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Moscow Defense BriefYour Professional Guide Inside # 3, 2010

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 1

#3 (21), 2010

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Dmitry Vasiliev

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Cover Photo: Collective Security Treaty Organization Secretary-General

Nikolay Bordyuzha (left) and Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko

(center) during the final stage of joint strategic exercises “West 2009”

at “Obuz-Lesnovskiy” firing ground in Brestskaya Oblast.

29.09.2009 Belarus, Brest

Photo by: Alexander Miridonov/Kommersant

© Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010

Printed in Russia

CONTENTSDefense IndustriesRanking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009 2

The Belarusian Defense Industry 6

MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant 11

Arms TradeRussia Raking in New Arms Contracts 15

Armed ForcesBig Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet 16

The Belarusian Army: Past and Present 18

Book ReviewThe Tanks of August 25

Facts & FiguresProcurement Prices for Some Items of Weapons, Ammunition and Special Equipment Purchased by the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation in 2010 26

Our Authors 28

Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief2

Defense Industries

Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009

Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009Dmitry Vasiliev

The Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies continues to publish its annual ranking of the top

Russian defense contractors, based on their key financial and operational indicators.

SourcesThe ranking was compiled based mostly on official

annual reports and press releases of the largest Russian defense contractors, as well as reports in the leading Russian media. The ranking also made use of information provided directly by the companies themselves. In a number of cases where official figures were not available, CAST used its own estimates.

The structure of the ranking includes the following operational indicators:

• revenues; • net profit (net loss) • share of exports in total revenues; • share of civilian contracts in total revenues; • number of employees; • sector: aerospace (AS), naval (N), ground equipment

(G), equipment and electronics (EQ), artillery (A), small arms (SA), munitions (M), engines (E), air defense systems (AD); and

• ownership: private (P – state-owned stake less than 25 %), majority private-owned (MP – state-owned stake between 25 % and 50 %), majority state-owned (MS – state-owned stake between 50 % and 75 %) and state-owned (S – companies with a state-owned stake of over 75%).The ranking does not include:

• companies working for the Russian nuclear forces or space forces;

• companies which derive over 80 per cent of their revenues from civilian contracts; and

• companies whose operational figures are not available and there is not enough information to make an accurate estimate.

RepresentativenessCompared to the previous year, the 2009 ranking is

much more representative, and for two reasons:

1. It now includes two new holding companies, the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and the United Engine Corporation (UEC). The level of integration between these companies’ subsidiaries is now deemed sufficient to consider UAC and UEC as single business entities. The two companies own almost all of the Russian aircraft and engine making assets. Their inclusion has made the ranking much more representative of the situation in the industry.

2. Two of Russia’s largest submarine makers, Sevmash and the Admiralty Shipyards 1, which have traditionally been very secretive, released their operational figures to the Russian media in 2009. Combined with the data from the shipyards that build surface ships – which are usually available from open sources2 – these figures paint a much more accurate picture of the Russian military shipbuilding industry.

Some of the big Russian defense contractors are not included in the 2009 ranking because their operational figures are not available. But we believe that only two of them – Aerospace Equipment Corporation (Moscow) and KBP instrument design bureau (Tula) – would have made it into the Top 10. The threshold for entry into the Top 20 would have increased accordingly; of the smaller companies now not included, only concern Vega, a radio-electronic instruments maker based in Moscow, would have earned a place somewhere at the bottom of this more comprehensive ranking. Therefore, despite the fact that only the Top 5 of the 2009 table is fully represented, the Top 20 as a whole quite accurately reflects the actual state of affairs in the Russian defense industry.

The ranking will become even more representative once the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC, St Petersburg) starts to release its annual report to the public. Some of its larger subsidiaries are now included in the Top 20 as individual companies. The impact of including USC as a single business entity on the accuracy of the ranking will be even stronger than in the case of UAC and UEC. The reason for that is not just that the large Russian shipbuilders specializing in nuclear submarines are generally very secretive. Another thing to take into account is that under the Russian accounting rules a new ship is only reflected in the shipyard’s revenue figures once it has been fully commissioned. As a result, the company underreports its annual indicators while the ship is being built, and overreports them on the year the ship is commissioned. Once

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 3Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009

Defense Industries

operational results of all the individual shipyards that are now part of USC are merged into a single USC annual report, these fluctuations will cancel each other out. And in future, the company will probably adopt international accounting standards, so the problem will be resolved once and for all.

Main conclusionsThe combined defense revenue of the Top-20 companies

reached the rouble equivalent of 12.25bn USD3 in 2009, down from 13.39bn the year before. If the 0.34-per-cent US deflation figure4 for 2009 is taken into account, the adjusted fall in revenues is 8.2 per cent.

We can surely say that 2009 was not the best year for the Russian defense contractors – owing partly to the world financial crisis. Among the Top 5 companies, which account for over 70 per cent of the combined Top-20 revenues, only Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), the maker of T-90 main battle tanks, showed growth. UVZ finances in general, meanwhile, were in a dire state by the end of 2009, as much of its revenues derive from its largest civilian customer, Russian Railways, which greatly reduced orders for railway carriages in view of the economic crisis.

In fact, Russia’s best-performing defense company is now Russian Helicopters. Apart from military contracts, the company has a thriving civilian business. Opposed to UVZ, Russian Helicopters have many eager buyers and does not depend so heavily on any single one of them. The company is therefore sitting pretty and will continue to do so at least until the life cycle of its main cash cow, the Mi-8/17 helicopters range, runs out.

The share of the Top-20 companies’ revenue generated by the domestic Russian market continued to grow in 2009. There has been a further increase in the Russian government’s defense procurement contracts, while export deliveries were on the decline. These domestic contracts essentially became the life raft for many Russian defense contractors amid the world economic crisis.

Company analysisFor several years now, Almaz-Antey, an air defense

systems maker, has been the top Russian defense contractor in terms of revenue. The UAC became a close second in 2009. The rest of the Top 20 companies remain far behind the two leaders. Deliveries of the S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) SAM systems to China seem to have accounted for the bulk of Almaz-Antey exports in 2009.5 On the domestic defense procurement side of its business, the company is known to have delivered the second mass-produced battalion of the S-400 (SA-21) SAM systems and an unspecified number

of the Tor-M2 (SA-15) SAM systems to the Russian armed forces.6

UAC exported 41 fighters of the Su-30 family in 2009. Twenty of them went to India (two finished ones and 18 assembly kits), 14 to Algeria, six to Malaysia and one to Indonesia. To Russia’s own air force, the company delivered 31 MiG-29SMT fighters previously destined for Algeria, as well as two new Su-34 frontline bombers. It also built three Yak-130 trainer jets (delivered to the Russian Air Force in February-March 2010) and upgraded Tu-160 and Su-24M bombers, Su-27 and Mig-31 fighters, and several other aircraft. The company also continued R&D under the fifth-generation fighter project, the T-50.

The Tactical Missiles Corporation, which came third in the ranking, relied mostly on aviation weapons sales. An increase in government procurement contracts “had a huge political and moral significance” for the company, according to its director-general, Boris Obnosov.7 Those contracts were instrumental in maintaining the revenue figure at the previous year’s level. Speaking in an interview, Obnosov highlighted Vietnam as one of the most promising export markets. He believes that the Chinese market is close to saturation, while the Indian one is rapidly becoming highly crowded.

Russian Helicopters, which ranked fourth in 2009, made 183 helicopters for Russian and foreign customers, up from 169 in 2008.8 The leader among its divisions in terms of output was the Kazan helicopter plant (85 helicopters, city of Kazan), followed by the Ulan-Ude aviation plant (60 helicopters, Ulan-Ude), Rostvertol (15 helicopters, Rostov), Kumertau plant (13, city of Kumertau, Bashkortostan), and the Sazykin Progress Aviation Company (10, city of Arsenyev, Far East). About 120 of the 183 helicopters made in 2009 were destined for exports.9 Known deliveries include Mi-17 family military helicopters sold to Afghanistan (13), Azerbaijan (six), China (six), Iran (five), Columbia (five), Sudan (four), Bolivia (at least two) and other countries. On the domestic Russian market, the main event was the delivery of 12 mass-produced Mi-28N combat helicopters made by Rostvertol to the Russian Air Force.

Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) took the fifth place in the ranking. For the third year running its produce formed the bulk of the Russian exports of weapons for ground troops. In 2009 the company delivered 80 finished T-90S tanks and possibly several dozen assembly kits to India. Turkmenistan took delivery of another four tanks of the same model. The Russian Army bought 63 new T-90A tanks; another 40 T-72B tanks were upgraded by UVZ to the T-72BA specification. For the Russian Defense Ministry the company made several BREM-1 armored repair and evacuation vehicles.

UEC and Salyut engine company came in sixth and eighth, respectively. The bulk of their defense revenues were generated by AL-31F turbofan engines, which are fitted onto Su-30 fighters. Apart from these engines, which were delivered as part of the aircraft contracts mentioned above, the two

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief4Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009

Defense Industries

companies also worked on several independent exports contracts. Salyut reportedly delivered 122 Al-31FN engines for the Chinese J-10 fighters under several such contracts. Saturn company (an UEC subsidiary based in the city of Rybinsk, Yaroslavl region) continued the development of the AL-55I turbofan engine for the Indian HJT-36 jet trainer. Production on Russian defense procurement contracts (mostly as part of larger aircraft contracts) was also on the rise.

Sevmash shipyard, which is the contractor for the main Russian Navy program, the new generation Project 955 (Borey class) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, came in seventh.10 In 2009 Sevmash began factory testing of the main Project 955 Yuriy Dolgorukiy submarine, which took to the sea for the first time in June. The company also completed the dry-dock phase of the construction of the new generation Project 885 Severodvinsk nuclear-powered attack submarine, and began work on the second sub of the series, the Kazan.

NPOmash machine building company, which came in ninth, is the Russian partner in the BrahMos joint venture with India. According to the company’s management, exports account for about 40 per cent of its revenues.11 In 2009 NPOmash also continued its work on the Bastion coastal anti-ship missile system armed with Yakhont missiles. One such system was made for the Russian Navy, another for Vietnam (delivered in the spring of 2010). Due to the nature of the company’s business (intercontinental ballistic missiles and anti-ship missiles), most of its domestic procurement contracts are kept under wraps.

Zvezdochka shipyard, which closes the Top 10, delivered a Project 20180 Zvezdochka survey and research ship to the Russian Navy in 2009. The company is currently repair and upgrading another Project 877EKM (Kilo class) conventional submarine under an Indian contract, but delivery is unlikely before 2011.

No Company Sector Owner-ship

Defense revenue, million USD

Share of exports, % in total revenue

Share of civilian contracts, % in total

revenue

Number of employees

2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008

1 Almaz-Antey Air Defense Concern (Moscow)

AD / EQ S 3,254.75 4,335.17 49.0 50.9 11.0 6.1 90,411 89,866

2 United Aircraft Corporation (Moscow)

A S 2,707.81 2,889.51 60.5 52.5 24.6 31.7 97,500 92,100

3 Tactical Missiles Corporation (Moscow)

M S 908.63 1,164.12 37.4 80.0 8.0 5.0* 23,323 21,200*

4 Russian Helicopters (Moscow) A S 811.72 845.14 39.4 42.0 55.3 49.0 37,930 n/a

5 Uralvagonzavod (Moscow) G S 799.46 524.14 55.8 30.0* 30.0* 65.2 30,493 33,140*

6 United Engine Corporation (Moscow)

E S 683.38 n/a 30.0 n/a 70.0 n/a 73,725 n/a

7 Sevmash (Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk region)

N S 533.02 431.04 10.0* 20.0* 20.0* 20.0* 26,951 26,191*

8 Salyut engine building company (Moscow)

E S 493.42 442.75 65.3 n/a 5.1 5.0* 12,214 n/a

9 NPOmash corporation (Reutov, Moscow region)

M S 342.84 232.24 40.0* 40.0* 5.0* 5.0* n/a 3,800*

10 Zvezdochka ship repair facility (Severodvisnk, Arkhangelsk region)

N S 243.46 n/a 10.0* n/a 20.0* n/a n/a n/a

11 Degtyarev plant (Kovrov, Vladimir region)

SA / M P 232.87 241.93 33.0 25.0 10.1 13.3 10,650 10,769

12 Admiralty shipyard (Saint-Petersburg)

N S 184.19 n/a 50.0* n/a 10.0* n/a n/a n/a

13 Sozvezdiye electronic concern (Moscow)

EQ S 179.49 n/a 9.3 n/a 20.0* n/a n/a n/a

Ranking of Russian defense companies by defense revenue in 2009

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 5Ranking of Top Russian Defense Companies in 2009

Defense Industries

1 Sevmash net profit forecast for 2009 at 1.87bn roubles, compared to 1.71bn loss the year before // ITAR-TASS, July 1, 2009; Shipyards to increase output // Vedomosti (St Petersburg), April 6, 2010.

2 Quarterly reports by Severnaya verf shipyards, Baltiyskiy Plant, Amurskiy Shipbuilding Plant and other companies.3 Conversion from roubles into dollars based on average yearly exchange rates: 31.76 roubles to the dollar in 2009 and 24.89 roubles

to the dollar in 2008. Data by the Russian Central Bank (www.cbr.ru).4 http://www.inflationdata.com/inflation/inflation_rate/currentinflation.asp.5 All information about Russian arms trade in this article was taken from: Russian arms trade in 2009 // Eksport Vooruzheniy, No 6,

2009. Please refer to that article for more information.6 All information about Russian defense procurement in this article was taken from: Frolov A. Russian defense procurement in 2009

// Eksport Vooruzheniy, No 2, 2010. Please refer to that article for more information.7 Loaded weapon. Interview with KTRV Director-General Boris Obnosov // Odnako, February 15, 2010.8 Russian helicopter production up 8.3 per cent in 2009 // ARMS-TASS, March 1, 2010.9 “We must anticipate the market rather than follow it.” Interview with Oboronprom (Vertolety Rossii and UEC parent company)

director-general Andrey Reus // Aviaport.ru, January 28, 2010.10 The value of Sevmash output in 2009 is thought to be in excess of 1.57bn USD. See: Sevmash net profit forecast for 2009 at 1.87bn

roubles, compared to 1.71bn loss the year before // ITAR-TASS, July 1, 2009.11 Medvedev visits NPOmash // Interfax-AVN, October 26, 2009.

No Company Sector Owner-ship

Defense revenue, million USD

Share of exports, % in total revenue

Share of civilian contracts, % in total

revenue

Number of employees

2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008

14 Severnaya verf shipyard (Saint-Petersburg)

N P 168.76 170.55 54.5 58.1 50.0* n/a 3,278 2,866

15 Arzamas Machine-Building Plant

G P 155.18 145.43 21.1 14.2 12.6 18.5 4,332 4,934

16 Yantar shipyard (Kaliningrad) N S 143.18 3.48 n/a n/a 20.0* 20.0* 3,056 2,670

17 Motovilikha plants (Perm) A MP 129.09 n/a 20.0* 20.0* 50.0 n/a n/a n/a

18 Almaz shipbuilding company (Saint-Petersburg)

N P 105.28 19.35 26.9 0.0 20.0* 20.0* 830 658

19 Krasnogorskiy optical plant (Krasnogorsk, Moscow region)

EQ MS 88.32 111.53 25.1 7.9 10.0* 10.0* 4,337 4,676

20 UOMZ optical & mechanical plant (Yekaterinburg)

EQ S 84.38 101.43 38.1 35.5 30.0* 33.9* 3,905 4,554

* – CAST estimate. Estimates for the share of exports and civilian contracts in the overall revenue of the shipbuilding companies were made based on actual revenue figures as opposed to output indicators. See more details in the text. The only exception is the Admiralty shipyard, where the 2009 estimate is based on output figures.

Notes for individual companies:• Revenue figure for Russian Helicopters also includes Rostvertol revenue. Although formally Oboronprom, the parent company of

Russian Helicopters, owns only a blocking stake in Rostvertol, it controls operational management of the company;• Salyut – consolidated revenue (including Omsk engine plant and several smaller companies) reached 673.8m USD in 2009;• NPOmash corporation – figures reflect only the head company’s results;• Sozvezdiye – figures reflect only the head company’s results;• Zvezdochka – figures reflect only the head company’s operational results for the period from November 2008 to December 2009 (i.e.

since the company’s incorporation); and• Admiralty Shipyards - 2009 figures reflect output rather that actual revenue.

Sources: annual reports and company press releases; media reports, CAST estimates.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief6The Belarusian Defense Industry

Defense Industries

The Belarusian Defense IndustryMikhail Barabanov

The Belarusian defense industry found itself in a fairly peculiar situation after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. On the one hand, that industry made up a sizeable chunk of the republic’s economy, with about 120 defense companies and organizations, including 15 military R&D centers and design bureaus. In 1995 the industry payroll was 245,000 people, accounting for 16.3 per cent of all manufacturing sector employment.1

But on the other hand, after World War II the Soviet government made a strategic decision not to build any large weapons plants in Belarus because they would be too close to the Soviet Union’s western border. The only notable exception was the Minsk Auto Plant (MAZ), the maker of wheeled chassis for most of the Soviet missile systems - but those chassis are not really weapons in the technical sense. The Belarusian defense companies were given mainly subcontractor jobs, producing parts and components assembled into the finished product elsewhere. They specialized in wireless equipment and electronics, automated control systems, optical and laser systems, telecommunications, air defense components, and wheeled and tracked chassis.

Belarus also hosted several large repair and maintenance plants belonging to the Soviet Defense Ministry. These were used to repair and upgrade a wide range of weapons, including aircraft, armor and air defense systems. Belarus could therefore rely on domestic suppliers for these services after independence.

Most of the country’s defense industry specialized in high-tech components for weapons made elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. That made the Belarusian defense contractors dependent on custom from the finished product manufacturers – the bulk of them in Russia. But it also gave them greater flexibility and more opportunities for diversification. In addition, none of the Belarusian defense companies were in a position whereby the economy of whole towns was entirely dependent on them. All of that meant less pain when the country’s defense contractors started restructuring and branching out into civilian markets in 1992-1993. The so-called conversion program involved some 59 defense companies and organizations. That program, along with Belarus’s more cautious transition to a market economy, meant that the industrial slump in the country was severe, but not quite as epic as in Russia. The Belarusian high-tech industries (including defense) shrank by 40 per cent in 1990-1996. The Russian figure was 70-80 per cent.2

By the turn of the century, Belarus was left with about 50 defense companies that had survived the transition. In

the process of conversion and restructuring the Belarusian government and industry captains managed to preserve the core of the specialized high-tech contractors, including all 15 R&D centers and design bureaus the country had inherited from the former Soviet Union. They also managed to repair the broken supply chains to some extent, finding Belarusian replacements for foreign suppliers, and to build up the domestic military R&D capability.3

The Belarusian administrations of Shushkevich and Kebich (to 1994) and then Aleksandr Lukashenko have always had the defense industry close to the top of their economic priorities. Thanks to a purposeful and competent government policy, Belarus has managed to transform the disjointed fragments of the Soviet defense sector it had inherited in 1991 into a viable and efficient industry. It has focused on the development of promising niche technologies, including IT, telecommunications, automated control systems, optics, electronics, and instrumentation technology. Based on this know-how, Belarusian defense contractors offer a range of upgrade solutions for Soviet and Russian-made aircraft, armor and air defense systems. The industry has also retained its traditional Russian market for wheeled and tracked chassis.

Thanks to close political partnership Belarus maintains with Russia, the two countries’ defense sectors remain tightly interlinked. Belarus is even allowed to re-export Russian weapons to a number of foreign markets, and to offer upgrades of Soviet and Russian platforms. Russian defense companies usually get a large share of these upgrade contracts.

Starting from 2000, the Belarusian administration has been able to support the country’s defense industry by stepping up military procurement programs. These programs – most of them focused on IT and weapons upgrades – are not large by any means, but every little helps. In 2007 a government newspaper reported that the domestic market accounted for about 69 per cent of the Belarusian defense industry’s business.4

Unlike in Russia, the defense sector in Belarus has always remained state owned and run centrally by the government. Such a system makes for easier administration and more streamlined industry restructuring programs. Up until 2003, the entire sector was run by the Ministry for Industry, except for the former Soviet military repair and upgrade plans, which were subordinated to the Belarusian MoD. On December 30, 2003 the government set up the State Defense Industry Committee (GVPK), which took over all 50 of the remaining

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 7The Belarusian Defense Industry

Defense Industries

Belarusian defense companies, including the repair plants. As of 2007, the GVPK coordinated 261 Belarusian businesses and organizations linked to the defense industry.5

The committee’s remit includes implementing a coordinated government policy in the sector. It also has regulatory functions and oversees the Belarusian arms trade. In 2004 it took over industrial licensing and the system of arms trade permits from the MoD. In addition, the committee is tasked with developing proposals on arms trade and export controls. Finally, it has the power to sign bilateral agreements on arms trade and defense industry cooperation with its counterparts in other countries.6

The government has retained control of practically all the remaining Belarusian defense contractors. After independence they were given the status of Republican Unitary Ventures (RUP). But in 2009 many of them were restructured into Joint Stock Companies, with the state retaining 100 per cent of their shares. But there is also a number of successful private defense and high-tech companies in Belarus, including Tetraedr, Monitor-Service, NTTS DELS, and others. Most of them were set up by former managers of state-owned defense contractors, leveraging old connections in the Russian defense industry and armed forces.

Belarusian defense industry’s specializationThe Belarusian government’s strategy for the national

defense sector is even deeper specialization rather than diversification. It has adopted a number of programs in the traditional niche areas of electronics and optics. GVPK companies are also involved in several projects in the framework of the Union State of Russia and Belarus.7

The country’s defense sector has largely preserved its specialization inherited from the former Soviet Union. It is aiming to make use of its lead in areas such as IT, telecommunications, optics and electronics to develop advanced new technologies for civilian and military applications. Unlike most of the other former Soviet republics, Belarus is not trying to achieve self-sufficiency in key weapons and ammunition categories. Economically, that strategy makes a lot of sense. Minsk has a reliable source of all the weapons platforms and systems it needs - those can always be procured from Russia, often at generous discounts thanks to the country’s membership of the Union State and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Over the period of 2005-2009, such discounts were secured for 38 weapons and upgrade contracts with Russian suppliers.8

Government procurement accounts for 69 per cent of the GVPK companies’ business. Exports to Russia and the CIS countries make up only 5 per cent, and sales to other countries 26 per cent.9

Domestic procurementLike in Russia, the Belarusian defense industry policy

is laid out in successive state armament programs. The one in effect now covers the period of 2006-2015; it is split into two five-tear terms, from 2006 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2015. The program is based on the Armed Forces Development Concept 2020 and the Defense Industry Policy Concept 2005-2015.10 In practice the armament program translates into plans for annual procurement contracts to be awarded by the GVPK.11

Up until the early 2000s, the Belarusian MoD could not afford any new weapons. What little money it did have was spent on ongoing repairs and maintenance of aircraft, armor and air defense systems. The bulk of those contracts were awarded to the MoD’s own repair plants.

But as the economy improved earlier in this decade, the government was able to ramp up defense procurement. The focus was on upgrading the existing hardware (especially aircraft and air defense systems). Almost all the contracts were given to Belarusian suppliers. The government then adopted the Air Defense Development State Program 2003-2010.12 The 558th Aircraft Repair Plant was chosen as the lead contractor for upgrading the Belarusian MiG-29 fighters to MiG-29BM specification, Su-27UB fighters to Su-27UBM1, and Mi-8MT helicopters to Mi-8MTK01 spec. The program involved the Russian lead designers of the aircraft. The Tetraedr company, GNPO Agat and the 2566th Repair Plant were contracted to upgrade the S-200V (SA-5) and Buk (SA-11) SAM systems (the latter to the Buk-MB spec). Belarus also upgraded its P-18 radars to P-18BM specification. The Air Force and Air Defense received new Bor and Neman automated control systems, as well as the R-934UM Udar and R-378UM Ukol electronic warfare stations. The country then rolled out a unified automated control system for its Air Force and Air Defense. The system includes 14 new automation kits that cover the entire process of troops and weapons management.13

For the Army, the MoD commissioned the development of upgrade options for the T-72 tanks, BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles, BTR-70 APCs and MTLB chassis. In also began upgrading the BM-21 MLR systems to the BM-21A BelGrad specification, with a new chassis. In 2004 the government announced a program of phased replacements of all trucks and chassis in the Belarusian armed forces with domestically made product.14

In most cases, however, the scope of the upgrade programs was very limited. Of all the Belarusian MiG-29 fighters, only eight were upgraded to the MiG-29BM specification; only four Su-27 jets were upgraded to Su-27UBM1. For the Mi-8MT helicopters and air defense systems, the numbers were in the same range. The armor upgrade programs produced only a few trial batches, most

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief8The Belarusian Defense Industry

Defense Industries

likely due to cash shortages and in some cases very high costs, which made the upgrade option uneconomical.

Most of the new hardware Belarus has bought for its army in recent years falls into the categories of automated control systems, telecommunications equipment, radio-electronic reconnaissance and warfare, optics, simulators, and testing instruments. The MoD has also been buying small batches of new trucks. This new hardware has resulted in some improvements to the Belarusian command-and-control, telecommunications and reconnaissance systems. But it cannot compensate for the age and obsolescence of the main weapons systems and platforms now in use in the country’s Air Force and Air Defense.

The government has recently released a list of its top defense R&D and procurement priorities, which includes:15

• Countermeasures to high-precision weapons; • Military geo-information systems; • New mobility hardware; • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and related systems; • IT, communication and automation, software for future

automated information gathering and command-and-control systems.

Cooperation with RussiaMost of the Belarusian defense companies were built in

Soviet times as parts and components subcontractors for the rest of the Soviet defense industry. Russia, which inherited the bulk of that industry, therefore remains their main market. The Belarusian government and defense industry captains are well aware of that, and keen to maintain the existing partnership with Moscow. In 1994 the two countries signed a defense industry cooperation agreement, which is still in place.16 As of 2010, more than 50 Belarusian defense contractors traded with over 400 companies in Russia. Electronics, parts and components account for the bulk of that trade, which includes both manufacturing and R&D.17 On the whole, the Belarusian defense sector continues to play the role of a second or third tier subcontractor for the Russian defense industry.

Since 1991, joint projects have delivered the following new products and technologies:

• Wired, optical and wireless communications systems for voice, packet and radar data;

• Control systems for air defense and anti-ship missile systems;

• Aerospace optics and electronics, photogrammetric systems;

• Advanced information display systems; • Towing trucks, wheeled and tracked chassis for weapons

systems; • Testing and measuring instruments for radar, chemical

and bacteriological reconnaissance; instruments for complex monitoring and diagnostics of on-board aviation and naval electronics;

• Firefighting, emergency response and rescue equipment, etc.18

Known Belarusian deliveries to Russian weapons makers include:

• targeting systems for armor (made by OAO Peleng); • pilot navigation systems for Su-27UB, Su-30 and Su-33

combat aircraft (by Ekran); • aerial surveying systems and high-precision measuring

equipment for aircraft (by BelOMO); • ultra-rugged military-grade electronic displays (KB

Display).19

The bulk of the Belarusian deliveries to the Russian armed forces also fall under these four categories. In addition, Russia buys wheeled chassis made by the MZKT plant in Minsk, aerial surveying equipment, military optics, and targeting systems for tanks and other armor.

Moscow is particularly interested in the Belarusian wheeled chassis, as Russia’s own wheeled and trucked chassis makers can’t seem to get their act together. The numbers and range of the MZKT chassis Russia buys from Belarus is on the rise. In 2008, Almaz-Antey, the leading Russian maker of air defense systems, approached the Russian MoD with a proposal that tracked chassis for the Tor and Tunguska missile systems (GM-352M1 and GM-355A chassis, respectively) should once again be sourced from Minsk.20

Joint ventures are an increasingly popular form of cooperation between the Russian and Belarusian defense contractors. One such venture, New Technologies Research Coordination Center, was set up in 2006 by the Belarusian NIISA (GNPO Agat) and the Russian Vega concern, the maker of wireless equipment and electronics. The venture will focus on developing and manufacturing automated control systems for combat operations, reconnaissance and weapons systems. It will also develop airborne reconnaissance, control and targeting systems. NIISA (GNPO Agat) has set up another joint venture, RosBelKontsern PVO, with Almaz-Antey to develop automated control systems for air defense applications.21 Three Belarusian companies (the 2566th Radio-Electronic Weapons Repair Plant, RUP Alevkurp and MZKT) are part of the MFPG Oboronitelnyye Sistemy joint venture with several Russian defense contractors. Its core business is upgrading the S-125M (SA-3) SAM system to Pechora-2M specification for third-country customers. OAO Peleng is part of the Russian-Belarusian venture Vizir and the tripartite OOO Sanoet, set up with Russian and French partners. Both ventures make targeting systems for Russian armor destined for exports or being upgraded for third-country customers.22

On the whole, however, defense industry cooperation with Belarus is not all that indispensable to Russia. None of

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 9The Belarusian Defense Industry

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the core weapons systems or platforms used in the Russian army are sourced from Belarus. The vast majority of the components subcontracted to the Belarusian manufacturers can be sourced from elsewhere, if need be. The MZKT chassis (especially those used in the Topol-M and Yars mobile strategic missile systems) are probably the single most important imports from Belarus for the Russian MoD. All-weather targeting systems for armor designed by the Belarusian OAO Peleng is another area where cooperation with Belarus really matters.

Belarusian arms exportsBelarusian arms exports since 1992 fall under the

following main categories: • Independent exports to former Soviet republics and

other countries; • Supplies to Russian weapons manufacturers of

components incorporated into finished weapons systems that are then sold to third countries;

• Services, components and finished systems supplied to the Russian armed forces (already listed in this article);

• Exports of used hardware from the Belarusian army surplus to former Soviet republics and other countries;

• Intermediary services provided by Belarus on exports to third countries of used hardware from the Russian army surplus;

• Maintenance, repair and upgrade of Soviet-made weapons in the arsenals of the former Soviet republics and other countries.Used weapons seems to be the main article of the

Belarusian arms exports, owing to the large surplus of military hardware the country had inherited from the former Soviet Union. Pre-sale repairs of used equipment destined for exports has been a major cash earner for the Belarusian defense contractors, especially the 140th (tanks), 558th (aviation) and 2566th (electronic) repair plants. An aggressive pricing policy compared to their Russian competitors has enabled Belarusian (as well as Ukrainian) companies to secure a large chunk of the market for the repairs of Soviet-made hardware.

Due to the highly specialized nature of the Belarusian defense industry, any independent military exports are limited to niche products such as a fairly narrow range of electronics and optical systems, wheeled chassis, one-

off sales of radar stations, and the like. Other than Russia and the CIS, the main customers are countries with large stocks of Soviet-made weapons, including Middle Eastern nations and, to a lesser extent, China. Attempts are being made to secure other markets – President Lukashenko has been courting Venezuela especially earnestly in that regard. Since Belarus has become something of an outcast in the West, its government has made a point of seeking closer ties with the other pariah states, thus making itself a more attractive source of weapons supplies to them. It appears that the Russian arms exporters have been cashing in on the situation by using Belarus as an intermediary for sales to problem countries such as Iran, Syria, Sudan and Angola. In September 1999, Russia and Belarus signed a bilateral agreement “On cooperation in arms exports to third countries”.23 And in early 2010, a group of US Congressmen introduced the Belarus Arms Transfers Accountability Act, which reflects Washington’s unease over the “sales or delivery of weapons or weapons-related technologies to states of concern, including state sponsors of terrorism.”24

Over the past decade the Belarusian defense industry has been busy marketing its upgrade solutions for Soviet-made hardware. That line of business was seen as a perfect fit for the industry’s key strengths in repair and maintenance, subcontracting, system integration and IT solutions. On the whole, however, the country’s achievements here are not that spectacular. In most cases, Belarusian companies were mere subcontractors, with their Russian counterparts acting as leads. All that being said, the Tetraedr company has actually been quite successful in securing contracts for the upgrade of the S-125M and Osa (SA-8) SAM systems. The 2566th repair plant, one of the Belarusian partners in MFPG Oboronitelnyye Sistemy joint venture, has also profited handsomely from upgrading the S-125M SAM systems, and Peleng has done well from supplying advanced targeting systems for the upgrade of various armor, in partnership with Russian companies. But many other widely advertized Belarusian upgrade solutions (especially in the aerospace sector) have either attracted very limited custom or failed to score a single sale.

Unlike Russia, Belarus does not have a monopolist state-owned arms exporter. Most of the country’s weapons exports are channeled through three state-owned companies set up in 1995-1996: GVTUP Belspetsvneshtekhnika, GVTUP Belvneshpromservis and ZAO Beltekheksport, with the GVPK acting as coordinator. But many individual defense contractors also hold export licenses.25

1 Vasilevich A., Belosludtsev V. Ukraine and Belarus: Searching for a niche in the arms market // Eksport Vooruzheniy, No 1, 2001.2 Alesin A. Conversion through arms trade // Belorusskiy Rynok, No 4, 1996.3 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007.4 Ibid.


Defense Industries

The Belarusian Defense Industry

5 Budkevich V. Maltsev: new system to ensure coordinated work of the defense industry // BelPAN, February 18, 2004.6 Bykovskiy P. Defense industry cooperation between Belarus and Russia // review.w-europe.org/16/1.html.7 GVPK web site: www.vpk.gov.by/gos_prog.php.8 Cooperation with Russia keeps the Belarusian defense industry afloat. Interview with S.K. Gurulev // www.vpk.gov.by/pub/

pub2_2010.php.9 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007.10 Gurulev S.K. Belarusian defense industry outlook // Problemy Upravleniya (Minsk), No 2, 2010.11 Azamatov N. Belarusian defense industry entering a new stage // Federal Reference Tome “Russian Defense Industry”.

Issue 4. M., 2006.12 Dyrman I. Belarusian army: new weapons in the pipeline // Armiya, No 6, 2005.13 Smart weapons: interview with S. Gurulev // Narodnaya Gazeta (Minsk), April 1, 2010.14 The Belarusian army prefers MAZ trucks // Krasnaya Zvezda, January 5, 2004.15 Gurulev S.K. Belarusian defense industry outlook // Problemy Upravleniya (Minsk), No 2, 2010.16 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007.17 Smart weapons: interview with S. Gurulev // Narodnaya Gazeta (Minsk), April 1, 2010.18 Gurulev S.K. Belarusian defense industry. Areas of cooperation // Federal Reference Tome “Russian Defense Industry”.

Issue 4. M., 2006.19 Ultra-rugged: interview with P. Rogozhevskiy // Delo (Vostok+Zapad), May 2001.20 Almaz Antey 2008 Annual Report // www.almaz-antey.ru/docs/Otchet_2008.pdf.21 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007.22 Smart weapons: interview with S. Gurulev // Narodnaya Gazeta (Minsk), April 1, 2010.23 Nezvanov A. Friendship on the sidelines where arms sales are concerned // Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, No 799, 2000.24 US concerned by Belarusian arms exports // europeanbelarus.org/be/news/2010/1/20/1162.25 Gorupay O. The Belarusian breakthrough // Krasnaya Zvezda, August 22, 2007.


MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis PlantAleksey Nikolsky, a Vedomosti newspaper correspondent

HistoryThe Belarusian auto industry was born after World War

II, when the Soviet government built the Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ). The company specialized in tippers and other heavy trucks. In 1954 it founded a new division, the SKB-1 design bureau, specializing in artillery towing trucks. The first lead designer of SKB-1 was Boris Shaposhnik, who stayed on in this job until 1984.

In 1956 SKB-1 assembled the first prototype of the MAZ-535 eight-by-eight artillery towing truck. In 1959, following the completion of a new MAZ assembly floor built to SKB-1 requirements, the company made the first mass-produced MAZ-537, a profoundly upgraded version of the MAZ-535. Production of the two trucks was then transferred to the Kurgan Wheeled Chassis Plant (KZKT) in Russia, where the last MAZ-537 left the assembly line in 1990.

In 1959 SKB-1 and MAZ launched production of wheeled chassis for Soviet missile systems. For the Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B) tactical ballistic missile system and the Temp (SS-12) theatre ballistic missile system it developed the MAZ-543 Uragan eight-by-eight chassis, which proved to be a real hit. Production of its various modifications ended at MAZ only recently, after more than 11,000 units had been made since 1962. The chassis was used throughout the Soviet armed forces. Its applications included the S-300P (SA-10) SAM system, the Smerch MLR system, the Rubezh (SSC-3) anti-ship missile system, and others. Many units were sold abroad as the chassis for the Scud B system. In the 1970, the MAZ-543 design became the core of the modified MAZ-7911 Oplot family (a total of 629 units was built). Starting from 1991 all MAZ-543 series trucks are marketed as MZKT-543.

In 1966 the company developed the MAZ-547A (12x10) chassis for the first Soviet road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the Temp-2S (SS-16). In order to launch its production, which continued throughout 1971-1979, MAZ implemented a large upgrade and retooling program, and built a second assembly line. In 1974 the company started making the MAZ-547V version of the chassis for the Pioner (SS-20) mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) systems. In the 1980s, MAZ used

the 547V design as the core of the new MAZ-7912 (14x12) chassis for the Topol (SS-25) ICBMs, and then the 14x14 version for the Topol, the MAZ-7917. Later it developed the MAZ-7916 twelve-by-twelve option for the upgrade Pioner-3 (SS-X-28) mobile IRBM.

These gigantic new chassis required another retooling program at MAZ, implemented over the period of 1976-1986. The program involved the construction of a third assembly floor. By the time the family had been retired, MAZ had built 294 units of the MAZ-547A chassis, 538 of MAZ-547V, 100 of MAZ-7912, 26 of MAZ-7916 and 402 of MAZ-7917. The company had also designed the super-heavy MAZ-7904 (12x12) wheeled chassis version for the Tselina mobile ICBM, as well as the MAZ-7906 (16x16) and MAZ-7907 (24x24, with electric transmission) for the Tselina-2 (SS-23) mobile ICBMs. But only a few prototypes of the two missile systems were ever built. As part of the disarmament program launched by Mikhail Gorbachev, MAZ stopped the development of the MAZ-7908 chassis for the new Skorost mobile IRBMs, as well as the MAZ-7909 and MAZ-7929 versions for the Kurier, another mobile ICBM.

Cosseted by the government In February 1991 production of special wheeled

chassis at BelavtoMAZ was spun off into a separate company, the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant (MZKT). As defense contracts dried up after the collapse of the Soviet Union, MZKT sought to find new civilian markets for its produce. Its wheeled chassis, which were cheap and had excellent off-road capabilities, remained in demand throughout the 1990s; about 700 of them were bought by Russian oil industry customers. But very soon the company found itself up against stiff competition from Western truck-makers; their offerings were more fuel-efficient and reliable, and they lasted longer. In order to regain its positions in Russia, which had become MZKT’s main market by the mid-1990s, the company began developing several models specifically tailored to the needs of the oil industry, the construction sector and road builders. These trucks are marketed under the Volat brand.

Defense Industries

MZKT – the Minsk Wheeled Chassis Plant

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MZKT has had its share of problems with government procurement contracts and taxes. But the company has always enjoyed generous financial support from the Belarusian taxpayer. In 1995 the government gave it a five-year corporate tax break on revenues generated from export contracts. The company was hit hard when that tax break expired in 2001, which coincided with the devaluation of the Belarusian rouble and the resulting rise in the cost of imported components. MZKT had to send 800 of its 5,000 staff on unpaid leave, and make another 500 redundant.

In 2006 the company was given 12.88bn Belarusian rubles (6m USD) in budget subsidies. And in 2007, despite favorable market conditions due to a construction boom in Russia, it received unprecedented government largesse to the tune of 64m dollars. That sum included a direct budget subsidy of 14m dollars to replenish operating capital, another subsidy for industrial retooling worth 25.5m USD, and a government guarantee on a low-interest 25m USD loan from the state-owned Belinvestbank. The global economic crisis that broke out in 2008 led to a collapse in demand for construction equipment in Russia and the CIS countries. In 2009 MZKT ran up big tax arrears, along with MAZ, the Minsk Tractor Plant and other automakers. The company was then given yet another dollop of state aide – the government bought all of its inventories of road building and construction machinery in one fell swoop.

In 2009 MZKT was restructured into a joint stock company, with the state retaining 100 per cent ownership. The company is run by the Belarusian State Defense Industry Committee (the GVKT). In 2008 it had 5,124 people on the payroll. Its current director-general is Gennadiy Sinegorovskiy, who was appointed to the job in 2002 after spending his entire career with the MAZ company.

MZKT does not release its annual reports to open sources. But some figures were made available when it was being restructured into a joint-stock company in 2009. Its 2008 output reached 651 units of various trucks and chassis. The authorized capital was estimated at 54m USD, with debts of 19.2m USD. In the period of January to November 2008, which appears to have been the best stretch in the company’s recent history, MZKT made 623 trucks and chassis worth some 70m USD. Its exports in the same period amounted to 87.5m USD – the discrepancy probably being explained by Belarusian export accounting quirks or a quick running down of inventories. Simple calculations suggest that in the best of times, the company’s net output was 75m USD or less, with exports of up to 90m USD.

Overall, it appears that MZKT has failed to find a comfortable niche on the commercial market. Its financial strategy boils down to making money on small-volume sales of expensive military products and the unique “quasi-military” chassis (cranes and “centipede” trucks), which cost nearly just as much. The proceeds are then spent on

keeping afloat the production of the mass-market offerings, which is barely breaking even (the tipping trucks division actually appears to be in the red). The company has never fully recovered after it had to end large-volume production of the MAZ-7917 chassis for the Topol ICBM systems and to slash the output of the MAZ-543 series military chassis to a fraction of the previous figures. It therefore makes perfect sense for the MZKT to be so focused on the defense market, even though nominally it accounts for only a small share of its custom. Development of new military chassis remains the cornerstone of its strategy for the future.

Main product categoriesThe Russian Armed Forces, and especially the strategic

missile forces, are the largest market for military chassis. The flagship MZKT product here is the MZKT-79221 Universal (16x16), which can tow up to 80 tonnes and is used in the Topol-M (SS-27) mobile ICBMs. It uses the core designs of the MAZ-7922 prototype; the first two of the new chassis were built using final approved specifications in 1995. In 2005-2007 the Russian Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN) bought nine 15U175 mobile launchers for the Topol-M missiles (based on the MZKT-79221 chassis) worth some 4.43bn Russian roubles. They also bought several 15M69 auxiliary vehicles, and placed an order for another nine of the mobile launchers, with delivery dates in 2009-2010. The new RS-24 Yars mobile ICBMs (SS-X-29), which are essentially a version of the Topol-M with a multiple warhead, also use the MZKT-79221 chassis. Their launcher seems to be virtually identical to the 15U175. The Russian strategic missile forces took delivery of the first three Yars missile systems in 2009; all three were put on combat duty in 2010. According to a number of estimates, by 2020 the Russian nuclear arsenal may receive another 27 Topol-M and 108 Yars mobile missile systems.

Given that the chassis itself makes up a considerable part of the cost of the 15U175 launcher (i.e. about 1m USD), sales of the MZKT-79221 to Russia are very important for the company’s financial wellbeing.And if Russia begins mass rollout of the Yars missile, it will have to buy 10-12 chassis from MZKT (including the 15M69 model) every year for the next several years. That will make the 79221 model the company’s biggest cash cow, with prospects for a large overall increase in annual sales.

The Russian armed forces also buy the MZKT-7930 Astrolog (8x8) chassis, which was designed to replace the venerable MAZ-543 and entered mass production in 1998. It is used in the mobile launchers and transporter loader vehicles for the Iskander (SS-26) theatre ballistic missile system; the Bastion-P (SSC-5) and the Bal (SSC-6) mobile coastal defense missile systems; the 220/300mm

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Defense Industries

Uragan-1M (Tornado) MRL system; the 15U182 auxiliary vehicles for Strategic Missile Troops; and the TMM-6 Gusenitsa-2 bridgelayer. The MZKT-7930 chassis has also been bought by Vietnam and Syria as part of the Bastion-P missile systems. Several others have been sold abroad as part of the 96L6 radars for the S-300PMU2 (SA-20B) SAM system.

Launchers and special-purpose vehicles (apart from SAM system mobile platforms) built on the basis of MZKT chassis are assembled in Russia by the Barrikady company in Volgograd.

In the past decade, MZKT has developed chassis for new and upgraded medium and short-range Russian SAM systems. The MZKT-8021 model is used as a platform for the mobile launcher of the upgraded Pechora-2M (SA-3) SAM system, which has been sold to a number of countries, including Egypt. In 2006 the company developed the new MZKT-6922 (6x6) model for Almaz-Antey, Russia’s biggest defense contractor. The chassis is designed for the upgraded Osa-AKM (SA-8), Tor-2ME (SA-15) and Buk-M2E (SA-17) mobile SAM systems. Another new model, the MZKT-79292 (10x10) is designed to carry the mast of the radar of the S-400 (SA-21) SAM system.

More than 200 MAZ-543 (MZKT-543) chassis have been exported as part of the S-300P SAM systems to China, Algeria, Cyprus and Vietnam, and as part of the Smerch MRL systems to Algeria, Kuwait and Turkmenistan. The Russian Navy has bought several 130mm Bereg coastal defense self-propelled guns and auxiliary vehicles which use the MAZ-543M chassis.

In 2008 the company unveiled an experimental MZKT-6001 (6x6) truck model, with a maximum load of 10 tonnes. It will be used as a prototype for a family of 4x4, 6x6 and 8x8 utility army trucks, with the intended market in Belarus itself, Russia and other countries.

Apart from Russia, another important export market for MZKT military chassis is China. In 1997 the company set up a joint venture with Sanjiang, a Chinese maker of heavy machinery, in Hubei province. MZKT was given a 30-per-cent share of the venture in return for providing technology and components. The primary customer is the Chinese strategic missile forces. The first product to have entered production at the joint venture was a version of the MAZ-543. The first units (a total of 25 to 50) were put together from assembly kits supplied by Belarus. But the Chinese soon launched their own production of the chassis, which they branded as WS2400. From MZKT they continue to buy only individual components. The WS2400 chassis is used in the launchers for the DF-11 (CSS-7) short-range ballistic missile, the DH-10 land-land-attack cruise missile, the YJ-62 mobile coastal defense missile system, and several other SAM and MRL systems. Annual production appears to be in the dozens.

In 2007 images were released on the Internet of a 16x16 chassis photographed in China, looking very similar to the MZKT-79221 model (the mobile platform of the Topol-M ICBM). The plan is apparently to use them for the DF-31/31A (CSS-9) mobile ICBM. It appears that the WS2500 (10x10) chassis for the DF-21 (CSS-5) mobile IRBM was also developed with Belarusian assistance. Other known Chinese chassis include the WS2600 (10x8), WS2900 (12x12) and WS21050 (14x12). All of them are versions of MZKT designs. Supplies to China seem to explain the large share of parts and components in MZKT output in 2007-2008.

Growing leakages of MZKT military technology to China has led to gradual decline of the joint venture in Hubei, though the company is still in business. Meanwhile, in September 2009 Sanjiang and MZKT set up another joint venture, Volat-Sanjiang, to develop and manufacture hydro-mechanical gearboxes for commercial Volat trucks.

MZKT has also sold its chassis to Pakistan, where they are used as mobile platforms for ballistic missiles. In the early 2000s, the country bought several MAZ-543s for use as launchers for the Shaheen-1 mobile short-range ballistic missile, as well as an unknown number of MAZ-7916 chassis for use with the Shaheen-2 mobile IRBM. Damascus has bought several MAZ-543s for the Syrian versions of the Scud tactical ballistic missiles. In June 2010 Belarusian Prime Minister Sergey Sidorskiy announced plans for joint ventures in Syria to assemble MAZ, MTZ and MZKT vehicles and trucks.

So far, MZKT has managed to win only two large Western contracts. In 2000 it signed a deal with the Turkish MoD to supply 130 MZKT 74295/93783 tank transporters and 120 MZKT-79091/79092 mobile tanker chassis (other sources put the figures at 200 and 50, respectively). The contract was estimated at 50m USD. And in 2005 the company won a 20m USD UAE contract for 40 tank transporters (consisting of the MZKT-74135 truck, MZKT-99942 semitrailer and MZKT-83721 trailer).

After its military business collapsed, MZKT has been working hard since the mid-1990s to expand into civilian markets. It has made use of its special chassis expertise to develop and launch a wide range of heavy commercial trucks, including tipper trucks (6x6, 8x4 and 8x8) with a maximum load of up to 27 tonnes; heavy haulers and road trains with a maximum load of 40 to 100 tonnes; special crane chassis (100 tonnes); 6x6, 8x8,10x10 and 12x12 chassis for the oil and gas industry; and various trailers and semitrailers with a maximum load of 15 to 100 tonnes.

The key commercial customers are the oil and gas industry and specialist construction companies, mostly in Russia. But production volumes are fairly limited. In 2002-2005 MZKT turned out about 300 commercial trucks and chassis per year, on average. The company’s foothold on the

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Defense Industries

commercial market is very uncertain. There have only been a few small and one-off contracts outside the CIS. In 2009 the company’s commercial business was hit hard by the global economic crisis, which led to a collapse in demand for heavy trucks in Russia.

Mixed prospectsMZKT went through a deep crisis in the 1990s - but

it has managed to preserve a formidable engineering and manufacturing capability. That was thanks largely to generous government subsidies, a booming Russian market before the world economic crisis, and renewed custom from the Russian army.

On the commercial trucks market, the company’s position is fairly marginal. But the future of its military business seems brighter. MZKT can look forward to large Russian army contracts as Moscow begins to roll out a number of new mobile missile systems, such as the Yars, Iskander-M and Bastion-P. The latter two of the three have good export prospects, meaning even more custom for the Belarusian truck maker. Once these orders from the Russian

MoD begin to flow, they can be expected to continue for five to seven years, and possibly even 10.

MZKT’s position on the Russian defense market is strengthened by the lack of any Russian competitors in the special wheeled chassis segment. The KZKT/Rusich plant in Kurgan, which used to build trucks in Russia using MZKT designs, finally bit the dust in 2010 thanks to incompetent management and lack of government support. The only remaining Russian designer and maker of special chassis is the Bryansk Automobile Plant (BAZ). But the chaos and ruthless lobbying that plague the military trucks procurement system in the Russian army has made the company’s situation very difficult. The MoD cannot even seem to make up its mind on whether to place any orders for the Voshchina-1 special chassis, which BAZ has designed to the requirements and specifications provided by the MoD itself. Meanwhile, the project to develop the Voshchina-2 military chassis has been taken away from BAZ, which has the expertise, and given to KamAZ, which has no relevant experience but lots of lobbying muscle. Long delays on the project are now more than likely. To MZKT this promises continued dominance of the Russian market for its military chassis and trucks, particularly those used in the strategic missile forces.

1 Alesin A. Our wheels on the Chinese cart // Belarusy i rynok, No 36, June 14-20, 2009.2 http://i29.tinypic.com/syr2b7.jpg.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 15Russia Raking in New Arms Contracts

Arms Trade

Russia Raking in New Arms ContractsKonstantin Makienko

After the unprecedented success of 2009, Russian weapons exporters are on track to break yet another record this

year. In just the first three months of 2010 they have signed new deals worth 7.7bn USD. The figure for the whole of last year was 15bn, with 8.5bn USD worth of actual deliveries made.

In late January, Moscow hosted the Libyan defense minister, Maj Gen Yunis Jabr, who signed several weapons contracts for a total of 1.3bn euros (1.8bn USD), according to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Among other things, Libya bought lots of small arms and six Yak-130 trainers worth some 90m euros. The deal may also include Russian assistance in the renovation of Libyan small arms factories, upgrade of its T-72S tanks and other armored vehicles, and the purchase of several Molnia-type missile boats. However, it is highly unlikely that the hoped-for Libyan contract for 12 of Russia’s latest Su-35 and four Su-30MK2 fighters has materialized so far. Nor have the Libyans bought any big air defense systems.

On February 10 it was announced that Vietnam had placed a 1bn-dollar order for 12 multirole Su-30MK2 fighter jets and airborne weapons. The deal comes hot on the heels of two other large Vietnamese contracts: one for eight Su-30MK2 fighters, the other for six Project 636M submarines and the attendant coastal infrastructure (the latter being worth up to 4bn USD). It was those two contracts, along with a new Venezuelan package, that helped Rosoboronprom achieve the record-breaking sales figure of 15bn last year. As the Algerian package of contracts is tailing off, Vietnam looks set to become Russia’s second or third-biggest defense customer for the next few years, after India and Venezuela.

Meanwhile, during Prime Minister Putin’s visit to India on March 12, another two big contracts were signed, both for the repair and upgrade of the Vikramaditya aircraft carrying cruiser (the former Admiral Gorshkov). To begin with, the

dispute over Russia’s growing costs of repairing and upgrading the Admiral Gorshkov itself has now been settled. The initial value of the contract was 974m USD. Now, according to media reports, it has been increased to 2.34-2.35bn USD, meaning an additional 1.4bn USD of Indian funding. That settlement has cleared the air in Russian-Indian defense cooperation and paved the way for a successful completion of this very important contract. Second, India has exercised an option for 29 deck-based MiG-29K fighters, worth 1.5bn USD (also see: RSK MiG: back from the brink in this edition of MDB).

Also in March, Algeria converted its 2006 option for 16 Su-30MKI (A) fighters into a confirmed order. The initial contract for 28 Su-30MKI (A) jets was part of a big portfolio signed in 2006. Over the period of 2007-2009, Russia made the deliveries in batches of four, 14 and 10. After the final deliveries had been made in late 2009, the Algerian Air Force decided to bring the size of its Su-30MKI fleet to 44 aircraft. That decision suggests that after Algeria walked away from the contract for the Russian MiG-29SMT fighters, the Su-30MKI (A) will now form the core of the country’s modern fighter aviation. It is quite notable that in the end, the Algerian military chose to stick with the Russian suppliers. At the height of the crisis over the MiG-29SMT contract there were concerns that the Algerians would opt for the French Rafale fighter instead. Nevertheless, it is quite likely that at some point in the future, Algeria will also buy a batch of light or superlight fighters (such as Sweden’s Gripen NG or China’s FC-1) to complement its fleet of heavy Su-30MKI (A) jets.

Finally, reports came in last March that Cyprus has bought 41 T-80U main battle tanks for 110m euros.

That means that the total value of the new Russian arms exports contracts signed in the first three months of 2010 and identified in non-governmental sources has now reached about 7.7bn USD.

Customer Date signed Contract ValueLibya 26-27 January Light arms, 6 Yak-130 trainers, presumably renovation

of a light arms factory, presumably modernization of the T-72S main battle tank

1.3bn euros (1.8bn USD)

Vietnamese Air Force 10 February 12 Su-30MK2 fighters and airborne weapons 1bn USD

Indian Navy 12 March 29 MiG-29K More than 1.5bn USD

Indian Navy 12 March Renegotiated terms of the contract for the repair and upgrade of the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier

2.35bn USD (an additional 1.4bn USD to the January 20, 2004 contract)

Algerian Air Force March 16 Su-30MKI (A) 0.9bn USD

Cyprus March 41 T-80U main battle tanks 110m euros (140m USD)

Total 7.69bn USD

Table 1. Russian arms exports contracts in January-August 2010


Armed Forces

Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet

Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea FleetMikhail Barabanov

A total of 15 frigates and conventional submarines will be built for the Russian Black Sea Fleet by 2020, Russian

Navy Commander Adm. Vladimir Vysotskiy has said. Speaking to a RIA Novosti correspondent on 23 June, he said the proportion between the frigates and the submarines will be “60 to 40” – i.e. nine frigates and six submarines. He added that the construction of one of each will begin before the end of this year. “The Black Sea Fleet will be renovated using newly built ships rather than transferring old ones from the other fleets,” the Navy commander said.

That statement has officially confirmed the decisions made in the last 18 months by the top Russian civilian and military officials completely to renovate and significantly strengthen the Black Sea Fleet. The ongoing revival of partnership between Russia and Ukraine on military issues following the election of Viktor Yanukovich as the Ukrainian president last spring will greatly facilitate the implementation of that decision.

Plans are afoot to build new ships of several types so as to renovate the core of the fleet by as early as 2015, giving it a much greater fighting ability. The schedule for the construction of these ships is therefore fairly tight. In order to bring forward the delivery dates and cut costs, the Navy will use the existing mass-produced ship designs. It is quite possible that the funding of the program will be augmented by ad hoc financing from the national budget.

In 2010, Admiralty Yards in St Petersburg was in the final stages of negotiations on an MoD contract for three diesel-electric submarines for the Black Sea Fleet. The subs will be built using a modified Project 06363 design. It is based on Project 636, the successor to Project 877 (Kilo class), which was widely used in the Soviet and several foreign navies. The first of these new submarines, the Novorossiysk, was laid down at Admiralty Yards on August 20, 2010..

The decision to use the tried and tested Project 877/636 design is explained by the ongoing delays to the operational launch of the new generation Project 677 (Lada class). The first Project 677 sub, the Sankt Petersburg, was delivered to the Navy for limited operational service only in May 2010 after almost six years of trials. The two other Lada class subs now being built by Admiralty Yards will not be completed before 2015. The Navy therefore rightly decided to fall back on the reliable and relatively cheap Project 877/636 design. The three new subs can be delivered to the Black Sea Fleet by

as early as 2013 - 2014. According to the latest statement by Adm. Vysotskiy, the number of the new subs of this class to be built for the Black Sea fleet could be as high as five. The new Project 06363 submarines will be armed with the Kalibr/Club (SS-N-27) advanced anti-ship and land-attack missile systems.

Very shortly the Russian Navy is also expected to place an order with a Russian defense contractor for three frigates of the modified Project 11356M design (Talwar class). Project 11356 was specially designed for India. Three of those frigates were built by Baltiyskiy Shipyard in St Petersburg and delivered to the Indian Navy in 2003-2004. Another three (Talwar class Batch 2) are now being built for India at the Yantar shipyard in Kaliningrad using a modified Project 11356M design. India has indicated that it might place an order for three more of those ships, for a total of nine.

Project 11356M frigates have produced quite an impression on foreign and Russian navy specialists. They have been recognized as some of the best designed, technologically advanced and well-balanced ships of their class in the world. No wonder then that the Russian Navy, which had long shown keen interest in those ships, has now decided to have several of them built for the Black Sea Fleet. Taking into account the ships already delivered to India and those now being built for New Delhi, Project 11356M has, to all intents and purposes, entered mass production. That will undoubtedly have a very positive impact on costs and the delivery schedule for the future Russian frigates of this type. The new ships will carry the Onyx (SS-N-26) and Kalibr/Club (SS-N-27) advanced anti-ship missile systems and the Shtil-1 (SAM-17) medium-range SAM systems with a vertical launching system (VLS).

The contract for the modified Project 11356M frigates is expected to be awarded to either the Yantar shipyards in Kaliningrad or the United Industrial Corporation (Severnaya Verf Shipyard and the Baltic Shipyard) in St Petersburg. But as of mid-September 2010 the Navy has not yet invited bids. Part of the reason is that the government is now considering the possibility of the United Industrial Corporation’s shipyards becoming part of the state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation. So far, no firm decision has been made as to where exactly the new frigates are to be built. Nevertheless, Adm. Vysotskiy has confirmed the Navy’s determination to make sure that the first Project 11356M frigate is laid

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 17Big Renovation Program for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet

Armed Forces

down before the year’s end. That means that all three could be commissioned in 2013-2015, becoming the core of the renovated Black Sea Fleet’s surface strength.

The decision to use the mass-produced Project 11356 design for the new frigates appears entirely justified. The first two frigates of the new-generation Project 22350 (the Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Gorshkov and the Admiral Flota Kasatonov) are still sitting half-finished in the dry docks of the SevernayaVerf Shipyard. Their completion, testing and commissioning will inevitably take very long, given all the new systems they carry. Project 22350 will not be able to enter mass production until after 2015. Since Adm. Vysotskiy said nine frigates will be built for the Black Sea Fleet by 2020, it is possible that six of them will arrive after 2015 using the Project 22350 design.

Plans have also been confirmed to build five new Project 21631 (Tornado class) guided missile light corvettes for the Black Sea Fleet at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard on the Volga. The design is based on Project 21630 (Buyan class) Astrakhan small gunboat built for the Caspian Flotilla. The 900-tonne Project 21631 light corvette will carry the A-190 100mm artillery system and the Kalibr/Club advanced anti-ship missile system. It will be equipped with a vertical launch system (8 launchers). The first ship of this class, the Grad Sviyazhsk, was laid down at the Zelenodolsk Shipyard on August 27, 2010, with the likely completion date in 2012.

There have also been reports that five Project 21820 (Dugon class) fast-speed air cavity landing craft could be built for the Black Sea Fleet at the Volga Shipyard in Nizhniy Novgorod.

Finally, two Project 11540 frigates of the Baltic Fleet, the Neustrashimyy and the Yaroslav Mudryy, are expected to be transferred to the Black Sea Fleet some time in 2011. The Yaroslav Mudryy was completed and delivered to the Russian Navy only last year.

There are also plans to augment the Black Sea coastal defenses, following the show of strength by US Navy warships in the area in August 2008. The Black Sea Fleet has recently gained the newly formed 11th Independent Coastal Missile-Artillery Brigade, stationed along the Russian coast of the Black Sea. To equip this brigade, the MoD placed an urgent order with NPO Machine-Building for a battalion (three batteries on four mobile launcher vehicles) of the latest K300P Bastion-P (SSC-5) mobile coastal defense missile systems armed with the Yakhont (Onyx export version, SS-

N-26) advanced supersonic anti-ship missiles. The first two Bastion-P batteries were delivered to the 11th Brigade in late 2009 – early 2010. The third is to follow in 2011. The brigade is also armed with the Rubezh (SSC-3) and Bal (SSC-6) mobile coastal defense missile systems, as well as the 130 mm Bereg coastal defense self-propelled guns.

It is therefore safe to say that with sufficient funding to pull off all these plans, the fighting ability of the Russian Black Sea Fleet will be growing in leaps and bounds over the next five years.

The decision comes not a day too soon. The fleet is now essentially a small and rather quaint collection of sundry old ships, many of which belong in a museum. It has only one sub that can still put up a fight, the diesel-electric Alrosa of Project 877V (Kilo class). The repairs of the fleet’s only other submarine, an obsolete Project 641B (Tango class), have been abandoned. Of the surface ships, only the Project 1164 Moskva guided missile cruiser and two Project 1239 (Sivuch Class) fast-speed cushion guided missiles corvettes can be moderately useful in battle. All the other ships of the fleet are little more than floating junk, including the old Project 1134B (Kara class) Kertch large anti-submarine ship, three old frigates, a few guided missile and ASW corvettes, missile boats, minesweepers, and seven large tank landing ships. All of them are old and obsolete, or will be within a decade. Until recently, the additions of new ships to the fleet were very few and far between, due to Russia’s financial difficulties and Ukraine’s obstructionism. In the past decade, there was only one new ocean minesweeper and a few boats.

Meanwhile, the continuing strategic importance to Russia of its Baltic and Black Sea fleets has been amply demonstrated by the August 2008 campaign against Georgia, when US Navy warships showed up (if for no other reason than to give Tbilisi moral support). The likelihood of the Black Sea Fleet – and, to a lesser degree, the Baltic Fleet – being put to real combat uses in the coming years seems much higher than for the ocean-going Northern and Pacific Fleets. It therefore comes as no surprise that huge resources are now being diverted to build new ships for the Black Sea Fleet and boost its fighting ability. The western theater still remains the priority for the Russian armed forces; hence the continuing importance of the two western seas, the Black Sea and the Baltic. It is there that Russia should restore its naval strength as a matter of priority before bulking up the two ocean-going fleets.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief18The Belarusian Army: Past and Present

Armed Forces

The Belarusian Army: Past and PresentAnton Lavrov

Belarus inherited a large chunk of the Soviet Armed Forces after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The

former Belarusian Military District included the 5th Guard Tank Army, the 7th Tank Army, and the 28th Army. These three armies consisted of a total of six tank divisions and two motorized rifle divisions. There was also the 26th Air Army, the 11th Air Defense Corps, an independent airborne assault division, an independent motorized rifle division, the Belarusian Military District training center, and a large number of arms depots. The total number of personnel of all the above-listed military formations was over 240,000 servicemen. The Soviet Air Force and Air Defense had 21 aviation regiments in Belarus, including six regiments of long-range bombers and reconnaissance aircraft. In addition to conventional arms, Belarus had strategic and tactical nuclear weapons stationed on its territory. The strategic component included two missile divisions armed with the Topol (SS-25) ICBMs.

Clearly, the young Belarusian state, with its fledgling economy and modest foreign policy ambitions, did not require and could not support such a massive force. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country made some radical cuts. By 1992, most of the divisions had been downsized to brigades. The three former armies were transformed into army corps (the 5th, the 28th and the 65th), which also included army brigades and logistic services. Most of the arms and equipment released in the process of the cuts was mothballed and put into storage. The main thrust of the reforms in the Air Force was to create airbases, which merged under a single command the former aviation regiments, airfield support and logistics battalions, and communication units. During the first phase of the reform in 1992-1993 the numerical strength of the Belarusian armed forces was slashed to 110,000 people, half the original size. Another wave of cuts was launched during the next phase of the reform in 2000.

Belarus was one of the areas worst affected by the Chernobyl disaster. After gaining independence, getting rid of nuclear weapons became one of its top priorities. In 1990, when the republic’s parliament approved the declaration of sovereignty, it also proclaimed its intention to turn Belarus into a nuclear-free zone.1 That pledge was soon fulfilled. The two missile divisions armed with the Topol ICBMs and all the long-range bombers were pulled out to Russia some time after 1993. The last nuclear devices were removed from Belarusian territory in November 1996.

The Belarusian economy was in the throes of a deep economic crisis in the 1990s, so military spending was not a priority. Even in its radically downsized form, the army was on the brink of survival. Combat training programs were slashed to a bare minimum. What little money the army did get it preferred to spend on maintaining the equipment at the arms depots to stop it from falling apart. The number of field exercises with live munitions fell sharply, especially in the Air Force and Air Defense Corp. The MoD had to abandon the program of training reservists. Not a single new type of weapons or military hardware was commissioned in 1992-2001.

The situation changed after NATO’s military operation against Yugoslavia in 1999. Improving the Belarusian army’s fighting ability suddenly became one of the government’s top priorities. In 2001-2002, it adopted several important documents, including the official Military Doctrine, the National Security Strategy, the Belarusian Army Development Strategy 2010, and a five-year program of completing the Belarusian military reform for 2001-2006.

The list of military priorities included the command-and-control system, air defense and air force, missile troops, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and communications.2 In 2001 the country launched a large-scale reform of the command structure. The MoD set up the General Staff and Army commands, merged Air Force and Air Defense, and created the Western and Northwestern Air Force and Air Defense Operational Commands. As part of the Air Force and Air Defense reform, 42 of the 89 military formations were disbanded, including several squadrons. The number of airfields serving as military airbases was also reduced. The equipment and personnel of the disbanded formations were incorporated into the remaining airbases and brigades.

The bulk of the Belarusian air defense forces were transferred in 2002 to the two new operational commands, the Western and the Northwestern. In addition to several air defense missile brigades, each of these two commands was also given a fighter airbase to augment the land-based anti-aircraft capability. All the Belarusian bombers, ground attack aircraft, reconnaissance planes and transport aviation, as well as attack and transport helicopters, were concentrated at several aviation bases taking their orders directly from the General Staff. In 2003, the new Air Force and Air Defense structure was put to the test during a large-scale military exercise ‘Clear Skies 2003’. The scenario involved defense against a massive NATO air campaign, similar to the one against Yugoslavia.


Armed Forces

The Belarusian Army: Past and Present

As part of the reform of the Army, the MoD created the Army Command on the basis of the command of the 5th Army Corps in Bobruysk. The two remaining Army Corps, the 28th and the 65th, were restructured into two new operational commands, the Western and the Northwestern. As part of further Army reform, the last remaining motorized rifle division, the 120th, was downsized to become the 120th Motorized Rifle Brigade in January 2002. As a result, the 120th is better equipped and better manned than any other Army brigade. One of the three Belarusian mobile brigades was disbanded in 2001, as were several arms depots. The numerical strength of the combat formations has therefore gone down – but the logistics and rear services have been strengthened and centralized.

During that second phase of military reform the Belarusian Armed Forces shed a further 45,000 people. As of today, their total numerical strength is 65,000, including 50,000 servicemen and 15,000 civilian employees. In order to compensate for this smaller size of its peacetime army, in 2001 Belarus set up the system of Territorial Troops. Their purpose is to augment the Belarusian defenses in wartime and wage guerrilla warfare on occupied territories. In the event of mobilization, these troops will also be tasked with guarding strategic facilities and maintaining law and order in the rear, dealing with the aftermath of bombing raids and assisting in relief efforts.

After the formation of the two Operational Commands in 2001, three of their six mechanized brigades essentially became arms depots. These depots were supposed to deploy into full brigades in the event of mobilization. But a large-scale mobilization exercise in 2005 demonstrated that military hardware at the depots was poorly maintained, the speed of deployment was very low, and the fighting ability of the freshly deployed brigades was completely unacceptable. The MoD sought to address the problem by maintaining a fully deployed mechanized training battalion at each depot. The depots themselves were renamed into “reduced-strength mechanized brigades”. The move has brought some improvements; in addition, the reduced-strength brigades are now being used to train the reserve.

Belarusian military spendingIn the first few years after independence Belarus had

to channel a big chunk of its GDP into maintaining the large

armed forces and the nuclear arsenal in had inherited from the former Soviet Union. But after a radical program of cuts and reforms, military spending had fallen to a comfortable 1.5-2 per cent of GDP by the mid-1990s, and that is where it stays to this day. However, GDP itself has been rising steadily since the beginning of this decade, meaning that military spending has increased significantly in absolute terms. Combined with the reform program launched a decade ago, that has resulted in serious improvements in the Belarusian military capability and a more active combat training program. There has been a notable rise in the proportion of Belarusian defense spending channeled into improving the army’s fighting ability rather than merely keeping it afloat. That figure had risen to 22 per cent in 2006 from 15 per cent a few years previously.3

The combination of army downsizing and higher defense spending has enabled Belarus to offer better pay and benefits to the officers and professional soldiers. Military pensions have also increased. But the Belarusian army still cannot afford to build anything major, buy new arms or even upgrade more than a handful of the existing weapons. Only the Air Force and Air Defense are getting more than what they absolutely need for the upkeep. As a result, the Army gets only the occasional trial sample or a small batch of new Belarusian-made weaponry, let alone any imports. The only major deliveries it has taken recently are Belarusian-made trucks and engineering equipment – those are being bought in the hundreds.

Russian military assistance therefore represents an important contribution to the Belarusian military capability. Several S-300PS (SA-10B) SAM systems donated by Russia have been the most important addition to the Belarusian arsenals since the country gained independence. When Belarusian air defense troops hold field exercises on Russian territory, the necessary equipment, ammunition, flying targets, and indeed the use of the training ranges are given by Russia free of charge. Without that aid, Belarus would have been forced to cut back on its air defense training program for economic reasons. Russia also shoulders the bulk of the costs during joint military exercises.

A major increase in Belarusian military spending as a share of GDP is not on the cards any time soon. And since economic growth has been sluggish in recent years, absolute spending figures are going to show only a modest increase. Any large arms procurement or upgrade programs will therefore remain out of reach for the Belarusian army.

Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 M USD 296 369 383 388 469 611 793 865 883 1036

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2010

Table 1. Belarusian defense spending


Armed Forces


Personnel policyThree quarters of the privates and sergeants serving

in the Belarusian armed forces are conscripts; the rest are professional soldiers serving under contract. The normal term of the conscription service is 18 months; those with a college degree serve only 12. Some universities and colleges have reserve-officer training courses; the students who take them but who are not given an officer rank at the end of the course are drafted for 6 months. There are no plans at the moment to abolish conscription. The Belarusian army still uses the mobilization model, so the government views conscription as indispensable for training a large military reserve.

Of the Belarusian army’s 50,000 servicemen, some 20,000 are conscripts. That is not a large figure for a population of 10 million. Many young people are allowed to finish their college education before they are drafted; some are given waivers for reason of ill health. But for all that, there are far more potential conscripts in the country than the Belarusian army actually needs. During the winter 2008-2009 draft, the army had 86,000 young Belarusian males to choose from; it only needed 10,000, meaning that it could pick only the best.4

Professional soldiers who serve in the Belarusian army as privates, sergeants and sergeant-majors sign a two-year contract. They make up just over 20 per cent of all privates and sergeants, and 10 per cent of all military servicemen.5 The Belarusian army tries to make use of the professional soldiers mainly on the jobs that require a lot of technical skill. Most of them therefore end up serving in the large Belarusian air defense service, missile troops, radar and communications units and special task force squads. Infantry, tank units and support services are staffed mainly by conscripts.

In 2004 Belarus introduced a new experimental system whereby young conscripts are given the option to serve in the military reserve without leaving their day jobs. That involves three or four relatively short stints of training over a period of three years, for a total of 800-1,350 training hours.6 The reservists are given basic military training, mainly for service in the infantry. The system enables the government to save money, and also allows young graduates to be released from conscription and contribute to the economy.7 A total of about 3,000 people are in this reserve training pipeline at any given time. They are not added to the overall Belarusian army headcount.

Before serving in the army units, conscripts are given three months of specialist military training at the 72nd Combined Training Center in Pech. The center is also used to train some of the reservists.

The main Belarusian officer school is the Military Academy of the Republic of Belarus, set up in 1995 by merging the Minsk Higher Engineering, Air Defense Troops School and the Minsk Higher Military Command School.

The academy trains officers for the Army, Air Force, Air Defense, Interior Troops and the Border Guard Service. In addition, the largest state-run Belarusian universities have military training departments. These departments train junior officers and also offer military courses to the regular students, who are then given the rank of reserve officers. About a thousand Belarusian servicemen are being trained at any given time in military academies in Russia and Kazakhstan.8 Some of the senior officers take courses at the Russian General Staff Academy.

In 2006 the Belarusian military academy rolled out a short training course for junior officers. The professional warrant officers, sergeant-majors and sergeants who wish to enroll must have served for at least one year; they are also required to hold a secondary vocational or higher education degree. Upon completion of the three-month course they are promoted to the rank of lieutenant. Some 200-250 servicemen take the course every year.9

ArmyThe Belarusian Army has two separate Operational

Commands set up in 2002 from the old army corps. In peacetime, the two commands are in charge only of their respective military units and formations. In wartime, they also give orders to units of the Interior Ministry, the Emergencies Ministry, Border Troops, the State Security Committee (KGB), Territorial Troops and various militarized civilian formations in their area or responsibility.

The Western Operational Command (HQ in Grodno) is in charge of the Polish stretch of the border. The Northwestern (HQ in Borisov) covers the Baltic direction. The two commands are similar in terms of their size and equipment; both are roughly equivalent to an army corps. The core of each is made up of three mechanized brigades, one artillery brigade and one air defense missile brigade. There are also several support regiments and battalions, including the engineers, communications, electronic warfare, logistics and maintenance. The Northwestern Command is second to the Western one in terms of equipment numbers and combat readiness. More of its units are manned under a skeleton-strength schedule. Of its three brigades, only one is actually deployed, and even that one uses a reduced peacetime schedule. The Belarusian army obviously believes that any large land invasion is more likely to come from Poland.10

The deployed mechanized Army formations are armed mostly with the T-72A and T-72B main battle tanks, and the BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles. Being made of just a handful of models, the Belarusian heavy armor fleet is relatively easy to maintain.11

Apart from the military formations reporting to the two Operational Commands, there are also several auxiliary units


Armed Forces


taking their orders directly from the General Staff or the MoD. These include the 72nd Combined Training Center, engineers, railway troops, NBC troops, communications, and various logistics and rear services.

The numerical strength of a fully deployed and fully manned mechanized brigade is 4,500-5,000 people. But the Belarusian army is not large enough to keep all six of its mechanized brigades fully deployed. All of them are manned under a reduced-strength staffing table. Even the 120th Guard Mechanized Brigade, which has more positions filled than any other brigade, is not fully deployed, with only about 3,000 positions filled.

As a result, in peacetime, i.e. without mobilization, the Belarusian army’s fighting ability is fairly limited. The speed and efficiency of mobilization will therefore be critically important if a war breaks out. That is why mobilization is one of the central elements of Belarusian command staff exercises. The scenario of almost every exercise or surprise inspection includes the call-up of reservists. Belarus is not a very large country; the reservists serve in units stationed close to their place of residence, so there is no need for lengthy travel. Combined with the regular exercises, this means that technically, mobilization can be accomplished in a matter of days. But on top of that, the reservists will need at least another two or three weeks to refresh their military skills

and start performing as a well-coordinated unit in combat.12 The Belarusian army may simply not have those two or three weeks in a real life situation, given the rapid pace of combat operations these days.

Belarus holds dozens of large and small military exercises every year. But almost all of them are command staff exercises, meaning that only a fraction of the strength of each participating unit is involved. A full-scale battle exercise is held once a year, involving several large formations. Belarus uses mobilized reservists to bring up the numerical strength of these formations to their wartime levels for the duration of the exercise. The army also borrows trucks from large state-owned companies. A typical scenario of such an exercise involves repelling the initial air and ground assault from the West and holding the defenses until the arrival of reinforcements from Russia, whereupon a joint counteroffensive is launched. Overall, these annual battle exercises are similar to the ones held by the Russian army.

Belarus still continues with the Soviet tradition of using soldiers to help with the harvesting at large state-owned farms.13 That affects the army’s combat readiness and diverts the servicemen from their duties and training programs.

In general, the frequency, scale and specific nature of combat exercises serve as an accurate indicator of any army’s fighting ability. Judging from the reports about such exercises

Western Operational Command Northwestern Operational Command 6th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade 120th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade

11th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade 19th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade (reduced strength)

50th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade (reduced strength) 37th Guard Independent Mechanized Brigade (reduced strength)

111th Guard Artillery Brigade 231st Combined Artillery Brigade

62nd Air Defense Missile Brigade 740th Air Defense Missile Brigade

1199th Combined Artillery Regiment 427th Rocket Artillery Regiment (reduced strength)

557th Engineers Regiment 7th Engineers Regiment

74th Independent Communications Regiment 60th Independent Communications Regiment

255th Independent Special Radio Engineers Regiment 110th Independent Logistics Regiment

108th Independent Logistics Regiment 258th Independent Security and Maintenance Regiment

250th Independent Security and Maintenance Regiment 10th Independent Electronic Warfare Regiment

48th Independent Electronic Warfare Regiment 244th Radio-Electronic Reconnaissance Center

40th Independent NBC Battalion 80th Independent NBC Battalion

22nd Independent Special Task Force Company 527th Independent Special Task Force Company

815th Supplies and Logistics Center (territorial) 814th Supplies and Logistics Center

582nd Command and Reconnaissance Center 1019th Command and Reconnaissance Center (reduced strength)

591st Air Defense Command Station 789th Air Defense Command Station

Sources: Armiya magazine, Belarusian MoD web site

Table 2. Structure of the Belarusian Army Operational Commands


Armed Forces


in the official Belarusian media, the country’s ground troops are certainly less well trained than the Russian army.

Air Force and Air DefenseIn 1992 Belarus took control of the large Air Force and

Air Defense formations left on its territory after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the end of 1993 the Air Force units had undergone some radical reforms. The old aviation regiments were merged with the support and logistics units into airbases. In 1995 Belarus rolled out its own pilot training program at the national military academy. And in December 2001, it merged Air Force and Air Defense into a combined service.

Some of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense units take their orders directly from the General Staff and the MoD. Others are subordinated to the Western and Northwestern Air Commands, which are separate from the two eponymous Army commands but have the same areas of responsibility.

The aircraft Belarus had inherited from the Soviet Union are reaching the end of their service life, and the country cannot afford expensive repairs or upgrades. The number of usable combat aircraft and helicopters is falling every year, forcing the MoD to disband or merge some of the Air Force and Air Defense formations. In 2010, all aircraft of the 927th Fighter Airbase of the Northwestern Operational Command were transferred to the 61st Fighter Airbase. The 206th Ground Attack Airbase has taken over all the hardware of the 116th Guard Bomber and Reconnaissance Airbase.14 As a result, the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense has only one Fighter Airbase and one Ground Attack Airbase left, both with a mixed set of hardware. In the event of war, individual squadrons now stationed at the large airbases will be dispersed to the remaining airfields, while maintaining a centralized command structure via distance communication.

The Belarusian MoD does not normally disclose how many training hours its Air Force pilots have clocked every year. According to official sources, that figure bottomed in 2001 and 2002, at 15 hours on average and 10 hours for junior pilots.15 Foreign sources estimate that the average figure has remained unchanged at 15 hours in recent years.16

In 2005 Belarus bought ten L-39 trainer jets from Ukraine. They are now stationed at the 206th Ground Attack Airbase.17 Belarusian Air Force pilots can now take the full flight training course in Belarus itself. The country also has several modern flight simulators produced by Belarusian defense contractors. The new trainer jets and the simulators have greatly improved the quality of the pilot training program. Upon its completion, the graduates are awarded the rank of Pilot 3rd Class. They then take additional training with the special training squadron of the 206th Ground Attack Airbase. In 2007, each pilot that had graduated from the Military Academy with the rank of Lieutenant had clocked

an average of 80 flight hours18, which is a record for the Belarusian Air Force. The ground attack pilots of the Airbase itself have also been making use of the new L-39’s. There are now plans to make the pilot training squadron independent from the airbase and turn it into a sole pilot training center for the entire Air Force. The MoD is considering the purchase of additional trainer jets for the future center, including the Russian-made Yak-130’s.19

General Staff Command116th Guard Bomber and Reconnaissance Airbase

206th Ground Attack Air Base (Su-25)

181st Attack Helicopter Airbase (Mi-24V, Mi-24P, Mi-8)

50th Combined Airbase – Machulishchi (Il-76MD, An-26, Mi-8MT, Mi-26, Mi-172)

56th Independent Communications Regiment

6th Independent Radio-electronic Warfare Battalion

483rd Independent Security and Maintenance Battalion

1034th Military Studies and IT Center

241st Navigation and Surveying Unit

3666th Aviation Depot

Northwestern Operational Command 927th Fighter Aviation Airbase (MiG-29, MiG-29UB)

15th Air Defense Missile Brigade (S-300PS)

29th Air Defense Missile Brigade (Buk)

377th Guard Air Defense Missile Regiment (S-200V)

825th Air Defense Missile Regiment (S-200V) (skeleton strength)

49th Radar Brigade

18th Independent Communications Battalion

20th Independent Security and Maintenance Company

Western Operational Command 61st Fighter Aviation Airbase (Su-27, Su-27UBM, MiG-29)


115th Air Defense Missile Brigade (S-300PS)


147th Air Defense Missile Brigade (S-300V)

302th Air Defense Missile Brigade (Osa-AKM)

8th Radar Brigade

17th Independent Communications Battalion

9th Independent Security and Maintenance Company

Table 3. Composition of the Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense


Armed Forces


Air Force and Air Defense combat training programs in Belarus itself are limited by the small size of the available training ranges. They are just big enough to practice bombing raids, ground attack and fighter aviation strikes, attack helicopter raids, and short-range air defense missile launches. But for medium-range missiles (such as Buk) and longer-range systems the Belarusian have to use large training grounds in Russia. The same applies to air-to-air missile launches. A critically important consideration is that Russia provides the training ranges, the flying targets and the missiles free of charge. Once every year, the Belarusian forces arrive at Russia’s Ashuluk and Telemba ranges, bringing one or two air defense missile brigades and a few combat aircraft. The exercises are usually joint events with the Russian forces, giving both sides a valuable opportunity to exchange experience and practical skills. The frequency and scale of the Belarusian Air Defense training events is roughly in line with the Russian standards. Belarusian Air Force pilots, on the other hand, clock in fewer hours than their Russian counterparts, and their program is generally less comprehensive and complex.

Special Task ForcesLarge forces of the Soviet Airborne Assault Troops were

stationed in Belarus at the time of the collapse of the former Soviet Union. They included the 103rd Guard Airborne Assault Division in Vitebsk and the 38th Independent Airborne Assault Brigade. But the country’s defensive military doctrine and relatively compact territory made these forces completely redundant. In 1996, they were reformed and restructured into three mobile brigades. Specialist airborne assault training programs were discontinued. The three brigades were given a new role as a mobile reserve for the rest of the armed forces, capable of rapidly deploying wherever required and assisting the ground troops in repelling an attack, sealing a breach or dealing with the enemy’s paratroopers.

As part of further restructuring, one of the brigades was disbanded. In 2007 the MoD set up a Special Operations Command, which took charge of the two remaining brigades, the 38th and the 103rd, as well as the 5th Independent Special Task Force Brigade inherited from the Soviet Union. The strategy of using the special task forces has also been revised. Although it is still incomplete, it no longer views the special task forces as a mere reserve for the rest of the army. Their new official raison d’etre is “to achieve various objectives by special methods and instruments with the aim of preventing an escalation or ending an armed aggression against the Republic of Belarus by any potential aggressor”.20

In effect, the Special Task Forces are now mobile units maintained in a state of permanent combat readiness. Unlike the majority of the country’s Army units, they do not require

any mobilization measures to be enacted or reservists to be brought in to beef up their numerical strength before they can perform to the expected standard. The 5th Independent Special Task Force brigade, for example, has a much larger proportion of professional soldiers serving under contract than the Army average. The MoD is now studying proposals to replace all the remaining conscripts in the brigade with professionals.

The mobile brigades have a very different structure compared to a typical Belarusian mechanized brigade. They have no tanks or heavy self-propelled artillery; their rear and logistics components are also reduced to a minimum to give the brigades much greater mobility. The numerical strength of the mobile brigades is also much lower, about 2,000 people. Mass landings of paratroopers are no longer part of the Belarusian strategy, but the mobile brigades’ training programs do have an airborne assault component. Their soldiers are required to take stints at the reconnaissance and airborne assault companies, where they score up to 10 parachute jumps.

Cooperation with RussiaThe size and strength of the Belarusian armed forces is,

on the whole, adequate to the country’s military requirements and the size of its economy. Only the Air Defense seems to be somewhat excessive. It is viewed as a top military priority by the government, taking up a lion’s share of the MoD budget, as well as the best specialists and conscripts. The Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense also account for the bulk of the military upgrade and procurement programs. That makes them a fairly useful component of the United Regional Air Defense System set up by Russia and Belarus in 2010.21

The Belarusian government lavishes far less attention on the ground troops and special task forces. In peacetime, only a 5,000-strong special task force group is maintained in a state of immediate combat readiness. The numerical strength of the Army units that can be deployed rapidly to support the special task forces is less than 10,000 people. These units will require only a very limited number of extra personnel to be brought in, which can be accomplished in a matter of days. The rest of the Belarusian army will require mobilization of large numbers of reservists, de-mothballing of the equipment stored at the army depots, and time for the newly drafted personnel to learn to work together. All of that will take weeks.

Even once the Belarusian armed forces have been fully mobilized, their equipment will still be stuck in the mid-1980s. All that old Soviet hardware will keep breaking down due to old age, even if it has been stored properly. In any large-scale mobilization, huge amounts of equipment will need to be de-mothballed. That will most likely cause a


Armed Forces


shortage of spare parts and skilled personnel, slowing down the whole process compared to limited-scale mobilization during exercises. Decrepitude and obsolescence of weapons and hardware are the two main scourges of the Belarusian armed forces, raising serious questions about their fighting ability.

In addition, just like any other army that relies on the old Soviet stocks of ammunition, the Belarusian army is facing great problems with the reliability of those arsenals. There has been a growing number of failures during the launches of solid-fuel missiles, most of which are well past their shelf life. The Air Defense forces are the worst-affected in that regard. With no fresh procurement contracts to speak of, a few years down the line the Belarusian armed forces may face a serious shortage of usable ammunition. The easiest way to address than problem is through cooperation with Russia.

The Belarusian government is already in talks with Moscow to secure subsidized or free supplies of weapons, combat aviation and the modern S-400 (SA-21) SAM systems.

Belarus largely compensates for the limited capability of its armed forces by maintaining close defense cooperation with Russia. As a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the United Regional Air Defense System and a number or bilateral agreements, the country can count on Russia’s immediate military assistance in the event of foreign aggression. Every year the two countries hold large joint exercises on Belarusian and Russian territory; the scenarios often involve repelling an attack by a third party and moving large Russian troop numbers into Belarus. The country’s ability to rely on such a powerful ally makes any foreign aggression against it highly unlikely, enabling Minsk to make do with a relatively small and cheap army.

1 Declaration of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus No 193-XII of July 27, 1990 “On the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus”, Article 10.

2 Current problems in the development of the Belarusian Armed Forces // Armiya magazine, No 2/2002, p.4.3 Defense Budget 2007 -http://mod.mil.by/voen_budjet.html.4 http://belta.by/ru/conference/i_29.html.5 http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/02/23/ic_articles_116_166758/.6 Belarusian Law “On conscription and military service”, Article 62.7 http://www.president.gov.by/press18226.html.8 Belarusian first year recruits sent to Russia and Kazakhstan for training // http://www.interfax.by/news/belarus/45057.9 http://www.dosaaf.gov.by/military/training/driver/.10 Intelligent Battalion // Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 4/2010.11 Armor indispensible in any war in the near future // http://www.interfax.by/exclusive/27513.12 Return to youth // Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 124/2010.13 The Big Harvest strategy // Armiya magazine, No 5.2002, p.11.14 Aircraft relocation // Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 133, July 21, 2010.15 Optimism about the future // Armiya magazine, No 6/2002, p.38.16 The Military Balance 2010, p.178.17 Belorusskaya Voyennaya Gazeta, No 121/2009.18 Guarding the Motherland’s Skies // Armiya magazine, No 1/2008, p.29.19 http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2010/08/03/ic_news_116_350246/.20 Special task forces: maneuverability and effectiveness // Armiya magazine, No 1/2008, p. 38.21 http://ng.by/ru/issues?art_id=45842.

# 3, 2010 Moscow Defense Brief 25The Tanks of August

“The Tanks of August,” the title of this work, is a clear reference to “The Guns of August” by Barbara Tuchman, the famous book about the events leading up to the First World War. It is the book John F. Kennedy was reading during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tuchman gave a brilliant portrayal of how the great powers were dragged into a military conflict, even against the inclinations of their leaders.

The war of 2008, which began as a local conflict, quickly overgrew into a war between two countries. One of them was a great nuclear power, the other an ally of the United States – the world’s only remaining superpower. Out of the blue, two decades after the end of the Cold War, there was a distinct smell of a hot war in the air. Comparisons to “August 1914” seemed ominous but not at all exaggerated. In those weeks, President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin were both speaking of a radical turn for the worse in international relations, and of Russia’s readiness for another confrontation with the United States. Moscow’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states was clearly an attempt to prevent another act of aggression by Georgia, which had received Washington’s direct support.

That local war could well have spiraled into a regional conflict if the Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Viktor Yushchenko had reinforced by his order the decree signed by the President Yushchenko about compulsory inspections of the Russian warships crossing the Ukrainian maritime boundary on their way from Sevastopol. Had an actual order to that effect been given to the Ukrainian Navy, a clash at sea between Russia and Ukraine would have been inevitable.

Once started, such a conflict would not have been limited to sea. In all likelihood, it would have turned into a battle for the Crimea. At some point, one could imagine that America’s 6th Fleet could have become involved. If that had happened, the Black Sea would have come to resemble the Caribbean during the Cuban missile crisis. Fortunately, that did not happen – but all sides must draw lessons from the events of 2008. This collection of essays published by the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, offers an in-depth analysis of the Russian-Georgian conflict, in particular its military aspects. It contains a detailed and carefully verified timeline of the events, which draws on a variety of sources, and gives a very professional account of the Five Day War.

War is always the main and essentially the only real test for an army. Mikhail Barabanov’s essay in this collection contains an interesting analysis of the Georgian army reforms under Mikheil Saakashvili. The Georgian president was fully committed to the stated purpose of making his army an

The Tanks of August*By Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center

effective fighting force. His consultants and allies had all the experience required to pull off such a venture. But despite all that, the Georgian army fled the battlefield after just three days of combat. The reason for that failure can be found not just in the army itself, but primarily in the broader Georgian society. The author of the essay concludes that modernization in one separate area, even such a distinct and autonomous one as the armed forces, is impossible without a radical reduction in the level of corruption in the country.

The timeline of the combat operations compiled by Anton Lavrov recounts in meticulous detail the growing contradictions between the sides to the conflict, with routine sporadic “provocations” – exchanges of fire and explosions – overgrowing into an all-out war. Based on this detailed information, Lavrov reconstructs quite convincingly the plans of the Georgian and Russian commandments. In separate pieces, he also offers a similarly comprehensive analysis of the losses to the Russian aviation during the Five Day War and the state of the Georgian army after the war. Readers will find especially interesting the table containing information about the main arms deliveries to Georgia from other countries.

But for all the detail about the military side of the conflict, the book leaves out the timeline of the political events that had led to the war. There is a clear need for a separate study focusing on Russian-Georgian relations practically since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with an emphasis on the period after the arrival of Mikheiel Saakashvili to power. Such a study should provide answers to the remaining questions about Russian and Georgian policies, their goals, methods, calculations and miscalculations. It must be recognized that the war of 2008, that led toGeorgia’s military defeat, was only made possible by the overall failure of Russian policytowards Georgia.

The fact that the danger of another conflict in the Caucasus is still present is amply demonstrated in Vyacheslav Tseluiko’s essay “The present and future of the Russian-Georgian conflict: the military aspects.” (italics added by DT). Of course, the leading role in the outbreak of various conflicts belongs to political factors, both domestic and international. These factors usually remain below the radar. But a professional analysis of the armed strength of the two sides, their territorial positions, the state of their military infrastructure, etc., is very important for an accurate assessment of the situation.

“The Tanks of August” is a very timely book. Let us hope that it will help to draw the right lessons from the events of the very recent past. That war did not have to happen. A new war between Russia and Georgia simply must not be allowed to happen.

Book Review

* – The Tanks of August / M.S. Barabanov, A.V. Lavrov, V.A. Tseluiko; Edited by R.N. Pukhov. – Moscow, Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, 2010. – 144 pages.


Facts & Figures

Type Price, roubles Price, USDPlastic police baton PR-73(M) 297.95 9.71

Handcuffs BR-ST 252.96 8.24

Combat body armor vest Shturm-1S (Shturm-1SM) 20,673.98 673.42

Combat helmet ZSh-1 (ZSh-1-2) 30,441.86 991.59

Ballistic shield BZT-75S 4,755 154.89

Riot shield Vitrazh 4,276.16 139.29

Armored vehicle KamAZ Vystrel 4,408,600 143,602.61

40 mm anti-tank rocket launcher RPG-7V (RPG-7V2) 95,000 3,094.46

5.45 mm assault rifle Kalashnikov AK-74M 12,750 415.31

12.7 mm sniper rifle OSV-96 218,500 7,117.26

9 mm sniper rifle Vintorez 80,200 2,612.38

9 mm pistol Makarov Mod PMM 3,900 127.04

9 mm pistol GSh-18 27,700 902.28

9 mm sub-machine gun AEK-919K Kashtan 63,700 2,074.92

9 mm sub-machine gun PP-19-01 Vityaz-SN 37,500 1,221.5

26 mm flare pistol SP-81 9,100 2,96.42

Combat knife 4,820 157

30 mm spin-stabilized training grenade VUS-17 (VUS-30) 1,220.84 39.77

7.62 mm M1943 cartridge 57-N-231 4.36 0.14

7.62 mm M1943 blank cartridge 57-Kh-231 3.9 0.13

5.6 mm cartridge Junior 3.84 0.13

9x18 mm pistol cartridge PSO 3.75 0.12

9x19 mm pistol cartridge Yarygin PYa PSO 4.98 0.16

26 mm flare cartridge 62.88 2.05

26 mm signal cartridge 56.95 1.86

Hand grenade RGN 2020 65.8

Hand grenade RGO 2370 77.2

Smoke hand grenade RGD-2 (RGD-P) 121.8 3.97

Procurement Prices for Some Items of Weapons, Ammunition and Special Equipment Purchased by the Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation in 2010Aleksandr Stukalin, Kommersant Publishing House


Facts & Figures

Type Price, roubles Price, USDStun hand grenade Zarya-2 1,275.68 41.55

Stun hand grenade Plamya-M 1,069.19 34.83

40 mm gas grenade Gvozd for VOG-25 3,741.67 121.88

7.62 mm M1943 cartridge with tracer bullet T-45M 16.12 0.53

12.7 mm cartridge with armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 130 4.23

5.45 mm pistol cartridge MPTs 7N7 13.52 0.44

5.45 mm cartridge with improved tracer bullet 7T3M 11.13 0.36

7.62 mm rifle cartridge with tracer bullet T-46M 15 0.49

7.62 mm sniper cartridge 7N1 16.2 0.53

14.5 mm cartridge with armor-piercing incendiary bullet B-32 130 4.23

Note: 1 USD = 30.7 roubles (September 2010).

Source: The Plan of Accommodation of Orders for the State Needs as of July 1, 2010. Federal Penitentiary Service of the Russian Federation // fsin.su/catalogue/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5480.


Our AuthorsMikhail Barabanov. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Culture, then worked for the Moscow City Government. Editor-in-Chief of MDB since 2008. An expert on naval history and armaments.

Anton Lavrov. Graduated from the Tver State Technical University. An independent aviation analyst and one of the most prominent independent Russian researchers of the 2008 Russian-Georgian War.

Konstantin Makienko. Graduated from the Oriental Department of the Moscow National Institute for International Relations in 1995 and the French-Russian Masters’ School of Political Science and International Relations in 1996. He was head of a project on conventional armaments at the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR-Center) in 1996–1997. Since September of 1997, he has been Deputy Director of CAST. He is the author of numerous articles on Russia’s military-technical cooperation with other countries.

Aleksey Nikolsky. Graduated from the Moscow National University of Economics, Statistics and Informatics in 1995. Worked as a correspondent for several newspapers and for Vedomosti since 2001.

Aleksandr Stukalin is a graduate of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Joined Kommersant, Russia’s leading broadsheet, in 1992 and became the newspaper’s editor-in-chief in 2004. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Russian Newsweek in 2005–2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of the Vedomosti newspaper in March-September 2008. Deputy editor-in-chief of Kommersant from October 2008 to date.

Dmitry Vasiliev. Graduated in 2004 from the State University – Higher School of Economics with a Master’s Degree in Strategic Management. From 2003 to mid-2004 worked as a risk evaluation analyst at Absolut Bank . CAST researcher since July 2004 , editor-in-chief of Eksport Vooruzheniy journal since 2005.

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