Most Favoured Nation Treatment

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MostFavouredNationTreatment

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Article: ConceptOfMostFavouredNationTreatmentUnderGeneralAgreementOnTariffsAndTrade

MostFavouredNationprincipleisoneofthemostfundamentalprinciplesoftheWTO.Itrequiresmemberstatestoaccordthemostfavourabletariffandregulatorytreatmentgiventotheproductofanyonememberand/ornonmemberatthetimeofexportorimportoflikeproductstoallotherWTOmembers.UndertheMostFavouredNationrule,shouldWTOmemberstateAagreeinnegotiationwithstateB,whichneedsnottobeaWTOmember,toreducethetariffonthesameproductXtofivepercent,thissametariffratemustapplytoallotherWTOmembersaswell.Inotherwords,ifacountrygivesfavourabletreatmenttoonecountryregardingaparticularissue,itmusthandleallmembersequallyregardingthesameissue.TheideaofMostFavouredNationtreatmenthasalonghistory.AnembryonicversionofanMFNclausehasbeentracedasfarbackas1417,buttheoriginsoftheMostFavouredNationcommitmentininternationalcommercialmattersaregenerallyconsideredtostemmainlyfromtheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies.PriortotheGATT,aMostFavouredNationclausewasoftenincludedinbilateraltradeagreements,andassuchitcontributedgreatlytotheliberalisationoftrade.OneofthePresidentWoodrowWilsonsFourteenpointsin1918urgedtheestablishmentofanequalityoftradeconditionsamongallthenationsconsentingtothepeacewhichwasexplainedtomeanwhatevertariffanynationmightdeemnecessaryforitsowneconomicservice,bethattariffhighorlow,itshouldapplyequallytoallforeignnations.

TheLeagueofNationsCovenantlikewisementionedthegoalofequitabletreatmentforthecommerceofallmembersandthe1919peacetreatiescontainedMostFavouredNationclauses.HoweverdespiteMFN,varioustraderestrictionsanddiscriminationsdidexist.AttheendoftheSecondWorldWar,oneoftheprimepostWorldWarIIobjectivesoftheUnitedStateswasthedismantlingoftradepreferences,especiallythecommonwealthsystem.TheUnitedStatespreoccupationwithCommonwealthpreferenceswassointensethataUnitedStatesrepresentativeinLondonin1946includedMostFavouredNationasoneofitsfivebasicprinciplesforthedevelopmentofanInternationalTradeOrganizationanditisgenerallysaidthatfailuretoachievethisresultwasoneofthecausesforthefailureoftheUnitedStatestoaccepttheHavanaCharter,thuscausingtheInternationalTradeOrganizationtofailtomaterialize.Howeverlearningformtheirmistakes,themajorpowersoftheworlddecidedtoincludeMostFavouredNationclausesintheGeneralAgreementonTradeandTariff(GATT)andtheincorporationofthisclauseinGATThascontributedtothestabilityoftheworldtradeandhence,againstthisbackground,MFNprinciplemustbeobservedasafundamentalprincipleforsustainingthemultilateralfreetradesystem.

TheconceptofMFNembodiestheprincipleofnondiscriminationwhichisabasicandkeyconceptofWorldTradeOrganization.Discriminationbetween,aswellasagainst,othercountrieswasanimportantcharacteristicofthe

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protectionisttradepoliciespursuedbymanycountriesduringtheeconomiccrisisof1930s.HistoriansnowregardthesediscriminatorypoliciesasanimportantcontributingcauseoftheeconomicandpoliticalcrisesthatresultedintheSecondWorldWar.Discriminationintrademattersbreedsresentmentamongthecountries,manufacturers,tradersandworkers.Suchresentmentpoisonsinternationalrelationsandmayleadtoeconomicandpoliticalconfrontationandconflict.Inaddition,discriminationmakesscanteconomicsense,generallyspeaking,sinceitdistortsthemarketinfavourofproductsandservicesthataremoreexpensiveand/orlesserquality.Eventually,itisthecitizensofthediscriminatingcountrythatendsuppayingthebillforthediscriminatorytradepoliciespursued.Notonlythisprincipleisjustifiedbyhistoryanditspotentialforreducingtradefrictionsamongcountries,butalsobyitsutilityasatoolforbuildingpeaceandsecurity.Withoutit,countriesmightretreatintotradingblocks,andthoseblocksmightbecomearmedfortress.Thus,unconditionalMFNtreatmentwasandremainsalegitimateeconomicmeanstoanoblepoliticalend.Itreducestradefrictionamongcountries,providestheirpeoplewiththeopportunitytogeneratejobsandincomethroughtrade,givingthemastakeinthemultilateraleconomicorder,andtherebycontributingtopeaceandstability.Withunconditionally,thebenefitsofopentradewouldspreadmultilaterally.Eachcountrywouldcometorealiseitsstakeinnurturingtheglobaleconomy,giventheproductionandconsumptionbenefitsfromfreetrade.

Theendconsequenceofthisrealisationwouldbeheightenedaversiontomilitaryconflict,whichobviouslywoulddestroytheeconomicgainsfromtrade.ThepeaceandsecuritylogicinfavourofunconditionalMFNtreatmentisthemostsophisticatedofallrationales.Generallyspeaking,themoresignificantthestakeacountryhasintheinternationaleconomicorder(i.e.themoreprosperityitscitizensderivefromcrossbordertradeandinvestmentrelationships,andfinancialflows),thelesslikelyitistounsettlethatorderthroughviolentconflictwithothercountries.

EconomicImplicationsOfMostFavouredNationTreatmentThemostfavourednationhasseveralpositiveeconomicimplications,whicharediscussedbelow:

IncreasedEfficiencyInTheWorldTrade:Firstly,mostfavourednationtreatmentmakesitpossibleforcountriestoimportfromthemostefficientsupplier,inaccordancewiththeprincipleofcomparativeadvantage.Forexample,ifcountryAdoesnotproduceproductX,andifcountryBcansupplyproductXatalowerpricethancountryC,countryAcanincreaseitseconomicefficiencybyimportingitfromcountryB.Ifhowever,countryAapplieshighertariffratestoproductXfromcountryBthanproductXfromcountryC,countryAmayendupimportingproductXfromcountryC,eventhoughcountryCisnotasefficientasupplier.Thisdistortstradeand,asaresult,reducesthewelfareofcountryAandtheeconomicefficiencyoftheentireworld.If,however,themostfavourednationprincipleisappliedbetweenthethreecountries,thencountryAwillapplyitstariffsequallytoallexportingcountriesandwillthereforenecessarilyimportproductXfromcountryBbecauseitischeapertodoso.Themostefficientresultisthusattained.

ReductionOfTheCostOfMaintainingTheFreeTradeSystem:Thirdly,MFNreducesthecostofmaintainingthefreetradesystem.Theequaltreatmentdemandedbythemostfavourednationprincipletendstoactasaforceforunifyingtreatmentatthemostadvantageouslevel(whichintrademeansthemostliberal).TheestablishmentandmaintenanceofthemostfavourednationruleenablesWTOMemberstoreducetheirmonitoringandnegotiatingcoststhecostofwatchingandcomparingtreatmentreceivedwiththatgiventothirdcountries.Inshort,themostfavourednationrulehastheeffectofreducingthecostofmaintainingthefreetradesystem.Finally,aslongasthemostfavourednationruleishonoured,importsfromallWTOMembersaretreatedequally,whichreducesthecostofdetermininganimportsoriginandthereforeimproveseconomicefficiency.

AdvantagesForSmallerCountries:MFNallowssmallercountries,inparticular,toparticipateintheadvantagesthatlargercountriesoftengranttoeachother,whereasontheirown,smallercountrieswouldoftenbenotpowerfulenoughtonegotiatesuchadvantagesbythemselves.Apartfromthat,GrantingMFNhasdomesticbenefits:havingonesetoftariffsforallcountriessimplifiestherulesandmakesthemmoretransparent.Italsolessensthefrustratingproblemofhavingtoestablishrulesoforigintodeterminewhichcountryaproduct(thatmaycontainpartsfromallovertheworld)mustbeattributedtoforcustomspurposes.MFNrestrainsdomesticspecialinterestsfromobtainingprotectionistmeasures.E.g.,butterproducersincountryAmaynotbeabletolobbyforhightariffsonbuttertopreventcheapimportsfromdevelopingcountryB,because,asthehighertariffswouldapplytoeverycountry,theinterestsofA'sprincipalallyCmightgetimpaired.

Article1Para1OfGATTArticle1oftheGATT1994,entitledGeneralMostFavouredNationTreatment,statesinparagraph1:Withrespecttocustomdutiesandchargesofanykindimposedonorinconnectionwithimportationorexportationorimposedontheinternationaltransferofpaymentsforimportorexports,andwithrespecttothemethodoflevyingsuchdutiesandcharges,andwithrespecttoallrulesandformalitiesinconnectionwithimportationandexportation,andwithrespecttoallmattersreferredtoinparagraphs2and4ofArticleIII,anyadvantage,favour,privilege,orimmunitygrantedbyanyMembertoanyproductoriginatinginordestinedforanyothercountryshallbeaccordedimmediatelyandunconditionallytothelikeproductoriginatinginordestinedfortheterritoriesofallotherMembers.

EssentialRequirementsOfArticleI:1UnderArticleI:1therearethreequestionsthatmustbeansweredtodeterminewhetherthereisaviolationoftheMFNtreatmentobligationofArticleI:1,namely:WhetherthemeasureatissueconfersatradeadvantageofthekindcoveredbyArticleI:1;Whethertheproductsconcernedarelikeproducts;andWhethertheadvantageatissueisgrantedimmediatelyandunconditionallytoalllikeproductsconcerned.



AnyAdvantageTheMFNtreatmentobligationconcernsanyadvantage,favour,privilegeorimmunitygrantedbyanymembertoanyproductoriginatingin,ordestinedfor,anyothercountrywithrespectto1)customduties;2)chargesofanykindimposedonexportationorimportation(e.g.import,surchargesorconsulartaxes);3)chargesofanykindimposedinconnectionwithimportationorexportation(e.g.customsfeesorqualityinspectionfees);4)chargesimposedontheinternationaltransferofpaymentsforimportsorexports;5)themethodoflevyingsuchdutiesorcharges,suchasthemethodofassessingthebasevalueonwhichthedutyorchargeislevied;6)allrulesandformalitiesinconnectionwithimportationandexportation;7)internaltaxesorotherinternalcharges;and8)laws,regulationsandrequirementsaffectinginternalsale,offeringforsale,purchase,transportation,distributionoruseofanyproduct.UnderArticleI:1,ifadvantagesaregrantedtoallothercountries,includingnonWTOmembers,thenthememberhastograntthatadvantagesalsotoallWTOmembers.Inotherwords,theMFNtreatmentobligationrequiresthatanyadvantagegrantedbyamembertoanyproductfromorforanothercountrybegrantedtoalllikeproductsfromorforallothermembers.TheArticleI:1castsaverywidenetanditisofverywideapplicability.Somecaseexamplesare:

InUSMFNFootwearcase,alsoreferredtoasUSNonRubberFootwearcase,thePanelfound:therulesandformalitiesapplicabletocountervailingduties,includingthoseapplicabletotherevocationofcountervailingdutyorders,arerulesandformalitiesimposedinconnectionwithimportation,withinthemeaningofArticleI:1.

ThePanelinUSCustomerUserFeecasestated:ThemerchandiseprocessingfeewasachargeimposedonorinconnectionwithimportationwithinthemeaningofArticleI:1.Exemptionsfromthefeefellwithinthecategoryofadvantage,favour,privilegeorimmunitywhichArticleI:1requiredtobeextendedunconditionallytoallothercontractingparties.

InCanadaAutoscase,theAppellateBodyusefullyclarifiedthescopeofArticleI:1byruling:ArticleI:1requiresthatanyadvantage,favour,privilegeorimmunitygrantedbyanyMembertoanyproductoriginatinginordestinedforanyothercountryshallbeaccordedimmediatelyandunconditionallytothelikeproductoriginatinginordestinedfortheterritoriesofallothermembers.ThewordsofArticleI:1refernottosomeadvantagesgrantedwithrespecttothesubjectsthatfallwithinthedefinedscopeoftheArticle,buttoanyadvantage;nottosomeproducts,buttoanyproduct;andnottolikeproductsfromsomeotherMembers,buttolikeproductsoriginatinginordestinedforallotherMembers.

Similarly,inEECImportsofBeefcase,thepanelappliedArticleI:1toEuropeanCommunitiesregulationsmakingthesuspensionofanimportlevyconditionalontheproductionofacertificateofauthenticity.

LikeProducts...ArticleI:1concernsanyproductoriginatinginordestinedforanyothercountryandrequiresthatanadvantagegrantedtosuchproductsshallbeaccordedtolikeproductsoriginatinginordestinedfortheterritoriesofallothermembers.Itmustbenotedthatitisonlywhentheproductsarelike,theMFNtreatmentobligationappliesandthatdiscriminationisprohibited.Productsthatarenotlikemaybetreateddifferently.TheconceptoflikeproductsisusedinvariousArticlesofGATTbutitisnowheredefinedintheGATT1994.Thedictionarymeaningoflikeproductssuggeststhatlikeproductsareproductsthatshareanumberofidenticalorsimilarcharacteristics.However,theAppellateBodynotedinCanadaAircraftcasethatthedictionarymeaningsleavemanyinterpretativequestionsopen.Withregardtotheconceptoflikeproducts,therearethreequestionsofinterpretationthatneedtoberesolved:1.whichcharacteristicsorqualitiesareimportantinassessinglikeness;2.towhatdegreeorextentmustproductssharequalitiesorcharacteristicsinordertobelikeproducts;3.fromwhoseperspectiveshouldlikenessbejudged?

ThePanelandAppellateBodyhasacceptedthattheconceptoflikeproductshasdifferentmeaninginthedifferentcontextsinwhichitisused.InJapanAlcoholicBeveragesIIcase,theAppellateBodyillustratedthepossibledifferencesinthescopeoftheconceptoflikeproductsbetweendifferentprovisionsoftheWTOAgreementbyevokingtheimageofanaccordion.TheAppellateBodysaid:TheaccordionoflikenessstretchesandsqueezesindifferentplacesasdifferentprovisionsoftheWTOAgreementareapplied.Thewidthoftheaccordioninanyoneofthoseplacesmustbedeterminedbytheparticularprovisioninwhichthetermlikeisencounteredaswellasbythecontextandthecircumstancesthatprevailinanygivencasetowhichthatprovisionmayapply.ThemeaningofthephraselikeproductsinArticleI:1wasaddressedinanumberofGATTworkingpartyandpanelreports.InSpainUnroastedCoffeecase,thePanelhastodecidewhethervarioustypesofunroastedcoffee(Colombianmild,othermild,unwashedArabica,Robustaandother)werelikeproductswithinthemeaningofArticleI:1.SpaindidnotapplycustomdutiesonColumbiamildandothermild,whileitimposedasevenpercentcustomsdutyontheotherthreetypesofunroastedcoffee.Brazil,whichexportedmainlyunwashedArabica,claimedthattheSpanishtariffregimewasinconsistentwithArticleI:1.InexaminingwhetherthevarioustypesofunroastedcoffeewerelikeproductstowhichtheMFNtreatmentobligationapplied,thePanelconsidered:thecharacteristicsoftheproducts;theirenduseandtariffregimeofothermembers.

Thepanelstatedasfollows:ThePanelexaminedallargumentsthathadbeenadvancedduringtheproceedingsforthejustificationofadifferenttarifftreatmentforvariousgroupsandtypesofunroastedcoffee.Itnotedthattheseargumentsmainlyrelatedtoorganolepticdifferencesresultingfromgeographicalfactors,cultivationmethods,theprocessingofthebean,andthegenericfactor.ThePaneldidnotconsiderthatsuchdifferencesweresufficientreasontoallowforadifferenttarifftreatment.Itpointedoutthatitwasnotunusualinthecaseofagriculturalproductsthatthetasteandaromaoftheendproductwoulddifferbecauseofoneorseveraloftheabovementionedfactors.ThePanel

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furthermorefoundrelevanttoitsexaminationofthematterthatunroastedcoffeewasmainly,ifnotexclusively,soldintheformofblends,combiningvarioustypesofcoffee,andthatcoffeeinitsenduse,wasuniversallyregardedasawelldefinedandsingleproductintendedfordrinking.ThePanelnotedthatnoothercontractingpartyapplieditstariffregimeinrespectofunroasted,nondecaffeinatedcoffeeinsuchawaythatdifferenttypesofcoffeeweresubjecttodifferenttariffrates.Inthelightoftheforegoing,thePanelconcludedthatunroasted,nondecaffeinatedcoffeebeanslistedintheSpanishCustomsTariffshouldbeconsideredaslikeproductswithinthemeaningofArticleI:1.InadditiontothethreecriteriausedbythePanelinSpainUnroastedcoffeecase,thereisonemorecriteriathathasassumedimportanceandthatisconsumerstastesandhabits.

AdvantageGrantedImmediatelyAndUnconditionallyArticleI:1requiresthatanyadvantagegrantedbyaWTOmemberstoimportsfromanycountrymustbegrantedimmediatelyandunconditionallytoimportsformallotherWTOMembers.OnceaWTOMemberhasgrantedanadvantagetoimportsfromacountry,itcannotmakethegrantingofthatadvantagetoimportsofotherWTOmembersconditionaluponthoseotherWTOMembers.Inalegalopinionof1973inthecontextoftheaccessionofHungarytotheGATT,theGATTSecretariatnotedthat:theprerequisiteofhavingacooperationcontractinordertobenefitfromcertaintarifftreatmentappearedtoimplyconditionalmostfavourednationtreatmentandwould,therefore,notappeartobecompatiblewiththeGeneralAgreement.Somecaseexamplesare:

InIndonesiaAutoscase,thePanelfoundwithrespecttotherequirementunderArticleI:1thatadvantagesaregrantedunconditionallyandimmediately,asfollows:undertheFebruary1996carprogrammethegrantingofcustomsdutybenefitstopartsandcomponentsisconditionaltotheirbeingusedintheassemblyinIndonesiaofaNationalCar.ThegrantingoftaxbenefitsisconditionalandlimitedtotheonlyPioneercompanyproducingNationalCars.Andthereisalsoathirdconditionforthesebenefits:themeaningofcertainlocalcontenttargets.Indeedunderallthesecarprogrammes,customdutyandtaxbenefitsareconditionalonachievingacertainlocalcontentvalueforthefinishedcar.TheexistenceoftheseconditionsisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofArticleI:1whichprovidesthattaxandcustomdutyadvantagesaccordedtoproductsofoneMember(hereonKoreanproducts)beaccordedtoimportedlikeproductsfromotherMembersimmediatelyandunconditionally.

InCanadaAutoscase,theAppellateBodyalsodiscussedtheconceptsofimmediatelyandunconditionally,andfound:ThemeasuresmaintainedbyCanadaaccordstheimportdutyexemptiontocertainmotorvehiclesenteringCanadafromcertaincountries.Theseprivilegedmotorvehiclesareimportedbyalimitednumberofdesignatedmanufacturerswhoarerequiredtomeetcertainperformanceconditions.Inpractice,thismeasuredoesnotaccordthesameimportdutyexemptionimmediatelyandunconditionallytolikemotorvehiclesofallotherMembers,asrequiredunderArticleI:1oftheGATT1994.TheadvantageoftheimportdutyexemptionisaccordedtolikemotorvehiclesfromallotherMembers.Accordingly,wefindthatthismeasureisnotconsistentwithCanadasobligationsunderArticleI:1oftheGATT1994.

IntheBelgianFamilyAllowancescase,adisputeof1952concerningaBelgianLawprovidingforanexemptionfromalevyonproductspurchasedformcountrieswhichhadasystemoffamilyallowancessimilartothatofBelgium,thePanelheldthattheBelgianlawatissueintroducedadiscriminationbetweencountrieshavingagivensystemoffamilyallowancesandthosewhichhadadifferentsystemornosystematall,andmadethegrantingoftheexemptiondependentoncertainconditions.ThepanelconcludedthattheadvantagetheexemptionfromalevywasnotgrantedunconditionallyandthattheBelgianlawwas,therefore,inconsistentwiththeMFNtreatmentobligationofArticleI:1.

SomeCaseExamplesOnTheConceptOfMFNInDetail:1998IndonesiaCarCase:InFebruaryandJune,1996,inanefforttodevelopNationalCar,theGovernmentofIndonesiaintroduceddifferencesbetweenimportsofcarcomponentsinallocationoftaxandcustomdutybenefitstotheseimports.Thebenefitstooktheformofdutyandsalesexemptions.TheIndonesiaCarpanelheldthattheNationalCarprogrammeblatantlyviolatedArticleI:1.TheCarPanelheldidentifiedfouranalyticalquestions:I)whetherthereisanadvantagecreatedbyameasure?II)Whethertheproductsaffectedbythemeasurearelike?III)WhetherdisputedmatterisatyperegulatedbytheMFNprovision?IV)Whethertheadvantageisofferedtoalllikeproductsunconditionally?

Onlyiftheanswertoallfourquestionsisyes,thereisaviolationofArticleI:1.ThePanelansweredthefirsttwoquestionsintheaffirmativewithoutanydifficulty.ThePanelfoundthatNationalCarsandtheirpartsandcomponentsimportedfromKoreaarelikeanymotorvehicleandpartsandcomponentsimportedfromotherWTOmembers.Astothethirdquestion,theIndonesiaCarPanelqueriedwhetherthecustomandtaxbenefitsoftheFebruaryandJune1996carprogrammeareadvantagesofthetypescoveredbyArticleI.Itreplied,

TheCustomdutybenefitsofthevariousIndonesiacarprogrammesareexplicitlycoveredbythewordingofArticleI.Astothetaxbenefitsoftheseprogrammes,wenotethatArticleI:1refersexplicitlytoallmattersreferredtoinparagraphs2and4ofArticleIII.WehavealreadydecidedthatthetaxdiscriminationaspectsoftheNationalCarprogrammewerematterscoveredbyArticleIII:2ofGATT.ThereforethecustomdutyandtaxadvantagesoftheFebruaryandJune1996carprogrammesareofthetypecoveredbyArticleIofGATT.

Onthefourthquestion,PanelfoundthatIndonesiadidnotconferunconditionallytoalllikeproductstheadvantagesfromitscustomdutyandtaxtreatmentmeasures.ThepanelheldthatGATTcaselawiscleartotheeffectthatanysuchadvantages(heretaxandcustomdutybenefits)cannotbemadeconditionalonanycriteriathatisnotrelatedtothe



importedproductitself.ThecourtheldthatitappearsthatthedesignandstructureoftheJune1996carprogrammeissuchastoallowsituationswhereanothermemberslikeproductissubjecttomuchhigherdutiesandsalestaxesthanthoseimposedonproductsimportedfromKorea.ThePanelfoundthatcustomdutiesashighas200%canbeimposedonfinishedmotorvehicleswhileanimportedNationalCarbenefitsfroma0%customsduty.Further,notaxesareimposedonaNationalCarwhileanimportedlikemotorvehiclefromanothermemberwouldbesubjectedtoa35%salestax.ThePanelfurtherfoundthatdistinctionastowhetheroneproductissubjecttoa0%dutyandtheotheroneissubjectto200%dutyorwhetheroneproductissubjectto0%salestaxandtheotherissubjecttoa35%salestax,dependonwhetherornotIndonesiahasmadeadealwiththatexportingcompanytoproducethatNationalCar,andiscoveredbytheauthorizationofJune1996withspecificationsthatcorrespondtothoseoftheKiacarproducedbytheKorea.ThePanelheldthat,inWTO/GATT,therightofMemberscannotbemadedependentupon,conditionalorevenaffectedby,anyprivatecontractualobligationsinplace.ThePanelheldthatexistenceoftheseconditionsisinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheArticleI:1whichprovidesthattaxandcustomsdutybenefitsaccordedtoproductsofoneMember(hereonKoreanproducts)beaccordedtoimportedlikeproductsfromotherMembersimmediatelyandunconditionally.Therefore,thePanelheldthatFebruaryandJune1996carprogrammewhichintroduceddiscriminationbetweenimportsintheallocationoftaxandcustomsdutybenefitsbasedonvariousconditionsandothercriterianotrelatedtotheimportthem,areinconsistentwiththeprovisionsofArticle1ofGATT.

CanadaAutoPactCase2000:OneofthefewdisputesinwhichMFNwasacentralissuefortheAppellateBodytoadjudicateistheCanadaAutoPactcase.InJanuary1965,PresidentLyndonJohnsonandCanadianPrimeMinisterLesterPearsonsignedanagreementtoliberalisetradeinautosandautospartbetweentwocountries.UndertheAutoPact,Canadaagreedtograntdutyfreetreatmenttovehiclesandoriginalequipmentmanufacturingparts(otherthantiresandtubes),butonlyiftheimporterofthecarsorpartsmetthedefinitionofamotorvehiclesmanufacturersetforthintheAutoPact.Therewerethreeteststobemetbeforeapersoncanbequalifiedasamanufacturer.First,theimportermusthaveproducedinCanadaduringthebaseyear196364motorvehiclesofthecategoryitisimporting.Inotherwords,theimporterhadtohavebeenestablishedandmadecarsinCanadasincebeforetheAutoPactenteredintoforce.Ineffect,theseimporterswerealsoforeigndirectinvestors,suchasGeneralMotorsofCanada,Ltd,FordMotorCompanyofCanadaLtd,andChryslerCanadaLtdAmericanCompaniesthatimportedcarsintoCanadathattheymadeintheUnitedStates(orelsewhere),andthatalsomadecarsinCanada.Secondly,theimportermustcomplywiththeratioof(1)thesalevalueofitslocally(Canadian)producedvehiclesofthatclassofvehicleto(2)thesalesitmakesinCanadaofthattypeofvehicle.Theratioiscalledproductiontosalesratio,becauseitem(1)isthevalueoftheimporterslocalproduction,anditem(2)isthevalueofitslocalsales.Theproductiontosalesratioisexpressedasfollows:

Theproductionismeasuredonannualbasis.UndertheAutoPact,toreceivedutyfreetreatment,animporterhadtokeeptheratioaboveacertainminimumthresholdbecausetheratioisagaugeoftheextenttowhichtheimporterissellingthecarsitmakesinCanadatoCanadianconsumers,i.e.sellingitslocalproductionlocally,andpossiblyalsosellingthecarsitmakeslocallytoforeigncountries.Putsuccinctly,theratioisameasureofanimporterscommitmenttodomesticcountries.TheproductiontosalesratioensuresthattheimporterdoesnotgettheentirevehicleitsellsinCanadafromabroad.Rather,theimporterusesitslocalfactoriestosourceasizeablepercentage,ifnotall,ofthelocalsales,andperhapsalsotosourceexportsfromthosefactories.Insum,theproductiontosalesrationissimplytodesigntoensuresomeproductionoccurslocally.ThePactspecifiestheproductiontosalesratiobycallingforcomparisonbetweentheproductiontosalesratiointhecurrentyearwiththeproductiontosalesratioinabaseyear.Theratiointhecurrentyearmustbeequaltoorgreaterthantheratiointhebaseyear.Moreover,theAutoPactspecifiedthattheratiomustneverbelessthan75100percent.Thirdly,theimportermustachieveaminimumamountofCanadianvalueadded(CVA)initslocalproductionofvehicles.Thatis,theimportersCanadianproductionfacilitiesmustnotbemereassemblyoperations.Theremustbesignificanteconomicactivitygoingon.Thus,includedintheCVAarethecostsofpartsandmaterialsthatareofCanadianorigin,Canadianlabourcosts,themanufacturingoverheadcosts,generalandadministrativeexpensesthatoccurredinCanadathatareattributabletotheproductionofvehicles,depreciationofmachineryandpermanentplantequipmentlocatedinCanadathatisdirectlyattributabletotheproductionofvehiclesandcapitalcostsforlandandbuildingsusedintheproductionofmotorvehicles.ThespecificCVArequirementwasstatedintermsofcomparison:howmuchCVAexistsinvehicleproducedinthecurrentyearincomparisonwiththeCVAthatexistedinthevehiclesproducedinadefinedbaseyear.TherequirementwasthatCVAincurrentyearhadtobeequaltoorgreaterthantheCVAinthebaseyear.

UnderthePact,CanadaagreedtoabolishitstariffsonimportsfromtheUnitedStatesofcertainfinishedvehicles,andonimportsofcertainpartsforuseasoriginalequipmentinvehiclestobeproducedinCanada.CanadaagreedthatautopartscouldbeimporteddutyfreenotonlyfromtheUnitedStates,butalsofromthirdcountries.However,noteveryonecouldbenefitfromthedutyfreetreatmentforautosandautopartsonlyqualifyingpersoncouldandthequalifyingpersonswerenonotherthanthemajorAmericanmanufacturers,namelyFord,GeneralMotorsandChryslerand/ortheirCanadiansubsidiaries.

TheprincipallegalissuethatwasraisedinCanadaAutoPactcasewastheMFNtreatment.InJanuary,1998,theEuropeanUnionandJapanchallengedtheAutoPactintheWTO,andinFebruary2000,aWTOPanelissueditsfinalreport,findinginfavourofthecomplainants.CanadaappealedandtheissuebeforetheAppellateBodywaswhetherCanadaviolatedMFNobligationbygivingdutyfreetreatmenttomotorvehiclesimportedfromcertainWTOMembers,butnotextendingtheadvantagesimmediatelyandunconditionallytolikeproductsfromallotherMembers.ThePanelansweredintheaffirmativeandsotoodidtheAppellateBody.TheEUandJapanarguedsuccessfullythatthe1965AutoPactrunafouloftheobligationlaiddowninarticleI:1oftheGATT.TheComplainantsarguedthatPactdiscriminatesinfavourofAmericancarcompanies,andagainstallothercarcompanies.OnlytheAmericancompaniescanimportcars



andcomponentsdutyfree.Incontrast,theCanadiancustomsauthoritiesimposeadutyontheseimportsbyaJapaneseorEuropeancarcompany.Thus,forexample,FordandGeneralMotorsneednotpayanydutyonimports,whereasHondaCanada,IncandToyotaCanada,Incmustpayadutyontheirimports.TheAppellateBodyagreeingwiththePanelsreasoningsaidthatArticleI:1appliestodefactoaswellasdejurediscrimination.TheAppellateBodysaidthatitistruethatPactdidnotcreatedejurediscriminationagainstimportofautoandautospartsbutthatisnottheonlywaytorunafoulofthelaw.Aslongastherewasdefactodiscrimination,thatisenoughfortheviolationofMFNobligationundertheGATT.TheAppellateBodyfoundthatCanadahasgrantedanadvantageintheformofdutyfreetreatment.Thisadvantageaccruestosomeproducts(autosandautoparts)fromsomeWTOMembers(principallytheUnitedStates).CanadahasnotaccordedthisadvantageimmediatelyandunconditionallytothelikeproductsthatoriginateinallotherMembers.Quitethecontrary,CanadahasimposedathreeparttestthateffectivelypreventstheextensionofadvantagetoallotherMembers.

1988JapanSemiconductorCase;ThisisacasewhichillustratesunsuccessfulefforttoinvoketheMFNobligationsofArticleI:1.Atthetimeofthefactsofthecase,JapanandU.Swerelargestproducersandexportersofsemiconductorchipsintheworld.Beginningin1983,theAmericansemiconductorindustriesbegancomplainingthatnonJapanesecompaniesdidnothavegoodaccesstotheJapanesesemiconductormarket.ThesemiconductorindustriesofU.SalsocomplainedthatGovernmentofJapanengagedinunfairtradepracticesvisvisAmericancompanies,andJapanesecompanieswereresortingtoantidumpingpractices.In1986,U.SSemiconductorIndustryAssociationfiledapetitionwiththeUnitedStatesTradeRepresentatives(USTR)askingforunilateralactionunderSection301oftheTradeActof1974.TheUSTRacceptedthepetitionandcarriedoutaninvestigation.Owingtotheinvestigation,theJapaneseandAmericanGovernmententeredintonegotiations.Theresultofthenegotiationwasthe1986UnitedStatesJapanArrangementConcerningTradeinSemiConductorProducts.UndertheArrangement,theGovernmentofJapanengagedtoimpressuponJapanproducersandusersofsemiconductorstheneedtotakeadvantageaggressivelyofincreasedmarketopportunitiesinJapanforforeignbasedfirmsseekingtoimprovetheirsalesperformanceandposition.Further,undertheArrangement,theGovernmentofJapanagreedtoprovidesupportintheformofestablishmentoforganizationtoprovidesalesassistance,qualityassessment,researchfellowshipprogrammesandexhibitionforforeignsemiconductorproducts.

TheGovernmentalsoagreedtopromotelongtermrelationshipbetweenJapanesesemiconductorbuyersandforeignproducers,includingjointdevelopmentprogrammes.Inexchange,theU.SGovernmentaskedAmericansemiconductorproducerstoexploittheopportunityofincreasedmarketaccessinJapan.TheU.SGovernmentalsoagreedtosuspendantidumpingcasesagainstJapanesechipmanufacturers,aftertheJapaneseGovernmentagreedtomonitorthecostandpricesofsemiconductorproductsexportedtoU.S.Further,bothofthemalsoagreedtomonitorthirdcountrymarkets,sayingthatdumpingshouldnotoccurinthirdcountrymarketsbecauseAmericansemiconductorproducersusedtocompetewithJapanesefirmsinthethirdcountrymarkets,andaftertheArrangement,theAmericanfirmsdonthavetocompetewithdumpedproductsinthesemarkets.

Oneissuewhicharosein1988Semiconductorcasewaswhether1986ArrangementviolatedtheMFNprincipleembodiedinArticleI:1bypreferringAmericansemiconductorproducersandexportersoverallothernonJapaneseproducersandexporters.TheEuropeanEconomicCommunities(EEC),whichbroughtthecase,allegedtheviolationofMFNprincipleandarguedthattheArrangementamountedtoBuyAmericanPolicyendorsedbyGovernmentofJapaninordertogivepreferentialtreatmenttotheAmericansemiconductorproducers.Asforevidenceinsupportofitsargument,theEECsaidtheAmericansemiconductorindustryexpectedthemarketshareofitssalesinJapanwouldshowasteadyincreaseandriseto20percentby1991,andthatJapanrecognisedthisexpectation.TheGATTPanelruledagainsttheEECsargument,findingthatthe1986ArrangementdidnotviolatetheArticleIMFNprinciple.ThePanelreachedtotheconclusionthatEECsevidencedoesnotsupportitsargument.

ThepanelheldthattherewasnothingintheArrangementtoshowthatJapanpromisedtoreserve20percentoftheJapanesesemiconductormarketforAmericanfirms.ThePanelgavefourreasonsforthefinding:First,salesofnonAmericanforeignsemiconductorsinJapanhadbeenexpandingsteadily,justlikesalesofAmericansemiconductors.Indeed,thegrowthofsalesofsemiconductorsinJapanfromnonAmericansourceshasbeenhigherthanthatofsalesofAmericansemiconductors.Secondly,thePanelfoundthat1986Arrangementuniformlyappliestoallforeignbasedsemiconductorcompanies.AlthoughthePanelfoundthattherewasonlyonesuchcompanynotofAmericanorigin,therewasnothingtopreventanonAmericancompanyfromestablishingitselfinJapanonthesametermsanAmericancompany.Thirdly,theGovernmentofJapanimplementedtheArrangementinanimpartialmanner.Fourth,theEECsargumentthatJapaneseusersandimportersofsemiconductorproductwouldperceivetheArrangementasaccordingpreferencetotheU.Swasasheerspeculation.Thus,PanelrejectedthecontentionofEEC.

FurtherIllustrationOfTheConceptAsafurtherexampleofthebroadtypeofmeasurescoveredbytheMFNobligation,letusconsiderthefollowinghypotheticalillustration.AssumeIndiaimposesanMFNrateonturmericspiceof5percent.But,forturmericfromThailand,Indiagenerallyimposesa10percentrate.NoIndianlaworregulationsetsoutthis10percentduty.Rather,thecustomofficialatvariousIndianportsimposethe10percentduty.DoesThailandcanclaimthatIndiaviolateMFNprinciple.Theanswerisintheaffirmative.ThailandcanarguethatIndianpracticeviolatestheMFNobligationofArticleI:1.Thisprovisiondoesnotdistinguishbetweenlawsandregulations,ontheonehand,andpracticesontheotherhand.Indeed,itspeaksofthemethodoflevyingdutiesandcharges.

Asanotherhypotheticalexample,consideranagencyanddistributionlawinKuwaitthatmandatesexclusivity.Thatis,anyforeigncompanyseekingtoexportitsproducttoKuwaitmustdosothroughasingleKuwaitagent,andthatagent



hasthesolerighttodistributetheproductinKuwait.Obviously,thislawprotectsKuwaitiholdersofexclusiveagreementsfromcompetingwithoneanother,andwithotherforeigners,foragencyanddistributionrights.WouldtheKuwaitlawviolateArticleI;1?Thefactthatthislawisanontariffmeasureisimmaterial.TheMFNobligationembracesallmeasuresaffectingimports,exportsorpayments.

ThejurisprudenceofArticleI:1extendsnotonlytodejurediscriminationbutalsotodefactoevenifitisnotmanifest.Inotherwords,anydefactodiscrimination,evenifitisnotmanifest(i.e.,potentialoractual)isenoughforconcern.Thus,supposetheproductatissueisflatscreenTVsetsbetween35and40inches,andthatKuwaitimportsthesefromJapanesemanufacturerslikeSony,andKoreanproducerslikeLG.IftheKuwaitilawsomehowfavourstheJapaneseexportersattheexpenseoftheKoreanexporters(orviceversa),thenthatlawviolatesArticleI:1.AmongthescenariosthatcouldgiverisetotheviolationwouldbethedifferencesintheadministrationofthelawbyKuwaitiofficials.SupposetheypermitsubagreementswithrespecttoJapaneseimports,butnotKoreanimports.Therefore,manufacturerslikeSonycanobtaintheservicesofvariousKuwaitisinmarketingtheTVs,bycallingonitsexclusiverepresentativetoenlistsubagentsandsubdistributors.Through,subrepresentation,SonysTVsarebroughttotheattentionofKuwaiticonsumersmorepervasivelythanLGsTVs,whicharemarketedonlybyacentralrepresentative.ThissimplyisaviolationofMFNobligation.Thus,ArticleI:1strikesnotonlyatpostborder,nontariffmeasures,butalsoatdefactodiscriminationthatisnotyetmanifest.

OtherProvisionsReflectingMFNPrincipleApartfromArticle1Para1,thereareotherprovisionsinGATT1994thatrequiresMFNorMFNliketreatment.Theseare:ArticleIIIPara7:ItprovidesforgrantingMFNstatusregardinginternalquantitativeregulations.ArticleV:ItprovidesforgrantingMFNstatusregardingfreedomoftransit.ArticleIXPara1:ItprovidesforgrantingMFNstatusregardingmarkingrequirements.ArticleXIII:Itprovidesfornondiscriminatoryadministrationofquantitativerestrictions.ArticleXVIIPara1:ItprovidesforgrantingMFNstatusregardingstatetradingenterprises.ArticleXVIIIPara20:Itconcernsgovernmentalassistancetoeconomicdevelopment.ArticleXX(j):Itconcernsgoodsinshortsupply.

ExceptionsToTheMostFavouredNationPrincipleTheGATTprovidesforcertainexceptionstotheMostFavouredNationrule.

RegionalTradingAgreements(GattArticleXXIV)RegionalTradeAgreements(RTAs)havebecomeinrecentyearsaveryprominentfeatureoftheMultilateralTradingSystem(MTS).ThesurgeinRTAhascontinuedunabatedsincetheearly1990s.Some380RTAshavebeennotifiedtotheGATT/WTOuptoJuly,2007.Regionalintegrationliberalizestradeamongcountrieswithintheregion,whileallowingtradebarrierswithcountriesoutsidetheregion.RegionalintegrationthereforemayleadtoresultsthatarecontrarytotheMostFavouredNationprinciplebecausecountriesinsideandoutsidetheregionaretreateddifferently.Thismayhaveanegativeeffectoncountriesoutsidetheregion,andthusleadtoresultscontrarytotheliberalizationoftrade.

Regionalintegration,thus,hasagreatimpactontheworldeconomytodayandisthesubjectoffrequentdebateinavarietyofforums,includingtheWTOCommitteeonRegionalTradeAgreements.OneofthemostfrequentlyaskedquestioniswhethertheseregionalgroupshelporhindertheWTOsmultilateraltradingsystem.TheWTOCommitteeonRegionalTradeAgreementsiskeepinganeyeonthedevelopment.TheregionaltradinggroupssuchastheEuropeanUnion(EU),theNorthAmericaFreeTradeAgreement(NAFTA),theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEANS),theSouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperation(SAARC),theSouthernCommonMarket(MERCOSUR),theCommonMarketofEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA),etchaveposedagreatchallengetotheMostFavouredNationprinciplewhichhaveloweredoreliminatedtariffsamongthememberswhilemaintainingtariffwallsbetweenmembernationsandtherestoftheworld.ThegroupingsthatareimportantfortheWTOarethosethatabolishorreducebarriersontradewithinthegroup.TheWTOagreementsrecognizethatregionalarrangementsandclosereconomicintegrationcanbenefitcountries.Italsorecognizesthatundersomecircumstancesregionaltradingarrangementscouldhurtthetradeinterestsofothercountries.Normally,settingupacustomsunionorfreetradeareawouldviolatetheWTOsprincipleofequaltreatmentforalltradingpartners(mostfavourednation).

ButGATTsArticle24allowsregionaltradingarrangementstobesetupasaspecialexception,providedcertainstrictcriteriaaremet(asmentionedabove).Inparticular,thearrangementsshouldhelptradeflowmorefreelyamongthecountriesinthegroupwithoutbarriersbeingraisedontradewiththeoutsideworld.Inotherwords,regionalintegrationshouldcomplementthemultilateraltradingsystemandnotthreatenit.Article24oftheGATTsaysthatifafreetradeareaorcustomsunioniscreated,dutiesandothertradebarriersshouldbereducedorremovedonsubstantiallyallsectorsoftradeinthegroup.Nonmembersshouldnotfindtradewiththegroupanymorerestrictivethanbeforethegroupwassetup.On6February1996,theWTOGeneralCouncilcreatedtheRegionalTradeAgreementsCommittee.ItspurposeistoexamineregionalgroupsandtoassesswhethertheyareconsistentwithWTOrules.Thecommitteeisalsoexamininghowregionalarrangementsmightaffectthemultilateraltradingsystem,andwhattherelationshipbetweenregionalandmultilateralarrangementsmightbe.

WaiverOfMFNPrincipleInFavourOfDevelopingCountries:GATTprovidesforexceptiontotheMostFavouredNationprincipleinfavourofthedevelopingcountries.Historically,developingcountrieswerecriticaloftheGATTbecausethetradeofthedevelopingcountrieswerenotgrowingasfastasdevelopedcountrieswithintheframeworkoftheGATT.SuchdissatisfactionledtoastudycalledtheHaberlerReport,whichsupportedtheperceptionthattheexportearningsofdevelopingcountrieswerenotsatisfactory.Later,the



formationofUnitedNationConferenceonTradeandDevelopment(UNCTAD)spurredseveralinitiativeswithintheGATT.First,in1965,theGATTcontractingpartiesadoptedPartIVoftheGATTtodemonstrateanewconcernfortheinterestsofthedevelopingcountries.Second,in1971,theGATTadoptedtwowaiversfortwotypesofpreferencestofavourdevelopingcountries:1)asetasideoftheMFNobligationtopermitageneralisedsystemofpreferences;and2)permissionfordevelopingcountriestoexchangetariffpreferencesamongthemselves.In1979,bothwaiversweremadepermanentthroughthesocalledEnablingClause.TheEnablingClausecontinuestoguideWTOpolicy.TheEnablingClausesettledadebatewithintheGATTandestablishedthepolicyofspecialandpreferentialtreatmentfordevelopingcountries.Atthesametime,theEnablingClausecontainsasocalledgraduationclause(Para7)whichisthepolicythateventuallypreferentialtreatmentshouldend.ArticleXXXVI,whichisincorporatedinPartIVoftheGATT,isahortatoryprovisionofPrinciplesandObjectivesstatingtheneedtoraisestandardsoflivingindevelopingcountries,theneedforrapidandsustainedexpansionoftheirexportearningsandincreasedaccesstoworldmarketfortheirproducts.ArticleXXXVIsetsouttheprinciplethatdevelopedcountriesdonotexpectreciprocityfortheircommitmentstoremoveorreducetariffsandothertradebarriers.

Totakeanhypotheticalexample,assumethattheUnitedStatesgrantsdutyfreetreatmenttoricefromLaos,whichisnotyetaWTOmember.TheUnitedStatesdoessobecauseLaosisalessdevelopedcountryinneedofhelp.TheUnitedSatesmakesthesamedecision,forthesamereason,forriceimportedbytheUnitedSatesfromCambodia,whichisaWTOmember.ThenormalMFNrateof15percentcontinuestoapplytoriceimportedbytheUnitedStatesfromJapan,whichisalsoaWTOmember.WouldJapanhaveanMFNgrievanceagainsttheAmericandecision?Theanswerisno.TheUnitedStatescangrantdutyfreetreatmenttodevelopingcountriesunderitsGeneralisedSystemofPreferencesprogram,whethertheyareWTOmembersornotbyvirtueofParagraph1ofEnablingClausewhichprovidesforthegeneralMFNwaiver.

OtherExceptionsApartfromtheabovementionedexceptions,thereareotherprovisionsintheGATTwhichcanbeconstruedasexceptionstotheMostFavouredNationrule.ArticleI:2providesforexceptiontotheMostFavouredNationprincipleregardinghistoricalpreferenceswhichwereinforceatthetimeofthesigningoftheGATT,suchastheBritishCommonwealth.ArticleXX,whichprovidesforGeneralExceptionstotheGATT,saysthatnothinginthisAgreementshallbeconstruedtopreventtheadoptionorenforcementbyanycontractingpartiesofmeasures:necessarytoprotectpublicmorals;necessarytoprotecthuman,animalorplantlifeorhealth;relatingtotheimportationsorexportationsofgoldorsilver;necessarytosecurecompliancewithlawsorregulationswhicharenotinconsistentwiththeprovisionsoftheGATT;relatingtotheproductsofprisonlabour;relatingtotheconservationofexhaustiblenaturalresources,etc.ArticleXXI,whichprovidesforSecurityExceptionstotheGATT,saysthatnothinginthisAgreementshallbeconstrued:

a)torequireanycontractingpartytofurnishanyinformationthedisclosureofwhichitconsiderscontrarytoitsessentialsecurityinterests;

b)topreventanycontractingpartyfromtakinganyactionwhichitconsidersnecessaryfortheprotectionofitsessentialsecurityinterestsrelatingtofissionablematerialsorthematerialsfromthematerialsfromwhichtheyarederived;relatingtotrafficinarms,ammunitionandimplementsofwarandtosuchtrafficinothergoodsandmaterialsasiscarriedondirectlyorindirectlyforthepurposeofsupplyingamaterialestablishment;takenintimeofwarorotheremergencyininternationalrelations;

c)topreventanycontractingpartyfromtakinganyactioninpursuanceofitsobligationsundertheUnitedNationsCharterforthemaintenanceofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.ArticleXIVprovidesforexceptionstotheruleofnondiscriminationinordertoenablethemembercountriestodealwiththebalanceofpaymentdifficulties.ArticleXIX,whichdealswithEmergencyActiononImportsofParticularProducts(SafeguardMeasures),providesthatif,asaresultofunforeseendevelopmentsandoftheeffectoftheobligationsincurredbyacontractingpartyunderthisAgreement,includingtariffconcessions,anyproductisbeingimportedintotheterritoryofthatcontractingpartyinsuchincreasedquantitiesandundersuchconditionsastocauseorthreatenseriousinjurytodomesticproducersinthatterritoryoflikeordirectlycompetitiveproducts,thecontractingpartyshallbefree,inrespectofsuchproduct,andtotheextentandforsuchtimeasmaybenecessarytopreventorremedysuchinjury,tosuspendtheobligationinwholeorinpartortowithdrawormodifytheconcession.

ConclusionTheMostFavouredNation(MFN)principleisacornerstoneofthemultilateraltradingsystemconceivedafterWorldWarII.Itseekstoreplacethefrictionsanddistortionsofpowerbased(bilateral)policieswiththeguaranteesofarulesbasedframeworkwheretradingrightsdonotdependontheindividualparticipantseconomicorpoliticalclout.Rather,thebestaccessconditionsthathavebeenconcededtoonecountrymustautomaticallybeextendedtoallotherparticipantsinthesystem.Thisallowseverybodytobenefit,withoutadditionalnegotiatingeffort,fromconcessionsthatmayhavebeenagreedbetweenlargetradingpartnerswithmuchnegotiatingleverage.AlthoughtheformationofRegionalTradingBlockshaserodedthefundamentalimportanceoftheconcepttosomeextent,itisstillthemostfundamentalobligationonwhichtheentirefoundationofGATTandWTOrests.TheMFNprinciplemustbeobservedasafundamentalprincipleforsustainingthemultilateralfreetradesystem.RegionalintegrationandrelatedexceptionsneedtobecarefullyadministeredsoasnottounderminetheMostFavouredNationprincipleasafundamentalprincipleoftheWTO.

ReferencesBooks



1)TheLawandPolicyoftheWorldTradeOrganization,Text,CasesandMaterialsbyPeterVanden,MaastrichtUniversity,CambridgeUniversityPress.2)LecturesonInternationalTradebyJagdishNBhagawati,ArvindPanagariyaandT.N.Srinivaasan,SecondEdition,OxfordUniversityPress.3)StatutesandConventionsonInternationalTradebyIndiraCarrandRichardKidner,FourthEdition,CavendishPublishingLimited.4)TheRegulationofInternationalTradebyMichaelJ.TrebilcockandRobertHowse,ThirdEdition,RoutledgeTaylorandFrancisGroup.5)InternationalTradeLaw:CasesandMaterialsbyRajBhala,MichieLawPublishers.6)InternationalTradeandBusiness:Law,PolicyandEthicsbyGabrielMoensandPeterGillies,CavendishPublishingPrivateLimited.7)TheEconomicsandIdeologyofFreeTrade:AnHistoricalReviewbyLeonardGomes,PublishedbyEdwardElgarHouse.8)DalhouisenonInternationalCommercial,FinancialandTradeLawbyHartPublishingOxfordandPortland,Oregon,2000.9)InternationalTradeLaw:TheoryandPracticebyRajBhala,SecondEdition,LexisPublishing.10)TheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade:Law,EconomicsandPoliticsbyAutarKrishenKoul,SatyamBooksPublishers.

Websites:1)WorldTradeOrganization.2)CentreForTradeAndDevelopment

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