the Heat Exchanger Building For Units 1-5

Installation of permanent bilge pumps in rooms housing important equipment

Completed Completed

Preparations for power loss [Augmenting power sources]

Additional deployment of air-cooled gas turbine power supply cars Underway Underway

Installation of emergency high voltage distribution panels Completed

Laying of permanent cables from emergency high-voltage distribution panels to reactor buildings

Completed Completed

Preparation of substitute DC power sources (batteries, etc.) Underway Completed

Reinforcement of transmission tower foundations* and strengthening of the seismic resistance of switchyard equipment*

Completed

Preparing for damage to the reactor core or spent fuel [Augmenting heat removal and cooling functions]

Installation of substitute submersible pumps and substitute seawater heat exchanger equipment

Completed Completed

Installation of high pressure substitute for water injection systems Underway Underway

Building of water sources (reservoirs) Completed

Enhancement of the seismic resistance of pure water tanks on the Oominato side*

Completed

Preparing for damage to the primary containment vessel or the reactor building [Measures to prevent damage due to excessive PCV pressure and prevent a hydrogen explosion]

Installation of filtered venting equipment (aboveground) Performance tests

completed2

Performance tests

completed

Installation of filtered venting equipment (below ground) Underway Underway

Installation of substitute circulation cooling system Underway Underway

Installation of equipment for keeping the top of the PCV filled with water

Completed Completed

Installation of H2 control and hydrogen detection equipment in reactor buildings

Completed Completed

Installation of top vents in reactor buildings* Completed Completed

Installation of corium shields Completed Completed

Preventing the dispersion of radioactive materials

Deployment of large volume water dispersion equipment Completed

2 Work in the vicinity is ongoing (at both Units 6 and 7)

Preparing for fires [Countermeasures for external and internal fires]

Construction of fire belts Underway

Installation of fire detectors in parking lots on high ground Completed

Installation of fire detectors and buildings Underway Underway

Installation of fixed firefighting systems Underway Underway

Installation of cable wrappings Underway Underway

Construction of fire resistant barriers Underway Underway

Addressing external hazards

Countermeasures for building openings Underway Underway

Removal of objects that could turn into flying debris as a result of a tornado

Underway Underway

Installation of spare book filter for ventilation and air conditioning systems

Completed Completed

Improvements to Main Control Room and Emergency Response Center environments

Measures to reduce operator exposure in the event of a severe accident Underway

Strengthening emergency response

Construction and reinforcement of multiple access routes Underway

Enhancement of communications equipment (in relation of satellite phones, etc.)

Completed

Enhancement of environment monitoring equipment/additional deployment of monitoring cars

Completed

Erection of emergency materials and equipment warehouse on high ground*

Completed

Construction of Emergency Response Center in Unit 5 Underway

*Countermeasures implemented as part of voluntary initiatives on behalf of TEPCO

Safety measure progress that has been made to during the first quarter is as follows

♦ Enhancing emergency response

Construction and reinforcement of multiple access routes

In order to make access routes redundant and to consider liquefaction of

the ground under the seawall on the Arahama side, a new access route

(1.9km in length) for traveling from the main building to the Unit 5

Emergency Response Center will be built on ground that is higher than

design standard tsunami height (at least 12m above sea level). A firebreak

at least 20m in width will also be created in order to protect this new

access route from forest fires. Mortar will be used to create the firebreak in

order to make it resistant to fires and the area will be paved to prevent

vegetation from growing. Construction of the access route and the fire belt

began in April and work is underway to fell trees and build slopes.

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Regulation Authority on June 16.

The major changes between the original application and the revised application are as

follows:

Major Change Original Application Revised Application

Addition of design basis earthquake ground motion

- In light of the seismic motion witnessed during the earthquake that occurred in Rumoi, Hokkaido after the original application was submitted, a new design basis earthquake ground motion Ss-8 (seismic motion with no specific hypocenter) was added to reflect new knowledge about underground structures.

Change to standard tsunamis (Arahama side (Unit 1-4 side))

Front of water intake: 6.0m Maximum run-up height: 8.5m

Front of water intake: 6.8m Maximum run-up height: 7.6m Run-up height on Arahama side of site: (added):

6.7m

Change to equipment subject to natural phenomenon design standards

Maximum wind speed of design basis tornadoes: 69m/sec.

Standard temperature (low temp.): -15.2°C (24-hour operation)

Standard rainfall:- Height of volcanic ash deposits: 30cm

Maximum wind speed of design basis tornadoes: 92m/sec.

Standard temperature (low temp.): -2.6°C (173.4-hour continuous operation)

Standard rainfall: 101.3mm/h Height of volcanic ash deposits: 35cm

Changes to filtered vent design

- Installation of remotely operated manual operating equipment

Installation of iodine filters (removes at least 98% of gaseous iodine (organic iodine))

Installation of the vent line bypass line

Addition of substitute circulation cooling system

- In addition to filtered events, a substitute circulation cooling system has been added as a means of removing heat from the primary containment vessel (PCV)

Changes to filtered vent-related sections of the application

The application mentions installation of PCV pressure relief equipment and substitute PCV pressure relief equipment as equipment for preventing damage to the primary containment vessel caused by over-pressurization

The application clearly states that in accordance with requests from Niigata Prefecture, rules for using filtered venting equipment will abide by evacuation plans for the local community and the equipment shall not be used without receiving permission in accordance with the Safety Agreement.

Addition of substitute circulation cooling system (deletion of substitute primary containment vessel pressure relief equipment (underground filtered vents))

The revised application clearly states that the superintendent has the authority to vent the PCV using PCV pressure relief equipment and that s/he shall take responsibility for such action (whereas discussions at the inspection meeting resulted in the deletion of the original statement, the conditions put forth by Niigata Prefecture shall be complied with)

Addition of substitute PCV spray system

- Addition of measures to inject cooling into the PCV using fire engines

(portable)

Installation of corium shields

- Corium shields will be installed to lower the possibility that PCV function is impacted from molten fuel that has eaten through the concrete at the bottom of the PCV

Deployment of large volume water dispersion equipment

- Large volume water dispersion equipment will be installed to prevent radioactive substances from the reactor buildings from dispersing (preventing dispersion into the atmosphere by dispersing large volumes of water (900m3/hour))

Changes to Main Control Rooms

- An evacuation room will be built in the Main Control Rooms to reduce operator exposure in the event of reactor core damage

Major changes made in relation to the Emergency Response Center

The original application mentions that the Emergency Response Center will be located inside the Main Anti-Earthquake Building

Preparations are being made to construct the Emergency Response Center inside the Unit 5 reactor building (in conjunction with this and access route from the Main building and fire belt will also be constructed)

Methods for effectively using the main anti-earthquake building, such as a place for non-emergency response personnel on standby to wait, etc., will be deliberated.

Design changes to other severe accident evacuation location equipment

Fire engines: 11 Gas turbine generator: 3

Additional fire engines:17 Additional gas turbine generator trucks: 4 (two

each in different locations) Installation of reactor building H2 control

equipment operation monitoring temperature gauge.

Preparation of small radiation monitoring boat on the sea side.

Improvement of heat resistance of material used for the primary containment vessel top head flange seal

Major changes made to technical capabilities during severe accidents

- The new application states that in the event of a simultaneous disaster at both Units 6 and 7, the response to a severe accident shall be implemented under the direction of the operation shift team assistantship supervisor on duty at each unit. (The shift supervisor shall be in charge of communicating and coordinating with the Emergency Response Center and coordinating between units)

Revision of emergency response personnel exposure assessments

- Setting severe conditions for, and assessing, severe accidents has shown that it will be possible to contain an accident without exceeding the maximum exposure limit (100mSv)

Changes to the major assessment conditions for severe accident countermeasure effectiveness assessments

- Predicted accident scenarios resulting in a total loss of all AC power were subdivided (into three subdivisions), and it was confirmed that in all of these scenarios the reactor core would not be damaged.

The case of using the alternate circulation cooling system was added to the “reactor coolant loss (major LOCA) + Emergency Core

Standby Cooling System (ECCS) cooling water injection function loss + total loss of AC power” scenario

The amount of time until the commencement of PCV venting in the “reactor coolant loss (major LOCA) + Emergency Core Standby Cooling System (ECCS) cooling water injection function loss + total loss of AC power” scenario was extended from 25 hours after the accident, to 38 hours after the accident. (reflects improvements to skill and management through training)

The amount of radioactive substances discharged was assessed under extremely severe conditions in order to assess worker exposure and it was confirmed that the amount of Cesium 137 released would fall below assessment guidelines (100TBq or less)(total release rate is approximately 16TBq)

We shall continue to be meticulous in our handling of Nuclear Regulation Authority

inspections and strives to further improve safety based upon the lessons learned from

the Fukushima Nuclear Accident.

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initiatives aimed at fostering better relationships between people within the

organization in order to enable the smooth conveyance of information both

horizontally and laterally within the Nuclear Power Division.

On March 24 two core members were chosen and in the first quarter internal

communication teams were formed at the Head Office and each power station.

During the first quarter, each team engaged in activities to discuss the intentions

of the team and the reasons for its establishment, such as the main anti-earthquake

building problem, as well as discussions about internal communication problems

that each department faces. As a result, common problems were identified, such as

the inability to accurately share information between departments and positions, and

a tendency to not be interested in the work of departments other than one’s own. At

the same time, the internal communication teams of each department are working

together to plan and share information in an effort to formulate initiatives, and invite

external experts to help with specific problems that need to be solved based upon

the understanding that underlying contributors and priorities differ depending on the

department.

(2) Enhancing the Sharing of Information about Important Work Issues in the Nuclear

Power Division

Since July 2016, each site superintendent and Head Office general managers have

been sending e-mails to all members of the Nuclear Power Division about important

work issues in order to share information on these matters. Since October 2016 we

have been conducting electronic questionnaires designed to gather opinions about

the messages that were conveyed and also confirm the level of understanding7 of

these messages and whether or not they were received. During the first quarter

response rate was 39.7% (objective: 70% or more), and the level of understanding

was 2.4 points (objective: 2.5 points or more). Compared to the fourth quarter,

response rate increased by 4.3 points, and there was no change in the level of

understanding.

The results of the questionnaire and opinions about messages are being provided

7 Measured on a four-step scale with 1 being "well understood" and 4 being "not very well understood"

as feedback to the sender in order to improve subsequent messages.

(3) Change Management

Change management is a systematic method for preventing risks from

manifesting and achieving expected goals by identifying those parties that’ll be

affected by organizational and operational changes and responding in a planned

manner, such as by giving detailed briefings, to anticipated risks.

During the first quarter, revisions of the change management guide created in

2014 began. Up until now the guide had only applied to large-scale organizational

restructuring and tasks changes, but the scope of the guide has been expanded to

include issues (large-scale improvements, etc.) that affect many employees. In

conjunction with this, efforts are being made to deepen understanding of change

management as an effective tool for developing internal communication and enable

it to permeate through business tasks.

2.2 Measure 1 REFORM FROM TOP MANAGEMENT

2.2.1 Initiatives Related to Suggestions from the Nuclear Reform Monitoring

Committee

(1) Activities to develop communication and understanding amongst contractors

In order to improve nuclear safety at TEPCO’s nuclear power stations, contractors

must have an understanding of nuclear safety reforms and cultivate nuclear safety

culture. In continuation from FY2016Q4, representatives of management from the Head

Office and the Head Office Safety Culture Cultivation Activity Secretariat have been

visiting the headquarters of contractors in order to exchange opinions on nuclear safety

with contractor executives at power stations. (April 26: one company, May 29: two

companies, June 23: two companies). Through these opinion exchanges the efforts of

each contractor to foster the 10 traits and 40 behaviors of robust nuclear safety culture

were examined. At the same time, since the 10 traits are conceptual, it was realized that

the 10 traits should be linked to actual duties and explained in an easy-to-understand

manner to enable more workers to accept the concept. We will continue to engage in

dialogue with contractors in order to deepen mutual understanding of nuclear safety.

(2) Reflecting on the 10 traits of individuals and the organization (enabling nuclear

safety culture to permeate the organization)

In the Nuclear Power Division, we have stipulated the, “individual, leader and

organizational traits needed to embody robust nuclear safety culture (10 traits and 40

behaviors for robust nuclear safety culture).” By using these traits to reflect on and

compare one’s own actions with ideal behavior on a daily basis, we are encouraging

employees to notice the differences in efforts to improve safety awareness.

The rate of self-retrospection during the first quarter was approximately 93% (+1%

compared with FY2016 Q4) and efforts will continue to ensure that this activity is

engaged in.

The implementation rate of group discussions, which are used to share the results of

individual self-retrospection, learn from each other, and take notice of new issues, was

86% (-2% compared to FY2016 Q4), so efforts will need to revitalize this activity.

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During the first quarter, discussions were held on the topics of looking at issues

from the perspective of the local community and communication with the

region. (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa: April 26, June 28, Fukushima Daini: May 18).

♦ Messages from nuclear power leaders

In order to promote nuclear safety reforms, nuclear power leaders must

accurately convey their expectations, and the reasons for those expectations, so

that they permeate throughout the entire organization. In order to do this,

nuclear power leaders are leveraging video messages, intranet messages, email,

meetings and morning meetings as opportunities to convey their expectations.

The following graph shows the number of times that messages by nuclear

power leaders have been read by employees via the intranet. During the first

quarter, the number of employees that read each message rose to 2,400 and the

percentage of people who rated the message as “helpful” rose to 21.3% thereby

showing a slowly increasing trend.

Number of views per message sent via the intranet/”Helpful” assessment rate

In order to convey “thoughts” that cannot be completely conveyed through

written messages over the intranet, the General Manager of the Nuclear Power

& Plant Siting Division has been engaging in direct dialogue with power

station personnel and headquarter employees since February 2014.

715.9

1,023.8 919.8

1,017.3 941.9

1,276.1 1,234.8

1,617.7 1,649.8

2,095.6 1,996.9

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20143Q

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20151Q

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20161Q

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20164Q

20171Q

No. of views/message

Percentage of people that felt the message was “helpful”

Number of times direct dialogue was engaged in between the General Manager of the Nuclear Power and

Plant Siting Division and workers

♦ Commendations given by the General Manager of the Nuclear Power & Plant

Siting Division and the president of the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination &

Decommissioning Engineering Company

Since FY2015, the General Manager of the Nuclear Power and Plant Siting

Division and the president of the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination &

Decommissioning Engineering Company have given awards to those people

that have led the way and taken on great challenges, and people who have

achieved high objectives in regards to the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan and

other missions. The following chart shows the number of commendations that

were given.

Commendations given by the General Manager of the Nuclear Power and Plant Siting Division and the

president of the Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company

Period Head Office Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Fukushima Daini NPS Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

FY2015 24(2) 47 19 24 FY2016 25(1) 19 14 25 FY2017

Q1 4(1) 2 4 10

(Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of commendations given at Higashidori)

♦ Gathering information on notifications that were given and information that was

disclosed during the accident

Many facts about the accident have been revealed by the government’s

Investigation and Verification Committee. However, in order to improve

nuclear safety going forward and contribute to improving how events are

reported and disclosed to the public, employees are being encouraged to

4

18

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proactively report anything that they find to be missing from these

investigation reports via an intranet site that has been set up for that purpose

(June 21, 2016). No information or opinions were provided through the site

during the first quarter.

(2) Enabling nuclear safety culture to permeate throughout the entire organization

♦ Safety Council Meetings

In June 2016, a Safety Council8 was established to enable the Nuclear Power

& Plant Siting Division to discuss safety with Fukushima Daiichi

Decontamination & Decommissioning Engineering Company (FDEC)

management, share problem awareness, and promote the quick implementation

of common countermeasures.

During the 4th Safety Council meeting, a discussion was held on the topic of

activities to cultivate safety culture amongst contractors (June 2). The

discussion reaffirmed the necessity to continue dialogue with contractors and

develop activities for cultivating safety culture, such as conveying the

importance of not only work safety, but also nuclear safety.

♦ Assessing the status of nuclear safety culture

During FY2016, TEPCO’s Safety Culture Promotion Secretariat spearheaded

an assessment of the status of safety culture at Fukushima Daini through

interviews and field observation. Fukushima Daini used the results of this

assessment as input and began a safety culture cultivation campaign in April

2017 with the cooperation of contractors that focuses on “complying with rules

and procedures,” which was an issue identified as being far from ideal.

During FY2017, An assessment of the state of nuclear safety culture at the

Fukushima Daiichi NPS is being planned/implemented in cooperation with the

field diagnosis initiatives9 implemented by the Japan Atomic Nuclear Safety

Institute (JANSI). During the field diagnosis, JANSI interviewed 53

Fukushima Daiichi NPS personnel (May 15-19). The results of these interviews

will be analyzed and TEPCO and JANSI will assess the status of safety culture

at the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.

8 The Council is comprised of the General Manager of the Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Division, FDEC President, power station site superintendents, and Head Office general managers. 9 Field diagnosis: employees from JANSI’s Safety Culture Cultivation Support Department conduct interviews with everyone from general employees to the site superintendent in order to ascertain the state of awareness of power station personnel and point out “things noticed” from the perspective of an outside party thereby providing support for safety culture cultivation.

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Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (NSOO) Quarterly Report

(2017 Quarter 1 Report)

Foreword

This report summarises the Nuclear Safety Oversight Office (NSOO) assessment results for

2017, Quarter 1 (April through June). Recommendations, advice and observations have

been discussed with the relevant management as they arose and have already been accepted

and acted on (or actions are planned). They are not repeated in this summary.

The amount of assessment done in this quarter was less than normal as several key staff

assisted with performing an independent check of safety documentation before submission to

NRA. This was seen as an important oversight activity and within the NSOO remit.

1. Safety Performance

The Assessment Team and the Senior Reactor Engineers (SRE) on site reports continue to indicate

steady improvement in safety in many areas.

There are still areas for improvement and the following summarizes the observations made and

advice given.

1.1 Fukushima Daiichi

The assessment teams have looked at Unit 1 SFP Removal, Emergency Preparedness and Human

Resource Development, and made the following observations;

As for the Unit 1 SFP Removal project, in order to achieve efficient decision making by the

project manager, the middle managers should clarify their responsibilities and reinforce

their ability of execution and management both for the individual technical study and

intra-group coordination.

There is room for improvement in the development of procedures for the Restoration team

as an emergency response organization and the level of effectiveness of their trainings.

Head of the Restoration team should instruct his Group Managers in charge of facility and

execute their responsibilities, while Nuclear Disaster Prevention Group should strengthen

its accountability including verification and the Nuclear Human Resources Development

Center should solidify its support to improve the education.

The Nuclear Human Resources Development Center launched a new system that reinforces

the governance of top managements on the improvement of the training program.

aContinuous improvement is expected going forward by clarifying input and output of

meetings and establishing process to capture emerging training needs.

The Senior Reactor Engineers on site have provided a matrix of detailed performance data for the

site management against the new Fundamentals. In particular they highlight:

The need to install instruments to directly monitor the Spent Fuel Pools water levels and

temperature.

Improvements needed to the design change process with respect to modifications and

temporary work

The need to shorten inspection periods of the Emergency Diesel Generators to reduce the

time with reduced back up.

1.2 Fukushima Daini

The Assessment Team has focused on Emergency Preparedness and, although there has been good

training to improve emergency preparedness, it is necessary to re-confirm the role assignments of

each functional team through family drills and also re-confirm the details and adequacy of

frequency of individual drill items.

The Senior Reactor Engineers on site have provided a matrix of detailed performance data for the

site management against the Functional Areas. In particular they highlight:

Many of challenges in the field are related to contractors, so their awareness and

behaviours as well as TEPCO employees should be improved.

The causal and trend analysis in the non-conformance management should be improved and

strengthened. In addition, the current practice of non-conformance management meetings

should be reviewed for its purpose and aims with ensuring PDCA cycle to improve overall

performance.

Many findings from the recent JANSI Peer Review are similar to those raised during the

past reviews. When the site takes improvement actions, they need to pay close attention to

the effectiveness and sustainability of the actions, as well as benchmarking the world’s

excellence. In addition, it is important to get CFAM at the Headquarters involved in the

activities.

1.3 Kashiwazaki Kariwa

The assessment teams have looked at Re-start, emergency preparedness, Operations management,

and long term engineering capabilities, and made the following observations;

The KK6/7 Re-start Project is a good initiative, although some of the basic design

operation at HQ was delayed due to NRA document submission priorities. Actions are

being taken to remedy earlier observations by NSOO.

Good work continues on emergency preparedness although there is room for improvement

for the Restoration Teams in the sense that they need to develop comprehensive and

effective procedures and conduct individual training.

To reinforce operators’ Fundamentals Conduct of Operations in the field it is necessary to

improve the management of change with current manuals and guides. We observed lack

of coordination between Corporate and the Site and poor leadership by Corporate in

particular.

Differences were identified between design reviews conducted by TEPCO and those by

plant manufacturers and the information was provided to reform the DR system.

The Senior Reactor Engineers on site have provided a matrix of detailed performance data for the

site management against the Functional Areas. In particular they highlight:

Activities derived from the Business Plan are effectively checked and implemented.

Respective departments analyze weakness and take actions to achieve targets of the site. As

a result, for instance, the number of significant non-conformances have become halved

year on year in FY2016.

The non-conformance in the penetration survey following Shika NPS event clearly raised

shared-awareness for the significant challenge on “organizational barriers in

communication.” In order to have the behavior of good project managers deep-rooted, it is

necessary to clarify the sponsorship and respective roles of senior managers and permeate

them, as well as ensuring the follow-up of the state of execution.

General Managers have repeatedly provided instructions to control deadlines of requests

for equipment repairs and to rectify the practice of insufficient lighting in the plant.

Front-line operators are often poor at voluntary management of their field. Management

observations and Fundamentals should be employed as effective tools so that operators are

promoted to act in a self-governing manner.

1.4 Corporate

Enhancing emergency response capability of the HQ personnel

As a preparation for the case of emergencies, the responsible personnel needs to undertake trainings

to maintain required emergency response capability. However, the result of participation to the

emergency drills last year indicated that there are multiple personnel who failed to show up the

drills. It is necessary to strictly control personnel in their training results and competence to

enhance their emergency response capacity.

Footnote to Section 1

NSOO re-iterates that all these and other detailed observations have been discussed with line

managers and actions and improvements are already underway in many areas.

2. CNSO Insights from Assessments

2.1 Governance

In general, the Governance of the training of the Restoration Teams in the Emergency

Response Centres needs improvement, though levels are different by site and corporate. This

is caused by poor implementation, exacerbated by poor accountability, responsibility,

authority and prioritization. Improvements are needed in the following areas;

- Drill Priority sharing among the entire organization

- Clear Accountability, Responsibility and Authority for drill

- Establishment of systems for managing drill implementation

- Permeation of expectations on capability of emergency response

CNSO further suggests that this problem may be common to other Cross-Functional projects.

CNSO suggests that TEPCO should improve the structural aspects to make sure that people

have the tools and the mechanisms to both manage and deliver all cross functional projects.

2.2 Nuclear Business Acumen of the Board.

CNSO suggests that the Board should assess, and if necessary improve, its abilities in the

area of nuclear technology and nuclear safety.

2.3 Nuclear Risk and Efficiency Initiatives.

The Executive should ensure that the current efficiency initiatives do not disturb the balance

between safety and delivery and that nuclear safety is not jeopardized.

2.4 Past Recommendations to the Executive and Board

As this is a new executive team, in particular the President and CNO (including the CNO's

immediate team), CNSO takes this opportunity to remind them of some of the more

important ongoing issues raised by NSOO over the last 2 years. Including for example, the

Management of Radiation Dose, Nuclear Risk Management, Nuclear Baseline and Staff Rotation,

Learning and Contractor Safety Culture.

3. NSOO Performance – Closure of NSOO Actions

There has continued to be good performance by the line in closing out NSOO recommendations;

Of the 131 actions raised prior to this quarter, 102 are closed. And there are 5 actions

closed in this quarter.

In this quarter we raised 7 new recommendations

4. Benchmarking and Mentoring

NSOO conducted a benchmarking to Nuclear Independent Oversight (NIO) of Sellafield in the UK

this quarter. We learnt from the NIO significantly as they perform a wide range of activities,

including reviews on management leadership and Independent Nuclear Safety Assessment (INSA)

as well as oversight activities similar to what NSOO does.

End

(3) Initiatives to Enhance Self-Assessments

Performance Improvement (PI) field gap analysis performed during FY2016 as

part of the management model project identified self-assessments as an area that is

not functioning effectively. In light of these results, since FY2017 efforts have been

made to formulate self-assessment guidelines as a Phase II initiative for the PI field.

In the process of formulating self-assessment guidelines, nuclear operators in the

United States were referenced under the guidance of overseas experts to compile

procedures that were put to trial use.

These self-assessments of nuclear safety reforms conducted during FY2016 also

revealed the necessity to enhance the skill of evaluators so improvements are being

made in coordination with the management model project.

2.4 Measure 3 ABILITY TO PROPOSE DEFENSE IN DEPTH/CAPABILITY FOR

PROPOSING DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH

2.4.1 Initiatives Related to Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee Proposals

(1) Leveraging operating experience (OE)11 from within and outside of Japan

♦ Gathering and sharing OE information

One of the lessons learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident is that

we must “learn from the failures of others.” Lessons to be learned are

being identified and countermeasures deliberated/implemented under the

premise that something that has occurred somewhere else in the world can

also occur at TEPCO power stations.

Prior to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, the gathering of operating

experience from within and outside of Japan, and the deliberation of

countermeasures, were put off. Therefore, efforts are being made to

promptly engage in these activities and enable everyone in the Nuclear

Power Vision to leverage this information.

During the first quarter 49 pieces of the new OE information were

gathered and 53 pieces of OE information, that includes information

gathered in the past, were analyzed. We will continue to analyze this

information in a planned manner to ensure that no information waits to

be analyzed for more than three months.

Trends in OE information gathering and analysis

11 Operating Experience

373

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to determine whether or not management is “taking a proactive

attitude towards learning about important OE information and not just

getting preoccupied with superficial causes.” During the first quarter,

participation rates were as follows:

Head Office: 22%

Fukushima Daiichi NPS: 29%

Fukushima Daini: 46%

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa: 63%

Participation rate did not increase last fiscal year in part because

planned tasks conflicted with planned study sessions, but this fiscal

year initiatives will commence to incorporate management

improvement programs for managers into OE study sessions and

promote discussions between group managers and members.

OE study session participation rate by managers

(2) Promoting improvements through CAP14

♦Enhancing CAP processes

We aim to make efficient and effective improvements by using CAP to

manage not only nonconformance and OE information, but also

information useful for improving performance that can contribute to

nuclear safety (management observation results, benchmarking results,

external review results, near-this information, etc.), in a unified manner.

At the KK performance improvement meeting (May 16) the role of these

bodies and the activities in which they engage in the United States were

introduced thereby increasing the knowledge that power station

management has about CAP and performance improvements.

14 Corrective Action Program (performance improvement program)

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2.4.2 Other Initiatives

(1) Competitions to Enhance the Ability to Propose Safety Improvement

Measures

TEPCO has been holding Safety Improvement Proposal Competitions so that

personnel may, in addition to conducting multi-faceted reviews from the

perspective of defense-in-depth, acquire the technical ability to propose

cost-effective safety measures and have these proposals put promptly into

practice.

Safety Improvement Proposal Competition PI calculate:

(the number of proposals) x (average assessment) x (number of

outstanding proposals that were implemented within six months).

The results from the 5th competition exceeded objectives (1,500 points

or more) since the beginning of these competitions. However, rather

than be satisfied with this result we plan to further develop and improve

methods for implementing this competition and also deliberate revising

how PIs are calculated. Furthermore, in order to improve motivation to

participate in the competition we will continue to give commendations

to those people who have submitted outstanding proposals and also

those departments that have implemented outstanding proposals that

have been submitted in past competitions.

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1341

14 11

3rd

proposalsut into action

petition PI (2nd

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e that were

outstanding

ce the last re

outstanding

ring the first

t (FY2016Q4n was counted

419

4th

21

22

12 6

4th

d16 - 6th comp

roposal Compeosals put into ac

put into pra

g proposals

eport (cumu

g proposals

competition s

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2,416

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petition)

etitions/Numberction

actice durin

submitted,

ulative total:

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so the results

outstanding m the fifth

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one

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four

s are

-

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-

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decrease

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water has c

e Great Eas

ed to drain t

venting the f

was installe

g the autom

g. (Fukushim

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l now accum

en monitore

ystem (conce

omatically o

hima Daiich

Accumulated

r to quickly

ed as a resu

e to monitor

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stern Japan

this water. I

flooding of

ed in the wa

matic drainag

ma Daiichi

f automatic gr

mulated wat

ed by comp

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outputs deta

hi NPS)

water/subdrai

ascertain if

ult of sloshin

r the water l

o flow into th

Earthquake

In order to e

emergency

ll of the pow

ge of ground

NPS)

roundwater dr

ter levels an

paring trend

onitoring sy

ailed water

in water level

f water leve

ng caused b

levels of SF

he Unit 5/6

e and operat

enhance cou

power pane

wer panel ro

dwater that

rainage line

nd subdrain

s to the dail

stem) has n

level data e

monitoring

ls in spent f

y an earthqu

FP skimmer

reactor bui

tors have

untermeasur

els, a draina

oom thereby

flows into

n water level

ly data shee

now been cr

every hour.

fuel pools h

quake, it is n

surge tanks

ilding

res

age

y

the

ls

ets,

reated

have

now

s on

Monito

-

-

the fron

oring of spent

- In order

condens

have be

manage

decision

equipme

correlat

Installation o

- In order

under co

dust turn

in smok

perform

by the s

nt panel of th

t fuel pool wat

r to improve

sation inside

en newly in

temperatur

ns on when

ent refrigera

ion charts. (

of temperature

r to enable o

onditions of

ned up by e

ke-filled roo

ming operatio

elf-breathin

he main con

ter levels in th

e the reliabi

e cable tray

nstalled in c

re and humi

to start up a

ators is now

(Fukushima

e and humidity

operators to

f poor visib

earthquake,

oms so that o

ons and exp

ng apparatu

ntrol room.

he main contro

ility of powe

ys, temperatu

cable tray co

idity levels.

and shut dow

w based upo

a Daini)

y gauges in ca

o remain cal

ility caused

we have sta

operators ca

perience the

s (air tanks)

(Fukushima

ol room (front

er panels by

ure and hum

onnections i

In conjunc

wn air cond

n temperatu

able tray areas

m and perfo

d by smoke

arted implem

an practice

e visual limi

). (Kashiwa

a Daini NPS

t panel)

y preventing

midity gaug

in order to

ction with th

ditioning

ure/humidit

s

orm operati

from a fire

menting tra

actually

itations imp

azaki-Kariw

S)

g

ges

his,

ty

ons

and

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posed

wa)

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w

i

F

d

b

c

(2) Impr

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not o

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impl

I

o

a

i

T

During the

which outst

instances w

Furthermor

during whic

being outsta

could contri

roving perio

order to pr

only engagin

es pointed o

ementing sa

In order to e

organized m

and created

improvemen

The status o

Fukush

A work

solution

Further

identifi

which f

After ri

Operator trai

second quar

tanding prop

where propos

e, before th

ch we plan t

anding durin

ibute to imp

odic safety a

oactively an

ng in impro

out during sa

afety review

effectively i

manner, we

a safety rev

nt) (June 21

of safety rev

hima Daiich

k group was

n to, the con

rmore, coun

ied as poten

focus on liq

isks are iden

ining in smoke

rter, we wil

posals are p

sals are not

he end of the

to re-exami

ng past com

proving nuc

assessment

nd continua

ovements to

afety inspec

ws that exam

implement p

deliberated

view guide

1).

views at eac

hi NPS

s established

ntinuing pro

ntermeasure

ntially havin

quids and ga

ntified a che

e-filled rooms

ll continue t

put into prac

put into pra

e year we w

ne proposal

mpetitions to

clear safety.

processes (

ally improve

respond to

ctions and th

mine underly

power statio

systematic

(periodic sa

ch power sta

d to focus on

oblem of oil

es have been

ng an impac

ases that con

eck is perfo

s

to monitor th

ctice and fol

actice smoo

will hold the

ls that were

o look for pr

safety revie

e nuclear sa

nonconform

hird-party re

ying contrib

on safety re

topic select

afety assess

ation are as

n, and quick

l leaks from

n formulated

t outside sit

ntain radioa

ormed to gua

the process

llow-up in

othly.

7th compet

not selecte

roposals tha

ews)

afety, TEPC

mances and

reviews, but

butors.

eviews in an

tion process

sment proce

follows:

kly find a

m vehicles.

d for risks

te boundari

active mater

arantee that

by

ition

d as

at

O is

d

t also

n

ses

ess

es

rials.

t no

risks have been overlooked, however in light of risk reduction

measures and changes to the environment in conjunction with the

progress of reactor decommissioning, risks that have the potential to

have an impact outside of site boundaries were once again looked

for. Furthermore, deliberations on the unified management of risks

that address not only radioactive material but also hazardous

materials and equipment aging, continue.

Fukushima Daini

In light of the fact that reactors are currently shut down, we are in

the process of formulating a review plan in order to identify areas

for improvement upon identifying latent weaknesses and selecting

topics for FY2017.

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS

During FY2016 the effectiveness of “mechanisms for confirming

the impact that field work has on plant safety functions” was

examined and improvements made to this mechanism. The results

were then reflected in the work guide to confirm the impact on plant

safety design. During this fiscal year we will commence initiatives

to confirm the suitability of checks by managing departments in

accordance with the aforementioned guide, and examine the

effectiveness of this improved mechanism. Furthermore, we will

draft a review plan for identifying areas for improvement upon

selecting topics for FY2017.

2.5 M

2.5.1

Com

(1) In

♦

(Le

Measure 4 E

1 Initiatives

mmittee

nitiatives to

♦ Training to

As of Ju

explain

member

held on

(three ti

Dartmou

corporat

corporat

compare

Professo

Fukushi

corporat

compare

with com

Furtherm

commun

message

eft: Exchangin

ENHANCEM

Related to

o improve ri

o maintain a

une 30, ther

the details o

rs of the loc

topics such

imes in total

uth College

te communi

te communi

ed to what i

or Argenti e

ima Daiichi

te communi

ed to when

mmunicatio

more, we le

nicator and

es.

ng opinions wi

Masuda

MENT OF

Suggestions

isk commun

and improve

e were 42 a

of the revise

cal commun

h as geology

l).

e professor,

ication, was

ications, an

it was like a

exchanged o

i site, and ga

ication staff

the acciden

on and that T

earned from

that commu

Instructio

ith Fukushima

a; Right: Spec

RISK COM

s from the N

nication ski

e the skill o

active risk c

ed applicati

nity, study se

y, seismolog

Paul Argen

s invited to

nd communi

at the time o

opinions wit

ave special

ff (54 partici

nt occurred,

TEPCO’s co

m Prof. Argen

unication st

on by Professo

a Daiichi D &

cial lecture for

MMUNICAT

Nuclear Ref

ll

of risk comm

ommunicat

ion for Kash

essions run

gy, and seism

nti, the world

examine to

ication as a

of the Fukus

th managem

lectures to

ipants). Pro

there have

ommunicati

nti that upp

trategies can

or Argenti

& D Engineerin

r risk commun

TION ACTI

form Monito

municators

ors. In orde

hiwazaki-K

by internal

mic resistan

d’s foremos

what degre

whole, has

shima Nucle

ment, took a

risk commu

f. Argenti co

been drastic

ion is still g

er managem

n be fulfille

ng Company (

nicators)

IVITIES

toring

er to accurat

Kariwa to the

l instructors

nce design.

st authority

ee TEPCO’s

improved

ear Acciden

a tour of the

unicators an

ommented

c improvem

getting bette

ment is the b

ed using sim

(FDEC) presi

tely

e

were

on

s

nt.

e

nd

that

ments

er.

best

mple

dent

♦ Improving the risk communication ability of employees

Simulated risk handling training for corporate communication staff was held

referencing incidents that have occurred at other companies and the response

was assessed by external instructors (32 participants during the first quarter)

We continue to issue “social opinions you should know about” reports to mainly

FDEC employees that serve to share information on concerns voiced to TEPCO

by the local governments of Fukushima Prefecture, the media, and customers,

and issues related to TEPCO that have been brought up on SNS (once a month).

2.5.2 Other Initiatives

(1) Engaging in risk communication

♦ Communicating with the siting community and overseas parties

Activities in the Fukushima area

We continue to offer tours of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS in an

effort to deepen understanding by having people see the power

station with their own eyes (first-quarter: 2,956 people). We will

continue to offer tours with the objective of reaching approximately

20,000 people, double that of 2016, by FY2020.

On April 1, we released the first issue of Hairo Michi, an

informational magazine intended to introduce the people engaged in

reactor decommissioning and convey their feelings, as well as give

updates on the progress of decommissioning at the Fukushima

Daiichi NPS to the people in the community (approximately 10,000

copies issued). The second issue was released on June 10. We plan

to publish issues approximately once every two months and make

efforts to improve the ease of reading of the magazine based upon

opinions from readers.

F

1 FOR

approxi

familie

every m

Monthl

Fukush

both th

continu

them in

At the

and De

Fukush

in regar

and TE

and tha

dialogu

At the f

Ensurin

Power

possibl

contam

from pe

held by

make th

First issue of H

ALL JAPA

imate 6,000

s continues

month we di

ly 1F newsl

hima Daiich

e Kyodo Ne

ue to look fo

n the conten

13th meeting

contaminat

hima Minyu

rds to the in

EPCO that, “

at it “should

ue with thes

first meetin

ng the Safet

Stations, di

e to give ex

minated wate

eople in Fuk

y experts, su

he details ea

Hairo Michi

AN website s

0 workers at

to get appr

istribute app

letter to wor

hi NPS facil

ews Service

or issues of

nts of these m

g of the Fuk

tion Measur

u/Fukushima

nformation b

“the informa

d be more tra

se parties to

ng of FY201

ty of Decom

agrams and

xplanations

er and fuel d

kushima Pre

uch as memb

asier to und

Second is

set up to pro

t the Fukush

roximately 2

proximately

rkers on site

ity. These in

e (April 12)

great conce

media tools

kushima Co

res (May 29

a Minpo new

being conve

ation should

ansparent.”

make impr

17 of the Pre

mmissioning

d photograph

on the statu

debris/fuel r

efecture bre

bers of gov

derstand (M

sue of Hairo M

ovide inform

hima Daiich

28,000 hits p

y 2,000 copi

e and people

nitiatives w

and NHK (

ern to worke

s.

ouncil on De

), represent

wspapers in

eyed by the

d be easier t

We will co

ovements.

efectural Co

g of Fukush

hs were use

us of handlin

removal in l

eak down th

ernment com

ay 17).

Michi

mation to th

hi NPS and

per month.

ies of the

e that tour t

were covered

(June 18). W

ers and incl

ecommissio

tatives of

n attendance

governmen

to understan

ontinue a

ouncil on

hima Nuclea

ed as much

ng of

light of requ

he discussio

mmittees, a

he

their

And,

the

d by

We’ll

lude

oning

e said

nt

nd,”

ar

as

uests

ons

and

Expla

18 Cu

anations given

umulative tota

n at the Prefec

Activities

The nu

quarte

(cumu

322 pe

In ord

Kashi

Hall (t

and to

partici

“Fure

Fureai

wome

total o

given

Kashi

Fukus

semin

A boo

City to

the Ka

resista

May 2

comm

al since of the

ctural Council

Nucl

in the Niiga

umber of pe

er is as follo

ulative total

eople (cumu

der to enable

wazaki-Kar

the power s

ours of the p

ipants: 1,81

ai Talk Salo

i Salon Ki-n

en in the siti

of 4 times, 8

of the safet

wazaki-Kar

shima Nucle

nars given.

oth was set u

o directly ex

ashiwazaki-

ance issue (A

29, TEPCO

munity reside

e Fukushima

l on Ensuring

lear Power Sta

ata Area

eople that to

ows: from N

: 41,96718 p

ulative total

e people to

riwa, Golde

stations PR

power statio

12).

ons” have b

na-se, and E

ing commun

85 participa

ty measures

riwa NPS b

ear Acciden

up inside co

xplain to th

-Kariwa ma

April 22-28

employees

ents in Kash

Nuclear Acc

the Safety of

ations

oured the po

Niigata Prefe

people); Ka

l: 16,012 pe

become mo

en Week eve

facility) fro

on were give

been opened

Energy Hall

nity and hea

nts). At thes

s being impl

ased upon t

nt, opinions

ommercial f

he communi

ain anti-earth

8, number o

have been

hiwazaki Ci

cident

Decommissio

ower station

ecture: 1,42

ashiwazaki-

eople).

ore familiar

ents were he

om May 3 th

en (total num

d at Service

to engage p

ar their opin

se salons, ex

lemented at

the lessons l

are exchang

facilities in K

ty residents

hquake buil

f visitors: 1

visiting the

ity and Kari

oning of Fuku

n during the

23 people

-Kariwa reg

with

eld at Servic

hrough May

mber of tou

Hall, TEPC

primarily

nions (held

xplanations

t the

learned from

ged, and cu

Kashiwazak

s the details

lding seism

44). Also, s

e homes of

iwa Village

shima

e first

gion:

ce

y 7,

ur

CO

a

s are

m the

ultural

ki

of

mic

since

e for

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establ

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tunity to dir

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the power s

g informatio

Fukushima

dent Ishizak

mmissioning

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mmissioning

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ki and Fukus

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the status of

eadquarters

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ki also made

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rmination to

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evitalization H

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minated wa

kushima Re

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nt of the Fu

so attended

o continue t

hima recove

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President Ishiz

nce held at N

dent Kimura

dquarters in

visits prese

gue with resi

ti-earthquak

well as the

rences by m

italization H

chi Deconta

ny (FDEC)

at the end o

at the Fukus

n the status

ter counterm

evitalization

n conjunctio

ukushima Re

the press co

to fulfill the

er under new

ters President

Mr. Okura; Ri

aki)

Niigata Hea

a explained i

n conjunctio

ent us an

idents,

ke building i

eir opinions

management

Headquarter

amination &

President

of each mon

shima

of progress

measures at

n Headquart

on with his

evitalization

onference a

e organizatio

w managem

t Ishizaki

ight: Fukushim

adquarters,

initiatives to

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any while p

oving comm

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arters presiden

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g social med

ontinue to u

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shima Daiic

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nicator comme from overs

ough May 6,

esident Ishid

visited the U

ns with expe

TEPCO and

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ce commen

rmation and

this, they e

TEPCO is m

he communi

n with the lo

to also rece

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hanging opini

mation over

ct that Kore

m eight prefe

rters from b

ries on the i

chi and the

ntrations tha

zaki-Kariwa

mentaries (fseas

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da and Head

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erts in comm

d the recove

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d engage in

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cation in wh

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ive advice i

mation and e

ions with Harv

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ectures, inclu

branches of K

impermeabl

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first quarter

a Revitaliza

d of Social C

es to give pr

munications

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a panel disc

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direct dialo

opinions abo

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nities. Presi

in regards to

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tly prohibiti

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erforms (Ju

provements

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resentations

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n Fukushim

cussion. Ma

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♦ Internal Communication

Sharing nuclear power-related information through utilization of

internal media and trainings

In conjunction with his replacement, Nuclear Power & Plant

Siting Division General Manager Anegawa posted a message on

the company’s intranet entitled, “A Look Back at the Nuclear

Safety Reform Plan and a Message to All Employees” on May 18.

GM Anegawa expressed his gratitude for the progress with the

reform plan that has been made over the last four years and urged

everyone to reaffirm the importance of moving steadily forward

with reforms. GM Anegawa’s successor, Nuclear Power & Plant

Siting Division General Manager Makino, will continue in this

role and send out messages to employees in the future.

On June 27, a video of the briefing given to employees on the

nuclear management model, which was created on June 13, was

posted on the company’s intranet.

Videos that explain to employees what type of media coverage

TEPCO is getting and the status of reactor decommissioning work

have also been posted (first quarter: four videos).

Since April, digital signs have been used to air media stories

related to TEPCO and convey information about the siting

community in a timely manner to everyone in the company.

Articles on the status of reactor decommissioning at Fukushima

Daiichi have also been included in the TEPCO Group newsletter.

The third article focused on the work environment improvements

that have been made in conjunction with enlargement of the area

in which workers can wear normal work clothes (issued on May

30).

Risk communicators are giving briefings to group companies. On

June 19, a study session was offered for approximately 30 TEPCO

Fuel & Power managers and site superintendents on Fukushima

Daiichi reactor decommissioning and nuclear preparedness. Going

forward, the details of these study sessions will be further

developed based upon the results of questionnaires distributed to

participants and of the needs of group companies.

2.6 Measure 5 ENHANCEMENT OF POWER STATION AND HEAD OFFICE

EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITIES

(1) Enhancement of Power Station and Head Office Emergency Response

(Organizational) Capabilities

♦ Implementing Improvements Based upon the Mid- to Long-Term Plan

In April, the Mid- to Long-Term Plan was revised based upon the results of

training implemented last fiscal year and an assessment of basic plan.

Since it has been deemed that Fukushima Daini, Kashiwazaki-Kariwa and the

Head Office have almost achieved the emergency response capability goals of

the basic plan (STEP-1), the decision was made to move to STEP-2. In

accordance with the results of the assessment, the frequency of training shall be

increased based upon a plan that reorganizes environmental conditions, such as

unidentified hazards and initiators that should be predicted.

Since it has been deemed that the Fukushima Daiichi NPS has not achieved the

emergency response objectives of the basic plan (STEP-1), the current

objectives (STEP-1) will remain in place. In accordance with the results of risk

analysis, some parts of the basic plan will be revised and training will be

implemented on newly identified nuclear disaster events and troubles that have

a large social impact.

In order to further improve our emergency response capability, we shall analyze

the gaps between our current state of skill and our objectives as we aim to

become an organization that has the world’s highest level of emergency

response capability.

♦ Training at Power Stations and the Head Office

In order to improve the ability of the organization to engage in an emergency

response in the event of an emergency, individual training and general training

sessions are being repeatedly implemented.

Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Since the number of training scenarios up to now has been insufficient,

during the first quarter a new scenario deliberation team was formed and

comprehensive training scenarios for nuclear disaster risks and troubles that

have a large social impact were created. Starting in the second quarter

general training sessions will be implemented based upon the revised

Mid-to Long-Term Plan.

Fukushima Daini NPS

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♦ Introduction of a Human Resource Development Management System

In order to manage the data that will be the foundation for long-term human

resource development we have introduced a new nuclear human resource

development management system for recording the results of education and

training and managing the certifications and skills of individuals. The system

was put into use in April after setting system functions and preparing data.

♦Middle management training

Since FY2015, TEPCO has been providing training for middle managers from

the standpoint that middle-managers need to be aware of, and have the ability to,

thoroughly fulfill their responsibilities jointly with nuclear power leaders while

remaining sufficiently aware of their own responsibilities to nuclear safety.

Group manager training

During the first quarter, a follow-up was performed for the action plan created

by group managers and shift supervisors that took part in training last fiscal

year (total: 178 people). Group manager training for this fiscal year will be held

during the second quarter.

Power station manager training

During the first quarter, follow-ups were performed for the action plans created

by the new department managers (15) and department managers that underwent

second and third-year department manager training (25 managers) last fiscal

year. Department manager training for this fiscal year will be held during the

second quarter just like group manager training.

♦ Status of initiatives to improve in-house technological capability of power stations

(maintenance/operation field, etc.)

Maintenance personnel initiatives

Fukushima Daiichi NPS

We are continually implementing training to develop in-house technical

ability (training on the operation of power supply cars, temporary laying

and connecting of hoses, and training on the use of heavy equipment, etc.)

in order to improve the ability to respond to emergencies

Fuk

In o

repe

gen

repa

to a

to g

thro

will

to f

Drone pilo

kushima Da

order to imp

etitive train

nerator repla

air). In Apri

acquire new

give worker

ough daily t

l continue tr

flexibly deal

oting training

Pow

aini NPS

prove the ab

ning drills w

acement, ➂

il, the memb

w skills. In Ju

s an opportu

training and

raining to d

l with a var

wer supply car

bility to resp

with four tea

➂ temporary

bers of the t

une, we wil

unity to dis

d compare th

develop crea

riety of circu

r operation tra

pond to eme

ams (➀ debr

cable conn

training tea

ll hold a ski

play the ski

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umstances.

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ergencies w

ris removal/

necting, ④ c

ms were rot

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oval, road rep

we are condu

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so as to be a

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s by newly c

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kushima Da

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tified on the

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of the end o

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FY 2014. A

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of June, 25 o

2,629

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participating in

ve engaged

As of the end

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5,034

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field) (fill-r

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rate: 120%,

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upply cars h

ave been ce

32

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hing training

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ators is to a

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ment, etc.

has commen

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8,360

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wer supply tr

had been

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no increase

fied on the

e or decreas

acquire skill

ater treatmen

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he operation

ruck

erator

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e

l in

nt

2014.

n of

fire engines thereby meeting our 25-operator goal (80% of the 31 operators

in the field) (Fill-rate: 100%, increase of five operators from FY2016Q4),

and 31 operators had been certified on the operation of power supply cars

(fill-rate: 124%, increase of four operators over FY2016Q4).

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa

Fire engine and power supply car operation training commenced during

FY2013. As of the end of June, 111 operators have been certified on the

operation of fire engines thereby exceeding our 104-operator goal (80% of

the 130 operators in the field) (Fill-rate: 106%, decrease of five operators

from FY2016Q4), and 120 operators had been certified on the operation of

power supply cars (fill-rate: 115%, increase of seven operators over

FY2016Q4). During power supply car training, in addition to the normal

start-up of power supply cars, training was also implemented on manual

switching in the event of an intake exhaust damper malfunction. Efforts

have also been made to cultivate certified instructors within operator

training teams and as of the end of June, 158 instructors (increase of eight

operators from FY2016Q4) had been trained. Efforts are also being made to

improve the ability of not only maintenance personnel but also operators to

diagnose equipment troubles in conjunction with the increase in the number

of operators that has occurred in order to handle emergencies. These

operators have obtained internal certification on equipment diagnostics and

are now continually sampling data for approximately 140 pieces of rotating

equipment at Unit 7. This has led to an improvement in the abilities of field

workers, such as the acquisition of a wide variety of knowledge related to

equipment and also an increased interest in equipment status.

Initiatives to improve the in-house technical skill of operators (number of skill certifications)

Power Station

Fire Engine Power Supply Truck

Number of skill certifications

(compared with the last quarter)

Fill rate Number of skill certifications

(compared with the last quarter)

Fill rate

Fukushima Daiichi 41 people (0)

120% 41 people (0)

120%

Fukushima Daini 25 people (+5)

100% 31 people (+4)

124%

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 111 people (-5)

106% 120 people (+7)

115%

(2) Initiatives to Improve the Technological Capability of the Organization

♦ Deliberation of the Establishment of a Nuclear Engineering Center

By integrating the engineering functions of the Head Office and power stations

to create a Nuclear Engineering Center under the direct supervision of the

General Manager of the Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Division, we will be able

to take responsibility for engineering work required to design and maintain

plant functions thereby enabling us to make improvements.

The Main Roles of the Nuclear Engineering Center Design Establish a process for taking responsibility for the management of design by enhancing

the company’s ability to design as well as the ability to manage design work consigned to the companies

Plant Management

Enhance the process for managing plant systems and equipment and improve the reliability of equipment.

Procurement Guarantee a high level of reliability of procured items by ascertaining the skill of suppliers, and establishing a process for receiving and guaranteeing procured items

Nuclear safety Re-examine internal/external hazards and risks based upon the latest knowledge and establish a process for continually improving plant safety

Fuel management

Maximize the amount of energy that can be safely extracted from fuel, and handle the fuel and operate the plant so as not to damage fuel. Ensure that security measures for nuclear fuel material are in place.

♦ Cultivating system engineers

In order to promptly and safely stabilize a reactor when there is an emergency,

personnel need to quickly ascertain the circumstances of the accident and make

accurate decisions. Therefore, engineers are being trained to be proficient in

design, laws and regulations, standards, operation, maintenance and other areas

pertaining to facilities important for safety.

System engineers formulate system monitoring programs, which stipulate

monitoring targets and standards for monitoring system performance

degradation, in order to monitor whether or not primary plant systems are

fulfilling design requirements. These monitoring activities also serve to

identify areas in which reliability can be improved, which lead to overall

improvements.

During the first quarter, 18 systems subject to monitoring were continually

monitored and events that can impact system integrity were identified/assessed.

Through this process it was deemed that one of these systems must be carefully

watched20. Whereas the required flow rate for this system is being maintained,

flow rate can be reduced by the accumulation of sea creatures in the heat

converter heat transfer pipe, therefore it was decided to quickly formulate an

inspection plan while continuing monitoring.

20 Reactor auxiliary cooling seawater system

What we currently have five system engineers (Kashiwazaki-Kariwa). Going

forward, we shall implement education and training to expand the scope of

expertise of existing engineers and maintain their skills, while at the same time

making preparations to open the Nuclear Engineering Center in order to train

personnel and achieve our goal of having five system engineers for each

reactor.

♦ Enhancing configuration management

Configuration management is a process for maintaining the safety of the plant

and ensuring that power station equipment has been manufactured, installed,

and is being operated as designed. Deliberations continue on constructing a

systematic process for maintaining and managing a state in which design

requirements, actual equipment, and equipment schematics all match.

During the first quarter, a draft of the Design Guideline Creation and

Management Guide (tentative title) was written based upon the original draft of

the design guidelines written in FY2016 and the best practices of operators in

the United States. Since there are three types of design guidelines for ①

individual systems, ② individual structures/architectural structures, and ③

common specifications, the design guidelines will be written upon stipulating

the scope of application and priorities. A draft of the ③ common specifications

is being written using Core/Fuel Design as a pilot model.

In the course of deliberating configuration management processes, the

applicability of the processes is being examined by applying past cases to the

management procedures that were created last fiscal year. Furthermore, the

development of this system to operate these processes is underway and will be

introduced in conjunction with establishment of the Nuclear Engineering

Center.

♦ Handling revisions to the inspection system

In the United States, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's)

regulatory framework for reactor oversight (ROP21) is a risk-informed, tiered

approach to assessing seven cornerstones (CS22) that comprise reactor safety,

radiation safety, and safeguards, and three cross-cutting areas deeply related to

the cultivation of safety culture. If the results of monitoring and inspections

performed based upon this process reveal decreases in the performance of a

nuclear operator, additional inspections are conducted in accordance with

21 Reactor Oversight Process 22 Corner Stones

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2.8 KPI/PI Performance and Assessment

2.8.1 KPI/PI Performance

(1) KPI Performance (FY2017Q1)

KPI Target Performance Notes

Safety awareness

Safety awareness KPI (nuclear power leaders) 70 points 62.1 points

Safety awareness KPI (entire Nuclear Power Division)

70 points 60.7 points

Technological capability

Technological capability KPI (in times of normalcy) 100 points To be assessed

at the end of the

fiscal year

Technological capability KPI (in times of emergency)

100 points 97 points

Ability to promote dialogue Ability to promote dialogue KPI (internal) 70 points 65.3 points

Ability to promote dialogue KPI (external) Increase over last fiscal year

To be assessed

at the end of the

fiscal yea

(2) PI Performance (FY2017Q1)

PI Target Performance Notes

Safety awareness Nuclear power leaders

<Safety-1> Rate of implementation of retrospection leveraging the traits

100% 81.4%

<Safety-2> Number of times emails have been sent by nuclear power leaders in order to share information

At least once a week

11 times in 12

weeks (91.7%)

<Safety-3> number of times nuclear power leaders participate in preparedness training

At least twice a year

3 times

(46.2%)

<Safety-4> Number of times nuclear power leaders go into the field (to engage in management observation or exchange opinions with workers)

At least twice a month

1.8

times/month

<Safety-5> Number of benchmarked issues for which nuclear power leaders are responsible for putting into practice that have been put into practice

At least four a year

-

To be

measured from

Q2

Entire Nuclear Power Division

<Safety-6> Percentage of groups that discuss the results of trait retrospection

100% 85.5%

<Safety-7> percentage of messages from nuclear power leaders that are read immediately

At least 80% 75.1%

<Safety-8> Number of times managers engage in management observation

Target values to be

set by the

1F: 0.84 times

2F: 4.03 times

No. of times per

person per month

PI Target Performance Notes department KK: 3.96

times

Head Office:

0.20 times

<Safety-9> Good MO rate (Percentage of reports that include things that PICO has pointed out as being good MO from MO results)

At least 50%

-

To be

measured from

Q2

<Safety-10> Percentage of corrective measures completed before deadline

100%

1F: 37%

2F: 33%

KK: 61%

Head Office:

60%

<Safety-11> Number of recurring GII or higher nonconformances

0

1F: 5

2F: 0

KK: 0

Head Office: 0

Numbers for 2F

are as of the end

of May

Technological capability During times of normalcy

<Engineering-1> Number of skilled workers trained in the Operations Department

At least 100% of

the number required

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-2> Number of skilled workers trained in the Maintenance Department

At least 100% of

the number required

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-3> Number of skilled workers trained in the Engineering Department

At least 100% of

the number required

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-4> Number of skilled workers trained in the Radiation and Chemistry Department

At least 100% of

the number required

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-5> Number of skilled workers trained in the Fuel Department

At least 100% of

the number required

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-6> Number of skilled workers trained in the Safety Department

At least 100% of

the number required

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-7> Number of personnel that have external certifications such as Licensed Reactor Engineer (LRE), Class 1 Chief Radiation Handler, Engineer (Nuclear and Radiation Dept.), etc.

Training objective

achievement rate:

100%

To be assessed

at the end of

the fiscal year

<Engineering-8> Participation rate in important OE training

At least 60% of

managers

1F: 29%

2F: 46%

KK: 63%

Head Office:

22%

<Engineering-9> View rate of newly arrived OE information

At least 75% 73%

During times of emergency

<Engineering-10> Number of emergency response personnel certified in-house on the operation of fire engines, power supply cars, cable connections, radiation surveys, wheel loaders, and unic trucks

At least 120% of

the necessary

number at each

power station

120%*

PI Target Performance Notes

<Engineering-11> Percentage of “A” assessments given during emergency response training

At least 80%

75.5% 1F: 72.2%

(7/11)

2F: 76.9% (10/13)

KK: 76.9%

(10/13)

Ability to promote dialogue Internal

<Dialogue-1> Percentage of employees that feel that messages from nuclear power leaders are “helpful”

At least 50% 21.6%

<Dialogue-2> Response rate to questionnaire on the information conveyed by nuclear power leaders

At least 70% 39.7%

Previously 35%

<Dialogue-3> Degree of understanding of information conveyed by nuclear power leaders

At least 2.5 points 2.4 points Previously 2.4

points

External

<Dialogue-4> Quality/quantity of disseminated information, questionnaire results

Increase over last

fiscal year

To be assessed

by the end of

the fiscal year

<Dialogue-5> Stance on, awareness of, public relations and public hearing

Increase over last

fiscal year

To be assessed

by the end of

the fiscal year

*Required numbers are being reexamined in light of the discrepancies between 1F, 2F

and KK, and are therefore not included.

2.8.2 KPI/PI Assessment

Starting this fiscal year, nuclear safety reform KPI and PI values will be set and

measured using the management indicators for each field of the Nuclear Power Division

management model. Going forward, the trends of each KPI and PI will be monitored.

During the assessment KPIs and PIs to date, KPIs and PIs have not only been assessed

as being high or low, but also:

- If they are high (target achieved), then our aim is to make them even higher.

- If they are low (target not achieved), then we analyze the causes and make

improvements.

- In both cases, we also assess whether or not the KPI or PI is effective in measuring the

degree to which nuclear safety reforms have been brought to fruition.

In addition, more effective improvement activities will be implemented, and KPIs and

PIs reassessed and target values increased as necessary.

3. Status of Initiatives to Handle the Main Anti-Earthquake Problem

As result of TEPCO’s failure to give adequate explanations and prepare sufficient

inspection documents concerning the seismic resistance of the main anti-earthquake

building during the course of New Regulatory Requirement compliance inspections for

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Units 6/7, we not only threw the inspections into a state of

confusion but also caused concern amongst the residents of Niigata Prefecture and

society as a whole.

TEPCO has investigated the causes of this problem, formulated countermeasures, and

given reports to Niigata Prefecture (April 19) and at the 451st inspection meeting

(March 9). The following is an update on the status23 of each countermeasure.

3.1 Accelerating Nuclear Safety Reforms

Enhancing corporate governance

In order to enhance corporate governance, we created a management model in

June that includes a management model diagram and also gives the objectives,

important success factors, and the achievement level indicators for each

structural element. This management model will be further leveraged in

departments by using it to revise work plans.

A fundamentals pamphlet has been created and distributed to all employees of

the Nuclear Power Division. This fundamentals pamphlet is being referenced

when engaging in management observation and giving instructions to

subordinates.

Human resource development

We currently have five system engineers that continually monitor 18 systems.

Going forward, we shall implement education and training to expand the scope

of expertise of existing engineers and maintain their skills, while at the same

time making preparations to open the Nuclear Engineering Center in order to

train personnel and achieve our goal of having five system engineers for each

reactor.

23 Out of the countermeasures reported on during the 451st inspection meeting, those countermeasures with immediate impact (establishment of a regulatory response improvement team, assignment of project supervisors, etc.) have already been completed.

Establishment of the Nuclear Engineering Center

We are planning the establishment of a Nuclear Engineering Center.

Deliberations on the development of existing training programs and the

creation of new programs has commenced with a focus on plant engineering

and design engineering.

Strengthening configuration management

Drafting of the Design Guideline Creation and Management Guide (tentative

title) was written based upon the original draft of the design guidelines (①

individual systems, ② individual structures/architectural structures, and ③

common specifications) written in FY2016 and the best practices of operators

in the United States.

In the course of deliberating configuration management processes, the

applicability of the management procedures created in FY2016 is being

examined and development of this system to operate these processes that will

be introduced in conjunction with establishment of the Nuclear Engineering

Center, is underway.

Establishment of internal communications teams

Internal communications teams have been formed that the Head Office and at

each power station. Each department team has shared information on the

reasons for and the intentions of establishing these teams, such as the main

anti-earthquake building problem, and has discussed problems faced by each

department related to internal communication. As a result, common issues,

such as the fact that information that traverses different departments and

positions is not being accurately shared, and that employees have a tendency to

not be concerned with work underway outside of their department, were

identified and improvements are being made.

3.2 Improvement Measures to Respond to the Concerns Expressed by Residents of

Niigata Prefecture

[Improvement measure ①] Sharing of information between Head Office inspection

handling departments and communications departments (utilization of the newly

established inspection plan review meetings)

Since March 17, communications departments have participated in the daily

inspection plan review meetings and inspection information sharing meetings

held by the Head Office inspection handling departments in an ongoing effort

to share information without delay.

[Improvement measure ②] Implementation of Public Hearing Activities at the Niigata

Headquarters by Nuclear Power Division Executives

In order to directly hear the concerns of the local community in regards to

nuclear power and restore faith in TEPCO, since July, Nuclear Power Division

managers have started participating in initiatives to visit homes in Kashiwazaki

City and Kariwa Village, give explanations at communications booths set up at

various locations within Niigata Prefecture, visit residents to hear their

opinions, and participate in town hall meetings.

[Improvement measure ③] Reporting on communications initiatives related to

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa at town hall meetings

Reports on communications initiatives at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS are

given and opinions elicited at the town hall meetings held on the first

Wednesday of each month. At the town hall meeting held on July 5, a report

was given on improvements made to materials that explain the seismic

resistance of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa main anti-earthquake building, and

earthquake faults under the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site to the residence of

Niigata Prefecture, local government officials and opinion holders.

[Improvement measure ④] Further Improvements to the Details of Explanations given

by TEPCO corporate communications (explaining events that have a social impact in

easy-to-understand and timely manner)

Parties handling inspections and corporate communications representatives

participate in daily inspection plan review meetings and inspection information

sharing meetings in order to identify those issues that may have a large social

impact and examine how to explain these issues in easy-to-understand and

timely manner.

In addition to giving a report to the mayor of Niigata Prefecture on our regrets

and the improvement measures that have been formulated in regards to the

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa main anti-earthquake building seismic resistance problem,

we also ran a formal apology in the newspaper (April 21) and issued a second

edition of the TEPCO News (newsletter distributed along with newspapers)

(April 28) in order to quickly notify the residents of Niigata Prefecture.

TEPCO has posted its opinion to the issues pointed out by the

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Active Fault Problem Review Committee

concerning earthquake faults under the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site on the

TEPCO website24 (May 29). In conjunction with this, a special edition of the

TEPCO News was also issued (June 20) in order to convey this information to

as many Niigata Prefecture residents as possible.

[Improvement measure ⑤] Continual awareness reforms using information disclosure

and communications problems that TEPCO has faced (for the Head Office Nuclear

Power Division, Niigata Division and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa)

Awareness reform training that uses incidents that have occurred at TEPCO in

the past related to information disclosure and communications, such as the

main anti-earthquake building problem, the drainage channel K problem, and

the core meltdown issue, is being planned. This training is planned to start

during the second quarter.

[Improvement measure ⑥] Enhancing communication between Niigata Prefecture,

Kashiwazaki City and Kariwa Village (giving status updates on inspections as

necessary/suitable)

In light of improvement measures ① and ④, weekly information sharing

meetings are being held between the Niigata headquarters and

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa in order to identify important issues and examine the

details of explanations given to the local government. Reports on the status

inspections are also given to the governments of the siting communities.

Furthermore, the Niigata Headquarters is also making preparations to develop a

framework for disclosing information in a proactive and unified manner.

24 http://www.tepco.co.jp/niigata/images/SIRYO_201705_01.pdf

Conclusion

During the first quarter of FY2017, we have seen the effects of the operation of

subdrains and the land-side impermeable wall (ice wall) at Fukushima Daiichi in the

form of a reduction in the amount of contaminated water generated to approximately 1/4

what it was. We have also moved forward with the removal of contaminants from, and

purification of, highly concentrated contaminated water that has accumulated in the Unit

1-4 turbine building thereby helping to reduce risks. On June 16, we were finally able to

submit the revised application to modify our installation permit in order to comply with

the New Regulatory Requirements for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS Units 6 and 7, which

we submitted in September 2013, after the application was reviewed at more than 140

inspection meetings. Continuing forward the revised application will be subject to

review and we will continue to carefully complete all procedures required.

On July 10, members of our new management team, such as Chairman Kawamura,

President Kobayakawa and Nuclear Power & Plant Siting Division General Manager

Makino, exchanged opinions with the Nuclear Regulation Authority. The Chairman and

members of the committee commented that, “we have not seen any independent

decision-making or prioritization when it comes to reducing risks associated with the

decommissioning of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.” Going forward we will continue to

provide written responses to the committee, and receive guidance through field

inspections and opinion exchanges. We will also make sure to give careful explanations

to the residents of the siting community in effort to regain trust and ensure that our

conviction to prioritize the local community does not falter.

Furthermore, in regards to the Nuclear Safety Reform Plan (Management Aspects),

TEPCO will continue to prioritize the strengthening of governance throughout the entire

organization and the development of human resources. It is also indispensable that we

work together with contractors to cultivate safety culture in order to further improve the

safety of our nuclear power stations. We will continue to develop communication by

reaching out (corporate visits) to and exchanging opinions with contractors in light of

the sheer diversity of contracting companies and contract workers.

Through our determination to, “Keep the Fukushima Nuclear Accident firmly in

mind; we should be safer today than we were yesterday, and safer tomorrow than

today; we call for nuclear power plant operations that keeps creating unparalleled

safety,” TEPCO will continue to advance nuclear safety reforms while subjecting our

organization to objective assessments by the Nuclear Reform Monitoring Committee.

We are more than happy to hear any comments or opinions you may have about these

reforms. Visit our website25 for more information.

End of Document

25 https://www4.tepco.co.jp/ep/support/voice/form.html