Muncorp Cases

7/24/2019 Muncorp Cases

1/22

Manosca vs. CA

G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996

Facts: Pettoners n!erte" a #ece o$ %an" &!en t!e #arce% &as ascertane" 'y t!e N()

to !ave 'een t!e 'rt! ste o$ Fe%* +. Mana%o, t!e $oun"er o$ )%esa N Crsto, t #asse"

Reso%uton No. 1, "ec%arn t!e %an" to 'e a natona% !storca% %an"-ar. Pettoners-ove" to "s-ss t!e co-#%ant on t!e -an t!ess t!at t!e nten"e" e*#ro#raton &as

not $or a #u'%c #ur#ose an", nc"enta%%y, t!at t!e act &ou%" consttute an a##%caton o$

#u'%c $un"s, "rect%y or n"rect%y, $or t!e use, 'ene$t, or su##ort o$ )%esa n Crsto, a

re%ous entty, contrary to t!e #rovson o$ /ecton 292, Artc%e ), o$ t!e 193

Consttuton.

)ssue: 5!et!er or not t!e e*#ro#raton o$ t!e %an" &!ereat Mana%o &as 'orn s va%"

an" consttutona%.

(e%": +es. !e tan to 'e va%" -ust 'e $or #u'%c use. !ere &as a t-e &!en t &as

$e%t t!at a %tera% -eann s!ou%" 'e attac!e" to suc! a re7ure-ent. 5!atever #ro8ect s

un"ertaen -ust 'e $or t!e #u'%c to en8oy, as n t!e case o$ streets or #ars. Ot!er&se,

e*#ro#raton s not a%%o&a'%e. )t s not so any -ore. As %on as t!e #ur#ose o$ t!e

tan s #u'%c, t!en t!e #o&er o$ e-nent "o-an co-es nto #%ay. As 8ust note", t!e

consttuton n at %east t&o cases, to re-ove any "ou't, "eter-nes &!at #u'%c use s.

One s t!e e*#ro#raton o$ %an"s to 'e su'"v"e" nto s-a%% %ots $or resa%e at cost to

n"v"ua%s. !e ot!er s t!e trans$er, t!rou! t!e e*ercse o$ t!s #o&er, o$ ut%tes an"

ot!er #rvate enter#rse to t!e overn-ent. )t s accurate to state t!en t!at at #resent

&!atever -ay 'e 'ene$ca%%y e-#%oye" $or t!e enera% &e%$are sats$es t!e re7ure-ent

o$ #u'%c use.

Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137, GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camarines Surpassed a esolution authori!ing the Provincial "overnor to purchase or e#propriate propert$

contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non%food and non%traditional agricultural crops and a housing pro&ect for provincial government emplo$eesPursuant to the esolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its "overnor, filed two separatecases for e#propriation against 'rnesto () San *oa+uin and 'fren () San *oa+uin, at the egionarial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur)

he San *oa+uins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inade+uac$ of the price offeredfor their propert$) -n an order, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and authori!ed the Provinceof Camarines Sur to ta.e possession of the propert$ upon the deposit with the Cler. of Court theamount provisionall$ fi#ed b$ the trial court to answer for damages that private respondents ma$suffer in the event that the e#propriation cases do not prosper)


2/22

he San *oa+uins filed a motion for relief from the order, authori!ing the Province of Camarines Surto ta.e possession of their propert$ and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss) /othmotions were denied in the order dated 0ebruar$ 2, 199)

-n their petition before the Court of 3ppeals, the San *oa+uins as.ed4 5a6 that esolution of theSangguniang Panlalawigan be declared null and void7 5b6 that the complaints for e#propriation bedismissed7 and 5c6 that the order den$ing the motion to dismiss and allowing the Province oCamarines Sur to ta.e possession of the propert$ sub&ect of the e#propriation and the order dated0ebruar$ 2, 199, den$ing the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside) he$also as.ed that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, andthereafter to issue a writ of in&unction)

3s.ed b$ the Court of 3ppeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor "eneral stated thatunder Section 9 of the ocal "overnment Code 5/)P) /lg) :6, there was no need for the approval b$the Office of the President of the e#ercise b$ the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminentdomain) ;owever, the Solicitor "eneral e#pressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur mustfirst secure the approval of the Department of 3grarian eform of the plan to e#propriate the lands of

petitioners for use as a housing pro&ect)he Court of 3ppeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines Sur tota.e possession of private respondents< lands and the order den$ing the admission of the amendedmotion to dismiss) -t also ordered the trial court to suspend the e#propriation proceedings until afterthe Province of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the re+uisite approval of the Department of

3grarian eform to convert the classification of the propert$ of the private respondents fromagricultural to non%agricultural land)

Issue: =O( the Province of Cam Sur must first secure the approval of the Department of 3grarianeform of the plan to e#propriate the lands of the San *oa+uins)

HELD: o sustain the Court of 3ppeals would mean that the local government units can no longere#propriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, etc),without first appl$ing for conversion of the use of the lands with the Department of 3grarian eform,because all of these pro&ects would naturall$ involve a change in the land use) -n effect, it would thenbe the Department of 3grarian eform to scrutini!e whether the e#propriation is for a public purposeor public use)

Ratio: =;''0O', the petition is "3('D and the +uestioned decision of the Court of 3ppealsis set aside insofar as it 5a6 nullifies the trial court'D insofar as it sets aside the order of the trial courtden$ing the amended motion to dismiss of the private respondents)

SO OD''D)


3/22

Municipality of Paraaque vs V.M. Realty Corporation GR 127820 (uly

20! 1""8#

G.R. $o. 127820

2"2 %CR& '7'uly 20! 1""8

acts:

Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the Municipality of

Paraa!ue "le# a $o%plaint for e&propriation against '.M. Realty $orporation, o(er t)o

parcels of lan#. *llege#ly, the co%plaint )as "le# +for the purpose of alle(iating the li(ing

con#itions of the un#erpri(ilege# y pro(i#ing ho%es for the ho%eless through a socialie#

housing proect./ Petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 500, Series of

1991, pre(iously %a#e an oer to enter into a negotiate# sale of the property )ith pri(ate

respon#ent, )hich the latter #i# not accept. 2he R2$ authorie# petitioner to tae possession

of the suect property upon its #eposit )ith the cler of court of an a%ount e!ui(alent to

154 of its fair %aret (alue. Pri(ate Respon#ent "le# an ans)er alleging that a6 the

co%plaint faile# to state a cause of action ecause it )as "le# pursuant to a resolution an#

not to an or#inance as re!uire# y R* 0178 an# 6 the cause of action, if any, )as arre#

y a prior u#g%ent or res u#icata. n pri(ate respon#ent;s %otion, its ans)er )as treate#

as a %otion to #is%iss. 2he trial court #is%isse# the co%plaint

)ssue:

o(ern%ent ?nit can e&ercise its po)er of e%inent #o%ain pursuant to a

resolution y its la)-%aing o#y.

*el+:

?n#er Section 19, of the present =ocal >o(ern%ent $o#e R* 01786, it is state# as the "rst

re!uisite that =>?s can e&ercise its po)er of e%inent #o%ain if there is an or#inance

enacte# y its legislati(e o#y enaling the %unicipal chief e&ecuti(e. * resolution is not an

or#inance, the for%er is only an opinion of a la)-%aing o#y, the latter is a la). 2he case

cite# y Petitioner in(ol(es BP 330, )hich )as the pre(ious =ocal >o(ern%ent $o#e, )hich is

o(iously no longer in eect. R* 0178 pre(ails o(er the @%ple%enting Rules, the for%er

eing the la) itself an# the latter only an a#%inistrati(e rule )hich cannot a%en# the

for%er.


4/22

City of Manila vs Chinese Community of Manila

FACTS:Petitioner (City of Manila) filed a petition praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of

constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such

expropriation was necessary.

Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the

land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres

and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes.

The lower court ruled that there wasno necessityfor the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question.

Petitioner therefore assails the decision of the lower court claiming that it (petitioner) has the authority to expropriate

any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in

question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation

or ask any questions concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in

expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a

judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

ISSUE:W/N the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation?

HELD:Yes. The courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable

necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. When the municipal corporation or entity

attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying such authority. The

necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is, without

question, within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the

right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a question that the courts have

the right to inquire into.

Saguitan v . City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137, GR 135087 (2000)

Facts: On October 1, 199?, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of >andalu$ong Cit$ issued a resolutionauthori!ing >a$or /en&amin S) 3balos to institute e#propriation proceeding over the propert$ of

3lberto Suguitan located at /oni 3venue and Sto) osario Streets in >andalu$ong Cit$ for thee#pansion of >andalu$ong >edical Center) On *anuar$ 2, 199@, >a$or 3balos wrote 3lbertoSuguitan offering to bu$ his propert$, but Suguitan refused to sell) Conse+uentl$, the Cit$ of>andalu$ong filed a complaint for e#propriation with the egional rial Court of Pasig) Suguitan fileda motion to dismiss) he trial court denied the said motion and subse+uentl$, it allowed thee#propriation of the sub&ect propert$) 3ggrieved b$ the said order, the heirs of Suguitan asserted thatthe Cit$ of >andalu$ong ma$ onl$ e#ercise its delegated power of eminent domain b$ means of anordinance as re+uired b$ Section 19 of epublic 3ct (o) :1, and not b$ means of a mereresolution)


5/22

Issue: =O( the cit$ of >andalu$ong has validl$ e#ercised its power of e#propriation)

Held: NEGATIE

Ratio: he Court ruled that the basis for the e#ercise of the power of eminent domain b$ localgovernment units is Section 19 of 3 :1 which provides that4 A3 local government unit ma$,through its chief e#ecutive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, e#ercise the power of eminent

domain for public use, purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, uponpa$ment of &ust compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws7Provided, however, hat the power of eminent domain ma$ not be e#ercised unless a valid anddefinite offer has been previousl$ made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted7 Provided,further, hat the local government unit ma$ immediatel$ ta.e possession of the propert$ upon thefiling of the e#propriation proceedings and upon ma.ing a deposit with the proper court of at leastfifteen percent 51@B6 of the fair mar.et value of the propert$ based on the current ta# declaration ofthe propert$ to be e#propriated7 Provided, finall$, hat the amount to be paid for the e#propriatedpropert$ shall be determined b$ the proper court, based on the fair mar.et value at the time of theta.ing of the propert$) -n the present case, the Cit$ of >andalu$ong sought to e#ercise the power ofeminent domain over petitioners< propert$ b$ means of a resolution, in contravention of the first

re+uisite) he law in this case is clear and free from ambiguit$) Section 19 of the Code re+uires anordinance, not a resolution, for the e#ercise of the power of eminent domain) herefore, while theCourt remains conscious of the constitutional polic$ of promoting local autonom$, it cannot grant

&udicial sanction to a local government unit


6/22

n accor$ance /!t te Rega#!an Doctr!ne, 'ar!ne resources %e#ong to te state an$ &ursuant to te (!rst&aragra& o( Sect!on 2, Art!c#e o( te )onst!tut!on, te!r 6e8orat!on, $eve#o&'ent an$ut!#!at!on...sa## %e un$er te (u## contro# an$ su&erv!s!on o( te State.

n a$$!t!on, one o( te $evo#ve$ &o/ers o( te )G on $evo#ut!on !s te en(orce'ent o( (!ser* #a/s !n'un!c!&a# /aters !nc#u$!ng te conservat!on o( 'angroves. T!s necessar!#* !nc#u$es te enact'ent o(or$!nances to e((ect!ve#* carr* out suc (!ser* #a/s /!t!n te 'un!c!&a# /aters. n #!gt o( te &r!nc!eso( $ecentra#!at!on an$ $evo#ut!on ensr!ne$ !n te G) an$ te &o/ers grante$ tere!n to Gs /!c

unuest!ona%#* !nvo#ve te e8erc!se o( &o#!ce &o/er, te va#!$!t* o( te uest!one$ or$!nances cannot %e$ou%te$.

SAMSON vs. CITY MAYOR OF BACOLOD CITYG.R. No. L-28745 October 2! "#74

F$cts%!e Cty o$ aco%o" #asse" Cty Or"nance No. 104 #ro!'tn t&on"v"ua%s to enternto t!e a-use-ent centers an" -ove !ouses usn a sn%etcet.%sa /a-son an"

Ane% Gav%an $%e" a co-#%ant a%%en t!at t!e CtyOr"nance No. 104 o$ aco%o" Cty

s u%tra vres an" contrary to t!e "ue #rocess#rovson o$ t!e Consttuton as t!ey &ere"e#rve" o$ t!er #ro#erty &t!out "ue#rocess o$ %a&.!ey sou!t an n8uncton to

restran t!e en$orce-ent o$ t!e or"nance n t!e-ean&!%e, an" t &as rante" 'y t!e%o&er court t!rou! Ju"e Jose F. Fernan"e;.

Iss&e's%

5!et!er or not Cty Or"nance No. 104 s va%" e*ercse o$ #o%ce #o&erunicipal /oard of >anila passed Ordinance (o) ?: with the following provisions+uestioned for its violation of due process4

1) refraining from entertaining or accepting an$ guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the

lobb$ in open view7

2) prohibiting admission o less than 18 $ears old7

) usurious increase of license fee to P?,@ and , o 1@B and 2B respectivel$ 5ta# issue also67

?) ma.ing unlawful lease or rent more than twice ever$ 2? hours7 and

@) cancellation of license for subse+uent violation)

he lower court issued preliminar$ in&unction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari)

Issue: -s the ordinance compliant with the due process re+uirement of the constitution

Held4 Ordinance is a valid e#ercise of police power to minimi!e certain practices hurtful to public morals) here is no

violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is en&o$s the presumption of

constitutionalit$ absent an$ irregularit$ on its face) a#ation ma$ be made to implement a police power and the

amount, ob&ect, and instance of ta#ation is dependent upon the local legislative bod$) *udgment of lower court

reversed and in&unctionlifted)

&C,, P3)C& Co. v. C&

G.R. $o. 100142! Marc5 61! 2000

Police Po)er as e&ercise# y =>?s, restrictions an# !uali"cationsPo)er of city %ayor to grantAcancelAre(oe usiness per%its

>ranting of usiness per%its (s. granting of per%it to practice profession

&C3%

Petitioner applie# )ith the ce of the $ity Mayor of @ligan for a usiness pe

r%it. Per%it )as therefor issue#, suect to certain con#itions lie prohiition

of putting up an optical clinic, e&a%ining an#Aor prescriing rea#ing an# si%il

ar optical glasses, etc.


10/22

egulations to pro%ote the health, %orals, peace, e#ucation, goo# or#er or

safety

an# general )elfare of the people. 2he State, through the legislature, has #ele

gate# the e&ercise of police po)er to local go(ern%ent units, as agencies of

the

State, in or#er to eecti(ely acco%plish an# carry out the #eclare# oects of

their creation. 2his #elegation of police po)er is e%o#ie# in the general )elfare clause of the =ocal >o(ern%ent $o#e &&&

2he scope of police po)er has een hel# to e so co%prehensi(e as to

enco%pass a

l%ost all %atters aecting the health, safety, peace, or#er, %orals, co%fort an

# con(enience of the co%%unity. Police po)er is essentially regulatory in

nature

an# the po)er to issue licenses or grant usiness per%its, if e&ercise# for a r

egulatory an# not re(enue-raising purpose, is )ithin the a%it of this po)er.

Po)er of city %ayor to grant usiness per%its

2he authority of city %ayors to issue or grant licenses an# usiness per%its is

eyon# ca(il. @t is pro(i#e# for y la).

Co)e(er, the po)er to grant or issue licenses or usiness per%its %ust al)ays

e

e&ercise# in accor#ance )ith la), )ith ut%ost oser(ance of the rights of all c

oncerne# to #ue process an# e!ual protection of the la).

But can city %ayor cancel usiness per%its or i%pose special con#itionsD *s

aptly #iscusse# y the Solicitor >eneral in his $o%%ent, the po)er to issue

licenses

an# per%its necessarily inclu#es the corollary po)er to re(oe, )ith#ra) or

can

cel the sa%e. *n# the po)er to re(oe or cancel, lie)ise inclu#es the po)er

to

restrict through the i%position of certain con#itions.

Ei# the con#itions or restrictions i%pose# a%ount to a con"scation of the usinessD

Eistinction %ust e %a#e et)een the grant of a license or per%it to #o

usiness

an# the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of a particular profess

ion. 2he "rst is usually grante# y the local authorities an# the secon# is iss

ue# y the Boar# or $o%%ission tase# to regulate the particular profession. *


11/22

usiness per%it authories the person, natural or other)ise, to engage in

usines

s or so%e for% of co%%ercial acti(ity. * professional license, on the other

han#

, is the grant of authority to a natural person to engage in the practice or e&e

rcise of his or her profession.

@n the case at ar, )hat is sought y petitioner fro% respon#ent $ity Mayor is aper%it to engage in the usiness of running an optical shop. @t #oes not purpor

t to see a license to engage in the practice of opto%etry as a corporate o#y

o

r entity, although it #oes ha(e in its e%ploy, persons )ho are #uly license# to

practice opto%etry y the Boar# of F&a%iners in pto%etry.

BINAY +S DOMINGO

acts

Pettoner Munc#a%ty o$ Maat, t!rou! ts Counc%, a##rove" Reso%uton No. 60 &!c! e*ten"s P?00

'ura% assstance to 'ereave" $a-%es &!ose ross $a-%y nco-e "oes not e*cee" P2,000.00 a

-ont!. !e $un"s are to 'e taen out o$ t!e una##ro#rate" ava%a'%e $un"s n t!e -unc#a% treasury.

!e Metro Man%a Co--sson a##rove" t!e reso%uton. !erea$ter, t!e -unc#a% secretary cert$e" a

"s'urse-ent o$ P400,000.00 $or t!e -#%e-entaton o$ t!e #rora-. (o&ever, t!e Co--sson on

Au"t "sa##rove" sa" reso%uton an" t!e "s'urse-ent o$ $un"s $or t!e -#%e-entaton t!ereo$ $ort!e $o%%o&n reasons: 1 t!e reso%uton !as no connecton to a%%ee" #u'%c sa$ety, enera% &e%$are,

sa$ety, etc. o$ t!e n!a'tants o$ Maat> 2 overn-ent $un"s -ust 'e "s'urse" $or #u'%c #ur#oses

on%y> an", @ t vo%ates t!e e7ua% #rotecton c%ause snce t &%% on%y 'ene$t a $e& n"v"ua%s.

)ssues

1. 5!et!er Reso%uton No. 60 s a va%" e*ercse o$ t!e #o%ce #o&er un"er t!e enera% &e%$are c%ause

2. 5!et!er t!e 7uestone" reso%uton s $or a #u'%c #ur#ose

@. 5!et!er t!e reso%uton vo%ates t!e e7ua% #rotecton c%ause

*el+

1.!e #o%ce #o&er s a overn-enta% $uncton, an n!erent attr'ute o$ soverenty, &!c! &as 'orn

&t! cv%;e" overn-ent. )t s $oun"e" %are%y on t!e -a*-s, /c utere tuo et a!enu- non %ae"as

an" /a%us #o#u% est su#re-a %e*. )ts $un"a-enta% #ur#ose s securn t!e enera% &e%$are, co-$ort

an" convenence o$ t!e #eo#%e.

Police po)er is inherent in the state ut not in %unicipal corporations. e$ore a -unc#a% cor#oraton

-ay e*ercse suc! #o&er, t!ere -ust 'e a va%" "e%eaton o$ suc! #o&er 'y t!e %es%ature &!c! s

t!e re#ostory o$ t!e n!erent #o&ers o$ t!e /tate.


12/22

Munc#a% overn-ents e*ercse t!s #o&er un"er t!e general )elfare clause. Pursuant t!ereto t!ey

are c%ot!e" &t! aut!orty to enact suc! or"nances an" ssue suc! reu%atons as -ay 'e necessary

to carry out an" "sc!are t!e res#ons'%tes con$erre" u#on t 'y %a&, an" suc! as s!a%% 'e

necessary an" #ro#er to #rov"e $or t!e !ea%t!, sa$ety, co-$ort an" convenence, -antan #eace an"

or"er, -#rove #u'%c -ora%s, #ro-ote t!e #ros#erty an" enera% &e%$are o$ t!e -unc#a%ty an" t!e

n!a'tants t!ereo$, an" nsure t!e #rotecton o$ #ro#erty t!eren.

2. Po%ce #o&er s not ca#a'%e o$ an e*act "e$nton 'ut !as 'een, #ur#ose%y, ve%e" n enera% ter-s

to un"erscore ts a%% co-#re!ensveness. )ts sco#e, overBe*#an"n to -eet t!e e*ences o$ t!e

t-es, even to antc#ate t!e $uture &!ere t cou%" 'e "one, #rov"es enou! roo- $or an e$$cent

an" $%e*'%e res#onse to con"tons an" crcu-stances t!us assurn t!e reatest 'ene$ts.

!e #o%ce #o&er o$ a -unc#a% cor#oraton s 'roa", an" !as 'een sa" to 'e co--ensurate &t!,

'ut not to e*cee", t!e "uty to #rov"e $or t!e rea% nee"s o$ t!e #eo#%e n t!er !ea%t!, sa$ety,

co-$ort, an" convenence as consstent%y as -ay 'e &t! #rvate r!ts. )t e*ten"s to a%% t!e reat

#u'%c nee"s, an", n a 'roa" sense nc%u"es a%% %es%aton an" a%-ost every $uncton o$ t!e -unc#a%

overn-ent. )t covers a &"e sco#e o$ su'8ects, an", &!%e t s es#eca%%y occu#e" &t! &!atever

a$$ects t!e #eace, securty, !ea%t!, -ora%s, an" enera% &e%$are o$ t!e co--unty, t s not %-te"t!ereto, 'ut s 'roa"ene" to "ea% &t! con"tons &!c! e*sts so as to 'rn out o$ t!e- t!e reatest

&e%$are o$ t!e #eo#%e 'y #ro-otn #u'%c convenence or enera% #ros#erty, an" to everyt!n

&ort!&!%e $or t!e #reservaton o$ co-$ort o$ t!e n!a'tants o$ t!e cor#oraton. !us, t s "ee-e"

na"vsa'%e to atte-#t to $ra-e any "e$nton &!c! s!a%% a'so%ute%y n"cate t!e %-ts o$ #o%ce

#o&er.

Pulic purpose is not unconstitutional %erely ecause it inci#entally ene"ts a li%ite# nu%er of

persons. As correct%y #onte" out 'y t!e O$$ce o$ t!e /o%ctor Genera%, t!e "r$t s to&ar"s soca%

&e%$are %es%aton eare" to&ar"s state #o%ces to #rov"e a"e7uate soca% servces, t!e #ro-oton o$

t!e enera% &e%$are, soca% 8ustce as &e%% as !u-an "nty an" res#ect $or !u-an r!ts. !e care$or t!e #oor s enera%%y recon;e" as a #u'%c "uty. !e su##ort $or t!e #oor !as %on 'een an

acce#te" e*ercse o$ #o%ce #o&er n t!e #ro-oton o$ t!e co--on oo".

6.!ere s no vo%aton o$ t!e e7ua% #rotecton c%ause. Paupers %ay e reasonaly classi"e#.

$$erent rou#s -ay receve varyn treat-ent. Precous to t!e !earts o$ our %es%ators, "o&n to our

%oca% counc%ors, s t!e &e%$are o$ t!e #au#ers. !us, statutes !ave 'een #asse" vn r!ts an"

'ene$ts to t!e "sa'%e", e-anc#atn t!e tenantB$ar-er $ro- t!e 'on"ae o$ t!e so%, !ousn t!e

ur'an #oor, etc. Reso%uton No. 60, reBenacte" un"er Reso%uton No. 24@, o$ t!e Munc#a%ty o$ Maat

s a #araon o$ t!e contnun #rora- o$ our overn-ent to&ar"s soca% 8ustce. !e ura%

Assstance Prora- s a re%e$ o$ #au#ers-, t!ou! not co-#%ete. !e %oss o$ a -e-'er o$ a $a-%y s

a #an$u% e*#erence, an" t s -ore #an$u% $or t!e #oor to 'e $nanca%%y 'ur"ene" 'y suc! "eat!.

Reso%uton No. 60 vv$es t!e very &or"s o$ t!e %ate Pres"ent Ra-on Masaysay Dt!ose &!o !ave

%ess n %$e, s!ou%" !ave -ore n %a&. !s "ecson, !o&ever -ust not 'e taen as a #rece"ent, or as

an o$$ca% oBsna% $or -unc#a% overn-ents to e-'ar on a #!%ant!ro#c ory o$ nor"nate "o%eB

outs $or -otves #o%tca% or ot!er&se. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)

%ultan sop Ca9i+ vs. 35e o:ce of t5e Presi+ent

>.R. No. 171G1G Hanuary 1G, I885


13/22

acts:

2he %unicipality of *n#ong, =anao #el Sur, is a to)n that is not suppose# to e&ist yet is

actually insiste# y so%e as ali(e an# thri(ing. 2he creation of the putati(e %unicipality )as

#eclare# (oi# a initio y the Supre%e $ourt four #eca#es ago, ut the present petition

insists that *n#ong thri(es on an#, hence, it;s legal personality shoul# e gi(en u#icial

ar%ation.

xxx

2he factual antece#ents #eri(e fro% the ruling in Pelaez vs.Auditor Generalin 1975. 2hen

Presi#ent Eios#a#o Macapagal issue# se(eral F&ecuti(e r#ers creating 33 %unicipalities in

Min#anao.

Presi#ent Macapagal usti"e# the creation of these %unicipalities citing his po)ers

un#erSec.7J of the Re(ise# *#%in. $o#e. 2hen 'P F%%anuel Pelae "le# a special ci(il

action for a )rit of prohiition alleging that the Fs )ere null an# (oi#, Sec. 7J ha(ing een

repeale# y R* I308, an# sai# or#ers constituting an un#ue #elegation of legislati(e po)er.

*fter #ue #elieration, the S$ rule# that the challenge# Fs )ere null an# (oi# since Sec. 7J

of the Re(ise# *#%in. $o#e #i# not %eet the )ell-settle# re!uire%ents for a (ali# #elegation

of legislati(e po)er to the e&ecuti(e ranch.

*%ong the Fs annulle# )as F 180 )hich create# the Municipality of *n#ong.

Petitioner represents hi%self as a current resi#ent of *n#ong an# allege# that *n#ong +has

%eta%orphose# into a full-lo)n %unicipality )ith a co%plete set of ocials appointe# to

han#le essential ser(ices for the %unicipality an# its constituents,/ #espite the fact that no

person has een appointe#, electe# or !uali"e# to ser(e any of the local go(ern%ent oces

of *n#ong since 197J.

$a%i# i%pute# gra(e ause of #iscretion on the part of E@=> +in not classifying K*n#ongL as

a regular e&isting %unicipality an# in not inclu#ing sai# %unicipality in its recor#s an# ocial

#ataase as KanL e&isting regular %unicipality/. Ce argues that Pelaezhas alrea#y een

%o#i"e# y super(ening e(ents consisting of suse!uent la)s an# urispru#ence,

particularly citing Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez)herein the court ar%e# the

uni!ue status of the Municipality of San *n#res as a +de facto%unicipal corporation/. $a%i#

also cites Sec. GGI#6 of the =ocal >o(ern%ent $o#e of 1991 as asis for the recognition ofthe i%pugne# %unicipality.

)ssue


14/22

claimed and exercised corporate functions with the nowled!e and ac"uiescence of the

le!islature# and without interruption or ob$ection for period lon! enou!h to a%ord title by

prescription. o(ern%ent $o#e on %unicipalities

such as *n#ong )arrants e&planation.

F 180 )hich estalishe# *n#ong )as #eclare# +null an# (oi# ab initioin 1975 y the

Supre%e $ourt in Pelaez vs. Auditor General# '( S)*A (+, -',+(, along )ith 33 other Fs.

2he phrase /ab initio+ %eans +fro% the eginning/. Pelaez)as ne(er re(erse# y the S$ ut

)as rather e&pressly ar%e# in the cases of Municipality of San /oa"uin v. Siva, Municipality

of Malaban! v. 0enito, an# Municipality of 1apalon! v. Moya. No suse!uent ruling

#eclare# Pelaezas o(erturne#Ainoperati(e. No suse!uent legislation has een passe# since

1975 creating the Municipality of *n#ong. >i(en these facts, there is har#ly any reason to

elaorate )hy *n#ong #oes not e&ist as a #uly constitute# %unicipality.

Pelaezan# its ospring cases rule# that the President has no power to create

municipalitiesyet li%ite# it;s nulli"catory eects to the particular %unicipalities challenge#

in actual cases efore this $ourt. $ in 1991, the legal clou#

)as lifte# o(er the %unicipalities si%ilarly create# y e&ecuti(e or#er ut not u#icially

annulle# Sec. GGI6 of the =>$ #ee%e# curati(e )hate(er legal #efects to title these

%unicipalities ha# laore# un#er.

2here are e%inent #ierences et)een *n#ong an# %unicipalities such as San *n#res, *licia

an# Sinacaan. Most pro%inent is the fact that the 23 creatin! Andon! was expressly

annulled by the S) in ',+(. )ourt decisions cannot lose their e4cacy due to sheer de5ance

by the parties a!!rieved.

Sec. GGI#6 of the =>$ #oes not ser(e to ar%Areconstitute the u#icially #issol(e#

%unicipalities )hich ha# een pre(iously create# y presi#ential issuancesAFs. 6he

provision only a4rms the le!al personalities of those municipalities which may have been


15/22

created usin! the same in5rm le!al basis# yet were fortunate enou!h not to have been

$udicially annulled. n the other han#, the %unicipalities u#icially #issol(e# re%ain

ine&istent unless recreate# through speci"c legislati(e enact%ents.

2he le!al e%ect of the nulli5cation of a municipality in Pelaez was to revert the constituent

barrios of the voided town bac to their ori!inal municipalities.

@f there is only a strong i%pulse for the reconstitution of the %unicipality nulli"e# in Pelaez,

the solution is throu!h the le!islature and not $udicial con5rmation of void title . 35e ti9e

5as co9e for t5e li;5t to seep in an+ for t5e petitioner an+ li


16/22

San Andres to have at least attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of a de

facto municipal corporation.Conventional wisdom cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No.

353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez v. Auditor

General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order

No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the States recognition of the continued

existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified

the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No.

1515.

At the present time, all doubts on the de jure standing of the municipality must be dispelled. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15October 1986) apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives, appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San

Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12) municipalities composing the Third District of the province of Quezon. Equally

significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential

issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the

effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.

All considered, the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must now be conceded.

,MM&$, P,&,> V% &)3R G,$,R&

-n 19?, President 0erdinand >arcos issued e#ecutive orders creating municipalities E this was

purportedl$ pursuant to Section 8 of the evised 3dministrative Code which provides in part4

The President may by executive order define the boundary of any municipality and may change the

seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require

he then Fice President, 'mmanuel Pelae!, as a ta#pa$er, filed a special civil action to prohibit the

auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities) Pelae! claims that the

'Os were unconstitutional) ;e said that Section 8 of the 3C had been impliedl$ repealed b$ Section of 3 2: which provides that barrios ma$ Gnot be created or their boundaries altered nor their names

changedH e#cept b$ 3ct of Congress) Pelae! argues4 G-f the President, under this new law, cannot even

create a barrio, how can he create a municipalit$ which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are

units of municipalitiesH

he 3uditor "eneral countered that there was no repeal and that onl$ barrios were barred from being

created b$ the President) >unicipalities are e#empt from the bar and that a municipalit$ can be created

without creating barrios) ;e further maintains that through Sec) 8 of the 3C, Congress has delegated

such power to create municipalities to the President)

I'',E: =hether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President b$ virtue of

Sec) 8 of the 3C)

HELD: (o) here was no delegation here) 3lthough Congress ma$ delegate to another branch of the

government the power to fill in the details in the e#ecution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is

essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law4 5a6 be complete in

itself I it must set forth therein the polic$ to be e#ecuted, carried out or implemented b$ the delegate I

and 5b6 fi# a standard I the limits of which are sufficientl$ determinate or determinable I to which the

delegate must conform in the performance of his functions) -n this case, Sec) 8 lac.ed an$ such


17/22

standard) -ndeed, without a statutor$ declaration of polic$, the delegate would, in effect, ma.e or formulate

such polic$, which is the essence of ever$ law7 and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be

no means to determine, with reasonable certaint$, whether the delegate has acted within or be$ond the

scope of his authorit$)

0urther, although Sec) 8 provides the +ualif$ing clause Gas the public welfare ma$ re+uireH E which would

mean that the President ma$ e#ercise such power as the public welfare ma$ re+uire E is present, still,

such will not replace the standard needed for a proper delegation of power) -n the first place, what thephrase Gas the public welfare ma$ re+uireH +ualifies is the te#t which immediatel$ precedes hence, the

proper interpretation is Gthe President ma$ change the seat of government within an$ subdivision to such

place therein as the public welfare ma$ re+uire)H Onl$ the seat of government ma$ be changed b$ the

President when public welfare so re+uires and (O the creation of municipalit$)

he Supreme Court declared that the power to create municipalities is essentiall$ and eminentl$

legislative in character not administrative 5not e#ecutive6)


18/22

NOR3?RTO ASN)ON, ?T A. vs. =AN? D? @RART?

[G.R. No. 9321. September 24, 1914.]

FACTS:The proposed incorporators began an action in the CFI to compel the chief of the division of archives to receive and register

said articles of incorporation and to do any and all acts necessary for the complete incorporation of the persons named in the articles.

The court below found in favor of the defendant and refused to order the registration of the articles mentioned, maintaining and holding

that the defendant, under the Corporation Law, had authority to determine both the sufficiency of the form of the articles and the legality

of the object of the proposed corporation. This appeal is taken from that judgment

The chief of the division of archives, the respondent, refused to file the articles of incorporation, upon the ground that the object of the

corporation, as stated in the articles, was not lawful and that, in pursuance of section 6 of Act No. 1459, they were not registerable.

Hence, this action to obtain a writ of mandamus.

ISSUE:Whether or not the chief of the division of archives has authority, under the Corporation Law, on being presented with articles of

incorporation for registration, to decide not only as to the sufficiency of the form of the articles, but also as to the lawfulness of the

purposes of the proposed corporation.

HELD: YES.

CORPORATION LAW; POWERS AND DUTIES OF CHIEF OF DIVISION OF ARCHIVES, EXECUTIVE BUREAU. The chief of the

division of archives, for and on behalf of the division, has authority under the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) to determine the

sufficiency of the form of articles of incorporation offered for registration with the division.

Section 6 of the Corporation Law reads in part as follows:

Five or more persons, not exceeding fifteen, a majority of whom are residents of the Philippine Islands, may form a private corporation

for any lawful purpose by filing with the division of archives, patents, copyrights, and trademarks of the Executive Bureau articles of

incorporation duly executed and acknowledged before a notary public, . . .

Simply because the duties of an official happen to be ministerial, it does not necessarily follow that he may not, in the

administration of his office, determine questions of law.We are of the opinion that it is the duty of the division of archives, when

articles of incorporation are presented for registration, to determine whether the objects of the corporation as expressed in the articles

are lawful. We do not believe that, simply because articles of incorporation presented for registration are perfect in form, the division of

archives must accept and register them and issue the corresponding certificate of incorporation no matter what the purpose of the

corporation may be as expressed in the articles. The chief of the division of archives, on behalf of the division, has also the power andduty to determine from the articles of incorporation presented for registration the lawfulness of the purposes of the proposed corporation

and whether or not those purposes bring the proposed corporation within the purview of the law authorizing corporations for given

purposes.

MANDAMUS TO COMPEL HIM TO PERFORM DUTIES. The duties of the chief of the division of archives, so far as relates to the

registration of articles of incorporation, are purely ministerial and not discretional; and mandamus will lie to compel him to perform his

duties under the Corporation Law if, in violation of law, he refuse to perform them

On the contrary, there is no incompatibility in holding, as we do hold, that his duties are ministerial and that he has no authority to

exercise discretion in receiving and registering articles of incorporation. He may exercise judgment that is, the judicial function in

the determination of the question of law referred to, but he may not use discretion. The question whether or not the objects of a

proposed corporation are lawful is one that can be decided one way only. If he err in the determination of that question and refuse to file

articles which should be filed under the law, that decision is subject to review and correction and, upon proper showing, he will be

ordered to file the articles.

Discretion, it may be said generally, is a faculty conferred upon a court or other official by which he may decide a question

either way and still be right. The power conferred upon the division of archives with respect to the registration of articles of

incorporation is not of that character. It is of the same character as the determination of a lawsuit by a court upon the merits.

It can be decided only one way correctly.


19/22

=A vs. )O==SSON ON ??)TONS, G.R. No. 20974, A&r!# 22,

2014

)ONSTTTONA A>; S"R?=? A> O TB? AND; Born%ooC $octr!ne !s tat ne!ter te #eg!s#at!ve, te

e8ecut!ve, nor te u$!c!ar* as te &o/er to act %e*on$ te )onst!tut!ons 'an$ate. Te )onst!tut!on !s su&re'e; an*

e8erc!se o( &o/er %e*on$ /at !s c!rcu'scr!%e$ %* te )onst!tut!on !s u#tra v!res an$ a nu##!t*. As e#uc!$ate$ %* (or'er

)!e( +ust!ce ?nr!ue ernan$o !n ernan$e v. )uerva:

)ONSTTTONA A>; )ONTRAR@ TO TB? )ONSTTTON; ?GSAT


20/22

'erge$ an$ tere !s su%stant!a# a#terat!on o( te %oun$ar!es. t !s tus !nesca&a%#e to conc#u$e tat te %oun$ar!es o( te

e8!st!ng &rov!nce o( Negros Occ!$enta# /ou#$ necessar!#* %e su%stant!a##* a#tere$ %* te $!v!s!on o( !ts e8!st!ng %oun$ar!es

!n or$er tat tere can %e create$ te &ro&ose$ ne/ &rov!nce o( Negros $e# Norte. "#a!n an$ s!'e #og!c /!## $e'onstrate

tan tat t/o &o#!t!ca# un!ts /ou#$ %e a((ecte$.

LA $,GAL $/LAAN TRI$AL A''"CIATI"N INC%) et% al% v% ICT"R "% RAM"') 'ec+eta+y De*a+tment of

Envi+onment and Natu+al Resou+ces0 H"RACI" RAM"') Di+ecto+) Mines and Geosciences $u+eau 1MG$2

DENR30 R,$EN T"RRE') E4ecutive 'ec+eta+y0 and 5MC 1#HILI##INE'3 INC%

G%R% No% 678997) 78 &anua+y 7;) En $anc 1Ca+*io2Mo+ales) &%3

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that

participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be

construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

FACT': 3 :9?2 5he Philippine >ining 3ct6 too. effect on 3pril 9, 199@) /efore the effectivit$ of 3 :9?2, or on

>arch , 199@, the President signed a 0inancial and echnical 3ssistance 3greement 50336 with =>CP, a

corporation organi!ed under Philippine laws, covering close to 1, hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan

Judarat, Davao del Sur and (orth Cotabato) On 3ugust 1@, 199@, the 'nvironment Secretar$ Fictor amos issuedD'( 3dministrative Order 9@%2, which was later repealed b$ D'( 3dministrative Order 9%?, adopted on

December 2, 199)

Petitioners pra$ed that 3 :9?2, its implementing rules, and the 033 between the government and =>CP be

declared unconstitutional on ground that the$ allow full$ foreign owned corporations li.e =>CP to e#ploit, e#plore

and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of 3rticle K-- Section 2 paragraphs 2 and ? of the

Charter)

-n *anuar$ 21, =>C % a publicl$ listed 3ustralian mining and e#ploration compan$ % sold its whole sta.e in =>CP

to Sagittarius >ines, B of which is owned b$ 0ilipinos while ?B of which is owned b$ -ndophil esources, an

3ustralian compan$) D'( approved the transfer and registration of the 033 in SagittariusL name but epanto

Consolidated assailed the same) he latter case is still pending before the Court of 3ppeals)

'O 2:9, issued b$ former President 3+uino on *ul$ 2@, 198:, authori!es the D'( to accept, consider and

evaluate proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving

wither technical or financial assistance for large scale e#ploration, development and utili!ation of minerals which

upon appropriate recommendation of the 5D'(6 Secretar$, the President ma$ e#ecute with the foreign proponent)

=>CP li.ewise contended that the annulment of the 033 would violate a treat$ between the Philippines and

3ustralia which provides for the protection of 3ustralian investments)

I'',E':1) =hether or not the Philippine >ining 3ct is unconstitutional for allowing full$ foreign%owned corporations to

e#ploit the Philippine mineral resources)

2) =hether or not the 033 between the government and =>CP is a Mservice contract that permits full$

foreign owned companies to e#ploit the Philippine mineral resources)

HELD:

Fi+st Issue: RA 8


21/22

3 :9?2 or the Philippine >ining 3ct of 199@ is unconstitutional for permitting full$ foreign owned corporations to

e#ploit the Philippine natural resources)

3rticle K-- Section 2 of the 198: Constitution retained the egalian Doctrine which states that M3ll lands of the

public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all

forces of potential energ$, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are

owned b$ the State) he same section also states that, Mthe e#ploration and development and utili!ation of

natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State)

Conspicuousl$ absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 19@ and 19: Constitution authori!ing the State to grant

licenses, concessions, or leases for the e#ploration, e#ploitation, development, or utili!ation of natural resources) /$

such omission, the utili!ation of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no

longer allowed under the 198: Constitution)

nder the concession s$stem, the concessionaire ma.es a direct e+uit$ investment for the purpose of e#ploiting a

particular natural resource within a given area) he concession amounts to complete control b$ the concessionaire

over the countr$Ls natural resource, for it is given e#clusive and plenar$ rights to e#ploit a particular resource at the

point of e#traction)

he 198: Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase Mmanagement or other forms of assistance in the 19:

Charter) he present Constitution now allows onl$ Mtechnical and financial assistance) he management and the

operation of the mining activities b$ foreign contractors, the primar$ feature of the service contracts was precisel$

the evil the drafters of the 198: Constitution sought to avoid)

he constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into 033s is an e#ception to the rule that participation in

the nationLs natural resources is reserved e#clusivel$ to 0ilipinos) 3ccordingl$, such provision must be construed

strictl$ against their en&o$ment b$ non%0ilipinos) herefore, 3 :9?2 is invalid insofar as the said act authori!es

service contracts) 3lthough the statute emplo$s the phrase Mfinancial and technical agreements in accordance

with the 198: Constitution, its pertinent provisions actuall$ treat these agreements as service contracts that grant

beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrar$ to the fundamental law)

he underl$ing assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources

&ust li.e the foreign contractor in a service contract) /$ allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the

aspects of the mining operation, 3 :9?2 has, in effect, conve$ed beneficial ownership over the nationLs minera

resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto)

he same provisions, whether b$ design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionall$ ordained %

?B capitali!ation re+uirement for corporations or associations engaged in the e#ploitation, development and

utili!ation of Philippine natural resources)

=hen parts of a statute are so mutuall$ dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or

compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts

are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them)

nder 3rticle K-- Section 2 of the 198: Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited onl$ to merel$ technical or

financial assistance to the State for large scale e#ploration, development and utili!ation of minerals, petroleum and

other mineral oils)

'econd Issue: R# Gove+nment25MC# FTAA is a 'e+vice Cont+act


22/22

he 033 between he =>CP and the Philippine government is li.ewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself

is a service contract)

Section 1) of the 033 grants =>CP a full$ foreign owned corporation, the e#clusive right to e#plore, e#ploit

utili!e and dispose of all minerals and b$%products that ma$ be produced from the contract area) Section 1)2 of the

same agreement provides that '>CP shall provide all financing, technolog$, management, and personne

necessar$ for the >ining Operations)

hese contractual stipulations and related provisions in the 033 ta.en together, grant =>CP beneficial ownership

over natural resources that properl$ belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citi!ens) hese

stipulations are abhorrent to the 198: Constitution) he$ are precisel$ the vices that the fundamental law see.s to

avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress) Conse+uentl$, the contract from which the$ spring must be struc. down)

Muncorp Cases

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Transcript of Muncorp Cases