Multistakeholder+Diplomacy Part1

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BASICS

OF MULISAKEHOLDER

DIPLOMACY

Part I


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Brian Hocking Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Forms, Functions, and Frustrations.

Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities 13

MULTISTAKeHoLDeR DIPLoMACY:

FoRMS, FUNCTIoNS, AND FRUSTRATIoNS.

Brian Hocking

It has become apparent to observers o diplomacy that its orms and

unctions are increasingly complex. At one level, or example, tradi-

tional distinctions between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy have

become less clear and, arguably, o diminishing signicance. At another

level, it is evident that the array o actors engaged in the diplomatic arenais ar more diverse and that, in this sense, we may be witnessing the return

to pre-modern orms o diplomacy. Tis diversity o actors has attracted

varying terminologies, o which multistakeholder diplomacy (MSD) is one.

However, the ideas in which these various orms o diplomacy are rooted are

similar. Actors, including states commonly identied as the generators o

diplomacy are no longer able to achieve their objectives in isolation rom

one another. Diplomacy is becoming an activity concerned with the creation

o networks, embracing a range o state and non-state actors ocusing on

the management o issues that demand resources over which no single

participant possesses a monopoly.

However, in what sense can MSD be described as diplomacy? Simply

pointing out that more actors are involved in international policy says little

about the nature o contemporary diplomacy, either in terms o process

or in terms o structure. Afer all, non-governmental actors have been

participants in diplomatic processes in earlier eras and the inclusion o non-

governmental organisations (NGOs) in multilateral agencies can be traced

back at least to the International Labour Organisation. Nevertheless, it isapparent that, as in the past, the character o the diplomatic environment

is adapting to changing circumstances. We are living in an era in which

the state and the apparatuses through which it conducts its business are

responding to a plethora o internal and external challenges, leading to

questions regarding the relevance o diplomacy within contemporary world

politics. In this context, is MSD a new model o diplomacy and, i so, how

does it relate to conventional models rooted in state-ocused intergovern-

mental processes?


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Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Forms, Functions, and Frustrations Brian Hocking

14 Multistakeholder Diplomacy: Challenges and Opportunities

MSD and Tw Culturs f Diplmacy

John Ruggie (2005) helps to set the scene or our discussion in drawing

attention to the challenges conronting the UN as it responds to criticismso its humanitarian operations. On the one hand, he argues, a traditionalist

diplomatic culture lies in the UN, reected in the administration o the Iraq

oil-or-ood programme. Tis sees UN multilateral diplomacy as beginning

and ending with responsibility to member states and represented in institutions

such as the Security Council (characterised by secrecy and a lack o account-

ability). By contrast, one can also nd in UN processes a modernist culture

rooted in transparency and engagement with a wide range o internal and

external stakeholders. Te traditionalists, he argues, regard opaqueness andexclusiveness as a strategic asset, whereas or modernists transparency is the

key to institutional success. While presented in obviously stark terms, this clash

o cultures is symptomatic o an international system undergoing proound

change, reected in the character o diplomacy. As Mattingly (1973) notes,

diplomacy is a unctional representation o the political system in which it

operates. Yet, however the contemporary context o diplomacy is characterised,

Ruggies two cultures are constrained to coexist. Te older, state-based orm o

diplomacy exists alongside emergent orms, one label or which might be mul-

tistakeholder diplomacy. What kind o a diplomatic system does this represent

and how does it work? In part, answering this question requires us to go back

to rst principles and to consider what it is that we are examining.

Idntifying Diplmacy

Understanding variants on a states-system-based model o diplomacy re-

quires us to take a broader perspective on its development. However, as a numbero analysts have noted, the study o diplomacy has either been ignored by those

preoccupied with the phenomena o globalisation and global governance or has

been constrained by analytical rameworks rooted in statehood and sovereignty.Consequently, discussion o Ruggies traditionalist culture has dominated the

analysis o diplomacy as well as its practice. Tat is, much o modern diplomatic

studies restricts itsel to the association o diplomacy with a system o sovereign

states, rather than seeking out its essential characteristics.

In seeking to dissociate diplomacy rom preoccupations with its rolewithin the states system, Sharp (1999) has suggested that we recall the un-


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damental qualities o diplomacy. He argues that these reside in the intersec-

tion o two conditions: separateness and the need to communicate. With a

similar purpose, Der Derian (1987) notes that the continual shaping and

reshaping o diplomacy sits uncomortably with the assumption that it hasattained its ultimate expression, that we have reached or even that we are

approaching afer a long odyssey the best, nal orm o diplomacy (p.

3). Likewise, Jnsson and Hall (2003) have argued or resisting the associa-

tion o diplomacy with a state centric perspective, adopting in their analysis

o diplomatic communication a denition o diplomacy as an institution

structuring relations among polities, that is, political authorities o various

kinds with distinct identities (p. 196). Equally, Lee and Hudson (2004) have

pointed to the distortions that the assumption that diplomacy is essentiallya dialogue between states poses to a broader understanding o its character

and evolution. In sum, each o these arguments, in diering ways, makes the

case or identiying both the essential character o diplomacy and the need

to recognise that the orm maniested in the classical state system is but one

variant. Tese arguments suggest that MSD is not some transient mutation

rom a well-established norm, but may be an interesting development indica-

tive o continuing adaptation.

Such considerations pose questions as to where MSD ts into the con-

tinually evolving patterns o diplomacy. I one argues that the principal dis-

course o diplomacy rom, say, the 16th to the 20th century, has ocused on the

emergence and development o national diplomatic systems, whose essence

is rooted in the system o sovereign states, how does the concept o MSD

relate to this? Does MSD represent a undamental shi in the character o

diplomacy such as that which accompanied the transition rom the medieval

to the Renaissance era or is it simply a minor modication o well-estab-

lished patterns o communication that have dominated international politics

or several centuries? Tese questions invite us to extend the analysis thatstudents o diplomacy such as Raymond Cohen (1999) have applied when

considering the broader issues o the impact o globalisation on diplomacy.

Arguing that a dispassionate analysis o diplomacy in a turbulent environment

demands a conscious attempt to distinguish the permanent rom the transi-

tory, Cohen (1999) invites us to identiy the core characteristics o diering

diplomatic systems. Pursuing the same theme, Jnsson and Hall (2003) argue

or the importance o analysing change and continuity in evolving patterns

o diplomacy divorced rom culture-bound assumptions regarding its originsand undamental characteristics.


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One o the difculties here (as Winham [1993] points out in reecting

on Mattinglys (1973) analysis o the evolution rom medieval to Renaissance

diplomacy) is that o perspective. What is clear with the benet o hindsight

would not have been apparent in, say, the 14th century. Te same point ap-plies now. I we are moving through a phase o signicant change in interna-

tional politics, the precise contours o the resultant landscape are uncertain.

However, it seems reasonable to propose, and it appears to accord with the

contemporary diplomatic environment, that we are witnessing the intersec-

tion, ollowing Ruggie (2005), o a traditionalist and a modernist diplomatic

culture. Assuming that we can denote MSD as one dimension o the latter,

how can we describe its parameters and how do they relate to earlier phases

in the long evolution o diplomatic practice?What we are concerned with here is the adaptation o diplomatic sys-

tems to internal cultural challenges as older and newer orms o diplomatic

environment and practice intersect. In able , I sketch how a traditionalist,

state-based diplomatic environment contrasts with the environment o the

MSD image. Te purpose here is not to argue that a orm o new diplomacy is

replacing an older, state based orm or, indeed that they are discrete diplomatic

systems. Rather, they exist alongside and intersect with each other, reecting

the pressures o adaptation in contemporary world politics. In other words, we

can understand the character o signicant areas o contemporary diplomacy

only in terms o the interaction o practices and expectations generated by

the interrelationship o the two images.

Cntxt

Te chie distinguishing eature o the setting or context in which

diplomacy unctions lies in the signicance o the sovereign state as theterminal authority within the international system. While MSD does not

deny the continuing signicance o the state, Cohen (1999) notes that one o

the by-products o globalisation is an erosion o the exclusive unctions andprerogatives o the state and the proessions that served it (pp. 1-2). Using

Rosenaus (2000) terminology, we now live in an era marked by multiple

spheres o authority whose agents are not constrained by domestic arenas.

Instead, state agents pursue their interests in whatever policy arenas are

appropriate to the attainment o their objectives. In terms o the evolutiono diplomacy, this represents a return to pre-modern orms where non-


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sovereign actors exercised the right to engage in diplomatic processes that

would later come to be regarded as the prerogative o the representatives

o the state.

One o the characteristic qualities o state-based diplomacy has been itsexclusivity. Diplomats are dened in terms o their role as representatives o

national governments; at the international level, their presence and activities

reect practices that emphasise a sense o community enshrined in codes o

behaviour and protected through conventions o diplomatic immunity. In

short, they can be regarded as aguild, sharing responsibilities deriving rom

the twin roles o diplomacy as statecra and as an institution o the interna-

tional system (Henrikson, 1997). Integral to this image is the proposition that

diplomacy is distinct rom other spheres o activity, a separation expressedin the concept o the diplomat asgatekeeper, or mediator between domestic

and international environments. Diplomacy is also traditionally dierentiated

rom policy making and rom politics, points stressed by Nicolson (1939) in

his writings.

MSD, by denition, possesses very dierent characteristics as reected

in the growing literature on multistakeholder processes rom which it has

emerged. A undamental premise o multistakeholder processes is inclusive-

ness and partnership in policy processes, rather than exclusiveness. Such

processes aim to bring together all major stakeholders in a new orm o

common decision nding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular

issue (Hemmati, 2000, p. 19). Furthermore, in multistakeholder processes,

inuence and the right to be heard should be based on the value o each

stakeholders unique perspective and expertise (Hemmati, 2000, p. 7). As is

oen pointed out, this modies the dominant democratic paradigm. At the

same time, it also modies the dominant diplomatic paradigm in signicant

ways. Not only does it challenge the rationale o the guild-like characteristics

o traditional diplomacy; it oers a very dierent picture o who is involvedin diplomacy. In particular, within MSD, private actors such as rms and,

o course, NGOs can and should play a signicant role.

Tis is not to say that non-state actors are unknown in the state-centred

model. However, their role is that oconsumers o diplomacy, whereas the

MSD model provides or a ar more proactive role in which the private sec-

tor can becomeproducers o diplomatic outcomes. However, these roles are

likely to depend on the dynamics underpinning the trisectoral interactions

between governments, NGOs, and business. Doh and eegen (2003) havesuggested that the patterns o relationships between business and NGOs exist


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on a spectrum lying between stakegiver roles, in which positive outcomes

are produced, to staketaker roles in which NGOs become opponents o the

interests o other parties.

able 1. State-centred and Multistakeholder Diplomacy

State-centred model Multistakeholder model

Context State as unchallenged termi-nal authority.

Multiple spheres o authority.

Forms Government-led usingbilateral and multilateralchannels.

Diuse: may be led bygovernments or otherstakeholder.

Developing and uid orms.

Participants Proessional diplomaticguild.

Diplomats whose credentialsare based on principles osovereignty.

Non-state actors as consum-

ers o diplomacy.

Multiple participation basedon varying models.

Frequently based on trisec-toral model incorporatinggovernments, NGOs, andbusiness.

Stakeholders whosecredentials are based oninterests and expertise.

Non-state actors as producerso diplomacy.

Roles Diplomat as gatekeeper. Diplomat as boundary-spanner: acilitator andentrepreneur.

Stakeholders perorming

multiple roles: stakegivers vs.staketakers.

Communicationpatterns

Government ocused.Relations with stakeholdersdefned as outreach.

Hierarchical inormationows ocused on govern-ments. Exclusive but withrecognition o need oroutreach.

Networks. Open andinclusive. Can be uid andunstable.

Multidirectional ows oinormation.


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Functions Managing relations betweensovereign entities.

Defning and promotingnational interests.

Compensate or defcien-cies in diplomatic processesby exchanging resources

through policy networks.

Inormation exchange.

Monitoring processes.

Defning and promotingglobal interests.

Location Outside domestic arenas.

Diplomatic sites:

intergovernmental.

Crosses domestic-interna-tional arenas.

Multiple diplomatic sites.Representationpatterns

State-ocused.

Mixed bilateral and multilat-eral with growing emphasison mission diplomacy.

Multilateral and missionoriented.

Variable permanentrepresentation.

Rules Clear normative expectationso behaviour.

Derived orm sovereignty-

related rules.Centrality o protocol.

Immunity o diplomaticagents.

Confdentiality.

Underdeveloped rules.

Clash o sovereignty andnon-sovereignty based rules.

Openness, accountability andtransparency.

Institutional tensions.

Clash o expectationsbetween stakeholders.

Nonetheless, the MSD model does not necessarily imply a diminished

role or the proessional diplomat. Indeed, that role might gain in importance,but, at the same time, become redened. Rather than that o gatekeeper, the

diplomat becomes what might be termed a boundary-spanner, recognising

that boundaries between organisations, ar rom being irrelevant, are uid and

continually reconstitute themselves, thereby becoming sites o intense activity

(Ansel and Weber, 1999). In such an environment, diplomats assume the role

o mediators or brokers, acilitators and entrepreneurs (Rana, 2004). Indeed,

Rosenau (2000) sees a crucial role or diplomats in assisting the creation and

legitimisation o new patterns o social contract between individuals and aplethora o spheres o authority.


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Cmmunicatin Pattrns

In contrast to the traditional, hierarchical model o diplomacy that

stresses the centrality o intergovernmental relations, MSD is a reection oa much more diuse, network model. Underpinning the various denitions

o networks lies the proposition that they have become indispensable in

managing increasingly complex policy environments through the promotiono communication and trust. A policy network can be dened as

a set o relatively stable relationships which are o a non-hierar-

chical and interdependent nature linking a variety o actors, who

share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchangeresources to pursue these shared interests, acknowledging that co-

operation is the best way to achieve common goals. (Stone, 1997)

Tis denition underpins Reineckes (2000) concept o global public

policy networks. Starting rom the premise that globalisation has highlightedthe deciencies o governments in terms o the scope o their activ ities, speed

o response to global issues, and range o contacts, he identies the signi-

cance o networks incorporating both public and private sector actors. Multi-

governmental institutions are not irrelevant to the management o global

issues, he suggests, but the more diverse membership and non-hierarchical

qualities o public policy networks promote collaboration and learning and

speeds up the acquisition and processing o knowledge. Furthermore, as an

Aspen Institute (Bollier, 2003) report argues, centralised decision making

processes are at a disadvantage when conronted by decentralised networks;

the latter ace ewer transactional barriers and are able to direct relevant

inormation speedily to where it will have greatest eect.

Functins

In contrast to the premise that the agents o government exercise pre-

dominance in the shaping o international policy, the logic o MSD is rooted in

the constraints conronting all actors both state and non-state in achieving

their policy objectives. Challenged by ever more complex and multiaceted

agendas, MSD establishes relationships o varying scope and composition,which, or example, bring together governmental actors, and business. Quite


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clearly, the motivations or developing relationships will vary. Business has

come to recognise that NGOs are now a critical element o the environment in

which it has to operate. Indeed, taxonomies drawn rom various stakeholder

theories developed in the corporate political strategy literature have beenused to analyse the motivations o business in engaging with NGOs and the

variety o relationships that such engagement produces (Doh and eegen,

2003). In general, such relationships seek to compensate or three orms o

decit that actors conront in achieving their diplomatic objectives: legiti-

macy, knowledge, and access. Tese decits underpin the goal o resource

exchange identied by Reinicke (2000) as a eature o global policy networks

demonstrated in the trade policy arena where the pattern o a closed, club-like

diplomatic environment has transormed into multistakeholder processes(Hocking, 2004).

Te rst decit, legitimacy, reects a decreased level o trust in the insti-

tutions o government. As Ostry (2002) has noted, accompanying the changes

in the trade agenda lies a more general decline in public condence in the

institutions o representative democracy. Haynal (2002) sees this development

as having a particular signicance in the realm o diplomacy, which represents

a mediating institution between people and policy arenas. What he terms the

growth o disintermediation, a rejection o such institutions, poses particu-

lar challenges to those charged with the conduct o international policy. Te

involvement o a broader cross-section o societal interests, as represented in

civil society organisations, particularly the NGOs, is thus a logical strategy

or dealing with this alienation.

Not surprisingly, in the wake o the experiences o the abortive Multilateral

Agreement on Investment negotiations in 1998 and the Seattle World rade

Organization ministerial in 1999, policy makers have emphasised the need

to consult domestic constituencies i support or trade liberalisation is to

be sustained and anti-globalisation orces resisted. Tus, the CanadianDepartment o Foreign Aairs and International rade (DFAI) now

renamed Foreign Aairs Canada is clear in its objectives regarding con-

sultative procedures:

By mobilising popular opinion and keeping people ully inormed

o the issues and the direction o trade negotiations, transpar-

ency and engagement combine to establish the legitimacy, con-

sistency, and the durability o policy decisions and outcomes.(DFAI, 2003)


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Similar sentiments have been voiced in the USA and the European Union

(EU). In evaluating the US system o trade consultation, Huenemann (2001)

suggests that its biggest weakness is its ailure to engage the public in a discus-

sion on the aims o trade policy. Te Seattle experience led CommissionerPascal Lamy to introduce a DG rade Civil Society Dialogue designed to

develop a condent working relationship among all stakeholders interested

in trade policy, to ensure that all contributions to EU trade policy can be

heard (DG rade Civil Society Dialogue, 2003). Te underlying goal is, as

Ostry (2002) suggests, or government to engage in capacity building within

civil society i the anti-globalisation backlash is to be contained.

Te second decit that underpins the growing interest in developing MSP

relates to knowledge. In the trade sphere, negotiators have long recognised thatadvice rom the business community is an essential component in the raming

o trade policy. Hence, or example, the advisory structures put in place by

Cordell Hull ollowing the enactment o the US rade Reciprocity Act o 1934

(Aaronson, 2001). However, in the ace o growing resource constraints, the

knowledge capacity o government has, in general terms, diminished just as

the demands imposed on it have grown. NGOs have a window o opportunity

to ll this gap by capitalising on their own expertise. As Curtis (2001) puts

it, NGOs

possess . . . a reservoir o knowledge, skills and perspective that

could be deployed to great advantage or policy development. Tis

includes inormation that bears on the gamut o trade policy issues,

rom negotiations to administration o the multilateral system to

the eective disposition o trade disputes. (p. 305)

In this context, Aaronson (2001) has suggested that one o the essential

unctions o consultative processes in trade policy is to establish a commonlanguage regarding the nature and objectives o trade agreements.

From the CSO perspective, another resource decit access is apparent.

One oen hears that although the growing role o NGOs in world politics is

underpinned by the diminishing obstacles to non-state actors, and that advan-

tages inhere in the non-sovereign qualities o such actors, governments and

the sovereignty-related rules governing the international system still control

access to key diplomatic networks. Despite some movement at the World rade

Organization toward greater NGO access, its intergovernmental qualities stil lplace a premium on opportunities provided by consultation at the national


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level. o summarise, many areas o contemporary diplomacy, including those

relating to international trade policy, involve the trading o resources between

dierent actors, each possessing resources that the others need (Cooper and

Hocking, 2000). Consequently, diplomacy is becoming more o a networkingactivity and thus demands the establishment o coalitions o diverse actors to

manage complex policy agendas (Curtis, 2001).

We could point out numerous examples o these processes (I have de-

scribed them elsewhere as catalytic diplomacy [Hocking, 1999]). Te exam-

ple o the Ottawa Process relating to landmines is an o-cited example. More

recently, the establishment o the Kimberley Process dealing with the sale

o illicit conict or blood diamonds is a good example; an NGO, Global

Witness, acted as a catalyst to a process in which British and American diplo-mats, the EU Commission, together with journalists and the global diamond

rm De Beers, contributed to the establishment o a diamond regime.

Lcatin

Location reers to the primary sites within which diplomatic activity

occurs. As noted earlier, Nicolson (1939) stressed two aspects o diplomacy

that he deemed signicant to its successul operation: the separation o policy

rom its execution and the separation o oreign rom domestic policy. It is

arguable whether the old diplomacy maintained these separations, but,

clearly, they are no longer eatures o the diplomatic environment. Te under-

lying rationale o MSD implies a democratisation o diplomacy that renders

both assumptions redundant. Moreover, the character o the stakeholders

particularly NGOs operating in domestic and international environments

simultaneously means that the precise location o diplomacy becomes

harder to determine. Te linkage between domestic and international ne-gotiating arenas is a well-established eature o contemporary negotiation

and demands continual and simultaneous evaluation o developments in

both arenas i successul outcomes are to be secured (Evans, Jacobson, and

Putnam, 1993). Te eect o MSD is to enhance the linkage and to project the

domestic environment more denitely into the international environment.

Quite clearly, the MSD model is likely to embrace a more diverse range o

diplomatic sites, reecting a varying degree o governmental involvement.

Tus, Coleman and Perl (1999) have suggested a typology o our sites rang-ing rom intergovernmental through multilevel governance and private


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regimes to loose couplings where interactions between governmental and

transnational actors are sparse and unstructured. Te nature o the site will

determine the objectives o MSD and the precise orm that it assumes.

Pattrns f rprsntatin

Diplomatic systems are marked by two basic modes o representation:

diplomacy by mission and diplomacy by permanent representation. Nicolson

(1939) regarded the latter as the essence o eective diplomacy. Te recent

history o state-centred diplomacy has emphasised the importance o mission

over permanent bilateral diplomacy. Diplomacy when and where you needit, instead o diplomacy whether you need it or not (Winham, 1993, p. 33)

reects the growing complexity and the technical nature o negotiations. Here,

we nd a direct linkage to MSD since one o the central impulses underlying

it is to bring expertise outside government into areas o complex negotiations.

As we have seen, however, the world o state-centred diplomacy has had to

adjust to changes whose roots lie in the political and economic conguration

o the international order, as well as within its social underpinnings. National

diplomatic systems around the world conront similar problems: how to bear

the burden o greater demands with ewer resources while responding to the

claims o domestic sectoral departments to act as their own representatives

in international environments. Tese dilemmas have produced, or example,

various models o alternative representation such as hub-and-spoke systems

and co-location o missions. Te more complex the environment as in the

case o the proposed reorms in EU external policy contained in the 2004

constitution the greater the challenge to national diplomatic systems and

the greater the opportunity or creative responses to these challenges.

Te concept o MSD adds another layer to the problems o representa-tion. Alongside statecraf comes what Cooper (2004) terms society-craf

or the weaving together o the diplomatic resources o the state with those

o non-state entities, particularly the NGO community. Society-cra poses

challenges both to governments and to multilateral organisations in decid-

ing with whom to engage and on what terms. O course, engagement with

stakeholders is not a new idea; the International Labour Organization is

commonly regarded as one o the earliest instances, establishing in 1919

trisectoral representation rom governments, unions, and employers. Sincethe creation o the UN, the trend has grown apace, with many o the concepts


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relating to stakeholder activity deriving rom the Rio Earth Summit o 1992.

As Dodds (2000) notes, a signicant aspect o the subsequent Agenda 21 was

its status as the rst UN document to recognise the roles and responsibilities

o nine stakeholder groups (pp. 28-29). Since then, the creation o the UNCommission on Sustainable Development has seen a gradual expansion o

stakeholder engagement.

Nevertheless, the intersection o the two diplomatic cultures creates ten-sions. Tis takes us back to a point made earlier, namely, the signicant degree

o control that state-based diplomacy exercises over access to the diplomatic

environment. Tis is evident in comparing the development o stakeholder

engagement in the UN system with that o the World rade Organization

where the dominance o sovereignty-related rules provides a less congenialenvironment or the development o MSD (Marceau and Pedersen, 1999;

Esty, 1998).

Ruls

Te transormation o multilateral diplomacy and the challenges that

it poses emphasise the tensions that underlie the operation o contemporary

diplomacy and generate the rustrations that stakeholders requently express

with multistakeholder processes. I we are witnessing the emergence o a newphase in the evolution o diplomacy, an important aspect is the development

o rules through which the new processes can unction. As Jnsson and Hall

(2003) note, ritual and protocol in diplomacy reduce transaction costs and

are critical to its operation. From an NGO perspective, Dodds (2000) sug-

gests the need or the development o agreed norms and standards by which

multistakeholder processes can operate. Tis will require a clearer denition

o the role and responsibility o governments, as well as o stakeholders, andan agreement on the modes o interaction (p. 37). However, two sets o rules

are requently in tension with one another. Te clear, normative expectations

o behaviour derived rom sovereignty-related rules do not parallel those in

the MSD environment wherein patterns o behaviour by some stakeholders

clearly reect dierent, non-sovereignty related norms. o take one example,

the sovereignty environment and the MSD environment take diering ap-

proaches to condentiality in negotiations.

Te character o these problems depends on the nature o the politicalenvironment. In general, they can be identied in terms o the institutional


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tension created by attempts to graf newer onto older modes o diplomacy. Te

result is a crisis o expectations, a mismatch o goals and ambitions o the

participants in the various processes, and a more general legitimacy debate

nested within the broader debate about the nature o democratic processesin the ace o globalisation. Such institutional tensions can be seen in the

trade policy sphere where conicts produced by the denition o new rules

at the national and multilateral levels are evident. Within national processes

o trade consultation, the shi rom a relatively closed club to a more open

multistakeholder model has generated tensions between business and NGOs,

with the ormer sometimes resenting what it regards as the incursion o the

latter (Hocking, 2004).

Much o this disquiet is related to the second actor, a crisis o expecta-tions concerning the objectives o consultation, the means through which it is

achieved, and the likely outcomes. Tis phenomenon is part o the stress more

generally maniest in the conduct o international policy making and diplo-

macy as NGOs, the business community, and ofcials rom government nd

themselves rubbing shoulders with increasing requency. It is hardly surpris-

ing that in the case o trade policy, diering operational styles, organisational

characteristics and, simply, a lack o amiliarity between diering participants

condition the workings o consultative processes. Tis has been the case with

the EU DG rade Civil Society Dialogue in which, as one commentator has

noted, such actors make it difcult or the creation o consultation spaces

where the actors eel comortable and, sometimes, rustrations and misun-

derstandings arise (Muguruza, 2002, p. 13).

Cnclusin

Te above discussion is not intended as an argument in avour o yet an-other mode o new diplomacy replacing older orms, nor is it a re-statemento the decline o diplomacy mantra. Certainly, it is the case that state-based

diplomacy is conronting challenges as it adapts to undamental changes in

world politics. Tis is a perectly amiliar process in the long history o diplo-macy. Nor has it been my purpose to suggest that the proessional diplomat is

an endangered species. On the contrary, the logic o MSD as I have sought to

dene it here suggests that diplomats have signicant roles that relate to their

historic unctions rather than to current preoccupations with, or example,commercial diplomacy.


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What I have suggested is, rst, that one must see diplomacy in a context

broader than that o the state system with which it is oen associated. I have

also suggested that identiying evolving patterns o diplomacy presents us

with problems o interpretation and understanding that is as applicable toMSD as it is to that o other models. Tird, I have suggested that it is possible to

recognise the intersection o two diplomatic cultures overlaying and inorm-

ing one another. Not surprisingly, their coexistence generates, simultaneously,

creative and negative tensions.

Such tensions requently re lect a clash o expectations rom all par-

ties involved as to the purposes o multistakeholder processes. In part icu-lar, civil society organisations may well entertain unrealistic assumptions

as to what might be achieved through essentially bureaucratic processes,especially where they are seeking to redeine the political agenda in a way

to which bureaucratic interlocutors are unable to respond. Diplomats, or

their part, may ail to appreciate the legitimate goals o non-state actors

with whom they become involved in negotiating arenas. What appears to

be happening is that rules o engagement between the essential sets o

actors, government, business, and NGOs, are gradua lly being shaped. Not

surprisingly, these rules are tenuous and uzzy. Yet, the success o much

contemporary diplomacy, not only in the trade arena, requires that they

be developed.

References

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