Miilamadhyamakaltariki of- a Tile Philof'oplzy ohe Middle Mulamadhyamakakarika of Nagarjuna THE PHILOSOPHYOFTHE MIDDLE WAY Introduction,SanskritText,English Translationand Annotation DAVIDJ. KALUPAHANA MOTILAL BANARSIDASSPUBUSHERS ... PRIVATELIMITEDeDELHI FirstIndian Edition:Delhi,1991 Reprint.'Delhi,1996,1999 01986StateUniversityof NewYork AllRightsReserved Nopart of lhisbookmaybeusedor reproducedinanymanner whatsoeverwilhout writtenpermissionexcept inlhecaseof brief embodiedincriticalarticlesand .ISBN:81-208-0774-x Alsoavailo.bleat: MOTILALBANARSIDASS 41U.A.BungalowRoad, Jawahar. Nagar,Delhi110007 8MahalaxmiChamber, WardenRoad,Mumbai400026 120RoyapettahHighRoad,Mylapore,Chennai600004 SanasPlaza,1302,BajiRaoRoad,Pune411002 16St.Mark's Road,Bangalore560001 8Camac Streel,Calcutta700017 AshokRajpath,Patna 800004 Chowk,Yaranasi221001 Library of CongressCataloging-in-PublicationData .. Nagaljuna,2nd cent. Miilamadhyamakakarika:lhephilosophy of lhemiddleway Translationof :Madhyamakakarika Includesbibliographical_referencesandindex 1.Miidhyamika(Buddhism)-Earlyworksto1800 I.Kalupahana,David J., I 933- 11. title III.title:Philosophyof themiddleway BQ2792.E5K351986294.3'8585-14757 PRINTEDININDIA BY JAINENDRAl'RAKASH JAINATSHRI JAINENDRAPRESS, A-45NARAINA,PHASEI,NEWDELHI110 028 AND, PUBLISHEDBY NA'RENDRAPRAKASH JAINFOR MOTII..ALBANARSIDASSPUBLISHERSPRIVATELIMITED, BUNGALOWROAD,DELHI110007 . To Professor N.A.Jayawickrema (yo)acanyo 'hosi mam' atthakiimo (j 5 . ~ 0 )PREFACE Almosttenyearsago,Iundertookanewtranslationof CandrakTrti'sen-cyclopaedicworkthePrasannapadii,acommentaryonNagarjuna's primaryphilosophicaltreatise,theMUiamadhyamakizk7irik4.MterIhad completednearlytenchapters,I 'learnedthrough. oneof mystudents about a similar attemptbyProfessor. MarvinSprung.Iwasabouttogiveupmy project,whenmystudent,who -hadpreviously underProfessor Sprung,sharedwithmeacopyof ProfessorSprung's of-thefirst chapter.ComparinghisanqmytranslationS,IdiscoveredthatProfessor Sprung'stranslationwastosomeextentinfluencedbywork' (TheConceptionof Buddhist. Nirvana,1927).Ifeltthenthat!JlYeffort wouldnot. beinvain,becauseIhadexpressedstrongdisagree-ment withStcherbatsky'sinterpretationof theBuddhistphilosophical tion (5eemyCausality,TheCentral PhilosophyofBuddhism,1975). Tomysurprise;ProfessorSprung'stranslation, . consitingofonlyseven-teenchapters (including an incomplete rendering of Chapter I),appearedin 1979.As1ploddedalongthroughmyownlaboriouswork,Ibeganto realizehowCandrakTrtiwasgraduallyleadingmeawayfrom. Nag:ujuna's philosophicalstandpoint.Mysuspicioll$werestrengthenedin1981whenI visitedIndiaon aSmithsoniangrant.Meeting with -somewho were brought up in the Vedantictradition,I foundthem to beextremely comfort-able with .Ni.garjuna asinterpretedbyCandrakTrti andlessimpressedbythe teachings -of earlyBuddhismasrecordedintheNikayasandtheAgamas. Mysuspicionthat NagarjunaandCandrakrniwereupholdingtwodifferent . philosophicalstandpointscompelledmetotakeafreshlook at Chung-lun,whichisatleasttwocenturiespriortoCan-drakrni.TranslatingtheentireChung-lunintoEnglisnan.dcomparingit withNagarjuna'soriginalSanskrittext,Iwaspleasantlysurprizedbytheir Ifoundnojustificationinl?OkingatNagarjuna throughCandritkrrti'seyeswhentherewas amorefaithfulandcloserdisci-pleof NaglirjunainKumlirajrva.Thisdiscoverydiminishedmyenthusiasm forcleaningupniyEnglishrenderingofthe foepossible publication. Mtectranslatingbothi:heSanskritandtheChineseversionsof Nagar-juna'streatise,Iproceededtoannotateboth accordingtomyunderstanding , of early .aswellaslaterBuddhisttraditionsbeforeNagujuna. nie annotation of theSanskrittextalorieturnedouttobemoreextensive ... viiiTHEOF THEMIDDlEWAY thananticipated.Furthermore,consideringthedifficultiesthatmightarise inpublishingthisworkwithSanskritandChinese. textssidebyside,and alsowiththeChinesecharactersinthebodyof theannotation,Idecided onceagaintomodifymyproject.TheSanskrittextispresentedwith annotationandintroduction.TheChinesetextwithcommentarywillap-pear subsequentlyasa companion volume. Iamnotunawareofthecontroversythisworkmayengender.Hoping thatitwillbeahealthyone,Iintendtoraiseonemajorquestionregarding especiallyinthelightof themorerecent researchinthehist.ory ofProfessorHajimeNakamura'smonumental Indian Buddhism(1980),hasprovidedmoreinformationregardingthehistoryof Buddhistthananyother workpublishedsofar.Thiscarefullyex-ecutedworknot onlydealswiththecontentsandauthorshipaswellasthe chronologyof mostoftheBrtddhisttexts,butalsocomparesthedifferent versionsavailablein Paii, .Chinese,Tibetan,and Japanese.Aftera carefulreadingof this work,Icannothelprecognizinganearlierstratumof literature thathassofarbeenlumpedtogetherwithalltheliteraturethat cametobecalledMahayanistic.Thisincludestwofamouspieces,the !ViiyapaparivartaandtheVajracchedikti-prajfltiptiramitti(seeNakamura, p.159).Iwonderwhethertheoriginalversionsofthesetextscanbeap-proriatelycalledMahayanistic,eventhoughtheywerepreservedbythe MahayanaSchools.Thisobjection,indeed,isnotverydifficultfromthat raisedagainst considering the N'ikayas and Agamas to be ffinayanisticbecause they werepreservedbythe Theravadins, the Sarvastivadins,or any later tradition. The major questionthat can be raisedis:"Where woulda philosopher like NagarjunagoinordertodiscovertheBuddha'steachings?"Thishistorical questionhas,tomyknowledge,neitherbeenraisednoranswered.The Saddharmapuf!t/affka-sutrathathighlightsthemnayana-Mahiyahacon-troversywasnot yet written.That doesnot mean that the controversy was. not knownbefore Nagarjuna.Evenif thecontroversyhadprecededNagarjuna, whatwerethecanonicallcxts,embodyingthepurephilosophical standpoint,thatNagarjunacould-haveutilizedinordertoexplainthe Buddha's message? Acarefulreadingof Nakamura'sworkshowsit tobefutileto attemptto discover a pure Mahayana text that Nagarjuna might have been able to depend upon.Beforethecompilationof theSaddharmapuf!tfanka,onecanhardly expect to finda carefuHy executed treatisethat'would explicate thephilosophyasitispresentedbymo-dernscholars.Sincesuchsohisticated Mahayana sutras .werenot availableto Nagarjuna,he could not help moving on to thein the Nikayas and the Agamas in search of the Bud-PREFACE IX dha'steachings,especiallyat a time when he realizedthat 'the problems were creatednotonlybymetaphysicians liketheSarvastivadinsandthe Sautrantikas;but alsobymorepopular religious teachers like Asvaghosa,who .over-emphasisedthefunctionof "faith"intheemergingbelief inatrans-cendent Buddha.A carefulreading of Nagarjuna's treatise willrevealthat he was, criticalof boththesetrends.If Buddhaghosawere. tobeconsideredthe model of a Theravadin and Candrakirti or Santideva were to be looked tipon as ideal Mahayanists, neither the Buddha, nor Moggal:rputta-tissa,nor Nagarjuna would fitintotheir shoes.. The present workmay come asa surprise to many whofamiliar with my previous publications,especiallybecause it repudiates many things that I. have said about Nagarjuna.In those earlier works,my major endeavor wasto show howtheBuddhismof 'theBuddhadifferedfrombothSthaviravadaand Mahayana, and the latter included philosophers like Nagarjuna. My main con-tentionwithscholarslikeStcherbatskyandMurtihas beeninregardtothe. manner in which the former equated Sarvastivada with early Buddhism and the latterportrayedtheBuddhaasahalf-heartedmetaphysicianintroducinga theory of elements that came to be rejected by Nagarjuna. I was prepared to ac-ceptMurti'sinterpretationof Nagarjuna,whilestruggling. tofindwaysin whichthat interpretation couldbejustified without s.acrificingthe empiricism of the Buddha.. A more detailed study .of both Magarjuna and CandrakTrti has convincedme _thattheformerstillremains faithfulto theBuddha,whilethe latter hasmovedmoretowardsa Vedamic interpretation,thereby initiating a thatculminatedinthedisappearanceofBuddhismasadistinct ideology fromtheIndian scene afewcenturies later. ABBREVIATIONS (ConsultKenneth Inada's Niigiirjuna,for a detailedbibliography on Nagiir-juna and the Miidhyamika school.) A AA Abhvt AD Adv AK Akb Ch'llng Chung D PI! DhsA DhsT It Klln"M Kp Anguttara-nikiiya, ed. R. Morrisand E.Hardy I5 volumes,London: PTS; Manorathapura,r, [Anguttara-a!(hakathii],ed. M. Walleser, London: PTS,1973. ed. D.Pannasara and P. Vimalad-hamma,Columbo:Mahabodhi Press,1933. Abhidharmadipa, see. At./v. Abhidharmadipa withVibhii!iiprabhiivrtti,ed.P.S. Jaini,Patna: K. P Jayaswal ResearchInstitute,1959. Abhidharmakoia,see Akb. Abhidha1"1'1'111koia-bhii1a, ed. Pralhad Pradhan, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute,1967. Ch'ang A-han Ching (Dirghiigama),tr.Buddhaya5as,Tairho No . .1. ChungA-hanChing(Madhyamiigama),tr.GautamaSarpghadeva TaishoNo.26. Digha-ni/t4ya,ed.T.W.RhysDavidsand).E.Carpenter,3 volume's, .London:PTS,1890-1911. Dhammapada,ed.V.Fausboll,London:Luzac,1900. Atthasiilinl, Dhammasanganl-atthakathii,ed.E.Muller,London: P':fS,1897. Abhidhammamulafikii[Tzka on Dhammasanganl-atthakathii],ed. D. Pannasara and P. Wimaladhamma, Colombo:Mahabodhi Press, 1938. ltivuttaka,ed.E. Windish,London: PTS,1889. SeeMKV(P),MKV(J-?. Kiiiyapapanvartaof theRPtnakuta-sutra,ed.A.Stael-Holstein, Shanghai:Commercial Press,1926. xii K'f!u Miln MKV(P) MKV(V) PEW PTS s sm Sdmp Sn Taisho Thag Thig Tsa Tseng THEPHILOSOPHY OF THEMIDDLEWAY Kath1ivallhu,ed.A.C.Taylor,2volumes,London:PTS, 1894-1897. Majjhima-nik1iya,ed.V.TrencknerandR.Chalmers,3 volumes, London:PTS,1887-1901. Milindapaflho,ed.V. London:PTS,1962. Miidhyamikavrtli. (Madhyamakak1in'k1is),ed. de la Vallee Poussin, BibliothecaBuddhica4,St.Petersburg: TheImperialAcademyof Sciences,1903-1913. MadhyamakaJiistraof Niig1irjunawiththecommentary;Prman-napadii byCandraliirti,ed.P. L.Vaidya, Darbhanga: TheMithlla Institute,1960. PhilosophyEastandWest,ed.EliotDeutsch,Honolulu:The UniversityPress. of Hawaii. ' ThePaliTextSociety.,London Sa1putta-nik1iJa,ed. L.Peer,5 volumes,London:PTS,1884-1904. Sphuf1irth1ibhidharmakoia-ry1ikhy1i, ed. U.Wogihara, 'Tokyo: The Publication Associationof Abhidharmako5avyakhya,1932-1936. Saddharmapu,tjznka-sutra, ed. H.Kern and B. Nanjio, St.Peters-burg: The Imperial Academyof Sciences,1912. Sutfii-nip1ita, ed. D. Anderson andH.Smith,London:PTS,1913. TaishoShinshuDaizokyo,ed.] .TakakusuandK.Watan.abe, Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan Company,1924-1934. Thera-then-g1ith1i, H.Oldenberg and R.Pi.Schel,London:PTS, 1883. SeeThag. Tsa A-han Ching (Sa1pyukfiigama),u. GuQabhadra, Taisho No.99. Tseng-iA-hanChing(Ekottar1igama),u.GautamaSarpghadeva, TaishoNo.l25. UdUdiina,ed.P.Steinthal, London:PTS,1948. VbhASammohavinodam,Vibhangat(hakath1i,ed.A.P.Buddhadatta, London: PTS,1923. ABBREVIATIONSxiii VinVinayaPz!aka,ed.H.Oldenberg,5Vst;tntiality"(nairi!itmya) separated from "the non-substantial" (nairi!itmya-dharma)or "dependent aris-ing"(prafityasamutpi!ida)differendatedfrom"thedependently arisen" (pratityasamutpanna-dharma)wouldbeasunidentifiableandtherefore nonsensicalasanyother metaphysicalconception that Nagarjuna .w'as endeavor1ogtorefute. Thus, for Nagarjuna, emptiness (fiinyati!i) was no more than what is implied 86THEPHILOSOPHYOF TI-lEMIDDLEWAY in the statement:"Allthisisempty" (sarvamida'f!l funyam).The statement, "All this is empty," isnot identical with the statement, "All is empty," (sarvaf?Z funyam).In fact,aspointed out in the annotation,nowhere in the Kiirikii can onecomeacrossanabsolutestatement suchas"Allisempty."It isindeed significant that even when making a universalized statement Nagarjuna retains thedemonstrative "this" (ida'f!l)in order toeliminatetheabsolutist sting. Thequestionwhetheronecanspeakof"emptiness"(fUnyatii)of "emptiness"(Sunyatii)isoftenraisedin discussionsof Nagarjuna's"!Jliddle way."Forexample,onecouldmaintainthat"emptiness"itselfisaniden-tifiable particular on the basis of which a universal "emptiness"could be iden-tified.Thelanguage utlizedbyNagarjuna doesnot permit such a flight into therealmof theAbsolute.Hisconceptionof "the empty"(fUnya)isapar-ticular.Yetthisparticularisnotequivalenttoaparticular"emptiness" (funyatii) abstracted from a concrete situation.To movefrom"the empty"to "emptiness" is an altogether different process. The former is grounded in an ex-perienced situation of an event with a characteristic, while the later begins with a characteristic sanstheevent. This careful avoidance of any absolutism or substantialism in relationto the conception of "dependent arising"as well as"emptiness" (funyatii)wasdeclaredbyNigarjunaasthe"middlepath"(pra#patsaiva madhyamli,XXIV.18).That"emptiness"isa"dependentconvention" (upadiiya prajnaptt), foritisdependent upon and,therefore,identifiablein termsof,"theempty"(fUnya).Nagarjurtaassertsthat" "emptiness"soiden-tifiedwould eliminate any dogmatism or obsession (adhilaya)and, along with it,anyerroneous views(do,Ja-prasanga,XXIV. l3). This,undoubtedly.isabeautiful restoration of the Buddha'sconception of "non-substantiality" (anatta).However,themodern interpretationof Nigar-juna seems to move in a totally different directon.Modern scholars, favoring an interpretationbyCandrakrtimadeknowntothembyT.R.V.Murti,insist that Nagarjuna hadno thesisof hisown (svapak!a)to present. This Vedantic interpretation presents Nigarjuna asa critical or analytical philosopher whose solefuncitonwastocriticizeoranalyse(vigraha)viewspresentedbyothers withouthavingto recognizeor uphold a view of hisown.Suchariinterpreta-tion hasledtotwomore relatedtheoriesbeing anributedtoNigarjuna. The ftrstisthe admission of the inadequacy of conceptualthinking,andtherefore of language,toexpresstheultimatetruth.The secondistheattribution of a conceptof ultimatetruthintheformof "absoluteemptiness"or"absolute nothingness"inexpressiblethroughordinaryhumanlinguisticapparatus. Thus,weareledto one of the mosttroublesome questions relating to Nagar-juna'sphilosoph.icalenterprise. In the annotation of the dedicatory verses of the Kiirikii, we have suggested a differentreadingwhichwouldmakeitpossibleforNagarjunatomakethe INTRODUCTION87 claim that he is presenting a right view (samyag-do!t) when refuting the inap-propriateviewsadvocatedbyhisopponents.Furthermore,Nagarjuna clearly indicateS that philosophical enterprise consists not only of analysis (vigraha) but aJsoexplanation (vjiikhjiina)(IV.9).This would provide legitimation forthe most positive explanation of the Buddha's view in Chapter XXVI,in addition tootherpositivestatementsmadebyNagarjunaelseWhere(e.g.,Chapter XVII). However, the two most troublesome questions regarding ultimatee ~ t y and theinadequcyof languagestillremain,primarilybecauseof themannerin whichthe Vedaotic scholars interpreted three related terms utilized by Nagar-ju:Oa.'.Theseare pramiirtha,nirvikalpa,and saf?Zvrti. For most scholars who havebeen nurtured in a predominantly substantialist philosophical or religioustradition, paramartha means "ultimate reality,"nir-vikalpaimplied"thenon-conceptulll,"andSiZf?lvrtistoodfor"lat:tguage."In understanding these three terms in this manner, did modern translators and in-terpretersimposetheirownsubstantialistoutlookonNagarjuna'sthought? The firsttest of the validity ofsuch translations would bea comparison of the implications of thesethreetranslations withthe Buddha's ownconceptions of "dependent arising" (prafityasamutpada) and "non-substantiality" (aniitman), all of whichNagarjuna accepted with reverence. PhtlosophyofLanguage Thetermsaf?Zvrti(Pali,sammutt)wasneverusedintheearlydiscourses toreferexclusivelytolanguage.AnalysingtheBuddha'sphilosophyonthe basisof theearlydiscourses,it Vfaspointedoutthatsammuti,voh1ira,and paflfiatti were terms used to refer to any convention,not merely linguistic con-veiuion. The specific terms used by the Buddha to refer to language are nirutti (etymology)and adhivaeana (definitionor semantics).Nagarjuna's useof the term abhidheya,meaning "that whichistobe designated,"(XVIII. 7)would provide us with a term that hemayhaveused if he had a need for referring to language.Suchll.termwouldbeadhidh1inaandwouldnotbesemantically much different fromtheterm adhivacana used bythe Buddha. However,formgarjuna, the abhidheya or "that which isto bedesignated" ceaseswiththecessationof cittt1-gocara("theojbectofthought").Thus, anything that isnot the object of thought, that isnon-conceptual (nirvikalpa), ,is alsonot describable.If so,Nagarjuna hadnoreasonto compose morethan four hundred versestrying to explain the indescribable.It would be a fruitless attempton thepart of anyphilosopher,letaloneone whoisextolledasan "enlightened one" (buddha). 881HE PHILOSOPHYOF THEMIDDLEWAY If Nagarjuna wastrying to explain something and in that process wasutiliz-ing language, he would be dealing with the conceptual or the object of thought (citta-gocara).Accordingly,anything that isconceptual would also bethe ob-ject of thought, andthe non-conceptual (niroikalpa)could not be an object of thought.Atruththatcannotbethoughtof,letaloneonethatcannotbe spokeno( wouldbeasmetaphysicalastheconceptionof1itmaninthe Brahmanical speculations.Niroikalpa would,therefore,mean something else. In the courseof the analysis of the Kiirikii,it waspointed outthat Nagarjuna was critical of a specific form of discrimination, a discrimination that produced polarities in humanthinking.These consisted of existence andnon-existence, substance and quality, self-nature and other-nature, permanence and annihila-tion. In such a context, nirvikalpa would refer to polar discriminations, not any and evety formof discrimination. Thisleadsustooneofthemostcontroversialdiscriminationsthatthe metaphysicians of the Buddhist tradition aswellastheir counterparts of other substantialisetraditionsmade with regardtobondageand freedom.Chapter XXVof theKiin"k'liisdevotedtoananalysisof thismetaphysicalissue.In Chapter XXIV,whenNagarjuna spokeof sa?'(Jvrti and vyavah'liraonthe one handand paramiirtha onthe other,he waspaving his wayforadiscussionof the discriminationbetweenbondageand freedom. Nagarjuna,whoprovidedeveryindicationthathehadreadtheearly discourses,couldnot havebeen unaware that the Buddha used the terms sam-muti andvoh'lira(vyavahtira)moreofteninthesenseof moralconventions. Thesemoralconventionspertainedtogood(dharma)andbad (adharma). Thus,wheneverheusedtheterm vyavahtira,Nagarjunawasreferringtothe moral conventions of good and bad (dharma-adharma) (XXIV.36) or merit and demerit(pu1Jya-ptipa)(XVII .24).Thesemoralconventionsareacceptednot becausethey aremere conventions agreedupon by consensusbut because they work.Theyarepragmaticallygrounded.They produce fruitsor consequences (artha).Suchconventionsprovideabasis foridealconventionsreferredto as paramfirlha ("highest fruit or consequence").Yet,to safeguard the ideal from becomingamereidealandnotafact,Nagarjunainsistsuponthe dependenceof theidealontheconcrete.AquotationfromWilliam J ames, even though extensive,seemstoberelevant here. If theethicalphilosopherwereonlyaskingafterthebestim-aginable system of goods he would indeed have an easytask;for all demandsassuchare prima facierespectable,andthebest simply imaginary world would be one in which every demand was gratified assoonasmade.Suchaworldwould,however,havetohavea physicalconstitution entirely different fromthat of the one which INTRODUCTION weinhabit. It wouldneed not only space,but a time, of n-dimen-sions,to include all the acts and experiences incompatible with one another herebelow,which would then go on in conjunction- such as spending our money, yet growing rich; taking a holiday, yet get ting ahead with our work; shooting and fishing,yet doing nohurt tothebeasts;gainingnoendof yetkeepingour youthful freshness of heart; and the like.There can be no question that such a system of things, however brought about, would be the absolutelyidealsystem;andthatif aphilosophercouldcreate universes a priori, and provide all the mechanical conditions, that is the sort of universewhichhe should unhesitatingly create. But thisworldof ours ismade on an entirelydifferent pattern, and thecasuisticquestion ishere most tragically practical.The ac-tuallypossibleinthisworldisvastlynarrowerthanallthatis demanded; and there isalwaysa pinch betweentheideal andthe actual which can onlybegotthroughby leaving part of the ideal behind.138 89 In a similar way,Nigarjuna, followingthe pragmatic teachings of the Bud-dha,could not divorce paramiirtha from(i.e.,the ultimate fruit from the fruit of everyday life of a human being). Just as much as "emptiness" isbased upon"theempty,"evenso paramiirthahadtobebasedupontheSl1f!Z11(1i. Without any reference to the concrete concepts of good, any notion of ultimate or ideal good wouldbe not only meaninglessbut also "fruitless" (an-artha) and terribly harmful (as proven by many such instances in the history of mankind). Thus, for Nigarjuna, ultimate good isnot one that transcends ordinary notions of good, but merely an extension of the so-called goodness recognized in every-day life ( ryavah'iira). Thesharpdichotomybetweentheordinarynotionof goodandtheideal good isthusbrokendown.It is significant tonotethat when speaking of two truthsNagarjuna utilizedtheterms and param'iirtha.Yet,whenhe proceeded to explain their relationship, he utilized the term vyavah'iira, thereby establishing the synonymity of saf!Zvrti and vyavah'iira. The fact that Nigarjuna wasnotpreparedtocreateanunbridgeablechasmbetween or ryavah'iira on the one hand and paramiirtha on the other is clearly expressed in hisfamous thatwithouttheformerthelatterisnotexpressed (vyavaharam anairitya paramiirthona deiyate,XXIV .10). Similarly, without understandl.ng the ultimate fruit, freedom is not obtained (param'iirthaman'iigamya niidhigamyate,ibid.).Thiswouldmean that freedom (nirv'iif!a) itself is notsomething to be sharply distinguished ftom Stlf!ZS'iira or ordinaryhumanlife,eventhoughtheyarenot identical.Freedom would not be absolute freedom that has nothing to do with human life.It isno 90THEPHILOSOPHY OF THEMIDDLEW AY morethan the absence of certain constraints (such asgreed, hatred, and' confu-sion)inthelifeof ahumanbeing.Itis,therefore,thelifeof anordinary humanbeing that isgraduallytransformed,throughthe cultivation of moral precepts,intooneofmoralperfection.Thistransformation than transcendence)iswhat isimpliedbynirziii?Ja. Moral Philosophy The moral lifethat leadsto the transformation of the human personalityis clearlyexplainedbyNigarjunainChapter XVII.Theabsolutisticinterpretation of Nagarjuna's conception of "emptiness" constrained many of his mqdern ad-mirersfromdiscussinghisviewsregardingkarmaand'survival, eventhese were part and parcel of the Buddha's teachings. The discus-sionofkarmaandsurvivalintheKJirz'kawasthusconsideredtobe "ffinayanistic,"having nothingto do withthe so-calledMahayana.As such, the Buddha's own views regarding these issues turn out to be "ffinayanistic" or, at least, wereintended forthoselow-witteddisciples who surrounded him. Contrary to this view, our analysis of the contents of Chapter XVII , placed in thebackgroundinwhichNagarjunalived,showsthathewasmorepositive than hismodern daydisciplesin histreatment of karma and survival.Nagar-juna'smajorendeavorinthischapteristorescuetheBudda'sdiscourseon mora)responsibility fromthe havoccreatedbythe substantialist thinkerswho assumedkarmatobeeither substantialorperformed. bya substantialagent. Hiswasnot an attempt todissolvethe conception of karma in favorof an ab-solutistic notion of "emptiness." Indeed, the chapter begins with a reference to the Supreme Sage (paramam) whosedoctrinehe wasabouttoexpound.Spe:lking of the morallygood life, Nagarjuna usesthetermdharma, insteadof karma,andthismayhavecon-founded the modern interpreters.The term dharma, as explained earlier in the discussionof theBuddha's philosophy,wasusedboth in an ontological sense andinanethicalcontext.Nigarjunahimself followedthispractice,asin-dicatedinthe annotationof the KJirz'kii(seeXXIV.36).Thus, in thepresent contexttoo,dharmameansgoodkarmaandtheseareidentifiedas(i)self-. restraint, and ( ii) benefitting others.Nagarjuna's selection of these two types of action asthe foundationof moralbehaviorissignificant:They arean echo of the Buddha's ownfirstsermonto the worldthat advocated amiddle path be-tweentwoextremesof seif-indulgenceandself-mortification.The"Middle Way"(miidhyamika) philosopherpar excellencecouldnof haveignoredthe lNTRODUCI10N91 ethical middle path of theHe knewthe implications of that flrst ser-mon.Self-restraint, but not self-mortification or self-immolation,constitutes one of thefoundationsof morallife.In this regard,Nigarjuna wasnot ad-vocating theextremist formof behav.iorsometimesextolledastheideal of a bodhisattvabothintheTheravadaandintheMahayana.Self-restraintisa necessary prerequisite for any altruistic activity,whichisthe second of the vir-tues extol.ledby Nigarjuna asa"friendly way"The implicacions'of the moral life recommended here should not go unnoticed. In spite of the exceedingly popular theme emerging among the Buddhists dur-ing Nigarjuna's day that emphasized extreme altruism, Nigarjuna seems to be playingarathermoderatetunerecognizingtheBuddha's ownwordsinthe Dhammapada (166):"One shouldnot neglect one's ownwelfarethrough ex-cessive altruism.Having understood one's own welfare,one should be devoted to true welfare." Areaderof theearlydiscoursescannotbutbeimpressedbytheidealof humanbehavior advocatedbytheBuddha.Thenoblest personaccording to theBuddhaisonewhoavoidssufferingforhimselfaswellasothers(at-tabytibtidha,parabytibtidha).139Thus,anoble action should be one that con-tribl,ltes toown happiness as well as the happiness of others. This involves ' the recognitionthat, while. abandoning a belief in a metaphysical self, one has to. cultivate compassion for one's own.person.At the same time such compas-sion shouldbe extended to others as well.Nigarjuna seems to have picked up this theme well when, unlike many Buddhist writers of his day,he emphasised that self-restraint and benefitting others are both acts of friendliness (maitram) . He was simply insisting: "Be a friend to yourself and be a friend to others." This would certainly be opposed to the ideal that calls for complete and unqualified self-sacrifice,including self-immolation.Thus Nigarjuna,the founderof the "MiddleWay"(Miidhyamika)school,couldnothaverecommendedamore sober morallifethan onewhichavoidsthe twoextremes of destroying onself and destroying others . . ThesetwofriendlywaysarerecommendedbyNigarjunabecause they are fruitful not only in the present life (iha)but also in an after-life (pretya).There couldbeno doubt that here he wasrecognizing dte possibility of human sur-vival.Theor "life-process"referredto at XXlV ..lOneed not be confmed to this present life t lone. On the contrary, it refers to the continuity of tHe life-processthrough severalbirths and deaths,referredtoas punabbhava in the early discourses.Thatcontinuity.alongwithitsattendantsuffering,istobe eliminatedbythe development of. wisdom (jntina)whichfor Nigarjuna con-sistsin theavoidanceof allmetaphysical views (drift). 92THEPHILOSOPHY OF TiiEMIDDLEWAY Knowledge LeadingToFreedom Knowledgethat leads to freedomis not omruscience(saroajnafii).Nowhere intheKiinliadoesNagarjunarefertoomniscience,eventhoughita popular theme among the Theravadins and the Mahayanists. In the absence of omniscience,whatformofknowledgecouldlead manfrombondageto freedom?Nagarjuna refersto "a wiseone" (vidviin)who, _through his percep-tion of the nature of truth (tattva-darfantit),does not accumulate dispositions (sa'f(lskiira)that lead to wandering (sa'f(lsiira)(XXVI.lO).Thus, for Nagarjuna, as it was with the Buddha, the problem lies in the accumulation and pursuit of one'sdispositions.Yetwithoutfollowingthedispositionsahumanbeingis unableto deal with the rather complex and excessivesensoryinput. Theblooming buzzing confusion" of experiencehas to be faced without the aid of omniscience. The task is rendered extremely difficultbecause the dispositional tendenciesthatanecessaryI)leansof dealingwithsuchexperiencealsolead toextremes,especiallywhenthesedispositionsare byone'slikes anddislikes.Whentheyaredominatedbylikesanddislikes,theyproduce perspectivesonthebasisof which onelooksat the world,two of these being eternalism and annihilationism. In order to adopt a middle path avoiding these two extremes, one needs to eliminatelikes arid dislikes and thereby appease dispositions.A person who has .achievedthe state of the appeasement of disposiiions (sa'f(lskiiropafama) (and this would include the appeasement of the objectof perception (dra!{avyopafama),whetherthat bethe cogitoor the realexternalworld) issaidto have attainedenlightentrientand freedom. Such a person is enlightened because he comesto perceive things asthey have come to be (yathiibhutajfliina= tativadarfana),and he is freebecause he' does nottoanydogmaticviewthatrulesoutotherpossibilities.Thedif-ferencebetween aview criticized by the Buddha as well as Nagar-juna and the "middle position;' (madhyamiipratipat)acceptedbyboth is that the former isa closed view while the lat.ter is an open one.An open view does not subscribe to an absolu'te discrimination as either I or. The very idea of open-nessimipliesnon-grasping(anupiidana).Thus,whenboththeBuddha. and Nagarjunaemphasiiedtherenunciationofallviews theywereinsistingupon abandoning allformsof dogmatismwithregardto views.Forthem,non-attachmenttoviewsdoesnotnecessarilymeanhaving "no-views.". Inappropriate of Sanskrittermsinto Englishseemsto havecon-tributed in some measure toward the myth that Nagarjuna had no view to ex-press.t4oThepassageoftenquotedinsupportofthismythoccursin Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyiivartani_ (29):"If I would make any commitment whatever, INTRODUCTION93 fromthat I would incur such error.On the contrary, I do not have a commitment. Therefore,there isno error onmypan." The term that here is pratijlfa,whichhasbeen translated asa simple proposition or statement.It ismuch more than a simple proposition or state-ment. It is a commitnient and should be contrasted with vyakhyana, "explana-tion," (IV.9).While avoiding the former, Nigarjuna continued to resort to the latter(seealsoXVII.13,etc.). Assuch,it wouldbehighlyinappropriateto compare Nagarjuna's philosophical method with that of Ludwig Wittgenstein, forexamplebyquotinghimasfollows:"Philosophysimplyputs everything beforeus,andneither explains nordeduces anything. -Sinceeverything lies opentoview,thereisnothingtoexplain. "141 Infact,thisquotation misrepresentsWittgenstein's ownapproachto metaphysics: Themostimpor-tant part of the statement has been omitted. It reads.: "For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us." If this crucial statement is retained, then Wit-tgenstein'sthoughtcancertainlybecomparedwithNigarjuna'soreventhe Buddha's.This omittedpartof the statement makes it abundantly clearthat whatWittgensteinwasnotwillingto explainis"whatishidden,"andthis "something"is,indeed,comparabletowhatNigarjunawasreferringtoas kif!Jcitor ka.fcit; thatis,thehiddensubstanceinphenomena.Neither"the empty" nor "emptiness"(fUnyalii) ,neither "the dependentiyarisen" (prafftyasamutpanna)nor"dependent arising" (prafftyasamutpada)represent ahiddensomething whichNigarjunawasreluctant to explain.On thecon-trary,if it canbe shownthat Wittgenstein did not provide any explanation of experience, or did not attempt to formulate in linguistic terms what a true ex-perience is,asopposed to a confused one, then he could certainly be enlightened bythe language of "emptiness"or ofadoptedbytheBuddha andNigarjuna. 94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THEMIDDLEWAY NOTES 1.S2.16-17;Tsa12.19 (Taisho2.85c). 2.S5.420-424;Tsa15.17 (Taisho2.103c). 3.For. a detailed historical study of the Kath?ivatthu,seeS.N. Du be,Cross CurrentsinEarlyBuddhism,NewDelhi:Manohar,1980.The studyof this work will be greatly facilitated by the recent PTS publication of a more carefully. edited versionof Buddhaghosa's commentarybyN.A. Jayawickretna. 4.Lunishu-p'u-sa-ch'uan, Taisho 2047: 5.KennethK. .Inada,Niigarjuna;A.Translationofhis Miilamadhyamakakiirik1iwith an IntroductoryEssay,Tokyo:TheHokuseido Press,1970, p.3. 6.DhsA76. 7.Sdmp p.43 ff. 8.Vin2.241;seeinnumerable references to the Chabbaggiya asmiscreants whose cond4ct was responsible for the formulation of many a rule of discipline. 9.Kp105.. 10.Sdmp p.45; see also MKV p.306. 11.T. R.V.Murti,Centrql Philosophy ofBuddhism, London:Alien & Un-wio,1960,pp.49-50. 12.MarkSiderits,bookreviewinjournalof IndianPhzlosophy,8 (1980): 192.. 13. A.K.Warder,IndianBuddhism,Delhi:MocilalBanarsidass,1970, p.376. 14.Klirikii XV. 7. 15.52.17. 16.Tsa12.19 (Taisho2.85c). 17.Kp 60-61. 18.Ibid.,56.. 19.SeeWhalen Lai,"ChineseBuddhist causation theories:An analysisof the si.niticMahayanaunderstanding of PrafiryllSamutpada,". PhilosophyEast and West,27(1977):241-264. 20.Richard H. Robinson, Early M1idhyamika in India and China,Madison: Universityof Wisconsin,1967,pp.83-88. 21.Rg-v.eda x.90;also Brhadiira,yaka Upanf!ad 1.4.11...,. 13.. 22.SeeDavid J.Kalupahana,Causality.TheCentral Philosophyof Bud-dhism,Honolulu:The University. Pressof Hawaii,1975,p.39. 23.S2. 17.Cf.Tsa12.19 (Taisho2.85c). 24.D1.12 ff.; Ch'ang14.1(Taisho1.88b ff.). For adetailed treatment of theseviews;seeK. N. Jayatilleke, Early Buddhist TheoryofKnowledge,Lon-don:Alien &Unwin,1963,pp.23-168. 25.Ud 1.. 26.D1.58-59;Ch'ang17.1(Taishol.l07a). INTRODUCTION95 27.Ud80. 28.M1.262-264;S 2:28,70.96;Ud 2;Tsa10.7(Taisho2.67a);14.16. (Taisho2.100a),etc. See Kalupahana,Causality,p.90. i9.S2.1Ri'Tsa12.20(Taisho2.86a);seealsoKalupahana,Causality, p.5-6. 30.Ibid. 31.Ibid. 32.S 2.25;3.3-4;Tsa12.14 (Taisho2.84b). 33.Ibid.AlsoM 1.167,324,325. 34.M 1.415-417;Chung3.4 (Taisho1.436a ff.). 35.Thag304. 36.M 1.395;also3.237. 37.Sn 68. 38.SeeKalupahana,Causality,pp.l77-183. 39.M 1.160-175;Chung56.1(Taisho1.775c ff.). 40.MKV pp.264,492. 41.Ibid.,p.374. 42.D1. 202 (where all four terms iiimanlfii, nirutti, vohara and pannatti are used assynonyms);Sn 897. 43.Sn897. 44.Ibid., 903. 45.Ibid.,897. 46.S 3.70-73;Tsa10.5(Taisho2.65c-66a). 47.M 3.230;Chung43.5(Taishol.701a f.). 48.M 1.395;3.237. 49.Inada,Niigarjuna,p.6. 50,._SeeKalupahana,Causality,pp.l48-149. 51.Ibid.pp.l49-150.. 52.Sakv p.ll. 53.Kalupahana,Causality,pp.l52-153. 54.SeeJiryoMasuda,"Origin_andDoctrinesofEarlyIndianBuddhist Schools,"(AtranslationoftheHsuan-ChwangVersionofVasumitca's Treatise), Aslil Major 2" (1925):17. 55.T. I. Stcherbatsky,The Central Conception ofBu.ddhism and. the Mean-ingof theTerm'Dharma,'London:RoyalAsiaticSociety,1923,pp.37-38; Buddhist Logic;Leningrad:Academy of Sciencesof The USSR,1930,I.4-5. )6.Jayawickrema,Kathavatthuppllkarar,a-af!hakatha,London: PTS,1979, p.X'tl.. 57.Kvu,p.l ff. 58.Ibid.p.l15ff. 59.Ibid.p.456 ff. 60.See Hajime Nakamura, Indliln Buddhism, Osaka:Kansai University of ForeignStudies,1980,p.l59. 61.Kp52. 96THEPHIWSOPHY OF THEMIDDLEWAY 62.Kiirika XVII.13;XVIII.12. 63.Marvin Sprung, The Lucid Exposition ofthe MiddleWay.The Essential Chapters fromthe Prasannapadii ofCandrak"irti,Boulder:Prajna Press,1979. 64.Central PhilosophyofBuddhism,p.134. 65.Translated into French by E.Lamotte,in Melanges Chinois et Bouddhi-que,iv(1935-1936). 66.MKV pp.324,390. 67.See Kalupahana, "The Buddhist Conception ofTime and Temporality," in PEW,24(1974):181-191. 68.Ibid.. 69.ThePrinciplesof Psychology,NewYork:HenryHolt,vol.I,1908, p.609. 70.Brhadaraf!yakaUpani!ad1.4.11-14. 71.SeeSwamiSatprakashananda,Methodsof Knowledge.Accordingto Advaita Vediinta,London:AJlen&Unwin,1965,pp.41ff. 72.Nfig1ir/una,p.54. 73.M2.87. 74.Ak 2.62'd. 75.MKV p.l35. 76.S 3.38;Tseng12.15 (Taisho2.607C). 77.Sakvp.174. 78.S 3.36;Tsa2.25 (Taisho2.14a); S 3.103;Tsa2.26 (Tai..rho2.14b-15a). 79.Ud80. 80.Sn916. 81.See).A.B.VanBuitenen,"StudiesinSarikhya,"journalof the AmericanOn'ental Society,82.See,forexample,the Agama versionat Tsa34.1 (Taisho2.214b). 83.S 2.18 ff.;Tsa12.20 (Taisho2.86a). 84.Dhp165. 85.Ibid. 278. 86.Sn886. 87.SomeProblemsof Philosophy, Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversity Press,1979.p.33. 88.M1.482. 89.SeeSn796-803. 90.M1.1 ll-112;Chung28.3 (Taisho1.60'4b). 91.Inada,Nfigar,iuna,p.148. 92.M 1.111-112;Chung28.3 (Taisho 1.604b). 93.M 3.19;S3.103;Tsa2.26 (Taisho2.15a). 94.Inada,p.10f 95.Ibid.,pp.l04-105. 96.A3.415;Chung27. 5 (Taisho1.600a). 97.Dhp127. 98.'Jnada,Nfig1irjuna,p.104. INTRODUCTJON 97 99.DonaldMitchell,"Buddhisttheoriesof causation-commentary,"in PEW,25(1975):102. 100.M1.184;Chung36.2 (Taisho1.658a). 101.Sn1076. 102.S 1.120;Tsa39.11(Taisho2.286a). 103.Sn1076. 104.M 1.395;also3.237;Chung43.5(Taisho1. 703c). 105.M1.426;Chung60.6 (TaishoL804a-b);M1.483ff. 106.s 3.83. 107.M1.184;Tsa39.11(Taisho2.286a). 108.SeeKalupahana,"Anna,"inEncyclopaediaof Buddhism,ed.G.P . . Malalasekera,Colombo:Governmentof Ceylon,1961,-1.693-696. 109.James,ThePn'nciplesofPsychology,vol.I,p.609. 110.D3.80 ff.;Ch'ang6.1(Taisho1.36b). 111.DhsAp .421; see Kalupahana, "Schools of Buddhism in Early Ceylon," TheCeylon journal of theHumanities,Peradeniya:Universityof Ceylon,1 (1970): 159-190. 112. Upanifad 1.3.28. 113.Ibid. 114.S3.110;Tsa5.2(Taisho2.3la-b). 115.Ibid. 116.Inada, !Vagarjuna,p.132. 117.S3.110;Tsq5.2(Taisho2.31a-b). 118.A2.52. 119.M1.140. 120.S3.54;Tsa9.4 (Taisho2.56b). 121.M1.228;S3.133;4.401;A1.286;Thag678;Dhp297;TJa10.7 (Taisho2.66b-67a);Tseng32.4 (Taisho2.668c). 122.TheGiindhaiiDharmapada,ed.).Brough,London:OxfordUniversity Press,1962,190,(alsoseep.240). 123.D1.51;Ch'ang17.1(Taisho1.107a ff.). 124.Petavatthu,ed.Minayeff,London:PTS,1888,57; Apadiina, ed.M.E. Lilley,London:PTS,1925-1927,395. 125.TheConception ofBuddhist Nirvana,Leningrad:Academy of Sciences of the USSR,1927. 126.Inada,!Vagarjuna,p.l53. 127.Ibid.,p.l60.. 128.Kalupahana,Causf!lity,p.150. 129.Sakvp.12. 130.SeePoussin, L'Abhidhatmakofa, 4.140. 131.SeeIanStevenson,TwentyCasesSuggestiveof Reincarnation,second revisedandenlargededition,Charlottesville:UniversityPressofVirginia, 1974 . . 132.M 3.94-99;Tsa2.25(Taisho2.13c- 14a). 98THEPHILOSOPHYOF THEMIDDLEWAY 133.D1.12ff. 134.Sn152. 135.D1.191ff. 136.Kalupahana,Buddhist Philosophy.AHistoncal Analysis,Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii,1976, pp.21-23._ 137.P. F.Strawson,Individuals,NewYork:Doubleday,1963, pp.2 ff. 138."The Moral Philosophers and the Moral Life," in Essays in Pragmatism, ed.A.Castell,NewYork: Hafner,1948,pp.77-78. 139.M 1.89-90,369-370,etc.;Chung25.2 (Taisho1.586a). 140.See Chris Gudmunsen,Wittgenstein and Buddhism, London: Harper &Row,1977,p .44. 141.Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E.M.Anscombe, New York: Mac-millan,1958,126,as quotedbyGudmunsen. .. SANSKRITTEXT, TRANSLATION AND .. ANNOTATION ____ DEDICATORY VERSES Anirodham anutpiidam anucchedam afiifvatar?t, anekiirtham aniiniirtham aniigamam anirgamaf!J, yal{ pralityasamutpadaf!l prapafJcopafamaf!Jfivaf!J, desayamasa saf!Jbuddhaf? vandevandataf!Jvaraf!l. Isalutehim, . thefullyenlightened,thebestof speakers,who preachedthenon-ceasingand .thenon-arising,the annihilationandthenon-permanence,thenon-identityandthe non-difference,thenon-appearanceandthenon-disappearance, thedependentarising,.theappeasementof obsessionsandthe auspiCIOus. Madhyamakavrttif?,ed.L.delaValleePoussin[abbreviatedMKV(P)),p.ll; ed.P.L.Vaidya,(abbreviated MKV(r-?. p.4. Theseintroductoryverses appearto beequivocalandthereforecouldaccountfor mostof thecoflflictingviewsinthetwomajorMadhyamikatraditions:(1) those of the Prasarigikas, represented by Candrak1rti and attributed by him to theearlierMadhyamikaphilosopherslikeAryadevaandBuddhapalita,who recognizedno viewsand merelyutilized the reductio ad absurdum method to, refutetheviewsoftheiropponents;and thoseoftheSvatantrikas, representedbyBhavaviveka,whoadmittedapositivethesisonthebasisof whichthey criticized the opponents' views.In these verses,the contents of the Buddha's discourse are all referred to in the accusative case as anirodha7'!i,anut-padaf!J,anucchedaf!J,afiifvalaf!lanekiirthaf!J,aniinarthaf!l,anagamaf!J, anirgamaf!l,pralityasamutpadaf!J,prapafJcopafamaf!J,fivaf!Jwithoutgiving anyindi.cation asto whether theyreferto onedoctrineorModerninterpretersof Nagarj.umi,probablyfollowingCandrak1rti,whose commentary,the Pra.sannapadii: istheonlyohe availableinitsoriginalSan-skrit,haveassumedthat allthesetermsreferto one doctrine,namely,depen-dent arising (parlityasamutpada) .However,aswillbe shownbelow,it is also possible to explain theseverses asreferringto several different concepts in the Buddha'sphilosophy,thusprovidingjustificationforthestandpointof the 'positivists' (svatantnka)of the' Madhyamikatradition. 1.Prasangtkainterpretation.Candrak1rti'scommentsontheseversesshow very definitely how.he moves from a sviitantrika interpretation to a prasaizgika one.Hebegins histreatise,the Prasannr1padii , by emphasizing the significance 101 102 THEPHILOSOPHYOF THI!MIDDLEWAY ofdependentarising(prafityasamutpii_da).Acceptingboththegeneralor distributive meaning and the particular usage of theterm,he explains depen-i:fied asthe conditions of the [different] bodies. However, if these actions and defilements are empty, what could be said about the bodies?. MKV,(P)p.327;MKV(V)p. l41. Here Nagarju.na moves on to a higher generality. Both katma and defilements . are' generally considered to be the conditions that determine the individual. As ... .. EXAMlNATION OF 1HE FRUIT OF AcnONsuch, karma and defilments become attributes of the personality (del>a).In the previous verse, Nigarjuna questioned the substantial reality ofpoth karma and defilments. If they are empty of such reality' what could be said about the per-sonality itself? 28.Avidyli-nivrto jan/fl,s IU1Jii-saf(Jjojanai easaf?, sa bhokfii sa ea na kartur anyo na Ctlsa eva saf? .. A sentient being, beclouded'by ignorance, is also fettered by craving.As an experiencer, he is neither identical _with norfrom the agent. .MKV{P)p.328; MKV(V)p. l41. TheBuddha'sdiscoursetoAcela-Ka5sapa,thediscoursewhich servedasthe foundationforNigarjuna'streatmentof "suffering"(Chapter XII.Dul?kha-paiikiii), rejected the theories of self-causation and externa} causationing.Rejecting self-causation,the Buddha maintained:"Kassapa,to say that 'a personactsandhehimself experiencestheconsequences.'where sufferingbelongstoone' whohasexistedfromthebeginning,implieseter-nalism"(sokaroJiso pa{isat!Jvediyaliti kho Kmsapatiditosatosayaf!Jkalaf!J dukkhanti iti vadaf!J sassalaf(J elaf!J pareti,S 2.20;Tsa12.20 [Taisho 2.86a]). Onthecontrary,"Tosaythat'oneactsandanotherexperiencestheconse-quences,' wherethe suffering causedbyanother belongs toone who hasbeen afflictedwithpain,impliesannihilationism"(afJfJokarotiafJfJo pafisaf!Jvediyaliti ...vedaniibhiiUf!'!tiSSasatoparaf(Jkaltlf!Jdukkhantiiti vadaf(J ucchedaf!J etaf(J pareti, ibid.). It is interesting to note that in the former case, the Buddha refers to the belief in a being who existed from the beginning (lidito sato),anideathat isgenerally consideredbothbytheBuddha and by . Nigarjuna as contributing to a belief in a permanent entity (see Chapter IX on PUrva-paiik!ii).. . Inthepresentverse,Nagirjuna isfaithfullyfollowingtheown argument to rejectthe identitywell as differencebetween a doer and an ex-periencer.Apersonwhobelieveseither in identity orindifferenceislooked upon asomeone who isbeclotidedbyignorance (avidyii)and craving (lo'!ii). . . 29.Napratyaya-samutpannaf(Jniipratyaya-samullhilflf(J, asti yt1Sf1itid idaf!J karmaJasmiit kartiipi niistyaltlf?. 260 THEPHILOSOPHYOF THEMJDOU:WAY Sincethis action doesnot exist as arisen from a condition nor asissuing forth from anon-condition,even an agent doesnot exist. MKV(P)p.328;MKV(V? p.l41. The causalexplanations of karma offered by me metaphysicians, namely. self-causation, external causation,etc .orthenon-causalexplanations arenot ac-ceptable.If karma itself cannot be explained in this way. it would be futileto attempt any such explanations of anagent of karma. Note the use of theterm ida'{Z (this) to refer to b..rrna, similar to the use of theterm efii at XVII. 6,thus specifyingthe typeof explanatioQthat isrejectedby him.Forthisreason, we prefer to confine his criticism onlytothe metaphysical viewsmentioned inthe verses immediately preceding (XVII.21-28),leaving the more appropriate view hementione4untouched.Thisseemstobetheonlywayinwhichonecan recognizeconsistencyin Nagarjuna'sstatementsthroughoutthischapter. 30.Ktm'l'lllcen n'iisti karlii ca llutaf?sj'iil karmaja'{Z phala'{Z, asaty alha p,halebhoRI'ii Rula e11ahhav#yati. If both action and agent are non-existent, where could there be the fruit botnof action?Whenthereisno-fruit,wherecantherebeanex-periencer? MKV(P)p.329;MKV(V?p. l41. ; In the absence of either an aciton or an agent metaphysically conceived, there could be no fruit or consequence born of such action (karmaja'{Z phala'{Z). Here again, it is not a denial of fruit or consequence born of action, but only of those that are born of such action as explained previously. l.f the (ruit or consequence isnot ob?ined, its experiencer (bhoRiii)wouldalsonot be appropriate. 31.Yath'iinirmitaka'{Z J'iist'iinirmimlta rddhi-sampad'ii nirmitonirmifliiliinya'{Zsa ea nirmitakaf? punaf?, EXAMINATIONOF 1HE FRUIT OF AcnON ]list as ateacher,through piyntradictions.In otherwords,heisstatingthatthequestionregarding "everything" cannot be settled by any form of discussion, a view clearly express-edbythe Buddha in hisfamous"Discourse oh Everything;'(Sabba-sutta,see commentary on IX.3), whichNagarjuria wasprobably conversant with. 9.Apara-pratyayaf?Z prapancair dpraptincilaf?Z, nirvikalpam ananartham etat tattvasya lakfaf!af?Z. Independentlyrealized,peaceful, . unobsessedbyobsessions,without discriminationsand avarietyof meanings:suchisthecharacteristicof truth. MKV(P)p.372;MKV(V( p.l58 . . This is oneof the most important state.ments ofNagarjuna, quoted often'by his classicalaswellasmodern interpreters.The most recent translation and inter-EXAMINATIONOFSELF271 pretation comes from Inada and, as such, it could be a digest of the existing views.Hence, it is appropriate toquote Inada's rendering of this verse in full . It readsasfollows: Non-conditionallyrelatedtoanyentity,quiscent,non-conceptualizedbyconceptualplay,non-discriminativeandnon-differentiated. These are the characteristics of reality (i. e. ,descrip-tiveof one whohasgained theBuddhisttruth) (p.l15). Thetermapara-pratyayaisheretakento meana specialkind of relation that transcends any form of empirical conditionality.Santa signifies "quiescence/' a quiescence resulting from the avoidance of any conceptuality, probably the.sort of peace and quiet experiencedby one who hastemporarily stopped the func- . tioningof the sixsensefacultiesbyreachingthestateof cessation (nirodha-samlipatti,orsaftifii-vedayita-nirodha).It iswherethedichotomyof subject and objectiscompletelydissolved(nir-vikalpa)and wherethe variegatedex-periencesoftheworld,thevarietyofmeaningsorfruits(niin'iirtha);is eliminated.Truth,insuchacontext,cannotbevetydifferentfromthatof eithertheUpani[adsortheVedanta.it istheflushing out of allconceptual thinking(ciffa-1!fiti-nirodha),therebytransformingtheempiricalexperience into one of absolute,ultimatetruthorreality. However,a glance at the"Discourseto Katyayana,"the primary source for Nagarjuna'sformulationof the "middJeway,"willrevealtheuntenabilityof suchanexplanation. Even though the verse seems to describethe characteristics of truth or reality (tattvasya lak!af!af!t) , every preceding statement points to the means by which a conceptionoftruthisarrivedat.Hence,itisoneofthemostimportant statements on epistemology.The mosrsalient featuresof this epistemolgoy are already clearly embodiedin the Buddha's discourseto Katyayana, presented in the form of an answer to the question asto what "right view" (samm'ii- dif{ht) is. Thecontents of the versecanbeanalysedinthe light of this discoursein the followingmanner. The termapara-pratyayadoesnot refertoa truththat isnon-condi tionally relatedtoanyentity.Rather,itexplainsthemannerinwhichknowledge (ft'iif!a) is attained byone whohas "right view"(sammli-dt'tfht). After rejecting themetaphysicalviewspertaining topermanentexistence (atthit'ii) as. wellas the -beliefinapermanentandsubstantialpersonalentity(att'ii .. .me),a belief that will requirethe testimony of some other person who claimsto know theabsolutebeginningofthings,theempiricistBuddhaclaimedthat knowledge (of one who hasright view)without having to depend upon anotherperson(aparf!-Pa&Ca)iift'iif!amevas}aetthahoti,S2 .17).Itis 272THE PHILOSOPHYOF THEMIDDLEWAY knowledgeforwhichonedoes .nothavetodependupon another,primarily it pertains to arising and ceasingof empirical phenomena.It involves personalverification,a verificationthatcanbeaccomplishedbysomeone beforeonebeginsto formulateanyright view. Man'ssearchforapermanententity,whileheisequippedwithlimited epistemological resources,leaveshim with unresolved questions.He continues todoubt.He isconstantly perplexedandtroubled.Looking for permanence, hemissestheempiricallygiven.The. searchfortheunseen"beautyqueen" (janapada-kalyiinJ,D1.193; M2.40) makes him forgetthe immediatley rele-vant questions (M 2.40). As such, he has no peace of mind. However, ifhe were todirecthisattentiontowhatisgiven, . andunderstandthe humanpredicamentinitscontewilling to assertthis. Occurrence and dissolution in themselves are not perceivable. They are seen on-lyin relationto phenomenathat occur and dissolve.The metaphysicalissues . thataroseduringNigarjuna'stimeasaresultof theextremistanalysis. of phenomenaintoeventsandrelationshavealreadybeenreferredtp(see XX.ll). 12.Na bhitilijjliyate bhivo bhivo 'bhivin na /liyate, nibhiviifayate 'bhivo'bhivo bhivin na Jayate. An existent does not arise from an existent; neither does an existent arise from anon-existent.Anon-existent doesnot arise fromanon-existent; neither does anon-existent arisefrom an existent. 13.Na svato /liyatebhival; parato naiva jiyate, na svatal; parataf caiva Jayate Jayate kutal;. An existent does not arise from itSelf,or from another or from both itself and another.W h ~ n c e can it then arise? MKV(P)pp.419-421;MKV(Ttjp. l82. 298 THEPHILOSOPHY OF THEMIDDLEWAY Bhavaand abhtiva referredto here maybe compared withthe sat and asat in the pre-Buddhist Indian philosophy.The unresolvablemetaphysical questions that plagued Indian philosophy for centuries, questions such as"Did existence (sat)arisefromnon-existence (asat)?"or viceversa,have onceagainbeenin-troduced .intoBuddhistthoughtbythe SarvastivadinsandtheSautrantikas. Theidentity andnon-identitytheories of causation,theories of self-causation and external causation, and many other metaphysical views that emerged in the Buddhisttra