Mysticism_and_Logic_1000046570.pdf

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M A L

A O E


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MYSTICISM ANDLOGIC

AND OTHER ESSAYS

BY

BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S,

SECOND IMPRESSION

r1

LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO.39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDONFOURTH AVENUE 30TH STREET, NEW YORK

BOMBAY, CALCUTTA AND MADRAS1918

AU rights reserved


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PREFACE

THE following essays have been written and pub-ishedat various times, and my thanks are due to

the previous publishers for the permission to reprintthem.

The essay on Mysticism and Logic appeared in theHihhert Journal for July, 1914. The Place of Sciencein a Liberal Education appeared in two numbers ofThe New Statesman, May 24 and 31, 1913. ** The FreeMan's Worship and The Study of Mathematics were included in a former collection (now out of print),Philosophical Essays, also published by Messrs. Longmans,Green Co. Both were written in 1902 ; the first appearedoriginally in the Itidependent Review for 1903, the secondin the New Quarterly, November, 1907. In theoreticalEthics, the position advocated in '* The Free Man'sWorship is not quite identical with that which Ihold now : I feel less convinced than I did then of the

objectivity of good and evil. But the general attitudetowards life which is suggested in that essay still seemsto m.e, in the main, the one which must be adopted intimes of stress and difficulty by those who have nodogmatic religious beliefs, if inward defeat is to beavoided.

The essay on ** Mathematics and the Metaphysicians was written in 1901, and appeared in an American maga-ine,

The International Monthly, under the title ** RecentWork in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Some points


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vi MYSTICISM AND LOGIC

in this essay require modification in view of later work.These are indicated in footnotes. Its tone is partlyexplained by the fact that the editor begged me to makethe article as romantic as possible.

All the above essays are entirely popular, but thosethat follow are somewhat more technical. On ScientificMethod in Philosophy was the Herbert Spencer lectureat Oxford in 1914, and was pubhshed by the ClarendonPress, which has kindly allowed me to include it in thiscollection. ** The Ultimate Constituents of Matter

was an address to the Manchester Philosophical Society,,early in 1915, and was published in the Monist in Julyof that year. The essay on The Relation of Sense-datato Physics was written in January, 1914, and firstappeared in No. 4 of that year's volume of Scientia, anInternational Review of Scientific Synthesis, edited byM. Eugenio Rignano, pubhshed monthly by Messrs.Williams and Norgate, London, Nicola Zanichelli,Bologna, and F6hx Alcan, Paris. The essay On theNotion of Cause was the presidential address to theAristotelian Society in November, 1912, and was pub-ished

in their Proceedings for 1912-13. *' Knowledge byAcquaintance and Knowledge by Description was alsoa paper read before the Aristotelian Society, and pub-ished

in their Proceedings for 1910-11.London,

September, 19 17


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CONTENTS

CHKT. PAGB

^IJ Mysticism and Logic. . . .

i

11. The Place of Science in a Liberal Education 33

46

IV. The Stvdy of Mathematics.

V. Mathematics and the Metaphysicians

/ffi? A Free Man's Worship

fVl. On Scientific Method in Philosophy

VIL The Ultimate Constituents of Matter

VI IL The Relation of Sense-data to Physics

(ix. On the Notion of Cause

X. Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by

Description.

.. .

58

74

97

125

145

180

209


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MYSTICISM AND LOGICAND OTHER ESSAYS

MYSTICISM AND LOGIC

METAPHYSICS,r the attempt to conceive theworld as a whole by means of thought, has been

developed, from the first,by the union and conflict oftwo very different human impulses, the one urging mentowards mysticism, the other urging them towardsscience. Some men have achieved greatness throughone of these impulses alone, others through the otheralone : in Hume, for example, the scientific impulsereigns quite unchecked, while in Blake a strong hostilityto science co-exists with profound mystic insight. Butthe greatest men who have been philosophers have feltthe need both of science and of mysticism : the attemptto harmonise the two was what made their life,and whatalways piust, for all its arduous uncertainty, makephilosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than eitherscience or religion.

Before attempting an explicit characterisation of thescientific and the mystical impulses, I will illustratethem by examples from two philosophers whose great-ess

lies in the very intim_ate blending which theyachieved. The two philosophers I mean are Heraclitusand Plato.


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2 MYSTICISM AND LOGICHeraclitus, as every one knows, was a believer in

universal flux : time builds and destroys all things.From the few fragments that remain, it is not easy todiscover how he arrived at his opinions,but there aresome sayingsthat stronglysuggest scientificobservationas the source.

The thingsthat can be seen, heard, and learned, hesays, are what I prizethe most. This is the languageof the empiricist,o whom observation is the sole guaran-ee

of truth. The sun is new every day, is anotherfragment ; and this opinion,in spiteof its paradoxicalcharacter, is obviously inspiredby scientific reflection,and no doubt seemed to him to obviate the difficultyfunderstanding how the sun can work its way under-round

from west to east during the night. Actualobservation must also have suggested to him his centraldoctrine, that Fire is the one permanent substance, ofwhich all visible things are passing phases. In com-ustion

we see things change utterly,while their flameand heat rise up into the air and vanish.

'' This world, which is the same for all, he says, noone of gods or men has made ; but it was ever, is now,and ever shall be, an ever-livingFire, with measureskindling,and measures going out.

The transformations of Fire are, first of all,sea ; andhalf of the sea is earth, half whirlwind.

This theory, though no longer one which science canaccept, is nevertheless scientific in spirit.Science, too,might have inspiredthe famous saying to which Platoalludes : You cannot step twice into the same rivers ;for fresh waters are ever flowingin upon you. But wefind also another statement among the extant fragments : We step and do not step into the same rivers ; we arcand are not.


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 3The comparison of this statement, which is mystical,

with the one quoted by Plato, which is scientific,howshow intimately the two tendencies are blended in thesystem of Heraclitus. Mysticism is, in essence, littlemore than a certain intensityand depth of feelinginregard to what is believed about the universe ; and thiskind of feelingleads Heraclitus,on the basis of his science,to strangely poignant sayings concerning life and theworld, such as :

Time is a child playingdraughts,the kingly power isa child's.

It is poeticimagination, not science, which presentsTime as despoticlord of the world, with all the irrespon-ible

frivolityof a child. It is mysticism, too, whichleads Heraclitus to assert the identityof opposites: Good and illare one, he says ; and again : ** To Godall thingsare fair and good and right,but men hold somethingswrong and some right.

Much of mysticism underlies the ethics of Heraclitus.It is true that a scientific determinism alone might haveinspiredthe statement : Man's character is his fate ;but only a mystic would have said :

Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows ;and again :

*' It is hard to fightwith one's heart's desire. What-verit wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul ;

and again : Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by

which all things are steered through all things. ^Examples might be multiplied,ut those that have

been given are enough to show the character of the man :the facts of science, as they appeared to him, fed the

^ All the above quotations are from Burnet's Early Greek Philo-ophy.(2ud ed., 1908),pp. 146-156.


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4 MYSTICISM AND LOGICflame in his soul, and in its lighthe saw into the depthsof the world by the reflection of his own dancing swiftlypenetratingfire. In such a nature we see the true unionof the mystic and the man of science ^the highesteminence, as I think, that it is possibleto achieve in theworld of thought.

In Plato, the same twofold impulse exists,though themysticimpulse is distinctlyhe stronger of the two, andsecures ultimate victorywhenever the conflict is sharp.His descriptionof the cave is the classical statement ofbelief in a knowledge and realitytruer and more realthan that of the senses :

Imagine ^ a number of men livingin an undergroundcavernous chamber, with an entrance open to the light,extending along the entire length of the cavern, in whichthey have been confined,from their childhood, with theirlegsand necks so shackled that they are obliged to sitstill and look straightforwards, because their chainsrender it impossiblefor them to turn their heads round :and imagine a bright fire burning some way off,aboveand behind them, and an elevated roadway passingbetween the fire and the prisoners,ith a low wall builtalong it,like the screens which conjurorsput up in frontof their audience, and above which they exhibit theirwonders.

I have it,he replied.Also figureto yourselfa number of persons walkingbehind this wall, and carryingwith them statues of men,and images of other animals, wrought in wood and stoneand all kinds of materials, together with various otherarticles,which overtop the wall ; and, as you mightexpect, let some of the passers-bybe talking,and otherssilent.

1 Republic, 514, translated by Davies and Vaughan.


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 5You are describing a strange scene, and strange

prisoners.They resemble us, I replied.Now consider what would happen if the course of

nature brought them a release from their fetters,and aremedy for their foolishness, in the followingmanner.Let us suppose that one of them has been released, andcompelled suddenly to stand up, and turn his neck roundand walk with open eyes towards the light; and let ussuppose that he goes through all these actions with pain,and that the dazzlingsplendour renders him incapableofdiscerningthose objectsof which he used formerly to seethe shadows. What answer should you expect him tomake, if some one were to tell him that in those days hewas watching foolish phantoms, but that now he is some-hat

nearer to reality,nd is turned towards thingsmorereal, and sees more correctly; above all,if lie were topoint out to him the several objectsthat are passingby,and questionhim, and compel him to answer what theyare ? Should you not expect him to be puzzled,and toregardhis old visions as truer than the objectsnow forcedupon his notice ?

Yes, much truer. . . .Hence, I suppose, habit will be necessary to enable him

to perceiveobjectsin that upper world. At first he willbe most successful in distinguishinghadows ; then hewill discern the reflections of men and other things inwater, and afterwards the realities ; and after this he willraise his eyes to encounter the lightof the moon and stars,findingit less difficult to study the heavenly bodies andthe heaven itselfby night,than the sun and the sun*s lightby day.Doubtless.

Last of all,I imagine, he will be able to observe and


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6 MYSTICISM AND LOGICcontemplate the nature of the sun, not as it appears inwater or on aUen ground, but as it is in itselfin its ownterritory.

Of course.His next step will be to draw the conclusion,that the

sun is the author of the seasons and the years, and theguardianof allthingsin the visible world, and in a mannerthe cause of all those thingswhich he and his companionsused to see.Obviously,this will be his next step. . . .Now this imaginary case, my dear Glancon, you must

apply in all its parts to our former statements, by com-aringthe region which the eye reveals, to the prison

house, and the lightof the fire therein to the power of thesun : and if,by the upward ascent and the contemplationof the upper world, you luiderstand the mounting of thesoul into the intellectual region,you will hit the tendencyof my own surmises,since you desire to be told what theyare ; though, indeed, God only knows whether they arecorrect. But, be that as it may, the view which I take ofthe subjectis to the followingeffect. In the world ofknowledge,the essential Form of Good is the limit of ourenquiries,and can barely be perceived; but, whenperceived,we cannot help concluding that it is in everycase the source of all that is brightand beautiful, ^inthevisible world giving birth to lightand its master, and inthe intellectual world dispensing,mmediately and withfull authority,truth and reason ; ^and that whosoeverwould act wisely,either in privateor in public,must setthis Form of Good before his eyes.

But in this passage, as throughout most of Plato'steaching,there is an identification of the good with thetrulyreal, which became embodied in the philosophical


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 7tradition,and is stilllargelyoperativein our own day.In thus allowinga legislativeunction to the good, Platoproduced a divorce between philosophy and science,from which, in my opinion,both have suffered ever sinceand are stillsuffering.The man of science, whatever hishopes may be, must lay them aside while he studiesnature ; and the philosopher,if he is to achieve truthmust do the same. Ethical considerations can onlylegitimatelyppear when the truth has been ascertained :they can and should appear as determining our feehngtowards the truth, and our manner of ordering our livesin view of the truth, but not as themselves dictatingwhatthe truth is to be.

There are passages in Plato among those which illus-ratethe scientific side of his mind ^where he seemsclearlyware of this. The most noteworthy is the one

in which Socrates, as a young man, is explainingthetheory of ideas to Parmenides.

After Socrates has explainedthat there is an idea ofthe good, but not of such things as hair and mud anddirt, Parmenides advises him not to despiseeven themeanest things, and this advice shows the genuinescientific temper. It is with this impartialtemper thatthe mystic'sapparent insightinto a higherrealityand ahidden good has to be combined if philosophyis to realiseits greatest possibilities.nd it is failure in this respectthat has made so much of idealistic philosophy thin,lifeless,nd insubstantial. It is only in marriage withthe world that our ideals can bear fruit : divorced fromit,they remain barren. But marriage with the world isnot to be achieved by an ideal which shrinks from fact,or demands in advance that the world shall conform toits desires.

Parmenides himself is the source of a peculiarly


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8 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC

interestingstrain of mysticism which pervades Plato'sthought the mysticism which may be called logicalbecause it is embodied in theories on logic. This form ofmysticism,which appears, so far as the West is con-erned,

to have originatedwith Parmenides, dominatesthe reasoningsof all the great mystical metaphysiciansfrom his day to that of Hegel and his modem disciples.Reality,e says, is uncreated, indestructible,unchanging,indivisible ; it is '' immovable in the bonds of mightychains, without beginningand without end ; since cominginto being and passingaway have been driven afar, andtrue belief has cast them away. The fundamentalprincipleof his inquiry is stated in a sentence whichwould not be out of place in Hegel : Thou canst notknow w^hat is not ^that is impossible ^nor utter it ; forit is the same thingthat can be thought and that can be.And again : It needs must be that what can be thoughtand spoken of is ; for it is possiblefor it to be, and it isnot possiblefor what is nothing to be. The impossi-ility

of change follows from this principle for what ispast can be spoken of, and therefore, by the principle,stillis.

Mysticalphilosophy,n all ages and in ail parts of tlieworld, is characterised by certain beliefs which are illus-rated

by the doctrines we have been considering.There is,first,the belief in insightas against discur-ive

analyticknowledge : the behef in a way of wisdom,sudden, penetrating,coercive, which is contrasted withthe slow and fallible study of outward appearance by ascience relyingwholly upon the senses. All who arecapable of absorption in an inward passion must haveexperienced at times the strange feelingof unrealityincommon objects,the loss of contact with dailythings,inwhich the soHdityof the outer world is lost,and the soul


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 9seems, in utter loneliness,to bring forth, out of its owndepths,the mad dance of fantastic phantoms which havehitherto appeared as independently real and living.This is the negative side of the mystic'sinitiation : thedoubt concerning common knowledge, preparingthe wayfor the receptionof what seems a higher wisdom. Manymen to whom this negativeexperienceis familiar do notpass beyond it,but for the mystic it is merely the gatewayto an ampler world.

The mystic insightbegins with the sense of a mysteryunveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenly becomecertain beyond the possibilityf a doubt. The sense ofcertaintyand revelation comes earlier than any definitebelief. The definite beliefs at which mystics arrive arethe result of reflection upon the inarticulate experiencegaiiiedin the moment of insight. Often, beUefs whic^ihave no real connection with this moment become subse-uently

attracted into the central nucleus ; thus in addi-ionto the convictions which all mystics share, we find,

in many of them, other convictions of a more local andtemporary character, which no doubt become amalga-ated

with what was essentiallymystical in virtue oftheir subjectivecertainty.We may ignoresuch inessentialaccretions,and confine ourselves to the beliefs which allmysticsshare.

The first and most direct outcome of the moHicnt ofillumination is belief in the possibilityf a Wciy of know-edge

which may be called revelation or insightor in-uition,as contrasted with sense, reason, and analysis,

which are regarded as blind guidesleadingto +I*u morassof illusion. Closely connected with this beV'v.1 is theconception of a Reality behind the world u appearanceand utterlydifferent from it. This Reality is regardedwith an admiration often amounting to worship ; it is


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lo MYSTICISM AND LOGICfelt to be always and everywhere close at hand, thinlyveiled by the shows of sense, ready, for the receptivemind, to shine in its glory ev^n through the apparentfollyand wickedness of Man. The poet, the artist,andthe lover are seekers after that glory : the hauntingbeauty that they pursue is the faint reflection of its sun.But the mystic lives in the full lightof the vision : whatothers dimly seek he knows, with a knowledge besidewhich all other knowledge is ignorance.

The second characteristic of mysticism is its belief inunity,and its refusal to admit oppositionor divisionanywhere. We found Heraclitus saying good and illare one ; and again he says, the way up and the waydown is one and the same. The same attitude appearsin the simultaneous assertion of contradictory pro-ositionsuch as : We step and do not step into thesame rivers ; we are and are not. The assertion of Par-menides, that realityis one and indivisible,omes fromthe same impulse towards unity. In Plato, this impulseis less prominent, being held in check by his theory ofideas ; but it reappears, so far as his logicpermits,in thedoctrine of the primacy of the Good.

A third mark of almost all mysticalmetaphysicsis the' denial of the realityf Time. This is an outcome of the

denial of division ; if all is one, the distinction of pastand future must be illusory. We have seen this doctrineprominent in Parmenides ; and among moderns it isfundamental in the systems of Spinoza and Hegel.

The last of the doctrines of mysticism which we haveto consider is its belief that all evil is mere appearance,an illusion produced by the divisions and oppositionsofthe analyticintellect. Mysticismdoes not maintain thatsuch things as cruelty,for example, are good, but itdenies that they are real : they belong to that lower


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC nworld of phantoms from which we are to be liberated bythe insightof the vision. Sometimes for example inHegel,and at least verballyin Spinoza not only evil,but good also,is regarded as illusory,hough neverthelessthe emotional attitude towards what is held to be Realityis such as would naturallybe associated with the beliefthat Realityis good. What is, in all cases, ethicallycharacteristic of mysticism is absence of indignationrprotest, acceptance with joy, disbelief in the ultimatetruth of the division into two hostile camps, the good andthe bad. This attitude is a direct outcome of the natureof the mystical experience: with its sense of unity isassociated a feehng of infinite peace. Indeed it may besuspected that the feelingof peace produces, as feelingsdo in dreams, the whole system of associated beliefswhich make up the body of mystic doctrine. But this isa difficultquestion,and one on which it cannot be hopedthat mankind will reach agreement.

Four questionsthus arise in consideringthe truth orfalsehood of mysticism,namely :

I. Are there two ways of knowing, which may be calledrespectivelyeason and intuition ? And if so, is either tobe preferredto the other ?

II. Is all pluralityand division illusoryIII. Is time unreal ?IV. What kind of realitybelongs to good and evil ?On all four of these questions,while fullydeveloped

mysticism seems to me mistaken, I yet believe that, bysufficient restraint,there is an element of wisdom to belearned from the mysticalway of feeling,hich does notseem to be attainable in any other manner. If this is thetruth, mysticism is to be commended as an attitudetowards life,not'as'a creedTaBout'tBe ^^^ Tlie ineta-


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physicalcreed, I shall maintain, is a mistaken outcomeof the emotion, although this emotion, as colouringandinformingall other thoughts and feelings,s the inspirerof whatever is best in Man. Even the cautious andpatient investigationof truth by science, which seemsthe very antithesis of the mystic'sswift certainty,maybe fostered and nourished by tliat very spiritf reverencein which mysticismlives and moves.

I. REASON AND INTUITION ^

Of the realityr unrealityof the mystic'sworld I knownothing. I have no wish to deny it,nor even to declarethat the insightwhich reveals it is not a genuine insight.What I do wish to maintain and it is here that thescientific attitude becomes imperative is that insight,untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee oftruth, in spiteof the fact that much of the most importanttruth is first suggested by its means. It is common tospeak of an oppositionbetween instinct and reason ; inthe eighteenthcentury, the oppositionwas drawn infavour of reason, but under the influence of Rousseau andthe romantic movement instinct was given the preference,first by those who rebelled against artificial forms ofgovernment and thought, and then, as the purelyrationalistic defence of traditional tlieology becameincreasinglyifficult,by all who felt in science a menaceto creeds which they associated with a spiritualutlookon life and the world. Bergson, under the name ofintuition, has raised instinct to the positionof sole

1 This section, and also one or two pages in later sections, have beenprinted in a course of Lowell lectures On our knowledge of the externalworld, published by the Open Court Publishing Company. But I haveleft ti^em here, as this is the context for which they were originallywritten.


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 13arbiter of metaphysicaltruth. But in fact the opposi-ion

of instinct and reason is mainly illusory.Instinct,intuition, or insightis what first leads to the beliefswhich subsequent reason confirms or confutes ; but theconfirmation, where it is possible,onsists, in the lastanalysis,of agreement with other behefs no less in-tinctive

Reason is a harmonising, controUing forcerather than a creative one. Even in the most purelylogicalrealm, it is insightthat first amves at what isnew.

Where instinct and reason do sometimes conflict is inregard to singlebeliefs,held instinctively,nd held \\ithsuch determination that no degree of inconhistenc^ ithother beliefs leads to their abandonment. Instinct, likeall human faculties,is liable to error. Those in whomreason is weak are often unwilling to admit this asregards themselves, though all admit it in regard toothers. Where instinct is least liable to error is inpracticalatters as to which rightjudgment is a help tosurvival : friendshipand hostilityn others, for instance,are often felt with extraordinarydiscrimination throughvery careful disguises.But even in such matters a wrongimpressionmay be given by reserve or flattery and inmatters less directlypractical,uch as philosophy dealswith, very strong instinctive beliefs are sometimes whollymistaken, as we may come to know through their per-eived

inconsistencywith other equally strong beliefs.It is such considerations that necessitate the harmonisingmediation of reason, which tests our behefs by theirmutual compatibility,and examines, in doubtful cases,the possiblesources of error on the one side and on theother. In this there is no opposition to instinct as awhole, but only to Wind reliance upon some one interest-ng

aspect of instinct to the exclusion of other more


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14 MYSTICISM AND LOGICcommonplace but not less trustworthy aspects. It issuch one-sidedness, not instinct itself,hat reason aimsat correcting.

These more or less trite maxims may be illustrated byapplicationto Bergson's advocacy of intuition asagainst intellect. There are, he says, two profoundlydifferent ways of knowing a thing. The firstimphes thatwe move round the object: the second that we enterinto it. The first depends on the point of view at whichwe are placed and on the symbols by which we expressourselves. The second neither depends on a point ofview nor rehes on any symbol. The fii'stkind of knowledgemay be said -to stop at the relative ; the second, in thosecases where it is possible,o attain the absolute. Thesecond of these, which is intuition,is,he says,

*'

the kindof intellectual sympathy by which one places oneselfwithin an objectin order to coincide with what is uniquein it and therefore inexpressible (p.6). In illustration,he mentions self-knowledge: there is one reality,tleast, which we all seize from within, by intuition andnot by simple analysis.It is our own personalityn itsflowing through time our self which endures (p.8).The rest of Bergson's philosophy consists in reporting,through the imperfect medium of words, the knowledgegained by intuition, and the consequent complete con-emnation

of all the pretended knowledge derived fromscience and common sense.

This procedure, since it takes sides in a conflict ofinstinctive beliefs,stands in need of justificationyproving the greater trustworthiness of the beliefs on oneside than of those on the other. Bergson attempts thisjustificationn two ways, firstby explainingthat intellectis a purely practicalfacultyto secure biologicaluccess,

^ Introduction to Metaphysics, p. i.


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 15

secondlyby mentioning remarkable feats of instinct inanimals and by pointingout characteristics of the worldwhich, though intuition can apprehend them, arebafflingo intellect as he interpretsit.

Of Bergson'stheory that intellect is a purely practicalfaculty,developed in the strugglefor survival, and not asource of true beliefs,e may say, first,that it is onlythrough intellect that we know of the strugglefor sur-ival

and of the biologicalncestry of man : if the intel-ectismisleading,the whole of this merelyinferred history

is presumably untrue. If,on the other hand, we agreewith him in thinkingthat evolution took placeas Darwinbelieved, then it is not only intellect,ut all our faculties,that have been developed under the stress of practicalutility.Intuition is seen at its best where it is directlyuseful,for example in regard to other people'scharactersand dispositions.Bergson apparentlyholds that capacity,for this kind of knowledge is less explicableby thestrugglefor existence than, for example, capacity forpure mathematics. Yet the savage deceived by falsefriendships hkely to pay for his mistake with his hfe ;whereas even in the most civilised societies men are notput to death for mathematical incompetence. All themost strikingof his instances of intuition in animals havea very direct survival value. The fact is,of course, thatboth intuition and intellect have been developed becausethey are useful,and that, speaking broadly,they are use-ul

when they give truth and become harmful when theygive falsehood. Intellect,in civilised man, like artisticcapacity,has occasionallyeen developed beyond thepointwhere it is useful to the individual ; intuition,onthe other hand, seems on the whole to diminish ascivilisation increases. It is greater,as a rule, in childrenthan in adults,in the uneducated than in the educated.


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Probably in dogs it exceeds anything to be found inhuman beings. But those who see in these facts a recom-endation

of intuition ought to return to running wildin the woods, dyeing themselves with woad and livingon hipsand haws.

Let us next examine whether intuition possesses anysuch infallibilitys Bergson claims for it. The bestinstance of it,according to him, is our acquaintance withourselves ; yet self-knowledgeis proverbiallyrare anddifficult. Most men, for example, have in their naturemeannesses, vanities,and envies of which they are quiteunconscious, though even their best friends can perceivethem without any difficulty.t is true that intuition hasa convincingnesswhich is lackingto intellect : while it ispresent, it is almost impossibleto doubt its truth. Butif it should appear, on examination, to be at least asfallible as intellect,its greater subjectivecertaintybe-omes

a demerit, making it only the more irresistiblydeceptive. Apart from self-knowledge,ne of the mostnotable examples of intuition is the knowledge peoplebelieve themselves to possess of those with whom theyare in love : the wall between different personalitiesseems to become transparent, and people think they seeinto another soul as into their own. Yet deception insuch cases is constantlypractisedwith success ; and evenwhere there is no intentional deception, experiencegradually proves, as a rule, that the supposed insightwas illusory,nd that the slower more groping methodsof the intellect are in the long run more reliable.Bergson maintains that intellect can only deal with

thingsin so far as they resemble what has been experi-ncedin the past, while intuition has the power of appre-ending

the uniqueness and novelty that always belongto each fresh moment. That there is something unique


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 17and new at every moment, iscertainlyrue ; itisalso truethat this cannot be fullyexpressed by means of intel-ectual

concepts. Only direct acquaintance can giveknowledge of what is unique and new. But direct ac-uaintance

of this kind is given fullyin sensation, anddoes not require,so far as I can see, any specialfacultyof intuition for its apprehension. It is neither intellectnor intuition, but sensation, that suppliesnew data ;but when the data are new in any remarkable manner,intellect is much more capable of dealingwith them thanintuition would be. The hen with a brood of ducklingsno doubt has intuition which seems to placeher insidethem, and not merely to know them analytically butwhen the ducklingstake to the water, the whole apparentintuition is seen to be illusory,nd the hen is left helplesson the shore. Intuition,in fact,is an aspect and develop-ent

of instinct,and, like all instinct, is admirable inthose customary surroundings which have moulded thehabits of the animal in question,but totallyincompetentas soon as the surroundings are changed in a way whichdemands some non-habitual mode of action.

The theoretical understanding of the world, which isthe aim of philosophy,is not a matter of great practicalimportance to animals, or to savages, or even to mostcivilised men. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore,that the rapid,rough and ready methods of instinct orintuition will find in this field a favourable ground fortheir application.It is the older kinds of activity,hichbring out our kinshipwith remote generationsof animaland semi-human ancestors, that show intuition at itsbest. In such matters as self-preservationnd love,intuition \vdllact sometimes (though not always) with aswiftness and precisionwhich are astonishingto thecritical intellect. But philosophy is not one of the


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i8 MYSTICISM AND LOGICpursuitswhich illustrate our affinityith the past : it isa highlyrefined,highly civilised pursuit,demanding, forits success, a certain liberation from the lifeof instinct,and even, at times, a certain aloofness from all mundanehopes and fears. It is not in philosophy,therefore, thatwe can hope to see intuition at its best. On the contrary,since the true objectsof philosophy,and the habit ofthought demanded for their apprehension, are strange,unusual, and remote, it is here, more almost than any-here

else, that intellect proves superior to intuition,and that quick unanalysed convictions are least deservingof uncritical acceptance.

In advocating the scientific restraint and balance, asagainst the self-assertion of a confident reliance uponintuition,e are onlyurging,in the sphere of knowledge,that largenessof contemplation,that impersonal dis-ntereste

and that freedom from practicalpre-ccupatiowhich have been inculcated by all the great

religionsf the world. Thus our conclusion,however itmay conflict with the expliciteliefs of many mystics,is,in essence, not contrary to the spirithich inspiresthosebeliefs,but rather the outcome of this very spiritsappliedin the realm of thought.

II. UNITY AND PLURALITY

One of the most convincingaspects of the mysticillumination is the apparent revelation of the oneness ofall things,giving rise to pantheism in religionand tomonism in philosophy. An elaborate logic,beginningwith Parmenides, and culminating in Hegel and hisfollowers, has been gradually developed, to prove thatthe universe is one indivisible Whole, and that whatseem to be its parts,if considered as substantial and self-


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 19existing,re mere illusion. The conception of a Realityquiteother than the world of appearance, a realityone,indivisible,and unchanging, was introduced into Westernphilosophy by Parmenides, not, nominally at least, formysticalor religiouseasons, but on the basis of a logicalargument as to the impossibilityf not-being,and mostsubsequent metaphysical systems are the outcome ofthis fundamental idea.

The logicused in defence of mysticism seems to befaultyas logic,and open to technical criticisms,which Ihave explained elsewhere. I shall not here repeat thesecriticisms,since they are lengthy and difficult,but shallinstead attempt an analysisof the state of mind fromwhich mysticallogichas arisen.

Belief in a realityquitedifferent from what appears tothe senses arises with irresistible force in certain moods,which are the source of most mysticism,and of mostmetaphysics. Wliile such a mood is dominant, the needof logicis not felt,and accordinglythe more thorough-oing

mystics do not employ logic,but appeal directlyto the immediate dehverance of their insight. But suchfullydeveloped mysticism is rare in the West. Wlienthe intensityof emotional conviction subsides, a manwho is in the habit of reasoning will search for logicalgrounds in favour of the belief which he finds in himself.But since the belief already exists,he will be very hos-itable

to any ground that suggests itself. The paradoxesapparently proved by his logicare reallythe paradoxesof mysticism,and are the goal which he feels his logicmust reach if it is to be in accordance with insight. Theresultinglogichas rendered most philosophersincapableof giving any account of the world of science and dailylife. If they had been anxious to give such an account,they would probablyhave discovered the errors of their


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logic; but most of them were less anxious to understandthe world of science and daily life than to convict it ofunrealityin the interests of a super-sensible* real world.

It is in this way that logichas been pursued by those ofthe great philosopherswho were mystics. But since theyusually took for granted the supposed insight of themystic emotion, their logicaldoctrines w^ere presentedwith a certain dryness, and were beUeved by their dis-iples

to be quiteindependent of the sudden illuminationfrom which they sprang. Nevertheless their originclungto them, and they remained ^to borrow a useful wordfrom Mr. Santayana maUcious in regard to theworld of science and common sense. It is only so thatwe can account for the complacency with which philo-ophershave accepted the inconsistencyf their doctrineswith all the common and scientificfacts which seem bestestablished and most worthy of belief.

The logicof mysticismshows, as is natural, the defectswhich are inherent in anything malicious. The impulseto logic,not felt while the mystic mood is dominant,reasserts itself as the mood fades, but with a desire toretain the vanishing insight,r at least to prove that itwas insight,and that what seems to contradict it is illu-ion.

The logic which thus arises is not quite dis-nteresteor candid, and is inspiredby a certain hatred

of the dailyworld to which it is to be applied. Such anattitude naturally does not tend to the best results.Everyone knows that to read an author simply in orderto refute him is not the way to understand him ; and toread the book of Nature with a conviction that it is allillusion is just as unlikelyto lead to understanding. Ifour logicis to find the common world intelligible,t mustnot be hostile,but must be inspiredby a genuine accept-


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 21

ance such as is not usually to be found among meta-hysicians.

III. TIME

The unrealityof time is a cardinal doctrine of manymetaphysical systems, often nominally based, as alreadyby Parmenides, upon logicalarguments, but originallyderived, at any rate in the founders of new systems, fromthe certaintywhich is born in the moment of mysticinsight.As a Persian Sufi poet says :

Past and future are what veil God from our sight.Bum up both of them with fire How longWilt thou be partitionedby these segments as a reed ? *

The belief that what is ultimatelyreal must be im-nmtable is a very common one : it gave rise to the meta-hysicalnotion of substance, and fhids, even now, awholly illegitimateatisfaction in such scientificdoctrinesas the conservation of energy and mass.

It is dif cult to disentanglethe truth and the error inthis view. The arguments for the contention that timeis unreal and that the world of sense is illusorymust, 1think, be regarded as fallacious. Nevertheless there issome sense easier to feel than to state ^in which timeis an unimportant and superficialharacteristic of reality.Past and future must be acknowledged to be as real asthe present, and a certain emancipation from slaverytotime is essential to philosophicthought. The importanceof time is rather practicalthan theoretical,rather inrelation to our desires than in relation to truth. A truerimage of the world, I think, is obtained by picturingthings as entering into the stream of time from aneternal world outside, than from a view which regardstime as the devouring tyrant of all that is. Both in

^ Whinfield's translation of the Masnavi (TrUbner, 1887),p. 34.


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2a MYSTICISM AND LOGICthoughtand in feeling,ven though time be real,to realisethe unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom.

That this is the case may be seen at once by askingourselves why our feelingstowards the past are sodifferent from our feelingstowards the future. Thereason for this difference is wholly practical our wishescan affect the future but not the past, the future is tosome extent subjectto our power, while the past is un-lterably

fixed. But every future will some day be past :if we see the past trulynow, it must, when it was stillfuture,have been justwhat we now see itto be, and whatis now future must be just what we shall see it to bewhen it has become past. The felt difference of qualitybetween past and future, therefore, is not an intrinsicdifference,but only a difference in relation to us : toimpartial contemplation, it ceases to exist. And im-artiali

of contemplationis,in the intellectual sphere,that very same virtue of disinterestedness which, in thesphere of action, appears as justiceand unselfishness.Whoever wishes to see the world truly,to rise in thoughtabove the tyranny of practicaldesires, must learn toovercome the difference of attitude towards past andfuture, and to survey the whole stream of time in onecomprehensive vision.

The kind of way in which, as it seems to me, time oughtnot to enter into our theoretic philosophicalhought,may be illustrated by the philosophywhich has becomeassociated with the idea of evolution, and which is ex-empUfied by Nietzsche, pragmatism, and Bergson. Thisphilosophy,on the basis of the development which hasled from the lowest forms of lifeup to man, sees in progressthe fundamental law of the universe, and thus admits thedifference between earlier and later into the very citadelof its contemplative outlook. With its past and future


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 23historyof the world, conjecturals it is,I do not wish toquarrel. But I think that, in the intoxication of a quicksuccess, much that is required for a true understandingof the universe has been forgotten. Something ofHellenism, something, too, of Oriental resignation,ustbe combined with its hurrying Western self-assertionbefore it can emerge from the ardour of youth into themature wisdom of manhood. In spiteof its appealstoscience,the true scientific philosophy,I think, is some-hing

more arduous and more aloof, appeahng to lessmundane hopes, and requiring severer disciplineor itssuccessful practice.

Darwin's Origin oj Speciespersuaded the world thatthe difference between different speciesof animals andplants is not the fixed immutable difference that itappears to be. The doctrine of natural kinds, which hadrendered classification easy and definite, which wasenshrined in the Aristotelian tradition,and protectedbyits supposed necessityor orthodox dogma, was suddenlyswept away for ever out of the biologicalworld. Thedifference between man and the lower animals, which toour human conceit appears enormous, was shown to be agradual achievement, involvingintermediate being whocould not with certaintybe placed either within or with-ut

the human family. The sun and the planets hadalready been shown by Laplace to be very probablyderived from a primitivemore or less undifierentiatednebula. Thus the old fixed landmarks became waveringand indistinct,and all sharp outlines were blurred.Things and specieslost their boundaries, and none could'say where they began or where they ended.

But if human conceit was staggered for a moment byits kinshipwith the ape, it soon found a way to reassertitself,nd that way is the philosophy of evolution.


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24 MYSTICISM AND LOGICA process which led h-om the amoeba to Man appearedto the philosophersto be obviouslya progress thoughwhether the amoeba would agree with this opinionis notknown. Hence the cycle of changes which science hadshown to be the probable historyof the past was wel-omed

as revealinga law of development towards goodin the universe ^an evolution or unfolding of an ideaslowlyembodying itself in the actual. But such a \4ew,though it might satisfySpencerand those whom we maycall Hegelian evolutionists,could not be accepted asadequate by the more whole-hearted votaries of change.An ideal to which the world continuouslyapproaches is,to these minds, too dead and static to be inspiring.Notonly the aspiration,ut the ideal too, must change anddevelop with the course of evolution : there must be nofixed goal,but a continual fashioningof fresh needs bythe impulse which is life and which alone givesunity tothe process.

Life, in this philosophy,is a continuous stream, inwhich all divisions are artificialand unreal. Separatethings, beginnings and endings, are mere convenientfictions : there is only smooth imbroken transition.The beliefs of to-day may count as true to-day,if theycarry us along the stream ; but to-morrow they will befalse,and must be replaced by new beliefs to meet thenew situation. All our thinking consists of conveniejitfictions,imaginary congeahngs of the stream : realityflows on in spiteof all our fictions,and though it can belived, it cannot be conceived in thought. Somehow,without explicitstatement, the assurance is slipped inthat the future, though we cannot foresee it, will bebetter than the past or the present : the reader is likethe child which expects a sweet because it has been toldto open its mouth and shut itseyes. Logic,mathematics.


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 25physics disappear in this philosophy,because they aretoo static ; what is real is no impulse and movementtowards a goal which, like the rainbow, recedes as weadvance, and makes every placedifferent when it reachesit from what it appeared to be at a distance.

I do not propose to enter upon a technical examinationof this philosophy. I wish only to maintain that themotives and interests which inspireit are so exclusivelypractical,nd the problems with which it deals are sospecial,that it can hardly be regarded as touching anyof the questions that, to my mind, constitute genuinephilosophy.

The predominant interest of evolutionism is in thequestionof human destiny,r at least of the destinyofLife. It is more interested in morality and happinessthan in knowledge for its own sake. It must be admittedthat the same may be said of many other philosophies,and that a desire for the kind of knowledge which philo-ophy

can give is very rare. But if philosophyis toattain truth, it is necessary first and foremost thatphilosophersshould acquirethe disinterested intellectualcuriosityhich characterises the genuine man of science.Knowledge concerning the future ^which is the kind ofknowledge that must be sought if we are to know abouthuman destiny ^ispossiblewithin certain narrow limits.It is impossibleto say how much the hmits may be en-arged

with the progress of science. But what is evidentis that any propositionabout the future belongs by itssubject-matterto some particularscience,and is to beascertained, if at all,by the methods of that science.Philosophyis not a short cut to the same kind of results asthose of the other sciences : if it is to be a genuine study,it must have a provnice of its own, and aim at resultswhich the other sciences can neither prove nor disprove.


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26 MYSTICISM AND LOGICEvolutionism, in basing itself upon the notion of

progress,which is change from the worse to the better,allows the notion of time, as it seems to me, to becomeitstyrant rather than its servant, and therebyloses thatimpartialityf contemplationwhich is the source of allthat is best in philosophicthought and feeling. Meta-hysicians,

as we saw, have frequentlydenied altogetherthe realityof time. I do not wish to do this ; I wishonly to preserve the mental outlook which inspiredthedenial, the attitude which, in thought, regards the pastas having the same realitys the present and the sameimportance as the future. In so far, says Spinoza,^ as the mind conceives a thing accordingto the dictateof reason, it will be equallyaffected whether the idea isthat of a future,past, or present thing. It is this

con-eivingaccordingto the dictate of reason that I find

lackingin the philosophywhich is based on evolution.

IV. GOOD AND EVIL

Mysticismmaintains that all evil is illusory,nd some-imesmaintains the same view as regardsgood, but more

often holds that all Reality is good. Both views are tobe found in Heraclitus : Good and illare one, he says,but again, To God all thingsre fair and good and right,but men hold some things wrong and some right. Asimilar twofold positions to be found in Spinoza,but heuses the word perfection when he means to speak ofthe good that is not merely human. By realityandperfection mean the same thing, he says ; ^ but else-here

we find the definition : By good I shall mean thatwhich we certainlyknow to be useful to us. ^ Thusperfectionelongsto Realityin its own nature, but good-

^ Ethics,Bk. IV. Prop. LXII. Ethics, Pt. II, Df. VI. lb., Pt. IV. Df. 1.


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 27ness is relative to ourselves and our needs, and disappearsin an impartialsurvey. Some such distinction, I think,is necessary in order to understand the ethical outlookof mysticisVn there is a lower mundane kind of goodand evil, which divides the world of appearance intowhat seem to be conflictingparts ; but there is also ahigher,mystical kind of good, which belongs to Realityand is not opposed by any correlative kind of evil.

It is difficult to give a logicallyenable account of thispositionwithout recognisingthat good and evil are sub-ective,

that what is good is merely that towards whichwe have one kind of feeling,and what is evil is merelythat towards which we have another kind of feeling.Inour active life,where we have to exercise choice, and topreferthis to that of two possibleacts, it is necessary tohave a distinction of good and evil,or at least of betterand worse. But this distinction, like everything per-aining

to action, belongs to what mysticismregards asthe world of illusion,if only because it is essentiallyconcerned with time. In our contemplativehfe, whereaction is not called for,it is possibleto be impartial,ndto overcome the ethical dualism which action requires.So long as we remain merelyimpartial,e may be contentto say that both the good and the evil of action arcillusions. But if,as we must do if we have the mysticvision, we find the whole world worthy of love andworship,if we see

The earth, and every common sight. . . .Apparell'd in celestial light,we shall say that there is a higher good than that ofaction, and that this higher good belongs to the wholeworld as it is in reality.In this way the twofold attitudeand the apparent vacillation of mysticismare explainedand justified.


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a8 MYSTICISM AND LOGICThe possibilityf this universal love and joy in all

that exists is of supreme importance for the conduct andhappiness of hfe, and gives inestimable value to themystic emotion, apart from any creeds which may bebuilt upon it. But if we are not to be led into falsebeliefs,it is necessary to realise exactly what the mysticemotion reveals. It reveals a possibilityf human nature du possibilityf a nobler, happier, freer life than anythat can be otherwise achieved. But it does not revealanything about the non-human, or about the nature ofthe universe in general. Good and bad, and even thehigher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are thereflections of our own emotions on other things,not partof the substance of things as they are in themselves.And therefore an impartialcontemplation,freed from allprc-occupationwith Self,will not judge thingsgood orbad, although it is very easilycombined with that feelingof universal love which leads the mystic to say that thewhole world is good.

The philosophy of evolution, through the notion ofprogress, is bound up with the ethical dualism of theworse and the better, and is thus shut out, not only fromthe kind of survey which discards good and evil alto-ether

from its view, but also from the mysticalbelief inthe goodness of everything. In this way the distinctionof good and evil, like time, becomes a tyrant in thisphilosophy, and introduces into thought the restlessselectiveness of action. Good and evil,like time, are, itwould seem, not general or fundamental in the world ofthought, but late and highly specialisedembers of theintellectual hierarchy.Although, as we saw, mysticism can be interpretedso

as to agree with the ^/iew that good and evil are notintellectuallyundamental, it must be admitted that here


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC agwe are no longer in verbal agreemenl with most of thegreat philosophersand religiousteachers of the past. Ibelieve, however, that the elimination of ethical con-iderations

from philosophyisboth scientificallyecessaryand ^tlioughthis may seem a paradox an ethicaladvance. Both these contentions must be brieflydefended.

The hope of satisfaction to our more human desires the hope of demonstrating that the world has this or thatdesirable ethical characteristic ^isnot one which, so faras I can see, a scientific philosophy can do anythingwhatever to satisfy.The difference between a good worldand a bad one is a difference in the particularcharacter-stics

of the particularthingsthat exist in these worlds :it is not a sufficientlybstract difference to come withinthe provinceof philosophy.Love and hate, for example,are ethical opposites,but to philosophythey are closelyanalogous attitudes towards objects. The general formand structure of those attitudes towards objectswhichconstitute mental phenomena is a problem for philosophy,but the difference between love and hate is not a differenceof form or structure, and therefore belongs rather to thespecialscience of psychology than to philosophy. Thusthe ethical interests which have often inspiredphilo-ophers

must remain in the background : some kind ofethical interest may inspirethe whole study, but nonemust obtrude in the detail or be expected in the specialresults which are sought.

If this view seems at first sightdisappointing,e mayremind ourselves that a similar change has been foundnecessary in all the other sciences. The physicistorchemist is not now required to prove the ethical im-ortanceof his ions or atoms ; the biologistis notexpected to prove the utilityof the plants or animals


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30 MYSTICISM AND LOGICwhich he dissects. In pre-scientificges this was not thecase. Astronomy, for example, was studied becausemen beheved in astrology: it was thought that themovements of the planetshad the most direct and im-ortant

bearing upon the lives of human beings. Pre-umably,when this belief decayed and the disinterested

study of astronomy began, many who had found astrologyabsorbinglyinterestingdecided that astronomy had toolittlehuman interest to be worthy of study. Physics,sit appears in Plato's Timaeus for example, is full of ethicalnotions : it is an essential part of its purpose to showthat the earth is worthy of admiration. The modernphysicist,n the contrary,though he has no wish to denythat the earth is admirable, is not concerned, as physicist,with its ethical attributes : he is merely concerned tofind out facts,not to consider whether they are good orbad. In psychology,the scientificattitude is even morerecent and more difficultthan in the physicalsciences :it is natural to consider that human nature is either goodor bad, and to suppose that the difference between goodand bad, so all-importantin practice,ust be importantin theory also. It is only during the last century that anethicallyneutral psychology has grown up ; and hereloo, ethical neutralityhas been essential to scientificsuccess.

In philosophy, hitherto, ethical neutralityhas beenseldom sought and hardly ever acliieved. Men haveremembered their wishes, and have judged philosophiesin relation to their wdshes. Driven from the particularsciences,the belief that the notions of good and evil mustafford a key to the understanding of the world has soughta refugein philosophy. But even from this last refuge,ifphilosoph}^s not to remain a set of pleasingdreams, thisbelief must be driven forth. It is a commonplace that


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MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 31happiness is not best achieved by those who seek itdirectly and it would seem that the same is true of thegood. In thought, at any rate, those who forgetgoodand evil and seek only to know the facts are more likelyto achieve good than those who view the world throughthe distortingmedium of their own desires.

We are thus brought back to our seeming paradox,that a philosophy which does not seek to impose uponthe world its own conceptionsof good and evil is not onlymore likelyo achieve truth, but is also the outcome of ahigher ethical standpointthan one which, like evolu-ionism

and most traditional systems, is perpetuallyappraising the universe and seeking to find in it anembodiment of present ideals. In rehgion,and in everydeeply serious view of the world and of human destiny,there is an element of submission, a realisation of thelimits of human power, which is somewhat lacking inthe modern world, with its quick material successes andits insolent belief in the boundless possibilitiesf progress. He that loveth his life shall lose it ; and there isdanger lest,through a too confident love of life,ifeitselfshould lose much of what givesit its highestworth. Thesubmission which religionnculcates in action is essen-ially

the same in spirits that which science teaches inthought ; and the ethical neutrahtyby which its victorieshave been achieved is the outcome of that submission.

The good which it concerns us to remember is the goodwhich it lies in our power to create ^the good in our ownlives and in our attitude towards the world. Insistenceon belief in an external realisation of the good is a formof self-assertion,which, while it cannot secure theexternal good which it desires,can seriouslyimpair theinward good which lieswithin our power, and destroythatreverence towards fact which constitutes both what is


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valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientifictemper.

Human beings cannot, of course, wholly transcendhuman nature ; something subjective, if only the interestthat determines the direction of our attention, mustremain in all our thought. But scientific philosophycomes nearer to objecti\dty than any other humanpursuit, and gives us, therefore, the closest constant andthe most intimate relation with the outer world that it ispossible to achieve. To the primitive mind, everythingis either friendly or hostile ; but experience has shownthat friendliness and hostility are not the conceptions bywhich the world is to be understood. Scientific philo-ophy

thus represents, though as yet only in a nascentcondition, a higher form of thought than any pre-scientificbelief or imagination, and, like every approach to self-transcendence, it brings with it a rich reward in increaseof scope and breadth and comprehension. Evolutionism,^in spite of its appeals to particular scientific facts, fails tobe a truly scientific philosophy because of its slavery totime, its ethical preoccupations, and its predominantinterest in our mundane concerns and destiny. A trulyscientific philosophy will be more humble, more piece-eal,

more arduous, offering less glitter of outwardmirage to flatter fallacious hopes, but more indifferentto fate, and more capable of accepting the world withoutthe tyrannous imposition of our human and temporarydemands.


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11

THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN ALIBERAL EDUCATION

OCIENCE, to the ordinary reader of newspapers, is^ represented by a varying selection of sensationaltriumphs, such as wireless telegraphy and aeroplanes,radio-activity and the marvels of modern alchemy. Itis not of this aspect of science that I wish to speak.Science, in this aspect, consists of detached up-to-datefragments, interesting only until they are replaced bysomething newer and more up-to-date, displayingnothing of the systems of patiently constructed know-edge

out of which, almost as a casual incident, havecome the practically useful results which interest theman in the street. The increased command over theforces of nature which is derived from science is un-oubtedly

an amply sufficient reason for encouragingscientific research, but this reason has been so oftenurged and is so easily appreciated that other reasons,to my mind quite as important, are apt to be overlooked.It is with these other reasons, especially with the in-rinsic

value of a scientific habit of mind in forming ouroutlook on the world, that I shall be concerned in whatfollows.

The instance of wireless telegraphy will serve to illus-tra^ the difference between the two points of view.Almost all the serious intellectual labour required for the


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34 MYSTICISM AND LOGICpossibilityf this invention is due to three men-Faraday,Maxwell, and Hertz. In alternatinglayersofexperiment and theory these three men built up themodem theory of electromagnetism,nd demonstratedthe identityof lightwith electromagneticaves. Thesystem which they discovered is one of profound intel-ectual

interest,bringingtogether and unifying an end-essvariety of apparently detached phenomena, and

displaying cumulative mental power which cannot butafford dehght to every generous spirit.The mechanicaldetails which remained to be adjusted in order to utilisetheir discoveries for a practicalsystem of telegraphydemanded, no doubt, very considerable ingenuity,buthad not that broad sweep and that universalitywhichcould give them intrinsic interest as an object of dis-nterestecontemplation.

From the pointof view of trainingthe mind, of givingthat well-informed, impersonaloutlook which constitutesculture in the good sense of this much-misused word, itseems to be generallyheld indisputablethat a Hteraryeducation is superiorto one based on science. Even thewarmest advocates of science are apt to rest their claimson the contention that culture ought to be sacrificed toutihty. Those men of science who respect culture, whenthey associate with men learned in the classics,are aptto admit, not merely pohtely, but sincerely, certaininferiorityn their side, compensated doubtless by theservices which science renders to humanity, but none theless real. And so long as this attitude exists among menof science, it tends to verifyitself : the intrinsicallyvahiable aspects of science tend to be sacrificed to themerely useful,and littleattempt is made to preserve thatleisurely,ystematicsurvey by which the finer qualityof mind is formed and nourished.


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SCIENCE AND CULTURE 35But even if there be, in present fact, any such in-eriorit

as issupposed in the educational value of science,this is,I believe,not the fault of science itself,ut thefault of the spiritin which science is taught. If its fullpossibilitiesere reahsed by those who teach it,I believethat its capacityof producingthose habits of mind whichconstitute the highest mental excellence would be atleast as great as that of literature,and more particularlyof Greek and Latin literature. In sayingthis I have nowish whatever to disparagea classical education. I havenot myself enjoyed its benefits, and my knowledge ofGreek and Latin authors is derived- almost wholly fromtranslations. But I am firmlypersuadedthat the Greeksfullydeserve all the admiration that is bestowed uponthem, and that it is a very great and serious loss to beunacquainted with their writings. It is not by attackingthem, but by drawing attention to neglectedexcellencesin science,that I wish to conduct my argument.

One defect, however, does seem inherent in a purelyclassical education namely, a too exclusive emphasison the past. By the study of what is absolutelyendedand can never be renewed, a habit of criticism towardsthe present and the future is engendered. The qualitiesin which the present excels are qualitieso which thestudy of the past does not direct attention, and towhich, therefore,the student of Greek civilisation mayeasilybecome bhnd. In what is new and growingthere is apt to be something crude, insolent, even alittle vulgar,which is shocking to the man of sensitivetaste ; quiveringfrom the rough contact, he retires tothe trim gardens of a polishedpast,forgettingthat theywere reclaimed from the wilderness by men as roughand earth-soiled as those from whom he shrinks in hisown day. The habit of being unable to recognisemerit


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36 MYSTICISM AND LOGICuntil it is dead is too apt to be the result of a purelybookish life,and a culture based wholly on the past willseldom be able to piercethrough everyday surroundingsto the essential splendour of contemporary things,or tothe hope of stillgreater splendour in the future.

My eyes saw not the men of old ;And now their age away has rolled.I weep to think I shall not see *The heroes of posterity.

So says the Chinese poet ; but such impartialitys rarein the more pugnacious atmosphere of the West, wherethe champions of past and future fighta never-endingbattle,instead of combining to seek out the merits ofboth.

This consideration, which militates not only againstthe exclusive study of the classics,but against everyform of culture which has become static,traditional,andacademic, leads inevitablyto the fundamental ques-ion

: What is the true end of education ? But beforeattempting to answer this question it will be well todefine the sense in which we are to use the word educa-ion.

For this purpose I shall distinguishthe sense inwhich I mean to use it from two others, both perfectlylegitimate,he one broader and the other narrower thanthe sense in which I mean to use the word.

In the broader sense, education will include not onlywhat we learn through instruction, but all that we learn

^ through personalexperience the formation of characterthrough the education of hfe. Of this aspect of education,vitallyimportant as it is, I will say nothing, since itsconsideration would introduce topicsquiteforeignto thequestionwith which we are concerned.In the narrower sense, education may be confined toinstruction, the imparting of definite information on


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SCIENCE AND CULTURE 37various subjects,because such information, in and foritself,is useful in daily life. Elementary education reading, writing,and arithmetic ^isalmost wholly ofthis kind. But instruction, necessary as it is,does notper se constitute education in the sense in which I wishto consider it.

Education, in the sense in which I mean it,may be.defined as the formation,by means ofinstruction,of certainmental habits and a certain outlook on lifeand the world.It remains to ask ourselves, what mental habits, andwhat sort of outlook, can be hoped for as the result ofinstruction ? When we have answered this questionwecan attempt to decide what science has to contribute tothe formation of the habits and outlook which we desire.

Our whole life is built about a certain number not avery small number-^-of primary instincts and impulses.jOnlywhat is in some way connected with these instinctsland impulsesappears to us desirable or important; thereis no faculty,hether reason or virtue or what-ver

it may be called, that can take our active life andour hopes and fears outside the region controlled bythese first movers of all desire. Each of them is like aqueen-bee,aided by a hive of workers gatheringhoney ;but when the queen is gone the workers languish anddie, and the cells remain empty of their expected sweet-ess.

So with each primary impulse in civilised man :it is surrounded and protected by a busy swarm ofattendant derivative desires,which store up in its servicewhatever honey the surrounding world affords. But ifthe queen-impulse dies, the death-deahng influence,though retarded a littleby habit,spreadsslowlythroughall the subsidiaryimpulses, and a whole tract of lifebecomes inexplicablycolourless. What was formerlyfull of zest, and so obviouslyworth doing that it raised


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3S MYSTICISM AND LOGICno questions,as now grown dreary and purposeleai:with a sense of disillusion we inquirethe meaning of Hfe,and decide, perhaps, that all is vanity. The search foran outside meaning that can compel an inner responsemust always be disappointed all meaning must beat bottom related to our primary desires,and when theyare extinct no miracle can restore to the world the valuewhich they reflected upon it.

The purpose of education, therefore, cannot be tocreate any primary impulse which is lacking in theuneducated ; the purpose can only be to enlarge thescope of those that human nature provides,by increasingthe number and varietyof attendant thoughts,and byshowing where the most permanent satisfaction is to befound. Under the impulse of a Calvinistic horror ofthe natural man, this obvious truth has been toooften misconceived in the training of the young ;nature has been falselyregarded as excludingallthat is best in what is natural, and the endeavour toteach virtue has led to the productionof stunted andcontorted hypocritesinstead of full-grownuman beings.From such mistakes in education a better psychologyora kinder heart is beginning to preserve the presentgeneration; we need, therefore, waste no more words onthe theory that the purpose of education is to thwart oreradicate nature.

But although nature must supply the initial force ofdesire,nature is not, in the civilised man, the spasmodic,fragmentary, and yet violent set of impulses that it isin the savage. Each impulse has its constitutionalministry of thought and knowledge and reflection,through which possibleonflicts of impulsesare foreseen,and temporary impulsesare controlled by the unifyingimpulse which may be called wisdom. In this way


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SCIENCE AND CULTURE 39education destroysthe crudityof instinct,and increasesthrough knowledge the wealth and varietyof the indi-idual's

contacts with the outside world, making himno longer an isolated fightingimit, but a citizen of theuniverse, embracing distant countries, remote regionsofspace, and vast stretches of past and future within thecircle of his interests. It is this simultaneous softeningin the insistence of desire and enlargement of its scopethat is the chief moral end of education.Closelyconnected with this moral end is the more

purely intellectual aim of education, the endeavour tomake us see and imagine the world in an objectivemanner, as far as possibles it is in itself,nd not merelythrough the distortingedium of personaldesire. Thecomplete attainment of such an objective view is nodoubt an ideal,indefinitelypproachable,but not actuallyand fullyrealisable. Education, considered as a processof forming our mental habits and our outlook on theworld, is to be judged successful in proportionas its out-ome

approximates to this ideal ; in proportion,hat isto say, as it gives us a true view of our placein society,of the relation of the whole human societyto its non-human environment, and of the nature of the non-human world as it is in itself apart from our desires andinterests. If this standard is admitted, we can returnto the consideration of science, inquiringhow far sciencecontributes to such an aim, and whether it is in anyrespect superiorto its rivals in educational practice.

II

Two opposite and at first sight conflictingeritsbelong to science as againsthterature and art. The one,which is not inherentlynecessary, but is certainlytrue


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40 MYSTICISM AND LOGICat the present day, is hopefulnessas to the future ofPiuman achievement, and in particulars to the usefulwork that may be accomplished by any intelligentstudent. This merit and the cheerful outlook which itengenders prevent what might otherwise be the de-ressing

effect of another aspect of science, to my mindalso a merit, and perhaps its greatest merit I mean theirrelevance of human passionsand of the whole subjectiveapparatus where scientific truth is concerned. Each ofthese reasons for preferringthe study of science requiressome amplification.Let us begin with the first.

In the study of literature or art our attention is per-etuallyriveted upon the past : the men of Greece or

of the Renaissance did better than any men do now ; thetriumphs of former ages, so far from facilitatingreshtriumphs in our own age, actually increase the difii-culty of fresh triumphs by rendering originalityarderof attainment ; not only is artistic achievement notcumulative, but it seems even to depend upon a certainfreshness and naivete of impulse and vision which civilisa-ion

tends to destroy. Hence comes, to those who havebeen nourished on the literarynd artistic productionsof former ages, a certain peevishness and undue fas-idiousne

towards the present, from which thereseems no escape except into the deliberate vandalismwhich ignorestradition and in the search after originalityachieves only the eccentric. But in such vandalismthere is none of the simplicitynd spontaneityout ofwhich great art springs: theory is stillthe canker in itscore, and insincerityestroysthe advantages of a merelypretended ignorance.

The despairthus arisingfrom an education whichsuggests no pre-emiinentental activityexcept that ofartistic creation is wholly absent from an education


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SCIENCE AND CULTURE 41which gives the knowledge of scientific method. Thediscoveryof scientific method, except in pure mathe-atics,

is a thing of yesterday ; speaking broadly, wemay say that it dates from Galileo. Yet already it hastransformed the world, and its success proceeds withever-acceleratingvelocity. In science men have dis-overed

an activityof the very highest value in whichthey are no longer, as in art, dependent for progressupon the appearance of continuallygreater genius,forin science the successors stand upon the shoulders oftheir predecessors; where one man of supreme geniushas invented a method, a thousand lesser men can applyit. No transcendent abilitys requiredin order to makeuseful discoveries in science ; the edifice of science needsits masons, bricklayers,and common labourers as wellas its foremen, master-builders, and architects. In artnothing worth doing can be done without genius; inscience even a very moderate capacitycan contribute toa supreme achievement.

In science the man of real genius is the man whoinvents a new method. The notable discoveries areoften made by his successors, who can apply the methodwith fresh vigour,unimpaired by the previouslabour ofperfectingit ; but the mental calibre of the thoughtrequiredfor their work, however brilliant,s not so greatas that required by the first inventor of the method.There are in science immense numbers of differentmethods, appropriate to different classes of problems ;but over and above them all,there is something noteasilydefinable, which may be called the method ofscience. It was formerly customary to identifythiswith the inductive method, and to associate it with thename of Bacon. But the true inductive method wasnot discovered by Bacon, and the true method of science


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42 MYSTICISM AND LOGICis something which includes deduction as much asinduction,logicand mathematics as much as botany andgeology. I shall not attempt the difficulttask of statingwhat the scientific method is,but I will try to indicatethe temper of mind out of which the scientific methodgrows, which is the second of the two merits that werementioned above as belonging to a scientific education..

The kernel of the scientific outlook is a thingso simple,so obvious, so seemingly trivial,that the mention of itmay almost excite derision. The kernel of the scientificIoutlook is the refusal to regard our own desires,tastes,land interests as affordinga key to the understanding ofthe world. Stated thus baldly,this may seem no morethan a trite truism. But to remember it consistentlynmatters arousing our passionatepartisanships by nomeans easy, especiallyhere the available evidence isuncertain and inconclusive. A few illustrations willmake this clear.

Aristotle, I understand, considered that the starsmust move in circles because the circle is the mostperfectcurve. In the absence of evidence to the con-rary,

he allowed himself to decide a questionof fact byan appeal to aesthetico-moral considerations. In sucha case it is at once obvious to us that this appeal wasunjustifiable.e know now how to ascertain as a factthe way in which the heavenly bodies move, and weknow that they do not move in circles,or even inaccurate ellipses,r in any other kind of simply de-scribable curve. This may be painful to a certainhankering after simplicityof pattern in the universe,but we know that in astronomy such feehngs are irre-evant.

Easy as this knowledge seems now, we owe itto the courage and insightof the first inventors of scien-ific

method, and more especiallyf Galileo.


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SCIENCE AND CULTURE 43We may take as another illustration Malthus's

doctrine of population. This illustration is all the betterfor the fact that his actual doctrine is now known to belargely erroneous. It is not his conclusions that arevaluable, but the temper and method of his inquiry.As everyone knows, it was to him that Darwin owed anessential part of his theory of natural selection, andthis was only possiblebecause Malthus's outlook wastrulyscientific. His great merit lies in consideringmannot as the object of praise or blame, but as a part ofnature, a thing with a certain characteristic behaviourfrom which certain consequences must follow. If thebehaviour is not quite what Malthus supposed, if theconsequences are not quite what he inferred, that mayfalsifyis conclusions, but does not impair the value ofhis method. The objectionswhich were made when hisdoctrine was new ^that it was horrible and depressing,that people ought not to act as he said they did, and soon ^were all such as imphed an unscientific attitude ofmind ; as against all of them, his calm determinationto treat man as a natural phenomenon marks an im-ortant

advance over the reformers of the eighteenthcentury and the Revolution.

Under the influence of Darwinism the scientific atti-udetowards man has now become fairlycommon, and

^ is to some peoplequitenatural, though to most it is stilladifficult and artificial intellectual contortion. There is,however, one study which is as yet almost wholly un-ouched

by the scientific spirit I mean the study ofphilosophy. Philosophersand the public imagine thatthe scientific spiritmust pervade pages that bristle withallusions to ions,germ-plasms,and the eyes of shell-fish.But as the devil can quote Scripture,o the philosophercan quote science. The scientificspirits not an afl[airof


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44 MYSTICISM AND LOGICquotation,of externallyacquiredinformation, any morethan manners are an affair of the etiquette-book. Thescientific attitude of mind involves a sweeping away ofall other desires in the interests of the desire to know it involves suppressionof hopes and fears, loves andhates, and the whole subjectiveemotional life,until webecome subdued to the material, able to see it frankly,without preconceptions,ithout bias, without any wishexcept to see it as it is,and without any belief that whatit is must be determined by some relation, positivernegative,to what we should like it to be, or to what wecan easilyimagineit to be.

Now in philosophythis attitude of mind has not asyet been achieved. A certain self-absorption,ot per-onal,

but human, has marked almost all attempts toconceive the universe as a whole. Mind, or some aspectof it ^thoughtor will or sentience ^has been regardedas the pattern after which the universe is to be con-eived,

for no better reason, at bottom, than that sucha universe would not seem strange,and would giveus the cosy feehng that every place is like home. Toconceive the universe as essentiallyrogressiveor essen-ially

deteriorating,or example, is to give to our hopesand fears a cosmic importance which may, of course,be justified,ut which we have as yet no reason to supposejustified.Until we have learnt to think of it in ethicallyneutral terms, we have not arrived at a scientificattitudein philosophy ; and until we have arrived at such anattitude, it is hardly to be hoped that philosophy willachieve any solid results.

I have spoken so far largelyof the negativeaspect of thescientific spirit,ut it is from the positiveaspect that i+svalue isderived. The instinct of constructiveness, which isone of the chief incentives to artistic creation,can find


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SCIENCE AND CULTURE 45

in scientific systems a satisfaction more massive than

any epic poem. Disinterested curiosity, which is thesource of almost all intellectual effort, finds with aston-shed

delight that science can unveil secrets whichmight well have seemed for ever undiscoverable. Thedesire for a larger life and wider interests, for an escapefrom private circumstances, and even from the wholerecurring human cycle of birth and death, is fulfilled bythe impersonal cosmic outlook of science as by nothingelse. To all these must be added, as contributing to thehappiness of the man of science, the admiration ofsplendid achievement, and the consciousness of inestim-ble

utility to the human race. A hfe devoted to scienceis therefore a happy life, and its happiness is derivedfrom the very best sources that are open to dwellers onthis troubled and passionate planet.


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Ill

A FREE MAN'S WORSHIP^

TO Dr. Faustus in his study Mephistopheles told thehistory of the Creation, saying : The endless praises of the choirs of angels had begun

to grow wearisome ; for, after all, did he not deservetheir praise ? Had he not given them endless joy ?Would it not be more amusing to obtain undeservedpraise, to be worshipped by beings whom he tortured ?He smiled inwardly, and resolved that the great dramashould be performed.

For countless ages the hot nebula whirled aimlesslythrough space. At length it began to take shape, thecentral mass threw ofi planets, the planets cooled, boil-ng

seas and burning mountains heaved and tossed,from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain delugedthe barely solid crust. And now the first germ of lifegrew in the depths of the ocean, and developed rapidlyin the fructifying warmth into vast forest trees, hugeferns springing from the damp mould, sea monstersbreeding, fighting, devouring, and passing away. Andfrom the monsters, as the play unfolded itself, Man wasborn, with the power of thought, the knowledge of goodand evil, and the cruel thirst for worship. And Mansaw that all is passing in this mad, monstrous world,that all is stniggling to snatch, at any cost, a few briefmoments of life before Death's inexorable decree. And

^ Reprinted from the Independent Review, December, i9^'*3-46


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A FREE MAN'S VVORS/lIP 47Man said : ' There is a hidden purpose, could we butiathom it,and the purpose is good ; for we must rever-nce

something, and in the visible world there is nothingworthy of reverence.' And Man stood aside from thestruggle,resolvingthat God intended harmony to comeout of chaos by human efforts. And when he followedthe instincts which God had transmitted to him fromhis ancestry of beasts of prey, he called it Sin,and askedGod to forgivehim. But he doubted whether he couldbe justlyforgiven,until he invented a divine Plan bywhich God's wrath was to have been appeased. Andseeingthe present was bad, he made it yet worse, thatthereby the future might be better. And he gave Godthanks for the strength that enabled him to forgo even,the joys that were possible. And God smiled ; andwhen he saw that Man had become perfectin renuncia-ion

and worship, he sent another sim through the sky,which crashed into Man's sun ; and all returned againto nebula.

Yes,' he murmured, it was a good play ; I willhave it performed again.'

Such, in outline, but even more purposeless,morevoid of meaning, is the world which Science presents forour belief. Amid such a world, if anywhere, our idealshenceforward must find a home. That Man is thei^

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