UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTMIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

LATRECE LOCKETT,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:07-cv-797-T-24MSS

CHOICE HOTELS INTERNATIONAL, INC.d/b/a CLARION HOTEL, U.S. CONSOLIDATEDRESOURCES, LLC and ADVANTAGEEMPLOYER SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendant.____________________________________/

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant, U.S. Consolidated Resources, LLC, by and through its undersigned

counsel and pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby

moves this Court for summary judgment and in support thereof state the following.

1. Plaintiff, Latrece Lockett, filed a five count Complaint against

Defendants1 under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.

§2000e et seq. (“Title VII”), the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, chapter 760, Florida

Statutes (“FCRA”) and Florida’s whistleblower law. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

involves allegations of sexual harassment from a male co-worker and retaliation. Count

I of the Amended Complaint is Plaintiff’s harassment claim under the FCRA. Count II is

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the FCRA. Count III is Plaintiff’s harassment claim

1 Plaintiff brought this action against three Defendants, Choice Hotels International, Inc., U.S. Consolidated Resources, LLC and Advantage Employer Solutions, Inc. Although the heading reads “Choice Hotels International, Inc. d/b/a Clarion Hotel,” the Clarion Hotel that is involved in the instant case is owned by Defendant U.S. Consolidated Resources, LLC, which is the Defendant filing this Motion for Summary Judgment.

under Title VII. Count IV is Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under Title VII. Finally, Count

V is Plaintiff’s whistleblower claim under Florida law.

2. Defendant U.S. Consolidated Resources is entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s hostile environment claims in Counts I and III of the Complaint for the

following reasons. First, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment because there is no

evidence that the alleged harassment was so severe and pervasive that it affected a term

or condition of Plaintiff’s employment. Second, Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment because it attempted to take prompt remedial action upon receiving notice of

the alleged sexual harassment.

3. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation

claims in Counts II and IV because Defendant had a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for

terminating Plaintiff’s employment and Plaintiff cannot overcome that reason by showing

pretext. For similar reasons, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the

whistleblower claim in Count V of the Amended Complaint.

4. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is further supported by the

following memorandum of law.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Defendant U.S. Consolidated Resources owns and operates the Clarion Hotel that

is located at 2701 East Fowler Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Plaintiff worked for Defendant

2 These factual allegations are based, in part, upon the deposition testimony of Plaintiff. Any factual allegations which are taken from Plaintiff's testimony in her deposition are offered solely for the purposes of summary judgment and should not be construed as admissions by Defendant as to such allegations' truthfulness. Defendant offers them for the purpose that, because Plaintiff cannot contradict her own sworn testimony, Plaintiff will be unable to offer a response that will overcome this motion. See generally, Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995); Clay v. Equifax, Inc., 762 F.2d 952, 955 (11th Cir. 1985); and Van T. Junkins and Assoc., Inc. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir. 1984). References to depositions will be made by the prefix "[Lockett]" followed by the referenced page.

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U.S. Consolidated Resources until her termination on August 22, 2006. During her

employment with Defendant, Plaintiff worked in the reservations department. (Lockett

depo. at 16-17). During the relevant time period, Plaintiff’s immediate supervisor was

Geneva Williams, who was in charge of reservations. Williams reported to Debbie

Mangual, the front desk manager. (Lockett depo. at 19). The Clarion’s operations

manager was Lillian Garcia.

Defendant has a policy against sexual harassment that was in effect during the

time that Plaintiff was allegedly harassed by Eric Watson. Defendant’s policy against

sexual harassment prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace. The policy also

provides employees with options in which they can report instances of sexual harassment.

(See Employee Handbook at 10-11 ). Defendant also had a policy against making

violent threats in the workplace. (See Employee Handbook at 9).

Plaintiff alleges that a co-worker, Eric Watson made sexual remarks toward her.

Plaintiff was not very specific with regards to the remarks, but claims that they began

sometime around April 2006. (Lockett depo. at 28-37, 66-67). Plaintiff claims that this

harassment allegedly occurred in the hotel’s café area, where Watson worked. Plaintiff

further claims that for a period of time, she stopped going to the café. (Lockett depo. at

35-36). Plaintiff later resumed her trips to the café. (Lockett depo. at 36).

Prior to August 2006, Plaintiff never presented anyone within her supervisory

chain of command with allegations of sexual harassment. (Lockett depo. at 67).

Indeed, Plaintiff did not tell Geneva Williams, her first line supervisor and friend, about

the allegations of harassment. (Williams depo. at 22-23, 25). According to the anti-

harassment policy, Lockett could have reported the harassment to Williams or the human

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resources manager. (See Harassment Policy in Employee Handbook). Sometime in

August 2006, for the first time, Plaintiff presented her allegations of sexual harassment to

Debbie Mangual. (Lockett depo. at 67).

After informing Mangual about the allegations of harassment, Plaintiff was sent to

see Jaqueline Gregory in human resources. (Gregory depo. at 31). While leaving human

resources, Plaintiff ran into Eric Watson the alleged harasser. (Gregory depo. at 44).

During this encounter, an argument developed between Plaintiff and Watson. During the

course of the argument Plaintiff threatened Watson by telling him that “she has a

boyfriend for him.”3 (Lockett depo. at 51-52). As a result of the threat directed towards

Watson, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. (Gregory depo. at 56). In light of

Watson’s conduct, Defendant also terminated his employment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where, upon motion of a party, the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10 (1986). See also Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986).

In making this determination, the Court must view all of the evidence in a light most

favorable to the party opposing the motion and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in favor of the non-moving party. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv., Inc., 112

3 Defendant believed that Lockett’s words directed towards Watson were stronger. Still, Plaintiff’s statement that she has a boyfriend for him points to a threat of physical harm.

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S.Ct. 2072, 2077 (1992); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513; Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. Still, the party opposing summary

judgment must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the

‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The court shall

then grant summary judgment “if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and if

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250,

106 S.Ct. at 2511. The question for the court is “not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a

verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Id. at 251,

106 S.Ct. at 2511 (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant USCR is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims in Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint.

Counts I and III of the Amended Complaint involve claims of sexual harassment

under the FCRA and Title VII. Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims are based on her

allegations that she was subjected to a hostile work environment by her co-worker, Eric

Watson. Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment are vague, but she contends that

Watson harassed her with offensive comments. Plaintiff’s harassment allegations also

included two incidents in which Watson allegedly touched her rear.

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment

claims because the alleged harassment was not so severe and pervasive as to alter the

terms and conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. To establish a prima facie case of

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hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII, Plaintiff must prove: 1) she

belonged to a protected category; 2) she was subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; 3)

the harassment she complained of was based on sex; 4) the harassment complained of

affected a term, condition or privilege of employment; and 5) respondeat superior – i.e.,

Defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt,

effective remedial action. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-69, (1986);

Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982). In evaluating hostile

environment claims, the Fifth Circuit provided the following guidance:

A hostile environment claim embodies a series of criteria that express extremely insensitive conduct against women, conduct so egregious as to alter the conditions of employment and destroy their equal opportunity in the workplace. Any lesser standard of liability, couched in terms of conduct that sporadically wounds or offends but does not hinder a female employee's performance, would not serve the goal of equality. In fact, a less onerous standard of liability would attempt to insulate women from everyday insults as if they remained models of Victorian reticence. A lesser standard of liability would create incentives for employers to bend over backwards in women's favor for fear of lawsuits.

DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995).

In Meritor, the Supreme Court stated that sexual harassment, to be actionable

under Title VII, "must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the

victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." 477 U.S. at 67. In

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 114 S.Ct. 367 (1993), the Court provided a list

of factors relevant to the somewhat elusive question of whether a work environment has

been rendered hostile or abusive. Circumstances creating a hostile or abusive

environment may include: 1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; 2) its severity;

3) whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris, 510

U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. at 371. In Harris, the Court also observed that:

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Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive--is beyond Title VII's purview.

Id. at 21, 114 S.Ct. at 370.

Though the courts have not identified a specific number of incidents that would

give rise to a cause of action, the following cases reveal that relatively few incidents of

unwelcome conduct -- which is allegedly evident in the present case -- will not support

claims for hostile environment sexual harassment. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc.,

915 F.2d 777, 779-83, (1st Cir. 1990)(finding no actionable hostile work environment

harassment despite five occasions in which the supervisor made sexual advances upon the

plaintiff and made comments including that the plaintiff had a good body, that the

plaintiff looked good in tight jeans which "show[ed] off your butt" (twice), that the

supervisor liked his women with "good looks and brains," and while taking plaintiff by

the hand, stated that he felt that his women are special and he liked to put them on

pedestals); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.

1993) (finding no actionable harassment where plaintiff's supervisor asked plaintiff out

on date, called her a "dumb-blonde," placed his hand on her shoulder several times,

placed "I love you" signs in her work area, and attempted to kiss her on one or more

occasions); Caleshu v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fener & Smith, 737 F. Supp. 1070, 1083

(E.D. Mo. 1990), aff'd, 985 F.2d 564 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1763 (1992)

(finding no actionable harassment where sales manager's conduct over five-month period

included kissing female assistant on two occasions, touching her thigh on two occasions

outside the office, telling her two off-color jokes, inviting himself to dinner with her,

inviting her to a work-related dinner, requiring her to pick him up at airport on one

occasion, giving her a birthday card and gift, and showing up at a bar while she was

there); Doe v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons, 843 F. Supp. 1278, (S.D. Ind. 1994), aff'd, 42 F. 3d

439 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding no actionable harassment where supervisor allegedly said

that he thought the plaintiff should be dressed in a body suit; asked the plaintiff what she

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wore to the gym when she works out, and what she wore at home, and how she looked in

it; told the plaintiff how beautiful she was and asked her how much weight she had lost;

told the plaintiff during her performance evaluation never to have an affair at work

because someone would always get burned; and patted the plaintiff on the rear on two

occasions).

The foregoing cases demonstrate that Defendant is entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims. Notably, some of the foregoing cases involved

incidents of touching, whereas the current case involves verbal harassment and no more

than two cases of alleged touching. Thus, applying the facts of the above cases to the

present case should lead to entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendant in the

present case.

Defendant also is entitled to summary judgment because it took prompt remedial

action upon learning of Plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment. An employer can be

held liable for sexual harassment if it knew or should have known of the harassment and

failed to take immediate and corrective action. Fleming v. Boeing Co., 120 F.3d 242,

246 (11th Cir. 1997). When an employer takes prompt remedial action, courts will

generally defer to the employer’s decision. For example, in Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114

F.3d 407 (3d Cir. 1997), the plaintiff challenged the adequacy of the employer's

investigation into her allegations of sexual harassment and the adequacy of the

employer's remedial action. The employer in Knabe decided not to reprimand the alleged

harasser because she erroneously believed that she could not find harassment without

corroboration. Id. at 409. Nonetheless, the employer reminded the alleged harasser that

the company did not tolerate "sexual comments or actions" and that any "violations of

[the company's] policy will receive possible suspension and or termination." Id. The

alleged harasser acknowledged that the policies were explained to him and that he did

understand them. Id. It is also worth noting that the plaintiff in Knabe claimed that she

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was not aware of the company's harassment policies during her employment at the

restaurant. Id.

The Third Circuit noted that the issue in Knabe was the adequacy of the remedial

action, rather than the adequacy of the investigation. Id. at 412. It ruled that:

The law does not require investigations into sexual harassment complaints be perfect. Rather, to determine whether the remedial action was adequate, we must consider whether the action was "reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment."

Id. (citing Saxton v. AT&T Co., 10 F.3d 526, 535 (7th Cir. 1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924

F.2d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 1991); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983)). The

Third Circuit then concluded that although the alleged harasser was not reprimanded, the

actions taken by the employer were reasonably calculated to prevent future harassment.

Id. The court noted that the employer's meeting with the alleged harasser was "clearly a

warning and no reasonable jury would find in [the plaintiff's] favor as to whether the

company actually took remedial action." Id. at 414. Regarding the plaintiff's objections

to the employer's remedial action, the Third Circuit stated:

[I]f the remedy chosen by the employer is adequate, an aggrieved employee cannot object to the selected action. Concomitantly, an employee cannot dictate that the employer select a certain remedial action. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that: "No doubt, from [the plaintiff's] perspective, [the defendant] could have done more to remedy the adverse effects of [the employee's] conduct. But Title VII requires only that the employer take steps reasonably likely to stop the harassment.

Id. (quoting Saxton, 10 F.3d at 535-536). The appellate court further noted that as long

as the remedy is reasonably calculated to prevent future instances of harassment, taking

punitive action, such as a reprimand, suspension, or dismissal, is not necessary to insulate

the employer from liability. Id. See also Kilgore v. Thompson and Brock Management,

Inc., 93 F.3d 752 (11th Cir. 1996)(affirming the district court's grant of summary

judgment and holding that an employer had taken prompt and remedial when it

commenced an investigation upon learning of allegations of sexual harassment).

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In the present case, Plaintiff may criticize Defendant’s efforts to conduct an

investigation and its efforts to take remedial action. When Defendant learned of

Plaintiff’s allegations, Defendant attempted to meet with both Plaintiff and Watson, the

alleged harasser. Under Knabe, Plaintiff can neither challenge the adequacy of

Defendant’s investigation nor its attempt to take remedial action. Defendant pursued a

course of action to determine the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations and eventually terminated

the alleged harasser. Unfortunately, for Plaintiff, her own misconduct led to her

termination. Defendant’s efforts were calculated to ascertain the truth and determine

what, if any, action needed to be taken. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claims in Counts I and III of the Amended

Complaint.

B. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s retaliation claims in Counts II, IV and V of the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff asserts claims of retaliation in Counts II and IV of her Amended

Complaint under the FCRA and Title VII respectively. In Count V of the Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff asserts a claim under Florida’s Whistleblower Act. Plaintiff’s

retaliation and whistleblower claims are based on her allegations that she was terminated

during the time that she submitted her claims of harassment. Defendant, however, is

entitled to summary judgment on the retaliation and whistleblower claims because it had

a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment. See

Sierminski v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 216 F.3d 945, 950-51 (11th Cir. 2000)(holding that

Title VII retaliation analysis applies to Florida whistleblower claims). Moreover,

Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendant’s legitimate non-retaliatory reason by showing

pretext.

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation an employee must show: 1) she

engaged in protected activity; 2) her employer was aware of that activity; 3) she suffered

an adverse employment action; and 4) there was a causal link between her protected

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activity and that adverse employment action. See e.g., Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d

1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff can establish the prima facie elements of

retaliation, the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by articulating

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its employment action. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d

1555, 1563, 1564 (11th Cir. 1997). The employer’s burden at this stage is exceedingly

light. Id. The employer’s burden is merely one of production, not persuasion. Thus, the

employer does not have to persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the reason

advanced. See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas Dept. of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-255 (1981).

Once the employer satisfies the burden of production, the presumption of

discrimination or retaliation is eliminated and the plaintiff has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence, including the previously produced evidence establishing the

prima facie case, sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons

given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision.

Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). The establishment of a

prima facie case does not in itself entitle a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary

judgment. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11th Cir. 1987). After an

employer proffers nonretaliatory reasons for its actions, in order to avoid summary

judgment, a plaintiff must produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that each of the employer’s proffered reasons is pretextual. Chapman, 229 F.3d

at 1037. To simply question the employer’s decision will not allow a plaintiff to escape

summary judgment. Rather, the Eleventh Circuit has consistently ruled that pretext

means, a phony reason, a lie. E.g., Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253,

1260 (11th Cir. 2001).

In the present case, Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of showing that Defendant’s

reason for terminating her employment was a pretext or lie. There is no dispute that

Plaintiff engaged in an argument with Watson, the alleged harasser. As the argument

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escalated, Plaintiff threatened Watson by stating that “she has a boyfriend for him.”

Defendant’s employee handbook precluded this kind of behavior. For example, in

pertinent part, the handbook states:

The following types of infractions, offenses, or misconduct, therefore, represent typical reasons for disciplinary action. They are not meant to be and are not the only reasons for such action:

1. Acts or threats of violence while on Company property or while on company business. . .

(See Employee Handbook at page 9). Because Defendant found that Plaintiff violated

this policy, Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendant’s legitimate, nonretaliatory reason by

showing that Defendant’s reason was a pretext.

Plaintiff will probably attempt to escape summary judgment by challenging the

wisdom of Defendant’s decision to terminate her employment. Still, under the law, such

a challenge cannot satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of showing pretext. The Eleventh Circuit

has ruled that “a plaintiff may not establish that an employer’s proferred reason is

pretextual merely by question the wisdom of the employer’s reasons.” Combs v.

Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1543 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom., 118

S.Ct. 685 (1998). Further, in Tidwell v. Carter Products, 135 F.3d 1422 (11th Cir. 1998),

the Eleventh Circuit held:

All of these contentions by Tidwell are disagreement about the wisdom of Carter’s decision to retain Booth in the Miami territory, rather than disbelief in the RIF and its application to Tidwell. [A] plaintiff may not establish that an employer’s proffered reason is pretextual merely by questioning the wisdom of the employer’s reason, at least not, where, as here the reason is one that motivate a reasonable employer.

Id. at 1427.

Likewise, in Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998),

the Eleventh Circuit ruled:

The pretext inquiry is concerned with the employer's perception of the employee's performance, not the employee's own beliefs. (citation omitted). Standard cannot

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show that the reasons listed on the worksheets are pretextual when he admits their truth, even if the forms are back-dated. The heart of the pretext inquiry is not whether the employee agrees with the reasons that the employer gives for the discharge, but whether the employer really was motivated by those reasons. Once Standard admitted that the other tooling department employees either had the superior qualities attributed to them or were perceived as having them by Grubbs, he cannot establish pretext merely by disagreeing with the evaluations or by pointing out the back-dating.

161 F.3d at 1332-33.

The Eleventh Circuit has emphasized that courts “are not in the business of

adjudging whether employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole concern is

whether unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment action.”

Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.¸196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999),

cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1962 (2000). Applying this concept to the present case, should

prevent this Court from engaging in an inquiry attempting to determine whether

terminating an employee for making threats in the workplace is prudent, fair, reasonable

or unusual. The appropriate inquiry is whether unlawful retaliatory animus motivated the

decision to terminate Plaintiff’s employment. There cannot be any retaliatory motive,

where as here, Defendant has provided a legitimate explanation for its decision to

terminate Plaintiff’s employment.

Defendant’s argument on this point has additional support in the Eleventh

Circuit’s decision in Chapman where the court ruled:

[f]ederal courts “do not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions. No matter how medieval a firm’s practice is, no matter how high-handed its decisional process, no matter how mistaken the firm’s managers, the ADEA does not interfere. Rather our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its behavior.”

Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030 (citing Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470

(11th Cir. 1991)). Thus, in the present case, the inquiry is not whether Defendant was

harsh, unthinking, mistaken or unusual. Defendant has demonstrated its business reason

for terminating Plaintiff’s employment – i.e., Plaintiff threatened to have her boyfriend

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take care of Eric Watson. The law does not allow Plaintiff to question or second guess

this decision. Plaintiff cannot present any evidence that Defendant’s reasons for

terminating her employment were lies. Therefore, the Court should enter summary

judgment in favor of Defendant on Counts II, IV and V of the Amended Complaint.

WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Defendant respectfully requests that

this Court enter an Order granting summary judgment in its favor on Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint and award Defendant costs and such further relief this Court deems just and

appropriate.

Dated this 21st day of March, 2008.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Richard L. Bradford____________ RICHARD L. BRADFORDFlorida Bar No.: 0068497BRADFORD AND BRADFORD, P.A.150 East Bloomingdale Ave., Suite 126Brandon, FL 33511Telephone: (813) 413-2402Facsimile: (813) 413-2425e-mail: rich@bradfordfirm.comAttorney for DefendantU.S. Consolidated Resources

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been

furnished via CM/ECF, electronic filing on this 21st day of March 2008 to:

Wolfgang M. Florin, Esq.Florin Roebig, P.A.777 Alderman RoadPalm Harbor, Florida 34683

Pedro F. Bajo, Esq.Akerman Senterfitt, P.A.Suntrust Financial Centre

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401 E. Jackson Street, Suite 1700Tampa, FL 33602

/s/ Richard L. Bradford____________ Attorney

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