Mysticism and Its Cultural Expression an Inquiry Into the Description of Mystical Experience and Its...

7/30/2019 Mysticism and Its Cultural Expression an Inquiry Into the Description of Mystical Experience and Its Ontological and

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This paper is dedicated to the examination ofthe problem of the forms of cultural expres-sions of mystical experience. That is, the pur-

pose of this paper is to critically explore the nature andontological and epistemological significance of differ-ences observed in how various cultural traditionsdescribe and explain such experiences. Prior to initiat-ing this undertaking, however, it is important to first

address definitional issues.The word mysticism and all its variants and

derivatives (e.g., mystical, mystic) holds several largelyunique meanings. For example, the term is used todesignate (a) the experience or feeling of unity of theperson with the ontological ground of the Universeand/or of all beings, (b) different esoteric rites andpractices, and (c) various forms of occultism. Further,the word mysticism is laden with pejorative conno-tations, the most problematic of which concerns it asbeing diametrically opposed to rationality as the basis

for epistemology.

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Consequently, there is a need toexercise care in delineating what is meant by mysti-cism, since any discourse regarding the epistemologicaland ontological features of it will likely be met withskepticism and mistrust by the majority of Westernscholars, scientists, and philosophers.

For the sake of this paper, mystical experience willbe defined in a very specific way. In particular, it willbe used to designate a type of experience described as

involving the expansion of consciousness and the feel-ing of unity of the experients heart-and-mind with thehidden (or concealed) ontological ground of all exis-tence or with the original principle of all things andbeings. This kind of experience, which often involvesthe transcendence of normal and sundry modes ofconsciousness, has direct and immediate relevance toepistemology and metaphysics.

Mystical Experience as Universal versusCulture Bound

Many of us use an expression such as mysticalexperience and yet there is little in the way ofelucidation as to how such an experience arises withinconsciousness and how, if at all, it conveys knowledgeof reality. In what sense can the feelings and intuitionsobserved to arise in a mystical experience be consid-ered the product of consciousness and reflective of trueknowledge? Before answering this question, we areconfronted with another query. If mystical experiencecontains even an element of true knowledge, then whyare there such a great number of descriptions andinterpretations of the experience across differenttraditions (e.g., Judeo-Christian, Muslim, Hindu,Buddhist, Taoist, etc.)? Should there not be some formof convergence of expression and meaning? Here restsone of the major challenges of studying mystical expe-

40 The International Journal of Transpersonal Studies, 2003, Volume 22

Mysticism and Its Cultural Expression:An Inquiry into the Description of

Mystical Experience and Its Ontological andEpistemological Nature

Evgeny Torchinov

St. Petersburg State University, Russia

The purpose of this paper is to critically explore the nature and ontological and epistemologicalsignificance of differences observed in how various cultural traditions describe and explain suchexperiences. After an initial consideration of definitional issues, the article focuses on the argu-ments supporting and challenging the idea of mystical experience being a universal phenomenonand a vehicle for true knowledge. The article also examines the problem of the unity of the mys-

tical experience as a definite state of consciousness and the multiplicity of its sociocultural andcivilizational expressions and descriptions conditioned by different cultural and historical factors.


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rience; making sense of the vast array of seeminglydivergent perspectives on the experience.

A number of scholars (e.g., Forman, 1998),including most notably Stace (1960), who completeda broad yet critical analysis of its phenomenology, haveargued quite convincingly that the mystical experience

is a universal phenomenon that is found in every cul-ture and tradition. This position is most clearly sup-ported by the essential descriptive features of the expe-rience. Stace himself identified nine characteristicsgenerally common to all mystical experience (e.g.,ineffability, noetic quality, religious quality, paradoxi-cality, time-space quality). Franklin (1998), as a sec-ond illustration, has asserted that all forms of mysticalexperience share one fundamental quality involvingstrong feelings of unity which he calls the flavor ofnonseparateness. Indeed, it may be argued that theacceptance of the inherent universality of the mystical

experience is one of the defining assumptions oftranspersonal studies.

With this said, the problem of the varied expres-sions of the experience may be traced to two interrelatedfactors, namely, (a) its inherent nonconceptual andineffable nature, and (b) the sociocultural and linguis-tic influences on the identification/detection andinterpretation of the experience. Stated another way,the varieties of mystical experience appear to have arisenfirst and foremost as a function of the inadequacies oflanguage in accurately capturing the flavor and imme-

diacy of the experience and second because of differ-ences in language and culture, which themselves bringstructure and meaning to experience. How do wemake sense of mystical experience in light of theseobfuscating elements?

One way that we may address the problem is bydividing mystical experience into two aspects. The firstconcerns the actual experience itself (i.e., the immedi-ate apprehension or intuition) and the second relatesto its level of expression and description. The formeraspect will likely be similar across individuals and tra-ditions while the latter will differ from person to per-

son and culture to culture. In a related vein, the formerwill be nonconceptual and nonlinguistic while the lat-ter will involve the transference of the nonconceptualexperience to the categories and terms of the experi-ents doctrine and/or thought system which, in turn, isa product of the cultural context in which the individ-ual is operating.

Considering the descriptive aspect, a question that

now emerges relates to the extent to which the higherstates of consciousness found in mystical experiencecan be accurately expressed. Is it truly possible todescribe and express the experience or are such expres-sions always doomed to being inexact and, ultimately,irrelevant in capturing the real stuff of mystical experi-

ences? There are a variety of positions on this matterand, unfortunately, I cannot give a final solution thatwould be satisfactory to all parties. However, if it couldbe acknowledged that the experience is beyond expres-sion as it is occurring but that its subsequent descrip-tion holds some veridicality, then it becomes possibleto gain a real sense of the experience through an analy-sis of its expressions and the associated culture-bounddoctrines that have arisen to explain the experience.This possibility has been argued by some prominentfigures including Stace (1960), who has stated that themystical experience is wholly unconceptualizable and

wholly unspeakable when the very experience lasts, butafterwards, when experience is kept in memory the sit-uation must be changed. Now mystics have words andconcepts and they can speak about their experience inthe terms natural to their tradition or culture. Furthersupport for the possibility of gaining knowledge of theexperience from a doctrinally-based description arisesfrom the fact that the act of labeling an experience asnonconceptualizable is itself a conceptualization.Therefore, the nonconceptual character of mysticalexperience cannot and should not be seen as absolute

(Burton, 1999). Interestingly, the relation of the doc-trinal/conceptual and the experiential modes ofknowledge is acknowledged in some extant religioussystems (e.g., Tibetan Buddhism recognizes and strug-gles with the implications of knowledge gainedthrough critical conceptually driven investigation ascompared to knowledge acquired through the higheststates of experiential knowing [Williams, 1992].).Finally, the association of doctrine to practice and, inparticular, the ubiquitous tendency of mystical tradi-tions not only to advocate a theory of the experiencebut also to put forth a structured technique or method

of cultivating consciousness to facilitate the arising ofthe experience may be seen as reflecting a universalprocess that is culturally variant only in terms of itscontent. This process may be depicted as starting withdoctrine that leads to engagement in a psychospiritualpractice. This, in turn, gives rise to the mystical expe-rience. Lastly, following the conclusion of the experi-ence, the individual utilizes the doctrine to articulate

Mysticism and Culture 41


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the nature and meaning of the experience. In thisprocess, neither the doctrine nor doctrinally driveninterpretation is synonymous with the experienceitself, though both hold some potential to give someknowledge of the experience.

Notwithstanding the argumentation about the

tenability of analyzing language as a means of garner-ing an understanding of mystical experience, there iswidespread recognition in the spiritual, religious, andphilosophical literature that language itself, regardlessof its particular cultural manifestation, serves as a hin-drance to the direct comprehension of the experience.

As stated above, while doctrine plays a role bothpreceding and following the experience, neither doc-trine nor language is the experience per se.Consequently, while language may be seen as a vehicleto introduce the possibility and quality of mysticalexperience, it must also be recognized as imperfect and

prone to distortion. Stated another way, while doctrinemay be useful in drawing our attention to the highestlevels of spirituality, it does not and cannot serve as asubstitute for the direct experience of such levels ofspirituality.2

In response to the limitations of language, virtuallyall mystical traditions attempt to utilize methods ofexpression that are aimed at simultaneously minimiz-ing distortion while also granting unhindered access tothe experience itself. One of the most salient examplesof this, found most clearly in Indian spiritual tradi-

tions (e.g., Hinduism, Buddhism), concerns the use ofnegative descriptions of the experience (i.e., describingthe highest mystical states in terms of what they arenot). This method of description has been referred toas the semantic destruction of language (Zilberman,1972), where the destruction of language occurs whena description, previously based upon a symbolic formof expression adopted by a certain tradition, ischanged into its negative form (or even paradoxicalform as is the case in the Zen koan and mondo).Extending from this, mystical texts may be viewed inmany instances as containing statements about the

conditional or provisional character of mystical experi-ence which, given the manner that they are described,are intended to communicate the nature of the experi-ence beyond the words used. The use of poetry,metaphor, parable, and myth may also be seen as waysin which mystics from various traditions have usedlanguage to articulate the indescribable.

It may be inferred from this discussion that, given

the apparent commonality across mystical traditions toaddress the challenges of language, there is an impliedagreement about the reality and concurrent ineffabili-ty of the highest spiritual experiences. That is, all tra-ditions appear to agree that the experience is real andinherently beyond language. Similarly, all traditions

appear to (a) use language to provide an initial sense ofwhat mystical experience is about, (b) manipulate lan-guage to enable the person to have the experiencewithout being limited to the words describing theexperience, and (c) advocate the use of practices thattake the person beyond language and into direct expe-riential contact with higher states of consciousness andknowledge.

Certainly, there have always existed people whotried to express their mystical experience in proper andprecise terms notwithstanding traditional cultural con-ventions. In historical perspective, usually these indi-

viduals abandoned their native traditions and eitherwere labeled heretics by the established cultural sys-tem and/or went on to found a new tradition. One ofthe most famous examples is the historical Buddha,who from the beginning of his religious career was aheterodox hermit (shramana) who rejected theBrahmanist interpretation of his experience ofEnlightenment (or Awakening). However, even in thiscase, the descriptions of Buddhas own experience andthe conclusions made from them by his followers wereprovided in terms consistent with the Indian cultural

paradigm and its traditional language. Consequently,it is impossible for me to agree with arguments whichmaintain that all mystical experience is an intensifiedpsychosomatic expression of extant religious beliefsand values (see, e.g., Gimello, 1983). The situation ismuch more complicated and dialectical. Mysticalexperience is by no means only the result of the influ-ence of beliefs of the established religious doctrines.Instead, the opposite appears to be more accuratemystical experience itself appears to serve as the basisfor the creation of religious and philosophical teachingand systems (see, e.g., Forman, 1994, p. 3849). More

particularly, the mystical experience taken separatelyby and in itself is not religion per se if, by the termreligion we mean a system of doctrines, beliefs, cults,and institutions.

However, the experience, when interpreted andunderstood within its cultural context, provides theexperiential foundation on which such doctrines,beliefs, and institutions are based. Of course, the



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extent to which established doctrinal traditions havebeen able to adapt and assimilate such experiencesvaries across the traditions (e.g., Eastern religions havetended to be more accommodating of mystical experi-ences while religions in the West, especially RomanCatholicism, have viewed such experiences as highly

suspect and threatening to the supremacy of churchdoctrine). Nevertheless, it appears reasonable to main-tain that both the mystical experience and the culturalcontext in which an individual has the experience areinteracting and mutually structuring elements thatlead toward the development and evolution of spiritu-al systems. Ostensibly, much more critical research isneeded before we have an accurate understanding ofthe interplay of culture and experience.

Mystical Experience and Knowledge

Having established, at least superficially, the uni-versality of mystical experience, we can now turnour attention to the first question posed in this paper:In what sense can the feelings and intuitions observedto arise in a mystical experience be considered theproduct of consciousness and reflective of true knowl-edge?

Perhaps the best place to start looking for ananswer to this question is in the work of WilliamJames, a pioneer in the study of religious and mysticalexperience. James was one of the first researchers to

create a theory of the universal or pure experience as akind of materia prima (metaphorically speaking),which is the material of which everything in the worldis made. Within such a conceptualization, knowl-edge can be understood as the relation between twoaspects of the pure experience. This is a very importantstatement because it eliminates the fundamental onto-logical necessity of a relation between subject andobject in acquiring knowledge. It is especially impor-tant for an examination of the nature of mystical expe-rience since, in virtually all mystical traditions, theassertion is made that such experience transcends the

subject-object distinction (e.g., in a number of branch-es of Indo-Buddhist thought, the highest state of mindor consciousness is described as advaita or advaya,meaning non-dual). Interestingly, in one of the earliestof the Hindu religious texts, the BrhadaranyakaUpanishad, the highest form of mystical experience,which involves the state of unity of Atman (self ) andBrahman (Absolute), is not described in terms of con-

sciousness. As the author of the Upanishad maintains,consciousness is impossible without duality of cogniz-er and cognized, perceiver and perceived. Instead, inthe state of religious liberation (i.e., moksha), con-sciousness ceases to exist and all that remains is the oneand only Atman (absolute Self) which is non-dual and

yet, simultaneously, is also an unmediated commun-ion with knowledge (jnana, gnosis). Following fromthis, it may be argued that the highest mystical expe-rience of non-duality is not really a state of conscious-ness at all since consciousness does not participate init.3 Rather, it may be best conceived as a pure non-dualgnosisas such.

Notwithstanding the view of ancient Hindu spiri-tuality, if the so-called mystical experience is a specialstate wherein the subject-object relation is eliminated,from the perspective of rational Western science andphilosophywhich has tended to assume the relation

is ontologically realhow can any knowledge bederived of it or from it? Putatively, it is not the kind ofexperience of which questions like what did youlearn? can be meaningfully asked. Instead, we tend tospeak about the mystical experience as a state of nomind or about consciousness without intentionwherein knowledge is simply given. Of course, fromthe standpoint of Husserls and Brentanos schools ofphenomenology, such consciousness and knowledgeare impossible. The substance of the phenomenologi-cal arguments, however, have been rendered suspect by

more recent writers in the area of mystical experience(Forman, 1998; Pike, 1992). Thus, in the end, it maybe contended that the highest experience of the mys-tics may be understood as consciousness directed uponitself or consciousness that experiences itself as pureawareness itself (Forman, 1998).

In order to evaluate the epistemological relevanceand veracity of mystical experience, it is of centralimportance that we understand the states of mind ofthose individuals who lay claim to having had such anexperience. Forman (1998, p. 1617) states,

It should be clear that on empirical matters, the

statements of philosophers have no legislative force.No matter how many Humes, Moores, orHamiltons observe that they cannot catch them-selves devoid of perceptions, this tells us little aboutwhat a Hindu monk, Dominican friar, or Sufi adeptmight experience after years of yoga, Jesus prayer, orSufi dancing. Indeed, many mystics do report thatthey have undergone something quite unique.



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It might be imagined that the philosophers cited byForman tried to catch themselves without perceptionon two or three quiet furtive attempts but to littleavail. This outcome should come as no surprise sincethose attempts likely would have been delimited by

their a priori commitment to their respective philo-sophical perspectives (much in the same way that themystical experience is interpreted by the doctrine usedby the experient). As a result, and likely without beingaware of the experiential implications of their attitudeof trying to seeing something about or within con-sciousness, these thinkers probably could not haveallowed themselves and their stance toward the sub-ject-object dichotomy to dissolve completely. Ofcourse, to say this does not mean that non-dual expe-rience was unavailable to these great thinkers. Who isto say whether one of them might have achieved such

states of consciousness after some years of meditation,visualization, or similar practices. Who is to say whatProfessor Moore might have seen in his sensation ofblue had he performed twenty years of Tantric visual-izations of blue mandalas. However, what I am tryingto get at here is that the mystical experience cannot beunderstood logically or through the application of arational system of thought. Rather, it is an empiricalmatter, though not one readily digestible by modernscience. As noted by Forman (1998), there are enor-mous differences between ordinary empirical attempts

to introspect the sensations of consciousness and atransformative meditative paththe former does notimpose logical limits on the latter.

If one agrees with the possibility of pure experi-ence in which there does not exist an ontologicallygrounded distinction between subject and object, itthen becomes possible to examine a subject (or inte-riorized world or phaneron in the terminology ofCharles Pierce) as a kind of self-conscious focus of thisexperience and to explore the manner in which thesubject-object distinction arises in consciousness. Insuch a case, we may begin the inquiry from the posi-

tion that we do not merely live in the outer world;rather, we experience the world and it is experiencedby us. The world becomes the objective side of thefield of pure experience, while the human beingembodies the subjective aspect. In this context, thefield of pure experience as a whole may be seen asutterly transcendent to a subject-object dichotomy,with the reification of the dichotomy holding some

pragmatic value but no ontological value.This position is very similar to that maintained by

Buddhism. Russian Buddhologist O. O. Rosenberghas written that in Buddhist thought there is no dis-tinction made between living beings and the contentsof their perceptions; they are one and the same entity.

Buddhism does not reject the reality of the external, itis simply not analyzed as separate from the perceptionof the experient. Rosenberg (1991) comments, it isonly said that a human being experiencing any phe-nomena (e.g., a person looking at the sun), consists ofsuch and such elements in such and such interrela-tions, and so on (p. 90).

Nevertheless, it may be supposed that some eventsare not given in immediate experience but rather occuroutside of experience (e.g., the events on the other sideof the moon as maintained by B. Russell). As an argu-ment against this point, Solovyev (1993) has contended

that even in the natural science of astronomy, gains inknowledge of the cosmos are dependent upon empiri-cal/experiential verification (e.g., the discovery of anew planet by Parisian astronomer Leverier basedupon his mathematical analysis of known planetaryorbits was viewed as suspect until it was confirmedthrough experience derived from use of the telescopeand spectral analysis). Thus, it does not appear ten-able, at least when exploring the nature of mysticalexperience, to maintain that reality occurs or can beknown outside of experience.

Taking the position consistent with Solovyev andBuddhism most generally, it can be maintained thatexperience is composed of the experiencer and thething to be experienced. However, it should appearobvious that every living being experiences the worldof its (his/her) own and that the worlds (phanerons) ofdifferent living beings differ greatly from one another(e.g., the phanerons of humans ostensibly differ fromthose of other animals). Despite this, it may be arguedthat regardless of the experiencer, the ability to deriveknowledge from any given experience is contingent onthe ability to conceptually differentiate between sub-

ject and object. That is, the almost arbitrary andabstract separation of the subject from the object hasepistemological implicationssuch a separationallows the subject to know the object. Nevertheless,such a distinction, while having a direct bearing onepistemology, does not uncover or adequately addressthe true ontological and metaphysical nature of pureexperience.



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Emerging from this is the question: Is it possibleto apprehend and know reality as prior to the world ofpure experience? Stated in a different way, is it possibleto recognize reality as it is by itself (yathabhutam)?Proponents of mystical experience as a mode of know-ing assert that it is possible. From this point of view,

the mystical experience in its highest expression maybe seen as a form of cognizing penetration. Subjectand object are embraced by a kind of unity which istranscendent to the immanent space of pure experi-ence, and the phenomenal interrelations of subject andobject can be perceived as a kind of reflection (orappearance) of a highest form of non-duality (or ofadvayaas mentioned in the Brhadaranyaka Upanishadcited earlier). Consequently, one can suppose that thephenomenological unity of pure experience needs asource beyond it. The contents of our experience aregiven to us and we are not able by our volition to

change such contents. Human subjects are not gods oftheir own phanerons. Rather, the universe is given tothe subject by something transcendent to phaneronitself (be it the transcendent ens matter of the mate-rialists or the God of theists). In all likelihood, thephenomenological unity of experience is preceded by aground unity of subject and object and simply due tothis natural and original unity, the experiencing sub-ject and the empirical object may be seen as two polesof the field of pure experience, which possess one andthe same basic nature. Thus, subjects and objects expe-

rienced are aspects of the field of pure experience. Allelements of the universe are phenomena or appear-ances of the fundamental unity that serves as theground on which all qualities of experience are con-structed.

Self-Cognizing As a Vehicle toTrue Knowledge

Schopenhauer noted that the only path to theknowledge of reality as it is (or as thing-in-itselfaccording to the Kantian phraseology adopted by

Schopenhauer) is the path of self-cognizing. All phe-nomena outside of the subject are given to our self-consciousness only vicariously, from the outside.However, insofar as we can examine ourselves, we findthat we know ourselves from the inside. Extendingfrom this, and assuming that the inner subject or selfis of the same nature as the whole world, it may bemaintained that the exploration of the nature of self

more readily enables the individual to discover thisunderlying pervasive quality of sameness. Further, wemay ex hypothesi conclude that the so-called mysticalexperience is a kind of cognizing (gnosis) that pene-trates in a very special manner from inside into thenature of the innermost self, thus revealing the charac-

ter and nature of this self. At the same time, because ofthe inherent unity of subject and object, this is also acognizing of the nature of all objective appearances asmuch as they are immanent to the cognizing self andthus attainable as knowledge of the subject. We candescribe such cognizing as movement from the con-ceptualized world of appearances to the nonconceptu-alized knowledge of nonconceptual reality as it is, orreality as such (Tathata, or Suchness of the Buddhisttexts). In Mahayana Buddhism, this knowledge of real-ity is referred to as yatha bhutam.

Kant stated in his Critique of Pure Reason that the

knowledge of the thing as it is (Ding an sich) is pos-sible only if we are able to eliminate our present formsof sensory intuitions and uncover a new kind of nonsensory intuition. It can be said that mystical experi-ence is such a non sensory mode of cognition.

In the end, and as stated earlier in this article, theultimate value and significance of mystical experiencecannot be ascertained by philosophical discoursealone. As such, the conclusions reached in the latterhalf of this paper should be interpreted as, at best, aneffort at approximating the process of how knowledge

arises in the context of subject-object duality. The epis-temological and ontological issues of the researchesinto the mystical experience are too important to beneglected anymore. One can even suppose that suchstudies, along with the development of philosophicalaspects of psychology (first of all, transpersonal psy-chology), may supply philosophy with new impetus toovercome the difficulties of its traditional approaches,thus opening new horizons and unknown dimensionsof our undersanding of reality.



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End Notes

1. This alignment of mysticism with irrationality maybe, at least in part, traced to Judeo-Christian interpre-tations of such problems as faith and knowledge/intel-lect and, ostensibly, has resulted in a largely negative

reaction on the part of scholars, scientists, and philoso-phers to the challenges presented by the mystical expe-rience. It is important to note, however, that in manynon-European cultures, the opposition of the mysticaland the rational is less absolute and even absent alltogether. Mystics in the Indo-Buddhist cultural tradi-tion, for instance, do not negate the significance of theintellect (or, more exactly, the significance of discursivethought). Instead, we see an effort at applying discrim-inating rationality to the analysis and comprehensionof mystical experience. Moreover, even in Europe,there are philosophical systems that may be interpret-ed as arising from the critical and rational analysis ofmystical experience (e.g., the work of Spinoza may beseen as the rationalization of the mystical experience[illumination]; Vladimir Solovyevs system of all-unity may be understood as closely connected to hisown mystical experience). Nevertheless, and despitethe few exceptions seen in Western thought, mysticismis generally perceived as an enemy of rationality and,combined with its numerous and ambiguous mean-ings, has become a term that has little value in mean-ingful philosophical discourse.

2. It may be argued that any description of any state ofconsciousness, even the most elementary of states, can-not be done in an absolutely adequate manner.Language, at least natural language, has not beenexplicitly developed to describe the inner world of per-sonality or inner psychic processes. That is, languagedoes not appear to have been designed, and is not par-ticularly well suited, to serve as an intersubjective toolof communication.

3. In this vein, I agree with Pikes (1992) criticism of

Staces (1960) concept of introvertive mysticism.

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