Challenges and Opportunities Ahead of the NATO 2014 Summit

RUSI, 18 March 2014

• Thanks, good to be back. Start with 2 observations:

• First, in preparing for this year’s, I used title of this session as source of inspiration and therefore asked the question: as we move towards Summit, do we face any challenges or do we rather have opportunities?

• Since opportunity is the softer word I believe it is also the better word, because Wales won’t be another milestone in development of BMD capability (after Lisbon and Chicago). However looking beyond Wales we will still face some challenges.

• Second, preparing for today I also looked at what I said last year. I spoke a lot about Russia and cooperation in the NRC@29. Well not again. This year I will focus on NATO@28, for the simple reason that our dialogue with Russia has stalled. Reasons:

o last autumn Russia called for a “pause” on BMD;

o this spring, following the most recent crisis over the Crimea, NATO asked for a “suspension” of all activities;

o the “window of opportunity” I talked about last year appears to be gone. Look forward to hear what my colleagues in the panel will have to say on this.

• Let me now comment on challenges and opportunities ahead for NATO, before Wales but also after Wales.

Opportunities for Wales

• Two points. First, current NATO BMD Interim Capability relies heavily on US contributing and paying for it (radar in TU, AEGIS ship in Mediterranean, EPAA phases).

o Wales could be an opportunity to show that we aim to make the capability

“more robust” also from a transatlantic perspective, through additional European contributions. This would also demonstrate a somewhat more ‘equal’ transatlantic burden sharing.

o This could be done e.g. through (list not exhaustive): � additional voluntary national contributions (sensors, interceptors) � additional joint training and exercises � contribute to BMD force protection � multinational cooperative projects under SD umbrella

o As said before, for NATO BMD Wales will be more of an opportunity than a challenge. There will be more opportunities to make Interim Capability more robust, also after Wales.

o NATO BMD will continue to rely on voluntary national contributions, only C2

is financed by all 28 together.

• Second, as said earlier, Wales won’t be another BMD milestone after Lisbon and Chicago. Next milestones will most likely be reaching and declaring IOC and FOC. o Details and timelines for declaring IOC and FOC are not yet defined, but this

reflection has started.

o If I had to look into crystal ball, my guess would be IOC hopefully in a couple of years from now, FOC will take longer.

o Wales could be an opportunity to decide by when we should aim to reach

and declare IOC. But am speculating. o Wales would in any case be too soon to declare IOC. What we can do

between now and Wales is continue to refine what we have - the BMD Interim Capability and the existing arrangements for its use if required.

Challenges after Wales

• You could ask: what about Russia? o As Chair of the WG and as a bridge-builder by nature I was fully committed

to the dialogue and attempt to achieve NRC MD cooperation.

o However, personal disappointments aside and looking at the current climate, I have a hard time imagining that we will pick this up again at 29 any time soon, if at all. However hope to be corrected. We shall see.

o While this was a challenge since 2009 and particularly since Lisbon NRC Summit, is it still the case? I personally have my doubts. But I have no doubts that NATO BMD will move forward.

• Challenge 1: make NATO BMD capability more robust, by having Europeans contributing more (on a voluntary basis) and ameliorate burden sharing. Currently the bulk in terms of capability and financial contribution is being offered by the United States.

• Challenge 2: have all conditions met to allow us to declare BMD IOC.

o What are these conditions? Cannot list them all as discussions still ongoing, however will likely include

� capability development (implementation of EPAA + hopefully additional voluntary national contributions)

� further elaborated command and control arrangements

• agreement on C2 arrangements (incl. defence design + ROE) was key prior to Chicago. Interim Capability would not have been declared without prior agreement on such arrangements

• we have to do it, many European Allies never tire to point out that political control over military action is a must

� progress in the programmatic domain – continue developing necessary BMC3I functionalities enabling truly integrated IAMD operations planning and execution

� consideration of evolution of threat posed by BM proliferation

� considerations on the wider political setting, including consequence management, legal aspects, relations with third states

o It is one thing to announce a goal, and another to reach it on time. This should be feasible, however previous experience indicates it could also be challenging – hence the word challenge here is probably appropriate.

• In conclusion, the collective learning curve has been and is still steep, on a number of issues. But record so far has been encouraging, if it continues we should be able to get there.