Sean BarkerHistory 201Section 001

4/18/2012

How Terrorist Actions by the African National Congress and Umkhonto we Sizwe Prolonged the Rule of Apartheid Government in South Africa.

On December 16, 1961, Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), or the “Spear of the Nation” was

born. Over the next 30 years, this organization would fight against the apartheid government of

South Africa in an effort to end the human rights violations and racial oppression targeting non-

whites living in the country. MK would act as the armed wing of the African National Congress

(ANC), providing a means of armed resistance for the ANC in their struggle against the

Apartheid government. MK grew from the minds of the increasingly radical ANC Youth League

(ANCYL), whose figureheads included such notable individuals as Nelson Mandela, the one-

time president of the ANC and the first black president of South Africa, Walter Sisulu, and

Oliver Tambo. While there is no definitive record of where the idea to turn to armed resistance

originated, one suggestion is that Mandela himself first pitched the idea to the ANC in June of

1960.1 Mandela supports this suggestion in his autobiography, A Long Walk to Freedom, saying

"If the government reaction is to crush by naked force our non-violent struggle, we will have to

reconsider our tactics. In my mind we are closing a chapter on this question of a non-violent

policy."2 Mandela would insist that the violence carried out by MK under his leadership would

target government buildings but would not result in deaths, saying “Sabotage did not involve loss

of life, and it offered the best hope for future race relations.”3 In the six months between the

1 “Nelson Mandela Biography,” Nobel Media, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1993/mandela-bio.html (accessed March 21, 2012).

2 Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom, (United Kingdom: Little Brown and Co. 1995), 320.3 Nelson Mandela, Speech at Pretoria Palace of Justice, “Nelson Mandela’s Statement From the Dock at the

Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial,” (April 20, 1961).

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founding of MK and the first acts of sabotage, the MK high command would set up regional

commands in main city centers, choosing members of these commands based on individuals who

had the “…necessary military or technical skills.”4 These regional commands would be

responsible for carrying out the acts of sabotage in their respective regions as planned by the

high command. The armed wing of the ANC served to radicalize the ANC, causing the ANC to

be disregarded as a legitimate political movement by South African and foreign governments

alike, while reversing the victim-aggressor roles of the apartheid government and those resisting

oppression, thereby weakening support for anti-apartheid movements and prolonging the

oppressive rule of apartheid.

Background and Historiography:

Although Joe Slovo, one of the leading members of the ANC, believed that the form of

resistance originally sponsored by MK was not terrorism, he maintained a flawed understanding

of what constituted terrorism, saying the tactic of sabotage “…would be a graphic pointer to the

need for carefully planned action rather than spontaneous or terrorist acts of retaliation which

were already in evidence.”5 While the definition of terrorism remains rather controversial, Bruce

Hoffman, a specialist in terrorism and counter insurgency at Georgetown University, contends

that there are certain key elements of terrorism. Hoffman believes that terrorism is “ineluctably

political in aims and motives, violent (or uses threat of violence), designed to have far reaching

psychological repercussions, conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of

command, whose members wear no uniform or insignia, and is perpetrated by a subnational

group or non-state entity.”6 It is apparent that all of these criteria apply to MK as they carried 4 South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)” South African History Online,

http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/13/2012).5 Ibid.

6 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York, Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press 2006), 30-31.

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out their acts of sabotage. Furthermore, Hoffman includes sabotage as a type of terrorist attack

and not as something separate of terrorism as Mandela believed.7 To these ends, the South

African Apartheid Government declared MK and the ANC as terrorist organizations in 1960.8

The United States Government followed suit that same year, along with the United Kingdom.9

These moves guaranteed that little foreign aid would be provided to the resistance movement,

and none from the wealthiest western nations of the time.

Morgan Norval, who has acted as CEO for the Selous Foundation that studies

unconventional warfare, terrorism and subversion and has had seven books on terrorism and

counter-insurgency published, also calls the ANC a terrorist organization in his book Inside the

ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organization.10 Norval believes that the ANC, and by

extension MK, became a terrorist organization when they moved to a policy of armed resistance.

What is original about Norval’s claims is that he believes the ANC continued to be a terrorist

organization after the end of Apartheid, calling them “vicious and subversive.”11

There are some individuals that believe that the label of “terrorist” need not stick with a

group or person forever. Dr. Immanuel Wallerstein, a noted sociologist who has taught at

universities all over the world, presents the argument that Nelson Mandela was a terrorist, and

the ANC and MK were terrorist organizations bent on overthrowing the Apartheid government

which was engaging in state-terrorism.12 Dr. Wallerstein believes that through time, the roles 7 Ibid, 32.

8 Unwembi, “African National Congress, South Africa’s National Liberation Movement,” ANC, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (accessed 3/11/2012).

9 “Terrorist Organization Profile (South Africa),” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=305 (accessed March 15, 2012).

10 Morgan Norval. Inside the ANC: The Evolution of a Terrorist Organization. (Washington D.C.: Selous Foundation Press, 1991.), 11.

11 Ibid, 44.

12 Immanuel Wallerstein. “Terrorists, Liberators, and the Rest of Us.” Binghamton University, Fernand Braudel Center, March 1, 1999, http://www2.binghamton.edu/fbc/archive/11en.htm (Accessed 3/17/2012).

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have reversed, and it is now Mandela and the ANC/MK that should be lauded as heroes

struggling against the Apartheid government that was actively engaging in this state-terrorism.

This allows Dr. Wallerstein to satisfy the technically accurate descriptor of terrorism without

condemning a group of revolutionaries that struggled against the blatant human rights violations

that were sponsored by the Apartheid government, an effort seen as laudable in the eyes of most

humanitarian individuals.

In contrast to these ideas, however, is that view that is held by Dr. Stephen Zunes of the

University of San Francisco’s Middle Eastern Studies. Dr. Zunes also serves as the chair of the

academic advisory committee for the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict.13 Dr. Zunes

believes that the non-violent struggle that took place was a major factor in the downfall of

Apartheid in South Africa.14 He acknowledges that most predictions were that the transition

could only come about “through violent revolutionary cataclysm,” but provides several reasons

why the non-violence proved to be a major factor.15 This was due primarily to the economic

structure of the country, which relied heavily on a black work force that cooperated with white

rule, combined with the fact that there were conditions that were working against an armed

overthrow of the government, conditions that did not rest so heavily on non-violent resistance.16

Among these conditions that worked against armed overthrow was South Africa’s control of

some of the richest mineral deposits in the world—including 1/3 of the earth’s gold deposits—a

large military force in an area that lacked any other large conventional force, and an incredibly

elaborate security system.17 Dr. Zunes believes that this unique situation is what gave non-

13 Stephen Zunes. “Stephen Zunes.” http://stephenzunes.org/ (accessed 4/19/2012).14 Stephen Zunes. “The Role of non-violent action in the downfall of apartheid,” abstract, The Journal of

Modern African Studies, 37, 1, (1999) http://www.jstor.org/stable/161471 (accessed 4/19/2012).15 Ibid.16 Ibid.

17 Stephen Zunes. “The Role of non-violent action in the downfall of apartheid,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 37, 1, (1999):1 http://www.jstor.org/stable/161471 (accessed 4/19/2012).

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violent resistance its power. The Apartheid government was incredibly powerful, but the source

of that power is what ultimately made it vulnerable to non-violent resistance, as the white

minority regime was dependent on the black minority and the industrialized west that imported

much of the mineral wealth of South Africa to maintain both modernization and oppressive

power.18 A focused, nonviolent resistance effort that included large-scale, organized labor strikes

would have been able to strike the South African government where its strength would work

against it, the economy.

As difficult as it can be to label the noble efforts of the ANC and MK in the resistance

against the Apartheid government as terroristic, it is important to be objective in studying these

groups. Thus, an objective analysis of this explosive topic should not be construed as a defense

of the apartheid government, or the role which that government played in human rights

violations, segregation and oppression for more than 4 decades. The ANC and MK were

terrorist organizations, and continued to be such until they ceased to commit violent acts for

political and ideological reasons. While the actions carried out did make these groups terrorist

organizations, the term terrorist should not necessarily carry a negative connotation. Actions

either are or are not terrorism, and that label exists independent of time or circumstance. Careful

analysis of individual actions will reveal the effect they have, as well as the moral implications

of the results, and only through this analysis can a positive or negative label be placed on the

actions. In the case of the ANC and MK, the tactics used were terroristic, but they were

implemented against a government that engaged in state terrorism, and grossly violated human

rights. However justified these tactics may have been they nonetheless functioned to prolong

apartheid rule by delegitimizing the ANC as a political movement, allowing the apartheid

18 Ibid.

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government to claim that they were the victim in the struggle, and weakening support for anti-

apartheid movements.

Legitimacy as Political Movement Destroyed:

After the establishment of MK, both the ANC and MK would be labeled a terrorist

organization, taking away the legitimacy of the ANC. While the ANC was banned in 1960,

before the creation of MK, they were still seen by many as a legitimate political movement until

they were appropriately designated a terrorist organization. This move drastically hurt the ANC,

which operated as a legitimate political movement from 1912-1960. In fact, the ANC’s greatest

pre-ban resistance period took place in the 1950s, just prior to the ban. The Defiance Campaign

of 1952 saw the ANC partner with the South African Indian Congress and the Coloured People’s

Congress to wage the first large-scale, multi-racial political protest. The volunteer protesters

walked into facilities designated for one race only, failed to carry passes, and violated curfew.19

The Defiance Campaign may have been one of the driving catalysts that spurred the apartheid

government to pass the Public Safety Act in 1953. This act allowed a declaration of state of

emergency, giving the government power to override existing laws as well as ceasing oversight

by the courts.20 This broad expansion of power would give the apartheid government the ability

to arrest hundreds of resistance leaders and suspend their hearings, or arbitrarily extend their

incarceration. This would leave many of the resistance leaders jailed long past the time that they

should have been free to rejoin the resistance movements.

Following the banning of the group, the ANC was forced to meet clandestinely. The

meetings would, of necessity, be held most often at night and in out of the way places so that the

19 “South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy, Sharpeville Massacre” Michigan State University, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/multimedia.php?id=13 (accessed 3/21/2012).20 “South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid Building Democracy, The Defiance Campaign” Michigan State University, http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/multimedia.php?id=8 (accessed 4/18/2012).

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members could attempt to avoid the notice of the military and police forces that would have

arrested them.21 While the ANC was still able to muster up new members, it was undeniably

more difficult to recruit individuals into a secret organization than one that can have offices on

the street. The ANC was further damaged by the banning when the United States and United

Kingdom followed suit the same year, as these two countries represented two of the wealthiest

western nations that the resistance movement could have hoped to obtain financial and political

support from.

In the 1960’s, there were few signs of resistance after the initial two years of heavy

sabotage from December 1961 to June 1963.22 This was due in large part to the high numbers of

the most influential resistance members to either go into voluntary exile or face arrest.23 In either

case, many of the most influential members of the ANC and MK were separated from the

resistance movement in a way that made them ineffectual in the fight against apartheid. This

lack of resistance may have led the Apartheid government to believe that they had been

successful in quelling rebellion. As a result the “Apartheid system grew stronger and extended

its control over all aspects of people’s lives.”24 This extended control would encase South Africa

in a more rigid set of laws that would make it continually harder to make changes to the system

once the resistance began to pick up steam again.

It is also important to note the large numbers of people that fled South Africa to receive

military and guerilla-warfare training, of which Nelson Mandela was one.25 Large numbers of

21 Douglas O. Linder. “The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An Account,” University of Missouri-Kansas City. http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccount.html (accessed 3/18/12).

22 South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe Launches its First Acts of Sabotage,” South African History Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/dated-event/umkhoto-wesizwe-mk-launches-its-first-acts-sabotage (accessed 4/29/2012).

23 Unwembi, “African National Congress, South Africa’s National Liberation Movement,” ANC, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (accessed 3/11/2012).

24 Ibid.

25 Nelson Mandela. Long Walk to Freedom, (United Kingdom: Little Brown and Co. 1995), 62.

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people, predominantly young individuals, fled South Africa to receive training in exile, with

hundreds swelling the ranks of MK after the 1976 Soweto Uprising.26 The large numbers of

people flocking to join MK helped to make the apartheid government see the ANC and MK as a

serious threat again, which helped MK to increase the level of sabotage attacks again from 1976-

1978.27 This reestablishment of threat to apartheid rule would not help to regain legitimacy,

however, as it served to underscore the image of violent revolutionaries rather than political

movement.

Victim-Aggressor Roles Reversed:

After 15 years of minimal sabotage, MK would drastically increase the number of attacks

in 1978. This long time period between active sabotage campaigns would allow the Apartheid

government to act as though they were the injured party. The ever increasing violence and acts

of sabotage against railroads, police stations, and other government properties switched the

victim-aggressor roles, with MK being demonized as a group bent on destroying the economic

system of South Africa. This portrayal was made easier with MK being born of (among others)

the ANC and the South African Communist Party, as the Apartheid government could point to

the communist ties as the “real reason” MK was bent on overthrowing the capitalist Apartheid

government. 28

Whether Chief Albert Luthuli, president of the ANC from 1952 until his death in 1967,

recognized the government’s attempt to point to economic issues as the real reason of resistance,

or was merely foresighted enough to see the problems that would arise from a policy of armed

resistance is unclear, but he did initially seek to maintain a policy of peaceful resistance. He

26 South African History Online, “Timeline: Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK),” South African History Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/timeline-umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/29/2012).

27 Ibid. 28 South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)” South African History Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/13/2012).

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would ultimately be persuaded by Mandela and others that they must move to a path of violent

resistance if they were to effect any changes. In June, 1961 Chief Luthuli was finally convinced

at the meeting of the National Executive in Durban, saying “If anyone thinks I am a pacifist, let

him try to take my chickens and he will see how wrong he is.”29 Though Chief Luthuli was

convinced of the need to move to armed resistance, he wanted to maintain the ANC as a non-

violent organization. To this end, he insisted on the creation of MK as a separate entity that was

allied with the ANC, thereby allowing ANC members to disavow any knowledge of armed

resistance or violent action.30

While it appears as though Chief Luthuli had accepted armed resistance as a necessary

evil, it is clear that he never embraced it. Just months later, in December, Chief Luthuli

delivered his Nobel Peace Prize speech at Oslo University, in which he said “We in our situation

have chosen the path of non-violence of our own volition. Along this path we have organized

many heroic campaigns. All the strength of progressive leadership in South Africa, all my life

and strength has been given to the pursuance of this method, in an attempt to avert disaster in the

interests of South Africa.”31 It appears that Chief Luthuli believed that violent resistance would

result in “disaster” for the “interests of South Africa,” and so attempted to prevent the adoption

of violence as a means by the ANC, settling on allowing the creation of MK to function as the

armed wing, which allowed the ANC to maintain at least some distance. Luthuli would fail

however, as MK and the ANC were ultimately lumped together by their common goals and

membership, if not their common means. Luthuli was correct in seeing the disaster however, as

29 Scott Couper. “Luthuli and Armed Struggle,” Ghandi-Luthuli Documentation Centre, http://scnc.ukzn.ac.za/doc/B/lutuli/Luthuli_Articles/Couper,_S_Luthuli_and_Armed_Struggle.pdf (Accessed 4/19/2012).30 South African History Online, “Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)” South African History Online, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/umkhonto-we-sizwe-mk (accessed 4/13/2012).

31 Albert Luthuli, Speech at Oslo University, “Nobel Prize Speech by Chief Albert Luthuli at the Oslo University,” (December 11, 1961).

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this violence strengthened the Apartheid government, allowing it to remain in power beyond

when it should have.

The Apartheid government would further take advantage of the ANC violence by

enacting new laws that would increase penalties for violent resistance. One such law, the

Sabotage Act of 1962 defined sabotage broadly enough to include strike action, and made

sabotage a capital crime.32 Another example of the harsh legislative response to MK violence

was the General Law Amendment Act of 1963, which allowed a South African police officer to

detain individuals suspected of politically motivated crimes without a warrant or access to a

lawyer for up to 90 days.33 The apartheid government enacted these laws to make criminals of

political resistors, to further distort the victim-aggressor relationship between the government

and dissidents.

During the first 18 months of violent resistance, MK would carry out over 200 acts of

sabotage.34 These shows of defiance would cause the state to pass laws such as the Sabotage Act

of 1962 and the General Amendment Act of 1963. These laws would continue to make

resistance more dangerous and difficult, and are a likely component to the lack of heavy

resistance later in the 1960s, which as discussed appears to have set the resistance movement

back as much as a decade. As the resistance continued, the government tried harder to track

down the leadership of MK, knowing that without this leadership, MK would likely be

demoralized if not at least marginally incapacitated. On July 10, 1963 Lieutenant van Wyk and

32 O’Malley, Padraig. “1962. Sabotage Act General Laws Amendment Act No 76.” Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue. http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/ (accessed 4/29/2012).

33 O’Malley, Padraig. “1963. General Laws Amendment Act No 37.” Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory and Dialogue, http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/ (accessed 4/29/2012).34 Unwembi, “African National Congress, South Africa’s National Liberation Movement,” ANC, http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=206 (accessed 3/11/2012).

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his informant were finally able to locate the ANC and MK headquarters at Rivonia.35 The next

day, police officers would enter the building and surrounding outbuildings, arresting 8 suspects

and confiscating incriminating documents. These men, along with others already in custody,

would be put on trial for sabotage in what would become known as the “Rivonia Trial.”36

The Apartheid government was further able to claim injury when arrested leaders of the

resistance publicly admitted to their role in the violence. In October of 1963, the Rivonia Trial

witnessed eleven prominent MK leaders tried for their roles in over 193 acts of sabotage.37

Mandela delivered a speech at the docks during the trial, saying

“I do not deny that I planned sabotage. I did not plan it in a spirit of recklessness, nor because I have any love of violence. I planned it as a result of a calm and sober assessment of the political situation that had arisen after many years of tyranny, exploitation, and oppression of my people by the Whites. I admit immediately that I was one of the persons who helped to form Umkhonto we Sizwe, and that I played a prominent role in its affairs until I was arrested in August 1962.”38

While Mandela’s words most certainly inspired other members of the resistance, as well as

helped to recruit new members, they also most assuredly incensed the Apartheid government.

The end of the trial would see one of the “Rivonia Eleven” acquitted, with the other ten accused

—including Mandela—being sentenced to one life sentence in prison.39 The judge in the case

elected not to pursue the ultimate penalty, which he considered to be the “appropriate penalty,”

to the surprise of many, who did not expect such a show of leniency from the very court system

Mandela and the others had challenged.40 This “show of leniency” was more likely the result of

35 Douglas O. Linder, “The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An Account,” University of Missouri-Kansas City, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccount.html (accessed 3/18/12).

36 Ibid.37 Ibid.38 Nelson Mandela, Speech at Pretoria Palace of Justice, “Nelson Mandela’s Statement From the Dock at

the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial,” (April 20, 1961).39 Douglas O. Linder, “The Nelson Mandela (Rivonia) Trial: An Account,” University of Missouri-Kansas

City, http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/mandela/mandelaaccount.html (accessed 3/18/12).

40 Ibid.

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careful consideration as the government did not want to make the ten men martyrs that the

resistance could rally around, preferring to leave them in prison as a reminder.

Anti-Apartheid Movements Lose Support, Apartheid Prolonged:

As the aforementioned incidents continued to weaken support for anti-Apartheid

movements, they would inexorably slow the movement towards a democratic, non-racial

government. Individuals and organizations that did not embrace the ideas of MK and the ANC

often were attempting to effect change within the system. These people were branded

collaborators, accused of going along with the Apartheid government in exchange for

preferential treatment, which usually took form in political appointments and money. Chief

among these was Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who founded the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) after

leaving the ANC in 1975, because Buthelezi supposedly wanted to work for a peaceful solution

to apartheid, and distrusted the connection between the ANC and MK.41 Buthelezi was not only

a collaborator, accepting money from the apartheid government in exchange for not making

waves, but led the IFP during a time when it was later revealed that the IFP was actively working

to stall negotiations on an end to Apartheid rule.42 As was revealed in the Inkathagate Scandal,

police and military forces supported Inkatha as violence ripped apart South Africa. The clashes

between the ANC/MK and the IFP turned violent resistance into bloody civil war. This war

would continue as the Apartheid government funneled money through Buthelezi to the IFP to

continue fighting. Aiding in the cause were the police and military forces disarming Inkatha

opponents while largely ignoring IFP fighters.43 This fighting continued to the negotiation table

where standards and decisions on how to hold the first democratic elections were being set.

41 Labor Against Apartheid, “The Killing Goes On,” New York Labor Committee Against Apartheid Publication, (Winter 1992).

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid.

12

Buthelezi, in an effort to hold onto his power as a regional homeland leader, boycotted the

negotiation process until the last minute for a wide range of reasons.44 The wide range of reasons

to boycott and rapid changes in Buthelezi’s demeanor when this boycott was ineffective suggest

that he was grabbing at straws in any effort to hang onto power. The violence between the ANC

and the IFP would slow the process of change, though the people involved attempted to prevent

Buthelezi from stalling, with relative success.45

In addition to the violent clashes, civilian protests against collaborators, the IFP, and the

ANC served to divide the non-white population of South Africa into several smaller groups,

which helped the Apartheid Government to maintain power. These highly publicized protests

targeted specific local, “tribal,” and religious leaders, among others, that were believed to be

collaborating with the Apartheid government. One such protest took place on March 25, 1991,

with ANC supporters distributing pamphlets leading up to the protest featuring the names of

Chief Buthelezi, Mayor Nelson Botile, Reverend Elijah Maswanganyi, Bishop Isaac Mokoena,

and a picture of Mayor Tamsanga Linda. The picture of Mayor Linda was printed with a large

“X” over it, and the words “SELL OUT” underneath.46 As the tensions built around these

leaders, the rift in the black population grew more pronounced, as people were forced to choose

to stay inactive, support the IFP, or support the ANC. This divide would help slow the motor of

change, and while it was already in motion at the time of this protest, democratic elections would

not be held for another 3 years.

44 “Managing Spoilers At The Bargaining Table: Inkatha And The Talks To End Apartheid, 1990-1994,” Princeton University, http://www.princeton.edu/successfulsocieties/content/data/policy_note/PN_id137/Policy_Note_ID137.txt (accessed March 15, 2012).

45 Ibid.46 Capital District Coalition Against Apartheid And Racism, “Picket Against Apartheid Collaborators,”

Pamphlet, (March 25, 1991).

13

The cause of the violence during this time cannot be easily attributed to just one cause.

Buthelezi certainly helped to instigate this violence in an attempt to avoid being sidelined in the

negotiations, but according to Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, Sociologists engaging in a

study for the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security in Ottawa, there are 5 other

major reasons. These reasons are 1) de Klerk’s double agenda, who like Buthelezi was

attempting to hold on to some sort of power, 2) a “third force” of right-wing elements in the

security establishment, 3) the ANC’s campaign of armed struggle, 4) ingrained tribalism that

resulted in black on black violence (which was coupled with Buthelezi’s supporting the Inkatha-

ANC war) and 5) the legacy of Apartheid.47 As the country was mired in turmoil, the violence

threatened to drown the efforts of leaders to transition to a democratic rule. Had the ANC

maintained a policy of non-violent resistance and abandoned the idea to form MK before it came

to fruition, it is possible that the IFP would have had no obvious group to engage in war, and

Buthelezi may not have felt his prominence so threatened. While it cannot be stated with

certainty that events would have played out that way, it is possible that with this removal of three

of the catalysts that Adam and Moodley believe contributed in large part to the violence that

slowed the transition. This may have ended Apartheid earlier while the transition period could

have been a time of relative peace and celebration, rather than violent civil war.

Conclusions:

At the time that MK was founded, peaceful resistance against the Apartheid government

was already taking place in South Africa. The ANC had operated legally for nearly 50 years,

and was attempting to affect change by working peacefully against the system. This process was

undeniably slow and at times seemed to regress. Eventually, Nelson Mandela, Joe Slovo, and

47 Heribert Adam and Kogila Moodley, “Political Violence, ‘Tribalism’ and Inkatha,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 3, (1992):485 http://www.jstor.org/stable/161169 (accessed 4/20/2012).

14

others would reach the conclusion that the practice of working within this system was a lost

cause, and would in fact convince Albert Luthuli of this, even though he was a man of strong

convictions and moral beliefs that discouraged violence. It is impossible to say with any

certainty that Apartheid would have ended earlier had the ANC Youth League contributed their

efforts to the nonviolent movement, but the evidence suggests that the radicalization of the

movement and the violent attacks carried out by MK caused the Apartheid government to react

with stricter laws that further violated human rights, which spurred MK on to greater efforts in a

cycle that would prove difficult to break out of. In this way it can be seen that the armed

resistance struggle and the repercussions of that violence would cause the ANC to lose

legitimacy as a political movement by South African and foreign governments alike, while

reversing the victim-aggressor role between the people and the Apartheid government, which

caused anti-Apartheid movements to split into multiple factions, thereby weakening the

resistance. All of these factors contributed to the prolonging of Apartheid rule and the

oppression that it brought with it.

15

Bibliography:Primary Sources

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Buthelezi, Mangosuthu. Speech, “Inkatha, ‘Zuluness’ and the Historians,” (September 21, 1991).

Capital District Coalition Against Apartheid and Racism, “Picket Against Apartheid Collaborators,” Pamphlet, (March 25, 1991).

Labor Against Apartheid, “The Killing Goes On,” New York Labor Committee Against Apartheid Publication, (Winter 1992).

Luthuli, Albert, Speech at Oslo University, “Nobel Prize Speech by Chief Albert Luthuli at the Oslo University,” (December 11, 1961).

Mandela, Nelson, Speech at Pretoria Palace of Justice, “Nelson Mandela’s Statement From the Dock at the Opening of the Defence Case in the Rivonia Trial,” (April 20, 1961).

Mandela, Nelson. Long Walk to Freedom, (United Kingdom: Little Brown and Co. 1995).

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