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 RE:  Comments  on  the  Recommendations  of  the  Presidential  Task  Force  on   Combating   Illegal,   Unreported   and   Unregulated   Fishing   and  Seafood  Fraud    January  19,  2015    Mark  Axelrod,  Associate  Professor  Department  of  Fisheries  and  Wildlife  &  James  Madison  College    Mark  Gibson,  PhD  Researcher  in  Conservation  Criminology  School  of  Criminal  Justice    Meredith  Gore,  Associate  Professor  Department  of  Fisheries  and  Wildlife  &  School  of  Criminal  Justice    John  Spink,  Director  and  Assistant  Professor  Food  Fraud  Initiative    We  commend  the  Presidential  Task  Force  for  its  release  of  a  comprehensive  set  of  recommendations  that,  if  appropriately  implemented,  will  effectively  combat  illegal,  unreported  and  unregulated  (IUU)  fishing  and  seafood  fraud.  Pursuant   to   the  Task  Force’s   request   for   comments   on  how   to   implement  these   recommendations,   we   provide   the   following   advice   for   the  implementation  of  recommendations  #6,  11,  and  12.    Recommendation   #6:     Direct   the   Secretaries   of   Commerce,   Defense,  Homeland   Security,   State,   the   Administrator   of   USAID,   and   the  Attorney  General   to   coordinate  with  donors,  multilateral   institutions  and   foreign   governments   and   prioritize   building   capacity   to  sustainably  manage  fisheries,  combat  IUU  fishing  and  seafood  fraud.    1. Overview  

 The  central  challenges  to  building  state  capacity  to  combat  IUU  fishing  in  the   developing   world   are   three-­‐fold:   increase   the   total   resources  available  for  management  activities,  lower  the  costs  of  enforcement,  and  increase  the  overall  effectiveness  of  compliance  programs.  A  subsidiary  challenge   is   supporting   compliance   reforms,   particularly   when   those  reforms   may   pose   adverse   consequences   to   law-­‐abiding   small-­‐scale  fishers   that   lack  political   representation.  We   therefore  advise   the  Task  Force   to   coordinate   with   donors,   multilateral   institutions   and   foreign  governments   to   jointly   invest   in   the   promotion,   advocacy,   and  implementation   of   cost   recovery   mechanisms;   fishery   compliance  surveys;  risk-­‐based  assessment  methods;  intelligence-­‐led  policing  tools;  UAV   surveillance   technologies;   compliance   programs   that   incorporate  

voluntary   compliance   measures;   professional   training   for   law  enforcement   and   court   personnel;   and   temporary   fisher   assistance  programs.  This  advice  is  further  detailed  below.    

 2. Cost  recovery  mechanisms  

 It   is  widely  recognized   that  developing  countries  have   fewer  resources  to   enforce   their   fishery   management   rules.   By   one   estimate,   public  investments   by   developing   countries   in   monitoring   and   control  represent   just  0.7%  of   the   total   landed  values  of   fishery  resources,  but  8.6%   for  developed  countries.i  Given   the   limited  public   funds  available  to  developing  country  fisheries  managers,   it   is   likely  that  cost  recovery  mechanisms,  which  include  fees  for  services,   fishery  taxes  proportional  to  quota  allocations,  and  landings  royalties,  will  need  to  be  implemented  in   at   least   some   fisheries   to   increase   overall   fishery   management  capacity.  Though  such  cost   recovery  mechanisms  are  used   to  a   limited  extent  in  the  United  States,  they  are  central  to  funding  the  management  of  many   fisheries   in   both  New  Zealand   and  Australia,   as  well   as   other  natural   resource   management   regimes   in   the   United   States,   such   as  those  in  place  for  the  timber  and  petroleum  industries.    For  instance,  the  Australian   Fisheries   Management   Authority   (AFMA),   which   manages  fisheries   that   lie   beyond   the   coastal   waters   under   state   jurisdiction,  annually  recovers  approximately  $14  million,  from  its  budget  of  around  $42  million,  via  taxes  on  the  fishing  industry.ii    Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   promote   the   use   of   cost   recovery  mechanisms   for   fisheries   through   the   development   of   a   guide   that  provides   best-­‐practice   strategies   for   the   implementation   of   cost  recovery  mechanisms   for   fisheries  management.  Such  a  guide  could  be  modeled   on   the   Catch   Share   Design   Manual   published   by   the  Environmental   Defense   Fundiii   and   include   case   studies   of   both  developed   and   developing   world   fisheries   that   incorporate   such  mechanisms,   as   well   as   an   overview   on   the   lessons   learned   from  implementing   cost   recovery   mechanisms   in   other   natural   resource  regimes,  such  as  timber  concessions,  in  the  developing  world.  Additional  content   could   also   assist   authorities   in   identifying   cost-­‐recovery  opportunities   that   do   not   significantly   impact   coastal   livelihoods   and  food  security.  

 3. Fishery  compliance  surveys  

 By   one   estimate,   over   80   percent   of   marine   catches   come   from   “data  poor”   fisheries,  meaning   that   they   lack   a   formal   stock   assessment   and  therefore   a   sound   scientific   basis   for   setting   management   targets.iv  Similarly,   it   is   likely   that   the  vast  majority  of   the  world’s   landings  also  

come   from   fisheries   that   lack   meaningful   information   on   the   state   of  fisher  compliance  with  management  rules.      The   weakness   of   official   law   enforcement   statistics   is   widely  acknowledged  and  can  be  attributed  to  the  widespread  lack  of  resources  for   fisheries   management,   high   cost   of   traditional   compliance  surveillance  methods,  and  ease  with  which   fishers  can  evade  detection  by  many  surveillance  methods.v  For  instance,  the  average  cost  per  at-­‐sea  boarding  by  the  U.S.  Coast  Guard  in  the  Northeast  Groundfish  Fishery  is  an  estimated  $61,700  to  $97,100,  a  cost  that  many  countries  would  find  prohibitive,  and  it  is  believed  that  such  at-­‐sea  patrols  have  resulted  in  an  overly   optimistic   official   compliance   rate.vi   GPS   tracking   through  automatic   identification   systems   (AIS)   and   vessel   monitoring   systems  (VMS)  are  also  unreliable  due  to  the  ease  with  which  the  systems  may  be  deactivated  during  illegal  fishing  operations.vii      In   fisheries   where   observer   programs,   electronic   monitoring   systems  (EMS),  or  comprehensive  landings  inspections  programs  are  impractical  or   cost-­‐prohibitive   –   a   group   likely   constituting   the   majority   of   the  world’s  fisheries  –  a  meaningful  alternative  would  be  to  employ  surveys  to   evaluate   the   state   of   compliance   with   fishery   management   rules.  Contrary  to  initial  skepticism  in  the  field  of  criminology,  half  a  century  of  research   efforts   have   revealed   that   surveys   are   a   valuable   tool   for   the  monitoring   of   a   variety   of   criminal   behaviors   in   that   they   reliably  provide  valid  “self-­‐report”  data  at  a  relatively   low-­‐cost.viii  Surveys  have  been  used  to  meaningfully  evaluate  such  activities  as  the  illegal  killing  of  terrestrial   wildlifeix,   tax   evasionx,   intimate   partner   violencexi,   juvenile  delinquencyxii,  and  illegal  drug  usexiii.      Research  scientists  have  also  recently  begun  to  use  surveys  to  evaluate  noncompliance   with   both   fishery   and   marine   protected   area   (MPA)  management   measures.xiv   Furthermore,   since   2009,   Australia   has  deployed   compliance   risk   perception   surveys   among   fishery  stakeholders   as   a   central   component   of   its   biennial   compliance   risk  assessment  for  Commonwealth  fisheries.xv      Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   develop   and   implement   pilot   projects   to  demonstrate   to   the   governments   of   developing   countries   that   fishery  compliance  surveys  can  effectively  fill  key  knowledge  gaps  with  regards  to  the  nature  and  occurrence  of  noncompliance  with  management  rules  at  a  relatively  low  cost,  and  in  turn,  support  the  development  of  targeted  fishery  compliance   interventions.  Such  pilot  projects  could  be  modeled  on,  if  not  incorporated  into,  fishery  improvement  projects  (FIPs),  which  are  now  widely  deployed  around  the  world  to  assist  fisheries  in  meeting  the   standards   of   leading   ecolabel   certification   organizations.xvi   For  

instance,   the   Honduran   Spiny   Lobster   FIP   –   a   joint   initiative   of   the  Honduran  government  and  WWF-­‐US  –  has  identified  noncompliance  as  a  key  challenge  to  the  management  of  the  Honduran  Spiny  Lobster  fishery  and   has   prioritized   a   comprehensive   compliance   assessment.xvii   If   a  relatively  small  amount  of  funding  were  made  available,  it   is  likely  that  this  or  other  FIPs  could  quickly  integrate  and  demonstrate  the  benefits  of  periodic  fishery  compliance  surveys.      

4. Risk-­‐based  compliance  assessment    Risk-­‐based   compliance   assessment   is   quickly   emerging   as   a   best-­‐practice  approach   to   the  design  of   fisheries  enforcement   interventions.  The   Australian   Fisheries   Management   Authority   perhaps   best  demonstrates   the   approach.   Since   2009,   AFMA   has   employed   a   risk-­‐based  methodology   to  assess  compliance   in  Australia’s  Commonwealth  fisheries.   The   results   of   the   most   recent   independent   audit   of   the  national   compliance   program   for   fisheries   indicates   that   such   an  approach   has   been   highly   effective   in   identifying   and   developing  effective,  targeted  responses  to  key  compliance  threats.xviii      

 Figure  1:  AFMA’s  risk  assessment  process    AFMA’s   methodology   entails   the   identification   and   classification   of  compliance   risks   for   Commonwealth   fisheries   according   to   their  likelihood  and   consequence,   and   it   occurs   in   two   stages   (see   figure  1).  First,  AFMA  conducts  an   internal  assessment  of   the  “inherent”  risks,  or  the   likelihood   and   consequences   of   compliance   risks   in   the   absence   of  current   enforcement   efforts.   Second,   AFMA,   industry,   and   other  stakeholders   jointly   assess   the   “residual   risk”,   or   the   likelihood   and  

consequence   of   identifiable   risks   given   current   enforcement   efforts,   to  produce   a   risk   rating   that   is   then  modified   in   the   event   there   exists   a  clear  history  of  risk  occurrence.  Through  this,  AFMA  is  able  to  prioritize  the  most  pressing  risks  to  fisheries  management.      As  a  result  of  risk-­‐based  compliance  assessment,  AFMA  has  been  able  to  clearly  justify  targeted  investments  to  address  a  number  of  key  risks  to  Commonwealth   fisheries.   The   two   risks   that   were   prioritized   by   the  most   recent   assessment   in   2013   were   the   failure   to   have   a   Vessel  Monitoring   System   (VMS)   operating   at   all   times   (risk   rating:  moderate/high)  and  quota  evasion  (risk  rating:  moderate/high).  These  risks   now   being   addressed   by   special   compliance   risk   management  teams   (CRMTs).   In   the   past,   the   CRMT   approach   has   succeeded  addressing  other  prioritized  risks,  including  lowering  logbook  reporting  noncompliance   from   5.5%   to   just   1.4%   of   required   submissions,  reducing   suspected   illegal   fishing   in   closed   areas   by   94%,   and  developing  various  intelligence-­‐led  policing  tools  (see  below).xix      Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign  governments  should  promote  risk-­‐based  compliance  assessment  through   the   development   of   informational   materials   on   the   approach  and  by  investing  in  demonstration  projects  for  developing  countries  that  show  interest   in   the  approach  and  a  need  to  better  understand  how  to  approach  the  problem  of  illegal  fishing  in  their  waters.  Furthermore,  the  United  States  could  demonstrate  the  utility  of  the  approach  by  adopting  it  for  the  identification  of  major  compliance  risks  for  federally  managed  fisheries.      

5. Intelligence-­‐led  policing  tools    In   many   developing   countries,   the   efficiency   and   effectiveness   of  fisheries   enforcement  programs   are   limited  due   to   time-­‐intensive  data  analysis   and   entry.   This   situation   could   be   greatly   improved   upon  through   targeted   investments   in   data   analysis   and   collection   tools.   In  particular,   analytical   tools   are   now   readily   available   to   facilitate   the  targeting  of  vessels  and  processors  at  a  higher  risk  of  offending.   In   the  management   of   Commonwealth   fisheries,   AFMA   has   developed   a  Multiple   Risk   Aggregation   Index   (MRAI)   to   better   target   vessel  inspections,   and   has   implemented   business   intelligence   software   that  audits  logbooks  and  receiver  reports  to  detect  quota  evasion.  The  MRAI  incorporates  a  variety  of  risk  criteria,  but  most  importantly  relies  upon  a  cash  flow  estimate  for  each  Commonwealth  fishing  vessel,  assuming  that  vessels   with   lower   estimated   net   cash   flows   are   at   a   higher   risk   of  breaking  the  rules  to  turn  a  profit.xx  The  business  intelligence  software,  meanwhile,   was   developed   in   response   to   the   most   recent   national  compliance   risk   assessment   and   now   permits   enforcement   officers   to  

audit   catch   reports   and   processor   receiver   reports   at   the   “push   of   a  button”.xxi        Meanwhile,   terrestrial   wildlife   management   offers   numerous   tools   to  improve   data   collection   in   fisheries   enforcement.   For   instance,   the  Management   Information   System   (MIST),   a   tool   that   provides   a  structured,   computerized   form   for   recording   patrol   information,   has  been   successfully   deployed   among   patrol   officers   in   tiger   reserves   to  streamline   data   collection   and   facilitate   reporting   and   analysis.xxii   A  more  sophisticated  tool  for  terrestrial  wildlife  management  surveillance,  the   spatial   monitoring   and   reporting   tool   (SMART),   has   since   been  developed  and   is   now  promoted   and  made   freely   available  by   a  broad  coalition   of   NGOs,   including   WWF   and   the   Wildlife   Conservation  Society.xxiii  With  little  additional  investment,  this  tool  could  be  modified  for  use  in  fisheries  and  MPA  management.    

 Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   leverage   existing   intelligence-­‐led   policing  tools  to  improve  fisheries  enforcement  by  investing  in  projects  to  adapt  analytical  and  data  collection  tools  for  developing  country  fisheries  and  their   enforcement   contexts,   where   appropriate.   This   could   be   further  facilitated   through   the   development   of   a   knowledge   document   that  draws   together   case   studies   of   existing   tools   and   the   lessons   learned  from   Australian   fisheries   management   and   the   SMART   conservation  initiative.    

6. UAV  surveillance  technologies      As   discussed   above,   it   is   likely   that   the   vast   majority   of   the   world’s  fishery   landings   come   from   fisheries   that   lack  meaningful   information  on   fisher   compliance   with   management   rules.   To   overcome   some   of  these  problems,  a  concerted  effort  should  be  made  to  deploy  unmanned  aerial   vehicles   (UAVs)   for   fishery   surveillance.  Many   newer  models   of  UAVs  can  be  deployed  in  coastal  fisheries  at  a  fraction  of  the  cost  of  at-­‐sea  patrols,  airplanes,  and  helicopters.  Furthermore,  due  to  their  small-­‐size  and  lack  of  noticeable  noise,  it  is  likely  that  illegal  fishers  would  be  unable   to   effectively   evade   detection,   such   as   by   disposing   of   illegal  catches   and   gears   or   leaving   a   prohibited   area   before   being   identified.  UAVs   could   also   be   used   to   construct   estimates   of   fishing   vessels   and  effort  in  poorly  regulated  fisheries,  such  as  coastal  small-­‐scale  fisheries,  and   evaluate   how   fishing   effort   is   deployed   across   both   time   and  geography  for  improved  dockside  and  at-­‐sea  patrol  targeting.      Recently,  pilot  projects  using  UAVs  for  fisheries  surveillance  and  marine  resource  monitoring  have  been  initiated   in  Belize,  Australia,  and  Palau,  among   other   countries.xxiv   In   spite   of   the   promise   of  UAV   technologies  

for  compliance  monitoring  in  fisheries  and  other  resource  management  regimes,   their  deployment   remains   limited  due   to   a   lack  of   knowledge  and  training  among  enforcement  agencies  as  well  as  associated  policies  that  support  the  use  of  UAV  imagery  for  prosecution.      Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   develop   and   implement   pilot   projects   to  demonstrate   the   opportunity   presented   by   UAVs   for   fisheries  surveillance   and   enforcement   and   assist   in   the   development   of  supportive   laws   and   enforcement   policies.   Additionally,   the   U.S.  government  and  its  partners  should  develop  a  guidebook  and  set  of  case  studies  for  countries  seeking  to  implement  UAV  surveillance  programs.    

 7. Voluntary  compliance  measures  

 In   most   countries,   the   standard   approach   to   achieving   a   high   rate   of  fisher   compliance   is   to   deter   rule   violations   through   investments   in  enforcement   activities,   including   at-­‐sea   patrols,   dockside   monitoring,  and  observer  programs  (see  figure  2).  This  is  built  upon  the  assumption  that   fishery   offenses   are   a   function   of   the   likelihood   and   penalties   of  detection,  and  the  perceived  costs  and  benefits  of  an  offense.  However,  modern   criminology   recognizes   that   many   people   often   comply   with  laws  not  because  they  fear  the  risks  of  getting  caught,  but  because  they  believe  it  is  the  right  thing  to  do.xxv  This  normative  theory  of  compliance  suggests   that   the   costs   of   obtaining   a   particular   level   of   compliance  through   enforcement   activities   could   be   reduced   through  complementary   investments   in   activities   that   increase   voluntary  compliance.      

 Figure  2:  Hypothetical  depiction  of  the  deterrence  functionxxvi      

With   respect   to   figure   2,   normative   theory  would   predict   that   the   red  and   black   curves   shift   downward   as   voluntary   compliance   increases.  Given  the  decreasing  marginal  returns  to  enforcement  investments,  it  is  likely  that  an  optimal  level  of  compliance  would  be  achieved  most  cost-­‐effectively   through   a   combination   of   both   enforcement   and   voluntary  compliance  measures.      The   experience   of   the   Australian   Fisheries   Management   Authority  (AFMA),   an   organization   utilizing   a   compliance   strategy   that  incorporates   both   voluntary   compliance   and   rational   deterrence,  suggests  that  voluntary  compliance  measures  will  relate  to:      

• Education  (e.g.,  informing  fishers  as  to  the  nature  and  content  of  the   rules   with   presentations,   educational   materials,   and   timely  communications);    

• Transparency  (e.g.,   communicating  with   fishers  regularly  on   the  management   authorities   actions   via   newsletters   and   other  media);    

• Participation  (e.g.,  ensuring  that  fishers  have  some  opportunity  to  provide  input  to  the  management  process);    

• Recognition  (e.g.,  publically  identifying  fishers  for  both  good  and  bad  behaviors);  and  

• Responsiveness   (e.g.,   periodically   surveying   fisher   satisfaction  with  management  and  responding  accordingly).xxvii    

 Meanwhile,   fisheries   research   literature   indicates   that   fishers   are   far  more   willing   to   comply   when   they   believe   the   rules   were   created  through  a  legitimate  process.xxviii    Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   advocate   for   the   widespread   adoption   of  voluntary   compliance   measures   by   developing   and   implementing  voluntary   compliance   improvement   projects   in   developing   world  fisheries,  carefully  monitoring  project  outcomes  with  fishery  compliance  surveys,   and   disseminating   the   results   through   the   development   of   a  best-­‐practice  guide.  

 8. Training  for  law  enforcement  and  court  personnel  

 Perhaps   due   to   the   limited   funding   for   marine   law   enforcement   in  developing  countries,  many  enforcement  agencies  lack  the  basic  training  necessary   to   effectively   deter   noncompliance   and   encourage   voluntary  compliance.   This   includes   training   in   boarding   procedures,   on-­‐scene  assessment   and   violations   recognition,   officer   safety,   command  presence,  interview  techniques,  exercising  interpretive  justice,  evidence  handling,   report   writing,   case   package   preparation,   communicating  

fisheries   rules   and   regulations,   and   developing   public   message  documents   to   share   on   agency   activities.   Similarly,  many   courts   in   the  developing  world  demonstrate  a  lack  of  concern  with  the  prosecution  of  illegal   fishers,   or   the   application   of   penalties   that   might   deter   future  noncompliance,  even  when  such  penalties  are  permitted  by  law.      Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   collaborate   in   the   creation   of   a   standard  training   program   and   manual   for   fisheries   enforcement   officers,   an  assessment  of   training  needs  among   fisheries  management  agencies   in  low-­‐capacity   countries,   and   the   implementation   of   targeted   training  workshops  for  both  law  enforcement  officers  and  court  prosecutors  and  judges.  Furthermore,   in  countries  where   illegal   fishing   is   found   to  be  a  serious   problem   deserving   specialized   attention,   the   U.S.   government  and   interested   partners   should   advocate   and   assist   in   the   funding   of  legislative   reforms   and   temporary   special   courts   and   prosecutors   to  effectively  deter  noncompliance  in  fisheries.    

 9. Temporary  fisher  assistance  programs    

 In  some  cases,   the   imposition  of  anti-­‐IUU  fishing  policies   in  developing  countries   will   create   an   excessive   burden   for   law-­‐abiding   fishers,  particularly   for   small-­‐scale   fishers   who   tend   to   lack   political  representation   and   the   resources   to   meet   new   legal   requirements.   In  other   cases,   the   sudden   enforcement   of   existing   regulations   could  significantly   impact  subsistence   fishers.  Because  of   licensing   fees  and  a  lack  of  enforcement,  many  subsistence  fishers  around  the  world  operate  in  violation  of  vessel  registration  and  fishing  license  requirements,  even  though   their   fishing   does   not   contribute   substantially   to   fisheries  depletion.      An   excellent   example   of   the   unintended   consequences   of   IUU   policies  comes   from   Indonesia,   where   President   Joko   Widodo   has   decided   to  take  action  against   the  estimated  5,000   foreign   fishing  boats  operating  illegally   in   Indonesian  waters,  which  costs   the   local   fishing   industry  an  estimated  US$24bn.xxix  In  order  to  protect  the  local  fishing  industry  from  these   losses,   the   government   has   since   instituted   a   six   month  moratorium   on   issuing   new   fishing   licenses   and   banned   at-­‐sea  transshipments  of  catches.  Yet  as  noted  by  Andrew  Harvey,  a  sustainable  fisheries   adviser   for   USAID,   these   policies   threaten   to   significantly  impact   small-­‐scale   fishers   who   require   a   renewal   of   their   licenses,   or  whose  business  model  is  dependent  on  at-­‐sea  transshipments.  Rational  noncompliance   theory   would   also   suggest   that   at   least   some   of   these  impacted   fishers   will   now   resort   to   illegal   fishing   by   engaging   in  unlicensed  fishing  and/or  illegal  at-­‐sea  transshipment,  meaning  that  the  new  IUU  policies  will  be  somewhat  counter-­‐productive.  Indeed,  research  

indicates   that   resource   users,   including   fishers,   are   often   willing   to  accept   the   risk   of   punishment   when   they   perceive   that   they   have   no  livelihood  alternative.xxx   In  sum,  this  example  suggests  that  when  there  is   a   risk   of   detrimental   impacts   to   small-­‐scale   fishers,   new   anti-­‐IUU  fishing   policies   should   be   implemented   along   with   temporary   fisher  assistance  programs.    Advice:  U.S.   government   agencies,   donors,  multilateral   institutions,   and  foreign   governments   should   make   available   special   funds   to   assist  fishers   in   adapting   to  new  anti-­‐IUU   fishing   laws   in   the   event   that   they  can   demonstrate   a   clear   impact   to   their   fishing   operations,   or   in   the  development   of   alternative   livelihoods   in   the   event   that   adaptation   is  not   possible.   Assistance   should   also   be   considered   for   subsistence  fishers   in   the   event   that   they   will   be   subject   to   new   enforcement  activities.    

 Recommendation   #11:   Direct   the   Secretaries   of   Agriculture,  Commerce,  Health   and  Human   Services,   and  Homeland   Security,   and  the   Attorney   General   to   work   with   state   and   local   enforcement  authorities   to   expand   information   sharing   and   develop   tools   that  address  illegal  fishing  and  seafood  fraud  at  the  state  and  local  level.    10. The   challenges   to   addressing   illegal   fishing   at   the   state   and   local   level  

are  the  same  as  those  challenges  facing  developing  countries.  State  and  local  governments  must  obtain  additional  resources,   lower  the  costs  of  enforcement,   and   increase   the   overall   effectiveness   of   compliance  programs.  Given  this,  some  of  the  advice  provided  for  implementation  of  Recommendation   #6,   specifically   sections   2   through   7,   should   also   be  considered  for  implementation  of  Recommendation  #11.    

 Recommendation  #12:  Work  with  Congress  to  the  extent  necessary  to  broaden   agency   enforcement   authorities,   including   those   to   (1)  search,   inspect  and   seize   seafood,  both  at   the  point  of   entry   into  U.S.  commerce   (whether   from   foreign   or   domestic   sources)   and  throughout   the   supply   chain;   and   (2)   pursue   a   full   range   of   judicial  enforcement  options  for  trafficking  and  other  violations  related  to  IUU  fishing  and  seafood  fraud.      11. More   pragmatic   evidentiary   standards   and   increased   governmental  

responsiveness  for  the  Moratorium  Protection  Act    

The  Moratorium   Protection   Act   requires  NOAA   Fisheries   to   produce   a  biennial   report   to  Congress   that   identifies   countries  whose  vessels   are  engaged   in   IUU   fishing.   If  NOAA  Fisheries   determines   after   a   two-­‐year  consultation  period  that  a  country  has  not  taken  necessary  measures  to  address   the   issues   for   which   it   was   identified,   the   country   can   be  

negatively  certified  in  the  following  report.  A  negative  certification  may  result  in  import  restrictions  on  fish  products  from  the  certified  country.  A  number  of  countries  have  been  identified  in  these  reports  to  Congress  since  they  first  began  in  2009  (see  figure  3).      

2009   2011   2013  France   Colombia   Colombia  Italy     Ecuador   Ecuador  Libya   Italy   Ghana  Panama   Panama   Italy  China   Portugal   Korea  Tunisia   Venezuela   Mexico  

    Panama       Spain       Tanzania       Venezuela  

Figure  3:  Countries  listed  by  NOAA  in  past  reports  

Surprisingly,  Italy  and  Panama  have  been  listed  for  all  three  reports,  and  three  countries  (Ecuador,  Colombia,  and  Venezuela)  were  listed  for  the  last   two   reports,   but   not   a   single   country   has   yet   received   a   negative  certification   under   the   U.S.   anti-­‐IUU   policy.   In   stark   contrast,   the   EU’s  seafood  trade  sanction  system  –  which  has  only  been  in  place  since  2012  –  has  identified  numerous  countries  as  supportive  of  IUU  fishing  and  has  resulted   in   trade   sanctions   being   applied   to   Belize,   Cambodia,   Guinea,  and  Sri  Lanka  for  their  lack  of  responsiveness.      This  disparity   in   identification   and   follow-­‐through   sanctions   is   at   least  partly   due   to   the   fact   that   the   U.S.   employs   a   violation-­‐by-­‐violation  approach,  while  the  EU  looks  for  patterns  of  behavior.  This  means  that  countries   with   habitual   IUU   enforcement   failures   can   obtain   “positive  certifications”   (and   thus   avoid   sanctions)   so   long   as   it   resolves   the  individual  cases  cited  in  NOAA’s  report.  It  also  means  a  country  with  just  a   few   unresolved   violations   but   otherwise   relatively   good   anti-­‐IUU  practices  may  be  identified  alongside  countries  with  much  weaker  laws  or   a   very   poor   record   of   enforcement.   Furthermore,   the   biennial  reporting   period   likely   limits   NOAA   from   appropriately   addressing  countries  with  IUU  supportive  behavior  in  a  timely  manner.      Advice:  the  U.S.  government  should  work  with  Congress  to  alter  relevant  legislation   such   that   the   evidentiary   standard   for   negatively   certifying  countries  is  the  “demonstration  of  a  clear  pattern  of  behavior  supportive  of   IUU   fishing”   and   that   negative   certifications   may   be   submitted   to  Congress  on  an  “as  needed”  basis.    

                                                                                                                         i  U.R.  Sumaila,  A.S.  Kahn,  A.J.  Dyck,  R.  Watson,  G.  Munro,  P.  Tyedmers,  and  D.  Pauly.  2010.  A  bottom-­‐up  reestimation  of  global  fisheries  subsidies.  Journal  of  Bioeconomics  12:  201-­‐225.    ii   Australian   National   Audit   Office.   2013.   Administration   of   the   Domestic   Fishing  Compliance   Program.   Commonwealth   of   Australia.   Available   at:  http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit   Reports/2012   2013/Audit   Report  20/Audit   Report   No   20.pdf;   For   additional   information,   see   AFMA.   2010.   AFMA   Cost  Recovery   Impact   Statement.   Available   at:   http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/06/AFMA-­‐Cost-­‐Recovery-­‐Impact-­‐Statement-­‐20101.pdf.    iii   EDF.   2010.   Catch   Share   Design   Manual.   Available   at:  http://catchshares.edf.org/sites/catchshares.edf.org/files/CSDM_Vol1_A_Guide_for_Managers_and_Fishermen.pdf.    iv  Christopher  Costello,  Daniel  Ovando,  Ray  Hilborn,  Steven  D.  Gaines,  Olivier  Deschenes  &  Sarah  E.   Lester.   2012.   Status   and   Solutions   for   the  World’s  Unassessed  Fisheries.  Science  338(6106):  517-­‐520.  v  For  example,  see  discussion  on  estimating  illegal  fishing  in  the  Combatting  IUU  Fishing  LinkedIn  Group,  available  at:  https://www.linkedin.com/groups/Is-­‐there-­‐Global-­‐Illegal-­‐Fishing-­‐4153219.S.5936140479652450305.  vi   Dennis   King,   Read  D.   Porter,   &   Elizabeth  W.   Price.   2009.   Reassessing   the   Value   of   U.S.  Coast   Guard   At-­‐Sea   Fishery   Enforcement.   Ocean   Development   and   International   Law  40:350-­‐372.  vii  For  example,  see  industry  report:  Windward.  2014.  AIS  Data  on  the  High  Seas:  An  Analysis  of  the  Magnitude  and  Implications  of  Growing  Data  Manipulation  at  Sea.  Available  at:  http://windward.eu/press/AIS_Executive_Summary-­‐Windward.pdf.  viii  John  V.  Pepper  &  Carol  V.  Petrie  (eds).  2004.  Measurement  Problems  in  Criminal  Justice  Research:  Workshop  Summary.  National  Research  Council.  The  National  Academies  Press.  Available   at:   http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10581/measurement-­‐problems-­‐in-­‐criminal-­‐justice-­‐research-­‐workshop-­‐summary.  ix  P.  Cross,  F.A.V.  St.  John,  S.  Kahn,  &  A.  Petroczi.  2013.  Innovative  Techniques  for  Estimating  Illegal   Activities   in   a   Human-­‐Wildlife-­‐Management   Conflict.   PLOS   ONE   DOI:  10.1371/journal.pone.0053681;  F.A.V.  St.  John,  A.M.  Keane,  G.  Edwards-­‐Jones,  L.  Jones,  R.W.  Yarnell  &   J.P.G.   Jones.  2011.   Identifying   Indicators  of   Illegal  Behavior:  Carnivore  Killing   in  Human-­‐Managed   Landscapes.   The   Proceedings   of   the   Royal   Society   B.  doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.1228;   F.A.V.   St.   John,   C.H.   Mai   &   K.J.C.   Pei.   2014.   Evaluating  deterrents  of  illegal  behaviour  in  conservation:  Carnivore  killing  in  rural  Taiwan.  Biological  Conservation   doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2014.08.019;   V.L.   Wright.   1980.   Use   of   Randomized  Response  Technique  to  Estimate  Deer  Poaching.  Wildlife  Society  Bulletin  8(4).  x  M.  Korndorfer,   I.  Krumpal  &  S.C.  Schmukle.  2014.  Measuring  and  explaining  tax  evasion:  Improving  self-­‐reports  using  the  crosswise  model.   Journal  of  Economic  Psychology  45:  18-­‐32.  xi  C.  Garcia-­‐Moreno,  H.A.F.M.  Jansen,  M.  Ellsberg,  L.  Heise  &  C.H.  Watts.  2006.  Prevalence  of  intimate  partner  violence:  findings  from  the  WHO  mutli-­‐country  study  on  women’s  health  and  domestic  violence.  The  Lancet  368(9543):  1260-­‐1269.  xii  T.P.  Thornberry  &  M.D.  Krohn.  2000.  The  Self-­‐Report  Method  for  Measuring  Delinquency  and  Crime.   In   :  Duffee,  D.   (ed),  Measurement   and  Analysis  of  Crime  and   Justice:  Criminal  Justice  2000,  vol.  4,  US  Department  of   Justice,  Office  of   Justice  Programs,  Washington,  DC,  2000,  pp.  33  –  83.  Available  at:      https://www.ncjrs.gov/criminal_justice2000/vol_4/04b.pdf.  

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       xiii  L.  Harrison.  1997.  The  validity  of  self-­‐reported  drug  use  in  survey  research:  an  overview  and  critique  of  research  methods.  NIDA  Research  Monograph  167:  17-­‐36.  xiv   For   example:   A.   Arias   &   S.G.   Sutton.   2013.   Understanding   Recreational   Fishers’  Compliance  with  No-­‐take  Zones  in  the  Great  Barrier  Reef  Marine  Park.  Ecology  and  Society  18(4):   18;     Brock   J.   Bergseth,   Garry   R.   Russ   &   Joshua   E.   Cinner.   2013.   Measuring   and  monitoring   compliance   in   no-­‐take   marine   reserves.   Fish   and   Fisheries  DOI:  10.1111/faf.12051;   Sarah   G.   Blank   &   Michael   C.   Gavin.   2009.   The   randomized  response  technique  as  a  tool  for  estimating  non-­‐compliance  rates  in  fisheries:  a  case  study  of   illegal   red   abalone   (Haliotis   rufescens)   fishing   in   Northern   California.   Environmental  Conservation   36(2):   112-­‐119;   F.A.V.   St.   John,   G.   Edwards-­‐Jones,   J.M.   Gibbons,   J.M.,   Jones,  J.P.G.,  2010.  Testing  novel  methods   for  assessing  rule  breaking   in  conservation.  Biological  Conservation  143,  1025-­‐1030.  xv   AFMA.   2013.   National   Compliance   2013-­‐15   Risk   Assessment   Methodology.   Australian  Government.   Available   at:   http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/06/2013-­‐15-­‐RA-­‐Methodology-­‐accessible-­‐version.pdf.  xvi  For  additional  information:  Sustainable  Fisheries  Partnership.  2014.  The  Seafood  Industry  Guide  to  FIPs.  Available  at:  http://cmsdevelopment.sustainablefish.org.s3.amazonaws.com/2014/04/28/SFP  FIPS  Guide  2014-­‐1722c02f.pdf.  xvii  Information  on  the  Honduran  Spiny  Lobster  FIP  and  other  FIPs  supported  by  WWF  at  is  available  at:  https://sites.google.com/site/fisheryimprovementprojects/home.    xviii   Audit   Office.   2013.   Administration   of   the   Domestic   Fishing   Compliance   Program.  Commonwealth  of  Australia.  Available  at:    http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit  Reports/2012  2013/Audit  Report  20/Audit  Report  No  20.pdf    xix   AFMA.   “The   Domestic   Compliance   Program.”   Accessed   1/3/2015.   Available   at:  http://www.afma.gov.au/managing-­‐our-­‐fisheries/compliance-­‐activities/the-­‐domestic-­‐compliance-­‐program/.  xx   Australian   National   Audit   Office.   2013.   Administration   of   the   Domestic   Fishing  Compliance   Program.   Commonwealth   of   Australia.   Available   at:  http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit   Reports/2012   2013/Audit   Report  20/Audit  Report  No  20.pdf.  xxi   AFMA.   2014.  National   Compliance   and  Enforcement  Program  2014-­‐2015.  Available   at:  http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/10/PUBLIC-­‐National-­‐Compliance-­‐and-­‐Enforcement-­‐Program-­‐2014-­‐15-­‐final.pdf;  Anon.  2014.  “New  software  to  detect  fraud.”  World  Fishing  and  Aquaculture.  Available  at:    http://www.worldfishing.net/news101/industry-­‐news/new-­‐software-­‐to-­‐detect-­‐fraud.    xxii   E.J.   Stokes.   2010.   Improving   effectiveness   of   protection   efforts   in   tiger   source   sites:  Developing  a   framework  for   law  Enforcement  monitoring  using  MIST.  Integrative  Zoology  5(4),  363-­‐377.  xxiii  Additional  information  may  be  found  at  smartconservationtools.org.    xxiv   Brian   Clark   Howard.   2014.   “Can   drones   fight   illegal   ‘pirate’   fishing.”   National  Geographic.   Available   at:   http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/07/140718-­‐drones-­‐illegal-­‐fishing-­‐pirate-­‐belize-­‐ocean/;   Luke   Hopewell.   2011.   “UAVs   to   patrol  Queensland   waters.”   ZDNet.   Available   at:   http://www.zdnet.com/article/uavs-­‐to-­‐patrol-­‐queensland-­‐waters/;   Sean   Dorney.   2013.   “Palau   ends   drone   patrol   tests   to   deter   illegal  fishing.”   ABC   News.   Available   at:   http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-­‐10-­‐04/an-­‐palau-­‐drone-­‐patrol-­‐tests-­‐to-­‐deter-­‐illegal-­‐fishing-­‐ends/4999344.    

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       xxv  See  for  example:  Tom  R.  Tyler.  1990.  Why  Do  People  Obey  the  Law?  Yale:  New  Haven.  xxvi   T.J.   Green  &   J.P.  McKinlay.   2009.  Compliance  Program  Evaluation   and  Optimisation   in  Commercial   and   Recreational  Western   Australian   Fisheries   Final   FRDC   Report   –   Project  Number   2001/069.   Fisheries   Research   Report   No.   195,   2009.   Government   of   Western  Australia,  Department  of  Fisheries.  Available  at:    http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/Documents/research_reports/frr195.pdf.    xxvii  These  elements  are  derived  from  the  information  provided  by  the  following  documents:  AFMA.   National   Compliance   and   Enforcement   Program   2014-­‐2015,   Available   at:  http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2012/10/PUBLIC-­‐National-­‐Compliance-­‐and-­‐Enforcement-­‐Program-­‐2014-­‐15-­‐final.pdf;   AFMA.   National   Compliance   and  Enforcement   Policy   2014.   Available   at:   http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/06/National-­‐Compliance-­‐and-­‐Enforcement-­‐Policy-­‐2013.pdf;  Australian  National  Audit  Office.  2013.  Administration  of  the  Domestic  Fishing  Compliance  Program.   Commonwealth   of   Australia.   Available   at:  http://www.anao.gov.au/~/media/Files/Audit   Reports/2012   2013/Audit   Report  20/Audit  Report  No  20.pdf.    xxviii  J.R.  Nielsen  &  C.  Mathiesen.  2003.  Important  factors  influencing  rule  compliance  in  fisheries:  Lessons  from  Denmark.  Marine  Policy  27:  409-­‐416;  J.M.  Novak  &  M.  Axelrod.  (in  review).  Multi-­‐level  Fisheries  Governance  and  Its  Impact  on  Fishers’  Adaptation  Strategies  in  Tamil  Nadu,  India.  Revised  and  resubmitted  to  Environmental  Policy  &  Governance;  S.  Gezelius  &  M.  Hauck.  2011.  Toward  a  Theory  of  Compliance  in  State-­‐Regulated  Livelihoods:  A  Comparative  Study  of  Compliance  Motivations  in  Developed  and  Developing  World  Fisheries.  Law  &  Society  Review,  45  (2),  435-­‐470.    xxix  Johnny  Langenheim.  2015.  “Indonesia’s  new  marine  laws  threaten  sustainable  fisheries.”  The  Guardian.  Available  at:  http://www.theguardian.com/environment/the-­‐coral-­‐triangle/2015/jan/14/indonesias-­‐new-­‐marine-­‐laws-­‐threaten-­‐sustainable-­‐fisheries.  xxx  Katherine  Groff  &  Mark  Axelrod.  2013.  A  Baseline  Analysis  of  Poaching  Incentives  in  Chiquibul  National  Park,  Belize.  Conservation  and  Society  11(3):  277-­‐290.