MRG 18899:MRG 18899 - BBC Newsnews.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/20_03_07_minority.pdf ·...

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly

adopted the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, which proclaimed that ‘all human beings are

born free and equal in dignity and rights’. Sadly, for

many minorities and indigenous peoples around the

world, this inspirational text – with its emphasis on

equality and non-discrimination – remains a dream,

not a reality.

Ethnic or sectarian tensions are evident in many parts

of our globe. In places, they have boiled over into

bitter violence. The Middle East situation continues

to deteriorate – with some minority communities

fearing for their very survival. In Africa, the crisis in

Darfur is deepening, as government-sponsored militia

continue to carry out massive human rights abuses

against traditional farming communities. In Europe,

the spotlight has fallen on Muslim minorities – with

rows flaring over the Danish cartoons and the

wearing of the veil and burqa.

ISBN 1 904584 59 4

Now more than ever, world leaders must insist that

the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples be

respected. The participation of minorities is essential

if conflict is to be prevented and lasting peace to be

built. This second annual edition of the State of theWorld’s Minorities looks at the key developments

over 2006 affecting the human rights and security of

ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and

indigenous peoples. It includes:

p a preface by the UN’s Independent Expert on

Minority Issues

p a unique statistical analysis of Peoples under

Threat 2007

p a special focus on the participation of minorities,

with analysis from leading academics on electoral

representation and the European system

p an eye-witness report from Sri Lanka, on the

impact on minorities of the resurgence of conflict

p comprehensive, regional sections, outlining the main

areas of concern as well as any notable progress.

The State of the World’s Minorities is an invaluable

reference for policy-makers, academics, journalists and

everyone who is interested in the conditions facing

minorities and indigenous peoples around the world.

State oftheWorld’sMinorities2007

minority rights group international

State oftheWorld’sMinorities2007Events of 2006


Stateof theWorld’s M

inorities 2007Events of 2006

Minority

Rights

Group

International

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AcknowledgementsMinority Rights Group International (MRG)gratefully acknowledges the support of allorganizations and individuals who gave financial andother assistance for this publication including theSigrid Rausing Trust and the European Commission.Commissioning Editor: Richard Green

Minority Rights Group InternationalMinority Rights Group International (MRG) is anon-governmental organization (NGO) working tosecure the rights of ethnic, religious and linguisticminorities and indigenous peoples worldwide, andto promote cooperation and understanding betweencommunities. Our activities are focused oninternational advocacy, training, publishing andoutreach. We are guided by the needs expressed byour worldwide partner network of organizationswhich represent minority and indigenous peoples.

MRG works with over 150 organizations innearly 50 countries. Our governing Council, whichmeets twice a year, has members from 10 differentcountries. MRG has consultative status with theUnited Nations Economic and Social Council(ECOSOC), and observer status with the AfricanCommission on Human and People’s Rights. MRGis registered as a charity and a company limited byguarantee under English law. Registered charity no.282305, limited company no. 1544957.

© Minority Rights Group International, March2007. All rights reserved.

Material from this publication may be reproducedfor teaching or for other non-commercial purposes.No part of it may be reproduced in any form forcommercial purposes without the prior expresspermission of the copyright holders.

For further information please contact MRG. ACIP catalogue record of this publication is availablefrom the British Library.

ISBN 1 904584 59 4Published March 2007Design by Texture +44 (0)20 7739 7123Printed in the UK

Cover photoA Tamil child living with her family in the damagedremains of Jaffna railway station, Sri Lanka, having beendisplaced by the civil war. Howard Davies/Exile Images

Inside cover photo

Dalit children collect wood in Uttar Pradesh, India.Ami Vitale/Panos Pictures

Minority Rights Group International54 Commercial Street, London, E1 6LT, UnitedKingdom. Tel +44 (0)20 7422 4200, Fax +44 (0)207422 4201, Email [email protected] www.minorityrights.org

Getting involvedMRG relies on the generous support of institutionsand individuals to further our work. All donationsreceived contribute directly to our projects withminorities and indigenous peoples.

One valuable way to support us is to subscribe toour report series. Subscribers receive regular MRGreports and our annual review. We also have over 100titles which can be purchased from our publicationscatalogue. In addition, MRG publications areavailable to minority and indigenous peoples’organizations through our library scheme.

MRG’s unique publications provide well-researched,accurate and impartial information on minority andindigenous peoples’ rights worldwide. We offer criticalanalysis and new perspectives on international issues.Our specialist training materials include essentialguides for NGOs and others on international humanrights instruments, and on accessing internationalbodies. Many MRG publications have been translatedinto several languages.

If you would like to know more about MRG,how to support us and how to work with us, pleasevisit our website www.minorityrights.org, or contactour London office.

Select MRG publications:p Assimilation, Exodus, Eradication: Iraq’s minority

communities since 2003p Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing:

The Challenge for the United Nationsp Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rulep Electoral Systems and the Protection and

Participation of Minorities

This document has been produced withthe financial assistance of the EuropeanUnion. The contents of this document

are the sole responsibility of Minority Rights GroupInternational and can under no circumstances be regard-ed as reflecting the position of the European Union.

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State oftheWorld’sMinorities2007Events of 2006With a preface by Gay J McDougall,UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues

Minority Rights Group International

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PrefaceGay J McDougall,UN Independent Expert on Minority Issues

Peoples underThreatMark Lattimer

NewsSri Lanka Flash PointFarah Mihlar

PublicParticipationby MinoritiesMinority Members of National LegislaturesAndrew ReynoldsMinority Protection in EuropeKristin Henrard

AfricaEric Witte

AmericasMaurice Bryn

6

9

18

25

25

32

4460

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Asia and PacificJoshua Castellino and Emma Eastwood

EuropeHugh Poulton

Middle EastEric Witte

ReferencePeoples under Threat 2007Minority Members in National LegislaturesExplaining Minority RepresentationStatus of Ratification of Major International andRegional Instruments Relevant to Minority andIndigenous Rights

AppendicesUN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belongingto National or Ethnic, Religiousand Linguistic MinoritiesWhat are Minorities?ContributorsSelect Bibliography

7489

103116

118124128130

142143

145145147

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PrefaceGay J McDougall,UN Independent Expert onMinority Issues

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It is increasingly clear that ethnicity and religion areamong the most potent mobilizing forces insocieties. This is exacerbated in societies in whichethnicity and religion mark the fault lines betweenthe haves and the have-nots, the powerful and thepowerless, those who have hope and those whodespair. In the past few months, this has beengraphically illustrated by the turbulence in theMiddle East – but, as this annual review byMinority Rights Group International shows, thesetensions are commonplace around the world.However, it is important to emphasize that ethnic orreligious diversity alone is neither a precondition fornor a determinant of violent conflict. The existenceof minority groups in what may be perceived to bean otherwise homogeneous society is not aninherent cause of conflict.

While acknowledging the reality of ethnic orreligious dimensions in many conflicts, the morefundamental causes of these conflicts generally liebelow the surface, buried, often intentionally, by thosewith an interest in fomenting conflict. In somesituations, the purveyors of war are actually seekingpower and profits by immoral or illegal means, andthey often find easy cover in deflecting blame ontothose who are most powerless and most different.Also, in times of hardship, racism is often employed todivert attention from the root causes of despair. Andtargeting an easily identifiable group for exclusion orexploitation allows some to feel comfort in amythology that dehumanizes certain people based onhow they look or what they believe, the language theyspeak or where their ancestors called home.

Wars with ethno-religious components are deeplycomplex and must be better understood if we are tostand a chance of preventing, in this century, thebloodshed that marked the last. We must dispel themyth that diversity is, in itself, a cause of tensionand conflict.

In contrast, we must promote the understandingthat diverse societies can be among the healthiest,the most stable and prosperous. Respect forminority rights is crucial to this understanding.Minority rights are based on the principle of anintegrated society, where each can use their ownlanguage, enjoy their culture and practise theirreligion while still embracing a broader, inclusivenational identity.

The opportunity to participate fully andeffectively in all aspects of society, while preserving

group identity, is essential to true equality and mayrequire positive steps on the part of governments.Minority rights are not about giving somecommunities more than others. Rather, they areabout recognizing that, owing to their minoritystatus and distinct identity, some groups aredisadvantaged and are at times targeted, and thatthese communities need special protection andempowerment.

Equality for all does not always come naturally oreasily when political power and influence over theinstitutions of state lie predominantly in the handsof certain groups, which, perhaps due to theirmajority status, have a political advantage. Historyhas shown us, time and again, the immense damagecaused to nations, peoples and regions by those whouse the power at their disposal for the benefit ofonly some, while excluding or actively oppressingothers as a means to maintain, entrench or extendtheir power.

For such societies, the exclusion, discriminationand resentment that are fostered by such powerimbalance, create the conditions under which faultlines may occur along ethnic or religious grounds. Itis perhaps here, in the fundamental flaws ordysfunctioning of governmental power, that theseeds of tensions and grievances are sown that latermay emerge into conflicts. Such conflicts aremisunderstood as being purely ethnic or religiousconflicts, based upon difference and the perceivedinability of different groups to live peacefullytogether. In fact they are often more correctlyconflicts of greed and inequality than they areconflicts of diversity.

Today, in almost every corner of our world itseems that that there is a growing suspicion of‘otherness’ or difference, whether it be ethnic,religious or based on other grounds. This climate offear is also open to abuse by those who might seekto exploit divisions between different religiousfaiths, or those who might justify oppression in thename of security.

In this worrying climate, the principles enshrinedin the UN Declaration on the Rights of National orEthnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities are asrelevant today as ever, and as needed for healthy,diverse societies. In adopting this Declaration in1992, states have pledged to protect the existence –and identity – of minorities within their territory, toestablish conditions of equality and non-

State of the World’sMinorities 2007

Preface 7

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discrimination, and to ensure effective participationof minorities in public life. The Declaration is abenchmark – codifying the minimum treatmentthat those belonging to minority communitiesshould expect from their governments. It is centralto my mandate to promote implementation of thisvital Declaration, and I pursue my work in theknowledge that, in doing so, I am also promotingconflict prevention; urging that injustices andinequities be identified at an early stage so thatlasting solutions may be found.

Gay J McDougall

Preface State of the World’sMinorities 2007

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Peoples underThreatMark Lattimer

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It is something of a paradox that, in the period fromthe aftermath of the Cold War to the early years ofthe ‘war on terror’, the world became, by mostobjective criteria, much safer. Certainly, the numberof conflicts fought around the world has steadilyfallen and, the great Congolese war apart, the totalnumber of people who have died in them hasdecreased too. Each research institute compiles itsfigures somewhat differently, but most conflictexperts recorded 20 or fewer major armed conflictsin 2006, compared to a high of over 30 in 1991.Of course, whether a community feels safe is asmuch a judgement about the future as an evaluationof the present. The recent use in Western states ofemergency powers and other mechanisms curtailingcivil liberties is a response to armed attacks in theUSA, Spain and the UK which are in many respectsunprecedented, although very rare. But the great tollof death from political violence continues in thecountries of the South, in Africa, Asia and theMiddle East, and today’s wars have this in commonwith the ethno-nationalist conflicts that succeededthe fall of the Soviet Union: the violence isoverwhelmingly targeted by ethnicity or religion.Wars as a whole may be less common, but in three-quarters of the major armed conflicts around theworld in 2006, particular ethnic or religious groupswere the principal target. In 2007, minorities havemore cause than most to feel unsafe.

New threats in 2007Minority Rights Group International (MRG) hasused recent advances in political science to identifywhich of the world’s peoples are currently undermost threat. As explained in the last edition of Stateof the World’s Minorities, academic researchers haveidentified the main antecedents to episodes ofgenocide or mass political killing over the last halfcentury (see State of the World’s Minorities 2006).Approximating those main antecedents by usingcurrent data from authoritative sources, includingthe World Bank, the Organization for EconomicCooperation and Development (OECD) andleading conflict prevention institutes, enables theconstruction of the Peoples Under Threat 2007table (see p.11 for short version and Table 1,pp.118–22 in the Reference section for the fullversion). The indicators used comprise measures ofprevailing armed conflict; a country’s priorexperience of genocide or mass killing; indicators of

group division; democracy and good governanceindicators; and a measure of country credit risk as aproxy for openness to international trade.

The position of Somalia at the top of the table for2006 attests to a highly dangerous combination offactors. In June 2006 the Union of Islamic Courts(UIC), an Islamic coalition seeking to restore lawand order to Somalia, took over Mogadishu andsubsequently much of the country, curbing thepower of Somalia’s warlords. However, in December,Ethiopian armed forces acting in support of theTransitional Federal Government (TFG), andsupported by the USA, overthrew the UIC, whichhad received support from Eritrea and a number ofMiddle Eastern states. The TFG is unlikely to beable to retain control of the country without outsidesupport. While one side has portrayed itself asfighting terrorists linked to al-Qaeda, and the otherclaims it is fighting Christian invaders, the mostimmediate fear is now a renewal of atrocities againstcivilians in the context of Darood–Hawiye inter-clan rivalry and a threat to minorities both inSomalia and in neighbouring Ethiopia. Althoughthe UIC emphasized the importance of movingaway from clan politics and had achieved somesuccess in overcoming ‘clanism’, it was nonethelessparticularly associated with the Hawiye clan. It alsoprovided overt support for Oromo and Ogaden self-determination movements in Ethiopia. There is nowa grave threat of violent repression against thesepopulations, as well as other groups in Somalia inthe context of a power vacuum and/or continuedintervention by neighbouring states.

The situation in Iraq continues to deteriorate.Figures released by the United Nations (UN) basedon body counts in Iraq’s hospitals and morguesshowed over 3,000 violent civilian deaths a monthfor most of the latter half of 2006. These weremainly comprised of killings by death squads, oftenlinked to the Iraqi government itself; attacks bySunni insurgent groups; and deaths in the contextof military operations conducted by theMultinational Force in Iraq. The UN HighCommissioner for Refugees estimates that between40,000 and 50,000 Iraqis flee their homes everymonth. What is less well publicized is the particularplight of Iraq’s smaller communities, the 10 per centof the population who are not Shia Arab, SunniArab or Sunni Kurd. These minorities, whichinclude Turkomans, Chaldo-Assyrians, Armenians,

Peoples under Threat State of the World’sMinorities 2007

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Peoples under Threat 11

Rank Country Group Total

1 Somalia Darood, Hawiye, Issaq and other clans; 21.95Bantu and other groups

2 Iraq Shia, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkomans, Christians; 21.61smaller minorities

2 Sudan Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; 21.50Dinka, Nuer and others in the South; Nuba, Beja

4 Afghanistan Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks 21.03

5 Burma/ Myanmar Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rohingyas, 20.40Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa

6 Dem. Rep. of Hema and Lendu, Hunde, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, 19.88the Congo Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Twa/Mbuti

7 Nigeria Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) 19.22and Christians in the North

8 Pakistan Ahmadiyya, Baluchis, Hindus, Mohhajirs, 18.97Pashtun, Sindhis

9 Angola Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu 16.68

10 Russian Federation Chechens, Ingush, Lezgins, indigenous 16.29northern peoples, Roma

11 Burundi Hutu, Tutsi, Twa 16.20

12 Uganda Acholi, Karamojong 16.18

13 Ethiopia Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis 16.11

14 Sri Lanka Tamils, Muslims 16.00

15 Haiti Political/social targets 15.72

16 Côte d’Ivoire Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, 15.62newly settled groups

17 Rwanda Hutu, Tutsi, Twa 15.31

18 Nepal Political/social targets, Dalits 15.07

19 Philippines Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims) 15.06

20 Iran Arabs, Azeris, Baha’is, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomans 15.02

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Mandean-Sabeans, Faili Kurds, Shabaks, Yezidis andBaha’is, as well as a significant community ofPalestinians, made up a large proportion of therefugees fleeing to neighbouring Jordan and Syria in2006. In addition to the generalized insecurity theyface, common to all people in Iraq, minorities sufferfrom specific attacks and threats due to their ethnicor religious status, and cannot benefit from thecommunity-based protection often available to thelarger groups.

With Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan taking threeout of the top four places in the table, and Pakistanrising eight places to be ranked eighth, thecorrelation between peoples under threat and thefront lines in the US-led ‘war on terror’ is evenstarker than it was in 2005–6. The debate aboutwhether US foreign policy on terrorism is makingAmericans safer or not continues to rage in the US,but it is now surely beyond doubt that it has madelife a lot less safe for peoples in the countries wherethe ‘war on terror’ is principally being fought.

The most significant risers in the table in additionto Pakistan are listed below. Perhaps the moststartling case is that of Sri Lanka, where peace talksfailed and the conflict between the government andthe Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam re-erupted,causing over a thousand civilian deaths and thedisplacement of hundreds of thousands in 2006 (seethe report by Farah Mihlar). Civilians in Tamil areasare at particular risk, as is the country’s Muslimpopulation, which is caught between the two sidesbut was excluded from the peace negotiations.

Another long-running self-determination conflictthat experienced a resurgence in 2006 was inTurkey, where a Kurdish splinter group carried outbomb attacks in major cities. It remains to be seenwhether the ongoing negotiations over Turkey’saccession to the European Union will temper theambitions of some parts of the Turkish governmentand military to increase repression of the Kurds. Infact, Kurds throughout the region face heightenedthreats in 2007, with both Turkey and Iran massingtroops on their respective borders with Iraq,claiming that Iraqi Kurdistan is being used as a baseby armed Kurdish groups from which to launchattacks on their territory.

Iran’s position in the top 20 does not relate solelyto the threat against Iranian Kurds but also to thecountry’s other minorities (including Ahwazi Arabs,Baluchis and Azeris), who in total constitute nearly

40 per cent of the population. Successive Iraniangovernments have been hostile to demands forgreater cultural freedom for ethnic minoritycommunities, and the US-led intervention in Iraqand the international stand-off over Iran’s nuclearprogramme have left the government deeply wary ofany perceived foreign involvement with minoritygroups. President Ahmadinejad has blamed Britishforces for being involved in ‘terrorist’ activities inKhuzistan, a mainly Arab province borderingsouthern Iraq.

The military coup in Thailand in September 2006was effected without significant bloodshed, althoughThailand’s status as a popular Western touristdestination ensured it received widespread mediacoverage. Less well known is the fact that the coupfollowed an escalation in the conflict in the south ofthe country between the government and separatistgroups, placing the mainly Muslim population in thesouthern border provinces at increased risk.

That both Lebanon and Israel and the OccupiedTerritories/Palestinian Authority have risen in thisyear’s table comes as no surprise following the warbetween Israel and Hezbollah in 2006 and anescalation of Israeli military operations in theOccupied Territories. (Israel did not appear in lastyear’s table due to the absence of data on some ofthe indicators.) Israel’s bombardment of Lebanonfell particularly heavily on the Shi’a population, butthe war has destabilized the country as a whole,placing all communities at the greatest risk since theearly 1990s of a return to civil war. In Gaza, anIsraeli offensive followed the kidnapping of anIsraeli soldier in June, with a total of over 600Palestinians killed in 2006 as a whole. Throughoutthe Occupied Territories/Palestinian Authority, thepopulation faces an increased threat, not just fromIsraeli military operations but also from civil conflictbetween rival Palestinian factions.

Three states have fallen out of the top 20 in 2006:Indonesia, where a peace agreement signed in 2005in Aceh has so far held, and Liberia and Algeria,both of which continue to recover following the civilwars that tore those countries apart in the 1990s.

Finally, it should be noted that although thenumber of African states in the top 20 has fallenslightly since 2005–6, Africa continues to accountfor half of the countries at the top of the table,making it still the world’s most dangerous regionfor minorities.


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Participation as preventionThe identification of communities at grave riskaround the world prompts the immediate question:what can be done to improve their situation?International action is considered later in thischapter; here, we concentrate on one factor at thenational level which, perhaps more than any other,has the potential to address minority grievances andto prevent the development of violent conflict. Thepublic participation of minorities, their activeengagement in the political and social life of a state,underpins all other efforts to protect the rights ofminorities and acts as a safety valve when major sitesof disagreement between communities threaten toturn violent.

Within the state, public participation can takemany forms, including, most importantly,representation in parliament (this is considered inmore detail in Andrew Reynolds’ chapter below)and in the executive branch of government, andparticipation in the judiciary, civil service, armedforces and police. More generally, it extends totaking part in the economic and social life of a state,

such that minorities feel they have a real stake in thesociety in which they live, that it is their society asmuch as that of anyone else. In areas whereminority communities are geographicallyconcentrated, it may also include a measure ofautonomy or self-government.

In an important speech he made on a visit toIndonesia, the former UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan also made this point when he wascommenting on the extreme case of separatism.

‘Minorities have to be convinced that the state reallybelongs to them, as well as to the majority, and thatboth will be the losers if it breaks up. Conflict is almostcertain to result if the state’s response to separatismcauses widespread suffering in the region or among theethnic group concerned. The effect then is to make morepeople feel that the state is not their state, and soprovide separatism with new recruits.’

Even within one state, very different responses toclaims for regional autonomy can develop. In India,for example, the positive approach shown to



Rank Rise in rank Country Group Totalsince 2006

8 8 Pakistan Ahmadiyya, Baluchis, Hindus, Mohhajirs, 18.97Pashtun, Sindhis

14 47 Sri Lanka Tamils, Muslims 16.00

15 13 Haiti Political/social targets 15.72

20 5 Iran Arabs, Azeris, Baha’is, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomans 15.02

33 12 Yemen Political/social targets 12.63

35 7 Lebanon Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, 12.25Shia, Sunnis

39 15 Turkey Kurds, Roma 12.02

40 7 Guinea Fulani, Malinke 11.83

53 New entry Thailand Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern Hill Tribes 10.96

54 New entry Israel/OT/PA Palestinians in Gaza/West Bank, Israeli Palestinians 10.83

Major risers since 2006

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managing decentralized governance in Tamil Naducan be contrasted with the state’s hostility towardsautonomy claims in Punjab, Kashmir and Nagaland.In the Russian Federation, the accommodation ofautonomy in a region such as Tatarstan can similarlybe contrasted with the gross human rights violationsthat continue to be committed in Chechnya in thename of combating separatism. Each situation is ofcourse different, but it is notable that, in the case ofIndonesia itself, perhaps the most significant faller inthis year’s Peoples under Threat table, the nationalparliament in July 2006 adopted a framework for

autonomy that will enable the first direct localelections to be held in the region of Aceh, the sceneof nearly three decades of separatist conflict. Since apact was signed in August 2005, the Free AcehMovement has reportedly dissolved its armed wingand the Indonesian government has withdrawntroops from Aceh.

But, in many states, it is public participation atthe national level that constitutes the key issue forminority protection and conflict prevention. Here itis worth making a distinction between the formalmechanisms of participation, such as elections, andhaving a genuine say in how a country is run (theformer being a necessary but not sufficientcondition for the latter). That Iraq has been pushedfrom the top of the list in this year’s table is due to a


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Below: Internally displaced man in Bartallah,Mosul, Iraq. Three of his family were assassinated.Mark Lattimer/MRG

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slightly less negative showing under the cited WorldBank governance indicators, particularly for ‘Voiceand Accountability’, a measure of the extent towhich citizens of a country are able to participate inthe selection of governments, including anassessment of the political process and human rights(note that the indicators were published inSeptember with a nine-month lag). Yet the fact thatIraqi citizens were able to participate in electionsand that the main communities are all representedin government has not prevented the polity frombeing fatally fractured. The same could be said ofBosnia and Herzegovina, which remains stubbornlyalongside Serbia in the upper part of the table,despite over a decade having passed since the power-sharing deal established under the Dayton PeaceAgreement. It is clear that the internationalcommunity still has a lot to learn about theapplication of public participation in practice.

For public participation to help reduce the threatof violent conflict it needs to be more than simplyan entry ticket to a shouting match. It needs toconstitute participation in governance, and that inturn depends on a basic level of governmentaleffectiveness and rule of law. However, in both Iraqand Bosnia the mechanisms for communityrepresentation introduced under internationalcontrol have themselves exacerbated or entrenchedthe division of the state on ethnic or sectarian lines,and induced a level of state failure. Following theoccupation of Iraq in 2003, the coalition authoritiesestablished an Iraqi Governing Council in whichmembership was strictly apportioned along ethnicand sectarian lines. Political patronage ensured thatwhole ministries became dominated by officialsfrom the minister’s own sect or group, and sectarianpolitics quickly became the defining feature of thenew Iraqi state. This mistake was compounded atthe first Iraqi elections in January 2005, when theelectoral system based on a national list combinedwith a boycott in Sunni Arab governorateseffectively ensured that Sunni Arabs were largelyexcluded from political representation during a keyyear in the country’s attempted transition todemocracy. In other states with a long history ofethnic conflict, such as South Africa or Nigeria,constitutional and electoral mechanisms have beenestablished which aim to promote inclusive politicalsystems, with representation across ethnic orreligious communities.

The subject of political participation andcommunity representation in very divided societiesmerits further study, given its fundamentalimportance to peace-building and stability, and thefocus on participation in this edition of the State ofthe World’s Minorities is intended as a contribution.But just a brief review of country situationsillustrates the obvious danger of constitutional orelectoral systems which make ethnicity or religion aprincipal mobilizing factor in politics, leading to thecreation of a majority or dominant group which isdefined by ethnicity or sect.

This should be contrasted with the growing rangeof examples, some quoted above, of where effectiveparticipation of minorities has helped to resolve orprevent conflict, through the promotion of moreinclusive political systems, whether at national orregional level. In addition to power-sharingagreements, a wide range of mechanisms are availableto promote such participation appropriate to thegiven situation, including rules or incentives forpolitical parties to appeal across communities, theadoption of electoral systems that favour rather thanmarginalize minorities, systems of reserved seats,special representation, formal consultative bodies,formal or informal quotas in public administration,and positive action programmes, as well asarrangements for greater self-government in regionswhere minorities are geographically concentrated.

Given the very high correlation around theworld between minority status and poverty, itshould also become a priority for internationaldevelopment agencies to promote the participationof minorities in their programmes, particularly atnational and local level. It is now widely acceptedthat anti-poverty initiatives are unlikely to achievelong-term success unless the poor are closelyconsulted and involved in their formulation anddelivery, yet minorities are typically excluded fromthe planning of development programmes, oftenthrough the same societal discrimination that is theroot cause of their impoverishment in the firstplace. This is one reason why developmentprogrammes, while often bringing importantbenefits to a society, rarely succeed in targetingeffectively the poorest communities.

The international responseAfter the hopes raised by the UN World Summit inSeptember 2005, the international response in 2006



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to the situation of peoples under threat can only bedescribed as disappointing.

The headline case during 2006 continued to bethe mass, ongoing crimes under international lawcommitted against the population of the Darfurregion of Sudan, which the Sudanese government ismanifestly failing to protect. The World Summitresolved that, in such cases, the UN SecurityCouncil should be ‘prepared to take collectiveaction’ in a manner that is ‘timely and decisive’. Inthe event, the reaction of the Security Council wasseen to be belated and divided. The strategy of theSudanese government has been to emphasize itscooperation with the existing African Union (AU)mission in Darfur – while on the ground effectivelycontrolling the AU forces’ access to much of theregion – and to oppose the deployment of anystronger UN force, relying on divisions in theSecurity Council and in particular the support ofChina, a major trading partner and heavy investorin the Sudanese oil industry. In August 2006, theSecurity Council did finally approve a 20,000-strongUN force, but Sudan continues to withhold consentfor its deployment. Meanwhile, the situation inDarfur has deteriorated and continuing attacks bySudanese armed forces and Janjaweed militia oncivilian targets threaten to push the death toll farbeyond the 200,000 that have already perished.

A measure of what international peacekeepingforces can achieve was demonstrated during 2006 inneighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo,where the UN’s largest peacekeeping force oversawthe successful conclusion of the country’s first freeelections for 45 years, a major milestone on the roadto peace. However, despite a new readiness on thepart of the UN peacekeepers to react robustly tothreats from militia groups, armed conflictcontinued in the east in both Ituri and Kivu (leavingthe position of the Congo unchanged, near the topof the Peoples under Threat table).

In the programme of UN reform initiated at theWorld Summit in 2005, the most importantdevelopment for human rights was the replacementof the discredited Commission on Human Rightswith a new Human Rights Council. The vision wasfor a smaller body that would meet more often,combining improved expertise and objectivity withgreater clout within the UN system. By the end of2006, however, uncertainty still prevailed over themodus operandi of the Council’s two main tools: the

new system of Universal Periodic Review, by whichstates’ human rights records would be assessed bytheir peers, and the Council’s special rapporteursand working groups, with the future of the countryrapporteurs called into question. More worryinglystill, the Council quickly attracted accusations ofpolitical bias, and even criticism from the UNSecretary-General, after it held two special sessionsdevoted to the situation in Gaza and one to theIsrael–Hezbollah conflict, but failed to lookcritically at other major cases of human rightsviolations around the world. It finally held a specialsession on Darfur in December, but passed a weakresolution, authorizing a high-level mission to assessthe human rights situation but failing to recognizethe culpability of the Sudanese government for theabuses committed in Darfur. This was despite thefact that indisputable links between the governmentand the militias responsible for much of the killinghad been reported almost two years earlier by theInternational Commission of Inquiry on Darfurestablished by the UN Security Council.

Two recently established UN mechanisms have,however, played an important role in protectingminorities. The Independent Expert on MinorityIssues has consistently highlighted minorityprotection issues worldwide, including issuingcommunications on the situation of Haitians in theDominican Republic and on minority women inBurma (Myanmar). The Special Adviser to the UNSecretary-General on the Prevention of Genocidehas undertaken two missions to Darfur, one to Côted’Ivoire and one to the Thai–Burmese border toinvestigate events in Burma’s Karen state followingan intensification of Burmese military operationsfrom November 2005 onwards. The Special Advisermakes recommendations concerning civilianprotection, establishing accountability for violations,the provision of humanitarian relief and steps tosettle the underlying causes of conflict.

The outgoing Secretary-General, Kofi Annan,established in May an Advisory Committee on thePrevention of Genocide to provide guidance to theSpecial Adviser and to contribute to the UN’sbroader efforts to prevent genocide. The committee’sreport, which has not been published, is believed torecommend strengthening the role of the SpecialAdviser by ensuring he report directly to theSecretary-General, improve his access to the SecurityCouncil and increase resources to the office, as well


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as calling for improved cooperation within andoutside the UN system to obtain informationspecifically focused on early warning of genocideand other crimes against humanity. Therecommendations have been sent to the incomingSecretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, and his responsewill be an early test of the new Secretary-General’scommitment to improving civilian protection frommass atrocities.

The principal normative development during 2006was the finalization of the Declaration on the Rightsof Indigenous Peoples, which had occupied the UNCommission on Human Rights for over a decade. Atits first meeting in June, the Human Rights Councilapproved a text of the Declaration that recognizedindigenous peoples’ rights to live in freedom, peaceand security; not to be subjected to forcedassimilation, destruction of their culture or forcedpopulation transfer; and recognized their rights toself-determination and self-government in mattersrelating to their internal and local affairs, and topractise their languages and cultural traditions.

However, in November the third committee ofthe UN General Assembly passed a proceduralmotion blocking approval of the Declaration, atleast until later in 2007. The motion was putforward by Namibia on behalf of the African groupon the committee and promoted by statesincluding Canada, the USA, Australia and NewZealand, which had claimed during the debate thatthe Declaration may negatively affect the interestsof other sectors of society. Although theDeclaration’s force would essentially have beenhortatory and not legally binding, the motion wasinterpreted as an attempt to weaken the documentor to ditch it altogether.

The failure to approve the Declaration isillustrative of a widespread refusal by states torecognize the special, and often very dangerous,position in which indigenous peoples and minoritiesmore generally find themselves, and their urgentneed for better international protection. Evenaffluent states that are free of internal armed conflictand whose territorial integrity remains unchallenged– whatever other security threats they face –frequently ignore the extent of discrimination facedby minorities and often indulge in a tendency toblame any community dispute or integrationproblem on the minority community itself. As theUN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide

wrote in the State of the World’s Minorities 2006,‘Governments in both the South and the Northpersist in labelling some people a threat simplybecause they are members of a minority.’ Yet anyassessment of prevailing conflicts and human rightsviolations around the world indicates that it isminorities themselves who are at greatest risk, usuallyat the hands of their own governments. Without thepolitical courage to admit that reality, and to respondappropriately, the world is unlikely to become a saferplace for minorities any time soon. p



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Sri LankaFlash PointFarah Mihlar

The coastal route to Galle is a picturesque one. Inthe 115 km trip south from the Sri Lankan capital,Colombo, the view of the sparkling, blue IndianOcean is almost uninterrupted. Fishermen returnwith their day’s catch; bustling, roadside markets linethe verges; girls in crisp white uniforms, with black,plaited hair scurry off to school. Unsurprisingly, theresorts in and around the southern port town aresome of the country’s top tourist destinations,drawing visitors from around the world.

The scenes are relaxed, even idyllic. But on BoxingDay 2004, Galle was one of the towns that wasravaged by the tsunami that ripped through most ofSri Lanka’s coastline, reducing entire villages to rubbleand killing some 40,000 people. Sri Lankans like me,who saw the waves crash in, and lived through thoseterrible days, have them etched in our memories. Thepanic, the horror, the grief of the bereaved were alsoplayed and replayed on television stations across theworld. Though less in the international limelight,many families remained displaced in camps as we setout to drive to Galle to report on the plight of thetsunami victims, two years after the disaster.

But, on approaching the town, Sri Lanka’srecurring nightmare of the past 20 years was aboutto engulf us. Not a natural disaster, but a man-madeone. A catastrophe that has ripped apart this pear-shaped island in the Indian Ocean and blighted thelives of successive generations of Sri Lankans.

The first sign is the panic. A mass frenzy ofpeople, mobbing vehicles, blocking our wayforward. A bamboo pole is hoisted across the road asa flimsy barrier. Young men surround us, bangingwindows telling us to go back. The driver nervouslylowers the shutters.

Left: A soldier stands guard near the site of thesuicide bomb attack in Colombo, Sri Lanka, inDecember 2006.

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‘The Tigers are attacking Galle. There is firingall over. You’ll be killed,’ someone shouts throughthe window.

In the mêlée, we can barely comprehend thenews. Everyone knew that Sri Lanka’s stutteringpeace process between the government and theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was aboutto collapse. But, even in the worst of times duringthe two-decade war, the southern coast was rarelyattacked. Galle, like most southern towns, remainedlargely unscathed through all the big battles, whichwere confined to the country’s north and east.

We draw into the side of the road, and waitnervously in the blazing sun. We turn on the radio.It tells of an audacious assault by the Tamil Tigerson the Galle port and adjoining naval base. Tworebel boats, carrying suicide bombers had launchedan attack – prompting the navy to retaliate. Reportson the radio keep referring to the battle, just a fewhundred metres away from where we are parked.Two people are reported killed.

We turn back and attempt another route. Wemake it to the nearby village of Katugoda, wheredozens of children were orphaned, women widowedand livelihoods lost, when the tsunami struck. Butnow, to add to their misfortune, the war has arrivedpractically in their backyard.

‘We heard four loud bangs, and went runningout,’ says Fauzun Nizam, a social worker who hadbeen meeting with tsunami widows, when theTigers’ attack happened. ‘Our hearts werepounding. I did not know what was happening. Ithought “Oh God! Why?” First the tsunami andthen this,’ she adds.

The attack sent jitters across Sri Lanka. It broughthome the painful reality that, after four years ofrelative peace, the war had returned. The ceasefireagreement signed between the government of SriLanka and Tamil Tigers in 2002 was in tatters. Atthe time, the deal was hailed by the internationalcommunity and embraced by the war-weary people.For the first time in decades, Sri Lankans from thesouth were able to travel to the north and east. Foodand clothes started to flow to the war-torn areas,banks and businesses opened new branches.Property began to boom, mainly propelled byexpatriate Sri Lankans most of whom had fled thecountry as refugees.

But the euphoria didn’t last long. Distrust betweenthe government and Tamil Tigers, extremist stances

by both parties and the rebels’ lack of commitment toa negotiated settlement to the conflict, saw the peaceprocess slowly crumble. The situation was furthercomplicated by a historic split within the Tamil Tigersmovement, which the Tigers’ leadership felt was beingexploited by the government.

Muslim minorities under attackThe impact of the resurgent conflict is being feltall over Sri Lanka. Almost half-way between Galleand Colombo lies the town of Aluthgama. School-teacher Mehroonniza Careem and her family fledhere after heavy fighting erupted in the war-tornnorth-eastern town of Muttur in July 2006. TheMuttur battle is considered by many to be themoment that sealed the end of the ceasefire. MrsCareem is the principal of a well-known Muslimgirls’ school in the area. She is a dignified, strong-minded woman, but even she shudders as sherecalls how the town came under attack by theTigers and the government launched a fiercecounter-offensive.

‘First we heard huge blasts through the night,none of us could sleep, we were terrified, we couldhear the explosions just near our house.’

Mrs Careem sought refuge in her school only tofind that thousands of others had done the same.

‘We were like matchsticks in a matchbox, eachperson stuck against the other, heads touching legs,’she says.

But the civilians sheltering in the school were notspared. Mrs Careem says the Sri Lankan armyattacked the buildings, claiming that the rebels hadinfiltrated the complex. ‘People fled, hoping to getto another town,’ she says. ‘We later heard some ofthem were killed by the Tigers.’

Mrs Careem did not just lose her home in theupsurge of violence – her beloved second son hasgone too. Just days before the Muttur attack, hedisappeared – allegedly kidnapped by the rebels –his whereabouts now unknown. When we meet, it isRamadan, a holy month for Muslims. Mrs Careemis putting her faith in God, for the return of her 24-year-old son, Ramy. She cannot speak of her child,without breaking down. ‘My son is mentally unwell.He has to take medication every day, otherwise hebecomes very sick. I am pleading with them torelease him.’

The toll exacted by Sri Lanka’s decades’ long civilwar has been immense. It has cost more than

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60,000 lives and displaced hundreds of thousands ofcivilians. There have been multiple human rightsviolations, rapes, and thousands of people have‘disappeared’. The causes of the conflict are complex– but the war pits the Tamil Tigers against theSinhalese-dominated government of Sri Lanka.

The Sinhalese Buddhists, who make up 70 percent of Sri Lanka’s population, control the statemachinery – the military as well as the government.The Tamils – the majority of whom are Hindus –are ethnically distinct and speak their own language.The rebel movement, the Tamil Tigers, want tocarve out a separate state for minority Tamils in thenorth and east of the country.

Minority suffering ignoredBut trapped in the middle, often ignored in thereporting of the Sri Lankan conflict, are the otherminority communities. After Tamils, Muslims are thesecond largest minority in Sri Lanka – numberingnearly a million. They have suffered tremendously inthe conflict but they are often the ‘forgottenminority’ and their plight is rarely acknowledged.

Sri Lankan Muslims are scattered across thecountry, but a majority live in the coastal areas.Their presence is a throwback mainly to the Arab-Indian traders who married local women and settledin the island many centuries after the Sinhalese andTamils. Their dominance in eastern Sri Lanka – insome small towns they form the majority – andtheir insistence on their separate and unique identityhas brought them into conflict with the TamilTigers, who see the Muslim presence as a hindranceto their homeland claim.

One of the most horrific episodes occurred inOctober 1990, when the Tigers engaged in acampaign to ‘ethnically cleanse’ areas theycontrolled. Nearly 100,000 Muslims were given 24hours to leave. Most fled, taking nothing with them,forced into flimsy boats in the monsoon deluge.Crowded and panicked, some families lost theirinfant babies, who fell into the sea. The purgeripped apart Tamil and Muslim communities, whohad previously lived peacefully side by side.

‘I remember how we left, our Tamil neighbourscrying, helpless, seeing us leave,’ says JuwairiyaUvais, who was a young girl at the time. ‘Hundredsand hundreds of people were all walking fromdifferent villages towards the beach.’

Juwairiya, her family and many others escaped to

the north-western town of Puttalam – the closestpoint that offered relative safety.

Yet, 16 years on, families still live in what wereintended to be temporary camps. Juwairiya – whonow works for a local charity – showed me aroundsome of them. It was a stormy day, and we struggledto enter homes through flooding muddy pathways.Half built with bricks, topped with thatched roofs,the families call these dwellings their homes. Butnot a single individual I spoke to could produce alegal document to claim ownership of the land.

In the backyards, little children in tattered clotheschased chickens, while water dripped through thedry coconut-palm leaf roofs. Poverty is entrenched.Many Muslims driven from their homes in 1990were left penniless. Well-to-do businessmen werereduced to working as labourers at onion farms.During Ramadan, Juwairiya helps to coordinatelarge sums of money traditionally given as charity inthis month by wealthy Muslims in Colombo. ‘Therewas a time we used to give charity, now for the lastso many years we are recipients,’ she says.

The renewed conflict has also added to theuncertainty surrounding people’s lives. In Puttalam,as elsewhere in the country, more militarycheckpoints have sprung up as the authorities seekto crack down on the rebels’ activities. When we arestopped at one of them, Juwairiya struggles toexplain who she is to the Sinhala-speaking soldiers.There are a few tense moments. Juwairiya is notcarrying the proper identity papers and, as shecomes from the north-east, she speaks Tamil. In thecurrent jittery climate, these two factors might be

80 km0

SRI LANKA

Puttalam

Colombo

Jaffna

Galle

Trincomalee

Batticaloa

Aluthgama

Mannar

Muttur

INDIA

SRI LANKA

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enough to get her arrested. Luckily, she is wearing aheadscarf and, after a few moments discussion, thesoldiers accept that she is Muslim, working with thedisplaced community, and wave her on.

It is not just Muslims who find themselvesstruggling to build new lives for themselves inPuttalam. Sinhalese Christians were also pushed outby the Tigers during the purge of the north-east.The Christians are Sri Lanka’s smallest religiousminority, found in both the ethnic Tamil andSinhalese communities, and who mostly convertedduring the 400-year colonial occupation of theisland by the Portuguese, Dutch and British.

Many of the displaced Christians in Puttalam livein one camp, close to the sea. The men eke out aliving as fishermen, but, poor as they are, theirfutures are now even more precarious. The Galleattack was just one illustration of the rebels’ capacityto launch sea-borne attacks. With the resumption ofthe war, the authorities have imposed harshrestrictions on sea travel. For fishermen, this meansthat they cannot set sail early in the morning.

‘They tell us we can only go after 5:30 in themorning. There are no fish to catch at that time.We have to start much earlier,’ says fishermanHerbert Jones.

Even if the rules were relaxed, Mr Jones believesthat the fishermen living in the displaced people’scamp, would still come off worse. ‘The sea issupposed to belong to everyone but we don’t belongto the village so we don’t get to fish.’

Four hours’ drive to the south, in the capitalColombo, at first glance, it seems as if it is adifferent world. Despite the renewed war, the citycentre – as always – displays an amazing sense ofresilience, ticking on despite the gloom. Hotels hostparties most nights, restaurants are bursting withcustomers and the city bustles with an almostsurreal sense of normalcy.

Behind the façade, however, you see a city undersiege. Armed soldiers are everywhere, standing attemporary barricades with red Stop signs, flaggingdown vehicles to be checked for explosives. In2006, Colombo has had more than five targetedbomb blasts, mainly aimed at opponents of theTamil Tigers.

Traditionally, moderate Tamils have been singledout by the Tigers, who have a reputation for nottolerating political opposition from among theirown ethnic community. In August 2005, Foreign

Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, an ethnic Tamil,was shot dead by a sniper at his home. In August2006, Kethesh Loganathan, also a Tamil and deputyhead of the government’s peace secretariat, was shotdead. No one was ever brought to justice for thosemurders – but they were widely assumed to havebeen carried out by the Tamil Tigers.

Tamils targetted by militaryDuring the conflict, Tamil moderates have foundthemselves doubly victimized. Vulnerable to rebelreprisals, they are also attacked by governmentforces, who believe them to be rebels or supportiveof the Tamil Tigers. Under the terrorism laws, theill-treatment of Tamils, subjected to illegal detentionand torture, is well-documented. Moreover, Tamilsin lower-class groups face routine harassment –something that has become more pronounced overthe past few months.

The story of Janaki Sinnaswami, who is 59, is alltoo common. A Tamil who makes a living as adomestic worker in the wealthy houses of Colombo,she and her family have borne the brunt of SriLanka’s bitter ethnic conflict. Her first home wasdestroyed in the infamous 1983 riots, when Sinhalamobs, with political backing, went on a rampagedestroying Tamil houses, shops and businesses in allthe main cities, and attacking Tamil families, killing,raping and injuring.

It was the first time an entire minority communitywas targeted and attacked in such a brutal andwidespread manner, and is widely seen as theprecursor to all-out war between the Tamil Tigers andthe government. For Janaki, the loss of her home wasa setback from which the family never recovered. Herfamily moved back to the crowded parental home inthe slums, where seven adults and six children werecooped up in one room. Her husband – unable tocope – became an alcoholic and died. With no moneyto educate her oldest son, he grew up illiterate.Incredibly, against all the odds, Janaki scraped togetherthe money from her work as a maid and succeeded ineducating her two youngest children.

But now, with the collapse of the peace process,things have again taken a turn for the worse. Inthe slums, the military are again raiding thehouses of Tamils.

‘They bang on our doors at midnight hours.Army men come with guns and they check ourentire house, open everything, ask us who we are

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harbouring,’ Janaki says. ‘I have told my mistress Ican’t work late, I have to go home because I have ayoung daughter and they can do anything to herwhen I am not at home.’

But if the situation for Tamils in Colombo isbad, in the war-torn north, it is much worse. In2006, the renewed fighting claimed 3,000 lives –the majority of them in the north and east. Overthe years, these areas have been shattered by theconflict. They are heavily mined in places, withlittle paths wending across a dry, barren landscape;families have been forced to flee their homes time

and time again. In the recent fighting, the situationhas bordered on catastrophic, with the northeffectively cut off from the rest of the country – themain roads have been blocked. At least one UNconvoy carrying humanitarian supplies into thenorth-east had to turn back because of heavyfighting, with officials warning that the situation insome places was ‘desperate’.

‘In some areas people are moving to starvation,but what is food compared to human dignity?’ saysRevd Dr Rayappu Joseph, the Bishop of Mannar, inthe north-west. The bishop is a well-known – butcontroversial – human rights activist. He is oftenattacked in the nationalist press for his alleged linksto the Tamil Tigers, an accusation he staunchlydenies. Shuttling between government and Tamil-

Below: A woman who fled from the town of Mutturprepares to make morning tea near a tent at the AlAysha refugee camp in Kantale in August 2006.

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controlled areas the bishop has first-handinformation on the plight of the people. He tellsstories of young men being shot down or kidnappedunder suspicion of being involved with the Tigers.He claims the killings often occur close to militaryor police checkpoints. Other human rights activistsin the area, who refused to be identified, fearing fortheir lives, corroborate the information.

In December 2006, the government gave thesecurity forces sweeping powers to search, arrest andquestion suspects. The fear is that these draconianmeasures could result in even more people beingarrested and held incommunicado. As the crisisdeepens, Bishop Joseph says, ‘We are helpless people.There is no one to help us, there is no one to save us.’

With the resurgence in the conflict, the ghosts ofthe past have returned to haunt Sri Lanka. Whitevans, the horrifying symbol attached todisappearances in the early 1980s, have come back.The vans appear at the doorstep of homes in broaddaylight, hauling in men and young boys aspetrified families look on.

The University Teachers for Human Rights(UTHR), one of Sri Lanka’s best-known humanrights groups, accused the Tamil Tigers in a reportpublished in June 2006. ‘Fathers are huddled intheir homes with their children fearing to go out,lest they are dragged into a van by thugs and are notseen again,’ the report says.

In previous reports, the UTHR pointed the fingerat the government, reporting on incidents where themilitary, in collusion with renegade Tamil groups,have been involved in abductions and killings.

Statistics are hard to come by, but in the monthof September alone, just in the northern town ofJaffna, Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Commissionreceived 41 complaints of abductions. The men whoare kidnapped rarely return; what happens to themremains a mystery. Although often presumed dead,years may pass without any official or rebelacknowledgement of the killing. Bodies may neverbe returned to grieving families.

The boys who are abducted are forced to take uparms. Since May 2006 UNICEF has received 135reports of children being abducted to fight for Tamilmilitants in the war. And there are accusations thatthe government is implicated in child kidnappingstoo. Although it denies involvement with thedissident Tamil armed groups, the credibility ofthose denials was dealt a blow in November 2006,

when the government’s position was contradicted bya senior UN official.

Following a visit to Sri Lanka, Allan Rock, aspecial adviser to the UN representative for childrenand armed conflict, said he ‘found strong andcredible evidence that certain elements of theGovernment security forces are supporting andsometimes participating in the abductions andforced recruitment of children’. His findings were anembarrassment to the government, which hadalways claimed to hold the moral high ground overthe Tamil Tigers by accusing them of using childsoldiers. It was this fact, combined with otherhuman rights violations, that resulted in a ban onthe Tamil Tigers and their political and fundraisingactivities in most Western states.

For many Sri Lankans, the collapse of the peaceprocess and resurgence of violence has marked aterrifying new chapter in Sri Lanka’s conflict-riddenhistory. One of the biggest fears is that it is nowimpossible to say who is responsible for the killingsand abductions. Is it the government, is itparamilitary groups, is it the Tamil Tigers, or is itrenegade factions? In 2006, several Tamil journalists,academics and peace activists with differentaffiliations have randomly been gunned down in asinister string of killings that point to numerousperpetrators. Even more worrying, no one has beentried or found guilty for these crimes.

‘Today the alarm is sounding for Sri Lanka. It ison the brink of a crisis of major proportions,’ saidPhillip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial killings, to the UN General Assembly inOctober 2006. But many Sri Lankans feel that suchappeals are falling on deaf ears – that the world isnot interested in their plight. With no vast oilreserves, or strategic importance to world powers,Sri Lankans feel they are being left to face a bleakfuture by themselves. As Lalith Chandana, aChristian fisherman living in the Puttalam camp,puts it, ‘Every day we hear about peace but … wehave no hope peace will come.’

Colombo, November 2006

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Public Participationby MinoritiesMinority Membersof the NationalLegislaturesAndrew Reynolds

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When the first democratic National Assemblyconvened in Cape Town, South Africa, in 1994 itwas the living embodiment of Archbishop DesmondTutu’s dream of a ‘rainbow nation’: an Assemblythat was not merely elected by all but included all.Black sat with white on the government’s benches,coloured MPs joined with Afrikaners in opposition.But, beyond that, the Assembly of 1994 containedNdebele, Pedi, Tswana, Sotho, Venda, Xhosa andZulu, along with Indian South Africans, Anglo-whites, Afrikaans-speaking Cape coloureds andAfrikaans speakers of Dutch or French Huguenotdescent. The descendants of Mohandas Gandhi,Henrik Verwoerd and Govan Mbeki sat together,side by side.

South Africa’s ethos of political inclusion haswaned a little over the past 12 years, but the over-representation of minority groups still remains thenorm. While the inclusion of minorities is lessvisible in most other parts of the world, there is nota nation-state, rich or poor, democratic or not,where minority groups do not press for their voicesto be heard at the highest levels of decision-making.Most countries seek to create at least a small spacefor minorities in their national parliaments: thereare Christians and Samaritans in the PalestinianAuthority, Maoris in the New Zealand house,nomadic Kuchi in the Afghan Wolesi Jirga,German-speaking MPs in Poland, and Romamembers of the Romania parliament. Whether theserepresentatives are enough, have influence ongovernment policy, or are even representative of theminority groups they come from, are crucialquestions, but when minority communities have norepresentatives in national legislatures we can bepretty sure that those minority groups are not beingheard in the policy dialogue, their rights are beingdisregarded and their importance in electoralcompetition is small.

In many respects, the question of promotingminority representation is akin to the attentionincreasingly being paid to ensuring the participationof women in politics. There are now more womenMPs around the world than ever before and an evergrowing number of countries that use specialmechanisms to increase their number of womenMPs. While the question of how best to promoteminority representation has received far lessattention, it is an evolving issue for bothinternational organizations and nation-states seeking

to build more stable and inclusive societies. Infragile and divided societies, ensuring that asignificant number of minority MPs are elected is anecessary, if not sufficient, condition of short-termconflict prevention and longer-term conflictmanagement. There is not a single case of peacefuldemocratization where the minority community wasexcluded from representation.

The full participation of minorities in politics doesnot necessarily mean veto power, nor does it implythat minority MPs are the only politicians capable ofprotecting and advancing the dignity and politicalinterests of marginalized groups. But a progressivedemocracy which values inclusion is characterized bya situation where members of minority groups canrun for office, have a fair chance of winning, andthen have a voice in national, regional and locallyelected government. Having representatives of one’sown group in parliament is not the end of politicalinvolvement, but it is the beginning.

Perhaps of most importance, the inclusion ofboth majorities and minorities within nationalparliaments can reduce group alienation andviolence in those divided societies where politics isoften viewed as a win-or-lose game. Many peacesettlements over the past 25 years have revolvedaround inclusive electoral systems or reserved seatsfor communal groups as part of broader power-sharing constructs. There is a debate about how bestto include minority MPs. Should systems bedesigned so that minorities can be elected through‘usual channels’ or are special affirmative actionmeasures needed, like quotas or specialappointments? Furthermore, is it better whenminority MPs represent ‘minority parties’ that arerooted in an ethnic community, or should they beintegrated into the ‘mainstream’ parties, which maybe ideologically driven or dominated by majoritycommunal groups. This analysis refrains fromdelving too deeply into that debate and focuses onthe first part of the question: exactly how many MPsin the parliaments of the world are from minoritycommunities and what explains their election?

Minority MPs: a league tableThe league table shown in Table 2, Referencesection (pp. 124–6) is the product of detailedresearch on the presence of minority MPs innational legislatures around the world. Suchcomparative data has not been published before and

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the 50 cases shown represent approximately aquarter of all countries; we have included bothdemocracies and non-democracies, rich and poorcountries, and legislatures from all continents.

Just under half, or 23 of the nation-states, over-represent their minorities when seat share iscompared to population share, while the remaining27 cases, on average, under-represent minoritygroups. The table details 115 distinct minority groupsin the 50 countries: 54 are over-represented in theirlegislatures while 59 are under-represented. A fewminority groups have MPs in legislatures in numberswell above what their population share would suggest.Most notable are Zanzibaris in Tanzania, whites inSouth Africa, Maronites in Lebanon, Croats inBosnia and Herzegovina, Walloons in Belgium,Sunnis in Iraq and Herero in Namibia. Sometimesminorities achieve significant representation becausetheir members vote in higher numbers than othergroups, but, more often, the ‘over-representation’ is aproduct of special mechanisms. In contrast, Russianspeakers in Latvia and Estonia, Serbs in Montenegro,Albanians in Macedonia, Bosniaks in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Arabs in Israel and Catalans in Spainare all significantly under-represented.

The top of the league table is something of asurprise. No single type of country consistentlyover-represents minority populations. The top 10most ‘inclusive’ legislatures in the world are foundin Africa, Europe, Oceania, North America and theMiddle East. Some are peaceful, wealthy, Westerndemocracies, while others are poor, democraticallyweak, and wrestling with ethnic divisions which stillturn violent. The strands that unite the countriesthat over-represent their minority communities arefour-fold: first, there are post-conflict democracieswhere minority inclusion was a core plank of thepower-sharing settlement which brought about anend to civil war and the beginnings of multi-partydemocracy – e.g. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanonand South Africa. Second, there are nation-statesthat entrenched power-sharing democracy over acentury ago and, while the pressures for minorityinclusion may have ebbed over time, the norm ofinclusion has remained strong – e.g. Belgium andSwitzerland. Third, there are cases which do well onthe inclusion of minorities in their parliamentsbecause significant elements of society and partypolitics are sensitive to minority issues and valueminority candidates – e.g. Canada, Finland, the

Netherlands and New Zealand. Last, there arecountries where the very geographical concentrationof a minority group allows such groups to gainsignificant representation in their nationallegislatures – e.g. Kiribati, Sri Lanka and Tanzania.

Interestingly, the three top cases are all in sub-Saharan Africa: Namibia, South Africa andTanzania. Why should these new and sometimestroubled states produce parliaments that are soinclusive of their many minorities? The SouthAfrican parliament is the most ethnicallyrepresentative of any democratic legislature in theworld. For the reasons discussed below, thepromotion of multi-ethnic parties and the deliberate‘over-representation’ of minorities was thewatchword of the first decade of democracy inSouth Africa. The same has been true in Namibia,where the liberation movement, the South WestAfrica People’s Organization (SWAPO), while beingrooted in the Ovambo majority, sought to presentitself as a catch-all party, similar to the AfricanNational Congress (ANC) in South Africa or theCongress Party of India. In the current NamibianNational Assembly 10 distinct ethnic groups arerepresented and the majority Ovambo group(representing 60 per cent of the population) onlyhave 50 per cent of the seats. It is true that theCongress of Democrats, Democratic TurnhalleAlliance of Namibia, Monitor Action Group,National Unity Democratic Organisation,Republican Party and United Democratic Frontopposition parties have non-Ovambo (bar one)MPs, but SWAPO has two Baster, four Caprivian,two Damara, four Herero, six Kavango, five Nama,three white, a coloured and a San representative.Tanzania’s high spot in the table is a result of theover-representation of the island of Zanzibar in theirNational Assembly.

South Africa is an interesting case study of thepositive good of including minorities in governanceover and above their population size. Post-apartheidSouth Africa has consistently done well onindicators of minority representation as a result oftwo pressures towards accommodation. First, thepost-apartheid peace settlement of 1994 (andpermanent Constitution of 1996) rested upon auniversally accepted principle of multi-ethnicinclusion in the new politics of the nation. Aprinciple beyond that of mere equality, whichemphasized the very opposite of the former



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apartheid laws, that is, the new South Africangovernment would deliberately reach out tominorities to visibly demonstrate their full role ingovernance. Second, it quickly became apparentthat, to be successful, any Xhosa party had to reachout to non-Xhosa, a Zulu party would atrophy ifZulu nationalism remained its raison d’être, andwhite parties could only gain leverage if theybecame multi-ethnic vehicles. Thus, the ANCunder Nelson Mandela deliberately placedcoloureds, Indians, whites and Zulus high up on itslists of candidates in 1994 and 1999. This diversitygoes beyond the simple black–white divide. As a‘catch-all’ national movement, the ANC seeks toexist in a universe beyond the Xhosa communitywhich has historically dominated its leadership. Itstrives to attract the votes of Ndebele, Pedi, Sotho,Tswana, Venda, along with Zulu in KwaZulu,coloureds in the Cape, and English- and Afrikaans-speaking whites throughout the country. Theseappeals are often based on policy promises, but justas much on having senior ‘ethnic’ politicians highup on the party lists. The same has been true forthe opposition – the white-dominated DemocraticAlliance places non-white leaders in visiblepositions – and was even true for the now defunctNational Party, which, in its failure to attractsufficient non-white leaders and voters, wasultimately subsumed into the ANC in the mostremarkable power-shift between two long opposedmovements in the history of modern politics. While

the level of minority over-representation hasdeclined under Thabo Mbeki, it still exists in 2006.Nevertheless, consolidating democracy and stabilitywill rest upon continuing this ethos of minorityinclusion and respect.

At the executive level, South Africans have also feltthat it is important to visibly include minorities. AsTable 1 shows, white and Indian South Africans weredramatically ‘over-represented’ in the first decade ofdemocratic governance under Presidents NelsonMandela and Thabo Mbeki. The over-representationof whites and Indians was most pronounced in 1994and 1999, but when ministers and their deputies aretaken together it remains to this day.

The deliberate reaching out to smaller minoritygroups and institutions, designed to ensure thewidest inclusion possible, was particularly key in1994, when South Africa made its first tentativesteps towards a multi-party electoral democracy.Two very small parties gained representation in thefirst National Assembly (the Freedom Front andPan-Africanist Congress of Azania), facilitatingconflict resolution by democratic rather than violentmeans. Although the Afrikaner Freedom Front onlywon nine (or 2 per cent) of the seats, theimportance of their inclusion in democraticstructures was disproportionate to their numbers.General Constand Viljoen’s Freedom Frontrepresented a volatile Afrikaner constituency thatcould easily have fallen into the hands of whitesupremacist demagogues such as Eugene



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Black White Coloured Indian

1994 Ministers 52% 26% 7% 15%

Ministers and Deputies 51% 28% 5% 15%

1999 Ministers 76% 7% 3% 14%


2006 Ministers 81% 11% 4% 4%


Population 74% 14% 8% 2%

Table 1 Cabinet ministers in South Africa

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Terre’blanche had its representatives been shut outof the political process. As it was, Viljoen, as formerhead of the South African Army, became chair ofthe National Assembly’s Defence Select Committeeand the paramilitary Afrikaner resistance faded away.

Representing a very different place and time, theinclusion of minority politicians in Canada today isa second positive example of how majority politicscan provide a space to hear and reassure minoritycommunities. Electoral system specialists wouldexpect the First Past the Post system of elections inCanada to provide a high hurdle to the election ofnon-white, non-majority MPs, but Canadian partiesand voters have managed to circumvent themajoritarianism of their Anglo election system toproduce a parliament which includes, and over-represents, Asians, Canadians of African extractionand Francophone Canadians. Inuits are under-represented in the House of Commons but theyhave some access to self-governance through thesemi-autonomous province of Nunavut.

The inclusion of French-Canadian politicians inlarge numbers is perhaps unsurprising considering thepowerful leverage Quebec has long had over nationalCanadian politics, but much smaller minorities arealso heard in parliament. There are 21 MPs fromminority backgrounds in addition to the French-speaking MPs – ten of South Asian extraction, fiveChinese, four African or Afro-Caribbean, one MiddleEastern and one Canadian Inuit. Importantly, theseminority MPs are not clustered in ‘ethnic’ politicalparties. Twelve are in the opposition Liberal Party, sixin the governing Conservative party, two in the BlocQuébécois and one in the New Democratic Party.The spread of minority MPs across parties is mirroredin the Netherlands, where the 15 MPs of African,Afro-Caribbean, Iranian, Moroccan or Turkishbackground are split between Christian DemocraticAppeal (4), Democrats 66 (1), Green Left (4), LabourParty (3), List Pym Fortuyn (1) and Peoples Party forFreedom and Democracy (2). While the Netherlandsdemonstrates the progress that can be made whenparties and voters promote multi-ethnicity, thecountry also illustrates the reality that, even in themost progressive polities, issues of minority rights andrespect can still be problematic and vulnerable toanti-immigration elements of society.

The bottom of the league table (pp. 124–6) isalso a jumble of very different countries. Half of thebottom 10 are Central European/Baltic states that

democratized in the early 1990s and, in those cases,the under-representation is focused on Albanian,Russian or Serb minority communities.Nevertheless, only in Montenegro is the Serbiancommunity assessed by MRG as being significantly‘under threat’. Outside Central Europe, the mostunder-represented minorities are found in Brazil,Israel, Spain and the United States. All 10 casesrepresent very different levels of humandevelopment, wealth and democracy.

One of the most important cases that scorespoorly on the indicator of minority inclusion inparliament is Afghanistan. On one level we see ahigh degree of diversity in the new Afghan WolesiJirga: there are 30 Hazaras, 53 Tajiks, 20 Uzbeksand 28 others, representing minority communities.There are significant ‘minority’ leaders in parliamentand government. Yunus Qanooni (a Tajik) isSpeaker of the Wolesi Jirga, Mohammed Mohaqeq(a Hazara) received the most votes of any candidatesin Kabul, and Rashid Dostom (an Uzbek) is Chiefof Staff of the Afghan National Army. Ten seats arereserved in the Assembly for the nomadic Kuchipopulation. President Karzai’s cabinet is also diverse,and minority MPs can be found on both the pro-government and opposition benches, but, as theleague table (pp. 124–6), each of the four mainminority groups is under-represented in thelegislature, while the largest group, the Pashtuns, isover-represented. This is a sensitive political issue asTajiks from the Northern Alliance and Uzbeks fromthe north feel increasingly marginalized by whatthey term the ‘Pashtun mafia’ which surroundsPresident Karzai.

What explains levels of minorityrepresentation?A number of variables might be expected toinfluence the level of minority representation innational legislatures (Table 3, Reference section, pp.128–9).

So what explains minority inclusion in legislativepolitics: region, electoral system, development orlevel of democracy? Regionally we see that the sixcases from Africa (Malawi, Namibia, South Africa,Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) on average over-represent their minority groups, but a cautionshould be noted. First, these results are driven bythe impressive minority inclusion of Namibia, SouthAfrica and Tanzania, which may not be replicated in



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other African states, and Malawi, Zambia andZimbabwe have positive scores because one or twoAsians or whites make it into their parliaments. TheMiddle East scores well because of Lebanon andIraq, but clearly neither case is a poster child forinter-ethnic harmony. The picture is more mixed inWestern Europe, Oceania and North America, anddecidedly negative in Asia and Central and EasternEurope, and Latin America (see Table 2).

Many groups have called for electoral systemreforms to ensure and encourage minority access toelected office, but, while such democratic changes

may help, the data suggest that electoral systemdesign only has a limited role in promotingminority representation. Half of the countries thatreserve seats for minorities end up over-representing them, while the other half under-represent (see Table 3). Just over half the countriesthat do not have reserved seats under-representtheir minorities, but the other half manage to over-represent despite not having any specialmechanisms.

When it comes to electoral system, we candiscern patterns in the data but the results are



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Africa Middle Western Oceania North Asia C-East LatinEast Europe America Europe America

No. over 6 2 6 3 1 1 4 0

No. under 0 1 6 3 2 4 10 1

Average 1.8 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -1.2 -1.3 -3.28

Reserved seats No reserved seats

Cases over-represented 6 17

Cases under-represented 6 21

BV MMP FPTP TRS List PR STV AV PAR SNTV

Average 0.5 0.2 -0.04 -0.3 -0.5 -0.5 -0.9 -1.3 -3.2

No. cases 2 3 11 2 26 1 3 1 1

Table 2 Minority representation by region

Table 4 Minority representation and electoral system

Table 3 Does adequate representation depend on reserved seats for minorities?

Free -0.7 35

Partly free 0.2 10

Not free -0.3 4

Table 5 Minority representation by level of democracy

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again surprising in certain respects (see Table 4).The five countries that use the Block Vote andMixed Member Proportional systems do best atincluding minorities, but Lebanon and NewZealand drive those high figures. Interestingly,First Past the Post systems, long criticized forproviding hurdles to minority representation, dobetter than List proportional systems. But againthe average scores can be misleading as seven of thetop ten states in the league table use List PRelection systems. Overall, none of the electoralsystem ‘families’, when combined, produce moreminority members than their population share.Majoritarian systems (First Past the Post, the BlockVote, Two-Round Systems, and the AlternativeVote) score -0.1, proportional systems (List PR,Mixed Member Proportional and the SingleTransferable Vote) -0.4, and semi-proportionalsystems (Parallel Systems and the Single Non-transferable Vote) -2.2.

Perhaps most surprising is the finding that thenation-states least able to demonstrate minorityinclusion are, on average, the most democratic. The35 cases ranked as ‘free’ democracies by the Freedomin the World survey produced by Freedom Houseare the least likely to fully represent their minorities,while the 10 cases ranked as ‘partly free’ on averagemarginally over-represent minorities in theirlegislatures (see Table 5).

As noted earlier, the inclusion of some minorityMPs within a national legislature is only the first steptowards minority protection. One could imagine asituation where a few token minority MPs wereelected (or appointed), but minority rights remainedseverely curtailed. So is there a relationship betweenthe number of minority representatives in parliamentand the degree of threat these minority groups liveunder? Compare the top 20 countries whichrepresent minorities best in their national legislatures(Table 2, Reference Section, pp.124–6) and MRG’sPeople Under Threat (Table 1, Reference Section,pp.118–123). While overall, the countries whichrepresent minorities best, are generally those whereminorities are not most at risk, the appearance ofIraq at No 2 (PUT), Bosnia at No 20 (PUT), andSri Lanka at No 22 (PUT) illustrates that sometimesminorities can gain significant politicalrepresentation, but still be marginalized from realdecision-making influence, and live under significantchallenges to their security.

How is minority inclusion best achieved?The findings outlined in this research suggest thatpolitical designs matter at the margins but,ultimately, minorities have access to elected office ifthe society is open to minority inclusion, or power-sharing arrangements dictate ‘fair shares’ inparliament for majority and minority groups. Ifminority MPs are deemed to be of value to voters orpolitical elites then the barriers of exclusionaryelection systems, under-development andauthoritarianism will be navigated.

Nevertheless, all else being equal, there are somelessons to be noted. First, much of the progress onissues of minority inclusion and representation hasoccurred not in the established democracies ofEurope and North America but in new electoralregimes in Africa, the Middle East and the SouthPacific. Second, even when minorities do gainrepresentation in national parliaments they are oftendiscriminated against, face threats to their integrityand are marginalized from real power. Last, theactual method and scope of minority inclusionneeds to be crafted to fit the needs of the givencountry. Some states may do better with reservedseats or autonomous self-governing assemblies, whileothers will require incentives for minority MPs to beinvolved in ‘mainstream’ parties and have aguarantee of both legislative and executiverepresentation. The key is to ensure both visibilityand voice: to have minorities in parliament andenable them to impact policies that affect not onlytheir communal affairs but the well-being of societyas a whole. p



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Minority Protectionin Europe: Whatabout EffectiveParticipation?Kristin Henrard

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Although minority protection has come more to theforefront since the 1990s, both at the internationallevel and at national level, many inadequaciesremain, not only regarding the standards or normsthemselves, but also and especially concerning theiractual implementation and enforcement.Nevertheless, several positive developments also canand should be highlighted.

When discussing minority protection, it isimportant to realize that this is not confined torights of ‘persons belonging to minorities’ (minority-specific rights). Indeed, the central importance ofthe prohibition of discrimination, in combinationwith general human rights (the rights of everyperson), should not be underestimated.

There is an ongoing debate as to whetherminority protection necessitates ‘special’ rights(minority-specific rights) or equal rights, as providedon the basis of the prohibition of discrimination incombination with general human rights. A lotdepends on how these rights are interpreted,implemented and supervised.

It may be obvious that it is important for personsbelonging to minorities that they should not beunjustly excluded from employment, education, etc.Being treated exactly the same leads to formalequality. However, formal equality does not seem toaddress all the concerns of minorities because it doesnot take into account differences in circumstances,like belonging to a minority with a separate identityand having the wish to hold on to this minorityidentity. The concept of substantive equality can behelpful here, because this understanding of equalityaccepts that differential treatment (formally unequaltreatment) or special rights might be necessary toreach real, genuine equality. To the extent that theinterpretation of general human rights is not(sufficiently) suffused by substantive equalityconsiderations and does not provide protection forthe right to identity of minorities, the minority-specific standards form a necessary complement.

The focus of this annual report, and of thisarticle, is on the participation of minorities. Theconcept ‘participation’ needs clarification. It seemsobvious that it can be interpreted broadly. In thisarticle, the central importance of participation isunderlined, and a generous approach is adopted asto the potential reach of the concept.

The other central concept in this article, namely‘minority’, also does not have a generally agreed

upon definition. One particularly controversialquestion is whether or not persons belonging tominorities are required to have the nationality of thecountry of residence before being able to availthemselves of that nation’s minority protection. Aclosely related question is whether (and to whatextent) immigrants could qualify as minorities.

In the first section, the two central concepts ofthis article are discussed; this is followed by apresentation of the most relevant developments inthe Council of Europe, the Organization forSecurity and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) andthe European Union (EU). An overview is thengiven of recurring problems in several Europeanstates, after which some concluding observations aremade about the actual and potential protection ofminorities in Europe.

What do we mean by ‘minority’ and‘participation’? Although there is no set legal definition of theterm ‘minority’, there is broad agreement aboutcertain requirements: that minorities should havestable ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristicsthat are different from those of the rest of thepopulation, a numerical minority position, non-dominance and the wish to preserve their own,separate cultural identity.

However, it is important to note that, underinternational legal norms, states do not explicitlyhave the right to decide which groups count asminorities. This point was underlined by the UnitedNations (UN) Human Rights Committee, the bodytasked with monitoring the International Covenanton Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In itsGeneral Comment on Article 27, the HumanRights Committee stated that individuals need notbe citizens of the state to have minority rightsprotection. Although not legally binding, theCommittee’s Comments are widely seen asauthoritative statements on the scope of ICCPR.

The Human Rights Committee position,however, is in conflict with the position traditionallyadopted by states, which have often been adamantabout the need for persons belonging to minoritiesto have the nationality of the country of residence.This requirement is increasingly criticized for thefollowing reasons. Nationality legislation can all tooeasily be manipulated by the public authorities.Especially in cases of state succession and change of



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frontiers, such a requirement seems problematic, asis clearly apparent in the Baltic states. Nationality isalso difficult to satisfy for nomadic groups. Finally,and especially in countries where it is difficult toacquire nationality, it may seem inappropriate toexclude certain groups that have lived in the countryfor decades or even generations. Where to draw theline will ultimately be an arbitrary decision. Henceit seems more appropriate not to focus onnationality or immigrant status as such, but ratherto adopt a more pragmatic attitude, taking intoaccount all the relevant circumstances and decidingon a case-by-case basis whether a particular groupcan enjoy minority rights.

Slowly but surely, the tide seems to be turning asstates increasingly, if only de facto, treat immigrantgroups as minorities. It is striking that a nationalityrequirement does not feature in the majority of thedeclarations of contracting states to the 1995Framework Convention for the Protection ofNational Minorities (FCNM), the only legallybinding document that is exclusively devoted tothe protection of minorities. Furthermore, theAdvisory Committee supervising theimplementation of the FCNM clearly adopted aninclusive approach, urging states to considerwhether they cannot expand the reach of theConvention on an article-by-article basis withrespect to immigrant groups as well.

Most minority rights provisions contain escapeclauses or conditional clauses, like ‘whereappropriate’, ‘when necessary’, etc., which couldeasily be used by contracting states to avoid theirobligations. However, the positive side to suchstandards is their inherent flexibility, which allowsthem to cater for the tremendous diversity ofminority situations. Indeed, not all groupsqualifying as minorities should necessarily haveequally strong rights. In this respect, some haveadvocated a ‘sliding-scale’ approach, especially inrelation to rights that would impose financialburdens on the public authorities. Following thisapproach, the state would have more far-reachingobligations towards minority groups of a greater size(and a higher level of territorial concentration).Likewise, states would have less far-reachingobligations in relation to newly immigrated groups(often called ‘new’ minorities, as opposed to thetraditional, autochthonous minorities). At the sametime, clearly it is essential that the exercise of this

state discretion should be suitably monitored so asto ensure that states do not abuse it.

International human rights law provides for theright to participation – for example Article 25 ofICCPR holds that: ‘every citizen shall have theright and the opportunity … without unreasonablerestrictions to … take part in the conduct of publicaffairs’. This has subsequently been taken up inminority-specific instruments: Article 2, paragraphs2 and 3 of the UN Declaration on the Rights ofPersons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religiousand Linguistic Minorities (UNDM; stipulatingrespectively the right to participation in thecultural, religious, social, economic and publicspheres of life and the right to participate indecisions concerning the minority to which theybelong), and Article 15 of the FCNM (enshriningthe right to effective participation in cultural, socialand economic life, and in public affairs, inparticular those affecting them). But the difficultyis that there is no legal definition of what theconcept of ‘participation’ entails.

It is generally agreed that, potentially, the concepthas a very broad reach. The High Commissioner onNational Minorities (HCNM) has instigated andendorsed in 1999 the Lund Recommendations onthe Effective Participation of National Minorities inPublic Life. These Recommendations are made byindependent experts and hence are not legallybinding. Nevertheless, as they are rooted in minorityrights and other standards generally applicable inthe situations in which the HCNM is involved, theycannot be ignored. Two major dimensions ofparticipation are distinguished in theRecommendations, namely ‘participation indecision-making’ and ‘self-governance’. The formeris actually mostly concerned with issues of‘representation’ in the broad sense, as it addressesnot only representation in parliament (e.g. reservedseats for minority groups) and government/executivebodies, but also members of minorities in the civilservice, the police and the judiciary, and even dealswith the establishment of advisory bodies and otherconsultation mechanisms. It also deals with electionsystems (including references to forms of preferencevoting and lower numerical thresholds forrepresentation in the legislature for minoritypolitical parties).

It should be emphasized, though, that while thepolitical dimension of participation traditionally



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attracts most attention, there are also importanteconomic, social and cultural dimensions toparticipation. In regard to economic participation,there is the issue of access to employment.Unemployment is a serious problem for manypersons belonging to minorities, especially the ‘new’minorities and the Roma.

In this regard, but also more generally, it isimportant to underline the inherent link betweenadequate participation and the prohibition ofdiscrimination. It can indeed be argued that fullparticipation of minorities would only be possiblewhen there is no discrimination against personsbelonging to minorities. There is a growingacknowledgement of the phenomenon of indirectdiscrimination, the prohibition of which targetsrules that are apparently neutral but which have adisproportionate negative impact on particulargroups (without justification). A good examplewould be the competence in language required inrelation to standing for elections or for access tojobs, as is the case in Latvia and Estonia.Requirements in terms of the official language of thestate are inherently more difficult to fulfil forforeigners. Insofar as these requirements would notbe proportionate in relation to the positionconcerned, they would be indirectly discriminatory(and thus prohibited).

Indirect discrimination is closely related to theunderstanding that the prohibition ofdiscrimination also requires differential treatment ofsubstantively different situations. This, in turn,appears inherently linked to a duty to reasonablyaccommodate different identities and lifestyles,which is slowly gaining ground. Arguably this couldhave repercussions for regulations on the wearing ofthe headscarf in education and employment, specialfood, special rules in relation to festive days ofminority religions, special attention to the lifestyleof nomadic groups and the like (see, for example,the Recommendations on Policing in Multi-EthnicSocieties endorsed by the HCNM).

Of course, the word ‘reasonably’ clearly indicatesthat this duty to accommodate would not be anabsolute, unlimited duty. This is reflected in thepractice of the Commission on Equal Treatment ofthe Netherlands. While that Commission tends toqualify prohibitions to wear the headscarf inemployment and education as violations of theGeneral Equal Treatment Act, because they would

amount to indirect discrimination on the basis ofreligion, it often allows prohibitions on the nikaaband the burka, because, in the Commission’s view,there would be reasonable justifications for theseprohibitions.

The concept ‘participation’ has a very broad reachindeed. It would be difficult to deny that theabsence of reasonable accommodation of differenceswould not hamper the full and genuineparticipation of the persons concerned.Furthermore, full participation would also sendimportant symbolic messages about inclusion,essential for an optimal integration. In the words ofthe previous HCNM, Max van der Stoel:‘participation has a broader connotation, namelythat minorities feel that they are active and equalmembers of the state’ (Speech by the OSCE HighCommissioner on National Minorities at aconference in Slovenia, February 2001).

Minority protection in EuropeCouncil of EuropeIt has often been pointed out that, while effectiveprotection against discrimination and of generalhuman rights is very important for minorities, thecase law of the European Court of Human Rights,supervising the European Convention on HumanRights (ECHR) is in many respects inadequate.

The Court has often been criticized for itsapparent reluctance to conclude that violations ofthe prohibition against discrimination haveoccurred. While this is still a problematic area,there have been some important developments.The cases of Nachova v. Bulgaria (26 February2004, partially confirmed by the Grand Chamberof the Court on 6 July 2005, concerning thekillings of two Roma by military police) andTimishev v. Russia (13 December 2005, concerningthe refusal to allow a Chechen person to enteranother republic of Russia) clearly indicate that theCourt is becoming more vigilant in relation toalleged racial discrimination. In the latter case, theCourt explicitly held that ‘no difference intreatment which is based exclusively or to adecisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin iscapable of being objectively justified in acontemporary democratic society built on theprinciples of pluralism and respect for differentcultures’ (para. 58). As both cases concernminorities, they confirm the special importance of



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the prohibition of discrimination for minorities.In Thlimmenos v. Greece (6 April 2000) the Court

had made a very important pronouncement on theprohibition of discrimination, which implied acrucial opening towards substantive equality. TheCourt underlined in its judgment that theprohibition of discrimination can also be violatedwhen states fail to treat differently persons insubstantively different situations (withoutjustification). In other words, the prohibition ofdiscrimination gives rise to a duty to adoptdifferential measures in certain circumstances. Thisclearly holds the promise of a duty to adoptminority-specific measures in order to reasonablyaccommodate their different identities and lifestyles.This could possibly concern regulations toreasonably accommodate persons belonging tominority religions and their specific needs as totiming of work, dress code and the like. The linkbetween these measures and full and effectiveparticipation has already been made. However, thesubsequent case law has been rather modest and hasnot (yet) ventured along this path.

The case law of the Court so far has revealed thatit struggles with the concept of indirectdiscrimination. The latest case in which this wasparticularly visible and detrimental for minoritieswas D.H. et al. v. Czech Republic (7 February2006). Despite the convincing statistical evidencethat Roma children were disproportionatelysidelined to schools for mentally retarded children,the Court failed to find a violation of theprohibition of discrimination.

The ECHR is not explicitly geared towards theprotection and promotion of minority identity.However, a lot depends on the interpretation ofconcepts that are in themselves vague and open-ended. A good example is Chapman v. UK (18January 2001), where the Court for the first timeacknowledged that the right to respect for privatelife, family life and home actually enshrines a rightto a traditional way of life, and that states havepositive obligations to facilitate the minority way oflife. However, states have broad margins ofdiscretion in this respect and de facto protection stillremains low.

An interesting case in relation to politicalparticipation, of special relevance for linguisticminorities, is Podkolzina v. Latvia (9 April 2002).This concerned a person of Russian ethnicity who

was ultimately barred from standing for electionbecause she did not have the required languageproficiency in Latvian. The Court found itlegitimate for a state to set linguistic requirementsfor candidates for parliament. It concluded thatthere was a violation of the Podkolzina’s ‘electionright’, not because the content of the measure – thelinguistic requirement itself – was disproportionate,but because of the way it was administered in casu.Even though it would have been welcome if theCourt had explicitly indicated that there are alsolimits on what exactly can be required (content ofthe measure) in this respect, this judgment in anyevent sends a signal to states that they do not haveunlimited discretion in the way in which theyimpose linguistic requirements for certain functions.This could be an indication that the Court, infuture, might be more attentive to protectinglinguistic minorities more generally.

Since the 1990s there has been long line of caselaw in which the Court emphasizes that states arenot allowed to limit the freedom of association ofmembers of minorities merely because theassociation would aim to promote the culture of aminority. However, the judgment in Gorzelik andothers v. Poland (20 December 2001, confirmed bythe Grand Chamber of the Court on 17 February2004; on the refusal to register an association underthe name ‘Union of People of Silesian Nationality’)seems to deviate from this case law. While there areno clear context-specific variables that explain the a-typical outcome in Gorzelik, the combination of twoareas in which states are accorded a broad margin ofappreciation, namely the identification of minoritiesand electoral matters, could explain this particularoutcome. It should in any event be underlined that,in subsequent case law, the Court has returned to itsprotective stance.

The Court traditionally has provided ampleprotection to religious minorities in terms offreedom of religion, inter alia by underscoring states’duty to protect and promote religious tolerance andpluralism. However, in a country like Turkey, wherethe great majority of people are Muslim, where thereis a history of a sensitive, fragile relation betweenreligions and state, and a perceived danger ofreligiously inspired movements/political partiestaking over, the supervisory organs of the ECHRseem willing to accept considerable limitations tothe freedom to manifest one’s religion (by wearing



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the headscarf ). The case that received most criticalattention in this respect was Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.According to the Court (10 November 2005,confirmed by the Grand Chamber on 29 June2004), the prohibition on wearing the veil in a stateuniversity in Turkey did not amount to a violationof the freedom to manifest one’s religion (underArticle 9 of the ECHR). It is to be hoped that theCourt will be equally context sensitive if a casecomes before it from a Muslim girl faced with asimilar prohibition in a country without this specifichistorical background, where Muslims are not in themajority and where the danger of pressurizing otherswould not be present.

The preceding overview arguably hints at a ratherambivalent picture with regard to the contributionof individual human rights to minority protection.Remarkable advances at the theoretical level inrelation to embracing both substantive equalityconsiderations and the right to identity ofminorities, are not always matched by equallyprogressive, minority-sensitive applications inconcrete cases. Furthermore, in certain areas wherethe Court has traditionally realized a meaningfullevel of minority protection, decisions in a fewrecent cases have gone against this trend and hencethreaten to question this traditionally minority-sensitive case law.

Nevertheless, it should be emphasized, the caselaw clearly reveals tremendous potential to provideenhanced levels of minority protection on the basisof general human rights and the prohibition ofdiscrimination. It is to be hoped that the Court will,in the future, actually realize this potential. Sincethe judgments of the Court are legally binding forthe states against which they are pronounced, theydo tend to lead to changes in the law and practice ofthese states (and also of other states).

As was pointed out above, the FCNM has anexplicit minority focus. Considering the centralimportance of substantive equality and the right to aminority identity for mechanisms of minorityprotection, it should not come as a surprise that thisConvention has these as guiding principles. Article15 explicitly addresses the effective participation ofpersons belonging to national minorities in cultural,social and economic life, and in public affairs.

It is the practice of the supervisory mechanism interms of Article 15 that will be focused upon here.However, it should be acknowledged that some

issues of relevance to full participation are focusedupon in other articles of the FCNM and hence nolonger attract attention in terms of Article 15. Thisdoes not mean, though, that these issues would notbe considered as important or relevant forparticipation purposes. A good example here wouldbe rules on the use of a minority language incommunication with public authorities, and ruleson language in education. Similarly, the practice ofsome states of assigning Roma children to specialschools for mentally retarded children isproblematic in view of the requirement of equalaccess to education (Article 12(3) and Article 4 onequal treatment).

Linguistic requirements to stand for elections areaddressed in terms of Article 15, and the same canbe said about such requirements in relation to accessto employment. Such requirements should not betoo rigid or demanding, so as to prevent a negativeimpact on effective participation of minorities.

Issues pertaining to religious accommodation donot attract much attention, either in the text of theFCNM or in the supervisory practice. Participationof religious groups is definitely considered but not (sofar) in terms of duties to reasonably accommodate thespecific needs of religious minorities.

Notwithstanding the fact that the FCNMstipulates that the Committee of Ministers of theCouncil of Europe has the final responsibility forthe supervision of the Convention, the importanceof the opinions of the independent expert body, theAdvisory Committee (AC) is now undisputed.Indeed, the Committee of Ministers has begun tofollow the opinions of the AC, and even refers backto them for further detail in its Resolutions. Hence,the focus of this analysis will be on the opinions ofthe AC. One general remark that needs to be madeis that the supervision by the AC has revealed thatthe discretion of contracting states to the FCNM isnot as boundless as it may seem at first sight.

The AC has recently added another tool to itssupervisory practice: the adoption of thematicreports reflecting and synthesizing its experience andviews on specific thematic issues. The first reportwas adopted in March 2006 and is entitledCommentary on Education under the FrameworkConvention for the Protection of National Minorities.A wealth of issues is addressed in this report, as isevidenced by the following description:



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‘the Commentary recognizes that the FrameworkConvention is of relevance not only in guaranteeing therights of persons belonging to minorities to good quality,free primary education as well as general and equalaccess to secondary education (right to education) butalso in setting standards on how such education shouldbe shaped in terms of content as well as form (rights ineducation) in order to facilitate the development of theabilities and personality of the child, guarantee childsafety and accommodate the linguistic, religious,philosophical aspirations of pupils and their parents’.(Commentary on Education under the FCNM, p. 4)

It should be highlighted that the AC is currentlyworking on a Commentary on politicalparticipation.

When reading through the opinions of the AC,its emphasis on the need to consult and tomaintain a dialogue with minorities on all theissues addressed in the FCNM is hard to miss. Thecentral importance of consultation and eveninvolvement of minorities in relation to policies of(direct or indirect) relevance to them, can beexplained by its double effect of enhancingintegration (inclusion) of minorities whilestrengthening their identity. It seems obvious thatwhen minority groups are allowed a say in theconstruction and implementation of policies andprogrammes concerning them, this is bound toimprove the quality, efficiency and overall impactof the latter.

The AC encourages states not only to go beyondmere ad hoc consultation and to make dialogue aregular, preferably institutionalized feature, but alsomakes suggestions on how this participation can bemore ‘effective’. The AC shows itself to beincreasingly demanding about the effectiveness ofparticipation, in the sense that it should bemeaningful, which implies that the ideas ofminorities are to be taken seriously. The AC appearsto consider consultation as the bare minimum andoften goes beyond mere consultation, urging statesto coordinate and cooperate on minority policieswith the minorities concerned. ‘Cooperation’ seemsto indicate that the minorities’ opinions should bereflected in the actual outcome.

While this consultation theme is omni-present, itshould be highlighted that the AC clearly focuses onthe public affairs component in Article 15.Participation in cultural, social and economic life is

given significantly less attention. The AC isnevertheless particularly attentive towards theproblems of economic exclusion of the Roma invirtually all contracting states, while also urgingsome states to address shortcomings in theparticipation of other minorities in economic life.Increasingly, the AC seems to address the socialsituation of Roma as well, looking at their problemswith regard to access to housing and health care, aswell as the resulting shortcomings in their livingconditions.

It has already been emphasized that the AC iscritical about language requirements that do notseem necessary in order to work in particularfunctions or deliver certain services. Nevertheless, itseems that the AC could expand its review in termsof the effective participation of minorities ineconomic, social and cultural life.

With regard to the public affairs component, it isnoteworthy that the AC regularly starts by notingthat minorities are not, or not sufficiently, presentin parliament (or other elected bodies), andencourages authorities to examine thoroughly allthe barriers that might hinder minorityrepresentation in political life and to developmechanisms to redress this situation, particularly inrelation to small and scattered minorities. Morerecently, the AC has expressed concern aboutinsufficient representation of minorities’ interests inthe decision-making process. The AC, furthermore,does not limit its review to elected and executivebodies, but also often speaks out against low levelsof minority members in the judiciary, the civilservice, the police, the army and the prison service.In relation to employment in the civil service, theAC expresses (again) concern about too-demandinglinguistic requirements.

Finally, the AC addresses an area that is closelyconnected to the sovereignty of states and for whichstates have generally not been willing to accept far-reaching international commitments, namelycitizenship legislation. It is obvious that citizenshipis still a requirement for the exercise of (most)electoral rights and hence is essential for politicalparticipation. The central importance of theprohibition of discrimination makes it possible forthe AC to point out that governments should makesure that legislation on citizenship is applied fairlyand in a non-discriminatory fashion. According tothe AC, the presence of large numbers of non-



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citizens would cast doubts in this respect,particularly in cases of the break-up of states andstate succession.

It may be obvious that, in terms of the FCNM,the contracting parties are continuously invited andeven urged to improve the full and effectiveparticipation of persons belonging to nationalminorities. Even though the outcome of thissupervisory process is not legally binding, thesecond round of monitoring has clearly revealedhigh levels of compliance with theRecommendations. It is to be welcomed that thecontracting states recognize its authority as in factcoming from the bodies that are responsible for thesupervision of its implementation by the states.

OSCEThe activities of the OSCE in relation to minoritiesare not limited to those of the High Commissioneron National Minorities, as can be witnessed, interalia, from the existence of the Roma Contact Point.Within the OSCE more generally there has beenheightened attention to the plight of the Romaacross the participating states. This led in 2003 tothe adoption of the Action Plan on Improving theSituation of Roma and Sinti in the OSCE Area.However, in view of space limitations, it seemsappropriate to focus on the HCNM because of itsexplicit focus on national minorities (in general).

It would be difficult to capture comprehensivelythe multiple activities of the HCNM in relation tonational minorities. The country-specific work ofthe HCNM continues to underline theimportance of comprehensive integrationstrategies, entailing special attention to theeffective participation of persons belonging tonational minorities, and especially the Roma.Themes that are taken up and criticized are theunder-representation of Roma in the legislativebodies, and the lack of consultation of Romawhen policies on Roma are being developed.

In addition to the country-specific work andensuing recommendations, the HCNM has beeninvolved (since 1995) in the elaboration of morethematic recommendations, concerning issues thatrecur in virtually all minority situations. TheHCNM does not have a mandate of standard-setting, but has adopted a practice of bringingtogether international experts to draw upRecommendation on such themes, which he

subsequently endorses. These Recommendationsare based on the existing standards but are moredetailed, and hence provide important additionalguidance. In relation to participation, the LundRecommendations on the Effective Participation ofNational Minorities (1999) should of course behighlighted. Nevertheless, the earlierRecommendations on Education Rights (1996)and Language Rights (1998) also concern issueswith important repercussions for the fullparticipation of minorities. Similarly, it can beremarked that the Guidelines on the Use of MinorityLanguages in the Broadcast Media (2003), and theirgoal of equal access to mainstream public media,are essential for optimal integration and adequateparticipation of minorities.

The year 2006 witnessed the adoption of a newset of recommendations, namely on Policing inMulti-ethnic Societies. Various themes addressed inthese Recommendations are very important for afull participation of minorities in society. The needfor an equitable representation of minorities withinthe police force, at all levels in the hierarchy, isobviously relevant. It is not difficult to see thatminorities will feel more ‘included’ when membersof their group are part of the police force. Otherthemes that are important in this respect concernthe way in which the police engage with ethniccommunities and, more generally, the way in whichthey exercise their functions, including questions ofuse of force and the need to avoid even theimpression of ‘ethnic profiling’. The importance of aneutral working environment should not beunderestimated either; or, better, a workingenvironment that adequately accommodates thepopulation diversity present in the force. Thepolicing recommendations are particularlyinnovative because they not only look at linguisticdiversity but also at religious diversity. The‘Explanatory Note to the Recommendations’explicitly points out that the working environmentshould be sensitive to diversity in the needs, customsand religions of different groups (e.g. with regard tomatters of dress, diet and religious observances suchas prayer and holy days).

In view of these characteristics of the policingrecommendations, it is particularly noteworthy thatthey have been very well received by the OSCEstates. While the OSCE may not have the power toadopt legally binding decisions, the documents



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produced by its institutions and bodies, includingthe work of the HCNM, do possess considerable defacto political authority.

European UnionIn relation to the European Union and minorityprotection, it should first of all be emphasized thatthe original, and still the main focus of thatorganization, namely economic integration, lendsitself less evidently to the adoption of minoritypolicies. Furthermore, the EU only has thosecompetences that are explicitly attributed to it in thefounding treaties and there is no explicitcompetence concerning minority protectionattributed to the EU. This explains why there are noexplicit EU standards in relation to minorityprotection and no explicit demands on the memberstates to respect minority rights.

Nevertheless, this has not prevented the EU fromdemanding that third states comply with minorityrights standards, which has led to the well-knowncomplaint about double standards. The best-knownexample is in relation to countries wanting toaccede to the EU. The reference to the need torespect and protect minorities in the politicalCopenhagen Criteria (the requirements that have tobe satisfied by candidate countries in order toaccede to the EU) has drawn the EuropeanCommission into monitoring and evaluating thecandidates’ progress in relation to minorityprotection. Since there were no internal EUbenchmarks, the annual reports used the standardsadopted in the Council of Europe and the OSCE.Arguably, this synergy in the use of standards addsto their strength. Furthermore, the EuropeanCommission relied heavily on the informationcoming from the opinions of the AdvisoryCommittee of the FCNM and the HCNM. Sincethese sources of information concern independentexpert bodies, this reduces (at least to some extent),the danger of politicization of the supervision.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that themonitoring exercise revealed a clear hierarchy ofminority issues. In the 10 recently accededcountries, two minority groups were consistentlystressed, specifically the Russophone minority inEstonia and Latvia and, more generally, the Romaminority. Nevertheless, most of the countriesconcerned have several other minority groups. Inrelation to Bulgaria and Romania, this virtually

exclusive focus on the Roma was apparent. Whilethe Roma are undoubtedly the most excluded anddisadvantaged minority group in these countries,this hierarchy can (also) be translated in terms ofpolitical sensitivities: on the one hand, it isimportant for the EU to maintain good relationswith its most powerful energy supplier, Russia(hence the attention paid to the Russian minorityin candidate countries); and, on the other hand, theRoma as a minority group are considerably lesspolitically sensitive in comparison with wellorganized, politically mobilized and territoriallyconcentrated groups like the Hungarians inSlovakia and Romania. In other words, it is harderfor states to comply with political demands forautonomy (or other issues) because of politicalsensitivities, than it is for them to improve thesituation (living conditions, employment,education, etc.) of the Roma.

This political dimension is also visible in the wayin which the political criteria are used in theaccession monitoring. In relation to the 10 recentlyacceded countries, there was a clear politicaldetermination to proceed with enlargement, whichtranslated itself into the absence of harsh criticisms.Even if some shortcomings were highlighted, theend conclusion remained that the political criteriahad been fulfilled.

When reviewing the European Commissionreports in relation to the current three candidatecountries, Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, adifferent overall picture emerges, which can still – tosome extent at least – be explained in terms ofpolitical considerations. Arguably, the practice inrelation to Macedonia is closest to that for the 10recently acceded countries: the evaluation is quiteeasy-going and not very detailed. While there areseveral references to ongoing ethnic tensions, themost sensitive minority, the Albanians, is nevermentioned by name.

The 2005 report on Croatia is definitelydifferent in tone; it goes into much more detailand is more critical. The extensive attention paidto issues of political participation of ‘minorities’ isstriking in this report. There is again a focus onthe Roma minority but now also on the Serbminority. Apparently, in this case, the EU has lessdifficulty in addressing ‘sensitive’ minorities;though it is difficult to deny that the situation inMacedonia is potentially much more explosive



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than it is in Croatia.Be that as it may, the accession monitoring in

relation to Turkey clearly stands out as being veryelaborate, and critical, which is arguably in line withthe lack of clear political determination to proceedwith the accession of this country. The EuropeanCommission is very critical of the Turkish positionthat the only minorities in Turkey would be non-Muslim minorities. The Commission focuses onseveral non-religious themes, such as language rightsand language in education, and is particularlycritical of the treatment of the Kurdish minority.The Roma minority in Turkey is also paid specialattention – as are the Muslim minorities,particularly the Alevis.

Notwithstanding the legitimacy problem facingthe EU when it is accused of double standards, itshould not be forgotten that all member states, oldand new, are member states of the OSCE andcontracting parties to the ECHR, and that most ofthe old member states have also ratified the FCNM.The impact of the related supervisory mechanismsshould not be underestimated and is conducted byindependent bodies.

It is not surprising that it has been remarked thatit is difficult to pin down the exact relationshipbetween domestic incentives and EU conditionality,and the conditions and recommendations of theEU, the OSCE and the Council of Europe overlap,making it impossible to separate their respectiveeffects. Furthermore, an empirical study of whathappened in relation to minority protection in aselection of recently acceded Central and EasternEurope countries has revealed that internationalpressures were important to set the process inmotion, but the precise content of the legislativeand policy changes was mainly determined bydomestic factors.

Going back to the problem of ‘double standards’and, especially, the lack of an internal minoritypolicy, the following comment can be made inregard to the alleged problem of lack of EUcompetence concerning minority protection. Ananalogy with human rights seems in order. The EUdoes not have an explicit competence in relation tohuman rights. Nevertheless, the European Court ofJustice (ECJ) has identified a duty to respect humanrights for the institutions and the member stateswhen they are operating in the field of EU law. Itcan be argued that, in order to respect human

rights, some kind of regulation/legislation onfundamental rights is needed in relation to theexisting explicit competencies of the EU. Thismainstreaming of human rights in the EU hasultimately resulted in the adoption of the EUCharter on Fundamental Rights.

It is generally accepted that minority rights arepart and parcel of human rights. Hence the duty torespect human rights entails an obligation to respectminority rights, as has been confirmed by theEuropean Commission and as is explicitlyconfirmed in Article I, 2 of the draft ConstitutionalTreaty. In other words, there would already be,under current EU law, a duty on all member statesto respect minority rights (when operating in thefield of EU law).

Some experts have pointed to the followingexisting EU competences where this minorityprotection mainstreaming could be very meaningful.Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty (1957) has beenqualified as a basis for mainstreaming regionalcultural diversity, which could indirectly benefitterritorially concentrated cultural and linguisticminorities. Similarly, Article 13 of the EC Treaty,and the expanded prohibition of discrimination inEC law, have a great deal of potential, since it isnow no longer limited to gender and EU nationalitybut also encompasses religion, and racial and ethnicorigin as prohibited grounds of discrimination. TheRacial Equality Directive (2000/43/EC), which hasbeen adopted on the basis of Article 13, is generallyconsidered to have (at the moment) most potentialfor internal minority protection. This Directive notonly tackles differentiation on the basis of racial orethnic origin, but can also – through the concept ofindirect discrimination – address certaindifferentiations on the basis of language or religion.As pointed out above, this prohibition of indirectdiscrimination if interpreted progressively can beunderstood as imposing on the member states aduty to reasonably accommodate differences, alsodifferences in identities and lifestyles. It is to behoped that this potential development will actuallytake place.

The Directive has a very broad material andpersonal scope of application. The material scope isnot limited to the employment sphere but also targetseducation, health care and social security. The degreeto which the dimension of political participation iscovered will have to be clarified by the jurisprudence



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of the ECJ. Finally, the Directive also sets out toaddress the traditional problems of actualenforcement of the prohibition of discrimination.

It should be underlined that third-countrynationals (immigrants or ‘new’ minorities) canbenefit from this Directive. While Article 3(2)excludes differentiations on the basis of nationalityas such, it has been justly claimed that when adifferentiation on the basis of nationality could bequalified as indirect racial discrimination, it wouldbe covered nevertheless. Clarification of case law ofthe ECJ on this (and other aspects) of the RacialEquality Directive is eagerly awaited, but so far nocases are pending.

While it is still true that there is no coherentinternal minority policy in the EU, there does seemto be an emerging awareness that the EU cannotremain indifferent towards the faith of minorities.While the overarching value of cultural diversityseems a likely avenue for minority-friendly internalmeasures, references in the founding treaties tocultural diversity arguably focus on diversitybetween states rather than diversity within states.However, there are a few exceptions, like Article151(4) and the duty to respect cultural diversityexpressed in Article 22 of the Charter ofFundamental Rights. Article 22 has been construedas a ‘minority’ provision by the EU Network ofIndependent Experts on Fundamental Rights, butthis body has no legislative or judicial power.

Be that as it may, there are increasing referencesto ‘ethnic minorities’ (often side by side with‘immigrants’) in the social inclusion programme.While this is focused on the employment sector, it isinteresting that the 2006 report on social exclusionof the European Commission and the Council ofMinisters states that ‘the exclusion of people andgroups, such as immigrants and ethnic minorities,from participation in work and society [should beaddressed] for economic as well as social justicereasons’. Furthermore, one of the key priorities is to‘improve access to quality services and to overcomediscrimination and increase integration of … ethnicminorities and immigrants’ (8–10). Admittedly,little attention is paid to identity issues, but, as wasalready pointed out, it is possible that identitythemes will also be addressed (in terms of theprohibition of indirect racial discrimination). Themain focus, however, is on employment, as was alsovisible in the name of the Advisory Group

established by the Commission in January 2006,namely the ‘high-level advisory group on socialintegration of ethnic minorities and their fullparticipation in the labour market’. Hopefully, thisattention to minorities and their fate in officialpolicies and documents will translate into a morepositive reality for these groups.

In view of the ongoing resistance of certainstates in relation to minorities (e.g. Belgium,France and Greece), it is unlikely that the foundingtreaties will ever contain an explicit competence inrelation to minorities. This was also noticeable inthe elaboration of the Draft Constitutional Treaty.The protection of minorities is marked as afoundation value of the EU. Although this was abig step forward for minorities, there are still noexplicit competences assigned to the EU to makethis more concrete.

It remains to be seen how the ‘mainstreaming’ ofattention for minorities will develop, and whetherthe ECJ, in its jurisprudence on human rights as ageneral principle of EC law, will take up theposition of the Commission that minority rights area component part of human rights, and hence thatthe actions of states in the field of EC law have tocomply with minority rights. If anything, it will be avery incremental process.

Minority issues in the European states:recurring problemsThe regional report on Europe (pp. 89–102)provides an excellent overview of the recurringproblems in relation to minority protection in theEuropean states. Hence it suffices here to highlightthose themes that are particularly problematic interms of participation (in the broad sense).

The systemic discrimination against the Roma isnot confined to Eastern European states but can alsobe witnessed in Western European states. Similarproblems of exclusion from economic, social andpolitical life have also been remarked in relation tothe North African communities (new minorities) inseveral states. Nevertheless, it should beacknowledged that in the wake of the (duty to)grant EU citizens electoral rights in local elections,Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden also grantelectoral rights to non-EU nationals after 3–5 yearsof residence. So far this does not seem to have had asignificant impact on the overall level of economic(or social) participation of the population groups



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concerned. More seems to be needed to counterprejudice against immigrant groups.

The practice of several countries of introducingadvisory bodies for immigrants or minorities is to bewelcomed as an important mechanism forrepresentation and participation. However, there isscope for such bodies to be better institutionalized.

Since 11 September 2001, anti-Muslim sentimenthas been gaining ground in several, if not most,European states. Governments should pay specialattention to the danger that the application of anti-terrorist measures does not disproportionately targetMuslims. This unjustifiable disparate impact wouldamount to a violation of the prohibition of indirectdiscrimination.

Finally, it should be underlined that unreasonablelinguistic requirements in relation to access to jobs,to nationality or to the passive right to vote,similarly could amount to indirect racialdiscrimination. While the problems of theRussophone minority in Estonia and Latvia in thisrespect are well known, other governments shouldalso take care to avoid such requirements, in view ofthe resulting serious impairments of variousdimensions of participation.

Trends, prospects and suggestionsThe above overview has revealed a complexpatchwork of outright positive developments,developments with potential to improve minorityprotection but also negative developments that needto be addressed urgently.

At the level of the states themselves, the questionof political will is very important, not least becausethe minority rights standards themselves leave statesa considerable amount of discretion. Political will onthe part of states matters not only at the level ofimplementation but also at the level of the adoptionof (new) standards. In this respect, the call to adoptan additional directive to tackle the particularintegration problems of Roma can be highlighted.

The discretion left to states concerningimplementation also underscores the importance ofadequate monitoring systems. It is striking that thelack of judicial supervision of the FCNM has notprevented the contracting parties from taking upthe suggestions of the AC by way of anincremental process. The jurisprudence of theECHR reveals that there is a great deal of potentialbut that the Court so far has not made full use of

it, often because of the margin of appreciation itallows states.

It remains to be seen to what extent the process ofinternalization of minority protection in the EU willproceed. In this respect, the case law of the ECJ,inter alia in relation to the Racial Equality Directive,and the possible place of minority rights withinhuman rights as general principle of EC law, iseagerly awaited. p



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A T L A N T I C

O C E A N

I N D I A N

O C E A N

TUNISIA

MOROCCO

ALGERIA LIBYA

SUDAN

EGYPT

ETHIOPIA

KENYA

UGANDA

CHAD

NIGER

NIGERIA

CAMEROON

GABONREP. OF

THE CONGO

DEM. REP. OF THE CONGO

CENTRALAFRICAN REP.

MALI

MAURITANIA

WesternSahara

SENEGAL

SIERRALEONE

LIBERIA

GUINEA-BISSAU

CÔTE D’IVOIRE GHANA

TOGO

BURKINA FASO

THE GAMBIA

BENIN

EQUAT. GUINEA

SAO TOMEAND PRINCIPE

ANGOLA

ZAMBIA

BOTSWANA

SOUTH AFRICA

SWAZILAND

MOZAMBIQUE

MALAWI

RWANDA

BURUNDI

TANZANIA

NAMIBIA

LESOTHO

GUINEADJIBOUTI

ZIMBABWE

SOMALIA

ERITREA

MADAGASCAR

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:38 Page 44

AfricaEric Witte

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On the whole, conditions for minorities in Africaremained bleak during 2006, and were clearly worsein those places where minorities lackedrepresentation. Mass atrocities in Darfur intensifiedfollowing a May peace agreement that largelyexcluded two important minority groups. Likewise,a July 2006 peace agreement in the Cabinda regionof Angola appeared to be in jeopardy following theexclusion of key Cabindan factions. In Nigeria,conflict in the Niger Delta region continuedunabated as credible representatives of Deltaminorities were largely excluded from discussionsabout the sharing of oil revenues and that issue’slink to endemic violence. In other parts of Nigeria,systematic exclusion of minorities in the name of‘indigeneity’ fuelled ethnic violence. In the Horn ofAfrica, pastoralist minorities competing for everscarcer resources came into worsening conflict witheach other, even as they remained under-representedin government institutions dealing with their plight.At the end of 2006, the US-backed Ethiopianmilitary action to break the grip of the Islamistalliance in Somalia raised the spectre of a growingconflict, drawing in many different foreign actors, asthe humanitarian plight of Somalis worsens.

Liberia saw improved prospects as new PresidentEllen Johnson Sirleaf aimed to include all ethnicgroups in her government and emphasized theempowerment of girls and women. Burundi hadreason to hope that cyclical inter-ethnic atrocitiesmight finally cease as the final rebel faction signedup to a peace agreement. Though still sufferingfrom years of brutal conflict, the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo went to the polls for the firsttime in 40 years with the hope that an electedgovernment might finally end the rampage ofwarlords who have brought suffering to all of itsmany minorities and chronic sexual violence toCongolese women.

West AfricaCôte d’Ivoire A stand-off continues between a governmentdominated by southern ethnic groups, notably thoseof the Akan linguistic-cultural area and the minorityBété (of which President Laurent Gbagbo is one),and northern New Forces rebels largely consisting ofMuslim ethnic Dioulas (Mandé) and Senoufos. Fordecades, Côte d’Ivoire had one of Africa’s strongesteconomies and attracted large immigrant

communities from Burkina Faso and Mali, many ofwhom stayed for generations, but whose citizenshipis now disputed by many southerners.

The seeds of the current conflict were sowed in1999 when Robert Guei (himself a Yacouba, aminority group along the Liberian border) seizedpower in a 1999 military coup and promoted hispredecessor’s xenophobic notion of ‘Ivoirité’ toquestion the citizenship of northerners, and tosideline prominent northern presidential candidateAlassane Outtara in 2000. Laurent Gbagbo replacedGuei following troubled elections that same year,but embraced ‘Ivoirité’, and his supporters killedscores of northerners. Northern army unitsmutinied in September 2002 and the resultingclashes killed thousands, leaving the country de factopartitioned.

Apart from a spike of violence in November2004, an international buffer of 7,000 UnitedNations (UN) peacekeepers and 4,000 Frenchtroops has been successful in preventing theresumption of large-scale clashes. Following thefailure of peace agreements in January 2003 andJuly 2004, the two sides signed a new compact inApril 2005. The agreement aimed to addressnorthern concerns about identification, nationalityand electoral laws; it led to the demobilization ofmilitant groups linked to President Gbagbo andprovided for a transitional power-sharinggovernment until elections in October 2005. Withlagging implementation and tension still palpable,the UN Security Council approved an extension ofthe provisional government until October 2006,albeit under an internationally appointed primeminister alongside President Gbagbo.

In November 2006, with elections cancelled andleaders on both sides of the north–south dividecultivating ethnic division, the UN Security Councilextended this arrangement until October 2007elections. Though the Security Council resolutiontransfers military and civilian authority fromPresident Gbagbo to appointed Prime MinisterCharles Konan Banny, Gbagbo immediatelyannounced that ‘any articles, any clauses in theresolution which constitute violations of Côted’Ivoire’s constitution will not be applied’.

Liberia In January 2006, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf wasinaugurated as Liberia’s new president. She pledged

Africa State of the World’sMinorities 2007

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to end the political manipulation of ethnicity,empower Liberia’s women, and pursue broadeconomic development. In February, Johnson Sirleafinaugurated a Truth and ReconciliationCommission tasked with helping the country facethe past and overcome its divisions. At her request,the following month Nigeria surrendered formerPresident Charles Taylor to Liberia for delivery tothe international war crimes tribunal in SierraLeone. In a stunning break with warlordism andimpunity in Africa, he now awaits trial in TheHague, while Liberia seeks to overcome the deepscars to which he contributed.

Around 95 per cent of Liberia’s populationconsists of 16 indigenous ethnic groups, withAmerico-Liberian descendants of freed slavesmaking up most of the rest. Americo-Liberian elitesestablished Liberia in 1847, employing divide-and-rule practices and limited voting rights againstindigenous Liberians to maintain dominance until1980, when Samuel K. Doe overthrew the rulingparty. Rather than empowering all indigenousLiberians, Doe built a brutal dictatorship based onfavouritism for his small ethnic Krahn and relatedgroups. His persecution of such other minorities asthe Gio, Grebo and Mano fuelled a December 1989insurgency led by Charles Taylor.

Rallied to ‘kill the Krahn’, Taylor’s forces engagedin years of brutal conflict against other factions andWest African peacekeepers before Taylor assumedthe presidency in 1997. His repression ofdisfavoured minorities encouraged a new rebellionin 1999. As rebels advanced on the capital – andfollowing announcement of his indictment for warcrimes in neighbouring Sierra Leone – Taylor fled toNigeria in August 2003. After two years oftransitional government noted for weak leadershipand corruption, in November 2005 Ellen JohnsonSirleaf won the presidency with broad support fromdiverse ethnic groups.

NigeriaIn the course of 2006, Nigeria, the most populouscountry in Africa, strained under its complicatedfederal system, the political manipulation ofethnicity, and unrest over resource sharing.

The Igbo (Ibo), Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba peoplesmake up around 65 per cent of Nigeria’s population,but there are over 250 ethnic groups. During thecolonial era, Britain gave preferred educational

opportunities to the largely Christian populations ofthe south, with northern Muslims relying to a greatextent on Koranic education. Beginning in colonialtimes, there have been varying attempts to manageor exploit Nigeria’s ethnic, religious and linguisticdiversity through various forms of federalism. Since1996, the country has been divided into 36 statesand 774 Local Government Areas.

Beginning with the country’s 1979 Constitution,the concept of ‘indigeneity’ has been perpetuated inthe current 1999 Constitution. This systemcategorizes all Nigerians as indigenes or non-indigenes (also labelled ‘settlers’) to a region basedon where their parents or grandparents were born.The mechanism’s intent was to ensure ethnic parityin education and employment, as well as to protecttraditional cultures. But in 2006 Human RightsWatch and the International Crisis Groupseparately reported that the principle has insteadsystematically marginalized millions of Nigeriansand encouraged ethno-linguistic identity politicsthat have fanned the flames of inter-communalviolence, even where the roots of many conflicts lieelsewhere or pre-date policies of indigeneity. Themere definition of which groups are indigenous to aregion creates many controversies; disputedhistorical migration patterns and intermarriageoften make clear delineations impossible. Thepolicy has become a tool for indigenes across thecountry to exclude competing ‘settlers’ from scarceeducational and employment opportunities, even ifthese are life-long residents of the community. Notsurprisingly, this has led to fierce resentment amongthe excluded.

For example, in diverse Plateau State, indigeneityhas been used by Christian politicians to maintaindominance through exclusion of Muslim Hausa andFulani ‘settlers’. The Jarawa ethnic group is alsoclassified as ‘non-indigene’, although it also fails toqualify for indigenous status anywhere in Nigeria.Between 1999 and 2004 in Plateau State, inter-communal fighting arising from disputes overindigeneity, land and religion resulted in 250,000internally displaced persons. April 2006 fightingbetween members of the Pan and Gomai ethnicgroups over issues of indigeneity resulted in over100 killed and 8,000 displaced persons.

In the wake of the September 2005 publication ofDanish cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed,in February 2006 Muslim mobs attacked minority


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Christians in northern Nigeria, killing 16 andburning 11 churches. The government deployedsoldiers and riot police to contain the violence.

Niger DeltaOil from the Niger Delta has made Nigeria theworld’s twelfth largest oil producer and accounts for95 per cent of its foreign currency revenue. Despitehigh world oil prices, such minority groups of theNiger Delta as the Ijaw and Ogoni remain mired inpoverty, lacking in education and jobs, and sufferingfrom oil companies’ pollution of their air and water.Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution gives the centralgovernment ownership of the country’s naturalresources. Most of the derivative percentage passedback to state and local accounts is stolen by corruptofficials. Tensions have mounted, with ethnicresistance groups in the Delta increasingly turningto violent means. Militants launched a series ofattacks on oil installations in January and February2006. In April, President Olusegun Obasanjoproposed a ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Delta, but onlywith involvement of corrupt local officials andexclusion of many civil society organizations thatenjoy credibility in the region. Following furtherattacks, in August 2006 Obasanjo ordered acrackdown on militants while still pursuingnegotiations. The abduction of oil workers inOctober 2006 pointed to continuing radicalizationamong minority populations of the Delta, and anongoing need to address the causes of their anger.

North AfricaAlgeria In 2006 the Berber minority of Algeria, comprising20–30 per cent of the population, viewed withtrepidation a possible thaw in the relationshipbetween the government and Islamic militantorganizations, all the more so following attacks onBerber political leaders.

In 2001, years of agitation for greater recognitionof their Tamazight language, music and cultureculminated in rioting. Implementation of vagueJanuary 2005 government concessions to Berberdemands stemming from the unrest has beenovershadowed by a rapprochement between thegovernment and Islamic extremists. In February2006, the cabinet of President Abdelaziz Bouteflikadeclared a six-month amnesty for government forcesand most Islamist militants who were involved in

the civil war of the 1990s if they agreed to disarm,but by its expiration fewer than 300 militants hadaccepted the offer. The sweeping ‘law implementingthe charter on peace and national reconciliation’ alsocriminalized discussion of the conflict. Some Berberorganizations that favour a secular Algerian state,such as the Movement for Autonomy in Kabylie,feared that the Bouteflika government was gettingtoo close to the Islamists, even as this relationshipremained ambivalent. In October 2006, thepresident of the Popular Assembly in the TiziOuzou province of the Kabylie region was shot andkilled. The government blamed Islamic militants forthis and two other assassinations of Berber leadersover the previous 13 months.

Egypt Continuing religious intolerance in Egypt during2006 led Christian Copts to seek the protectionfrom the government, and the Baha’i minority tofear that government’s active role in their torment.

The Copts are Egyptian Christians, mostlyOrthodox, who trace their roots to Pharaonicpeoples and their conversion to the arrival of StMark in the first century AD. Nationally, Coptsmake up around 5–10 per cent of the populationbut are more concentrated in Cairo and Alexandriaand comprise an estimated 18–19 per cent of thepopulation in southern Egypt. They face statediscrimination in such areas as universityadmissions, public spending, military promotionsand required authorizations for the building orrepair of churches. Islamist attacks on Copts haveled the latter to fear legalization of Egypt’s largestopposition force, the Muslim Brotherhood. April2006 knife attacks on Copts outside churches inAlexandria led to sectarian violence.

Whereas Shari’a law recognizes Coptic Christiansas ‘people of the book’, no such tolerance exists forthe tiny Baha’i community of 500–2,000. Baha’i is areligion with roots in Shia Islam that emanated fromPersia in the nineteenth century. Because the Baha’ibelieve that God’s word is passed to humansthrough an ongoing series of revelations, it clasheswith Islam’s view that the Prophet Mohammed’srevelations were the final ones. Currently, manyBaha’i believers in Egypt are denied birth certificatesand the identification required to open bankaccounts or enrol their children in school, and theirmarriages are not recognized. The Egyptian


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government is appealing a court ruling from April2006 that allows Baha’i to have identity cards listingtheir faith. A related government report in October2006 argued that Baha’is must be ‘identified,confronted and singled out so that they can bewatched carefully, isolated and monitored in orderto protect the rest of the population as well as Islamfrom their danger, influence and their teachings’.

Morocco: Western SaharaIn 2006, Morocco continued in its refusal to allow areferendum in Western Sahara that might end thelong-standing impasse with the Saharawis in thatoccupied land.

The Saharawis of Western Sahara are traditionallynomadic herders, now largely urbanized, of mixedBerber, Arab and black African descent. They speak adialect of Arabic called Hassaniya. In 1975, thecolonial ruler Spain ceded Western Sahara, which isrich in phosphates, fisheries and suspected offshoreoil, to Morocco and Mauritania. That same year theInternational Court of Justice (ICJ) found thatneither had legitimate claims to territorialsovereignty over the region. The Saharawiopposition, the Polisario Front, fought bothcountries. Mauritania withdrew in 1979, ceding itsclaim to Morocco, against whom the rebels foughtfor 16 years with Algeria’s support. Of a populationof around 250,000, some 160,000 Saharawis fled torefugee camps in southern Algeria, where theyremain today. The conflict ended with theintroduction of UN peacekeepers in 1991, and theexpectation that there would be a referendum onself-determination in accordance with the 1975 ICJruling and subsequent UN resolutions.

Morocco has consistently refused to allow areferendum and, in October 2006, the UN SecurityCouncil extended the 15-year-old UN peacekeepingmission for a further six months. Following a May2005 crackdown by Moroccan authorities, aSeptember 2006 UN report leaked to the press raisedconcerns about Saharawis suffering police brutality,torture, lack of freedom of expression or due process.Nevertheless, Moroccan ally France blocked proposalsto include these concerns in the latest UN resolutionprolonging the peacekeeping force. A controversialJuly 2005 fishing agreement between the EU andMorocco, pending approval by the EuropeanParliament, would allow EU fishing vessels to catch inoccupied Western Sahara’s rich coastal waters.

Central AfricaAngola: Cabinda Hopes of progress to end the conflict over the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda faded in that latter half of2006 as the government sidelined a civil societyorganization representing the minority population.

The Bakongo people of Central Africa make uparound 14 per cent of Angola’s population, and thepreponderance of the 300,000 people of thenorthern Angolan province of Cabinda. Cabinda isseparated from the rest of Angola by the sliver of theDemocratic Republic of Congo that runs to theAtlantic. Though tiny in size and relativepopulation, the area represents an estimated 60 percent of Angola’s vast oil reserves.

The natural resource has raised the stakes forCabindan efforts to achieve self-determination thatdate back to 1961. With the end of Angola’s civilwar in 2002, fighting in Cabinda betweenseparatists and the Angolan army intensified,resulting in widespread human rights abuses againstCabindans. From March 2006, an umbrellaorganization, the Cabinda Forum for Dialogue(FDC), entered into discussions with thegovernment. In July 2006, the government bannedone element of the FDC: Cabinda’s only humanrights organization, Mpalabanda. In August oneCabindan rebel leader signed a separate peace withthe government that was disavowed by otherCabindan factions. The head of Mpalabanda wasarrested in September 2006 and released one monthlater, pending trial for ‘instigating, inciting andcondoning crimes against the security of the state’.Chevron, the largest oil operator in Cabinda,conceals the amount they pay to the Angolangovernment. Non-governmental organizations(NGOs) criticize the oil giant for contributing tograft that only fuels resentment among theimpoverished Cabindan population.

BurundiIn 2006, war-torn Burundi had reason to hope thatit could finally end decades of mutual atrocitiesbetween its Hutu majority and Tutsi minority as thelast rebel group signed up to a peace agreement andtransitional justice mechanisms were being developedto help the country process its tortured history.

The population of Burundi is 85 per cent Hutu,14 per cent Tutsi and 1 per cent Twa. Although Tutsipastoralists generally enjoyed privilege in pre-colonial


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times, colonialism and political manipulationfollowing the country’s independence in 1962sharpened ethnic differences, and these eclipsed othersocial divides. Successive Tutsi military regimesoversaw several massacres of Hutu, notably in 1972,when between 100,000 and 200,000 Hutu werekilled and 300,000 forced to flee the country. Theassassination of a newly elected Hutu president in1993 sparked an uprising that resulted in 100,000Tutsi deaths; the Tutsi-dominated army killed tens ofthousands of Hutu in retribution. Fighting continuedthroughout the decade, exacerbated by the 1994genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. Throughout, thesmall Twa minority of forest dwellers suffered at thehands of both Hutu and Tutsi fighters.

The 2000 Arusha Accords created a transitionalgovernment. By 2003, one of two hold-out Hutumilitias had signed up to the peace agreement, andUN peacekeepers arrived in 2004. In 2005,Burundians voted overwhelmingly to approve a newpower-sharing constitution with ethnic quotas forrepresentation in government, administration andthe military. In August 2005 elections, PierreNkurunziza and his Hutu-dominated party, aformer rebel faction that allegedly committedmassive human rights abuses, took control of everybranch of government. The election campaign sawintra-Hutu rivalries overshadow the Hutu–Tutsidivide. In April 2006, the government deemed thesituation in Burundi safe enough to lift a midnight-to-dawn curfew that had been in place since 1993.Amid halting progress on political reform, temperedby continued reports of government torture andother human rights abuses, the last hold-out Hutumilitia signed a peace agreement in September2006. Despite a limited amnesty granted to theserebels, the government and UN are moving forwardwith creation of a special war crimes court and aTruth and Reconciliation Commission.

Democratic Republic of the CongoIn 2006 the first democratic elections in nearly 40years offered some hope that the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo (DRC) might finally


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Right: Election materials stockpiled in the warehouseof the Independent Electoral Commission. TheDemocratic Republic of Congo’s first multi-partyelections in over 40 years were held in July 2006.Sven Torfinn/Panos Pictures

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overcome ethnic divisions long exploited bydomestic and foreign powers for political andmaterial gain. Against the backdrop of deep ethno-linguistic divides, a devastated economy and themilitarization of much of the country, thedemocratic election of incumbent President JosephKabila and his party’s strong showing in elections tothe weak national Parliament may have signalled anew chance for the DRC, but by no means assuredits peaceful future.

The DRC is a geographically diverse country thesize of Western Europe, with a population of almost60 million made up of hundreds of ethno-linguisticgroups. Throughout its history of brutalexploitation as a personal fiefdom of Belgian KingLeopold II from 1881 until 1908, Belgian colonialrule until independence in 1960, and its plunderingby US-backed dictator Mobutu Sese Seko duringthe Cold War years, the territory’s ethnic diversityhas been manipulated to serve the interests of thoseseeking to control its tremendous wealth of naturalresources, including rubber, timber, gold, copper,cobalt, coltan and diamonds.

Following the 1994 genocide in neighbouringRwanda, many Hutu extremist perpetrators joinedhundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees who fearedretribution in eastern DRC (then still known asZaire). From there, the militants, with the support of

Mobutu, launched attacks on the new Rwandangovernment as well as on Congolese Tutsi, theBanyamulenge. In 1996 Rwanda and Uganda senttheir own forces into Zaire, and backed the rebelLaurent Kabila in a westward sweep through the vastcountry. In the process, Rwandan government forcesand Kabila’s forces killed thousands of Hutus,combatants and non-combatants alike. Mobutu fledas Kabila took the capital Kinshasa in May 1997 andrenamed the country DRC. However, Kabila quicklyfell out with Rwanda and Uganda, and in 1998 thesecountries sponsored rebel movements to invade theDRC anew. The rebels also had the support ofBurundi, while the Kabila government had that ofAngola, Namibia and Zimbabwe. Seven nations werenow involved and, because their various roles wereoften rewarded with natural resource concessions,they had little incentive to withdraw. Fightingcontinued despite a July 1999 ceasefire agreementand deployment of an understaffed UNpeacekeeping mission (MONUC) in 2000. A studyby the International Rescue Committee found thatbetween 1998 and 2004 nearly 4 million people inthe DRC – the equivalent of the entire population ofIreland – died as a result of the war.

Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001and his son, Joseph Kabila, assumed the presidency.Under international pressure, he entered into a


52

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DRC

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power-sharing government with rebel factions andcivil society in July 2003. Violence in the north-eastern Ituri province flared, despite the improvedsituation in Kinshasa, and French-led EuropeanUnion (EU) peacekeepers intervened in 2003 toquell the violence in and around Ituri’s capitalBunia. In July 2003 and October 2004 the UNSecurity Council bolstered MONUC to a nearly17,000-strong force, and gave it a new mandate toprotect civilians ‘under imminent threat of violence’.In April 2006, the EU approved deployment ofadditional peacekeepers to provide security for UN-administered national and local elections foreseen bythe 2002 peace agreement that led to the power-sharing government.

Over 30 presidential candidates emerged during2006 in a campaign marred by incitement to ethnichatred. According to Human Rights Watch, in May2006 one of DRC’s four vice-presidents engaged inanti-Tutsi rhetoric at a campaign rally for JosephKabila in the North Kivu town of Goma. Anothervice-president, and Kabila’s main rival for thepresidency, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was a leadingUgandan-backed warlord in north-eastern Congoprior to entering the government in 2003. Hestands indicted in the Central African Republic inconnection with a rebellion there, and is widelybelieved to be under investigation by theInternational Criminal Court. He based much of hiscampaign on xenophobic rhetoric aimed at castingdoubt on Kabila’s Congolese identity. When resultswere announced on 20 August 2006, Kabila had 45per cent to Bemba’s 20 per cent, requiring a run-off.The announcement sparked three days of violencebetween their supporters in Kinshasa that killed atleast 23 people and required intervention by UNand EU peacekeepers.

The run-off election was held on 29 October and,despite violence in part of Ituri province,international observers deemed the voting to belargely free and fair. Kabila won with 58 per cent ofthe vote, mostly from the Swahili-speaking east,creating concern about his ability to overcome thedivide with the Lingala-speaking west. Bemba losthis challenge of the results in court and, despiteearlier violent outbursts by his supporters inKinshasa, Bemba announced in late November thathe would respect the election results.

The years of war since the 1996 and 1998invasions have resulted in a proliferation of militias

and a spread of lawlessness, particularly in theeastern DRC provinces of Ituri, North and SouthKivu, and Katanga. The Kinshasa government andinvading forces alike have established ethnicallybased militias, including local Mai-Mai defenceforces, usually organized along tribal lines. Armedfactions were encouraged by their sponsors to preyon local populations for subsistence and lootedgoods. The larger context of DRC’s chaos andnatural resource wealth combined with marauding,predatory militias has sharpened various ethnicconflicts, put the country’s minority groups at riskand resulted in staggering levels of sexual violenceagainst women.

Inter-communal violence has gone well beyondthat associated with the divide between Hutu andTutsi/Banyamulenge, most prevalent in North andSouth Kivu. Tensions between Hema and Lendupeoples, incited during colonial times and theMobutu era, have destabilized Ituri province. As thepower-sharing government was taking shape in2002–3, clashes between heavily armed Hema andLendu militias and massacres of civilians resulted inat least 50,000 deaths and sparked EU intervention.Despite a demobilization programme, extended inJuly 2006, there were reports in September 2006that splintered Hema and Lendu militias were re-arming and engaging in new clashes. In Katangaprovince, allies of Kabila engaged in violentintimidation of the opposition, consisting largely ofthe Luba people who have roots in Kasai province.

As MRG found in 2002, even Twa or Bambuti(pygmy) peoples living deep in the forests of easternDRC had become targets of various militias, includingthat of Jean-Pierre Bemba. Militias target the Twa inorder to deprive rivals of Twa hunting skills andknowledge of forest paths. Twa women have beensingled out for rape due to the belief that sleepingwith them confers special powers on the rapist.

All of DRC’s many minority groups, andespecially women, remain under threat from anunprofessional government army and the manymilitias. Their greatest hope rests with efforts toovercome the country’s corruption, mal-governance,impunity and lack of state control in the east.

RwandaDuring 2006, the Tutsi-dominated RwandanPatriotic Front (RPF) government continued topursue policies of playing down ethnicity as a means


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of overcoming the minority’s endangerment – alltoo evident in the 1994 genocide that claimed anestimated 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu victimsat the hands of Hutu nationalists. Rwanda’spopulation consists of 85 per cent Hutu, 14 percent Tutsi, and 1 per cent Twa.

Critics claim that its bans on ‘divisive’ parties andorganizations are designed to serve RPF powerinterests. In February 2006, Rwanda’s first post-genocide president, Pasteur Bizimungu – a Hutu –lost an appeal against his 2004 conviction for‘criminal association’ in his attempt to form a rivalparty in 2002. Human Rights Watch documentedflaws in his first-instance trial.

In the course 2006, the International CriminalTribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) continued to hear top-tier genocide cases, while Rwanda’s traditionalgacaca courts continued to try large numbers of lessprominent cases. In January 2007, the Rwandancabinet voted to abolish the death penalty. Ifapproved by parliament, the move will allowcountries which object to the death penalty toextradite genocide suspects back to Rwanda.Abolition of the death penalty was also a pre-requisite for the transfer of some ICTR cases toRwanda’s national court system. The ICTRprosecutor still hadn’t taken up serious allegations ofwar crimes committed by the RPF’s predecessor, theRwandan Patriotic Army, during the genocide. Theprosecutor faced the implicit threat that if he did sothe government would rescind all cooperation withthe tribunal.

The indigenous Twa people of Rwanda,numbering an estimated 25,000–30,000, remain onsociety’s margins, disadvantaged in education, healthcare and land rights. The government of Rwandahas threatened to cut off all assistance to the Twaand their organizations if they continue to considerthemselves as a distinct people.

UgandaAcholiIn Uganda during 2006, the search for an end tothe brutalizing war of the north gathered pace, asthe Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), notorious forabducting children and turning them into killers,signalled a willingness to negotiate following itsleaders’ indictment in 2005 by the InternationalCriminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and crimesagainst humanity.

Under British colonial rule the Acholi people ofnorthern Uganda were favoured for service in thepolice and army. When Milton Obote seized powerin 1966, four years after independence, hesurrounded himself with Acholi and othernortherners, and repressed southern peoples. IdiAmin, himself a northerner from the minorityKakwa group in the West Nile area, unleashedhorrific retribution against the Acholi from 1972to 1979. Rebel leader Yoweri Museveni, asoutherner, came to power in 1985, and broughtincreasing stability and prosperity to Uganda, withexception of the north.

For 20 years, the Acholi have been victimized bythe LRA. The rebel group receives support from theSudanese government and are led by an erratic Acholinamed Joseph Kony. The LRA has abducted anestimated 25,000 children over the years, forcingthem to commit heinous atrocities against the Acholipeople. In response, Museveni’s government hasforced 1.4 to 1.9 million civilians into camps wherethey remain prone to attack by the LRA and thenational army alike, and unable to grow their ownfood. The ICC issued arrest warrants for Kony andfour other LRA leaders on charges of war crimes andcrimes against humanity in February 2005. Through2006, the LRA has insisted on immunity fromprosecution in exchange for an end to the fighting.Acholi opinion on the matter is divided. Negotiationsare continuing despite the international indictments;the discussions included a meeting between Kony andUN Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland.

BatwaIn July 2006, the Uganda Land Alliance for Coalitionof Pastoral Civil Society Organizations warned thatthe few thousand Batwa (Twa) of Uganda are indanger of extinction. The organization’s reportwarned of starvation and loss of social cohesionamong desperate Batwa who lost their homes in theBwindi Impenetrable Game Park when this became aWorld Heritage Site for preservation of endangeredmountain gorillas in 1992.

East AfricaEthiopiaThe efforts of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi tocontrol separatism in Ethiopia appeared to beunravelling in 2006, as various ethnic movementsdrew inspiration from government repression and


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lack of democratic participation. Ethnic liberation movements toppled former

Communist dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in1991, and Meles Zenawi, the leader of the TigreanPeople’s Liberation Front, set about organizing thestate as an ethnic federation, albeit one in which hewould lead co-opted representatives of otherethnicities under a single-party umbrella: theEthiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front.This proved a particularly difficult undertaking asTigreans comprise only around 6 per cent of theEthiopian population. Prime Minister Meles’s re-election in flawed May 2005 balloting onlydeepened the resentment of other ethnic groups.

This was especially true of Ethiopia’s Amharapeople, about 30 per cent of the population of thecountry. The Amhara are prominent in the politicalopposition and suffered in the governmentcrackdown on protests at election fraud, whichresulted in at least 193 deaths and 763 injuries.

In February 2006, the government arrestedthousands of Oromo – an ethnic group making upapproximately 30–50 per cent of the country’spopulation – following its protests of the electionirregularities called for by the rebel OromoLiberation Front (OLF) in the south of the country.In September, two senior Ethiopian military officersdefected to the OLF.

In December 2006, the Ethiopian military,backed by the USA, took on the Islamist alliance inneighbouring Somalia, driving it from control of thecapital Mogadishu on 28 December. Ethiopia is theprincipal backer of the weak Somali transitionalfederal government headed by President AbdullahiYusuf Ahmed. Prime Minister Meles Zenawijustified the invasion by citing national defenceinterests, claiming that the Islamists had beeninfiltrated by al-Qaeda. Sabre-rattling by the Unionof Islamic Courts – calling for a holy war on AddisAbaba, and overt support for the Ogaden self-determination groups – raised tensions in 2006.Two wars have already been fought over the Ogadenregion in the South-East of the Ethiopia, where themajority of the population is ethnic Somali.Although Ethiopia has vowed to withdraw its forcescompletely from Somalia, it is unclear whether thepromised AU peacekeeping mission will transpire.Without Ethiopian military support, a question-mark remains over the TFG’s ability to hold ontothe territory seized in December’s offensive.

Meles also faced rebellions among smaller ethnicminority groups. The Anuak – traditional hunters,farmers and fishers – make up approximately 1 percent of the country’s population, and for centurieshave lived in the area that is today’s Gambella regionof south-western Ethiopia. The Anuak have livedalongside, and in competition with, Nuerpastoralists. Under the Mengistu regime, the Anuakfaced considerable suppression as the authoritiesseized land and forcibly conscripted Anuak villagersfor service in the army and on collective farms.Some 60,000 peasants, mostly lighter-skinned‘highlanders’ from other parts of Ethiopia, were alsoforcibly resettled in Gambella. Tensions have risen ascompetition for land and water has intensified.

In recent years, the Meles government has alsomoved against the Anuak, with human rights activistsreporting murder, rape and torture. The governmenthas increased the military presence in the areafollowing attacks by militants. It argues that themilitary action is targeted at the rebels – but Anuakleaders claim that civilians are also being targeted. InApril 2006, there were reports that the Ethiopian armywas cooperating with the Sudan People’s LiberationArmy to disarm Anuak along the border. AmnestyInternational reported in May 2006 that, in theprevious two and a half years, the Ethiopiangovernment had detained 900 Anuak oppositionmembers without trial, though it had released 15former senior officials in December 2005. Tensionsrose again in June 2006 when attackers thought by aidworkers to be Anuak militia members ambushed a bustravelling from Addis Ababa to Gambella, killing anestimated 14–30 civilians. In the immediate aftermath,water and power were cut to Gambella town, andEthiopian troops and highlander militias enforced acurfew. In September 2006 a Dutch humanitarianNGO reported that more than 44,600 internallydisplaced persons – Anuak, Nuer and Highlander alike– were living in camps and in dire need of assistance.

Oil is another factor in this dispute. Although inMay 2006 the Malaysian oil company Petronasannounced that its first test well in the area hadproved barren, land use rights in Gambella remaincontentious, and efforts to discover oil could yetintensify the struggle for control of the region.

Horn of Africa: Pastoralist peoplesAcross the Horn of Africa, traditionally nomadicherders are suffering from competition for land


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worsened by drought and regional conflict. Inturn, their dire situation is increasingly drivingthem into conflict with each other, as well as non-pastoralist peoples.

Traditionally pastoral peoples of Kenya, includingBorana, Gabra, Maasai, Pokot, Samburu, Somalis andTurkana, have long seen the land available for theirherds diminish. Under British colonialism, whitescarved out large estates in fertile areas that had earlierbeen used as communal grazing lands. Atindependence in 1963 much of this land made its wayinto the hands of Kenyan elites. The establishment ofnational parks and game reserves also pushed nomadicherders out of their traditional lands. For example, theEndorois community has been evicted from the Lake

Bogoria area in the Rift Valley, and the Monchongoiforest on the Laikipia Plains, to make way for a gamereserve and ruby mining. The community has notreceived adequate compensation for their eviction, norhas it benefited from the tourism in the reserve.

In recent years, the area of pasture lands availableto pastoralists has been further reduced through afailure of multiple rainy seasons widely attributed toglobal warming. As pastures and water have becomescarcer, pastoralist peoples of Kenya andneighbouring states have come into conflict overwhat little remains.

A March 2006 cattle raid launched by the Pokotpeople of north-western Kenya into Uganda sparkeda response from the Ugandan army, and at least fourcivilians were killed. A UN official in Ugandaobserved that, ‘the first aim is normally not to stealanimals, but to monopolize the water source’. ByMay, in response to the killing of at least 19 peoplein cattle raids over the course of the year, the Kenyangovernment had launched an operation aimed atcollecting up to 30,000 illegally held weapons in


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Below: The outline of a body in the village ofJowara, which was attacked by Janjaweed militiaduring a series of raids in April 2006. Over 109people from this and other villages betweenD’jmenez and Jowara were massacred over a periodof two days. Tim A. Hetherington/Panos Pictures

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western Kenya. Local Pokot and Samburu peopleclaimed that the operation was undertaken withoutadequate consultation and had sparked the flight ofthousands of pastoralists across the border.

Pokot cattle raids continued in 2006, drivingthousands of Samburu into camps, and have beenmarked by widespread murder and rape. In October,Samburu pastoralists pressed claims to ancestralrights to graze their cattle on private farms inLaikipia and government forces moved in to forciblyevict the herders. Similarly, Maasai herdsmen drovecattle into the Masai Mara game reserve to protestwhat they claimed was a corrupt allocation of 4,000acres of park land to an elite Maasai developer.

In October, MRG and the Centre for MinorityRights Development brought together women fromvarious pastoral communities in Kenya to discusscommon problems. The participants underscored thelack of women’s representation within theircommunities, and the lack of adequate representationof pastoral peoples in the Kenyan government.

In south-western Tanzania, in May 2006, thegovernment began the eviction of hundreds ofpastoralists from riverbeds in Mbeya in order toprevent further environmental degradation caused bytheir cattle. Likewise, following poor March–Mayrains across the region, competition for land insouthern Ethiopia has led to conflict. In June,Oxfam reported that clashes between Guji andBorena peoples over pasture land had resulted in atleast 100 killings and the displacement of thousands.

MRG is supporting an initiative to establish aregional council of traditional pastoralist eldersfrom Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It ishoped that, as water and available pasture landbecome scarcer, elders can work together to resolveconflicts and determine equitable sharing of whatresources there are.

Somalia According to MRG’s People under Threatcalculation (Table 1, Reference section, pp.118–23), Somalia is the most dangerous place inthe world for minorities. Throughout 2006,tensions between Ethiopia – the main backer of theweak transitional federal government (TFG) – andan alliance of Islamist parties escalated. The US-backed Ethiopian military offensive broke the gripof the Islamist alliance, but ushered in the prospectof further instability and conflict, in a country

which has been without a central government since1991. Ominously, foreign actors – in the MiddleEast, and the Horn of Africa region, as well as theUS – have become increasingly involved in thisround of the fighting. However, the roots of theconflict are to be found in inter-clan rivalries.According to the International Crisis Group, theUnion of Islamic Courts became a platform forpowerful Hawiye clan, after many sections of thisinfluential grouping felt excluded from the TFG.The TFG’s head President Yusuf is from the largeDarod clan – as are many in the higher ranks of theTFG. After December's crisis, the president facesfaces calls from the international community toform a more inclusive government. As the fightingspread, many Somalis fled. Pastoralist peoplesalready suffering hardship from the twin disasters ofdrought and heavy flooding in 2006 – have beenespecially vulnerable. By October 2006, UNofficials estimated that 1000 refugees a day werearriving in North-Western Kenya. In early 2007,the Kenyan government shut its border withSomalia, drawing strong criticism from the UnitedNations Refugee Agency (UNHCR). Humanitarianagencies continue to warn that lack of access torefugees is exacerbating an already dire situation.

Sudan: Darfur Despite a peace deal hailed in May 2006 and asubsequent UN Security Council resolution thatcalled for the deployment of a robust peacekeepingforce, the latter part of the year saw an intensificationof fighting, mass killings and displacements in theDarfur region of Sudan. The year 2006 also witnessedthe continued unwillingness of the internationalcommunity to intervene on behalf of targeted blackcivilians, whom many observers regard as victims ofan active genocide.

In Arabic, Darfur means ‘home of the Fur’, whoare black Nilo Saharan sedentary farmers. Thewestern region is also home to other black tribes,notably the Masalit and the Zaghawa, who are semi-nomadic pastoralists, as well as various Arab camel-and cattle-herding peoples. Worsening drought overthe past 25 years created tension between pastoralistsand agriculturalists in competition for land and wasintentionally exacerbated by the Sudanesegovernment. Its divide-and-rule tactics injectedmounting frictions with racism, and spurrednomadic Arabs to band together to form Janjaweed


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militias that targeted black Africans. In response,beginning in the 1980s, the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa,and other, smaller ethnic groups began forming theirown militias. Whereas the North–South war inSudan that lasted from 1983 to 2005 pitted ArabMuslims in the North against black Christians andanimists in the South, all groups involved in theDarfur conflict are predominantly Muslim.

In early 2003, Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa militiasengaged in skirmishes with government forces.Following initial setbacks for the Sudanese army, thenstill preoccupied with fighting in southern Sudan, thegovernment turned to the Janjaweed. Heavily armedby Khartoum and backed by the Sudanese air force,the Janjaweed launched devastating assaults againstthe opposing militias over the course of 2003 and2004. It also targeted Fur, Masalit and Zaghawavillages, killing thousands and displacing tens ofthousands within Darfur and across the Sudaneseborder to Chad. In February 2004, the InternationalAssociation of Genocide Scholars labelled theatrocities in Darfur ‘genocide’, followed unanimouslyin July 2004 by the United States Congress.

Although the UN and many governments soughtto avoid this term – and the associated obligation tointervene in accordance with the 1948 GenocideConvention – those who did adopt the finding,including US President Bush in September 2004,proved equally unwilling to take effective action.Instead, the international community vested itshopes in a small, under-funded and under-equippedAfrican Union (AU) peacekeeping force that firstdeployed in August 2004. By September 2005, theAU force had increased to 7,000 soldiers but,despite its best efforts, was still ill-trained, ill-equipped and incapable of protecting Darfuricivilians under attack in an area the size of France.

A January 2005 peace agreement betweenKhartoum and south Sudanese rebels envisionedpower-sharing and broad autonomy for the South,but excluded Sudan’s other disgruntled regions,including Darfur. As the death toll in Darfur roseinto the hundreds of thousands, and atrocities suchas the systematic rape of black Darfuri women byJanjaweed forces became well established, theInternational Criminal Court announced in June2005 that it was launching an investigation intoalleged violations of international humanitarian law.

The international community touted as a majorbreakthrough an AU-brokered peace agreement for

Darfur signed in Abuja, Nigeria, in May 2006. Yetonly one of the three main Darfuri rebel factions –that most closely aligned with the Zaghawa people –signed the agreement with Khartoum. Absent theagreement of the other two main factions, for themost part closely aligned with Fur and Masalittribes, violence intensified in the weeks followingthe agreement.

With increased violence came new calls for theUN to take over peacekeeping responsibilities inDarfur, notably by AU heads of state meeting in July2006. Sudan’s leader, Omar Bashir, rejected the ideaout of hand, and that same month the Sudanese airforce resumed attacks on Darfuri villages for the firsttime since the May peace agreement.

At the end of July, UN Secretary-General KofiAnnan proposed deployment of a UN force of24,000 and, on 31 August, the Security Councilapproved a smaller but robust force of 17,000.However, at the insistence of China and Russia – tiedto Khartoum through oil development and weaponstrafficking – deployment of the force hinged onSudan’s invitation. By November 2006, PresidentBashir had repeatedly made it clear that no suchinvitation would be forthcoming. Instead the AUagreed to extend its force through the end of the year.

In October a former Janjaweed fighter confirmedto the BBC that the militias were under directcontrol of the Khartoum government, which haddirectly ordered the killing and raping of civilians.He alleged that Sudanese Interior Minister AbdulRahim Muhammad Hussein frequently conveyedsuch instructions personally to Janjaweed fighters.

Minority Rights Group International (MRG)released a report in October 2006, which found thatthe catastrophe in Darfur could have been preventedif early warning signals had been recognized andacted on. The report said that instead the UN andits member states had repeated in Darfur many ofthe same failings as in their response to the 1994Rwandan genocide. In particular, policy-makers hadfailed to take account of Khartoum’s long-standingefforts to foment ethnic division in the region.

Southern AfricaZimbabwe and South Africa Zimbabwe’s economy continued its implosion during2006, and the Ndebele people, prominent among theopposition Movement for Democratic Change(MDC) and distrusted by the government of


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President Robert Mugabe, continued to bear thebrunt of his regime. The Ndebele make up around16 per cent of the country’s population. Shortly afterhis 1980 election, following the ouster of whitesupremacist Ian Smith’s regime, Mugabe summonednationalism among the Shona people – comprisingabout 70 per cent of the population – to consolidatehis power and sideline his greatest liberation rival, theNdebele tribesman Joshua Nkomo. It is estimatedthat Mugabe’s ‘Gukurahundi’ pogrom in the Ndebeleheartlands of Matabeleland and the Midlands from1983 to 1987 resulted in 10,000–20,000 killings. Inrecent years, Mugabe has discriminated againstopposition supporters, and thus many Ndebele, indistribution of food aid necessitated by his economicpolicies. In October 2006, Mugabe’s party spokesmanresurrected bitterness over Gukurahundi, saying hehad no regrets about the atrocities.

In 2006, it was estimated that 85 per cent ofZimbabweans lived in poverty and in 2007 thecountry’s inflation rate has reached 1,600 per cent.An estimated 3–5 million impoverishedZimbabweans have fled the former breadbasket ofsouthern Africa to South Africa, where they havebecome targets of resentment and face the prospectof grim migrant holding camps.

South African whites have expressed nervousnessthat Jacob Zuma, a leading candidate to succeedcurrent President Thabo Mbeki, has not sufficientlydistanced himself from Mugabe’s policies of landredistribution, which, beginning in 2000, strippedsome 4,000 white Zimbabweans of their farms andprecipitated Zimbabwe’s economic meltdown. Manyamong South Africa’s black majority are impatientwith the pace of economic improvement afterApartheid, and the continued white ownership ofmost fertile land. They clamour for landredistribution, although in Zimbabwe mostconfiscated land ended up in the hands of elites orunskilled and largely unsuccessful subsistencefarmers, all regime supporters

Botswana In December 2006, the Basarwa – also known asthe Khoesan or San – in Botswana won a historiclegal victory when the country’s High Court ruledthat the Basarwa had been illegally forced out oftheir ancestral home in the Central Kalahari gamereserve. The panel of three judges ruled 2–1 infavour of the Basarwa. Judge Mpaphi Phumaphi

said the treatment of the remaining Basarwa in thegame reserve amounted to ‘death by starvation’, asthey were prohibited from hunting, or receivingfood rations. Judge Unity Dow ruled that thegovernment had ‘failed to take account of theknowledge and culture’ of the Basarwa when itexpelled them. However, the verdict also said thegovernment was not obliged to provide basicservices to anyone wishing to return to the reserve,nor had it acted illegally by terminating essentialservices in the game reserve.

The Basarwa are believed to have lived in areacovered by the Central Kalahari game reserve for20,000 years, but their hunter-gatherer lifestyle andunique traditions have come under intense pressurein modern Botswana. The government claims thatthe Basarwa have voluntarily moved from theKalahari into resettlement camps, where theauthorities are better able to provide education andhealth services. But campaigners maintain they havebeen forcibly resettled. Before the court case,hunting in the game reserve was prohibited andBasarwa caught breaking the law were arrested. Butthe High Court ruled that it was illegal to refuse toissue the Basarwa with special game licences. It alsofound that the refusal to allow the Basarwa into theCentral Kalahari game reserve was unlawful andunconstitutional. There are persistent allegations ofharassment and ill-treatment of the Basarwa at thehands of the police and wildlife officers. Critics alsosay the resettlement camps have exposed theBasarwa to HIV/Aids – Botswana has one of thehighest rates of infection in the world.

Concerns about the Basarwa’s treatment were alsohighlighted by the UN Committee tasked withmonitoring the implementation of the InternationalConvention on the Elimination of RacialDiscrimination, which Botswana ratified in 1974. Inits 2006 response to a country report submitted byBotswana, the Committee recommended that thegovernment resume negotiations with the residentsof the reserve with a view to finding a ‘solutionacceptable to all’. The Committee also noted thedifficulties experienced by poor people – many ofwhom belonged to the Basarwa – accessing lawcourts, because of high court fees, and the problemsfacing children who did not belong to the majorityTswana tribe, because education was not sufficientlytailored to minority linguistic and cultural needs. p


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N O R T H

P A C I F I C

S O U T H

P A C I F I C

A T L A N T I C

O C E A N

Alaska (US)

VENEZUELA

PERU

BOLIVIA

PARAGUAY

ARGENTINA

URUGUAY

COLOMBIA

ECUADOR

CUBAMEXICO

JAMAICABELIZE

GUATEMALA HONDURAS

EL SALVADOR NICARAGUA

COSTA RICA

PANAMAGUYANA

SURINAMGuyane (Fr.)

HAITI DOMINICAN REP.

Puerto Rico (US)

CANADA

UNITED STATES

BRAZIL

CHILE

Hawaiian Islands (US)

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AmericasMaurice Bryn

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The Americas display a diverse indigenous andminority profile. Besides large populations ofmixed ethnicity, there are significant numbers ofpeople of African descent as well as immigrantsfrom European, Asian–Pacific, Arab and otherMiddle Eastern countries.

The most disadvantaged and vulnerableminorities continue to be those of African andindigenous origin. Even when examining specificnational trends, such as the substantial growth ofLatino/Hispanic minorities in the USA to almost42.7 million, in the end this involves largelyindigenous, African descendant or Afro-indigenousand mestizo migrant populations from Central andSouth America and the Caribbean.

Americas: Afro-descendants African descended populations represent a majorityon most of the islands of the Caribbean andconstituted substantial minorities in many Centraland South American states; especially in Brazil,Colombia and Venezuela, as well as the USA.

The African presence in the Americas goes backto the earliest formation of colonial societies and ismainly – though not exclusively – the result ofseveral centuries of large-scale importation ofmillions of people from the African continent toprovide forced labour on plantations and in minesand other commercial enterprises.

Although forced labour was instituted mostly foreconomic reasons, racist beliefs became entrenched.Across the Americas mainstream society continues tofavour white people and assimilationist culturalvalues. As a result, the main issues affecting the Afro-descendant minority population group today are stillmostly related to discrimination and exclusion.

In Caribbean and Latin American economies,discrimination against Afro-descendant citizens iseffected in the public and private sector throughpreferential hiring and credit practices, racialprofiling by law enforcement agencies andinsufficient allocation of government resources inthe public sector.

This has a particularly negative impact on bothAfrican descended and indigenous people, whoshare a history of discrimination, marginalizationand exclusion that continues to affect their presentsocio-economic condition.

Nevertheless, in countries such as Brazil, Canada,Cuba, the USA and Venezuela, Afro-descendant

individuals have increasingly attained high-levelpositions in the government, military and privatesector. However, as a group this populationcontinues to experience significant covert and overtdiscrimination and racial prejudice, and they stillmake up the poorest strata of their nationalsocieties.

Human rights organizations in the Americasreported in 2005/6 that most Afro-descendantpopulations continue to have severe disadvantages ineducation, income, health, life expectancy, literacyand employment.

Countries with statistics disaggregated by race,such as Brazil, Canada, Colombia and the USA,continue to show a persistent socio-economic gapbetween blacks and whites. According to The Stateof Black America 2005, the income level of African-American families is only one-tenth that of whitefamilies, 78 per cent of Afro-Brazilians live belowthe poverty line, compared to 40 per cent of whiteBrazilians. According to the World Bank, Afro-Colombians, although they constitute approximately25 per cent of the entire population, represent wellover 75 per cent of the poor.

In the Caribbean area, decades of studies havealso suggested that Afro-Puerto Ricans aredisproportionately present in deprived urbanneighbourhoods and low-paid informal-sectoremployment. This is hardly different from Cuba,where Afro-Cubans live in the most neglected partsof cities such as Havana. Moreover, Afro-Cubanactivists continued to report, in 2006, that mostAfro-Cubans remain economically marginalizedfrom the dollarized tourist sector and externalinvestment initiatives, and have to create their owninformal sector opportunities.

Most of the predominantly Afro-descendant areasin the Americas continue to be poorly served orcompletely lacking in many basic services and socialprogrammes. The majority of the region’s Afro-descendant population continued to live in isolatedrural communities or overcrowded urban zones,with poor health, education and social services.Many of these locales lack adequate roads,electricity, communications and water supply, andappear to have been abandoned by federal, state andmunicipal governments.

This discrimination is especially evident in legalresponses, and in the allocation of national resourcesand social sector investment. Mainstream political and

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economic elites continue to ignore the acute economicand social problems that affect the region’s Afro-descendant populations and the zones they inhabit. Ingreat measure this is essentially a reflection of their defacto invisibility as a population group.

Statistical invisibilityDespite a long historical – and substantialcontemporary – presence in the Americas, Afro-descendant minorities continue to be subjected toofficial and statistical invisibility. Even thoughnumbering in the tens of millions in somecountries, Afro-descendants are still not recognizedor acknowledged as a distinct cultural group in thenational constitutions of states such as Bolivia,Brazil, Mexico, Peru or Venezuela. The presence ofsmall historical Afro-descendant populations inArgentina, Chile and Paraguay is also still officiallyignored. Recently, in a break from the nationalnorm, the state of Oaxaca became the onlygovernment entity in Mexico to officially recognizeAfro-Mexicans as a distinct ethnic group.

Afro-descendant activists continue to argue that thefirst step towards addressing invisibility and relatedsocio-economic disparities is the collection ofdisaggregated census data on African descendedpopulations in these and other countries.

In Venezuela in 2005, the Network of Afro-Venezuelan Organizations pressured the Chávezgovernment to collect data on Afro-Venezuelans inthe next census. Similar advocacy is also taking placein Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras and Peru.Through the Todos Contamos programme supportedby the World Bank and Inter-American DevelopmentBank, Colombia received funds to incorporate racialindicators into the recent 2005 census. Similarly,Bolivian government authorities in the state of SantaCruz agreed to a census of Afro-Bolivians for 2006.

Moreover, Afro-descendant activists continue tohighlight the need for census methodologies thatadequately capture how African descendantsdescribe themselves. Only 1 per cent of blacks self-identified as ‘Afro-Colombian’ in that country’sofficial census; however an independently conductedsurvey conducted by the City of Cali in 1998–9,based instead on self-descriptions by skin colour,found that over 30 per cent of residents at that timeidentified themselves as black or mulatto. Thisresulted in a radically different Afro-descendantcount from the official version.

Political participation There is a notable increase in Afro-descendantparticipation in the political processes of a numberof countries in the Americas. Following the 2002election, for the first time in its history, Brazilappointed four Afro-Brazilian national ministers,three of whom were women. This pattern ofinclusion is set to continue with the re-election ofPresident Lula da Silva to a second term in October2006. Likewise, in Suriname, Afro-descendantMaroon political parties participated in the May2005 national elections, with voters electing eightMaroon representatives of whom three obtainedcabinet positions.

Afro-Ecuadorians have gained more visibilitythrough the presence of black politicians and Afro-Ecuadorian non-governmental organizations(NGOs). In Peru, there were three Afro-Peruvians inthe 2004 Congress. However, while the election ofEvo Morales in Bolivia in 2005 promised to endAfro-Bolivian exclusion, in mid 2006 there werecomplaints about the lack of Afro-Boliviancandidates included in the new ConstituentAssembly.

In 2006, there was one Afro-Uruguayanrepresentative in Congress, who made efforts toincrease general awareness of the country’s Africanancestry and cultural heritage and to promotepositive discrimination in congressional policy.

Significantly, in the USA just as in Latin America,the African-American minority remains massivelypolitically under-represented. Despite constituting12 per cent of the US population, African-Americans currently hold only about 2 per cent ofpolitical offices across the country, and, at thehighest level, even fewer – notwithstanding theappointments of Colin Powell and CondoleezzaRice during the Bush presidency.

This is hardly any different from Panama where,despite their high numbers, Afro-Panamaniansremain markedly absent from positions of politicaland economic power. As of 2004 there was oneAfro-Panamanian in the 13-member NationalCabinet and the Solicitor General was an Afro-Panamanian woman.

In spite of their small numbers, since 1996 Afro-Costa Ricans have increasingly become electedrepresentatives and gained cabinet-levelappointments. This includes the 2005 nominationby the Citizen Action Party of a female Afro-Costa


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Rican for the vice-presidency of the nation.Similarly, in Canada in 2005, Her Excellency theRight Honourable Michaëlle Jean of refugee Haitianorigin, who migrated to Canada in 1968, becamethe first Afro-descendant woman to be sworn in asGovernor General of Canada.

In the USA, the disenfranchisement of largenumbers of the Afro-descendant minority continuesto be of concern. Denial of voting rights particularlyaffects minority communities, whose residents makeup a disproportionate number of those held in theUS prison system. An estimated 2 million African-American and Latinos have lost their right to votebecause of felony convictions and incarceration.

There are now 39 states in the US legislativelysupporting the reinstatement of the voting rights offormer offenders. In June 2005, both Iowa andRhode Island took legislative steps to restore votingrights to parolees and probationers.

Profiling and incarcerationThis problem points to an ongoing issue of unequallegal treatment and the remarkably high rates ofincarceration experienced by Afro-descendantpopulations in most of the countries of theAmericas; especially in Brazil, Colombia, Cuba,Dominican Republic, Panama, Puerto Rico, theUSA and Venezuela.

This is largely a reflection of the strong racialprejudice that operates against African descendants.Discrimination is particularly violent in poorerareas, where police forces often act with impunityand racial profiling is rampant. In the USA,principally, there were continuing concerns in 2006about the extraordinarily high incarceration ratesand long sentence periods for African-American andLatino minorities. These are far higher and longerthan those for white Americans. ConsequentlyAfrican-Americans, who only constitute 12.9 percent of the US population, make up 38.9 per centof that country’s prison inmates.

Likewise, in Brazil investigators found that Afro-Brazilians receive longer sentences than whitecounterparts for the same crime and are more likelyto suffer discrimination in prison. This matched theUSA, where, despite an ongoing debate, convictions

for crack-cocaine possession (mostly non-whiteusers) continue to be harsher than for powder-cocaine (mostly white users), leading to thedisproportionate imprisonment of black, Latino andNative Americans.

There is increasing concern in the USA that thelegal system is now affecting an even higherpercentage of non-white women than men. In itsMarch 2005 report, Fair Laws for Families revealedthat, since 1986, there has been an 800 per centincrease in the number of African-American womenbehind bars in state and federal prisons.

Rights activists also point out that, because of thediscriminatory patterns of arrest and excessive use ofphysical and deadly force against African-descendants, they are much more likely than othergroup to end up dead after encounters with the lawenforcement agencies.

With the USA being one of the few Westerndemocracies still employing the death penalty,blacks are sentenced to death four times more oftenthan whites. A December 2005 study by theUniversity of Maryland indicated that those whokilled a white victim were still two to three timesmore likely to be sentenced to death than those whokilled a non-white.

A report by the UN Special Rapporteur onTorture also found that most torture victims inBrazilian prisons were of Afro-Brazilian descent. TheInstitute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)found that Brazil’s people of colour are five timesmore likely to be killed by police than whites, andthe Institute for Religious Studies (ISER) foundthat, in the extra-judicial police killings that wereinvestigated, 64 per cent of the victims were shot inthe back at close range and the majority were ofAfrican descent.

Also, in Cuba, activists continued to report thatapproximately 80–90 per cent of that country’s largeprison population are estimated to be Afro-Cubans,who only make up about 50 per cent of the nationalpopulation. The same pertains in nearby PuertoRico, where sociological studies indicate that Afro-Puerto Ricans still disproportionately occupy youthdetention centres.

Racial prejudice is particularly rampant in theidentification of potential offenders based on looks– also known as ‘racial profiling’, In February 2005,Afro-Canadian police officers in Toronto testifiedthat racial profiling was an existing policy and that


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Left: Indigenous Bolivian man in Cochabambaholds a sketch book showing his vision of Bolovia’snew Constituent Assembly

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they themselves experienced racism on the job. Thesame pattern is again revealed in Cuba where,although there are many Afro-Cuban police officersand army-enlisted personnel, racial discriminationin policing is common. In 2006, Afro-Cubanscontinued to complain of frequent anddisproportionate stops for identity checks.

In Puerto Rico, many people from theDominican Republic are classified as black and‘mulatto’. However, there is also a significant nativeAfro-Puerto Rican population, consequently localauthorities sometimes arrest Afro-Puerto Ricans,assuming them to be illegal Dominican migrants.Likewise, police in the Dominican Republic oftenarrest Afro-Dominicans, assuming them to be illegalHaitians. Once in the USA, police similarly targetboth Puerto Ricans and Dominican immigrants.

Racial profiling by the police, immigration andairport officials is particularly widespread in theUSA. The recent concern about terrorism has onlyexacerbated the problem. Following the attacks of11 September 2001, profiling has greatly expanded.Approximately 32 million Americans have reportedbeing victims of racial profiling. In Canada, thetargeting of young African-Canadians, includingthose from Somali and Rastafarian communities,continued to be a major concern in 2006. The

African Canadian Legal Clinic attributes thisincrease to the new Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act(ATA). Moreover, Somali Canadians, being Muslim,are doubly discriminated against.

Besides Canada, Rastafari in the Caribbean alsocontinue to be a vulnerable minority. Reportspersisted of Rastafari being profiled because of hairlength and beards, and being subjected toharassment and discrimination by both the state andprivate sectors.

Conflict In Colombia, after years of isolation, the zonesinhabited by Afro-Colombians have now becomethe most affected by the ongoing war. Almost fouryears after the most violent massacre in the historyof Colombia’s 40-year conflict in 2002, when 119people were killed in a small Afro-Colombianfishing village, the Association of Afro-ColombianMunicipalities reported in 2005 that as many as 40per cent of paramilitary and guerrilla recruits incoastal regions are now African descendants.

In 2006, ethnic tensions between minority groupssuch as African descendants and those of EastIndian origin in Guyana and Trinidad continued tobe driven by competition for political dominance.Following elections in August 2006, grassroots Afro-


66

Percentage of men aged 18–29 in prison in the USA, by race/ethnicity

2%

0%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

WHITE AFRICAN AMERICAN HISPANIC

Source: Prison and Jail Inmates at Midyear 2005, Bureau of Justice, May 2006

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Guyanese increased calls for greater inclusion oftheir community by the predominantly Indo-Guyanese-based governing party.

Haitian migrants and refugees have continued toendure particular troubles that set them apart fromother Afro-descendants in their destinationcountries, particularly in the Dominican Republicand the Bahamas. In March 2006, a mob seeking toavenge the murder of the mayor of the village of LasMatas de Farfan in the Dominican Republic caughttwo Haitians, doused with them with gasoline andset them ablaze.

Themes and initiatives The annual regional Meetings of Legislators ofAfrican Descent (last held in Costa Rica in 2005)have continued to be of particular importance toAfro-descendant leaders. In these encounters,delegates from 19 countries gather to discuss waysof fostering democratic participation; to reaffirmtheir Afro-descendant identities; and reiteratenational government commitments to combatprejudice and exclusion.

The Inter-American Convention againstDiscriminationAnother important emerging initiative is the Inter-American Convention against Discrimination,currently under consideration by the Organizationof American States (OAS). This proposal attemptsto provide people of colour throughout theAmericas with a regional mechanism to redressrights violations specifically related todiscrimination. Currently, cases of racialdiscrimination need to be tried as generic humanrights violations, since no OAS statute exists thatoversees discrimination cases.

Activists see the creation of the Inter-AmericanConvention as a vital step towards providing Africandescendants and other minorities with a form ofredress in countries where national courts have beenreluctant to tackle racial inequities.

Brazil has taken a leadership role in this initiativeand is also the sole supporter of the SpecialRapporteur for African Descendants; however, theinitiative has been strongly opposed by the USgovernment. Also, in Brazil, the policy debate hascontinued during the Lula da Silva presidencyregarding how best to address discrimination/exclusion of the African-descended population. This

has included discussions on whether to emulate theUS model of positive discrimination, quota systemsand the criminalizing of discrimination. However, in2006 a group of prominent opinion-makers,including several leading Brazilian academics, wrotea controversial letter to the Brazilian presscondemning quotas, while in the US itself therewere increasing attacks and legal challenges to thepolicy of ‘quotas’ and ‘reverse discrimination’.

In July 2005, Canada signed the Council ofEurope’s first Additional Protocol to the Conventionon Cybercrime, Concerning the Criminalization ofActs of a Racist and Xenophobic Nature as Well asHate-motivated Threats and Insults CommittedThrough Computer Systems. This is significantgiven Canada’s close communication/cultural linkswith the USA. According to an October 2005 FBIreport, 67.9 per cent of the victims of the 9,528hate crimes in the USA were of African descent.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights andAfro-descendantsIn June 2005, the Inter-American Court of HumanRights (IACHR) found the government of Surinameguilty of human rights violations in the case of the1986 massacre at the Afro-descendant N’Djukavillage of Moiwana and the intentional destructionof their property by a National Army unit. TheIACHR ordered the government to pay reparationsto each survivor, investigate the crimes and conducta public ceremony recognizing state responsibilityand apologizing to the N’Djuka people.

Also, on 8 October 2005, the IACHR ruled againstthe government of the Dominican Republic in thecase brought on behalf of two Dominican girls ofHaitian ancestry who were refused birth certificates.

In December 2005, the foreign ministry indicatedthat, even though the verdict was considered unjust,they would abide by it. However, in essence thegovernment has rejected the ruling and legaldecisions in 2006 indicate that the courts aredetermined to continue using ‘transit’ classificationsfor Dominican-born Haitians.

Americas: indigenous peoplesSignificant numbers of indigenous nations live inthe Americas. In Latin America, indigenous peoplenumber around 52 million, about 11 per cent of thetotal population. There are also another 2 millionindigenous people in Canada and the USA.


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The present indigenous populations are thedescendants of the millions who settled the entirehemisphere for several millennia before the start ofthe European colonial era. They developedthousands of nations, each with a distinct language,political tradition and social structure, and materialcultures that ranged from nomadic hunter-gatheringto monumental high-culture civilizations.

Canada has 612 different indigenous nations.Colombia has more than 80 indigenous peoples,living in a variety of ecological zones. Ecuador has14 distinct indigenous ethnic groups. In Bolivia,Guatemala and Peru, indigenous populationsconstitute as much as 63 per cent of the nationaltotal. Mexico, with 62 groups numbering over 15million people, has the largest number ofindigenous people of any country in the region.

From the beginning of European settlement,indigenous communities in the Americas have beenaffected by successive attempts at extermination,enslavement, massacres and violent dispossession bythose wishing to claim their lands and the terrestrialand subterranean wealth they provide.

From the outset, indigenous populations havefaced two main survival choices: either total culturalassimilation or complete marginalization andexclusion from a mainstream society that is heavilyoriented towards European socio-cultural values andlife choices, and that negatively prejudges anddiscriminates against the culturally different.

In a pattern remarkably consistent with thatestablished from the very beginning of fifteenth-century colonial contact, indigenous people todaycontinued to face significant political and economicdiscrimination, particularly the invasion and loss oftheir ancestral lands in all of the countries of theAmericas.

Despite constitutional reforms in most of LatinAmerica during the 1980s and 1990s thatrecognized indigenous rights, and even with legalmeasures such as the International LabourOrganization’s Convention No. 169 on the Rightsof Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1989), indigenouspopulations continued to be threatened by theinroads of investors and private enterprises ontotheir territories. Ironically, this is often encouragedby the same state authorities that are signatories tothe supposedly protective treaties.

NGOs in almost every country in the hemispherecontinue to complain that the major threat facing

indigenous people is their ongoing relentlessdispossession of land by national settlers andexpanding investment by international commercialinterests. The latter include tourism, real estatedevelopment and natural resource exploitation –particularly mining, oil exploration and loggingventures. These activities invariably threaten thecultural and economic vitality of indigenouscommunities, as well as the natural environmentsthey inhabit.

Indigenous peoples continued to display muchhigher levels of poverty, disease, malnutrition andilliteracy than the rest of the national populations.As for Afro-descendants, with whom they havehistorically shared the negative effects of forcedlabour and dispossession, the ongoing prejudice anddiscrimination against indigenous people continuesto be a major issue.

In many countries across the region, racial andethnic discrimination is a daily occurrence,especially for those rurally based indigenousindividuals who leave their communities andventure into large urban areas. Furthermore,organizations like Amnesty International (2004)have found that indigenous females experiencedisproportionate levels of economic and socialmarginalization, and experience doublediscrimination based on their identity as bothfemale and indigenous people.

In recent years, indigenous NGOs and advocacygroups have become increasingly mobilized locally andinternationally to address some of the issues affectingthem. However, there continues to be a remarkablelack of political will on the part of governments tohonour their international and constitutionalobligations, and consequently indigenous peoples’ livescontinue to be negatively affected.

Sometimes this has encouraged growingpartnerships between indigenous rights activists andenvironmental movements. It has also widened thedebate regarding the place and function of indigenouspeople in their societies, and the need for continuedcultural preservation. For example, in Peru, NGOsseeking convergence of indigenous activism andglobal environmentalism have become involved in theprotest campaigns of Ashaninka communities againstlogging and oil exploration corporations.

On the other hand, modernizing trends, includingthe advent of new communications technologies andincreased physical access to formerly isolated


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indigenous areas, are prompting new cycles ofchange. In places such as the gold-rich rainforests ofBrazil and the Guianas, consumer goods acquisitionis increasingly becoming a measure of status anddevaluing indigenous traditional agriculture andother socio-cultural practices.

Many of the large South American Altiplano andother campesino indigenous populations in theregion have been marketplace oriented since thecolonial period, including through slave/indenturedlabour and land dispossession. However, manylowland communities have tended to be smaller,more isolated and less connected to thenational/global economy. This has often made themmuch more vulnerable to contemporary naturalresource exploitation.

In an increasingly globalized environment,continuing poverty and the desire for material goodsmeans that indigenous youth in these zones areincreasingly seeking ways to join the contemporarycash economy. Finding opportunities for incomegeneration has therefore become a major concern.This is especially because the loss of traditional landusually hastens cultural disintegration and brings anend to traditional means of survival.

In communities across Central and SouthAmerica, and especially in the rainforest zones, landdispossession has continued, prompting new wavesof indigenous migration into hostile urban areas toseek often poorly paid wage labour and to face alandless future that promises generations of struggleto escape from the bottom of the urban socio-economic scale.

Economic developmentAfter centuries of interaction, increasing numbers ofindigenous people of varying social classes now livein the region’s urban areas, from Canada toArgentina, and in some cases have achievedeconomic and social standing greater thanmainstream non-indigenous middle-class residents.

This is especially true in the wealthyindustrialized northern countries like the US wherehalf of the Native American population lives incities and towns, largely integrated with the generalpopulation. In Canada, only about a quarter of allindigenous people still live on their ancestral lands,and a well-organized network of 117 indigenous-controlled Native Friendship Centres exists toprovide services in urban areas.

Moreover, many North American indigenousnations continue to move increasingly towardseconomic self-sufficiency, with sizeable revenuesbeing accrued from casinos, resource extraction andother ventures.

Nevertheless, for the vast majority of indigenouspeople in the Americas, the communities and areaswhere they live continue to be chronicallyimpoverished and lack adequate education, housing,electricity, health and other social services. In LatinAmerica, most indigenous people in 2006 continuedto eke out a marginal existence as the poorest of thepoor, using various subsistence measures to survivein remote, hard-to-reach, poorly serviced interiorareas of their countries. This has a negative impacton family and environmental health, education andinfant mortality.

Moreover, all across the Americas the municipalitiesand regions with the highest numbers of indigenouspeoples continue to be among the poorest, regardlessof the size and wealth of the country.

In the USA, Native American reservation housingis still substandard, often without electricity, indoorplumbing or refrigeration, except on the wealthiestreserves. In Canada, a Community Well-BeingIndex, developed by the Department of IndianAffairs and Northern Development (2004), foundthat, of the bottom 100 Canadian communities inthe country, 92 were indigenous communities. InChile, the 600,000 indigenous Mapuche remainamong the poorest, least educated and mostmalnourished sector of Chilean society.

In cases where indigenous people are supposed tobe owners of their resources, the issues of land titling,resource rights and revenues are still major concerns.Unregulated non-participatory resource extractionmeans that the major share of revenue usually goes tothe state and does not benefit the indigenouseconomies. Consequently, indigenous rights issues arestill closely linked to the demand for greaterautonomy and social sector investment.

Land/property rightsIn some countries like Canada, Colombia, Guyanaand Nicaragua, indigenous groups have title tosignificant land areas. In September 2006, theMinistry of Amerindian Affairs of Guyana in SouthAmerica indicated that 13 per cent of that country’sland (11,205 square miles) has now been deemed tobe indigenous property; however, this does not


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include subsurface mining rights, which, as in the restof Latin America, are still held by the government.

That is in contrast to the USA and Canada, whereterritorial rights include subsoil resources.Nevertheless, disputes persist. In March 2006,following urgent requests from the Western Shoshonepeople whose land claims cover 80 per cent of theState of Nevada, the UN Committee for theElimination of Racial Discrimination (Early Warningand Urgent Action Procedure) called on the USA tofreeze any plans to privatize Western Shoshoneancestral lands for transfer to multinational miningand energy interests, and to desist from activitiesbeing carried out without consultation.

Although, on paper, Latin American governmentshave shown an increasing willingness to begin the

process of land titling, this still did not translateinto increased security, autonomy or greater materialbenefits. Despite new legislation or constitutionalamendments promising respect for indigenousterritorial rights, private interests and states’economic agendas are still prioritized over thedemands of local indigenous communities.

Consequently, indigenous people continued toface the centuries-old limits on their ability toparticipate in decisions affecting their lands,traditions and natural resources, causing someindigenous organizations to engage in protests that


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Below: Quechua Indian woman and daughter withhoes for tending their land in Chimborazo,Ecuador. Jeremy Horner/Panos Pictures

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have sometimes led to violent confrontations.In May 2006, Quichuan organizations in Ecuador

set up a series of protests and roadblocks that led tothe retreat of a US oil company. In Colombia, theU’wa peoples continued their struggle against oilexploitation in their territories, despite winning legalvictories against multinational oil companies beforethe Colombian courts. Indigenous leaders inParaguay have stepped up protest campaigns againstdeforestation and the pollution of water sources.Furthermore, the presence of internationalcorporations and tourism operators on indigenousancestral lands in Venezuela caused protests over thedeterioration of the environment and indigenouspeoples’ traditional ways of life.

Among other land/resource rights issues across theregion that have raised the concern of activists arepetroleum discoveries on Maya land in Belize;rubber, tin, gold mining and cattle ranching onUrueu-Wau-Wau lands in Brazil; petroleumextraction on Waroani land in Ecuador; ranching onAyoreo land in Paraguay and also on Yabrana landsin Venezuela; and gold, oil and mineral exploitationin Guatemala and Honduras.

In Brazil, French Guiana, Guyana and Suriname, arelentless increase in rainforest exploration and goldmining activities is bringing with it a host ofirreversible social and environmental changes. In2006, indigenous community groups in thesecountries continued to complain about the allocationof mining and logging rights without adequateconsultation, and are particularly concerned aboutcontinuing environmental degradation and socialdisruption, including mercury poisoning,community violence, prostitution, alcohol abuse,youth suicides and family disintegration.

The link between culture and ecology is often atthe heart of indigenous group survival across theAmericas, and is invariably linked to safeguardingthe environment.

In Honduras, the Tawanka are struggling to havetheir inhabited zone in the Moskitia rainforestdeclared an eco-cultural biological reserve. InNicaragua’s Caribbean Coast region, indigenouspopulations are seeking to safeguard theircommunal lands in the second largest rainforestafter the Amazon. This area continues to be invadedby Pacific region settlers, who deforest lands forcattle-raising in a zone already designated as aBiosphere Reserve

Moreover, conflict between indigenous peoplesand the state over land use and titling has alsooccurred in some instances where the stated aim isenvironmental and cultural preservation.

This includes archaeological parks of so-calledMayan ruins in Guatemala and the establishment ofnational parks in Argentina, French Guiana andHonduras. Indigenous leaders often cite lack ofconsultation and limited participation in planningprocesses, which do not take into account spiritualperceptions and traditional land-use patterns.

It should be noted that much of the conflict overinadequate consultation is related to disregard for, ornon-compliance with, ILO No. 169, whichcommits governments to prior consultation withindigenous groups over development projects thatmay affect them, and also mandates compensation.

While Argentina, Guatemala and Honduras haveratified ILO No. 169, France has not. Indigenousgroups in French Guiana, which is an overseasdépartement of France – have had to base theirarguments on the international agreements of the2003 World Parks Congress of Durban, whichrequire the involvement of local populations in allstages of protected area design.

Prevention of conflict/genocideThe continued dispossession of indigenouspopulations and the resulting protests are invariablyaccompanied by violence against indigenous leadersand rights activists in many Central and SouthAmerican countries. In Honduras and Mexico, as inthe rest of the region, leaders who speak out forpolitical change are singled out for persecution bypowerful landowners who wield inordinateinfluence over local police, and the political andjudicial systems.

In Bolivia, systematic attacks, killings and otherviolent acts are perpetrated against indigenousGuarani leaders in the lowland region around SantaCruz, carried out by thugs recruited by largelandowners.

The Arhuaco lands in the high coastal SierraNevada region of Colombia in 2006 have continuedto be the battleground between growers of illicit cropsand the Colombian government, and in Venezuelathe most serious threat facing the Wayuú is still theirlocation, close to the war-torn Colombian border.

A particularly unsettling development forindigenous activists is the opportunistic attempt by


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some governments to link international anti-terrorism efforts to the suppression of localindigenous search for rights. In Chile thegovernment’s 2004 counter-terrorism legislation hasbeen used against indigenous Mapuche fighting forterritorial rights. This led to the arrest andimprisonment of many Mapuche leaders.International protests and prisoner hunger strikespressured the government to agree, in 2006, that theanti-terrorist law would not be applied to thoseinvolved in communal actions related to therecuperation of indigenous lands. However, manyMapuche activists still remain imprisoned underChile’s counter-terrorism law.

This development must be seen in light of theconsistent failure by Latin American governments toprosecute those who have consistently terrorized andperpetrated violence on indigenous rights advocates.In Honduras, there is continuing concern regardingthe apparent inability of the authorities to pursuejustice related to past assassinations and thecontinuing threats and harassment directed atGarifuna, Lenca and Xicaque–Tolupan indigenousland rights activists. Also, in Guatemala thegovernment’s efforts to acknowledge and prosecuteabuses have been marred by charges of judicialcorruption evidenced by the light sentencing incases of gross violations of human rights. Few of thepeople responsible for the genocide of nearly200,000 indigenous people during the 1980s civilwar have been brought to justice.

Education reformIn seeking avenues to safeguard their rights,indigenous groups continue to explore ways toincrease educational levels. Access to educationcontinued to be a problem for many of the region’sindigenous children. In addition to scholarshipsbeing allocated to indigenous secondary schoolstudents in a number of countries, indigenousorganizations continued the debate over the formand content of bilingual/intercultural educationprogrammes, many of which were mandated in theconstitutional reforms of the 1980s and 1990s.

In what are often criticized as easy token gesturesdesigned to conform to clauses of ILO No. 169,many governments – including El Salvador andPanama – have willingly engaged in bilingualeducation programmes, even in cases where theconstitution does not guarantee it, such as Peru.

Ironically, in Peru, despite the much-publicizeddevelopment of a Microsoft Word Quechualanguage program, many Quechua and Aymarareject bilingual education, arguing instead for bettereducation in Spanish in order to properly confrontthe racism of mainstream Peruvian society andadvance economically.

A similar debate exists in Guatemala, where,although a bilingual programme exists, children indensely indigenous municipalities are still taught inSpanish by indigenous teachers. By 2005 there were7,832 schools in departments with significantindigenous Maya populations, but only 1,869provided bilingual education. These concerns havepractical origins and, in Guatemala, are partlyconnected to the restrictions of indigenous rights injudicial proceedings where, in 2006, many Mayacontinued to be tried in Spanish, even though theydo not speak that language.

On the other hand, in Argentina the bilingualintercultural education issue has united members ofAymara, Chiriguano, Mapuche, Mbyá Guarani,Mocoví, Quechua, Toba and Wichi nations, andeven non-indigenous linguistic minorities.

Still others in the Americas see cultural protectionand bilingual education as important to social andecological preservation. In most cases, however,curricula have failed to develop new methods orcultural knowledge content relevant to indigenouspeople’s contemporary needs.

In Chile, Mapuche organizations continue to beinvolved in many schemes in rural and urban areasto try to reform the teaching methods as well asbilingual education content. This accords withother initiatives, such as eco-friendly tourism,which local Mapuche have often turned to theiradvantage, allowing them to publicize their ‘cause’to foreign travellers.

However, in general across the region in 2006,bilingual education programmes continued to beconstrained by a shortage of government resourcesand/or a lack of political will to enforce laws andimplement local legislation or international treatycommitments. In many countries, efforts continueto be more theoretical than practical because ofresource and training shortfalls.

Public participationThe issue of exclusion is particularly relevant in thepolitical arena and progress has been slow. In most of


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the Americas, including those countries with largeindigenous populations in the Yucatan and the SouthAmerican Andes, political power continues to be inthe hands of the mestizo elite. National political partiesroutinely restrict the election of indigenous membersto the decision-making leadership posts within theinternal party structures, thereby effectively excludingthem from the wider political arena.

Changes are beginning to occur, however.Although not willing to self-identify as the first‘indigenous president ’ in the history of Bolivia, theelection of Evo Morales in 2005 raised hopes forchange across the region. The new government hasimplemented parliamentary reforms to encouragethe increased participation of indigenous people at anational level. In July 2006 it was announced thatan indigenous woman would preside over the newConstituent Assembly.

In Peru, where quotas now require that 15 percent of candidates be indigenous, PresidentAlejandro Toledo created the Instituto Nacional deDesarrollo de los Pueblos Andinos, Amazónicas yAfro-Peruano in 2004. This body, consisting ofNGOs, sector ministry representatives and delegateselected by indigenous and Afro-Peruviancommunities, promotes policy coordination betweenthe government and indigenous organizations.

Chile is one of the few Latin American countriesthat has not provided constitutional recognition ofindigenous people or ratified ILO ConventionNo.169. Congress has continually rejected theproposals and, overall in 2006, indigenous peoplecontinued to have barely any representation in theChilean Congress and Senate.

Although Canada has never ratified ILO No.169, nevertheless it has remained in the forefront oftrends in the region towards reform andreconciliation between government and indigenousnations. This includes the granting of greaterdegrees of autonomy, self-government, land titlingand indigenous control over resources. In January2006, the incoming Conservative government inCanada indicated its commitment to continue thisresponsiveness.

Inter-American Court andindigenous rightsIn 2006, the text of the Declaration on the Rightsof Indigenous Populations in the Americas beingdeveloped by the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights (the Commission) still remains atdraft stage, nevertheless indigenous groups haveincreasingly been taking their concerns to thisinternational court.

In 1998, the Toledo Maya Cultural Council(TMCC) of Belize submitted a petition to theIACHR regarding government recognition oftraditional Maya land rights and resource control,and calling for a moratorium on logging permitsand other activities.

In late 2003, the IACHR issued a preliminaryreport on this case, built upon the jurisprudence ofthe precedent-setting Awas Tingni case (2001)against the government of Nicaragua, which for thefirst time ruled on the collective rights of indigenouspeoples and mandated the government to titlecommunity lands.

According to the IACHR’s ruling on Belize, thegovernment violated the provisions of the AmericanDeclaration on the Rights and Duties of Man thataffirm the rights to property and equality before thelaw by failing to protect Maya lands and resources,and by failing to obtain Maya consent for activitieson their traditional lands, Despite the favourableIACHR decision, the Belize government in 2006continued to issue leases, concessions and otherinterests that encumber Maya traditional lands.

The USA and most of the common law countriesof the Caribbean have still not agreed to be boundby the jurisdiction of the IACHR; nevertheless, atthe end of 2005, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference(ICC) submitted a communication to the IACHRclaiming that the US failure to control emissions ofgreenhouse gases is damaging Inuit (Eskimo)livelihoods in the Arctic. p


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Asia andPacificJoshua Castellino and Emma Eastwood

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Pacific A high proportion of indigenous peoples characterizesthe populations of the Pacific states and, in 2006,differing trends for minorities were observed in theregion. The Maori in New Zealand, who form aminority within their state, are seeing increasedprotection, yet ethnic Aborigines and Torres StraitIslanders in Australia remain vulnerable, with only afew notable land rights victories. The issue of newmigrants is gradually assuming centre-stage in theregion, with Asian migration to Australia and NewZealand and migration of Pacific Islander populationsto other states in the region on the increase.

Australia Australia is undergoing a troubled period in itsrelations with minorities and indigenous peoples. Thegovernment appears to be placing a stronger emphasison ‘Australian-ness’, emphasizing a ‘white’ rather thana composite national identity. This reaction, against abackdrop of growing immigration of Asian/Muslimpopulations (currently close to 8 per cent of thepopulation), is raising tensions in cities such asSydney, as manifested in the violence on CronullaBeach in December 2005. Following the same trend,Pauline Hanson, former leader of the One NationParty, announced plans in December 2006 to make acome-back in the federal elections of 2007 on an anti-immigration platform; she has accused black Africanimmigrants of bringing HIV/Aids to Australia.

Over the last two years, the replacement of theelected Aboriginal and Torres Strait IslanderCommission by the government-appointed NationalIndigenous Council has denied Aboriginal nations(2.4 per cent of the population) effective politicalparticipation. Meanwhile, mining and otherextractive industries see ever-increasing commercialvalues in Aboriginal homelands. The Aboriginal andTorres Strait Islander Act of 2005 (withamendments) that came into force in October 2006needs to be monitored closely in this regard.

Despite the landmark 1992 Mabo decisionconcerning land rights, Australia seemed for a longtime to be making little progress in terms of therecognition of native title. However, in October2006, the Perth High Court ruled in favour of theNoongar people’s claim, accepting a native title claimover urban land in the city. Political parties haveexpressed consternation over the result of the case,and the government has announced that it ispreparing to file an appeal. In December 2006, anagreement was struck between the Githabul peopleand the New South Wales state government to shareownership of World Heritage-listed rainforestscovering 6,000 sq km. The resolution of the landrights issue remains the key to reconciliation betweenAustralian settlers and Australia’s indigenous peoples.

Aboriginal life expectancy remains 20 years lowerthan that of other Australians, some Aboriginallanguages are disappearing, and the nations face an

Asia and Pacific State of the World’sMinorities 2007

76

Australian male death rates, assault,by indigenous status and age, 1999–2003

10

0

20

30

40

0–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65 OR OVER

(a) Data for Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory combined. Deaths are based on year of occurrence of death for1999–2002 and year of registration of death for 2003.(b) Per 100,000 population.Source: AIHW, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare National Mortality Database.

INDIGENOUS

NON-INDIGENOUS

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array of other social problems. In December 2006,following a court ruling that there was not enoughevidence to prosecute police involved in the death ofan Aboriginal man in custody, indigenous leaderscomplained that ‘Aboriginal lives can be taken withno consequences.’

Australia’s ‘Pacific solution’ anti-refugee policy hasseen it re-interpret its territorial dimensions to avoidresponsibilities over intakes of refugees by establishinga ‘clearing house’ on the island state of Nauru to keeprefugees away from the Australian mainland.

The Tasmanian government’s apology in 2006 forits role in the Stolen Generations scheme (whereAboriginal children of mixed descent were takenfrom their families and settled with white familiesbetween approximately 1900 and 1969) goes againstthis trend. The apology, announced alongside acompensation package of AU $4 million (US $3.12million), provides a model for other states, althoughthus far they have been reluctant to acknowledgetheir responsibility for the policies of eugenics thathave been perpetrated against the Aboriginal nationsfor more than a century.

New ZealandAlthough similar in many respects to Australia, NewZealand handles indigenous and minority rightsissues in a different way. The Maori account for closeto 15 per cent of the total population of the state, afurther 6.5 per cent consists of Pacific Islanders,

while Asian immigrants account for another 8 percent. The issues attendant on reconciliation betweenthe white settlers and the Maori population are beingexamined by the Waitangi Tribunal, which wascreated by the New Zealand government in 1975.Like other Truth and Reconciliation processes, thefindings of the Tribunal are not legally binding;however, they are respected by society and inform abasis for rapprochement. Progress before the Tribunal,although slow, has remained positive in 2006. Whilethe fundamental issue of land return orcompensation is at the forefront (with aGovernmental Fiscal Envelope of NZ $1,000 millionor US $687 million), most land claims remainoutstanding, with Maori owning only 5 per cent ofthe country’s land. Away from the land rights issues,Maori continue to face lower life expectancy andhigher rates of unemployment, though the directionof the statistics would indicate the situation isimproving.

Pacific Islanders have not benefited fromgovernment schemes aimed at the Maori and aredisproportionately represented in unemploymentstatistics. They also form a higher proportion of theurban poor. The popularity of the racist New ZealandFirst party, at its zenith in 1996, appears to havewaned (it won 5.72 per cent of support, garneringseven seats in Parliament in the 2005 elections).However, hostility has been reported towards Asian,and particularly Muslim immigrants, with vandalism


Asia and Pacific 77

Australian female death rates, assault,by indigenous status and age, 1999–2003

10

0

20

30

40

0–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65 OR OVER

(a) Data for Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory combined. Deaths are based on year of occurrence of death for1999–2002 and year of registration of death for 2003.(b) Per 100,000 population.Source: AIHW, Australian Institute of Health and Welfare National Mortality Database.

INDIGENOUS

NON-INDIGENOUS

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of mosques in the aftermath of the 7 July 2005bombings in London. In 2006, there were police callsfor Muslim women wearing the burqa to be bannedfrom driving – a move that sparked a public debateon issues of national identity and tolerance.

FijiThe year 2006 proved to be an eventful one forminority rights protection in Fiji. Despite the FijianLabour Party, representing the large Indian minority(45 per cent), taking its place in a power-sharingsystem with the ethnic Fijian Soqosoqo Duavata niLewenivanua party, a military coup ousted thegovernment on 5 December. The takeover – Fiji’sfourth in two decades – was the culmination of a longimpasse between coup leader Commodore FrankBainimarama and Prime Minister Laisenia Qarase overattempts to offer pardons to conspirators in the 2000coup and to grant lucrative coastal land ownership toindigenous Fijians. Commodore Bainimarama,himself an indigenous Fijian, said the bills were unfairto the island’s ethnic Indian minority. At the time ofwriting, the island was enjoying a relative calm andthe interim government was taking shape, with eightministers being sworn in to work under Bainimaramawho has been declared Prime Minister.

East AsiaAlthough many states vary in terms of theirpolitical structure and ideology, the need forspecific minority rights standards is considered oflow importance in East Asia or not accepted. Chinais a notable exception, however, enjoying aConstitution that enshrines minority rights andallows for ethnic autonomy in some of its regions.Nevertheless, the state’s system of categorizingminorities is fraught with difficulties and, in reality,ethnic minorities suffer discrimination in all walksof life. China’s relentless economic developmentappears to be overshadowing protection of ruralethnic communities, with forced migration fromareas such as Inner Mongolia to urban centresbeing increasingly commonplace.

Japan and Mongolia have traditionally consideredthemselves to be ethnically homogeneous, resultingin either a lack of implementation or neglect ofminority issues. Important exceptions to this rule in2006 were the election of a Japanese parliamentaryrepresentative from the caste-based Okinawacommunity, and the provision of native-languageeducation for ethnic Kazakh children in Mongolia.

People’s Republic of ChinaThe definition of ethnic minorities/nationalities inthe People’s Republic of China has been conceivedby the state and does not truly reflect the self-identification of such ethnic minorities or the realityof ethnic diversity within China’s boundaries. Mínzú(the Chinese term that signifies non-Han‘undistinguished ethnic groups’, numbering morethan 730,000 people) have not been recognizedamong or classified within the state’s official 56ethnic minorities (these comprise the majority Hangrouping and 55 minority nationalities).

The Minzú also do not include ethnicities thathave been classified by the state authorities asbelonging to existing minorities and hence deniedtheir legal rights to public participation. Forexample, the Mosuo are officially classified as Naxi,and the Chuanqing are classified as Han Chinese,but they reject these classifications as they viewthemselves as separate ethnic minorities.

Some groups are still actively fighting forrecognition as minorities. In the 1964 census, therewere 183 nationalities registered, among which thegovernment recognized only 54. However, censusnumbers are somewhat suspect due to the re-registration of significant numbers of Han people asmembers of minority nationalities in order to gainpersonal benefits, such as exemption from the familyplanning policy of ‘one family one child’ or theright to cremate their dead.

The recognized ethnic minorities haveconsiderable autonomy with regard to their way oflife and this has resulted in complicated forms ofautonomy for six provinces (among them InnerMongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang), but also in thecreation of autonomous cities, prefectures andmunicipalities where minority nationalities areterritorially concentrated. In practice, the systemremains subject to the political control of theCommunist Party. For instance, the Constitutionstipulates that the leaders of an ‘autonomous area’,


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Left: The Naxi, an ethnic minority numbering280,000 people in China’s Yunnan and Sichuanprovinces, practise the ancient shamanistic religionof Dongba. This Dongba text is written in the lastliving hieroglyphic language in the world.Dermot Tatlow/Panos Pictures

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and most of its representatives to the People’sCongress, must be members of the area’s mainnationality. However, the Chinese CommunistParty, which controls the government and holds allfinal decision-making powers, is exempt from thesestipulations. According to available records,appointments made in September 2006 to theChinese Communist Party’s committee in Lhasa,which in effect runs Tibet’s capital, had a lowerproportion of Tibetans than at any time in the last40 years.

China’s western regions are the most ethnicallydiverse, with 80 per cent of the country’s minoritiesliving in the area. However the Mínzú are mainlydistributed in the border areas of the north-east,north, north-west and south-west of China. Manyof these regions have significant natural resources,including oil, gas, minerals and precious metals,and new regional development strategies are beingspecifically targeted there. Nevertheless, withoutaccompanying decentralization of political power,this strategy risks further exacerbating the alreadysimmering ethno-regional tensions, as developmentrights for these groups are totally controlled by thecentral government.

Since 11 September 2001, the Chinese governmentclaims to be acting against global terrorism. However,activists say that this is a convenient excuse to crackdown on areas susceptible to ethnic tensions. This hasled to widespread arbitrary arrests, closure of places ofworship and the sentencing of hundreds of people toharsh prison terms or death after grossly unfair andoften summary judicial processes. China’s 8.68 millionUyghurs, who are the largest Muslim ethnic group inthe country, have felt the brunt of these policies in2006, particularly in Urumqi, the capital of theXingiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).Uyghur observance of Islam is severely curtailed on aroutine basis; mosques are under government control,and students and civil servants are not allowed topublicly engage in any religious activity other thanobserving the Muslim ban on eating pork.

According to the population census in 2000, theilliteracy of ethnic minorities is 14.63 per cent, 60per cent higher than the national average. As such, acentral government 2006 decision to allocate aspecial fund of 10 million yuan (US $1.28 million)each year to foster the education level of minoritiesand improve school conditions for primary andmiddle school students in minority areas is to be

applauded. A China View (Xinhua news agency)article in November 2006 reports that about 6million children are attending more than 10,000bilingual schools in China, using both Mandarinand ethnic languages, and more than 3,000textbooks are compiled in 29 languages annually.

Throughout 2006, the Chinese state continuedinvesting to improve ethnic minorities TVprogramming in minorities’ languages. Currently, inthe autonomous areas of ethnic minorities, of 441radio programmes, 105 are in ethnic minoritylanguages. In addition, of 489 TV programmes, 100are in ethnic minority languages. Moreover, the TVstations managed at prefecture or county level inethnic areas also use more than 10 ethnic minoritylanguages or dialects, including but not limited toDai, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Korean, Mongolian, Tibetan,Uyghur and Zhuang.

Ethnic minorities find it increasingly difficult tocompete for certain jobs; it is not uncommon to findsigns at job fairs saying ‘Uyghurs need not apply’.The huge boom in economic and industrialdevelopment in itself threatens the cultures andlanguages of minorities. China’s famed WesternDevelopment Strategy exemplifies this trend, itsmain aim being to extract oil and gas from resource-rich rural areas for use in urban, coastal centres.Indirectly, however, Chinese Communist Partyleaders hope that the resulting influx of Han Chinesesettlers and state capital into the western regions willlead to assimilation in areas currently dominated bythe presence of minorities. Ultimately, it appears tobe an internal colonization project. On a morepositive note, the Chinese government partneredwith United Nations Development Programme(UNDP) in 2006 to attempt to lift ethnic minoritygroups out of poverty through developing cultural-based industries and tourism.

Central AsiaWhile most of the Central Asian Republics aremultinational in composition, they vary fromTurkmenistan, described as 85 per cent Turkmen,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – both 80 per cent Tajikand Uzbek respectively, to Kyrgyzstan andKazakhstan, where the majority is less dominant(around 60 per cent). Unlike some of the other formerSoviet Republics in Europe, the relative homogeneityof each of the states means that there is a reducedpossibility of ethnic conflict. Religious persecution is


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rife in all of the republics, however, both of Muslimswho are considered ‘extremists’ and of minority faithssuch as Baptists and Hare Krishna devotees.

Despite the establishment of modernconstitutions replete with human rights standardsand accession to several human rights treaties in thepost-Soviet era, the states have a low level ofcompliance with international human rightsstandards, resulting in a lack of opportunities forwomen, especially those from minoritycommunities. In addition, the need for the resource-rich states of the region to capitalize on their naturalwealth has meant that development remains the toppriority, and this is being implemented throughincreased urbanization.

In November 2006, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan decided to launch an inter-state dialogue and assist each other on issues of socialintegration and national minority education. A firstworking group meeting is scheduled to take placeearly 2007 and will be monitored by the Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)High Commissioner on National Minorities.

UzbekistanIn May 2005, the government responded to anarmed uprising in Andijan, Uzbekistan, withindiscriminate force, gunning down hundreds ofmostly unarmed civilians. The protest started when agroup of armed people freed 23 businessmen accusedof Islamic extremism and took officials hostage inlocal government buildings. Repercussions were feltthroughout the region as refugees fleeing the violenceflooded into Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia,some of whom were forcibly repatriated in blatantcontravention of the 1951 Refugee Convention.Despite European Union (EU) sanctions imposedafter the massacre, the crackdown on dissent amongminorities in Uzbekistan has continued. In May2006, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torturedocumented reports of torture, disappearances andharassment against Muslims who practise their faithoutside state controls. Many are labelled terrorists,and have been convicted of religious extremism, yetthe government continues to create conditions inwhich popular support for radical Islam is likely togrow. In October 2006, President Karimov firedAndijan governor Saydullo Begaliyev, naming himpartially responsible for the Andijan massacre, butgenerally Karimov continues to deny that his

regime’s policies were in any way at fault, while thesame abuses go unchecked in other provinces.

State control of religious expression is extreme inUzbekistan. In December 2006 Uzbekistan’s stateReligious Affairs Committee and state-controlledSpiritual Administration of Muslims (the Muftiate)restricted the number of Uzbek Muslims making theHaj pilgrimage to 5,000. According to Forum 18, aNorwegian non-governmental organization (NGO)reporting on threats against the religious freedomsof all people, on 24 September, a Baptist church inTashkent was raided mid-way through a sermon andtwo church members subsequently fined, while on 1October, in the town of Angren, nearly 50 membersof a registered Pentecostal church were taken to thepolice station after their Sunday service was raided.Other religious minorities also face severe pressure.Forum 18 also reports that a Hare Krishna devoteewas taken to the Khorezm police department on 19August. Under pressure from her parents andofficials from the law enforcement agencies, shesigned a document renouncing her religious beliefs.

Kyrgyzstan In Kyrgyzstan, ethnic Uzbeks form the largestnational minority and are concentrated mainly inthe southern and western parts of the country,especially the Ferghana Valley and the threeadministrative provinces of Batken, Osh and Jalal-Abad. The Uzbek language does not have anyofficial status and this has indirectly led to thecontinued under-representation of Uzbeks employedin government offices. Demonstrations calling forofficial status for the language, and for some kind ofproportional representation of Uzbeks in stateadministration in the southern provinces, have beenheld in 2006. A former governor of the Oshprovince alleged that President Bakiyev removedhim from his position because of his Uzbekethnicity. In October 2006, the head of the Centerof Uzbek Culture in Osh was murdered and aninvestigation into his death remains unresolved.

The trend towards a ‘Kyrgyzstan for the Kyrgyz’has gathered pace in 2006. New languageprovisions require that candidates for elected officeneed to demonstrate proficiency in Kyrgyz, as dostudents wishing to enter or graduate fromuniversity. State officials are to use primarilyKyrgyz, though Russian remains as a ‘language ofinter-ethnic communication’.


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In February 2006, clashes between Kyrgyz andDungan youth in a village about 70 km outside thecapital, Bishkek, were feared by some to be asymptom of growing resentment and nationalism.The Dungans are Muslims of Chinese origin whomoved to central Asia in the 1870s to escapepersecution at home and there are about 40,000 inthe country today.

KazakhstanAlthough religious minorities have been generallyfree to operate in Kazakhstan, in July 2005President Nazarbaev signed ‘amendments to lawsrelating to national security’ making it compulsoryto register all religious communities and banningthe activities of all religious organizations that havenot been registered. Attempts in 2006 to confiscateHare Krishna devotees’ property near Almaty couldbe justified under the new amendment.

On the positive side, Kazakhstan ratified twomajor human rights conventions in January 2006,the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights and the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights. Ifimplemented in domestic law, these could offergreater human rights protection for minority groups.

By 2006, the number of ethnic Germans inKazakhstan appears to have fallen to about 200,000.While traditionally concentrated in the Akmola,Kostanai and North Kazakhstan areas, theirremaining numbers now predominantly live incentral Karaganda, and in the north and the east ofKazakhstan. The villages where Germans weremainly concentrated and the German language wasused most frequently have been taken over by ethnicKazakhs as their former inhabitants have mostlymigrated en masse.

TajikistanThe Tajiks are an Iranian people who speak a varietyof Persian, an Indo-Aryan language. Most of themare Sunni Muslims and they make up about 80 percent of the population of Tajikistan, according to anofficial 2000 census. The country is home to over 80ethnic groups, most notably Kyrgyz, Russians, Tatars,Ukrainians and Uzbeks. Tensions between Uzbeksand Tajiks increased further in November 2006 aftera Tajik border guard shot and killed an Uzbekcounterpart. At the close of 2006, the governmentbegan resettling about 1,000 volunteer families,

purportedly to help create new farmland in the westof the country. However, observers note that virtuallyall of the families are ethnic Tajiks, while their newhome is an area mainly populated by ethnic Uzbeks.

Tajikistan has tried to encourage Russians andUkrainians to remain in the country, as many ofthem occupy technical and other skilled positions.For these reasons, schools teaching in Russian havebeen maintained and the Russian language is still inwidespread use in government and business. Tajiklegislation now permits dual citizenship but manyRussians in Tajikistan still appear to want to leavebecause of the country’s poor economic conditions.

Turkmenistan Turkmenistan’s notorious president SaparmuratNiyazov died at the end of December 2006, after21 years of authoritarian rule of the Central Asianrepublic. This country is one of the most despoticof the region, with the tyrannical regime toleratingno opposition or freedom of the media. The one-party state was completely under the tight controlof President Niyazov, who not only declaredhimself ‘Turkmenbashi’ (the father of all Turkmen),but was also made ‘president-for-life’ by the People’sCouncil in 2003. His book on spirituality andmorality – the Rukhnama (‘Book of the Soul’) – iscompulsory reading in schools and workplaces, andis intended to help displace the Koran as theprimary Turkmen religious guide (Turkmenistan is90 per cent Muslim).

President Niyazov is reported to have called forthe enhancement of the ‘purity’ of the Turkmen andfor the removal of those who dilute Turkmenistan’s‘blood’. While verifiable statistics and data are hardto come by given that NGOs – both domestic andinternational – cannot be based or operate in thecountry, anecdotal information and reports fromobservers confirm the continuing extensive exclusionof minorities (Russians and Uzbeks) from most areasof employment and participation in public life.Senior officials must be able to trace their Turkmenancestry for several generations and it is reportedthat members of ethnic minorities are excludedfrom positions in the judicial system, lawenforcement and military organizations.

Although the interim leader has pledged stability,Turkmenistan, which has large gas reserves, nowfaces an uncertain future with rival groups andoutside powers scrambling for influence.


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South AsiaThe legal systems of the countries of South Asiahave administrative, legislative and judicial measuresfor the protection of minority rights, and, ingeneral, government policies demonstrate awillingness to tackle economic and social rights ofminorities. India, however, highlights theimportance of implementation of standards: whilethe state has a plethora of minority rights standards,minorities continue to be vulnerable. Thisphenomenon is manifest in long-standingsecessionist conflicts in India, but also apparent inSri Lanka, and, to a lesser extent, in Pakistan. Theyear 2006 saw the King of Nepal’s dictatorial ruleoverturned by a movement of the masses and thegovernment struggling to come to terms with thedemands of Maoist insurgents. The warring factionsfinally signed a peace agreement in November 2006and elections are promised for 2007. The re-building process in Afghanistan has struggledagainst persistent violence. NATO troops appearunable to restore order and face increasing attacksfrom Taliban forces. Even though the newConstitution passed in 2005 under the leadership ofHamid Karzai promises the protection andpromotion of minority and women’s rights, thesecan only ever be put into action if peace andstability return to the country. Afghanistan andPakistan have also been in the frontline of the USand coalition forces’ fight against internationalterrorism, with particularly dangerous consequencesin Pakistan, where swathes of villages in thenorthern areas have been bombed.

IndiaIndia recognizes three types of minorities: religious,caste based and linguistic. According to the NationalMinorities Commission, the designated minorityreligions are Buddhists, Christians, Muslims, Sikhsand Zoroastrians. The Indian Constitutiondesignates Scheduled Castes (SCs or Dalits,comprising 16 per cent of the population) andScheduled Tribes (STs or Adivasis, 8 per cent of thepopulation) for protection by enacting affirmativeaction programmes that provide not only equalprotection in law but also ‘reservation’ of seats in theAssembly and national Parliament. An Act ofParliament passed in 1973 allows women and SCsand STs entitlement to ‘reservation’ jobs ingovernment, educational institutions and elected

bodies. The government has established nearly 35bodies for the protection of minorities at a nationallevel, including the National Commission forScheduled Castes, other Backward Castes,Minorities and Linguistic Minorities. Numericallylarge linguistic minorities with a distinctive historyand regional identity, such as Gujaratis andMaharashtrans, have been entitled to a state-province within the Indian federation.

Evidence of continued commitment to minorityrights standards in India in 2006 included the creationof a Ministry for Minority Affairs, the publishing ofthe Sachar Report on the Social, Economic andEducational Status of the Muslim Community and thePrime Minister’s 15-point programme for the welfareof minorities. The government has also beenconsidering a Draft Plan for the Tribals, howeveractivists have criticized both the contents of the draftand the lack of adequate opportunity for consultationwith leaders of Adivasi groups.

While Dalits and Adivasis have begun to mobilizethemselves politically, they remain on the fringes ofIndian society despite the affirmative action in theirfavour. An attempt to raise ‘reservations’ in publicinstitutions to 50 per cent in April 2006 has dividedthe country. Meanwhile, Dalits and Adivasiscontinue to languish at the bottom of socialindicators tables, face rising levels of discriminationand are often subject to violence. In September, in avillage in the Bhandara district of Maharashtra, aDalit woman and her three children were draggedout of their home by an upper-caste mob andmurdered. The four were reportedly beaten withbicycle chains and sticks. The mother and daughterwere allegedly raped by the mob, many of whomlived in the same village and were possibly theirneighbours. The murders remain unresolved andDalit organizations accuse state police ofmishandling the case.

Frustrations with the oppression of the Hindu castesystem continues, and is visible in mass ceremonies ofDalit conversions to both Buddhism and Christianityin 2006. However, if Dalits convert to Christianityand are then discriminated against, they will have norecourse to the protections and safeguards that existfor Buddhist, Hindu and Sikh Dalits.

India’s 138 million Muslims (13.4 per cent)remain particularly vulnerable; 31 per cent of themfall below the poverty line, according to the Sacharreport. The seeds of distrust against Muslims in


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India go back at least to the battle for Indianindependence and partition. The perceivedgrievances have been nursed through the conflict inJammu and Kashmir, and more recently through thebomb-blasts on the Mumbai rail network on 11 July2006, which claimed over 200 lives. Police claimedthat the Mumbai attacks bore the hallmarks of anIslamic militant group. The investigations continue.

India’s troubled north-east has also been markedby ethnic tension. Although fragile, the ceasefirebetween the Nationalist Socialist Council ofNagaland (NSCN) and the government remained inplace and the rebels’ cause was weakened byfactional infighting. The NSCN believes that Indiashould create a unified Naga homeland by mergingthe Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam andArunachal Pradesh states into the state of Nagaland.Ever since talks between the United LiberationFront of Assam and the government collapsed inSeptember 2006, the insurgents have targetedminority Hindi-speaking migrants, mostly from thenorthern state of Bihar, with bomb and grenadeattacks. Fifty-five migrant workers were killedduring the first days of 2007.

PakistanPakistan has a large Muslim majority population(96.58 per cent), the bulk of whom are Sunni.There were simmering tensions between themajority Sunni and minority Shia Muslims. InFebruary 2006 the violence came to the strategicallyimportant North West Frontier Province (NWFP)bordering Afghanistan. At least 31 people werekilled and scores injured after a suicide bomberattacked a congregation of Shia Muslims markingthe Ashura festival in Hangu. In May 2006, at least57 people were killed, amongst them the entireleadership of the Sunni Tehrik group, in the suicidebombing of a congregation of Sunnis celebrating theEid Milad festival in Karachi. According to HumanRights Watch, at least 4,000 people, largely from theShia community, have died as a result of sectarianhostility since 1980.

In July 2005, the Provincial Assembly of theNWFP, led by the religious coalition MMA(Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal), voted in favour of theHasba Bill, which establishes a Muhtasib (a personqualified to be a Federal Sharia Court judge) tomonitor observance of Islamic and Sharia ‘values’.The Supreme Court subsequently annulled the draftlaw because it was ‘discriminatory’. However, inNovember 2006, the Provincial Assembly approvedthe bill with minor changes that they said took intoaccount the Supreme Court’s concerns. The bill hassparked protests by the APMA (All PakistanMinorities Alliance), who, together with humanrights organizations, are calling for its dissolution,claiming it seeks to ‘Talibanize’ both the NWFP andthe country as a whole.

The Asia Human Rights Commission notes thatit has become a common practice in Pakistan forMuslim seminaries to encourage young men toconvert non-Muslim minorities to Islam. YoungHindu girls are usually kidnapped for this purposebut, when arrested by the police, their Muslim malekidnappers produce marriage certificates andevidence from Madrassas stating that the girls haveadopted Islam. Many of these girls are minors butthe courts appear to overlook this fact and simplyaccept the certificates as legitimate.

In Baluchistan, the head of the Bugti tribe waskilled in an incident with the armed forces inAugust 2006 while hiding out in caves near hisvillage, Dera Bugti. Baluchistan is the mosteconomically marginalized province in Pakistanand he and his followers were demanding greatercompensation from the government forexploitation of the natural gas reserves present ontheir lands. This killing caused huge riots acrossBaluchistan and in other parts of the country, andhighlighted the unequal relations between theprovinces and the centre.

The Hudood Ordinance, a set of laws enacted in1979, makes rape victims in Pakistan liable toprosecution, and has led to thousands of womenbeing imprisoned for so-called ‘honour’ crimes. Thelaws rendered most sexual assault victims unable toseek redress through the criminal justice system,deeming them guilty of illegal sex rather thanvictims of unlawful violence or abuse. The HudoodOrdinance has always provoked debate across thecountry, with members of the MMA religiouscoalition opposing any changes as ‘un-Islamic’ and


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Left: A woman mourns her son, who was allegedlybeaten to death in a police raid on their Adivasitribal village in Bokaro, Jharkhand State, India.Police targeted members of the Adivasi communityfollowing the robbery of a jewellery store.Robert Wallis/Panos Pictures

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all other parties and NGOs calling for a full repeal.In a small but important victory for women’s rights,the National Assembly finally passed the November2006 Women’s Protection Bill, an amendment tothe Hudood Ordinance. Although it still leavesmany other discriminatory provisions in place, thisamendment permits rape victims to file chargesunder the criminal law instead of the previousreligious law (which required four male witnesses toguarantee proof of rape).

Sri LankaWhile in several of the states in this region there issimmering discontent and elements of ethnictension, in Sri Lanka this has taken the shape of afull-scale civil war that has divided the island. Thestate’s largest ethnic groups, the Sinhala (74 percent) dominate state institutions and the army.Meanwhile the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE, drawn from the minority Tamil community– 13 per cent) have resorted to guerrilla warfare andhave clashed with the Sri Lankan security forces in adecades-long armed confrontation.

The hope of the peace process yielding dividendswas shattered in 2006 when the island was plungedback into a war reminiscent of the 1990s. Peace talksin Geneva in October 2006 were a failure, despiteboth sides claiming to adhere to the 2002 ceasefire.Nearly 3,000 people have been reported killed in thefighting in 2006, with 216,000 displaced.

In the context of this conflict, the 2 million-strong minority Muslim population is often ignored.In September 2006, civilians in Muttur in easternSri Lanka, a town with a large Muslim population,were caught in the crossfire as air force planesbombed LTTE targets, forcing residents to flee andseek shelter in overcrowded camps with poorsanitation. (See pp.18–24)

NepalIn Nepal, after months of negotiations following theApril 2006 mass movement that overturned KingGyanendra’s direct rule, a peace agreement wassigned on 21 November 2006 between Maoistinsurgents and the government. The agreement endsa 10-year civil war and charts a course towards June2007 elections for a Constituent Assembly followingthe formation of an interim government thatincludes the Maoists. Although all members ofsociety have welcomed a cessation to the violence

and instability, Nepal’s minorities claim that thepeace agreement was drawn up without sufficientminority input and fear that the new constitution in2007 will not bring them real change.

Careful reading of the agreement shows that itdoes not propose to alter electoral systems enshrinedin the much-criticized 1990 Constitution. Nepal’sjanajatis (which include the 59 memberorganizations of the Nepal Federation of Ethnic andIndigenous Nationalities and the Indigenous PeaceCommission) feel that the current system ofconstituencies and representation has always ignoredtheir aspirations and as a result have little faith inthe approaching June 2007 elections.

Being overwhelmingly Hindu (80.6 per cent),notions of caste within Nepalese society are deep-rootedand discrimination against the 2.8 million Dalits or‘untouchables’ (13 per cent of the total population)remains rife. The peace agreement promises:

‘to address the problems related to women, Dalit,indigenous people, Janajatis, Madheshi, oppressed,neglected, minorities and the backward by endingdiscrimination based on class, caste, language, sex,culture, religion, and region and to restructure thestate on the basis of inclusiveness, democracy andprogression by ending the present centralized andunitary structure of the state.’

However Dalit organizations point out that, eventhough caste discrimination was outlawed in the 1963and 1990 Constitutions, the legal provisions werenever implemented. They argue that implementationof these promises would involve major structuralchanges and, up to now, they have seen no will by theentrenched political elite to relinquish their power. Yetanother obstacle in the way of change is thatenforcement of any new laws would mainly fall on theshoulders of the civilian police force who aretraditionally unsympathetic to Dalit issues.

BangladeshBangladesh is the world’s third most populousMuslim nation and 2006 saw a growing campaignagainst religious minorities. The Ahmadiyyacommunity, a revivalist movement within Islamoriginating in the Punjab in India and rejected bymost mainstream Muslim sects, has continued tosuffer in 2006. In June, 22 Ahmadi families living inDhaka were publicly threatened with death by


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members of the Islamist group International KhatmeNabuwat, an organization dedicated to safeguardingthe sanctity of the finality of the ProphetMohammed. According to Amnesty International,by targeting the Ahmadiyya community KhatmeNabuwat is attempting to force the government toyield to their political demands for the introductionof more stringent Islamic law. They also hope toobtain mass support from poor and disenfranchisedsections of society, whom they feel they couldinfluence by appealing to their religious beliefs.

The tribal people of the Chittagong Hill Tracts(CHT) have for a long time been the targets ofmassacres and torture, notably during the years ofarmed conflict (mid-1970s to 1997). The signing ofthe peace accord between the government ofBangladesh and tribal representatives in December1997 appeared to provide assurances that their rightswould be respected. However, nine years later, thegovernment has failed to implement fully some of themost crucial provisions of the accord. These includethe rehabilitation of all returned refugees andinternally displaced families, settlement of landconfiscated from the tribal people during the conflict,withdrawal of non-permanent army camps from theCHT and transfer of power within the provisions ofthe peace accord to the local CHT administration.

The country is due to hold elections in 2007 – butthe poll has already been postponed from the originaldate of 22 January. The run-up to the elections hasalready been marked by violence. NGOs warned thatthe rights of minorities to participate without fearand intimidation must be a priority.

Southeast AsiaPopulations in Southeast Asia are characterized bylarge-scale migrations from China and India, inconjunction with dominant regional groups such asMalays and Indonesians (arguably both compositeidentities themselves), as well as a host of indigenoustribes and hill peoples. Islamic extremism has had astrong influence throughout the region in 2006,manifest in government crackdowns against militantsin Muslim minority states or the installation ofSharia-inspired local laws in Muslim-dominatedstates such as Indonesia. Despite constitutionalprotections in both the Philippines and Malaysia,indigenous peoples have seen usurpation of theirlands for commercial purposes continue to impacttheir struggle for greater land rights.

ThailandThe military coup in Thailand on 19 September2006, was orchestrated by Thai Army CommanderGeneral Boonyaratglin during the brief absence ofPrime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. In October2006, a new prime minister, Suayud Chulanont,and a new cabinet were installed – but theabrogation of the Constitution and the impositionof martial law has made it difficult to gauge theprecise levels of support for this new arrangement.

The forging of a strong Thai nationality has alwaysbeen given prominence over that of the ethnic Lao,who are numerically superior in Thailand. Otherminorities, such as the Chinese, Indians, Khmer,Malays and Mon have been forced to adopt ‘Thai’national identities in the name of building a unifiedstate. This is most exemplified by the continuingarmed violence in the Muslim Malay-majoritysouthernmost provinces (Kala, Narathiwat andPattani) where an estimated 1,750 people have diedsince January 2004. The origins of the violence lie inhistorical grievances stemming from discriminationand neglect of the local ethnic Malay Muslims, andattempts at forced assimilation by successivegovernments in Bangkok (dominated by Thailand’sBuddhist majority – 94.6 per cent). Islamic militantshave been fighting for the restoration of anindependent Muslim sultanate in the region.

A National Reconciliation Commission wasappointed in 2005 to consult with southerncommunity and religious leaders about how best toaddress their grievances. In June 2006 they presentedthe government with a blueprint for policies toaddress the underlying cultural and economicgrievances driving the insurgency, which was largelyignored. However, the new post-coup governmenthas signalled a willingness to talk to the Islamicrebels and the people of the south are generallyoptimistic that their situation will now improve.

IndonesiaThe last two years have seen a dramatic turnaroundin the fortunes of Indonesia, the most populousMuslim-majority nation in the world. The country’sfirst-ever direct presidential election, won by SusiloBambang Yudhoyono in 2004 on a platform ofreform and dismantling of the authoritarian state, hasbeen followed by sustained progress on human rights.Democratic elections have been held at various levelsand have served to dampen the ethnic tension that


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characterized the state for much of the 1990s. Withpolicies of decentralization accompanied by devolveddecision-making being offered (as manifest in theAugust 2005 peace agreement in Aceh), entrenchedconflict appears to be ending.

Despite the Indonesian government’s compliancewith the Bush administration’s counter-terrorismalliance, illustrated by the welcoming of PresidentBush by President Yudhoyono in November 2006,the visit was met with mass protest rallies across thecountry. There has been a revival in therepresentation of groups who have tried to bring inIslamic legislation in Indonesia: they have succeededin garnering election victories through criticism ofthe corruption that still persists at every level ofIndonesian society.

The rise of religious intolerance as manifest inattacks against Ahmadiyya mosques and Christianchurches in Java and North Sumatra is indicative ofthe continued threat of Islamist extremists, and hasalready resulted in the installation of Sharia-inspiredlocal laws in Aceh, Java, Sulawesi and Sumatra.Christian–Muslim tensions were particularlyapparent in Sulawesi, where three Catholics,sentenced to death for their alleged role in the deathof Muslims during religious riots, were executed inSeptember 2006. Fearing outbreaks of violence, theIndonesian government deployed thousands oftroops to protect Christian sites during theDecember 2006 Christmas celebrations.

In a radical shift from centuries of policies thatfavoured indigenous groups against Indonesia’sArabs, Chinese and Indians, the governmentpassed a new citizenship law in 2006 in which‘indigenous’ was redefined to include the ethnicChinese population.

BurmaThe November 2006 report of the UN SpecialRapporteur for Burma highlights the deteriorationin the rights, security and livelihoods of Burma’s 54million people. The repression of the ruling militaryjunta against its population is most evident inattacks against minorities such as the Karen HillTribes. More than 10,000 Karen were displaced in amilitary attack by the junta in November 2006,with the prospects of them fleeing into Thailand toclaim asylum being hindered by the presence of alarge number of landmines on the Burmese side ofthe border. This latest attack by the military is the

largest of its kind since 1997 and is resulting in ahumanitarian disaster on a grand scale, with the tensof thousands of the displaced falling victim towater-borne diseases fuelled by Cyclone Mala. Thesystematic abuses are not restricted to the Karen,with ongoing conflicts against other ethnic minorityrebel groups being waged, on the government side,through an array of extra-judicial executions, rapes,the use of torture and forced relocations of entirevillages. Human Rights Watch estimates that, sincethe start of 2006, 232 villages have been destroyedin Burma as part of the army’s campaign againstethnic insurgents, and 82,000 people have beenforced to flee as a direct result of armed conflict. p


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Racism, discrimination and intolerance remainedprevalent throughout the 48 states of Europe. Apartfrom overt racism and discrimination, ethnic andnational minorities face socio-economic exclusion andassimilation. Roma remain the most excluded andvulnerable group in Europe – closely followed byimmigrants and some refugee groups – and facedisadvantage in access to employment, education,housing and health care. Female members ofminorities often suffer double or triple discrimination:as women, as members of minorities and as membersof the poorest part of the population.

The admission of 10 new member states on 1May 2004 saw the number ethnic minorities livingin the previous 15-member European Union (EU)increasing from around 50 million to 80–100million, not including immigrants. Only Ireland andthe UK allowed free employment access to citizens ofthe new members. However, the large numbers ofarrivals, especially from Poland, saw both Ireland andthe UK announce in October 2006 that workpermits would be needed for citizens of Bulgaria andRomania when they joined the EU in January 2007.In January 2006, the EU’s European MonitoringCentre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)published a comparative analysis, Migrants,Minorities and Housing, based on informationsupplied by the EUMC’s national focal points. Itshows that, across the EU, similar mechanisms ofhousing disadvantage and discrimination affectmigrants and minorities, such as denial of access toaccommodation on the grounds of the applicant’sskin colour, imposition of restrictive conditionslimiting access to public housing, or even violentphysical attacks aimed at deterring minorities fromsettling in certain neighbourhoods. The report alsodocuments instances of resistance on the part ofpublic authorities to address such discrimination. InOctober 2006 the EUMC published a pilot studybased on the data of 12 country studies of EUmember states – Austria, Belgium, France, Germany,Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,Portugal, Spain and the UK. The study shows that asignificant number of migrants in all 12 countrieshave subjectively experienced discriminatorypractices in their everyday life.

The level of education among certain minoritygroups is generally low. Ethnic and national minoritiesexperience language difficulties in state school systemsresulting in high drop-out rates and even non-

attendance. For example, the provincial government ofCarinthia in Austria is openly anti-Slovene and hasfought bitterly against the provision of Sloveneeducation, with any student opting to do studies inSlovenian considered to be taking a political standagainst the German-speaking establishment. Religiousminorities in France continued to struggle with theimpact of a 2004 law restricting the wearing ofreligious signs in the classroom. Although mostattention has focused on the issues surroundingMuslim schoolgirls and the headscarf, in September2006 four Sikh schoolboys were excluded from schoolfor refusing to remove their turbans. In a separate case,a Sikh driver who was refused a replacement drivinglicence because his ID photo showed him wearing aturban, lost his appeal. The French authorities arguedthat the measure was taken on grounds of security andwas not a restriction of freedom of religion. However,the French branch of United Sikhs said the casehighlighted ‘indirect discrimination’ suffered by Sikhs.

The incentive of joining the EU has been used topressure the 10 new members and the otherapplicant countries to improve their practices withregard to minorities. Most of these new memberstates have adopted higher legal standards onminority rights than the 15 member states. The keyminority instrument of the 46-member Council ofEurope (CoE) – Belarus and the new state ofMontenegro are applicants – the 1995 FrameworkConvention for the Protection of NationalMinorities (FCNM) has not yet been ratified by anumber of the CoE’s members: Andorra, France,Monaco and Turkey have not signed the instrument,while Belgium, Greece, Iceland and Luxembourgand have signed but not ratified it. The new state ofMontenegro ratified it in 2006. Some Europeancountries continue not to recognize their minoritiesas such, clinging to a unified model of thehomogenized state: e.g. France, Greece – which onlyrecognizes religious minorities as laid down in the1923 Treaty of Lausanne – and similarly Turkey,although there have been some recent changes inTurkey due to European pressure.

The rise of IslamophobiaThe 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA, andthe subsequent bombings in Madrid and London,have resulted in European governments – fearingfurther terrorist attacks – adopting legislation thatcurbs the rights of all citizens but predominantly


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targets Muslim communities. This has led to both arise in Islamic radicalism in response to perceivedracial discrimination as well as a rise inIslamophobia among majority populations. Thelatter has resulted in Muslim communities,particularly in Western Europe, increasingly feelingintimidated and persecuted. In November 2006, theDutch government, in what was viewed as a pre-election gambit, proposed banning the wearing offace veils in the streets, public places, schools andcourts. In Germany, Muslim women wearingheadscarves are particularly vulnerable to racistattacks, and some non-Muslim schools enforce strictpolicies against the wearing of headscarves. InBelgium, the Flemish Region requires mosques tomeet certain conditions for public funding: outsideof Arabic rituals, Dutch must be used, there mustbe tolerance for women and homosexuals and nopreaching of extremist ideas. These restrictions applyonly to Islam. Anti-Muslim sentiment continued tobe fuelled in Russia by the conflict in predominantlyMuslim Chechnya, and in Serbia due to thesituation in Kosovo, which has a large MuslimAlbanian majority.

DenmarkIn March 2006, Doudou Diène, United NationsSpecial Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,racial discrimination, xenophobia and relatedintolerance, referred to the recent controversialdepictions of the Prophet Mohammed in Danishnewspaper cartoons and the subsequent violentreactions in many countries. He said: ‘the cartoonsillustrated the increasing emergence of the racist andxenophobic currents in everyday life’. He also pointedto the political context in Denmark, where anextremist political party enjoyed 13 per cent of thevote and had formed part of the governing coalition,and stated that ‘the development of Islamophobia orany racism and racial discrimination always tookplace in the context of the emergence of strong racist,

extremist political parties and a correspondingabsence of reaction against such racism by thecountry's political leaders’. In March 2006,Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions upheldthe earlier decision not to press criminal chargesagainst those responsible for the cartoons on the basisthat the drawings were protected by legislation onfreedom of speech and did not violate bans on racistand blasphemous speech. In retaliation, the IslamicFaith Community, an umbrella organization of 27radical Muslim organizations in Denmark, is lodginga complaint against the state of Denmark with theOffice of the United Nations High Commission forHuman Rights (OHCHR) in Geneva.

Spain In 2006, the Spanish government approved a newStatute of Autonomy for Catalonia, furtherexpanding the region’s autonomous powers andstrengthening Catalan culture. The statute wasapproved by referendum in Catalonia on 18 June2006. Due to its geographical position, Spain is aprimary entry point for African migrants to Europe.In November 2006 it was reported that some 16,000illegal immigrants from Africa had come to theCanary Isles in 2006, and Spain continued to beaccused of abuse against African migrants and asylumseekers. In July 2006, three were killed when theytried to enter the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta andMelilla from Morocco, allegedly as a result of Spanishand Moroccan law enforcement officers usingdisproportionate and lethal force to prevent thementering; in 2005 at least 13 people were similarlykilled. In October 2006, Amnesty International againexpressed its concern about the allegations of ill-treatment and excessive use of force by the SpanishCivil Guard, including use of firearms and heavyrubber bullets at close range, when confrontingmigrants and asylum seekers attempting to climb overthe fences into Ceuta and Melilla. Moreover,Amnesty asserted that, when people are interceptedby Spanish Civil Guards in the area between the twoborder fences, they are often immediately unlawfullyexpelled through one of the gates in the fence closestto Moroccan territory.

United Kingdom In the UK, the debate over multiculturalismintensified as the repercussions from the 11September 2001 attacks in the US and the 7 July


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Left: A woman holds up the Koran as Muslimprotesters demonstrate outside the NorwegianParliament. Anger erupted around the Muslimworld after the publication of a controversialseries of cartoons depicting the ProphetMohammed in a Danish newspaper, which werethen reprinted in a small Norwegian magazine.Fredrik Naumann/Panos Pictures

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2005 bomb attacks in London continued toreverberate. Tensions between the government andthe Muslim community flared when someprominent British Muslims blamed the UK MiddleEast policy for ‘giving ammunition to extremists’ –an analysis roundly rejected by the government. In apoll of UK Muslims published in July 2006, 13 percent of those questioned believed that the Britishsuicide bombers who carried out the 7 July 2005attacks, ‘could be regarded as martyrs’. A monthlater, the Secretary of State for Communities andLocal Government, Ruth Kelly, announced theestablishment of a Commission on Integration andCohesion. In her speech setting out the terms of theCommission, Ms Kelly said, ‘We have moved from aperiod of uniform consensus on the value ofmulticulturalism, to one where we can encouragethat debate by questioning whether it is encouragingseparateness.’ According to the government, the aimof the Commission is to look at best practice aroundthe UK, with a view to coming up withrecommendations on measures which encourage theintegration of minorities. The Commission is due toreport in July 2007. The debate over the position ofthe Muslim community in the UK crystallized in therow over Muslim women wearing veils. The issueseized the headlines in October 2006, when a seniorgovernment minister, Jack Straw – the formerForeign Secretary and now Leader of the House ofCommons – revealed that he asked Muslim womenwho came to visit him in his constituency office toconsider removing their veils. Mr Straw – whorepresents a constituency with a high Muslimpopulation – argued that ‘the veil is a visiblestatement of separation and of difference’. Manygovernment ministers – including the PrimeMinister Tony Blair – supported his view. The rowgathered pace, when a Muslim classroom assistant innorth-east England was suspended for insisting onwearing a veil in school when male colleagues werepresent. Although a small proportion of the Muslimwomen in the UK elect to wear the veil, the issuebecame a focus for questions about broader Muslimintegration. In the torrent of debate in newspapers,on radio and on television, it was clear that there wasa diversity of opinion on the matter – UK Muslimsthemselves were divided as to whether it wasappropriate to wear the veil in all settings andcircumstances. In November, the classroom assistant,Aishah Azmi, was sacked by her school. Previously,

an employment tribunal ruled that Mrs Azmi hadnot been discriminated against, but had awarded hercompensation for ‘injury to her feelings’.

South-East Europe In some countries of the former Yugoslavia,discrimination on ethnic grounds in areas such asemployment and housing continues to block adurable and dignified return for many peopledisplaced by the conflicts of the 1990s. However,there was some improvement concerning the issueof refugee returns, with the Sarajevo Process seeingBosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro andSerbia beginning to work together withinternational partners on the issues, although someof the most sensitive issues have yet to be tackled.

KosovoIn February 2007, the UN’s special envoy, MarttiAhtisaari, presented his plans for Kosovo’s future.Following the NATO-led war of 1999, which tookcontrol of Kosovo away from Serbia, the territory –with its majority Albanian population – remainedan international protectorate under UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1244. Mr Ahtisaari proposedthat Kosovo be given limited independence, withinternational supervision. Under Ahtisaari’s plan, theSerb minority would have guaranteed places in thelocal government and parliament, as well asrepresentation in the police and civil service, and aspecial status for the Serbian Orthodox Church.However, MRG expressed concern that the needs ofother smaller minorities – including the Roma andTurks – have been side-lined under the newproposals. These communities had effectively beenmarginalized from the UN discussions on the futureof Kosovo. There are fears that if a new constitutionis rushed through a matter of months, they wouldbe excluded again.

The situation of minorities in Kosovo is perhapsthe worst in Europe. Basic human rights includingthe right to life continue to be violated. People faceharassment and physical violence for being who theyare, for living in their homes if they belong to the'wrong' community, or for speaking their ownlanguage. The authorities, thus far, have been unableor unwilling to bring those responsible for crimes tojustice. This includes those responsible for ethniccleansing after the establishment of the internationalprotectorate in 1999 and again in Spring 2004. These

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waves of violence saw Kosovo's minority populationdiminish further and people forced to live in enclaves.Furthermore, segregation is institutionalized anddiscrimination in access to employment and publicservices such as health-care, is allowed to continue.MRG is extremely concerned that under the UNproposals, segregation will become even more deeplyentrenched, and it will become even harder totranslate the legal prohibition on discrimination intoa practical reality on the ground.

Serbia The UN proposals on Kosovo’s future were badlyreceived in Belgrade. Serbia’s president stated flatlythat his country would never accept theindependence of Kosovo – many Serbs see theprovince as the cradle of their culture, with manyimportant religious and cultural sites. Overall, the riseof virulent Serbian nationalism continued, with theJanuary 2007 elections, seeing the nationalist SerbianRadical Party taking almost thirty per cent of thevote. The Radicals – which ran a campaign opposingEU membership and for a Greater Serbia – now formthe biggest bloc in the Serbian parliament.

In the Vojvodina, which has a Serbian majority butwhich is an ethnic mosaic including a substantialHungarian minority, reports of intimidation ofHungarian, Slovak and other minority communitiescontinued in 2006, although there was a decrease inthe number of incidents. The situation in Sandzakalso remained tense between the majority Serb andthe minority Bosniac communities. In April 2006,the Serbian government dissolved the municipaladministration in Novi Pazar, heightening politicaltensions, which came to a head in September 2006when a Bosniac candidate was killed during localelections. In October 2006 a referendum (criticized asbeing neither free nor fair) approved a newConstitution for Serbia, which curtailed human andminority rights, specifically in Articles 10, 20 and114. Article 10 stipulated that the Serbian languageand the Cyrillic script be used for officialcommunications, while the use of ‘other languagesand scripts shall be regulated by law based on theConstitution’, effectively banning them for official useuntil such laws are passed. The wording of Article 20allows the government to curtail human and minorityrights for unspecified reasons, while Article 114requires the President ‘to preserve the sovereignty andintegrity of the territory of the Republic of Serbia,

including Kosovo and Metohija as its constituentpart’, thus making any recognition of independencefor Kosovo constitutionally impossible.

MontenegroThe Union of Serbia and Montenegro ended with areferendum on 26 May 2006, when just over therequired 55 per cent of Montenegrin citizens votedin favour of independence for Montenegro. Itappears that most Montenegrins wanted to join theEU and were apparently dismayed at Belgrade’spolicies (e.g. harbouring war criminals, and itsfixation on Kosovo) that inhibited progress towardaccession. In April 2006, the MontenegrinParliament adopted a new Law on Minority Rightsand Freedoms, which provides for a generalframework for the protection of minorities andaffirms the multi-ethnic character of Montenegroand Montenegrin society. This includes non-discrimination against ethnic and other minorities,use of minority languages, free association andparticipation of minorities in public and social life.It also envisages the establishment of minorityNational Councils, as well as a Republican Fundfor Minorities. However, a motion launched beforethe Constitutional Court questioned someprovisions of the law providing for affirmativeaction in the area of elections and parliamentaryrepresentation of minorities through a guaranteedquota of seats, and the Constitutional Courtannulled the related provisions.

Bosnia and HerzegovinaBosnia and Herzegovina is made up of two Entities,the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosniaand Herzegovina. It is a state of three constituentpeoples – Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs – and ‘Others’,which includes anyone who does not identify withone of the three ethnic groups, including allminorities, people of mixed ethnicity who do notwish to identify with one group over the others, andthose who simply identify as Bosnian citizens. Theterm ‘Others’ is problematic as it implies exclusion.Important rights, such as the right to stand and votefor certain offices, including the House of Peoplesand the three-person Presidency, are granted on thebasis of ethnic belonging and not on the basis ofcitizenship. In January 2007, a leader of the BosnianJewish Community, Jakob Finci – supported byMRG – lodged an application with the European


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Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, challengingthe discriminatory curtailment of these rights. Theethnically polarized campaigning during the electionsof October 2006 reinforced this situation of ethnicdiscrimination. The Entity governments have far-reaching powers, while the power of the stategovernment is very limited, although centralgovernment has gradually taken additional powers.Such an arrangement sets up a society where allcitizens are not equal and people are discriminatedagainst solely on the basis of their ethnicity. A July2000 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosniaand Herzegovina states that Bosniacs, Croats andSerbs have the status of constituent peoples acrossthe whole state, not just in the Entity where theyform a numerical majority, i.e. Serbs in RepublikaSrpska and Bosniacs and Croats in the Federation.However, in practice there is widespreaddiscrimination in the fields of public participation,employment, public services such as health care andpensions, and education, against minorities andconstituent peoples living in areas where they are notthe majority.

MacedoniaIn Macedonia, ethnic Albanian political parties havebeen members of the governing coalitions sinceindependence, and, in the run-up to the July 2006elections, there were clashes between the two mainAlbanian political parties, the Democratic Union forIntegration, which was in government, and theDemocratic Party of Albanians (PDA). The electionssaw the PDA joining the government coalition ledby the previous opposition ethnic Macedonian party.The Commission of the European Communites, inNovember 2006, reported on Macedonia’s accessionto the EU and noted that ‘[i]n general, inter-ethnicrelations have continued to improve. Thecommitment of the government to make progress inthe implementation of the Ohrid FrameworkAgreement remained essential for the country’sstability. Inter-ethnic issues were not conflictingissues during the electoral campaign.’ The OhridFramework Agreement, which ended the armedconflict in 2001, provides for a range of legislativeand policy measures to ensure equality and minorityprotection. As a result, constitutional changes havebeen made and legislation introduced or amended,including a decentralization law, giving official statusto a minority language where at least 20 per cent of

the population speak it, proportional representation,measures in education, as well as measures aimed atimproved participation and employment ofminorities in public life and state institutions. At themunicipal level, Committees for Inter-ethnicRelations are being established in areas with morethan 20 per cent minority population; if given aproper role, these could be an important mechanismfor participation. The Ohrid Framework Agreementfocuses on the ethnic Albanian and Macedoniancommunities, marginalizing smaller minoritycommunities. While comprehensive legislativechanges have been made, implementation of thelaws, policies and programmes has varied, withprogress in some but not in other areas.

The Russian FederationRacism and xenophobia remain rife throughoutRussia. In 2006, local and international mediareported racist attacks – which have been taking placefor years (in 2005 alone there were at least 28 raciallymotivated murders) – on an almost daily basis. In areport of May 2006, Amnesty International statedthat racist attacks and killings of foreigners andmembers of ethnic minorities were being reportedwith ‘shocking regularity’ and ‘disturbingly, theirfrequency seems to be increasing’. Victims included:students; asylum seekers and refugees from Africa andAsia; people from the south Caucasus; people fromSouth, South-East and Central Asia; people from theMiddle East and from Latin America; citizens of theRussian Federation who do not look typically ethnicRussian, such as ethnic groups of the north Caucasus,in particular Chechens, as well as members of theJewish community, Roma and children of mixedparentage. Even ethnic Russians who are seen assympathizing with foreigners or ethnic minoritygroups, for example fans of rap or reggae music,members of other youth subcultures and campaignersagainst racism, have also been targeted as they areperceived as ‘unpatriotic’ or ‘traitors’. Attacks havebeen reported in towns and cities across the RussianFederation. Cases included the murder in March2006 of a 70-year-old Afro-Cuban man working as achef in a Moscow restaurant; the stabbing to death ofAinur Bulekbaeva from Kazakhstan in February2006; the fatal shooting in April 2006 of Senegalesestudent Lamsar Samba Sell in St Petersburg, after agunman opened fire on a group of foreign students asthey left a weekly gathering of intercultural friendship


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between Russians and foreigners. In January 2006,nine people were stabbed at a Moscow synagogue bya man described as a ‘skinhead’. People have beenseriously injured in many other racist attacks.

Russian human rights activists claim thatskinhead gangs operate under conditions of broadimpunity, and have raised concerns regardingpossible links between the Kremlin-sponsored‘youth movement’ Nashi (‘Our People’) andxenophobic gangs. Human rights organizationsbelieve that local authorities’ silent endorsement ofviolent racism has fostered a climate of impunityfor those perpetrating such attacks, with redress forvictims of such attacks being minimal or non-existent. In April 2006, the Culture Minister ofKabardino-Balkaria (a Russian republic in the northCaucasus), Zaur Tutov, was attacked in Moscow,and witnesses made statements that the attackershad shouted racist slogans, such as ‘Russia is forRussians!’, during the assault, which resulted inZaur Tutov being hospitalized with a fracturedcheekbone, concussion and bruises. TheOmbudsperson for Human Rights, Vladimir Lukin,following the initial failure of the Moscowprocurator’s office to classify the assault as racist,accused law enforcement officers of covering up theextent of racist violence.

The Russian Federation (RF) inherited thecomplex Soviet system of recognizing minoritieswith a territorial base. By January 1993, the politicsof ethno-regionalism had produced a situation inwhich the Russian central authorities had recognizedthe special nature of most ethnic-basedadministrative units within the RF. Republicanstatus (the highest) had been reached by 21 units,leaving a number of other units – six krais, 49oblasts, one autonomous oblast and 10 autonomousokrugs. Since the demise of the Soviet system, thenorth Caucasus has emerged as the most ethnicallyvolatile region in the RF. The area is riven withterritorial and border disputes, involving many ofthe more than 60 distinct national, ethnic andreligious groups (Christian and Muslim) in theregion. In response to the new challenges that havefaced the peoples of the region, a number ofinitiatives to create organizations to challengeMoscow’s control have been launched, most notablyin Chechnya. In the RF as a whole, the ambiguousand often contradictory rights allocated to theethnic republics in the main agreements regulating

centre–regional relations have further reinforced thepyramid of inequality that has developed amongminorities in the RF. Those minorities with theirown officially recognized territory (‘homeland’)usually enjoy considerable advantages over otherminority populations in the RF. However, the titulargroups of autonomous areas with highconcentrations of Slavic settlers have often facedproblems similar to those of minorities lacking aformal homeland.

Chechnya remains a ‘black hole’ of massive humanrights violations and abuses, accompanied by a lack ofwill by the Russian authorities to negotiate, althoughfor most Chechens the climate has improved from thewidespread terror of five years ago, when there werewidespread abuses, including murder, kidnap andrape, by federal soldiers. In 2006, it was alleged thatmostly fighters and their families were targeted. InNovember 2006, a report by the US-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Human RightsWatch concluded that torture and ill-treatment ofsuspected rebels in Chechnya was ‘systematic’, andthat relatives of fighters had been kidnapped todiscourage opposition. In November 2006, theEuropean Court of Human Rights ruled that theRussian authorities had violated the right to life,liberty and security of Chechens Said-Khusein andSaid-Magomed Imakaev (or Imakayev), and NuraSaid-Aliyevna Luluyeva, and had failed to effectivelyinvestigate their subsequent ‘disappearances’ in 2000.The European Court of Human Rights found that theapplicants, who were relatives of the ‘disappeared’,were subjected to inhuman and degrading treatmentand that, in the Imakaev case, the applicant’s right toprivate and family life had been violated. TheEuropean Court of Human Rights also criticized theRussian authorities in this case for failing to cooperatewith the Court by not submitting relevant documents.

TurkeyTurkey, while having made notable progress in thelast few years due to European pressure, continues toexperience a major national identity problem withregard to recognizing minorities as well as facing upto its past history of repression against minoritiessuch as the Armenians and the Kurds. Amid growinguncertainty about EU membership, the EuropeanCommission issued its annual progress report inNovember 2006, charting the country’s progresstowards accession. While noting some progress in


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reforms, the Commission noted that there was ‘aneed for Turkey to address the serious economic andsocial problems in the South-East and to ensure fullenjoyment of rights and freedoms by the Kurdishpopulation’. In addition, apart from ensuringfreedom of expression by amending Article 301 ofthe Penal Code and by bringing the legislation as awhole into line with European standards, furtherefforts were needed to strengthen freedom ofreligion, women’s rights and minority rights. Article301 of the Turkish penal code criminalizes the‘public denigration’ of Turkishness, the TurkishRepublic, the Grand National Assembly, thegovernment, judiciary, military and security servicesin terms so broad as to be applicable to a wide rangeof critical opinions. More than 60 writers have beencharged under the law since its introduction in 2005.For example, in September 2006 the novelist ElifShafak was tried for ‘insult’ to Turkishness underArticle 301 for comments referring to the Armenianmassacres as genocide made by fictitious characters inher bestselling novel Baba ve Pic (‘Father andBastard’). The case provoked internationalcondemnation and she was acquitted. Turkey’scontinuing refusal to admit to any notion of theArmenian genocide was highlighted by the EUParliament report on Turkey of September 2006 and,in October, the French lower house of parliamentpassed a bill making it a crime to deny thatArmenians suffered genocide at the hands ofOttoman Turks, provoking a furious reaction fromTurkey. In January 2007, the Turkish-Armenianjournalist and editor, Hrant Dink, who campaignedcourageously for the public acknowledgement of thefate of Ottoman Armenians, was shot dead in anIstanbul street. His murder caused an international –and national – outcry, and prompted much soul-searching about the ugly rise in nationalism inTurkey. A youth from Trabzon was arrested forDink’s murder.

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) alsocontinued to campaign for the rights of the hundredsof thousands of people displaced by the war in thesouth-east of the country. Many now live in povertyaround Istanbul and other Turkish cities. Spurred bythe accession criteria, the Turkish government


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Left: ‘No Parking’ traffic sign aimed primarily atRoma vehicles in Sighisoara, Romania.Peter Barker/Panos Pictures

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introduced a new law to compensate for destroyedproperty. However, the authorities did not makestrenuous efforts to inform those who may benefitfrom the laws – and the expiry date for compensationat the beginning of January 2007 passed with manystill unaware of their new rights. When PopeBenedict XVI paid a landmark visit to Turkey inNovember 2006, issues of religious freedom onceagain came to the fore. Although Turkey is aconstitutionally secular state that guaranteessubstantial rights to religious minorities, in practicedeep-seated discrimination persists against non-Muslim minorities such as Christians and Jews, andMuslim minorities such as the Alevis – a Muslim sectdifferent from Turkey’s majority Sunnis, numbering12–15 million. Despite changes to the law, adherentsof minority religions continue to face discriminationin education, and over rights to own and establishplaces of worship in Turkey.

RomaAcross the region, Roma remain severelydisadvantaged in key areas of public and private life,such as housing, employment, education and healthservices. They are also frequently the targets of racismby law enforcement officials and non-governmentalactors. In April 2006, a group of 20 youths armedwith metal bars and spades attacked a Roma family

and a visiting ethnic Russian woman as the groupwere sitting round a fire talking in the Volgogradregion; a Roma man and the ethnic Russian womanwere killed and others were seriously injured. On 24January 2006, the European Roma Rights Center(ERRC) filed an application with the European Courtof Human Rights against Romania, concerning a caseof excessive and unjustified use of force by the policeagainst the Roma Pandeles family in Targu Frumos inAugust 2003, as well as the subsequent failure of theauthorities to conduct an effective investigation intothe alleged incidents. In November, the Commissionof the European Communities noted that Roma inMacedonia were still disproportionately the subject ofill-treatment by the police.

In April 2006, the EU Parliament released areport on the situation of Roma women in the EU,which stated that ‘Romani women face extremelevels of discrimination including multiple orcompound discrimination’ and that they tended tohave shorter life expectancy that other EU females;were often excluded from health care; faced attackson their physical integrity, including coercivesterilization; often failed to complete primaryeducation, and that Roma girls, along with Romaboys, faced racial segregation and biased attitudesfrom teachers and school administrators; wereespecially vulnerable to high unemployment; were


100

Highest education level attained in the Czech RepublicRoma and majority population

0,00%

5,00%

10,00%

15,00%

20,00%

25,00%

30,00%

35,00%

40,00%

NONE AND IN

COMPLETE

ELEMENTARY

ELEMENTARY

INCOM

PLETE PRIM

ARY

SCH

OOL

SECONDARY V

OCATIONAL

SECONDARY C

OMPLETE

UNIVERSI

TY –

BACHELOR D

EGREE

INCOM

PLETE UNIV

ERSITY

COMPLETE U

NIVERSI

TY

SCH

OOL FOR D

ISABLED

REFUSE

D/DON’T

KNOW

Source: UNDP (2005) Survey data (Education): Highest attained education level

ROMA

MAJORITY LIVING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO ROMA

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frequently victims of trafficking; and that asignificant proportion of Roma women (and men)throughout Europe lived in sub-standard housing.

Coercive sterilization of Roma women continuedto be an issue in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,with no action by either government to provideadequate remedy to victims or even tocomprehensively stop the practice. In August 2006,the UN Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW) expressedits concern regarding coercive sterilization of Romawomen by Czech doctors, as well as condemningHungary for sterilizing a Roma women without herconsent in January 2001. In August 2004, eight ofthe Roma women involved in sterilization cases fileda case with the European Court of Human Rightswhen Slovak hospitals allegedly denied them accessto their own medical records. The case was ongoingat the time of writing.

Roma remain politically under-represented andRoma women especially so. In 2006, there were twoRoma women from Hungary in the EuropeanParliament, but there are none currently serving inany European national parliament, andrepresentation of Roma women at the local level issimilarly weak.

Roma children remained disadvantaged in accessto education. In May 2006, the EUMC released areport, Roma and Travellers in Public Education, onthe situation of Roma and Travellers in educationacross the EU, which showed that Roma andTraveller pupils are subject to direct and systemicdiscrimination and exclusion in education. InNovember 2006, Amnesty International released areport highlighting the lack of access of Romachildren to primary education in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia. The reportnoted that often Roma did not attend school, or didso only intermittently, and that many failed tocomplete even primary education; in places theywere segregated in ‘Roma only’ groups or classes,where they are offered only a reduced curriculum;and racist attitudes and prejudice were prevalent,even among some teachers and educators workingwith Roma children. Such segregation in educationis compounded in countries such as Serbia andSlovakia by dubious testing processes, wherebymany Roma children are classified as educationallybackward and sent to special schools. In May 2006,18 Roma children forced to attend segregated

schools in the Czech Republic filed their final appealbefore the European Court of Human Rights: inFebruary 2006, the Court had ruled that, althoughthe Roma children suffered from a pattern ofadverse treatment, the Czech government’s intent todiscriminate was not proven.

Roma were the victims of forced evictions in anumber of countries throughout 2006, includingBulgaria, Italy, Romania, Russia and Turkey. InOctober 2006, an extended Roma family wasforced to leave their home in Ambrus in Slovakiaby local inhabitants. In April 2006, the EuropeanCommittee of Social Rights ruled that Italy, inboth policy and practice, systemically violatedRoma’s right to adequate housing. The Committeeruled that: housing arrangements for Roma in Italydeliberately aimed at separating Roma from themainstream of Italian society, thus blockingpossibilities for integration and subjecting Roma toracial segregation; in a number of Romasettlements in Italy, housing conditions were soinadequate as to threaten the health and even thelives of the inhabitants; the Italian authoritiesregularly and systematically subjected Roma toforced evictions, arbitrarily destroying theirproperty and humiliating the evictees; in manycases, those evicted became homeless; in someinstances Roma evictees have been collectivelyexpelled from Italy; and that a significant numberof Roma in Italy lived under constant threat offorced eviction.

An important development is the Decade ofRoma Inclusion, set to run from 2005 to 2015,which was initiated by the World Bank, the OpenSociety Institute and the Hungarian government insummer 2003. The Decade has four priority areas:education, employment, health and housing, andtwo cross-cutting areas, gender and non-discrimination. The governments of Bulgaria,Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia,Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, and Slovakiahave signed up to the Decade’s action plan. There isalso the Roma Education Fund, which covers thesame countries for the same time period. Thepotential of the Decade initiatives for improving thelives of the Roma is substantial. To date, however,the record of the participating countries on movingtoward the stated goals has been mixed, withproblems of insufficient resources allocated atnational level, and with adequate participation of


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Roma, which is often hampered by numerousinternal divisions and rivalries, in the designing,drafting and implementation of plans.

In Bulgaria, a programme for Roma literacy andoccupational training ‘From Social Aid toEmployment’ was launched in May 2006, aiming toprovide basic occupational training for unemployedRoma, and other measures were implemented in2006 in line with the Decade of Roma Inclusion.However, the Commission of the EuropeanCommunities in November 2006 noted thatconcerns persisted: measures to integrate Romachildren in schools needed to be further enhancedto cover higher education; the health conditions ofmany Roma remained poor, with outbreaks ofdisease caused by poverty or lack of hygienefrequent, and many Roma continued to havelimited access to health-care services; there was aneed for greater access of Roma to the labourmarket; and that the forced evictions of non-registered Roma settlements were increasingtensions.

In Romania the new National Employment Plan,approved in August 2006, provided targeted actionfor minorities, including Roma, and theadministrative capacity of the National Agency forRoma improved in 2006 as regional offices werebeing developed. However, implementation is slowand the social inclusion of the Roma remains aproblem; overall living conditions are stillinadequate; unemployment of Roma remains high;and forced evictions continue.

In Albania, the Commission of the EuropeanCommunities noted in November 2006 that thedisparity between the social and economic situationof Roma and that of the rest of the population wasincreasing, with 78 per cent of the Roma living inpoverty and 39 per cent in extreme poverty. Thesituation of the Roma community in Tirana notablyworsened in 2006, with some 40,000 Roma in needof social and economic support by November 2006.Only 12 per cent of the Roma are enrolled insecondary school, compared to a national average of81 per cent. Social factors and the mobility ofcertain groups make lack of access to education andhealth services, especially vaccination, a particularproblem. Weak or non-existent birth registration ofRoma children in Albania, as well as lack of personaldocuments, makes them particularly vulnerable tohuman trafficking.

Denial of citizenshipMinorities in some countries continue to facediscrimination around issues of their legal status. InSlovenia, thousands of people ‘erased’ in 1992 fromthe registry of permanent residents, mainly peoplefrom other former Yugoslav republics (many ofthem Roma), are still waiting for their status to beresolved. As a result of the ‘erasure’, many are deniedfull access to their economic and social rights. InMacedonia, one of the conditions for citizenship isto have a permanent source of income. Thisindirectly affects minorities, as they form asignificant portion of the unemployed population,particularly Roma and Turks. Also, an applicant hasto prove that they have continuously resided inMacedonia for eight years, and people often findthis difficult to prove. The Ministry of InternalAffairs is often discriminatory towards Muslimminorities (Albanians, Bosniacs, Turks), who oftenfind that they are denied citizenship on the groundsthat they are ‘unsuitable … due to security reasons’.Meskhetians in the Krasnodar Territory in Russiacontinue to be refused recognition of theircitizenship on ethnic grounds and so are unable toaccess a wide range of basic rights. In Greece, theauthorities still refused to reissue citizenshipdocuments to some members of the Muslimpopulation in western Thrace, with those affectedthereby denied access to state benefits andinstitutions. In Estonia, in February 2006, theCouncil of Europe’s Committee of Ministers notedthat the number of persons without citizenship inthe country was still disconcertingly high, while inLatvia, which similarly has strict citizenship criteria– including five years of permanent residence,command of the Latvian language, knowledge ofLatvian history and Constitution, legal source ofincome, renunciation of previous citizenship and apledge of loyalty to Latvia – as of January 2006,80.1 per cent of the total population of Latvia werecitizens, 18.3 per cent were non-citizens and 1.6 percent aliens and stateless persons. Russians accountedfor 66.5 per cent of the non-citizens. Thecontinuing division of Cyprus has resulted inconsiderable numbers of people not yet affordedlegal citizenship. p


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MiddleEastEric Witte

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A R A B I A N

S E A

QATAR

OMAN

JORDANEGYPT

SYRIALEBANON

KUWAIT

IRAN

YEMEN

SAUDI ARABIA BAHRAIN

IRAQ

U.A.E .

ISRAEL/OT/Palestinian Authority

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The year 2006 was another year of conflict in theMiddle East, marked by a worsening of sectarian andethnic strife in Iraq; an intensive, month-long warbetween Israel and Hezbollah that saw widespreaddestruction in Lebanon; and continuation of theIsraeli–Palestinian conflict. All of this violence haddire consequences for minority rights.

The Iraq Study Group commissioned by the USCongress warned in December 2006 of a ‘broaderregional war’ fuelled by Sunni–Shia violencespilling out of Iraq. Indeed, Iran, Lebanon andSyria all saw a worsening of sectarian relations.Even in usually calm Bahrain, sectarian frictionbetween the ruling Sunni minority and the 60 percent majority Shia population rose ahead ofNovember parliamentary elections, following theleaking of a government report in September thatdescribed the proposals of a government ministerto weaken the Shia, including through electionmanipulation.

The Iraq war also sharpened the plight ofPalestinian refugees trying to escape from Iraqwithout travel documents. As violence in Iraqescalated in 2006, Syria and Jordan bothdemonstrated reluctance to admit Palestinianscamped at their borders. Minority women in Iraqfaced the triple threat of targeting on the basis ofreligion, ethnicity and gender.

Iraq Violence in Iraq continues to worsen, with a studyin the Lancet finding that – as of September 2006 –the Iraqi death toll attributable to conflict since theMarch 2003 American-led invasion had risen toover 650,000. With mounting chaos, the UnitedNations (UN) estimated that, by October 2006,over 1.6 million Iraqis had fled the country and100,000 more each month were abandoning theirburning homeland. Militants sought to extend theircontrol over land, principally by killing andexpelling minority populations. Religious and ethnicminorities throughout Iraq became even moreimperilled with acceleration of the cycle of killingsand retribution, especially in sectarian violencebetween Shia and Sunni Arabs. Minority womenfaced added danger of violence from Islamicextremists, and even their own families, through so-called ‘honour killings’ following sexual violence.Some have stopped attending university in order toavoid coercion.

Muslims make up about 96 per cent of the Iraqipopulation. This overwhelming majority is mainlydivided into a large Shia Arab majority, a SunniArab minority estimated at around 20 per cent, andaround 6 million ethnic Kurds, who are mostlySunni. An estimated 10 per cent of the populationis not Shia Arab, Sunni Arab or Sunni Kurd, andincludes ethnic Shabaks, Turkomans and Faili (Shia)Kurds, as well as Christians, Mandean-Sabeans,Yezidis and Baha’is.

The Baathist regime of former dictator SaddamHussein was firmly based in the favoured SunniArab minority and became notorious for therepression and even slaughter of Shia, Kurds andmany of Iraq’s smaller minorities. Following theouster of Saddam in 2003, the American-ledoccupying force installed a transitional governmentusing ethnic and sectarian quotas that left SunniArabs feeling under-represented. Elections inJanuary 2005, boycotted by Sunni Arabs, led toestablishment of a government dominated by Shiaand Kurds. This government oversaw the draftingand ratification of a new constitution in October2005 that left Sunni Arabs feeling marginalized.Other minorities were also largely excluded from theprocess, as Western powers concentrated on forgingconsensus among the three main ethnic/sectariangroups, to which all but five of the 71 constitutionalframers belonged.

The Shia Arab majority appeared content toawait the post-Saddam transition that would cedethem control of the country, and refrained fromlarge-scale retaliation against Sunni Arab attacksuntil coming to power in the January 2005elections. But, following those elections, Shiamilitants associated with the Iranian-backedSupreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq(SCIRI) and its Badr Organization, played a majorrole in the Interior Ministry and committednumerous indiscriminate attacks on Sunni civilians.In November 2005, US forces discovered anunderground detention and torture facility run bythe Interior Ministry in Baghdad.

Amidst this bloodshed, sectarian and ethnicdivision marked the campaign ahead of anotherround of elections in December 2005. Thegovernment arising from that vote is divided amongthe three main factions: President Jalal Talabani isKurdish, Vice-President Tariq al-Hashemi is SunniArab, and Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki is


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Shia Arab; yet this power-sharing has not hinderedIraq’s slide into sectarian civil war and dark days forits minorities.

Rival political parties within government openlysupport different militias who patrol various parts ofthe country in the name of community protection,but are also clearly working to extend their areas ofcontrol. These same militias detain, torture andconduct ‘trials’ of their victims, and summarilyexecute them with impunity. For example, PrimeMinister Maliki depends on a faction allied withradical Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Many SunniArab victims of militia assaults report thatperpetrators are in police or sometimes armyuniforms, use police vehicles and act withoutinterference from local police. Sunni Arab militantshave targeted police stations and police recruits inretaliation for Shia Arab militia attacks, and todiscourage cooperation with the government andinternational troops.

It is unclear to what extent Sunni Arab attacks arethe work of domestic Baathist forces, or that offoreign insurgents, but it is increasingly clear thatIraqi Sunnis are engaging in sectarian violence. Shiamilitias have been unwilling to disarm because theysay their community would then be endangered bythe Sunni insurgency, but these in turn encourageSunni Arab militancy. Iraqis of many stripes feelincreasingly reliant on sectarian and ethnic militiasbecause the American-led international and Iraqigovernment forces have proved incapable ofestablishing security.

The 22 February 2006 bombing of a Shia shrineset off a particularly fierce round of sectarianviolence, the worst of which came in such mixedSunni–Shia Arab areas of the country as Baghdad,Tal Afar and Diyala. The violence escalatedthroughout the year. Iraqi government figures placedthe number of civilian dead for September andOctober 2006 at 7,054, with 5,000 of these killingsin Baghdad. Most victims had been tortured. In oneOctober incident, following the abduction anddecapitation of 17 Shia civilians in the mixedSunni–Shia Arab town of Balad, up to 90 Sunnicivilians suffered reprisal killings and the UNAssistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) reported thatmost remaining Sunnis had fled the town. ByNovember 2006, the UN estimated that 425,000Iraqis had been displaced in sectarian violence sincethe February Samarra bombings. On 23 November,

a new assault threatened to intensify the killingfurther, as a series of car bombs, mortar attacks androckets killed over 200 civilians in Sadr City, theShia Arab slum of Baghdad and stronghold ofleading Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Armymilitia. In the aftermath, Shia Arab militantslaunched retaliatory attacks on Sunni civilians andtheir holy sites.

In September 2006 the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM) reportedpatterns of displacement that reflected the perceivedthreat to Shia and Sunni Arabs living as sectarianminorities. Shia Arabs were fleeing the Sunni Arab-dominated central Iraqi governates of Anbar andSalah al Din, as well as the mixed governate ofBaghdad for the majority Shia Arab southerngovernates, while Sunni Arabs were moving fromthose southern governates into the governates ofBaghdad, Diyala and Anbar. IOM also reportedhigh rates of movement by Shia and Sunni Arabsinto segregated towns and neighbourhoods withinthe mixed governates of Baghdad and Diyala.

The overwhelming reality of daily sectarianviolence has left Iraq’s smaller minorities particularlyvulnerable. A report for Minority Rights GroupInternational (MRG), published in early 2007,warned that the impact of the conflict on someminority groups has been so acute that they are indanger of being driven out entirely from a territorythey have called home for hundreds – in some cases,thousands – of years. They are targeted on sectarianand/or ethnic grounds, and face added danger fromthe perception that they cooperate with American-led forces.

Iraq’s ethnic Kurdish minority is mostly Sunniand concentrated in the north. Iraqi Kurds sufferedgreatly under Saddam’s rule, but gained wideautonomy and relative prosperity during thesanctions regime, and with the Western airprotection from Saddam’s forces that preceded the2003 invasion. Kurds in Iraq strive for greaterautonomy and the dream of an independentKurdistan, which is anathema to Iran, Syria andTurkey, all of which have neighbouring Kurdishminorities who, they fear, would seek to join sucha new state. In July 2006, the International CrisisGroup warned of a brewing battle for oil-richKirkuk in the north, which lies beyond the Erbil-based Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG’s)reach, but within its desire. Kurds used their

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position in the government elected in January2005 to secure a process that would reverse theSaddam-era process of Arabization in Kirkuk,moving toward its eventual formal inclusion in theKurdish region by referendum in late 2007. Turkeyhas signalled its opposition, as have Iraq’s Sunniand Shia Arabs. Similarly, the Kurdish governmentin Erbil governate has attempted to extend itsinfluence to the likewise disputed city of Mosul. InOctober 2006, a Kurdish member of parliamentand his driver, who had been kidnapped earlier,were found dead – the suspected work of a ShiaArab militia. That same month, a senior memberof the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan wasassassinated in Mosul.

Kurdish claims on Kirkuk and Mosul clash withthose of the Turkish-speaking Turkomans, Iraq’sthird-largest ethnic group, which makes up 3 percent of the population, and has both Sunni andShia adherents. Turkomans view Kirkuk ashistorically theirs and, with Turkish assistance, haveformed the Iraqi Turkman Front (ITF) to preventKurdish control of Kirkuk. UN reports in 2006indicated that forces of the KRG and Kurdishmilitias were policing illegally in Kirkuk and otherdisputed areas. These militas have abductedTurkomans and Arabs, subjecting them to torture.In June, 20 Turkoman students were killed in KaraTeppe and explosions in Turkoman areas of Kirkukkilled 13. A car bomb at a July parade by the ITFin Kirkuk wounded another 20. Turkomans alsoremain prone to predominant sectarian violence. Of17 Turkoman officials arrested in October at amilitia checkpoint in Tikrit, two Sunnis werereleased while 15 Shias disappeared.

The small ethnic Shabak minority, among whichare both Sunni and Shia, has lived in the NinevehPlains of the north for hundreds of years, but facesharassment from Kurdish militants. DespiteShabaks’ distinct language and recognition as anethnic group, Kurds wishing to extend land claimsinto the Nineveh governate claim that Shabaks arereally Kurds. The Faili Kurds, who follow ShiaIslam, live along the Iran/Iraq border and inBaghdad. Repressed as ‘Iranians’ under the Saddamregime, they are now targeted for ethnic andreligious reasons. In November 2005, two FailiKurdish mosques in the town of Khanaqin werebombed. The Yezidi are ethnically and linguisticallyKurdish but have their own 4,000-year-old religion.

They face persecution by religious extremists as‘devil worshippers’. A Yezidi council member for theNineveh Plains was assassinated in April 2006, oneof 11 Yezidis reported murdered between September2005 and September 2006.

Iraq is home to many Christian groups, includingChaldo-Assyrians, Syriac-speaking OrthodoxChristians, Catholic and Oriental OrthodoxArmenians, and Protestants. Chaldo-Assyrians andSyriac Christians both speak the ancient Syriaclanguage and have been in the region since theearliest days of Christianity’s spread in the region;they consider themselves Arabs but are notrecognized as such by the government. Armenianshave been in Mesopotamia since the days ofBabylon, their numbers bolstered following theArmenian genocide of 1915. In itsSeptember–October human rights report, UNAMIreported increasing violence against all Christians,with a spike in attacks on Christians following thePope’s controversial remarks on Islam in September2006. Churches and convents were attacked byrocket and gunfire, and a Syriac Orthodox priestwas kidnapped and decapitated in October. Withmounting violence, many Iraqi churches havecancelled services and the UN reports that IraqiChristians are fleeing in disproportionate numbersto Syria, Jordan and beyond.

The Mandean-Sabeans are Gnostics who havepractised their faith in Iraq for over 2,000 years andspeak an endangered language. Their religionforbids the use of violence, which makes them easytargets for Islamic extremists. The state offers noprotection from attacks, such as one that killed fourMandean-Sabeans in October 2006. As members ofthe community flee abroad, the number ofMandean-Sabeans estimated to remain in Iraq inlate 2006 was 13,000, down two-thirds since theAmerican-led invasion.

Followers of the Baha’i faith in Iraq are targetedby Islamic extremists because they don’t believeMohammed was the last prophet. For the past 30years, Baha’i have not been allowed to havecitizenship papers or travel documents, which makesit difficult for them to leave the country. Almostentirely gone from Iraq are Jews, who have a 2,600-year history in the country and once numbered150,000. In October 2005, the UN reported thatthe only Jews left in Iraq were in Baghdad, and theirnumbers had shrunk to 20.


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Although an estimated 4,000–15,000 Palestinianrefugees have left Iraq since 2003, some 20,000remain and are subject to attack by militias inBaghdad. Favoured as political pawns underSaddam, this mostly Sunni minority now faceretaliatory attacks, including by Iraqi securityservices. Militias have also been seizing Palestinianhomes, often for their ethnic kin, who have beendisplaced by other militias elsewhere in Iraq. TheUN received reports of at least six Palestinians killed

in June 2006 and the refugee agency reported thatmany Palestinians were encamped at the Syrianborder, trying to flee the country.

Subject to the same sectarian and ethnic targetingas Iraqi men, women face the added burden ofgender discrimination. The number of widows inthe country is increasing, and Islamic militants leavefew opportunities for women to make money, letalone drive or move around without a male relative.The Iraqi government estimates that mixedmarriages between Sunni and Shia Arabs accountfor nearly a third of all marriages in Iraq. InNovember 2006, the local Peace for IraqisAssociation reported that hundreds of Iraqis inmixed sectarian marriages were being forced bymilitias or their families to divorce, throwing more


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Below: An old man talks to a younger man duringprayers in the synagogue on Philistine Street,Tehran. There are approximately 25,000 Jews inIran, their number ever decreasing.Jeroen Oerlemans/Panos Pictures

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women into economic uncertainty. Short-termmarriages of convenience, known as Muta’a, were onthe rise in 2006; these may serve immediateeconomic needs of women, but afford them norights when the marriage is over.

Women across Iraq, many of them non-Muslims,have reported numerous death threats for failing tofully cover their heads and bodies in line with strictIslamic teachings. The Women’s Rights Association ofBaghdad reported in March 2006 that, since the 2003invasion, the number of women attacked for failing tocover their heads and faces had more than tripled.

Across Iraq, kidnappings, rapes and sexual slaveryof women have increased. UNAMI, in itsSeptember–October human rights report, mentionsa ‘worrying trend of female “suicides” and“attempted suicides” as a result of family conflicts’ inthe KRG. The government has not aggressivelypursued the perpetrators of such ‘honour killings’,who receive light sentences when they areapprehended and tried. In October, an activist forwomen’s and Arab rights in the Kurdistan regionwas murdered following threats accusing her ofcollaboration with international forces. In responseto their targeting by militants, many girls’ schoolsdid not open this fall.

Although aiming to serve the cause of transitionaljustice, it appeared that the trial of Saddam Husseinonly provided more fodder for sectarian tensions.When Saddam and two co-defendants weresentenced to death on 5 November 2006 for a 1982massacre of Shia in Dujail, Shia Arabs and Kurdscelebrated, while Sunni Arabs saw it as furtherevidence of their endangerment and loss ofprivilege. Human Rights Watch criticized the trial’sconduct and the verdict’s ‘suspect’ timing, two daysbefore US mid-term Congressional elections. In thecourse of the trial, three defence attorneys and awitness were assassinated. Although the ‘Anfal’ trialagainst Saddam and others for the killing of some180,000 Kurds was ongoing, Saddam was hangedon 30 December 2006 – the first day of the Muslimholiday Eid-al-Adha as observed by Sunnis.

As Iraqi civil war raged, the report of the IraqStudy Group, commissioned by the US Congressand released in December 2006, stirred enormouscontroversy in the US and UK but offered few newideas for Iraq. It was not clear that the weak Iraqigovernment would be able to establish security foranyone, especially the country’s minorities.

IranIran is an ethnically and religiously diverse countrywhose Shia Persian majority amounts to onlyslightly more than 50 per cent of the population. In2006, the Iranian government was embroiled incontroversies over its nuclear programme and itsbacking of Shia militants in neighbouring Iraq, aswell as Hezbollah in Lebanon. Receiving lessattention was the country’s ongoing repression of itsmany minority groups.

Sunni Arabs make up around 5 per cent of theIranian population and are concentrated in the south-western, oil-rich province of Khuzistan along theIraqi border. Over 2006, sectarian civil war in Iraqhas led to enhanced calls for Sunni Arab autonomywithin Iran, and even independence. Human RightsWatch reported rioting in April 2005 among SunniArabs in Khuzistan following a purported letter froma presidential adviser that recommended dispersal ofthe Arab population. The violence between protestersand police was followed by a series of bombingsattributed to Sunni Arab activists in Tehran andAhwaz in June and October 2005, and January 2006,which killed some 20 people and injured many more.Renewed confrontation between Sunni Arabprotesters and Iranian police in March 2006 resultedin three deaths and hundreds of arrests. The Iraniangovernment claims that unrest in Khuzistan is beingstirred by British intelligence services across theborder.

Kurds, who are mostly Sunni Muslims, make uparound 10 per cent of the Iranian population andare concentrated in the north-west, adjacent to theKurdish populations of Iraq and Turkey. The Iraniangovernment has watched nervously over the courseof 2006 as Iraqi Kurds have moved towards greaterautonomy, fearing that its Kurds may seek to join anindependent Kurdistan. Iranian security forces shota young Kurd in July 2005, sparking a round ofconfrontations with the Kurdish minority, andtensions remained palpable through 2006.

Azeris form the largest ethnic minority in Iran atabout 25 per cent. These Turkic-speaking Shias liveconcentrated along the border with Azerbaijan inthe north-west of the country and in the capitalTehran. They are relatively well integrated intoIranian society, and Supreme Leader AyatollahKhamenei is ethnic Azeri. Nonetheless tensionsbecame evident in May 2006 when thousands ofAzeris protested in north-west Iran following


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publication in a government newspaper of a cartooninsulting to Azeris. Government security forces firedon the protesters, killing five and injuring dozens.

The mostly Sunni Baluchi ethnic minoritycomprises around 2 per cent of the Iranianpopulation, and lives in the impoverishedBaluchistan region that straddles the Pakistaniborder. As Tehran opened a new military base in thearea, Baluchi militants attacked a governmentmotorcade in March 2006, killing over 20 peopleand taking others hostage.

Iran’s record on religious freedom continued tobe dismal. Baluchis, Kurds and Sunni Arabs decriedthe fact that not a single Sunni mosque has beenpermitted in the country, and public displays ofSunni religion remain banned. The 300,000 Baha’iof Iran remain subject to severe statediscrimination. In September 2005, state-controlledmedia began an intense campaign against theBaha’i, whom Islamic clerics decry as heretics forbelieving that other prophets came afterMohammed. In March 2006, the UN SpecialRapporteur on Freedom of Religion said she hadreceived an October 2005 document in whichAyatollah Khamenei ordered the Iranian military toidentify and monitor members of the Baha’icommunity. In May 2006, Human Rights Watchreported the arrests of 54 Baha’i youth volunteers inShiraz. In February 2006, police and organizedgangs broke up a peaceful protest amongNematollahi Sufis (dervishes) in Qom, whocomplained of a state order to relinquish their placeof worship. Hundreds were injured and over athousand detained. Amnesty International reportedthat, as of March, at least 173 Sufis remained indetention and that their lawyer had been arrested.The 25,000 Jews of Iran, the largest population inthe Middle East outside Israel, continued theircoexistence with the Shia Persian majority despitesome provocations. In July 2006, during theLebanon war, an Iranian newspaper falsely reportedthat Iranian Jews were celebrating Israeliindependence day, which prompted extremists totarget two synagogues. The community haswatched nervously as new Iranian PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad has threatened to ‘wipeIsrael off the map’ and questioned the dimensionsof the Holocaust. His campaign promotingHolocaust denial culminated in an internationalconference held in Tehran in December 2006 – a

move that met with widespread condemnation inEurope and the US.

Women in Iran remained subject to severerestrictions on their rights in accordance with Iran’sinterpretation of the tenets of Sharia law, includingthe requirement that married women receive theirhusbands’ permission to work. Iran’s ruling clericsrejected a suggestion from President Ahmadinejad at


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Below: Residents return to find that large areas ofsouthern Beirut had been reduced to rubble byIsraeli bombardment during 34 days of conflictbetween Israel and Hezbollah. Sean Sutton/MAG

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the time of the 2006 World Cup that women beallowed to attend football matches, ruling that itwas un-Islamic for women to look at strange men’slegs. Human Rights Watch reported that, in June2006, police brutally assaulted hundreds of peacefulprotesters in Tehran who were demanding an end tolegally sanctioned discrimination against women.

Lebanon In late 2006, identity politics and sectarian tensionswere rising in Lebanon following politicalassassinations and the fall-out from the July warbetween Hezbollah and Israel that resulted in over

1,000 civilian deaths, the displacement of over 1million Lebanese, and the widespread destruction ofthe country’s infrastructure, especially in the south.

Lebanon’s Islamic majority is sharply divided intoSunni and Shia groupings that have usually been onopposite sides of political divides, leaving the countrywithout an effective majority. Lebanon’s minoritygroups also display internal political divisions.Lebanon’s largest group is Shia Muslims, making up32 per cent of the population, which has generallyfelt more drawn to Arab traditions and ties, and thusmore open to influence and support from Syria andIran. Maronite Christians (16 per cent) and Sunni


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Muslims (18 per cent) have long dominated Lebanesegovernment and maintained closer relationships withformer colonizer France and other Western countries.Smaller minority groups are Palestinians (10 percent), Druze (7 per cent), Greek Orthodox (5 percent), Greek Catholic (5 per cent), Armenians (3 percent), Alawis (3 per cent) and Kurds (1 per cent).

Following its 1975–90 sectarian civil war,Lebanon returned to a modified form of politicalconfessionalism, whereby government positions areapportioned among the main religious groups of thecountry. This system has led to under-representationof smaller minorities in government, with the Druzecommunity in particular chafing at its limitations.

Palestinian refugees have been particularlymarginalized in Lebanon. About half of thecountry’s 400,000 Palestinians live in the south andhalf of them live in camps. Palestinians are deniedcitizenship and, although restrictions were loosenedin June 2005, they remain barred from manyprofessions and relegated to manual labour.

The country’s ethnic and religious groups livelargely segregated throughout the country. Shia,concentrated in the south, felt neglected bysuccessive Maronite–Sunni governments in Beirut,and formed Hezbollah with Iranian and Syrianbacking in response to the 1982 Israeli invasion ofLebanon. Following the February 2005 assassinationof the Sunni former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiqal-Hariri, Sunni, Christian and Druze opponents ofbroad Syrian influence in Lebanon took to the streetsto launch the March 2005 ‘Cedar Revolution’, whileHezbollah and the Shia community demonstrated insupport of Syria. Hezbollah complained bitterlywhen anti-Syrian forces won control of parliamenttwo months later and, with the support of the UNSecurity Council, prodded Syria to end its 30-yearmilitary occupation.

In July 2006, Hezbollah abducted two Israelisoldiers along the border, sparking a fierce Israelimilitary assault on Lebanon. While the brunt of theattack came in the Hezbollah stronghold insouthern Lebanon, from where the organization hadlong fired rockets indiscriminately into northernIsrael, it extended to most parts of Lebanon.Lebanon was cut off from the outside worldthrough a naval blockade and the bombing ofrunways at Beirut airport and strategic roadinfrastructure throughout the country, ostensibly toprevent Hezbollah’s re-supply from Syria. The

bombings, and an Israeli ground invasion,continued until 14 August, as did Hezbollah rocketfire into Israel. Human rights organizations blamedboth sides for the indiscriminate nature of theirattacks, which killed over 1,000 Lebanese and 43Israeli civilians. The United Nations estimated that,as of 1 November 2006, 150,000–200,000 Lebaneseremained displaced as a result of the conflict.

The already vulnerable Palestinian refugeecommunity in southern Lebanon was particularlyhard hit by the war. Not only were some of theircamps and homes damaged or destroyed by Israeli airraids, but many lost their livelihoods. Israel madebroad use of cluster bombs during the war, andhundreds of thousands of unexploded munitions nowlitter southern Lebanese agricultural fields on whichmany Palestinian labourers depend for their income.

In September 2006, Refugees Internationalwarned that displaced Christians and SunniMuslims in the majority Shia south were reluctantto return home for fear of discrimination byHezbollah. Indeed, Hezbollah appeared to be moreeffective than the government in providing cashassistance to those residents of the south whosehomes had been destroyed in the bombing.

During the war, as Israel targeted all parts ofLebanon, destroying its booming tourist season andsetting back its economic development by years,many Lebanese of all communities rallied aroundHezbollah in their anger. However, shortly after thewar, representatives of non-Shia communities wereloud in their remonstrations against Hezbollah forhaving provoked Israel and having brought suchdestruction to Lebanon.

On 11 November 2006, all Shia members ofgovernment resigned, ending its ethnic balance.Subsequent parliamentary approval of aninternational investigation into the Haririassassination fuelled Hezbollah demands that thegovernment step down to pave the way for newelections that the organization felt should end Shiaunder-representation.

The assassination of Industry Minister andMaronite Christian leader Pierre Gemayel on 21November 2006 resulted in the further sharpening ofsectarian tensions. Many Sunni, Druze and Christians,and, internationally, the United States, immediatelysuspected Syrian involvement, and the UN SecurityCouncil approved the establishment of aninternational criminal tribunal to investigate the


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Hariri and Gemayel assassinations, as well as otherkillings of prominent anti-Syrian figures since early2005. Political leaders and Lebanese citizens alikeappeared to be balancing their anger and sense ofinjustice with wariness about nearing the abyss of war.

Israel Israel continued to be pulled between its foundationas a ‘Jewish state’ and its claim to full democracy,inherent to which is respect for the rights ofPalestinian Arabs who comprise 20 per cent of theIsraeli population. Around 85 per cent of these areMuslim, and they are the fastest growingcommunity in Israel, which many Jews regard as athreat to the Jewish identity of Israel. Continuedattacks on Israel from the occupied territories of theWest Bank and Gaza Strip have further complicatedefforts to secure the rights of this minority.

In 2006, race continued to form the basis for manyIsraeli government actions. In 2003, Israeli legislatorsinstituted race-based discrimination againstPalestinian Arab citizens seeking to acquire citizenshipfor spouses in the occupied territories, forcingthousands of families to separate. In May 2006, theIsraeli Supreme Court narrowly rejected a challengeto the law. Bedouins, who make up an estimated 8.5per cent of the Israeli Palestinian population, facedcontinued Israeli government efforts to change thedemographics in southern Israel through the supportof Jewish settlements and neglect of services to anddemolition of Arab Bedouin homes in the Naqab(Negev) desert region. In August and September2006, courts issued orders for the destruction of 12Bedouin homes in ‘unrecognized’ villages. Followingthe July 2006 war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, theIsraeli Finance Minister issued an order forcompensation for Israeli border towns that sufferedduring the war, but systematically excluded Arabcommunities from the scheme. In November 2006, adraft action plan to close the gap between Jewish andArab Israelis in educational resources had the broadagreement of Israel’s Union of Local Authorities andthe Higher Arab Monitoring Committee, but hadreceived only a tepid response from the IsraeliEducation Ministry, which wanted to spread theresources for the project over a longer time-frame.Arab Druze, the only ethnic minority subject tomilitary conscription, make up around 1.5 per centof the Israeli population, and have chafed at militaryservice out of opposition to Israeli policy in the

occupied territories. The Arab Druze Initiative, anorganization of conscientious objectors to militaryservice, estimated in April 2006 that the number ofDruze youth refusing military service had climbed to40 per cent, despite the threat of arrest.

Palestine The Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank(including East Jerusalem) and Gaza are home to2.3 million indigenous Palestinians and 280,000Jewish settlers. To the extent that Israel continues toexercise authority over the territories, it assumesmuch responsibility under international law forpublic order and safety, the rule of law and therights of the population.

The election of a Hamas-led government in January2006 by Palestinians fed up with the long-ruling FatahParty’s corruption and its inability to move thepolitical process forward led Western countries toimpose strict economic sanctions on the PalestinianAuthority in an attempt to bring about its recognitionof Israel, acceptance of past peace agreements andrenunciation of violence. Meanwhile, violencebetween Hamas and Fatah factions escalated during2006, especially in Gaza, as both adjusted to their newroles in government and opposition, respectively.

Following the abduction of an Israeli soldier byPalestinian militants and repeated andindiscriminate firing of home-made missiles fromthe occupied territories into Israel, Israel launched anew military incursion into Gaza on 25 June 2006.Israeli forces bombed Gaza’s only independentpower station, cutting 43 per cent of the territory’selectricity supply. According to an Israeli humanrights organization, B’Tselem, through October2006, over 375 Palestinians had been killed in thesustained assault, including 199 civilians. A tenuousceasefire in November 2006 provided some hopethat negotiations might soon begin.

In the West Bank, the separation barrier that Israelbegan building in 2002 with the stated intent toenhance its defences against terrorist attacks hadreached a length of 670 km by late 2006. The wallcarves off 10 per cent of the West Bank to the Israeliside, including settlements on Palestinian land, andin July 2004 the International Court of Justice foundthat it gravely infringed Palestinian rights. 200,000Palestinians caught on the western side of the wallare effectively imprisoned between the hours of 10pm and 6 am, denied entry if they miss the curfew,


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and denied access to emergency services during thesehours. UN High Commissioner for Human RightsLouise Arbour remarked, in November 2006, ‘Hereyou have one people balancing their right to securityagainst another people’s right to freedom.’ Palestinianfreedom of movement between the West Bank andGaza, as well as the passage of goods at Karnicrossing, also remained curtailed, with drasticeconomic consequences.

In July 2005 Israeli law-makers barredPalestinians in the occupied territories from seekingcompensation for deaths, injury or damages causedby Israeli security forces since the beginning of theSecond Intifada in September 2000. Israeli andPalestinian human rights organizations filed achallenge to the law before the Israeli SupremeCourt in September 2005. The Court rejected partof the law in December 2006, ruling thatPalestinians could seek redress for damagesstemming from non-combat military operations.

Just under 2 per cent of indigenous Palestiniansin the occupied territories are Christian, and thesereside largely in Bethlehem, Jerusalem andRamallah. Following the Pope’s controversialremarks on Islam in September 2006, sevenchurches in the Palestinian territories were set onfire. While Hamas leader and Palestinian AuthorityPrime Minister Ismail Haniya condemned thePope’s statement, he also denounced the attacks onChristian churches in the occupied territories.

Syria Sectarian tension in Syria is rising as the majoritySunni Arab country grows alarmed at the fate of theSunni minority in Iraq, and increasinglysympathetic to such Sunni militant organizations asal-Qaeda, who purport to defend Sunnis and bringretribution to Shia. Iraqi refugees, including Shia,have streamed into Syria, and in June 2006 sectarianrioting erupted in a largely Iraqi Damascus suburb.

There are an estimated 1.5 million Kurds in Syria,although an estimated 300,000 remain statelessfollowing a 1962 decision that stripped many Kurdsand their descendants of their citizenship, and thepresence of many more without official papers.Police violently prevented an October 2006 rally inDamascus in support of these stateless Kurds, whoare barred from property ownership, admission touniversity and public sector employment. AmnestyInternational raised alarm over the arrest in

November 2006 of a Syrian Kurdish activist whohad been demanding an investigation into the May2005 torture and murder of his father – allegedly bySyrian Military Intelligence officers.

Saudi Arabia During 2006, Saudi Arabia remained an abyss in thearea of religious freedom. The absolute monarchy,though itself the target of al-Qaeda attacks in recentyears, continued to foster Sunni extremism directedtoward the West, religious minorities and women.

Despite some recent efforts at their revision,educational materials used in Saudi schools still fanreligious intolerance toward Jews, Shia Muslimsand Christians. The US Commission onInternational Religious Freedom reported that, in2006, clerics authorized by the Ministry of IslamicAffairs continued to engage in hate speech. InApril 2006, the government arrested a Saudijournalist for criticism of the government’s strictinterpretation of Islam.

Since the founding of the Kingdom of SaudiArabia, the country’s minority Shia – comprisingaround 10 per cent of the population – have facedrestrictions on religious practice and discriminationin education, employment and representation ingovernment. King Abdullah formally took power inAugust 2005 and has taken some steps to easetension with the Shia minority by releasing politicalprisoners and allowing greater political participationby Shia. Nevertheless, the International CrisisGroup reported in September 2005 that thesectarian war in Iraq had worsened relationsbetween Sunnis and Shia in Saudi Arabia.

The 700,000 Ismaili Muslims in Saudi Arabialikewise have faced rampant discrimination, as thegovernment has closed their mosques and accusedthem of blasphemy, apostasy and witchcraft. InNovember 2006, King Abdullah pardoned a groupof Ismailis jailed after rioting in 2000, but theSaudi-based Human Rights First Society reportedthat at least two other Ismailis remained imprisonedfor insulting the Prophet Mohammed. It was notclear whether this included Hadi al Mutif, anIsmaili sentenced to death in 1996 for allegedlycommitting that offence in 1993.

Kuwait Pressure on the government from the NationalAssembly may improve the situation of ‘Bidouns’


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(meaning ‘without’ in Arabic) in Kuwait, whonumber 100,000–120,000, or around 5 per cent ofthe population. Bidouns are Arabs who have longbeen resident in Kuwait but are denied citizenshiprights as the Kuwaiti government maintains they arereally Saudi or other nationals who seek citizenshipto take advantage of generous Kuwaiti socialbenefits. Despite some improvements in 2005,notably provision of health care to the children ofBidouns, this minority still faces discrimination inemployment, freedom of movement and education.In November 2006, a number of MPs attended aBidoun rights forum hosted by the Kuwaiti HumanRights Society, where they urged the government togrant greater citizenship rights to Bidouns andindicated that formal parliamentary hearings on theissue were in the offing. The MPs were particularlyconcerned that Bidouns who have served in theKuwaiti military, and the families of Bidoun soldierswho have died for Kuwait, are still denied basicrights of citizenship.

Gulf States: migrant workers The oil-producing Gulf States rely heavily for labouron migrant workers, mostly from South and South-East Asia, as well as other Arab countries. Lax ornon-existent labour laws have led to widespreadexploitative work conditions and restricted freedomof movement for migrants, which led to unheard-ofstrikes in the oil industry. Women migrant workersare especially subject to physical and sexual violence.Human Rights Watch released a report inNovember 2006 detailing the reliance onexploitative labour of 600,000 Asian migrants tofuel the building boom in the United Arab Emirates(UAE). On the eve of the report’s release, the UAEannounced sweeping labour reforms. There werealso some moves toward reform in Saudi Arabia,where migrant workers make up around 33 per centof the population; King Abdullah signed a newlabour law in September 2005 that entitles migrantworkers to one day off per week, and 21 days forholidays per year. Oman and Bahrain enactedlegislation in 2006 to legalize labour unions.

Many migrant workers arrive in the regionthrough human traffickers and are surprised to findthemselves in exploitative situations. In November2006, a Special Rapporteur on trafficking for theUN Human Rights Council travelled through theGulf States. She criticized Oman and Qatar for

treating trafficked migrant workers as criminalsrather than victims, and noted a pending anti-trafficking bill in Bahrain, as well as its establishmentof safe houses for abused migrant workers. p


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ReferenceCompiled by Marusca PerazziReferenceCompiled by Marusca Perazzi

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 116

Peoples under Threat 2007Notes to Table 1

Sources of the indicators are as follows:p Conflict indicators: The base data used was

Marshall/Gurr/Khosla, Center for InternationalDevelopment and Conflict Management,University of Maryland, updated for 2006 usinglatest figures from Marshall, Center for SystemicPeace, and Heidelberg Institute for InternationalConflict Research. Self-determinations conflicts in 2006 were rankedon a scale of 0–5 as follows: 5=ongoing armedconflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settledarmed conflict; 2=militant politics;1=conventional politics. Major armed conflictswere classified as 2=ongoing in late 2006;1=emerging from conflict since 2001.

p Prior genocide or politicide: Harff, US PoliticalInstability Task Force (formerly State Failure TaskForce). 1=one or more episodes since 1945.

p Indicators of group division: Failed States Index,Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2006.

p Democracy/governance indicators: Annual GoodGovernance Indicators, World Bank, 2006.

p OECD country risk classification: Organisation forEconomic Cooperation and Development,country risk classification prevailing at October2006. Where no classification is given, a value of8 was accorded.

Full bibliographic references are given in the SelectBibliography.

Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an equalweighting to the five categories above, with theexception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. Asa dichotomous variable this received a lesserweighting to avoid too great a distortion to the finalranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:

(A/2) + (Bx1.25) + (Cx2) + (D+E+F)/6 +(G+H+I)/-1 + (Jx0.625)

Note that Djibouti is ranked artificially low due tothe absence of data on some of the indicators.Israel/Occupied Territories/Palestinian Authority isalso ranked artificially low as some of the indicatorsonly apply to the state of Israel and not to theOccupied Territories.

The methodology for the choice of indicators wasdescribed in State of the World’s Minorities 2006. It isbased on compiling current data to approximate themain known antecedents of genocide or politicalmass killing, drawing on the work of Barbara Harffand others. Responsibility for the table and anyerrors or omissions remains with Minority RightsGroup International.


Reference 117

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 117

Reference State of the World’sMinorities 2007

118

Darood, Hawiye, Issaq and otherclans; Bantu and other groups

Shia, Sunni, Kurds, Turkomans,Christians, Smaller minorites

Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and othersin Darfur; Dinka, Nuer and othersin the South; Nuba, Beja

Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks

Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons,Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa

Hema and Lendu, Hunde, Hutu,Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge,Twa/Mbuti

Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa(Muslims) and Christians in theNorth

Ahmadiyya, Baluchis, Hindus,Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis

Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu

Chechens, Ingush, Lezgins, indige-nous northern peoples, Roma

Hutu, Tutsi, Twa

Acholi, Karamojong

Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis

Tamils, Muslims

Political/social targets

Northern Mande (Dioula),Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups

Hutu, Tutsi, Twa

Political/social targets, Dalits

Indigenous peoples, Moros(Muslims)

Arabs, Azeris, Baha’is, Baluchis,Kurds, Turkomans

Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks,Madurese, Papuans

Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs

Ethnic Albanians, Croats, Roma,Ashkali, Serbs (Kosovo)

Southerners

Ndebele, Europeans

Dan, Krahn, Ma, other groups

Political/social targets, Afro-descen-dants, indigenous peoples

Tajiks, Islamic political groups,Russians

Kurds

Somalia

Iraq

Sudan

Afghanistan

Burma

Dem. Rep. of the Congo

Nigeria

Pakistan

Angola

Russian Federation

Burundi

Uganda

Ethiopia

Sri Lanka

Haiti

Côte d’Ivoire

Rwanda

Nepal

Philippines

Iran

Indonesia

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Serbia

Chad

Zimbabwe

Liberia

Colombia

Uzbekistan

Syria

Conflict indicatorsGroupCountry

4

4

5

4

5

1

5

5

4

5

0

1

5

5

0

0

0

0

5

5

4

4

4

3

1

0

3

1

0

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

2

1

2

1

2

0

2

2

1

1

2

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

2

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

A. Self-determinationconflicts

B. Majorarmedconflict

Table 1Peoples under threat 2007

C. Prior genocide/politicide

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 118


Reference 119

Indicators of group division

8.1

8.3

9.7

9.6

8.8

9.5

5.9

9.3

8.5

7.2

9.1

9.2

7.6

8.2

5

7.6

7

4.8

5.5

8.7

8.2

8.5

8.5

9

8.9

9.3

9.1

5.8

7.1

8

9.8

9.7

9.1

9

9.1

9.1

8.6

6.3

8

7

7.8

7

9.1

8.8

9.8

9

9.2

7.2

6.9

6.3

8.6

8.6

8.5

8.5

7

7.4

7.5

8

9.8

9.7

9.1

8

8

9.6

9

9.1

8

9

7.8

7.9

8.7

8.9

9.6

9.8

8.9

9

7.2

8.8

7.9

8.7

8.6

9.5

8.5

8.8

9.2

9.1

7.1

Democracy/governance indicators

-1.89

-1.47

-1.84

-1.28

-2.16

-1.64

-0.69

-1.23

-1.15

-0.85

-1.15

-0.59

-1.1

-0.26

-1.41

-1.5

-1.32

-1.19

0.01

-1.43

-0.21

-0.11

0.12

-1.25

-1.65

-0.92

-0.32

-1.76

-1.67

-2.51

-2.82

-2.05

-2.12

-1

-2.4

-1.77

-1.68

-0.82

-1.07

-1.65

-1.32

-1.48

-1.25

-1.91

-2.49

-1.21

-2.36

-1.11

-1.14

-1.42

-0.78

-0.91

-1.34

-1.58

-1.45

-1.79

-1.91

-0.91

-2.36

-1.81

-1.48

-1.68

-1.56

-1.76

-1.38

-0.81

-1.28

-0.84

-1.17

-0.74

-0.77

0

-1.62

-1.47

-1

-0.81

-0.52

-0.76

-0.87

-0.74

-0.81

-1.23

-1.47

-1.6

-0.71

-1.31

-0.42

Total

D. Massivemovement –refugees andIDPs

E. Legacy ofvengeance –groupgrievance

F. Rise offactionalizedelites

G. Voice andaccountability

H. Politicalstability

I. Rule of law J. OECDcountry riskclassification

7

7

7

8

7

7

7

6

7

4

8

7

7

5

7

7

7

7

5

5

5

7

7

7

7

7

4

7

7

21.95

21.61

21.50

21.03

20.40

19.88

19.22

18.97

16.68

16.29

16.20

16.18

16.11

16.00

15.72

15.62

15.31

15.07

15.06

15.02

14.61

14.31

14.26

14.20

13.89

13.78

13.60

13.59

13.08

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 119


120

Cham, Vietnamese

Bubi

Hmong


Ahmadiyya, Hindus, other religiousminorities, Chittagong Hill Tribes

Druze, Maronite Christians,Palestinians, Shia, Sunnis

Berbers

Armenians

Political/social targets, Aka

Kurds, Roma

Fulani, Malinke

Adzhars, Abkhazians, SouthOssetians

Uzbeks, Russians

Afars

Uzbeks, Russians

Westerners

All groups incl. Krio, Limba,Mende, Temne

Political/social targets, religiousminorities

Trans-Dniester Slavs

Ewe, Kabre

Tibetans, Uyghurs, Hui, religiousminorities

Political/social targets, Russians

Montagnards

Chinese, Malay-Muslims, NorthernHill Tribes

Palestinians in Gaza/West Bank,Israeli Palestinians

Indigenous Highland, IndigenousLowland

Indigenous peoples

Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs


Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples

Poles

Indigenous peoples, Creoles

Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras,other Adivasis, Kashmiris, Sikhs,Muslims, Dalits

Cambodia

Equatorial Guinea

Laos

Yemen

Bangladesh

Lebanon

Algeria

Azerbaijan

Central African Republic

Turkey

Guinea

Georgia

Kyrgyzstan

Eritrea

Tajikistan

Cameroon

Sierra Leone

North Korea

Moldova

Togo

China

Turkmenistan

Vietnam

Thailand

Israel/OT/PA

Bolivia

Guatemala

Niger

Cuba

Ecuador

Belarus

Nicaragua

India


0

2

4

0

3

2

2

4

0

5

0

4

1

0

0

2

0

0

4

0

4

0

2

5

5

2

0

3

0

2

0

3

5

0

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

1

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0



Table 1 (continued)Peoples under threat 2007


MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 120


Reference 121


6.5

2

5.9

6.7

5.8

4.3

6.6

8.1

7.7

6.1

7.2

6.8

6.6

7.2

6.6

6.8

7.9

6

4.7

5.8

5.1

4.2

6.5

5.7

8.5

4

6

4.3

4.7

4.8

5.1

5.5

2.8

7

6.7

6.3

7

9.5

7.8

7.1

7.3

8.8

7.3

8.1

7.4

7

5.4

6.2

6.5

7.1

7.2

7.3

6

8

5.2

5.3

8.1

9

7

7.1

8.5

5.5

6.8

5.5

6.4

6.9

7.5

8

8.9

9.4

8.9

8.3

6.4

7.5

8

6.9

9

7.1

7.9

7.5

8.7

7.9

7.7

8

6.8

7.8

8

8

7

7.2

7.5

8.4

6

6

8

7.3

8

7

5.7


-0.94

-1.71

-1.54

-1.07

-0.5

-0.72

-0.92

-1.16

-1.15

-0.04

-1.18

-0.27

-1.03

-1.83

-1.17

-1.19

-0.38

-2.06

-0.49

-1.23

-1.66

-1.95

-1.6

0.07

0.61

-0.09

-0.37

-0.06

-1.87

-0.16

-1.68

0.01

0.35

-0.44

0.21

-0.27

-1.61

-1.65

-1.14

-1.09

-1.21

-1.13

-0.54

-1.11

-0.8

-1.21

-0.72

-1.35

-0.34

-0.48

-0.12

-0.65

-1.22

-0.18

-0.34

0.34

-0.55

-1.16

-1.15

-0.89

-0.56

0.03

-0.83

0.01

-0.16

-0.85

-1.13

-1.33

-1.12

-1.1

-0.87

-0.36

-0.71

-0.84

-1.29

0.07

-1.11

-0.82

-1.07

-0.81

-0.99

-1.02

-1.12

-1.15

-0.59

-1.07

-0.47

-1.41

-0.45

-0.1

0.76

-0.78

-1.04

-0.82

-1.14

-0.84

-1.04

-0.7

0.09

Total







8

7

7

6

6

7

3

5

7

5

7

7

7

8

7

7

7

7

7

7

2

7

5

3

3

7

5

7

7

7

7

7

3

13.01

12.99

12.82

12.63

12.30

12.25

12.20

12.15

12.03

12.02

11.83

11.82

11.77

11.71

11.47

11.46

11.39

11.24

11.24

11.16

11.08

10.98

10.97

10.96

10.83

10.63

10.61

10.45

10.39

10.36

10.19

9.88

9.85

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122

Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants

Albanians, Roma, Serbs

Borana, Endorois, Kalenjin, Maasai,Ogiek, Somalis, Turkana

Lhotshampa, Nepalese

Black Moors, Kewri

Bounganvilleans

Tatars, Russians (Crimea)

Afars

Venezuela

Macedonia

Kenya

Bhutan

Mauritania

Papua New Guinea

Ukraine

Djibouti


0

3

0

2

0

3

2

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0



Table 1 (continued)Peoples under threat 2007


MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 122


Reference 123


4.8

5.1

7.1

8.1

5.9

2.5

3.8

6.8

7.1

6.7

7

8.5

8

7.2

7.3

6.2

7.6

8.4

7.9

6.7

7.5


-0.5

-0.03

-0.12

-1.05

-1.09

-0.05

-0.26

-0.84

-1.22

-1.04

-1.16

1.01

0.31

-0.81

-0.39

-0.74

-1.22

-0.38

-0.94

0.52

-0.54

-0.92

-0.6

-0.87

Total







6

6

6

8

7

5

6

8

9.84

9.77

9.54

9.44

9.41

9.27

9.08

8.95

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 123


124

WhiteColouredIndian

WhiteKavangoDamaraHereroNamaColouredCaprivianSanBasterTswana

Zanzibaris

Francoph.

Bosniac

WhitesChinese

ShiaSunniMaronitesDruzeGreek Orth.Greek Cath.ArmeniansAlawis

AF/ME/TurkCaribbean

Francoph.*AsiansBlackInuit

Francoph.ItalophonesRomansh

MaoriPacific IslandersAsian

HungariansItalians

TamilsMuslims

Swedes

Banabans

Med/Mid EastBlackLatinoSami

HungariansRussians

WhiteAsian

Asian

29.3 8.96.9

9.06.47.7

12.86.43.85.11.33.8

0

18.6

40.3

33.333.333.3

15.85.3

21.121.126.64.7

10.96.23.91.6

6.73.3

24.5 5.21.30.6

24.0 4.01.5

16.03.02.0

1.12.3

16.910.7

7.7

2.4

1.81.20.60.3

12.40.7

0.70.7

1.0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

SouthAfrica**

Namibia

Tanzania

Belgium*

Bosnia-H

Fr. Polynesia

Lebanon

Netherlands

Canada

Switzerland

New Zealand

Slovenia*

Sri Lanka

Finland*

Kiribati

Sweden

Slovakia*

Zambia

Malawi

Minoritypopulation %

Under/over LSQ Score Number ofelections

Minority Seat %CountryRank

14.08.02.4

5.08.06.66.04.03.03.02.02.00.6

2.8

32.0

43.717.331.4

10.13.7

32.018.016.07.05.05.03.03.0

4.01.3

20.91.51.23.5

21.04.30.6

12.35.00.5

0.40.1

18.07.6

5.8

0.6

1.90.10.10.2

10.81.0

0.10.1

0.1

(15.3)(0.9)(4.5)

(4.0)(-1.6)(1.1)(6.8)(2.4)(0.8)(2.1)

(-0.7)(1.8)

(-0.6)

(15.8)

(8.3)

(-10.4)(16.0)(1.9)

(5.7)(1.6)

(-10.9)(3.1)

(10.6)(-2.3)(5.9)(1.2)(0.9)

(-1.4)

(2.7)(2.0)

(3.6)(3.7)(0.1)(2.9)

(3.0)(-0.3)(0.9)

(3.7)(-2.0)(1.5)

(0.7)(2.2)

(-1.1)(3.1)

(1.9)

(1.8)

(-0.1)(1.1)(0.5)(0.1)

(1.6)(-0.3)

(0.6)(0.6)

(0.9)

3.22

2.84

2.81

2.04

1.94

1.91

1.88

1.53

1.41

1.34

1.30

1.20

1.0

0.97

0.95

0.89

0.81

0.77

0.67

222

1

1

4

1

1

1

1

3

111

1

44

1

3

1

1

55

1

1

Table 2Minority members in national legislatures

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 124


Reference 125




KurdsSunniTurkmenChristian

Greeks

White

MuslimInuitFaroese

Bougainvilleans

Non-Whites

Aborigines

Asian

Kazaks

Germans

Non-Muslims

Nth. Af/MidEast

Turks

Afro-CaribbeanAsian

AfroMixedChinese

Lezgins

Indo-Fijian

HungariansRoma

Nth AfricaOverseas territ.

MuslimsDalitsAdivasis

African Amer.LatinoNative Amer.

PolesRussians

ArabsDruze

SerbsCzechHungarianItalianOthers

AlbaniansTurksRomaSerbs

23.423.40.40.4

3.6

0.7

1.11.11.1

3.7

0.0

0.0

0.6

4.2

0.4

2.9

0.6

6.9

0.60.7

41.711.13.0

0.8

38.0

7.50.3

0.20.7

5.314.57.5

8.44.30.1

3.12.4

7.51.0

2.40.80.80.81.6

23.04.02.32.0

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

Iraq

Albania

Zimbabwe

Dennmark

Papua NewGuinea

Ireland

Australia*

Norway

Mongolia

Poland

Pakistan

Germany

Bulgaria*

UK

Trinidad &Tobago

Azerbaijan

Fiji

Romania*

France

India*

United States*

Lithuania*

Israel

Croatia

Macedonia

22.017.04.04.0

3.1

0.5

1.30.90.9

4.0

0.5

1.4

2.0

5.9

2.4

5.0

3.0

9.4

0.92.9

37.020.02.0

4.0

42.0

7.11.8

2.53.8

11.415.87.5

12.18.90.8

7.08.5

17.51.5

12.20.70.50.45.7

23.04.02.32.0

(1.4)(6.4)

(-3.6)(-3.6)

(0.5)

(0.2)

(-0.2)(0.2)(0.2)

(-0.3)

(-0.5)

(-1.4)

(-1.4)

(-1.7)

(-2.0)

(-2.1)

(-2.4)

(-2.5)

(-0.3)(-2.2)

(4.7)(-8.9)(1.0)

(-3.2)

(-4.0)

(-0.4)(-1.5)

(-2.3)(-3.1)

(-6.1)(-1.3)(0.0)

(-3.7)(-4.6)(-0.7)

(-3.9)(-6.1)

(-10.0)(-0.5)

(-9.8)(-0.1)(-0.3)(-0.4)(-4.1)

(-12.2)(-2.3)(-1.5)(-1.2)

0.55

0.5

0.32

0.3

-0.39

-0.5

-0.84

-0.84

-0.92

-1.0

-1.02

-1.09

-1.1

-1.12

-1.26

-1.27

-1.41

-1.41

-1.64

-1.92

-2.12

-2.24

-2.29

-2.56

-2.93

1

1

1

1

1

1

5

1

2

1

1

1

4

33

1

1

1

33

1

4

777

33

44

1

1

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 125


126

HazaraTajikUzbekKuchi

Afro

CatalanGalicianBasqueCanary Is.

Russians

Russophones

AlbaniansSerbians

12.021.38.04.0

3.9

5.10.62.30.9

9.3

4.7

2.67.8

45

46

47

48

49

50

Afghanistan

Brazil

Spain

Latvia*

Estonia*

Montenegro




16.030.013.07.0

13.2

16.07.92.04.6

33.1

30.3

5.032.0

(-4.0)(-8.7)(-5.0)(-3.0)

(-9.3)

(-10.9)(-7.3)(-0.3)(-3.7)

(-23.8)

(-25.6)

(-2.4)(-24.2)

-3.22

-3.28

-3.29

-3.45

-3.58

-3.65

1

1

1

4

4

1

Table 2 (continued)Minority members in national legislatures

Key: Minority percentage: MRG, World Directory ofMinorities (London: MRG 1997).Seat percentages are from the most recent electionunless noted. Data is for the lower house in bicameral parliaments,current to 1 December 2006 unless otherwise stated.* 1990–2003 average data from Lublin 2006. **South Africa 1994 and 1999.

Sources: Data collected by Andrew Reynolds,Marusca Perazzi from MRG and partners of MRG.Very grateful thanks go to Catherine Kannam,Susan Glover, Wendy Wolford, Altin Iranjani,Bernt Aardal, Krzysztof Jasiewicz, MichaelGallagher, Burt Monroe, John Carey, NenadStojanovic, Juan Díez-Nicolás and the Center forPeace, Legal Advice and Psychosocial Assistance,Vukovar, Croatia.

See also: Stojanovic, N. (2006) ‘Do multiculturaldemocracies really require PR? Counterevidencefrom Switzerland’, Swiss Political Science Review12(4), forthcoming; Lublin, D. (2006), forthcoming.

Adapted LSQ IndexThe Least Squares Index used to aggregate minorityunder/over-representation in this table was inventedby Michael Gallagher of Trinity College Dublin tomeasure electoral system disproportionality. Inprinciple it treats one group with 15 percent of the

population but no seats as a more disproportionaloutcome than 15 groups each winning 1 per centless of the seats than their population share wouldsuggest. Thus the measure gives a more accurateimpression of minority inclusion.

Pi = population share for group iSi = seat share for group iIndex = sqrt(.5* sum of all (Pi – Si) squared)

The adaptation of Gallagher’s LSQ Index used inthis table is that positives and negatives of eachdisproportionality have remained in the equation.

A note on data gatheringThis report represents the first time that data onminority MPs in national parliaments has beensystematically collected across a large number ofcountries and continents. We have sought to be asaccurate as possible and focus on self-identifiedminority MPs. We have relied upon in-countryexpertise wherever possible. Our minoritycategorizations and population shares come fromMRG’s Directory of World Minorities (1997). Therewill be some disputes about population size andwhat constitutes a minority group. There may bequestions about whether an MP really is from aminority group and issues of basic counting error.In future iterations of this survey we hope toinclude many more national legislatures.

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 126


Reference 127

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 127


128

List PR

List PR

FPTP

List PR

List PR

List PR

BV-Comm

List PR

FPTP

List PR

MMP

List PR

FPTP

List PR

TRS

List PR

List PR

FPTP

FPTP

List PR

MMP

FPTP

List PR

AV

STV

AV

List PR

BV

List PR

FPTP

MMP

List PR

FPTP

FPTP

PAR

AV

List PR

TRS

FPTP

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

South Africa

Namibia

Tanzania

Belgium

Bosnia-H

Fr. Polynesia

Lebanon

Netherlands

Canada

Switzerland

New Zealand

Slovenia

Sri Lanka

Finland

Kiribati

Sweden

Slovakia

Zambia

Malawi

Iraq

Albania

Zimbabwe

Denmark

Papua New Guinea

Ireland

Australia

Norway

Mongolia

Poland

Pakistan

Germany

Bulgaria

UK

Trinidad & Tobago

Azerbaijan

Fiji

Romania

France

India

HDIranking

Dem. score Reserv. seats? RegionElectoralsystem

CountryRep. rank

121

125

162

13

62

-

78

10

6

9

20

27

93

11

-

5

42

165

166

-

73

151

15

139

4

3

1

116

37

134

21

54

18

57

99

90

60

16

126

3

4

7

2

7

-

9

2

2

2

2

2

6

2

2

2

2

8

8

11

6

13

2

5

2

2

2

4

2

11

2

3

2

5

11

7

4

2

5

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

AFR

AFR

AFR

WEUR

CEEUR

OCEA

ME

WEUR

NA

WEUR

OCEA

CEEUR

ASIA

WEUR

OCEA

WEUR

CEEUR

AFR

AFR

ME

CEEUR

AFR

WEUR

OCEA

WEUR

OCEA

WEUR

ASIA

CEEUR

ASIA

WEUR

CEEUR

WEUR

NA

CEEUR

OCEA

CEEUR

WEUR

ASIA

Table 3Explaining minority representation

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 128


Reference 129

HDIranking

Dem. score Reserv. seats? RegionElectoralsystem

CountryRep. rank

FPTP

List PR

List PR

List PR

List PR

SNTV

List PR

List PR

List PR

List PR

List PR

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

United States

Lithuania

Israel

Croatia

Macedonia

Afghanistan

Brazil

Spain

Latvia

Estonia

Montenegro

8

41

23

44

66

-

69

19

45

40

-

2

2

3

4

6

10

5

2

2

2

5

No

No

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

NA

CEEUR

ME

CEEUR

CEEUR

ASIA

LA

WEUR

CEEUR

CEEUR

CEEUR

Sources: Electoral System: See Reynolds, Reilly andEllis, Electoral System Design: The New InternationalIDEA Handbook (Stockholm, International Institutefor Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2005).Reserved Seats: see Andrew Reynolds, ‘Reservedseats in national legislatures’, Legislative StudiesQuarterly vol. 25, no. 3 (May 2005).Human Development Index 2006, UNDP: Seehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Human_Development_Index Democracy Score: See Freedom House 2006:http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (scores range from 2, highest democracy score, to14, lowest).

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130

Status ofratificationof majorinternationaland regionalinstrumentsrelevant tominorityandindigenousrightsas of October 2006

p Ratification, accessionor succession.

P Signature not yetfollowed by ratification.

pu Ratification ofICERD and Declarationon Article 14.

pU Ratification ofICERD and Signature ofDeclaration on Article 14.

p1 Ratification ofICCPR and OptionalProtocol.

p! Ratification ofICCPR and Signature ofOptional Protocol.

P! Signature of ICCPRand Optional Protocol.

Africa

Algeria

Angola

Benin

Botswana

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cameroon

Cape Verde

Central African Republic

Chad

Comoros

Congo

Côte d’Ivoire

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Djibouti

Egypt

Equatorial Guinea

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Gabon

Gambia

Ghana

Guinea

Guinea Bissau

Kenya

Lesotho

Liberia

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mauritania

Mauritius

Morocco

Mozambique

Namibia

Niger

InternationalConventionon thePrevention andPunishment ofthe Crime ofGenocide1948

InternationalConventionon theElimination ofAll Forms ofRacialDiscrimination1965

InternationalCovenant onCivil andPolitical Rights1966

InternationalCovenant onEconomic,Social andCulturalRights 1966

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

pu

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

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p

p

p

p

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p1

p1

p

p1

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p1

p1

p1

p1

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MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 130


Reference 131

Conventionon theElimination ofAll Forms ofDiscriminationagainstWomen 1979

Conventionon the Rightsof the Child1989

ILO 111Discrimination(EmploymentandOccupation)Convention,1958

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

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p

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p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

ILO 169ConventionConcerningIndigenousand TribalPeoples inIndependentCountries1989

InternationalConventionon theProtection ofthe Rights ofAll MigrantWorkers andMembers ofTheir Families1990

ICC RomeStatute of theInternationalCriminalCourt 1998

p

P

p

p

P

p

P

p

p

P

p

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p

p

p

P

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p

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p

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p

p

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p

p

AfricanCharter onHuman andPeoples’ Rights2003

AfricanCharter on theRights andWelfare of theChild 1990

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

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p

p

p

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p

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p

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p

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p

p

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p

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 131


132









Nigeria

Rwanda

Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic

São Tóme and Príncipe

Senegal

Seychelles

Sierra Leone

Somalia

South Africa

Sudan

Swaziland

Togo

Tunisia

Uganda

United Republic of Tanzania

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Americas

Antigua and Barbuda

Argentina

Bahamas

Barbados

Belize

Bolivia

Brazil

Canada

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Dominica

Dominican Republic





p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

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p

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Reference 133




p

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p

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p

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p

AfricanCharter onHuman andPeoples’ Rights2003

African Charteron the Rightsand Welfare ofthe Child 1990

p

p

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p

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p

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AdditionalProtocol to theAmericanConvention onHuman Rightsin the area ofEconomic, Socialand CulturalRights 1988

AmericanConventionon HumanRights 1969

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 133


134









Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Haití

Honduras

Jamaica

México

Nicaragua

Panamá

Paraguay

Perú

Saint Kitts and Nevis

Saint Lucia

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

United States of America

Uruguay

Venezuela

Asia

Afghanistan

Bangladesh

Bhutan

Brunei Darussalam

Cambodia

China

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

India

Indonesia

Japan

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Malaysia





p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

p

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p

p

p

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p

p

p

p

p

p

pu

p

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p

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pu

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p

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pu

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Reference 135




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AmericanConventionon HumanRights 1969

AdditionalProtocol to theAmericanConvention onHuman Rightsin the area ofEconomic, Socialand CulturalRights 1988

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MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 135

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136









Maldives

Mongolia

Myanmar

Nepal

Pakistan

Philippines

Republic of Korea

Singapore

Sri Lanka

Tajikistan

Thailand

Timor-Leste

Turkmenistan

Uzbekistan

Viet Nam

Europe

Albania

Andorra

Armenia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Belarus

Belgium

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bulgaria

Croatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Georgia

Germany





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Reference 137




p

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EuropeanCharter forRegional orMinorityLanguages1992

FrameworkConvention forthe Protectionof NationalMinorities1995

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 137


138









Greece

Holy See

Hungary

Iceland

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Malta

Monaco

Montenegro

Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Republic of Moldova

Romania

Russian Federation

San Marino

Serbia

Slovakia

Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

The former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia

Turkey

Ukraine

United Kingdom of Great Britainand Northern Ireland

Middle East

Bahrain

Iran (Islamic Republic of )

Iraq





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Reference 139




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EuropeanCharter forRegional orMinorityLanguages1992

FrameworkConventionfor theProtection ofNationalMinorities1995

p

P

P

p

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P

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P

P

P

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140









Israel

Jordan

Kuwait

Lebanon

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Syrian Arab Republic

United Arab Emirates

Yemen

Oceania

Australia

Cook Islands

Fiji

Kiribati

Marshall Islands

Micronesia (Federated States of )

Nauru

New Zealand

Niue

Palau

Papua New Guinea

Samoa

Solomon Islands

Tonga

Tuvalu

Vanuatu





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Sources:

http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Statusfrset?OpenFrameSet

http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/worldsigsandratifications.html

Treaty Office on http://conventions.coe.int/

http://www.achpr.org/

http://www.cidh.oas.org/

http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b32.html

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Reference 141




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Appendices

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 142

Declaration on the Rights of PersonsBelonging to National or Ethnic,Religious and Linguistic Minorities

Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of18 December 1992

The General Assembly, Reaffirming that one of the basic aims of the UnitedNations, as proclaimed in the Charter, is to promoteand encourage respect for human rights and forfundamental freedoms for all, without distinction asto race, sex, language or religion,

Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights,in the dignity and worth of the human person, inthe equal rights of men and women and of nationslarge and small,

Desiring to promote the realization of the principlescontained in the Charter, the Universal Declaration ofHuman Rights, the Convention on the Prevention andPunishment of the Crime of Genocide, theInternational Convention on the Elimination of AllForms of Racial Discrimination, the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights, theInternational Covenant on Economic, Social andCultural Rights, the Declaration on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Basedon Religion or Belief, and the Convention on theRights of the Child, as well as other relevantinternational instruments that have been adopted at theuniversal or regional level and those concluded betweenindividual States Members of the United Nations,

Inspired by the provisions of article 27 of theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsconcerning the rights of persons belonging toethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,

Considering that the promotion and protection ofthe rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic,religious and linguistic minorities contribute to thepolitical and social stability of States in which they live,

Emphasizing that the constant promotion andrealization of the rights of persons belonging to nationalor ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, as anintegral part of the development of society as a wholeand within a democratic framework based on the rule oflaw, would contribute to the strengthening of friendshipand cooperation among peoples and States,

Considering that the United Nations has animportant role to play regarding the protection ofminorities,

Bearing in mind the work done so far within theUnited Nations system, in particular by theCommission on Human Rights, the Subcommissionon Prevention of Discrimination and Protection ofMinorities and the bodies established pursuant tothe International Covenants on Human Rights andother relevant international human rightsinstruments in promoting and protecting the rightsof persons belonging to national or ethnic, religiousand linguistic minorities,

Taking into account the important work which isdone by intergovernmental and non-governmentalorganizations in protecting minorities and in promotingand protecting the rights of persons belonging tonational or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities,

Recognizing the need to ensure even moreeffective implementation of international humanrights instruments with regard to the rights ofpersons belonging to national or ethnic, religiousand linguistic minorities,

Proclaims this Declaration on the Rights ofPersons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religiousand Linguistic Minorities:

Article 1 1. States shall protect the existence and the national

or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguisticidentity of minorities within their respectiveterritories and shall encourage conditions for thepromotion of that identity.

2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and othermeasures to achieve those ends.

Article 2 1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious

and linguistic minorities (hereinafter referred to aspersons belonging to minorities) have the right toenjoy their own culture, to profess and practisetheir own religion, and to use their own language,in private and in public, freely and withoutinterference or any form of discrimination.

2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right toparticipate effectively in cultural, religious, social,economic and public life.

3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right toparticipate effectively in decisions on the nationaland, where appropriate, regional level concerningthe minority to which they belong or the regionsin which they live, in a manner not incompatiblewith national legislation.


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4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right toestablish and maintain their own associations.

5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right toestablish and maintain, without any discrimination,free and peaceful contacts with other members oftheir group and with persons belonging to otherminorities, as well as contacts across frontiers withcitizens of other States to whom they are related bynational or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties.

Article 3 1. Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their

rights, including those set forth in the presentDeclaration, individually as well as in communitywith other members of their group, without anydiscrimination.

2. No disadvantage shall result for any personbelonging to a minority as the consequence of theexercise or non-exercise of the rights set forth inthe present Declaration.

Article 4 1. States shall take measures where required to

ensure that persons belonging to minorities mayexercise fully and effectively all their human rightsand fundamental freedoms without anydiscrimination and in full equality before the law.

2. States shall take measures to create favourableconditions to enable persons belonging tominorities to express their characteristics and todevelop their culture, language, religion,traditions and customs, except where specificpractices are in violation of national law andcontrary to international standards.

3. States should take appropriate measures so that,wherever possible, persons belonging tominorities may have adequate opportunities tolearn their mother tongue or to have instructionin their mother tongue.

4. States should, where appropriate, take measures inthe field of education, in order to encourageknowledge of the history, traditions, language andculture of the minorities existing within theirterritory. Persons belonging to minorities shouldhave adequate opportunities to gain knowledge ofthe society as a whole.

5. States should consider appropriate measures sothat persons belonging to minorities mayparticipate fully in the economic progress anddevelopment in their country.

Article 5

1. National policies and programmes shall be plannedand implemented with due regard for the legitimateinterests of persons belonging to minorities.

2. Programmes of cooperation and assistance amongStates should be planned and implemented withdue regard for the legitimate interests of personsbelonging to minorities.

Article 6 States should cooperate on questions relating topersons belonging to minorities, inter alia,exchanging information and experiences, in order topromote mutual understanding and confidence.

Article 7 States should cooperate in order to promote respectfor the rights set forth in the present Declaration.

Article 8 1. Nothing in the present Declaration shall prevent

the fulfilment of international obligations ofStates in relation to persons belonging tominorities. In particular, States shall fulfil in goodfaith the obligations and commitments they haveassumed under international treaties andagreements to which they are parties.

2. The exercise of the rights set forth in the presentDeclaration shall not prejudice the enjoyment byall persons of universally recognized human rightsand fundamental freedoms.

3. Measures taken by States to ensure the effectiveenjoyment of the rights set forth in the presentDeclaration shall not prima facie be consideredcontrary to the principle of equality contained inthe Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

4. Nothing in the present Declaration may beconstrued as permitting any activity contrary tothe purposes and principles of the UnitedNations, including sovereign equality, territorialintegrity and political independence of States.

Article 9 The specialized agencies and other organizations ofthe United Nations system shall contribute to thefull realization of the rights and principles set forthin the present Declaration, within their respectivefields of competence.

Appendices State of the World’sMinorities 2007

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Who are Minorities?There is no universally accepted definition of‘minorities’, and the word is interpreted differentlyin different societies. The United Nations (UN) hasfailed to agree a definition of what constitutes aminority, beyond that implied in the title of the UNDeclaration on the Rights of Persons belonging toNational or Ethnic, Religious and LinguisticMinorities. Attempting a more precise statement hasbeen fraught with difficulties: in some cases themotivation for a tighter definition has been to denycertain rights to certain peoples.

Minority Rights Group International (MRG)focuses its work on non-dominant ethnic, religiousand linguistic communities, who may notnecessarily be numerical minorities. MRG’s workincludes initiatives with indigenous and tribalpeoples, migrant communities and refugees. Thesecommunities may not wish to be classified asminorities for various reasons. We also recognizethat these groups are not homogeneous – somemembers face further marginalization due to age,class, disability, gender or other factors.

The groups MRG works with are among thepoorest and most marginalized groups in society. Theymay lack access to political power, face discriminationand human rights abuses, and have ‘development’policies imposed upon them. MRG seeks to protectand promote the basic rights of these communities.We believe that recognition of minority andindigenous peoples’ rights is crucial to establishing andmaintaining just and peaceful societies.

ContributorsMaurice Bryn is a Caribbean-born writer andcommunications consultant. Over the past twodecades he has worked in a variety of countries inLatin America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa.This included examining the role of history,culture and information technology in facilitatinga rights-based approach to social and economicchange. He currently spends most of his time inCentral America.

Dr Joshua Castellino is Professor of Law at theTransitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster,Northern Ireland. He completed his PhD inInternational Law at the University of Hull, in1998. A former journalist in India, he specializes inminority rights, international and human rights law,and has authored three books on these subjects. Hehas extensive experience of involvement on issuesconcerning minority rights at intergovernmental andNGO levels.

Emma Eastwood has spent over a decade working inthe field of human rights protection in Latin Americaas an international observer and CommunicationsOfficer with Peace Brigades International. She iscurrently working as media and events officer atMinority Rights Group International.

Dr Kristin Henrard is associate professor at theUniversity of Groningen and academic coordinatorof the Human Rights specialization within theexisting LLM in International and European Law.Since February 2005 she has been working on aproject regarding the implications for minorityprotection of the Race Directive. She is a member ofthe Young Academy of the Royal Dutch Academy ofSciences, managing editor of the NetherlandsInternational Law Review, and is on theinternational advisory board of the Global Review ofEthnopolitics.

Mark Lattimer is the Executive Director of MinorityRights Group International. Formerly with AmnestyInternational, his recent publications include (asEditor) Genocide and Human Rights (Ashgate, 2007)and (with Philippe Sands QC), Justice for CrimesAgainst Humanity (Oxford, Hart, 2003).


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Gay J. McDougall is the United NationsIndependent Expert on minority issues. A humanrights lawyer, she was formerly Executive Director ofGlobal Rights and served on the UN Committee onthe Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD).She was one of five international members of SouthAfrica’s Independent Electoral Commission, whichsuccessfully organized and administered thatcountry’s first non-racial elections.

Farah Mihlar has worked as a journalist forinternational organizations including Reuters, Timesof India and BBC World Service. She covered SriLanka for more than ten years, reporting extensivelyon the conflict. In the past few years she has workedas a consultant media officer in human rightsorganizations including the Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) andthe International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). Shecurrently works as press officer at Minority RightsGroup International.

Marusca Perazzi is Programmes Officer andExecutive Assistant to the Director at MinorityRights Group International. She holds an MA inGlobal Governance from the University of Readingand an MA in Diplomacy and InternationalRelations from the University of Padua.

Dr Hugh Poulton is an independent scholar andwriter, and a specialist in human and minority rightsin South-East Europe. His books include: TheBalkans: Minorities and States in Conflict (1991,1993); Who Are the Macedonians? (1995, 2000); TopHat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism andthe Turkish Republic (1997); and an edited volumeMuslim Identity and the Balkan State (1997).

Andrew Reynolds is Associate Professor of PoliticalScience at the University of Chapel Hill, NorthCarolina. His research and teaching focus ondemocratization, constitutional design and electoralpolitics. He has worked for the United Nations, theInternational Institute for Democracy and ElectoralAssistance, the US State Department and manyother organizations. He has served as a consultanton issues of constitutional design for 16 countries.

Eric A. Witte is a senior associate at theDemocratisation Policy Council, a trans-Atlantic

initiative for accountability in democracypromotion. He served as political adviser to thechief prosecutor at the Special Court for SierraLeone, and previously worked at policy NGOs inWashington, DC, including the Coalition forInternational Justice and International Crisis Group.He holds an MA in political science from theUniversität Regensburg, Germany.

A report of this size also involves contributionsfrom a large number of other individuals includingMRG staff, whose expertise and advice wasinvaluable. Special thanks to the anonymousreviewers of the different sections, and to RichieAndrew for production coordination and SophieRichmond for copy editing.

Appendices State of the World’sMinorities 2007

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Select BibliographyFund for Peace/Foreign Policy, Failed States Index,Fund for Peace and Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, 2006,http://www.fundforpeace.org/programs/fsi/fsindex.php

Harff, B., ‘No lessons learned from the Holocaust?Assessing risks of genocide and political massmurder since 1955’, American Political ScienceReview 97(1), 2003.

Heidelberg Institute for International ConflictResearch, Conflict Barometer 2006, University ofHeidelberg, 2006.

Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M., WorldBank Institute, Governance Indicators for1996–2005, World Bank, Washington DC, 2006

Marshall, M.G., Major Episodes of Political Violence1946–2006, Center for Systemic Peace, 2006.

Marshall, M.G., and Gurr, T.R., Peace and Conflict2005: A Global Survey of Armed Conflicts, Self-Determination Movements, and Democracy, Center forInternational Development and Conflict Management(CIDCM), University of Maryland, 2005.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment, Country Risk Classifications of theParticipants to the Arrangement on OfficiallySupported Export Credits, www.oecd.org, 2006.


Bibliography 147

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148

MRG_18899:MRG_18899 2/3/07 10:39 Page 148

MRG_18899_FC 2/3/07 11:08 Page 2

In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly

adopted the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights, which proclaimed that ‘all human beings are

born free and equal in dignity and rights’. Sadly, for

many minorities and indigenous peoples around the

world, this inspirational text – with its emphasis on

equality and non-discrimination – remains a dream,

not a reality.

Ethnic or sectarian tensions are evident in many parts

of our globe. In places, they have boiled over into

bitter violence. The Middle East situation continues

to deteriorate – with some minority communities

fearing for their very survival. In Africa, the crisis in

Darfur is deepening, as government-sponsored militia

continue to carry out massive human rights abuses

against traditional farming communities. In Europe,

the spotlight has fallen on Muslim minorities – with

rows flaring over the Danish cartoons and the

wearing of the veil and burqa.

ISBN 1 904584 59 4

Now more than ever, world leaders must insist that

the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples be

respected. The participation of minorities is essential

if conflict is to be prevented and lasting peace to be

built. This second annual edition of the State of theWorld’s Minorities looks at the key developments

over 2006 affecting the human rights and security of

ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities and

indigenous peoples. It includes:

p a preface by the UN’s Independent Expert on

Minority Issues

p a unique statistical analysis of Peoples under

Threat 2007

p a special focus on the participation of minorities,

with analysis from leading academics on electoral

representation and the European system

p an eye-witness report from Sri Lanka, on the

impact on minorities of the resurgence of conflict

p comprehensive, regional sections, outlining the main

areas of concern as well as any notable progress.

The State of the World’s Minorities is an invaluable

reference for policy-makers, academics, journalists and

everyone who is interested in the conditions facing

minorities and indigenous peoples around the world.



State oftheWorld’sMinorities2007Events of 2006


Stateof theWorld’s M

inorities 2007Events of 2006

Minority

Rights

Group

InternationalMRG_18899_FC 2/3/07 11:08 Page 1

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