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Political, Religious, and PsychologicalCharacteristics of Muslim ProtestMarchers in Eight European Cities:Jerusalem Day 2002

Ayla Schbley a & Clark McCauley ba

Washburn University, Topeka, Kansas, USAb

Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, USA

Available onl ine: 25 Jan 2007

To cite this art icle: Ayla Schbley & Clark McCauley (2005): Political, Religious, and PsychologicalCharact eri st ics of Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European Cit ies: Jerusalem Day 2002, Terrorismand Political Violence, 17:4, 551-572

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Political, Religious, and Psychological Characteristicsof Muslim Protest Marchers in Eight European Cities:

Jerusalem Day 2002

AYLA SCHBLEY

Washburn University, Topeka, Kansas, USA

CLARK McCAULEY

Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, USA

A questionnaire was completed by 650 Muslim men marching on Jerusalem Day2002 to protest the loss of Jerusalem to the Israelis. These respondents were selectedfor religiosity and support for terrorism from among 2,619 marchers in eightEuropean cities who completed a brief screening survey. Results indicate thatmarchers differ on four independent dimensions of religion and politics: charismaticleadership, religiosity, separate nationalism, and family commitment to the IslamicRevolution. Marchers also differed on two independent dimensions of personality:neuroticism and extraversion-impulsiveness. Respondents with a charismaticreligious leader were more willing to use chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons(CBN). None of the six dimensions was related to interest in martyrdom. Notably,

neither religion (Sunni vs. Shia) nor religiosity was related to willingness to useCBN or interest in martyrdom. Most generally, results suggest that violence in sup-port of Islamic causes cannot be understood as the expression of extreme religiousbeliefs or exceptional religious devotion. The discussion points to the importance ofrelationships rather than individual characteristics in understanding propensity forterrorist violence.

The war on terrorism that began after September 11, has focused particularly on AlQaeda, an organization or franchise built by Osama bin Laden. Exactly who andwhat Al Qaeda is today cannot be answered with confidence, but what makes AlQaeda more than a temporary problem is the sympathy and support it receives from

Muslims in predominantly Islamic countries stretching from Morocco to Indonesia,the Philippines, and Thailand. Sympathy and support for Al Qaeda comes also fromMuslims in non-Islamic countries. The attacks of September 11 signaled the impor-tance of the Islamic diaspora: the young men who carried out the attacks weremostly of Saudi Arabian origins who had emigrated to work and study in Europe.Thus the war on terrorism has tended to give special attention to the threat posed

The authors gratefully acknowledge support for their work on this paper from WashburnUniversity, Bryn Mawr College, and the Solomon Asch Center for Study of EthnopoliticalConflict at the University of Pennsylvania. Thanks are also due to Sophia Moskalenko

and Marc Schulz for comments and suggestions related to personality dimensions in our data.Address correspondence to Clark McCauley, Psychology Department, Bryn Mawr

College, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Terrorism and Political Violence, 17:551572, 2005Copyright Taylor & Francis Inc.ISSN: 0954-6553 print=1556-1836 onlineDOI: 10.1080/09546550500174921

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by young Muslim men in Europe, particularly those who can be construed asfundamentalists.

From a Western perspective, fundamentalism refers to a specifiable pattern ofreligious militancy by which self-styled true believers attempt to arrest the erosion

of religious identity, fortify the borders of the religious community, and create viablealternatives to secular structures and processes.1 Islamic fundamentalists seek anIslamic state or states in the model of the Islamic caliphates of the seventh and eighthcenturies. Some Islamic fundamentalists do not at this time support political violence(e.g., Hizb-at-Tahrir); those who do are often called Islamists.2

The relation between religion and political violence in Islam is therefore complexand in need of exploration. In this paper we present results of a survey of Muslimmen participating in Jerusalem Day protest marches in eight European cities in2002. The marchers might seem, by shared appearance and shared action, to be arelatively homogenous group. We will show, however, that marchers differ in back-ground, personality, and political and religious opinions in ways that can be relatedto willingness to use violence against Western targets.

To introduce the study, three brief reviews are in order. First, we need to look atterrorist profiling, an enterprise based on the idea that terrorists are sufficiently hom-ogenous that a description can be developed to aid in identifying and combating ter-rorists. Second, we need to review a particular instantiation of profiling that linksterrorism with fundamentalist Islamic beliefs and organizations. Third, we need todescribe the origins and meaning of Jerusalem Day and of Al Manar television,the occasion and instigation of the protests from which our respondents came.

Profiling Terrorists: Potential and Problems

Police and security services are ever on the lookout for a typology or characteriza-tion of criminals that can be used for screening purposes in criminal investigations.3

Since September 11, there has been a considerable effort to find the characteristics ofIslamist terrorists and potential terrorists that can be employed for screening air tra-velers or focusing investigations of terrorist threats or activities.4 These characteris-tics may include relatively objective indicators such as age (young), gender (male),dress and hair (beard, no jewelry), suitcase content (particular foods), life history(origin or recent travel in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iraq), socioeconomic status (lower),and personal contacts (associations with radical individuals or radical mosques).More psychological indicators may also be sought, such as religious beliefs(millenarian interpretation of the Koran), nervous behavior under observation orinterrogation, low self-esteem, depression, or narcissistic personality.

The difficulty in producing a successful profile for religious terrorists lies in theproblem of false positives. The characteristics of terrorist actors are usually sharedby a large number of individuals who may be sympathetic to terrorists and theircause but who have not been mobilized to action. Terrorists are usually the smallapex of a very large pyramid of supporters and sympathizers. The base of the pyra-mid includes all who agree with the announced goals of the terrorists, even thoughthey may disagree with terrorist attacks on civilians as the means to these goals.Rising from the base of the pyramid, there are smaller numbers but increasing com-

mitment and mobilization in support of the terrorist apex. The difficulty of distin-guishing terrorist actors from terrorist sympathizers is made more acute by thepossibility that action taken against all who fit a profile will backfire in mobilizing

552 A. Schbley and C. McCauley


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terrorist sympathizers to increased risk-taking and commitment to terrorist action.5

Concerns of this kind have led some scholars to doubt the possibility of a usefulterrorist profile.6

Like other forms of categorization and classification, profiling aims to summar-

ize information, to give structure to research and communication among researchers,and to facilitate prediction and explanation of terrorist events. Profiling cannotbecome a court-admissible science until it satisfies the requirements of Daubertand the Federal Rules of Evidence.7 These can only be satisfied with replication ofstudies that can test profiling characteristics in ways that will provide some indi-cation of the probability that a randomly chosen individual who fits the profile willin fact be involved in terrorist activity. The difficulty of doing this kind of researchsuggests that profiling may better be thought of as the first step in a rough screening,with more attention to those who fit the profile and perhaps application of moreexpensive forms of testing.8

In this study, we examine the opinions, feelings, and experiences of JerusalemDay protestors to learn what may distinguish those who are more and less readyfor terrorist actions such as martyrdom and the use of weapons of mass destruction.We do so with respect both for those who are trying to develop diagnostic descrip-tions of terrorist motivations and characteristics, and for those who have pointed tothe danger of putting too much weight on terrorist profiles that are fallible startingpoints for understanding the origins and recruitment of terrorists. Our results willindicate some of the complexity of this kind of understanding.

The Link between Terrorism and Fundamentalist Islam

This section will consider briefly how the terrorist threat to the United States hascome to be associated with fundamentalist Islam, including both Shia and Sunnigroups (5).

The link between terrorism and fundamentalist Islam is commonplace in the dis-course of policy makers, security analysts, and the general public. Google results inApril 2005 show this link clearly: Wahhabism and terrorism 55,900 hits, Salafi andterrorism 20,600 hits, Shia and terrorism 375,000 hitsbut fundamentalism and ter-rorism a striking 623,000 hits. Currently the simplest and most general answer to thequestion where does terrorism come from? is that it comes from fundamentalistIslam.

The relations among Wahhabi, Salafi, and Shia Islamic fundamentalistideologiesand between these ideologies and terrorismare complex and cannotbe fully explicated here. In brief it may be said that the Shia are one of Islamstwo primary sects, the other being the majority Sunni, and that Wahhabism andSalafism are austere forms and movements, respectively, of Sunni Islam that seeka return to the purity and politics of the first generation of Muslims.

Shia involvement in terrorism has in recent years included Hizbullah violenceagainst American, European, Lebanese, and Israeli targets.9 Wahhabist=Salafistinvolvements in terrorism became salient after Al Qaedas 1993, 1996, 1999, and2001 attacks on U.S. targets, as bin Laden and many of his followers are often ident-ified as Wahhabists. In relation to the September 11 attacks, Sageman distinguishes

between Salafists and global Salafists.10

Salafists can seek political power in their ownstates, or they can seek to integrate many current states into a single great Islamicpower. The model for this great power is the caliphate and other Islamic dynasties

Characteristics of Muslim Protest Marchers 553


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that ruled what now constitutes forty-five countries (including Syria, Lebanon,Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey) between 622 and 1927.11

Sageman focuses his empirical efforts on tracing networks of Al Qaeda terrorists,some of whom are Salafists, and describes Al Qaeda as the vanguard of a global

Salafist movement.A more conservative analysis might recognize Salafists as only part of the pyramid

of Al Qaeda supporters, perhaps a more important part before September 11 thanafter. Many Salafists aim for a seventh century lifestyle that can get in the way oftwenty-first century terrorism. Similarly, many Wahhabists, particularly in SaudiArabia, do not support Al Qaedas terror operations. Even if most members of afundamentalist Islamic group were known to support terrorism against Westerntargets, it would not follow that the most religious members of these groups are mostlikely to undertake terrorism. A relation between terrorism and religion at the grouplevel is not necessarily reflected in a similar relation at the individual level: morefundamentalist groups may produce more terrorists even if it is the least religiousgroup members who turn to terrorism.

Thus the goal of the present study was to learn more about the political,religious, and psychological constituents of support for terrorism, especially as theseconstituents might relate to individual willingness to undertake martyrdom and useweapons of mass destruction.

Jerusalem Day Marchers in European Cities

Shia leader Ayatollah Khomeinis fatwa (edict) originated Jerusalem Day onOctober 18, 1979. The fatwa12 called on all Shia to commemorate the loss of

Jerusalems holy mosques to the Israelis and to prepare for the liberation of Jerusalemand the eradication of Israel. The day appointed for this commemoration was to bethe last Friday of each Ramadan, a period of atonement in the Islamic calendar. 13

Until the attacks of September 11, Jerusalem Day memorials and parades werelimited to Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon; these are Shia enclaves that were bound to followKhomeinis fatwa.14 Sunni Muslims did not participate because the schism betweenSunni and Shia involves blood and animosity almost as old as Islam itself. SinceSeptember 11, however, the ongoing war on terrorism and the war in Iraq haveprovided a powerful impetus to Islamic unity. Worldwide there is an effort to patchthe deep wounds that divide Shia and Sunniwounds that are being miraculouslyhealed and cauterized by the intensity of shared animosity toward Israel and theUnited States.

On Friday, December 6, 2002, for the first time marches and parades took placein all Islamic countriesSunni as well as Shiaand in twenty European cities fromMadrid to Moscow. In each city, the marchers ended their route with a demon-stration at the gate of the Israeli or American embassy. Signs calling for the with-drawal from Islamic lands were brought in or handed out at the train stations.

Orchestrated by the Al Manar television station and several Islamic organiza-tions throughout Europe, an estimated twenty thousand marchers gathered in themain train stations of sixteen European capitals, including the Vatican train stationin Rome and Victoria Station in England. The number of marchers was estimated to

be over five thousand in The Hague, three thousand in Paris and Berlin, and one totwo thousand in Bern, Copenhagen, Diekirch (Luxembourg), London, and Rome.15

These are the eight cities in which our survey was conducted.



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The role of Al Manar in encouraging marching on Jerusalem Day requires someexplication. Al Manar is often thought of as the voice of Hizbullah, a Shia-dominatedmilitant group, but this characterization may be misleading. Schbley suggests thatHizbullah in Lebanon, an organization originally established as a religious network

with narrowly defined politico-socioeconomic goals, has eroded.16

It is evolvinginto a transnational political and military arm of Islamists with wider politico-socio-economic and sectarian interests; its fundamental Islamist jihad activities nowfunction as a core that can reunite Islamists of all sects and national origins. Applebysuggests that to be effective. . .religious militants must find vehicles of persuasion,17

and Islamists seeking reunification and reconsolidation are being spearheaded bytools of persuasion such as Al Manar.

It is worth noting that Al Manar broadcasts two different packages of programs,one aimed at its local Lebanese and primarily Muslim audience (both Shia andSunni) and the second that is geared for foreign consumption via satellite by Islamicaudiences worldwide. The second package cannot be received in Lebanon by themany who do not have a satellite receiver, but is widely received around the world.Al Manar does broadcast some canned programs produced in Iran, but according toAvi Jorisch, Al Manar has no interest in promoting a shiite sectarian agenda. . ..[rather it is] vying for a much broader target audience: the. . .Arab-Muslim world. . .Al-Manar. . .station ranks among the top five most-watched stations throughout theArab world and. . .draws approximately 10 million viewers daily.18

In 2003 and 2004, the numbers of Jerusalem Day marchers increased throughoutEurope, Australia, Africa, and the Islamic nations.19 These marches may not begrowing further, however. On Monday, December 13, 2004, a French court orderedthe French-based Eutelsat company to shut down Al Manar broadcasts following

accusations that its program were anti-Semitic and could incite hatred. And onFriday, December 17, 2004, this French court decision was followed by the U.S.secretary of states designation of Al Manar as a terrorist organization.20

Therefore, until Al Manar launches its own satellite, its present inability to transmitinto Europe, the United States, Australia, Canada, and Africa via French andAmerican satellites may slow the growth of Jerusalem Day marches.

Jerusalem Day marchers are not typical Muslims, or even typical of Muslimsliving in Europe. According to the U.S. State Departments 2004 InternationalReligious Freedom Report, Islam is the religion of about 8 percent of the French popu-lation; 6 percent of the Dutch; 4 percent of the Germans, Austrians, and Belgians; 3percent of the British and the Danish; and 2 percent of Italians and Spaniards.21

These percentages translate into about 15 million people of Islamic faith in Europe,of which perhaps 9 million are males between fourteen and thirty years of age.

Thus, the approximately twenty thousand marchers were an activist minority ofMuslim males living in Europe; less than one in a thousand Muslim men in Europe

joined the Jerusalem Day marchers in 2002. As a minority turned out to protest onthe last day of Ramadan and a fast day, the marchers were a group self-selected forhigh motivation and outrage against the United States and Israel.

Methods

Participants in this study were selected from a larger number of Jerusalem Daymarchers who completed a brief survey in eight European train stations in 2002.The most radical among those completing this first survey were solicited to participate



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in a second and longer survey. Responses to the second survey are the focus of thisreport, which aims to learn more about the structure of political-religious opinionsand personality in relation to motivation for martyrdom and willingness to usechemical, biological, and nuclear (CBN) weapons in support of Islamist goals.

The First Survey Used to Screen Participants

Refreshment stands were placed in the main train stations in seven of the eight cities,and in the Victoria Station in London. They were set adjacent to Al Manar infor-mation tables. Each refreshment stand was composed of a table with a sign (2 by5 feet in size) upon which the following statement was handwritten in English: FreeSoft Drinks to Jerusalem Day Marchers.

Atop and around the table were stacked boxes of 4-ounce cans of soft drinks.Individuals who were offered soft drinks were also asked if they would be willingto fill out a questionnaire in English. Those who were willing were handed a ques-tionnaire in English that solicited data presented elsewhere,22 with a cover letter thatin turn provided each prospective participant with a general briefing about the natureof the study. The only verbal instructions given were, Please answer every question.If you do not respond to all the questions, your questionnaire will not be used.

The surveys were anonymous and relatively brief (about ten minutes). Com-pleted surveys were thus obtained from 2,619 Muslim males, citizens of twentytwo Arab and eight non-Arab Muslim countries, who were willing to travel on aFriday while fasting and to sacrifice time and money to express their feelings againstIsrael and the United States.

The Second Survey

Of the 2,619 participants who completed the first survey, 722 were solicited to com-plete the second survey that is the focus of this report. The sum of 5 Euros wasoffered for completion of the second survey (about $5.40 at the time). No recordwas kept of refusals, but few refused to complete the second survey and fewer than50 of those completing the second survey accepted payment.

The 722 were solicited partly on the basis of orthodox Islamic appearance:beard, no jewelry, plain clothes. Particular attention was given to the presence ofa samah (prayer callus on the forehead) that indicates strong Islamic practice andreligiosity; survey workers encouraged all those with a samah to complete the secondsurvey. In addition to appearance, respondents were selected on the basis ofresponses to seven items in the first survey: (1) martyrdom (istishhad) is a duty,(2) I will serve Allah with my life worldwide if called upon, (3) the IslamicRevolutions ends vindicate terrorism, (4) all Middle-and Near-Eastern countriesmust be united under the banner of Islam, (5) religious obligations consume morethan 40 percent of daily activities, (6) member of Hizbullah, Islamic Brotherhood,or other Islamic movement, and (7) military=combat training other than compulsorynational guard training. The response boxes corresponding to agreement with theseseven items were starred. At the end of the first survey appeared this solicitation: Ifyou have checked five or more boxes containing a () please complete another ques-

tionnaire and you will be paid 5 Euros. Thus the 722 respondents who completedthe second survey were selected from the 2,619 who completed the first survey onsome combination of appearance and agreement with at least five of the seven items.



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Of the 722 respondents to the second survey, 72 identified themselves as Chris-tian, Alewite, Druze, or other. These 72 were dropped from analysis to leave onlyrespondents from the two major divisions of Islam, 380 Shia and 270 Sunni.

The result of this triple selectionself selection as Jerusalem Day marchers

attracted to Al Manar information tables and stopping for a soft drink advertisedin English, selection for appearance and questionnaire markers of fundamentalistfervor, and selection for religionwas an eight-city sample of 650 Shia and SunniMuslims with a likely propensity to martyrdom and terrorism. Our goal was to learnmore about these radical and action-inclined individuals, both in regard to politicaland religious opinions and in regard to demographic background and personality.

Questionnaire for Second Survey

For an earlier study of members of Hizbullah, Schbley devised a self-administeredquestionnaire that could be completed in about ten minutes.23 This questionnairewas adapted for the present study in a four-page format with three sections (com-plete questionnaire available from authors).

Section 1 (page 1) consisted of fifteen items: self-reported demographic,citizenship, voting, and religious fellowship information, as well as respondentsage, marital status, educational level, and parents and household income. One ofthese items, asking whether the respondent follows the same religious leader as hisfather (1 no, 2 yes), was analyzed with the opinion items because of its observedrelation with these. In addition, presence of a samah on the respondents foreheadwas noted by the survey worker to whom the survey was handed (1 no, 2 yes).

Section 2 (pages 24) included sixty opinion items, including four multiple choiceitems and fifty-six opinion items rated on a 14 scale (1 strongly disagree,

2 disagree, 3 agree, 4 strongly agree). Of these items, thirty-six assessedopinions about terrorism, martyrdom, employment, leadership charisma, theocracy,ethno-religious national and international politics, and Muslim sectarian divisions.One of these items was unclear and dropped from analysis, leaving thirty-five polit-ical-religious opinion items for analysis. In addition twenty-four items assessed per-sonality and pathology issues that might be related to political and religious opinions.

Section 3 (page 4) contained one open-ended item: Please provide anyinformation not solicited in the prior section of the questionnaire regarding your:attitude, opinion, beliefs, optimism, reasons behind your association with yourMujtahid=Marjah=Ulama=Mufti24 and=or your sects religious organization. Thisitem was included to permit respondents to formulate and express, in their ownwords, their thoughts and attitudes toward martyrdom, terrorism, and nationaland international politics. It provided qualitative context included in the resultsand allowed each respondent to be involved in the research context by becoming apart of the data-collection and analysis process.25

Results

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

Questionnaires were completed by respondents residing in eight different European

countries. Respondents or their parents came from twenty-two Arab countries, and

In-text references to the surveys have retained French spellings of Arabic terms.



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Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Pakistan, and Sudan. In eachcountry, the modal respondent originated in a particular Islamic sect that inhabits aspecific area of the Arab and Muslim world. Therefore, this studys respondentsincluded most of the primary Islamic sects; more generally, 380 (58 percent) of the

respondents were Shia and 270 (42 percent) were Sunni. Most (58 percent) borethe samah that indicates high religiosity, but Shia and Sunni were equally likely tohave the samah (r .04).

The modal respondent was Iraqi (28 percent Iraqi, 13 percent Algerian, 10 percentMoroccan, 10 percent Lebanese, 9 percent Pakistani; East European, Palestinian,Egyptian, Syrian, Iranian each 7 percent to 4 percent), young (29 percent 1721,62 percent 2227, 5 percent 2839, 1 percent 40 or older), divorced (42 percentdivorced, 39 percent Islamic marriage, 8 percent married in mutaa,26 5 percentengaged, 5 percent single), employed (70 percent self-employed, 15 percent employedby corporation, 6 percent student, 5 percent unemployed), a European citizen (60percent naturalized citizen, 23 percent citizen by birth, 7 refugee, 6 percent legal resi-dent, 3 percent student visa), a current or previous recipient of aid from an Islamicsociety (37 percent World Islamic Study Enterprise, 30 percent International IslamicRelief, 8 percent Islamic World League, 7 percent Harriri; total 100 percent somesource of aid), with college, high school, or grade school education (30 percent college,29 percent high school, 28 percent grade school), six siblings (59 percent six, 23 percentthree, 3 percent none), and poor (68 percent current household yearly income$10,000$20,000, 13 percent less than $10,000). See Table 1.

As many respondents have not completed their education (age with educationr .35, age with Islamic marriage r .32; not tabled), their current level of edu-cation may be less informative than their parents education: 51 percent of parents

had 6th to 9th grade education, 24 percent had high school education, 16 percentfifth grade or less, and 9 percent college education.

Individual Difference Dimensions for Political and Religious Opinion Items

All 650 respondents strongly agreed with the following two items. Al-Qaeda and Hiz-bullah are one and the same, united in their quest to liberate the Holy Lands anddefend Islam worldwide. If I were to seek a target with my life, it would be well-defined, limited in scope and dimension, and would not transcend a concentric targetzone. In addition, 647 of 650 respondents strongly agreed with the following item.All those who are sacrificed in=victims of a jihad (bombers & bombed in the nameof Allah) are messengers of Allah and are forever alive in heaven. It is Allahs will thatdetermines our presence, our functions while alive, and when and how we die. Also,609 of 650 strongly agreed that Muslims are being humiliated and dishonored. Lackof variation on these four items led us to drop them from correlational analyses.

In this report we focus particularly on what we take to be the most extreme twoopinion items in the questionnaire. The first such item assesses willingness to useCBN: I will use chemical, biological, and=or nuclear weapons, if I am able.Response to this item was generally positive: 31 percent strongly agree, 51 percentagree, 16 percent disagree, 2 percent strongly disagree. Similarly extreme is an itemabout having volunteered for martyrdom. To become a martyr is a privilege I have

applied for and pray to achieve. This item was phrased with the idea that only thoseserious about seeking martyrdom will have learned that an individual has to apply tobecome a martyr, and that there are more applicants than can be accommodated.



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Response to this item was also generally positive: 50 percent strongly agree, 23 per-

cent agree, 24 percent disagree, 3 percent strongly disagree.

Though both the CBN and martyrdom items represent extreme commitments,

the correlation between these two items is negligible (r 08). Because we are inter-

ested in learning what might predict agreement with these two forms of extreme com-

mitment, these two items were not included in the factor analyses that follow.

Setting aside the six items just mentioned and one item that turned out to be a

redundant measure of Sunni versus Shia religion, there were twenty eight political-

religious items for analysis. To these were added the item about presence of samah

and the item about following a fathers religious leader. These thirty items were sub-

mitted to Principal Components Analysis (PCA). Inspection of the scree plot and

number of iterations to convergence suggested four components (eigenvalues 4.4,

3.5, 2.7, 1.9) that accounted for 13, 11, 8, and 6 percent of the variance. Oblimin

rotation indicated uncorrelated components (correlations between .06 and .05);

varimax rotation of four components converged in 6 iterations.

Table 2 shows, for each component, the relevant item loadings (bold for items

averaged to form scale).

The first component assesses level of commitment to a charismatic religious

leader (Charismatic Leadership): Marja=Ulama is charismatic, committed to absoluteservice to Allah, and receives inspiration directly from Allah. Associated with this

charisma is the message that judgment day is coming and jihad justifies any means.

Table 1. Modal characteristics of respondents from eight cities

City (N) Origin Sect

Marital

Status

Ulama=Imam=Marja=Moufty

Berlin (63) 30% Iraqi 62% Shia 59% D Fadlallah37% M

Bern (105) 26% Iraqi 52% Shia 44% D Fadlallah

44% M

Copennagen (118) 19% Iraqi 55% Sunni 46% M Araki

30% D

The Hague (117) 20% Iraqi 54% Shia 39% D Fadlallah

27% M

London (25) 56% Iraqi 84% Shia 48% D Fadlallah

16%

MMParis (50) 26% Iraqi 62% Sunni 40% D Araki

27% M

Rome (73) 45% Iraqi 64% Shia 47% D Fadlallah

44% M

Diekirch (99)

[Luxembourg]

26% Iraqi 84% Shia 51% M

44% D

Fadlallah

Note: Total n 650. M Married; D Divorced; MM Married in mutaa (see text);others single, engaged, or citizenship marriage. In every city the modal respondent was anaturalized European citizen, self-employed, 2227 years old, with 6th9th grade education.



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Table 2. Mean (SD) and loadings of political and religious opinion items on fourrotated components

Component

Item Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4

My Marja=Ulama is charismaticand I am energized by his presence.

2.4(1.0) .72 .23

Our Faqih=Ulama is committed tothe absolute service of Allah andthe Islamic message.

2.7(0.9) .67

My father or I inherited a lot of money. 2.5(1.0) .52 .36 .25 .32I have been told and I do believe that

judgment day is upon us.3.1(0.9) .50 .26

Islamic Revolutions ends(Al-Jihad Islam vindicate anymeans to include what iscalled by nonfaithful as terrorism.

3.8(0.5) .49

Our Waliy Al-Faqih=Ulama receiveshis inspiration directly from Allah.

2.6(1.0) .49

I have memorized 114 Surras and docomprehend each of the 6,400 versesof the Koran.

2.8(0.9) .74

My jihad is directed toward (Fe-Sabil)Allah, regardless of others decision=

opinion=aims.

2.8(0.7) .62

Samah (forehead callus) 1.6(0.5) .60I watch Al Manar TV programs daily. 2.8(0.8) .36 .54 .21I do not need=Kaleed my Marja=Ulamas

explanations to envisage Allah=s messages.2.9(0.7) .52 .21

Our sects organization and myMarjah=Ulama embody all theinformation, knowledge,wisdom, inspirations, goals, objectives,happiness, love, education, wealth,future, and aspirations I need.

2.8(0.8) .81

My national=origin country must remainindependent from all other nations,including Arab nations.

2.1(1.1) .29 .79

There are significant differences betweenSunni and Shia religious canons.

2.6(1.0) .21 .63

I was recruited to join my Marja=Ulamasfellowship by a family=friend or in ahusseiniya=mosque (vs. not applicable orI sought him on my own).

1.4(0.5) .37 .51 .37

Western values and principles are essential to

our modernity and thus our subsistence.

2.0(0.8) .34 .35 .32

(Continued)



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The second component is bipolar. At one extreme is high religiosity (memorizingsuras, possessing samah) and a weaker positive loading for military training in

Yemen or Afghanistan. At the other extreme is individualist jihad (not caring what

others say or do) and not needing Marjas explanations. We believe this component

assesses level of commitment to the Islamic ideal of piety and submission, and we call

the component Religiosity.

The third component is also bipolar: separate country nationalism and seeing

important differences between Sunni and Shia at one extreme, and seeing religion

as everything needed at the other extreme. This component assesses level of commit-

ment to Separate Nationalism, in contrast to the idea of new caliphate in which all

Islamic countries will be joined and submerged. The secular aspect is evident in a

positive loading for openness to Western values (.35).

The fourth component seems to tap respondents long-term and family commit-

ment to the Islamic Revolution. Loading on this component are items about follow-

ing a fathers religious leader, a leader whose wishes as head of the Islamic

Revolution are commands, and about taking military training in Yemen or

Afghanistan without any radical change in worldview. Respondents high on the

fourth component are showing long and steady commitment to the Islamic

Revolution, a commitment that follows their fathers commitment. We call this

component Jihadist Family.

In Table 2, loadings in bold indicate, for each component, the items that were

averaged to form a scale to represent that component. Alpha reliabilities of thesescales (Table 4) range from satisfactory (.76 for Separate Nationalism) to marginal

(.64 for Religiosity, .60 for Charismatic Leadership, .51 for Jihadist Family).

Table 2. Continued

Component

Item Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4

Follow=Taqalid the sameFaqih=Ulama of your father?

1.4(0.5) .26 .66

I will only baiah a government=leaderthat is governed by=follows Islam.

3.7(0.5) .51

I have received military training

in Afghanistan=Yemen.1.4(0.5) .42 .28 .48

Since I have joined our sects

organization, I have radically

changed my worldviews and have

disengaged from worldly needs,friends, etc.

2.8(0.8) .33 .33 .47

Our Walayat Al-Faqih=Ulama is thehead of our Islamic Revolution and

his wishes are my commands.

3.7(0.6) .21 .46

Note: Items on 4-point scale from 1 strongly disagree to 4 strongly agree, exceptstarred items 1 no, 2 yes. Loadings less than .20 omitted. Loadings in bold in eachcolumn mark the items averaged to form a scale representing the component (see Table 4).



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Substantial correlations with other measures (see below and Table 4) indicate thatthese scales do have adequate reliability for meaningful analysis.

Individual Difference Dimensions for Personality Items

Two of the twenty-four personality items, #70 and #75 in the questionnaire, werecorrelated .96: I may be described as a pessimist and cynical, and I used to beable to cry, but now I cant cry at all even though I want to. It is not clear why thesetwo items showed such a high correlation, but empirically they are redundant andincluding both distorted the factor analysis of the personality items. Thus #75was dropped from analysis; all results presented below would be almost exactlythe same if #70 had been replaced with #75.

The remaining twenty-three per items were submitted to PCA. Inspection of thescree plot and iterations to convergence suggested two components (eigenvalues 3.4and 2.3) that accounted for 15 and 10 percent of the variance. Oblimin rotation indi-cated uncorrelated components (r .01). Varimax rotation of two components con-verged in 3 iterations.

Table 3 shows the seven highest-loading items for each component (thirteenitems total because the item about sleep problems loads high but oppositely on bothcomponents). The complete loadings table is available from the authors.

The first component assesses individual experience of negative affect and relieffrom this affect (wahabnee, peace) thanks to the imam. Individuals high on thiscomponent describe themselves as pessimist and cynical, harshly disciplined in child-hood, having fluctuating energy without physical exhaustion (presumably lowenergy), low self-confidence, and feeling afraid for no reason. Following the Psycho-

ticism-Extraversion-Neuroticism (PEN) model of personality dimensions,27

we willcall this component Neuroticism. Individuals high on neuroticism are generally highon negative affect and behavioral inhibition.

The second component assesses a positive outgoing personality style, with someimpulsive-aggressive elements. Before joining the Islamic Revolution, the respondenthad a good job, was liked by and got along with most people, was not morbid, anddid not lack self-confidence. These are markers for extraversion in the PEN model.Impulsive-aggressive elements before joining include frequent arguing, contempla-dting suicide, assaulting others, and trouble sleeping due to nightmares and intrusivethoughts. Whether impulsiveness should be considered a part or aspect of extraver-sion has been debated, but we will here join with those who believe it should28 andrefer to the second component as Extraversion-Impulsiveness.

Loadings in bold (Table 3) indicate, for each component, the three items that wereaveraged to form a scale to represent that component. Alpha reliabilities of these scales(Table 4) are satisfactory (.79 for Neuroticism, .72 for Extraversion-Impulsiveness).

Intercorrelations of Political-Religious Scales and Willingness to Use CBN Weapons

In examining the correlations in Table 4, we will focus on correlations at least as largeas .25 (bold print in Table 4). Owing to the large sample size, smaller correlations canbe statistically significant but in our opinion do not warrant substantive attention.

The top four rows of Table 4 show that the four political-religious scales are sub-stantially uncorrelated, as expected from the independence of the four PCA compo-nents that the scales represent.



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The Neuroticism and Extraversion-Impulsiveness scales correlated .20, a small

departure from the zero correlation of the PCA components the scales represent.

Row five of Table 4 shows that Neuroticism is strongly negatively correlated

with Separate Nationalism (.48).

Row six shows that Extraversion-Impulsiveness is positively correlated with

both Separate Nationalism (.27) and Jihadist Family (.35).

Row seven of Table 4 shows that only one of our six scales is a significant pre-

dictor of willingness to use CBN. The Charismatic Leadership scale correlates .37

with willingness to use CBN, a substantial correlation given the limitations ofreliability for a single-item criterion measure. Examination of the items in the Char-

ismatic Leadership scale showed that the scale correlation with willingness to use

Table 3. Mean (SD) and loadings of personality items on two rotated components

Component

Item Mean (SD) 1 2

Through my Marja=Ulama, Allahhas given me (wahabnee) tranquility

and inner peace.

3.2(0.7) .84

I may be described as a pessimist and cynical. 3.2(0.7) .82

I was harshly disciplined for minor infractions,

by my parents.

3.6(0.7) .64 .24

My energy levels fluctuate without

physical exhaustion.

3.1(0.6) .51

I feel I need more self-confidence. 3.2(0.9) .47 .31

I have witnessed a well-remembered killing. 3.2(0.8) .40 .29

I feel afraid for no reason. 3.4(0.8) .39

I have trouble sleeping through the night

due to nightmares and intrusive thoughts.

2.4(1.1) .39 .38

I had a good job, which I left to serve Allah

through our sects organization.

2.0(0.8) .22 .75

Before I joined our sects organization,

I was liked by=got along with most people.1.9(0.8) .22 .73

Before I joined our sects organization,

I used to find myself taking=choosingthe opposite side on most conversations.

3.6(0.7) .65

Before my commitment to Allah and Islam,I contemplated suicide.

3.4(0.7) .50

Before I joined my sects religious

organization, I would describe myself

as morbid (mutashaeem)

2.2(1.0) .42

Before I began to follow my Marja=Ulama,I did not hesitate to assault others and

properties.

3.5(0.6) .34

Note: Items on 4-point scale from 1 strongly disagree to 4 strongly agree. Loadings lessthan .20 omitted. Loadings in bold in each column mark items averaged to form a scale repre-

senting the component (see Table 4).



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CBN is largely due to the .52 correlation of the CBN item with the following item:

My Marjah=Ulama is charismatic and I am energized by his presence. The size ofthis correlation cannot be attributed to any kind of local response set, as these twoitems were respectively #40 and #60 in the survey.

Row 8 of Table 4 shows that none of our scales offers any useful prediction ofcommitment to martyrdom. Nor did any demographic measure show any useful cor-relation with commitment to martyrdom (demographic correlations not presented inTable 4).

Rows 9 through 12 of Table 4 show correlationsof demographic measures with oursix scales and willingness to use CBN and volunteer for martyrdom. Row 9 shows thathigher Parental Education is associated with higher Separate Nationalism (.85) andlower Neuroticism (.45). These two correlations are made more striking by notingthat Parent Annual Income is correlated in the same direction as Parental Educationwith Nationalism and Neuroticism, but the correlations for Parent Annual Incomeare much lower (.30 versus .85; 24 versus 45). A similar pattern is apparent forcitizenship: citizens by birth are higher on Nationalism (.27) and lower on Neuroticism(.36), and indeed Parental Education is positively associated with both ParentIncome (.34) and Birth Citizenship (.20). (The last two correlations are not in Table 4).

On the other hand, Parent Annual Income is not just a pale reflection ofParental Education, because Parent Annual Income is negatively associated withReligiosity (.39) but Parental Education is not (.09). Evidently parental edu-cation is tapping something importantly different from parental income. We suspect

that parental education teaches parents the idea of nationalism as natural and gives apersonal and political perspective that protects children from the negative affect andfeelings of helplessness represented by high Neuroticism.

Table 4. Intercorrelations of four political-religious scales, two personality scales,and items assessing willingness to use CBN, application for martyrdom, andselected demographic items

Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6

1. Charismatic Leadership .602. Religiosity .01 .643. Separate Nationalism .07 .17 .764. Jihadist Family .01 .15 .01 .515. Neuroticism .05 .02 .48 .09 .786. Extraversion-Impulsiveness .14 .06 .27 .35 .20 .737. I will use CBN weapons, if I am able. .37 .07 .01 .12 .09 .038. To become a martyr is a privilege

I have applied for and pray to achieve..06 .08 .15 .09 .20 .17

9. Parental education .09 .04 .85

.09

.45 .1910. Parent annual income .17 .10 .30 .39 .24 .0111. Citizen by birth .12 .16 .27 .20 .36 .2312. Shia (vs. Sunni) .11 .06 .13 .10 .04 .04

Note: Correlations in italics are alpha scale reliabilities; each scale is mean of three or fouritems (see Tables 2 and 3). Bold correlations are .25 or greater and significantly different fromzero at p < .01 two-tailed.



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Responses to Open-Ended Question

Almost all respondents wrote something in response to the open-ended question atthe end of the questionnaire. The most common statements can be summarized asfollows: Israel and the United States are terrorist states occupying holy lands;Muslims are only defending their faith, their holy land, their homes, and their future;Muslims are uniting and will again defeat the Second Crusaders; Islam will bevictorious against its enemy; and eventually, justice will defeat might.

Discussion

Interpretation of our results must begin from an appreciation of the very unusualsample of respondents from whom our data came. Marchers on Jerusalem Day2002 were demonstrating in recollection of the loss of Jerusalem to the Israelis in1967. Jerusalem Day was initiated by Ayatollah Khomeini when he was the spiritualand political leader of Iran, which is principally Shia in religion. Al Manar television,a satellite station with Shia origins in Lebanon, has in recent years encouraged view-ers to march on Jerusalem Day; and viewers include many Sunni, especially inEurope. It is evidence of the growing unification of Shia and Sunni Islam in oppo-sition to the West that our respondents included almost as many Sunni (42 percent)as Shia (58 percent).

Our respondents were 650 young Muslim men marching on the last day ofRamadan, a day of fasting in which they are not able to have drink or food unlessthey are traveling. A table offering free soft drinks to Jerusalem Day marchers wasset up next to the Al Manar table in eight European railway stations. The signs were

in English and 2,619 marchers completed a first screening survey in English. Of thesethe most extreme in terms of religiosity and politics were solicited to participate inthe second survey, the survey reported here. Selection was on the basis of some com-bination of the following characteristics: time spent in religious obligations, supportof terrorism and martyrdom, experience of military training, membership inHizbullah or related group, and the forehead callus that marks the most observantMuslim males. Thus our respondents are an extremist subset of marchers rather thana random or typical sample of marchers.

Given this double selection, first self-selection in joining the Jerusalem Day pro-test march and then researchers selection for religiosity and political extremity, onemight expect a degree of homogeneity that would lead to unanimity on manypolitical and religious opinions. Surprisingly, our respondents were unanimous ornear-unanimous on only four items: Al-Qaeda and Hizbullah are one and the same,united in their quest to liberate the Holy Lands and defend Islam worldwide, If Iwere to seek a target with my life, it would be well-defined, limited in scope anddimension, and would not transcend a concentric target zone, All those who aresacrificed in=victims of a Jihad (Bombers & bombed in the name of Allah) are mes-sengers of Allah and are forever alive in heaven. It is Allahs will that determines ourpresence, our functions while alive, and when and how we die, and Muslims arebeing humiliated and dishonored.

These four statements are evidently normative views among Muslim activists, at

least in Europe. The first and fourth items repeat commonplace political messages ofAl Manar television. The second and third items represent a common Islamist under-standing of the requirements for martyrdom and the outcomes of martyrdom. Note



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that, if bomber and bombed are alike forever in heaven, the bombing is not to beunderstood as a kind of hate crime. The goal of hatred is to punish or obliterate whatis hated.29

Dimensions of Individual Differences in Political and Religious Opinions

Despite the homogeneity of our sample, items tapping political and religious opi-nions produced four independent dimensions of individual differences. Each dimen-sion was represented by a three- or four-item scale: Charismatic Leadership,Religiosity, Separate Nationalism, and Jihadist Family. One way to understandthese dimensions is to look at the correlations of each scale with other measures.

The first scale, Charismatic Leadership, is not correlated significantly with anyother scale or demographic besides willingness to use CBN. This is unfortunate, tothe extent that Charismatic Leadership is the only scale that offers substantialprediction of willingness to use CBN.

The second scale, Religiosity, was uncorrelated with any other scale or demo-graphic measure.

The third scale, Separate Nationalism, was strongly associated with ParentalEducation (.85) and moderately associated with Parent Annual Income (.30)and European citizenship by birth (.27). The size of the correlation between ParentalEducation and Separate Nationalism is so large as to suggest that Separate Nationa-lism is entirely determined by Parental Education. Nationalism is the idea that theworld is naturally divided into nations and that each nation should have its ownstate. Our interpretation is that the idea of nationalism is a staple assumption ofthe Western world, and that Muslims learn this idea from parents with more Western

education. In terms of personality, Separate Nationalists were higher on Extraver-sion-Impulsiveness (.27) and much lower on Neuroticism (.48) than other respon-dents. We suspect that parents with higher education communicate ideas ofopportunity and activity that can buffer their sons against the threat-dominatedworldview characteristic of neurotic individuals (see below).

The fourth scale, Jihadist Family, is positively related to Extraversion-Impul-siveness (.35) and negatively related to parental income (.39). It appears that apoor fathers commitment to a jihadist religious leader is likely to move a son withoutgoing and impulsive personality to military training in Yemen or Afghanistan. AsYemen and Afghanistan are associated particularly with Al Qaeda military training,we may say that a Jihadist Family is likely to move an extroverted and action-oriented son toward Al Qaeda training.

Personality Dimensions

We identified the first personality dimension in our results as Neuroticism and thesecond dimension as Extraversion-Impulsiveness. Intuition might suggest that thesetwo dimensions should be negatively correlated, as outgoing people might seem to below on the anxiety that is the hallmark of neurotic interaction style. But, in ourresults, these dimensions emerged from PCA as independent. Even after the imper-fections of item selection for scale construction, the correlation between Neuroticism

and Extraversion-Impulsiveness was not substantial (.20). Although counterintui-tive, the independence of neuroticism and extraversion is a commonplace of modernpersonality research.



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The two highest-loading items for the Neuroticism dimension indicate a pessi-mistic and cynical person who has received inner peace from Allah through hisreligious leader. Further indications of negative affect include recollection of harshparental discipline, low self-confidence, and feeling afraid for no reason. Other

high-loading items indicate low energy without physical exhaustion and no problemssleeping. This combination of susceptibility to negative affect and behavioral inhi-bition has been found as a dimension of normal personality in many Americanand European studies. The dimension has been represented with different namesby different investigators; here we refer to the Neuroticism dimension of the three-dimensional PEN model that offers the simplest framing for our results.30

Again we can seek assistance in interpreting the dimension by looking at its cor-relations with other measures. Neuroticism is negatively associated with ParentalEducation (.45) and with European citizenship by birth (.36). Thus we suggestthat the predominance of negative affect and low self-confidence associated withNeuroticism may be the result of predominance of threat and punishment in a familydisadvantaged by poverty and low education (relative to European education ofbirth citizens). That is, the association of Neuroticism with low Parental Educationand non-European birth suggests that Neuroticism may be better understood as thepunishment-oriented outlook of the disadvantaged than as some kind of biologicalendowment.

Similarly, Extraversion-Impulsiveness in the PEN model is a dimension of nor-mal personality. This dimension is identified in our results by items indicating posi-tive social activity (good job, liked by most people, not morbid). Other high-loadingitems indicate more impulsive and oppositional elements (opposite side in most con-versations, attacking people and property, troubled sleep, considering suicide). There

is debate in the personality literature about whether impulsiveness should be con-sidered part of extraversion along with sociability, but these two are joined in ourresults.

For Extraversion-Impulsiveness, there are small positive correlations withParental Education (.19) and Birth Citizenship (.23). Notably these are small positivecorrelations where Neuroticism showed substantial negative correlations (.45,.36). Our tentative interpretation is that Extraversion-Impulsiveness is to a smalldegree the reward-oriented outlook of the relatively advantaged among our respon-dents. As already noted, Extraversion-Impulsiveness is positively associated withSeparate Nationalism (.27) and Jihadist Family (.35). A possible interpretation isthat a reward-oriented view of the world is encouraged both by the advantages ofparental education and income (Separate Nationalism) and by the continuity andsecurity of a family-based commitment to jihad (Jihadist Family).

Seeking Martyrdom and Willingness to Use CBN

Our analysis aimed to use the four political-religious scales and the two personalityscales to understand two forms of extreme behavior, each represented by a singleitem. The survey did not use multiple items to assess these two behaviors in ordernot to draw special attention to them. One item asked about willingness to useCBN. The other item asked about becoming a martyr, in a phrasing that was designed

to assess both the motive to become a martyr and the knowledge that would comefrom actually trying to become a martyr, namely that one has to apply for this honor:To become a martyr is a privilege that I applied for and pray to achieve. Our



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analysis focused on using the four political-religious scales and the two personalityscales to predict willingness to use CBN and application for martyrdom.

A result of some interest in its own right is that agreement was high on bothitems (81 percent agreed with using CBN, 72 percent agreed they were seeking mar-

tyrdom), but responses to these two items were uncorrelated (.08, not tabled). Thatis, willingness to attack the enemy without limit or restraint was independent of will-ingness to sacrifice oneself without limit or restraint.

It is easy to assume that both items depend on level of commitment to theIslamic Revolution, with more commitment associated with more willingness bothto kill and be killed. Further, one might assume that willingness to kill is easier thanwillingness to die. Despite the plausibility of these assumptions, our results do notsupport them. Inspection of the cross-tabulation of these two items on our four-point scale of disagreement=agreement shows that 264 of 650 respondents were morefavorable toward martyrdom than toward using CBN; 164 were more favorabletoward CBN than toward martyrdom. It may be that these results are related tothe Islamic belief that both bomber and bombed are alive in heaven (see previousdiscussion of highly agreed items). Understanding the relation between these twokinds of sacrifice, of self and other, will require additional research. The potentialvalue of this kind of understanding is reflected in the surprise many felt in findingonly prayer, and no litany of hatred, in Attas Manual, the document withpreparations for martyrdom found in the baggage of several of the September 11attackers.31

Predicting Attraction to Martyrdom and Willingness to Use CBN

Turning now to our goal of predicting willingness to use CBN and interest in mar-tyrdom, we begin with a success. High scores on the Charismatic Leadership scalerepresented agreement that the respondents religious leader was charismatic, com-mitted absolutely to Allah, and inspired directly from Allah. Also loading on thisscale was agreement that the Islamic Revolutions ends vindicate any means toinclude what is called by non-faithful as terrorism. This was the only scale withsubstantial prediction of willingness to use CBN (r .37). Unpacking the scaleshowed that the highest-loading item of this scale was the best-predicting item.Ratings of agreement with this single item (My Marjah=Ulama is charismaticand I am energized by his presence) correlated .52 with willingness to use CBN.

Our interpretation of the power of this scale and this item begins with the factthat Islam has strong strictures against attacking noncombatants. But CBN weaponsare by nature weapons of mass destruction that cannot distinguish combatants fromnoncombatants. Thus a strong case must be made that using CBN is acceptablewithin Islamic law if observant Muslims are to favor using CBN. Insofar as 81 per-cent of respondents strongly agreed or agreed with use of CBN, this case has beenmade with considerable success. Nevertheless, the case for CBN will be strongerto the extent that a charismatic religious leader, directly inspired by Allah, is makingthe case. The power of a charismatic leader is thus positively associated with willing-ness to use CBN.

This relation was the only useful prediction of extreme behavior in our results.

No other scale and no other demographic measure provided any additional predic-tion of willingness to use CBN. No scale or demographic measure was related tointerest in martyrdom.



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Conclusion

Perhaps the most important implication of our results is negative: religion and religi-osity were not useful predictors of any important differences among our militantrespondents. Sunni versus Shia did not predict willingness to use CBN or interestin martyrdom, nor did Sunni and Shia differ on any of the four dimensions of polit-ical-religious opinion or on either of the two personality dimensions. One of the fourpolitical-religious dimensions is religiosity. Religiosity was unrelated to any otherpolitical-religious dimension, or to personality, or to willingness to use CBN orinterest in martyrdom.

At least among our militant respondents, then, it is not helpful to think of pro-pensity to terrorist behavior as linked to individual differences in religion or religiousintensity. Our introduction to this paper represented the common understanding ofIslamist terrorism in general and Al Qaeda in particular as the vanguard of funda-mentalist Islam and global Salafism. In this view, the enemy is an extremist religious

movement that wants to purify Islamic countries of Western influence. In this view,the gradient from the base of the pyramid of terrorist supporters to the apex ofterrorist actors is a gradient of fundamentalism that is represented in Wahhabist,Salafist, and Shia Islam.

Our results are not consistent with this understanding. Religion and religiosityare not related to extreme intentions or to personality or even to other dimensionsof political-religious opinions. The irrelevance of religiosity is further underlinedby results for the Separate Nationalism scale.

Separate nationalists want Islamic government in their own countries but wanttheir countries to remain separate from other countries, even other Islamic countries.Perhaps surprisingly, nationalists opposition to the Salafist ideal of restoring anIslamic caliphate does not make them less extreme: scores on the Separate National-ism scale are not related to willingness to use CBN or to interest in martyrdom. Nordoes nationalists above-average openness to Western valuesat least for Islamicsubsistencemake them less extreme or even less religious than others. In short,respondents high on the Separate Nationalism scale are anti-Salafist, but no lessopen to martyrdom and use of CBN.

If religion and religiosity and even separate nationalism cannot help our under-standing of propensity for violence, we must look elsewhere. The most interestingcorrelation in our results is that respondents who see their religious leader as char-ismatic were more likely to be willing to use CBN. Whether this special relation with

the leader depends on face-to-face interaction with the leader or whether it is gener-ated and maintained by video or audio linkages cannot be determined from our data.But the correlation between charismatic authority and willingness to use CBN pointsto the importance of relationship, the relation between respondent and leader. Indi-vidual characteristics such as education, religion, and family background are notuseful predictors; neither are personality characteristics. Individual differences inSeparate Nationalism, Religiosity, and Jihadist Family background are also not use-ful. In other words, individual characteristics are not useful predictors, but currentrelation with religious leader is.

In the most general terms our results indicate that willingness to use CBN is basedin a particular social relationship. This is not a new idea. There is a growing consensusabout the importance of social relationships in the origins of terrorism and terroristbehavior, including relationships of family, friendship, and fellowship.32 In this view,



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the origins of terrorist behavior are less a matter of traits of individual pathology orpersonality than a matter of the current state of personal attachments and groupdynamics in support of an intergroup grievance. A profiling approach to identifyingterrorists is not thereby made impossible, but the elements of the profile will need to

be more about relationship characteristics and less about individual characteristics.Our results are subject to the limitation that they come from Muslim protestors

in Europe in 2002. Whether the same patterns might be found today in Europe orelsewhere, or with less selected samples of Muslim respondents, cannot be determ-ined without additional research. We suspect that the religious element in Islamistmotivations for martyrdom and terrorism has decreased since U.S. forces enteredIraq in 2003. In particular we suspect that religious differences are being bridgedas Shia and Sunni join in common defense against what they see as a common threat.The perception of common threat may be particularly strong in Europe, wheredistinctions among Islamic sects and Islamic countries of origin are often lost inEuropean reactions to Muslim immigrants.

Notes

1. Jeffrey Kaplan, Radical Religion in America: Millenarian Movements from the FarRight to the Children of Noah (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997).

2. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9=11Commission Report (New York, W. W. Norton, 2004) 562 footnote 3).

3. John Douglas, Robert Ressler, Adam Burgess, and Charles Hartman, CriminalProfiling from Crime Analysis, Behavioral Science and the Law 4 no. 4 (1986), 401; JamesFox and Jack Levin, Overkill: Mass Murder and Serial Killing Exposed (New York: Plenum,1994); Anthony Pinizzotto, Forensic Psychology: Criminal Personality Profiling, Journal ofPolice Science and Administration

12 no.1 (1984): 32.4. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Reconciliation(New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); John Douglas, Journey into Darkness (New York:Mindhunters, 1997); Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise ofReligious Violence (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000); Bruce Hoffman, OldMadness, New Methods: Revival of Religious Terrorism Begs for Broader U.S. Policy (1999);Martin Kramer, Sacrifice and Self-Martyrdom in Shiite Lebanon, ed. Martin Kramer,in 23143, Arab Awakening and Islamic Revival (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,1996); Ariel Merari, The Readiness to Kill and Die, ed. William Reich, Origins ofTerrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1990, 193); in Assaf Moghadam, Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in theSecond Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,26 no.2 (2003); 65. Ayla Schbley, Defining Religious Terrorism: A Causal and Anthological

Profile, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 no.2 (2003); 105.5. Clark McCauley, Psychological Issues in Understanding Terrorism and the

Response to Terrorism, in ed. Charles Stout, In The Psychology of Terrorism, TheoreticalUnderstandings and Perspectives vol. 2 (Westport: Praeger, 2002); Clark McCauley, TerrorismResearch and Public Policy: An Overview, in Terrorism Research and Public Policy, ed. ClarkMcCauley, (London: Frank Cass, 1991).

6. Martha Crenshaw, The Psychology of Terrorism: An Agenda for the 21st Century,Political Psychology 21 (2000): 405; Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and theArms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Merari, The Readinessto Kill.

7. The Daubert rule of evidence identifies the two touchstones for court admissibility asreliability and relevancy (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786(1993)). http:==www.law.harvard.edu=publications=evidenceiii=cases=daubert.htm. Accessed16 August 2005.

8. Ayla Schbley, Islamists and Agro-Terrorism: The Limitations of Bayesian Logic inThreat Analyses (Washburn University, KS: 2004).



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9. Hizbullah is one of thirty-four organizations designated as a terrorist group by theU.S. State Department under Section 212 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, asamended by Section 411 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Hizbullah has held several American civi-lians as hostages and has extorted funds, military supplies, and resources in exchange for theirrelease. Hizbullah has also claimed responsibility for and has been accused of in excess of

3,600 military incursions and suicide bombings. Included in these acts are the killing of over8,300 individuals, including 243 U.S. Marines in Lebanon, and the destruction of 3 U.S.airliners. Schbley, Defining Religious Terrorism, 109.

10. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University ofPennsylvania Press, 2004).

11. Starting in AD 622 with Muhammad, followed by his first-generation Caliphs, thenthe Umayyad Caliphates, the Abbasid Caliphates, the Tulunid and Fatimid Caliphates, on toregional Caliphates such as the Seljuks and Ayyubids, the Almoravid and Almohad, theIfriqiya and Sicily, the Mughals, the Safavids, to the final Ottoman ruler in 1927.

12. Center for Special Studies, Special Information Bulletin, http:==www.intelligence.org.il=eng=bu=iran=jerusalem.htm#gen, accesssed 16 August 2005; Innovative Minds, QudsDay 1423=2002, http: ==www.inminds.co.uk=qudsday2002.html, accessed 16 August 2005.

13. Schbley, Defining Religious Terrorism, 123.14. Before the American invasion of Iraq, these parades did not include Baathists (who

were the ruling party in Iraq and remain the ruling party in Syria).15. Agence FrancePresse, Pro-Palestinian Protests in European Cities, Independent

Media Center, http:==jerusalem.indymedia.org=news=2002=03=1355.php, accessed 16 August2005.

16. Ayla Schbley, Torn between God, Family, and Money: The Changing Profile ofLebanons Religious Terrorists, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23, no.1 (2000): 175.

17. Scott Appleby, Divining the Conflicts (New York: America Press, 2000), 96.18. Avi Jorisch, Al-Manar: Hizbullah TV, Middle East Quarterly 24, no.7 (2004),

http:==www.meforum.org=article=583.19. Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballahs al-Manar Television (Washington

DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004).

20. The State Department added Al Manar to the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL). Thisdesignation permitted the United States and the French governments to halt Al Manars sat-ellite uplinks via Arabsat (and its subsidiaries Hispasat, Asiasat, Eutelsat, and New Skies) andGlobecast that are covered by Intelsat. Center for Special Studies, Further Limits on AlManar broadcasts, http:==www.intelligence.org.il=eng=sib=7 05=almanar.htm (accessed 16August 2005).

21. Pew Forum, An Uncertain Road: Muslims and the Future of Europe, http:==pewforum.org=publications=reports=MuslimsinEurope2004.pdf, accessed 16 August 2005.

22. Ayla Schbley, Religious Terrorism, the Media, and International IslamizationTerrorism: Justifying the Unjustifiable, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no.3 (2004): 207.

23. Ayla Schbley, Defining Religious Terrorism, 105.24. Although these are names of various ranks and levels of proficiency and scholarship

in Islamic canonic studies, they are equals when mustering followers, acting as nuclei for terror

cells, or forming fundamentalist groups.25. Jaber Gubrium and Andrea Sankar, Qualitative Methods in Aging Research

(Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994).26. Traditionally the Shia sect of Islam empowered males with the right to marry in

mutaa (marriage with intent to divorce once security, sexual, or financial needs are fulfilled).This tradition was adopted by the Shia in defiance of Islams second Khalifa, Omar Azam,who issued a fatwa prohibiting it. This practice, that has traditionally differentiated betweenthe Sunni and Shia sects, is being readopted by both as a sign of unity and cooperation inexploiting non-Muslim Western females.

27. Hans Eysenck, Dimensions of Personality: Criteria for a Taxonomic Paradigm,Personality and Individual Differences 12 (1991): 773.

28. William Revelle, Three Fundamental Dimensions of Personality, http:==personality-

project.org=perproj=theory=big3.table.html, accessed 16 August 2005. Jeffrey Gray, A critiqueof Eysencks Theory of Personality, in A Model for Personality, ed. Hans. J. Eysenck, 246277,(Berlin: Springer, 1981).



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29. Edward Royzman, Clark McCauley, and Paul Rozin, Four Ways of ThinkingAbout Hate: From Plato to Putnam, in Psychology of Hate, ed. Robert Sternberg, 335(Washington DC: APA Books, 2004).

30. Avi Jorisch, Beacon of Hatred: Inside Hizballahs alManar Television. Op. cit.31. Clark McCauley, Understanding the 9=11 Perpetrators: Crazy, Lost in Hate, or

Martyred?, in History Behind the Headlines: The Origins of Ethnic Conflicts Worldwide , ed.Newman Matuszak, (New York: Gale Publishing, 2002) 5:274286.

32. Crenshaw, The Psychology of Terrorism, 405; Clark McCauley and Mary Segal,Social Psychology of Terrorist Groups, in Review of Personality and Social Psychology,ed. Clyde Hendrick, (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1987) 9:231256. McCauley, PsychologicalIssues, 330; Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Network; Schbley. Torn between God, 175.


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