MVMB v. Gray - Petition for Writ of Prohibition - Mo. Sup. Ct.
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Transcript of MVMB v. Gray - Petition for Writ of Prohibition - Mo. Sup. Ct.
Case No. _______________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. BROOKE RENE GRAY,Relator,
v.THE HONORABLE THOMAS J. CHAPMAN,
Circuit Judge of Clinton County,Respondent.
WRIT SUMMARY
Identity of parties and their attorneys in the underlying action, if any: Brooke Rene
Gray, defendant, represented by David Roland (Mo. Bar #60548); Missouri Veterinary
Medical Board, represented by Edwin Frownfelter, Asst. Atty. Gen.
Nature of underlying action, if any: Case No. 10CN-CV00842 is a civil action filed
pursuant to § 340.276, RSMo, to enjoin alleged unauthorized practice of veterinary
medicine, which is a Class A misdemeanor under § 340.294.
Action of Respondent being challenged, including date thereof: Respondent denied
Ms. Gray’s demand for jury trial. Initial determination that Ms. Gray had no right to jury
trial made in docket entry on February 15, 2011; on April 22, 2011, Respondent ordered
case set for bench trial to commence on September 26, 2011.
Relief sought by Relator or Petitioner: Relator asks this Court to prohibit Respondent
from proceeding to trial without first empanelling a jury to determine the facts to which
the law will apply.
Date case set for trial, if set, and date of any other event bearing upon relief sought
(e.g., date of deposition or motion hearing): Respondent has scheduled a bench trial to
commence on September 26, 2011.
Date, court and disposition of any previous or pending writ proceeding concerning
the action or related matter: Relator filed Petition for Writ of Prohibition with the
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, on June 23, 2011. The matter was assigned
case number WD74032. That court issued an order denying the writ on June 27, 2011.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________________DAVID E. ROLAND, Mo. Bar #60548Freedom Center of Missouri5938 De Giverville Ave.St. Louis, Missouri 63112Telephone: (314) 604-6621Facsimile: (314) [email protected]
Attorney for the Relator
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Case No. _______________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. BROOKE RENE GRAY,Relator,
v.
THE HONORABLE THOMAS J. CHAPMAN,Circuit Judge of Clinton County,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
DAVID E. ROLAND, Mo. Bar #60548Freedom Center of Missouri5938 De Giverville Ave.St. Louis, Missouri 63112Telephone: (314) 604-6621Facsimile: (314) [email protected]
Attorney for the Relator
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Comes now Relator, and in support of her Petition for Writ of Prohibition, states
as follows:
1. Relator Brooke Gray is a defendant in the civil matter of Missouri Veterinary
Medical Board v. Gray, Case No. 10CN-CV00842, now pending in the Clinton County
Circuit Court, State of Missouri.
2. Respondent is the Honorable Thomas J. Chapman, Circuit Judge of Clinton
County, which is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
3. The Supreme Court of Missouri has jurisdiction to hear this matter and authority
to grant Relator relief pursuant to V.A.M.R. Civil Rule 84.23.
4. On September 7, 2011, the Missouri Veterinary Medical Board filed a Petition
for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction which accused Ms. Gray of engaging in
behaviors that, if proven, would constitute multiple Class A misdemeanors.
5. In her Answer, Ms. Gray raised a number of affirmative defenses based on the
Missouri and U.S. Constitutions and demanded a jury trial as is her right under Article I,
Section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution.
6. In its Reply to Defendant’s Affirmative Defenses, the Veterinary Medical Board
denied that Ms. Gray had any right to a jury trial.
7. On January 18, 2011, the Veterinary Medical Board filed a Motion in Limine
that included a request for a ruling that Ms. Gray had no right to a jury trial.
8. On February 15, 2011, a hearing was held on this Motion in Limine. After
hearing arguments, the Honorable Thomas J. Chapman announced his finding that Ms.
Gray is not entitled to have a jury determine the facts to which the law will be applied in
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this case.
9. Respondent has set this case for a non-jury trial on September 26, 2011.
10. Article I, Section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution guarantees citizens the
right of trial by jury in both criminal and civil matters “as heretofore enjoyed;” because in
order to prevail in its case the government must prove that Ms. Gray committed criminal
acts and also because Missouri courts have recognized that the Anglo-American legal
tradition has always afforded a jury trial in cases demanding the injunction of a public
nuisance, the Respondent’s denial of Ms. Gray’s demand for a jury trial would
improperly deprive her of this constitutional right.
11. Failure to issue a writ of prohibition will result in irreparable harm to Ms.
Gray, due to the denial of her constitutional right.
12. Relator herein files Suggestions in Support of Petition for Writ of Prohibition,
as well as Notice of Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
WHEREFORE, Relator prays this Court issue its preliminary Writ of Prohibition
against Respondent, the Honorable Thomas J. Chapman, barring the holding of a trial
without a jury in Clinton County Circuit Court, Case No. 10CN-CV00842, and that
Respondent be required to answer and show cause why a final judgment in Prohibition
should not be entered, and that upon a final hearing the preliminary rule be made final.
Respectfully submitted,
__________________________Attorney for Relator
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Case No. _______________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. BROOKE RENE GRAY,Relator,
v.THE HONORABLE THOMAS J. CHAPMAN,
Circuit Judge of Clinton County,Respondent.
SUGGESTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
I. INTRODUCTION
Relator Brooke Gray is a defendant in the civil matter of Missouri Veterinary
Medical Board v. Gray, Case No. 10CN-CV00842, now pending in the Clinton County
Circuit Court, State of Missouri. Respondent is the Honorable Thomas J. Chapman,
judge of the Circuit Court of Clinton County.
Ms. Gray is seeking the requested Writ of Prohibition in response to the
Respondent’s rejecting her demand for a jury trial and setting of the underlying case for a
trial without a jury. The Missouri Constitution guarantees citizens the right to trial by
jury in both criminal and civil matters, although Missouri courts have recognized that in
the Anglo-American legal tradition the right to a jury trial was not generally extended to
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civil actions calling for a balancing of equities. The Missouri Veterinary Medical Board
has attempted to frame the underlying case as an equitable action because injunctions
have traditionally been considered equitable in nature. But the equitable nature of an
injunction lies in the fact that the courts would traditionally only use this tool after
engaging in a balancing of equities. In this case, the Veterinary Medical Board has
argued that section 340.276, RSMo., requires Missouri courts to issue an injunction
without engaging in any balancing of equities.1 Additionally, the government can only
prevail at trial if it proves that Ms. Gray committed acts that section 340.294 categorizes
as Class A misdemeanors. Missouri law has long held that even under the very limited
circumstances in which courts are permitted to enjoin criminal acts,2 citizens in Ms.
Gray’s situation still are entitled to have a jury determine the facts to which the law will
1 Specifically, the Board maintains that it need not demonstrate that any identifiable
person has suffered (or is likely to suffer) any harm as a result of the acts to be enjoined.
2 Missouri courts have steadfastly refused to enjoin criminal acts unless the act
complained of threatens irreparable injury to the party seeking the injunction. See Kinder
v. Nixon, 2000 WL 684860, *12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2000) (unreported); City of Kansas City
v. Mary Don Co., 606 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Mo. App. W.D. 1980); Missouri Veterinary
Medical Ass’n v. Glisan, 230 S.W.2d 169, 171 (Mo. App. 1950); State ex rel. Chicago, B.
& Q.R. Co v. Woolfolk, 190 S.W. 877, 878 (Mo. banc 1916); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co.
v. Saxey, 32 S.W. 1106, 1108 (Mo. 1895). The trial court has not yet ruled whether it
may exercise its equitable powers to enjoin the criminal acts the government has alleged
in this case, so this issue is not presented by this Petition.
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be applied. “A writ of prohibition is appropriate when a trial court improperly denies the
right to a trial by jury.” State ex rel. Barker v. Tobben, 311 S.W.3d 798, 800 (Mo. banc
2010).
II. ARGUMENT
The Missouri Bill of Rights ensures that “the right of trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate.” Mo. Const. Art. I, § 22(a). The Missouri Supreme Court
“has interpreted the phrase ‘as heretofore enjoyed’ as protecting ‘all the substantial
incidents and consequences that pertain to the right to jury trial at common law.’” State
v. Celis-Garcia, Case No. SC90980 (Mo. banc June 14, 2011). Missouri courts have
generally determined that because jury trials were not traditionally afforded in courts of
equity, the right to a jury trial does not apply to civil actions sounding in equity. Tobben,
311 S.W.3d at 800. However, an unbroken string of Missouri court decisions have also
held that where a party requests an injunction to enforce a criminal statute rather than to
prevent an injury to their property rights or to terminate a public nuisance, the relief
demanded cannot be considered equitable in nature and that the defendant is entitled to
have a jury determine the facts to which the law will be applied in their case.
In State ex rel. Cir. Atty. v. Uhrig, 14 Mo.App. 413 (1883), a government attorney
had instituted a civil action to enjoin the unlicensed operation of a dram-shop, which St.
Louis City had made a criminal offense. As in the instant case, the government attorney
in Uhrig attempted to avoid a jury trial by treating the action as an equitable proceeding
rather than pursuing the available criminal charges. The Court of Appeals determined
that in the Anglo-American common law tradition the government was almost never
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permitted to ask a court of equity to enjoin activity that might constitute a criminal
offense, although the exceptions to this rule included efforts “to restrain threatened
nuisances dangerous to the health of a whole community.” Id. at 414. But the Court also
pointed out that even where the law allowed courts to enjoin criminal acts, Missouri
citizens retained their right to a jury trial because “the right of trial by jury has always
been enjoyed in England and America in prosecutions for public nuisances.” Id. at 417.
Courts established these rules — and Missouri courts have maintained them — due to a
recognition that if the government is permitted to enforce criminal laws through courts of
equity, it would seize the opportunity to use that power to deprive citizens of their
liberties without affording them the protections due to those directly accused of crimes.
See id. at 416. The Uhrig Court did not dispute that the unlicensed dramshop at issue in
that case might be shown to constitute a public nuisance injurious to the public, but it still
denied judicial authority to issue the requested injunction because if such an injunction
were disobeyed, “a single judge… would hear evidence and try the facts whether the
defendants had committed such isolated criminal acts—facts which, with the exceptions
already stated, the law has always required to be contested before a jury.” Id. at 417.
Thus, the Uhrig Court made clear that as a matter of history and Missouri Constitutional
law, even if the circumstances allow a court to consider enjoining criminal activity, the
citizen accused of engaging in that activity is entitled to have a jury determine the facts to
which the court will apply the law.
This reasoning was adopted just a few years later when the St. Louis Court of
Appeals decided Warren v. Cavanaugh, 33 Mo.App. 102 (Mo. Ct. App.1888), in which a
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party attempted to enjoin the operation of an allegedly unlawful rock quarry in St. Louis.
The question before the Court in that case was whether “courts of equity [will], by
injunction or otherwise, restrain the doing of a thing which is not a nuisance per se or at
common law, but which is only illegal by reason of the ordinance or regulation of a city
or town?” Id. at 107. The Court found near-unanimous agreement among authorities that
“a court of equity may enjoin a defendant from doing that which an ordinance also
prohibits, but not because of the ordinance, but rather because, and aside from the
ordinance, the thing itself is a nuisance, either always or because of particular facts or
circumstances surrounding the case.” Id. at 108 (emphasis in original). While the Court’s
decision in this case did not specifically reference the constitutional right to trial by jury,
it highlighted the importance of fact-finding in cases such as this, which both reinforces
the vital role that juries play in such a situation and demonstrates that the legislature may
not conjure up “equity” by fiat. See also Missouri Veterinary Medical Ass’n v. Glisan,
230 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Mo. App. 1950) (practicing veterinary medicine without a license
may violate the law, but “is not of itself a public nuisance”); Parvey v. Humane Society of
Missouri, 343 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961) (dismissing petition to enjoin nuisance
for failure to state a claim, even though Chapter 340 explicitly declared unauthorized
practice of veterinary medicine to be a public nuisance).
The Kansas City Court of Appeals considered a similar case, Rice v. Jefferson, 50
Mo.App. 464 (1892), which provides a perfect example of the constitutional dangers that
would result if Missouri courts were permitted to enjoin allegedly criminal behavior. In
Rice, a private party sought to enjoin the construction of a building allegedly in violation
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of a Kansas City ordinance, even though the defendant had already been subjected to a
criminal prosecution in which a jury found him not guilty. The Court cited Uhrig for the
proposition that “equity will not interfere in [nuisance] cases” where a criminal penalty is
available, id. at 469, but also pointed out that allowing such cases to proceed in equity
could result in “one accused of crime or misdemeanor [being] deprived of the
constitutional right of trial by jury.” Id. at 470.
The cited cases anticipated the very problem presented by the instant case: a
government agency has accused a citizen of engaging in criminal activity, but it has
attempted to deny Ms. Gray the constitutional rights due to the criminally accused by
pursuing an injunction rather than criminal prosecution. If the Respondent is permitted to
try this case without empanelling a jury to decide the facts to which the law will be
applied, Ms. Gray faces the very same deprivation of constitutional rights warned of in
each of the above cases. The Relator has found no Missouri appellate cases that have
either questioned or overturned the well-established rule that citizens accused of crimes,
misdemeanors, or civil public nuisances have a constitutional right to have their cases
heard by a jury. As such, Ms. Gray is entitled to have a jury determine the facts of the
underlying action and this Court should grant a Writ of Prohibition that will assure her of
this right.
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Relator prays this court to issue its
preliminary Writ of Prohibition against Respondent, the Honorable Thomas J. Chapman,
barring him from proceeding to trial in this case without granting Ms. Gray the jury to
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which Article I, section 22(a) entitles her.
Respectfully submitted,
________________________________DAVID E. ROLAND, Mo. Bar #60548Freedom Center of Missouri5938 De Giverville Ave.St. Louis, Missouri 63112Telephone: (314) 604-6621Facsimile: (314) [email protected]
Attorney for the Relator
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