Moscow Campaign

7/25/2019 Moscow Campaign

1/31

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The

Moscow Campaign, October December

1941

by

MSG

Larry

A. Hart ig

MSG

Rober t

P. Harn

MSG Ronald

W.

Linv i l l e

MSG Hartman Wilkins

SGM

Donald

H. Halsey

Group

14

26

May 1994


2/31

ii

Outl ine

Thesis : The

German Army

l o s t its October December 1941 campaign

aga ins t

Moscow because o f t h ree f ac to r s .

I . H i t l e r and

his

mi l i t a r y

s t a f f

overes t imated

t he ab i l i t y

of

the German Army and underest imated the a b i l i t y o f

t he

Sovie t

Army.

A.

H i t l e r

and

h is

s t a f f

did

not respec t

the Sovie t Army

or

the o v i ~

s o ld i e r .

B. H i t l e r

underest imated

the wi l l of both

t he

Sovie t

so ld ie r

and the Sovie t

c i t i z e n to r e s i s t .

c

H i t l e r

and

hi s

s t a f f

vas t ly

u n r s t i m ~ t

the

ab i l i t y

of

the USSR to mobi l ize

fo r

war.

D

H i t l e r was so confident of hi s army t ha t he made no

provis ions

for s t r a t e g i c

bombing

o f

the

USSR

E.

H i t l e r

overes t imated

the a b i l i t y

of h is

fo rces to

succeed

aga ins t

super io r fo rces in prepared defens ive pos i t ions .

F.

H i t l e r

overes t imated the

useful lness

of b l i t zk r ieg

t a c t i c s in the vas tness of the USSR

I I . The

Sovie t Army was ab le to

f i e ld l a rge

numbers

of

replacement fo rces .

A. The Lend

Lease

Act

was

the

bas i s

fo r Russian success

dur ing World War I I .

B.

From the s t a r t ,

H i t l e r ' s

a t tack

on Moscow had littl

chance of

success .

C. Bri t i sh

a id

to Russia was se l f - se rv ing because Br i ta in

had

i t s own

war objec t ives aga ins t

Germany.

D The F i r s t Russian Pro toco l was an agreement with

the

Western

All ies fo r

mi l i t a r y

a id .


3/31

E Promised a id began to ar r ive in the Soviet Union

F The a b i l i t y of

the

Sovie t Army to

move

t roops and

supp l ies

exceeded

t ha t of the German Army

I I I

The ear ly

onset of

the

severe

Russian

winter

dras t i ca l ly

impeded the

ef fec t iveness

of

Army Group

Center

A The c l imate

had

a

severe

impact on

the

German so ld ie r

B

Movement in

deep snow was

extremely d i f f i c u l t

C Extreme co ld

reduced

the eff ic iency

of

equipment

D German

so ld i e r s

did

not have adequate

c lo th ing fo r

winter operat ions

E Rations f roze

dur ing

t r anspor t to f i e l d

l oca t ions

F German so ld i e r s suf fe red from disease and f ro s t b i t e

G Weather condi t ions l e f t German so ld i e r s exhausted and

unable to f igh t


4/31

1

The Moscow Campaign, October December 1941

Between

2

October and

8

December 1941, the

German

and Sovie t

Armies

ba t t l ed fo r con t ro l of the c i t y of Moscow. This campaign

was

but

a

small

por t ion

of

H i t le r s

s t r a t e g i c

plans

for

the

conquest of the

USSR.

But the

r e su l t s

of the campaign

were

very

s ign i f i can t . t

marked

the f i r s t t ime

t ha t

German

forces

on the

Eas tern Front had fa i l ed

to

ul t ima te ly secure

an

objec t ive . This

campaign foreshadowed the Sovie t Army s inev i tab le

de fea t

o f

H i t le r s Germany.

The German Army

l o s t

its campaign

aga ins t Moscow

because of

t h ree f ac to r s .

Fi r s t ,

H i t l e r

and hi s mi l i t a r y s t a f f over-

es t imated the

ab i l i t y

of

the

German Army and underes t ima ted the

ab i l i t y of the Sovie t Army.

Second,

the

Sovie t Army

was ab le to

f i e l d

l a rge numbers of rep lacement fo rces . And t h i rd , the ear ly

onse t o f the severe

Russian winter dra s t i c a l l y impeded

the

e f fec t iveness of

the German fo rces .

Before

discuss ing these

t h ree f ac to r s ,

however,

a

h i s to r i c a l

understanding of c e r t a i n even ts

i s

necessary .

These

even ts

inc lude the mi l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n in Europe,

the

war

on the

Eas tern

Fron t , and

the

b a t t l e fo r Moscow

i t s e l f .

In 1939,

H i t l e r

was

f ea r fu l

of S t a l i n s in ten t ions

in

Europe. H i t l e r

was ready to begin

mi l i t a r y campaigns

on the

cont inent . However, he

was f ea r fu l o f

doing

so

with

Sta l in and

the Sovie t Army a t hi s back. So Hit le r d i r ec ted hi s foreign

mini s t e r

to

seek

a t r e a t y with the Sovie t Union. On 23 August

1939,

the fo re ign

minis te rs

of the USSR and

Germany

s igned a Non-

Aggression Pact in Moscow (Seaton 9) . This pac t al lowed

H i t l e r


5/31

to

begin

h is

armed conquest

of Europe. t

a l so al lowed

S t a l i n

t ime to bui ld up

the

Sovie t

Army.

By

the

f a l l of

1940, Germany's land

war

in Europe was

a t

a

temporary

s t a n d s t i l l .

Germany

had mi l i t a r i l y

defea ted

or

had

subjugated

by

mi l i t a r y

t h r e a t a l l of western

Europe

and

most

of

eas t e rn

Europe. B r i t a in remained as

the only

count ry

t ha t

Germany had

fought

and

not defea ted .

The Engl ish Channel and the Royal Air Force saved B r i t a in

from

f a l l i n g to

Hi t l e r ' s Wehrmacht.

The Royal Air Force gained

a i r super io r i ty

over the

German

Luftwaffe

during

the

B at t l e

of

Br i ta in

(Keegan 102).

without a i r super io r i ty ,

Hi t l e r

decided

t h a t

an

amphibious invas ion

across the

Engl ish Ohannel was

too

r i sky . ~ 12 October

1940,

Hi t l e r cance l l ed Operat ion

S LO W

( S

ea

l i on ) , Germany's

planned seaborne invas ion

of

England (Blau

1 and

Keegan 131).

Yet even before

cance l l ing

SEELOEWE H i t l e r was

a l ready

consider ing

an

a t tack

on

the Soviet

Union.

with in

days

of

France ' s su r render on 25 June

1940,

Hi t l e r

had

in fo rmal ly

mentioned war with

Russia

(Seaton 36). On 21

Ju ly

1940,

H i t l e r

o f f i c i a l l y discussed t h i s

pos s ib i l i t y with Fie ld Marshal Walter

von Brauch i t sch ,

Commander-in-Chief

of

the

Army.

On

t ha t

da te ,

H i t l e r

di rec t ed

Brauchi tsch

to prepare p lans for

a campaign

aga ins t the

Sovie t

Union

(Blau

1

and

Fugate

61).

Hi t l e r had long

and

ardent ly des i red

the

de fea t and

sub jugat ion o f Russia

(Keegan

128). Since h is

r i s e

to power in

1933,

H i t l e r had

cons i s ten t ly implemented anti-communist

and

an t i -Sov ie t p o l i c i e s (Seaton 24). In 1924) in

Mein

Kampf, Hi t l e r


6/31

3

had

wri t t en of

his ha t red

o f

Jews, Bolshevis t s ,

and a l l of

the

Slav races (Seaton 24) .

He

had wri t t en t h a t h is

u l t ima te

aim

was

the

conquest of

Russia

with i t s gra in , c a t t l e , o i l , and ores

(Seaton

24).

Hi t l e r

a l so

wanted

to

defea t t he

USSR

to

secure

Lebensraum

( l iv ing

space ) fo r t he German na t ion

(Anders

2) .

In

t he f a l l

of 1940,

Hi t l e r

had nothing to fear

from the

West. The

German

Armed

Forces

had

t he

B r i t i s h

conta ined . And

for the

meantime,

the uni ted

Sta tes was neu t r a l . But

the

untouched power of the USSR hung over Hi t l e r and t he German

na t ion

l i ke

the sword

of Damocles (Anders 5) .

In

mid-June

1940,

t he Sovie t

Union

had annexed t he

Bal t i c

S ta te s - -L i thuan ia , Latvia ,

and

Estonia (Seaton 9) . On

28

June

1940, the Sovie t Union had annexed the

border

areas of

Rumania-

Bessarabia and

North

Bukovina (Seaton 9) . Although

a

sec re t

protocol to t he Non-Aggression

Pact

o f 1939 author ized

these

act ions , they still

alarmed

Hi t l e r

(Keegan 129) .

Hi t l e r

saw

these ac t ions as a

westward movement of

the USSR's s t r a t eg i c

boundar ies

(Keegan

129) . Hi t l e r

r ea l i zed

t ha t h

could not

defe r

a t e s t of s t r eng th

with

the USSR forever ; and, i

so ,

it

must

be

sooner

ra the r than l a t e r

(Keegan 129).

On 18 December 1940, Hi t l e r i s sued Fuhrer

Direct ive

Number

21, o r Opera t ion

BARBAROSSA, for the

a t t a c k

on the USSR

(Fugate

84).

This

order

ca l l ed

for th ree

army

groups--North ,

Center ,

and

South- - to

a t t a c k

t he Sovie t Union

(Keegan

136-138). According

to

The Encyclopedia Americana, Germany committed 148 d iv i s ions ,

inc luding

19

panzer

d iv i s ions , to

the invas ion

of

the USSR.

Tota l

personnel s t r eng th was

3,050,000

men. I n i t i a l l y

the armies


7/31

had 3,350

tanks ,

7,184

a r t i l l e r y pieces , 600,000 motor

vehic les ,

and

625,000 horses , and the Luf twaffe

provided

2,500

a i r c r a f t

of

a l l types (422) . The immediate objec t ives of

Opera t ion

B RB ROSS

were

Leningrad

and

the

Ukraine

(Kiev)

(Fugate

84-85) .

The

f i r s t p r i o r i t y of

a l l army groups was the t o t a l

d es t ru c t i o n o f a l l Soviet forces

s t a t ioned

in

western Russia

(Blau

22). I n i t i a l l y , a l l army

groups were to

prevent the

organized withdrawal o f

i n t a c t

uni t s

to

the i n t e r i o r o f Russia

(Blau

22) .

They

were to use

deep t h r u s t s

spearheaded by

armored

uni t s

to

enc i rc l e

and des t roy

Sovie t fo rces along the border

(Blau

19-22).

Army Group North was to

a t t ack

toward Leningrad. The r igh t

wing was to t h ru s t

deep

i n to the Bal t i c S ta t e s and

t hen

fo rce

Soviet

fo rces toward

the

sea

(Anders

37 . The ul t imate ob jec t ive

of

Army Group North was to occupy

Leningrad

and

Kronstadt

(Fugate

69-84).

Army

Group

Center

was

to a t t ack

toward

Smolensk.

After

c rush ing enemy fo rces in White Russia ,

t

was to send

northward

s t rong

motor ized

uni t s

(armor) (Blau 23 . These

un i t s

were to

ann ih i l a t e

enemy fo rces in

the Bal t i c area in

coord ina t ion

with

Army

Group

North

(Blau

23) .

After

success fu l ly complet ing t h a t

urgent miss ion, Army

Group

North was

to cap ture

Leningrad and

Kronstadt

(Blau

23) .

Only t hen

could the

motor ized

un i t s re tu rn

to Army Group

Center

fo r an

a t t ack

toward Moscow (Blau 23) .

Army Group South was to

a t t ack

toward Kiev. Army

Group

South

was

to

c rush a l l

Russian t roops in the

Ukraine

west

of

the

Dnepr River

(Blau

25) .


8/31

5

According to

Blau, the u l t imate ob jec t ive

o f Operat ion

B RB ROSS

was . .

to sc reen

European aga ins t

Asia t ic

Russia

along the course

of

the Volga and thence along

a genera l l i n e

extending

northward toward Archangel .

Thus,

i

necessary ,

the

German

Air

Force would be in a pos i t ion

to

neu t ra l i z e the l a s t

i n d u s t r i a l

region

remaining

in

Russian hands, i . e . t h a t s i tua ted

in the Urals (22) .

The

German Army High Command es t imated

. t h a t

the

Sovie t

Union

would be defea ted in a

campaign not

exceeding

8-10

weeks '

dura t ion (20) .

Before

beginning Operat ion

BARBAROSSA, Hit le r

had to

secure

the

r i g h t f lank of

the Eastern

Fron t .

This meant

conquer ing the

Balkans .

Conquering the

Balkans

a l so

presen ted other benef i t s .

H i t l e r wanted the r i ch resources t h a t the Balkans

could

af fo rd him. Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia

could

provide

resources

t h a t

were important

to Germany.

To support hi s war

e f fo r t s , Hit le r needed the resources and fue l fo r hi s tanks t h a t

the

Balkans

had.

H i t l e r

a l s o

knew

t h a t

the

very

l oca t ion

of

the

land i t s e l f would

bene f i t

him. S t r a t eg i ca l l y ,

the region

was a

cor r idor

between

the

eas t

and west ,

a rou te to

supply his armies

in Russia .

~ ~

H i t l e r committed

} i n fan t ry and panzer div i s ions

to

the

invasion of

the Balkans.

The

occupat ion of

Greece was hi s

pr imary

objec t ive . This

would

ensure

a secure Balkan f lank fo r

his

planned

a t t ack

aga ins t

the

Sovie t

Union.

H i t l e r

faced the

problem of

moving

the t roops

and

equipment in to

a t t ack pos i t i ons

along

the Greek border . This

movement r eq u i red

diplomatic

nego t ia t ions , which a t the t ime

involved

Russia . The Sovie t


9/31

Union began asking ques t ions about Germany's i n t e r e s t in the

Balkans. / )

H i t l e r and

hi s

mi l i t a r y planners

concluded

t h a t an a t tack

through

Yugoslavia

was

the

bes t

opt ion

and

approach.

German

fo rces overran

Yugoslavia

in

11

days

dur ing t h e invas ion named

Operat ion

PUNISHMENT.

The invas ion o f

Greece

was code-named

Operat ion

M RIT and

took

only t h ree weeks

to complete .

H i t le r s

Balkan campaign took but a few weeks to complete dur ing the

spr ing o f 1941.

However,

the t ime and resources expended during

t h i s campaign would

cause H i t l e r t o delay

hi s

invas ion o f the

USSR.

This turned out

to

be one of the domino

pieces t h a t

caused

H i t le r s fo rces to f igh t

during

the Russ ian winter (Cochran

39-44) .

Operat ion

B RB ROSS

began

a t 0300, 22 June 1940

(Blau

44) .

According to

The

Encyclopedia

Americana, Sovie t

fo rces in

European Russia

i nc luded

170

div i s ions

and 41 motor ized o r

armored

br igades

(422) . This

amounted

to

approximately 2,300,000

men and

10,000

tanks (422) . The

invasion

of the

USSR s t a r t e d

the

c lash between two of the

l a r g e s t

armies in the world (Compton's

CD-ROM). Army Groups

North, Center ,

and South achieved complete

t a c t i c a l su rp r i se over Sovie t fo rces

(Anders

31).

After

Germany invaded

the Sovie t Union,

other

nat ions

quickly chose

s ide s .

Br i ta in s ided

with

the Sovie t

Union,

providing a id

to t h a t count ry .

I t a ly , Hungary, Fin land , and

Rumania

a l l i e d

themselves with

Germany (Compton's CD-ROM).

By mid-August

[1941], the f i r s t

phase

of the o f fens ive was

near ly ended (The Encyclopedia Americana 424). The German Front


10/31

7

extended from the Bal t i c

Sea

to the

Black

Sea, a dis tance o f

2,000 miles

(Trask 4) .

All

t h ree

army

groups,

wi th the

except ion

of Army Group South, had met o r exceeded t h e i r

objec t ives

fo r the

f i r s t phase

(Blau

65).

The

Sovie t

Army s

r e t r e a t

had

crea ted

havoc fo r the

German

Army s

advance.

The r e t r e a t i n g Sovie t Army

had destroyed

everything t h a t was

of value

to t h e German fo rces .

D

Pamphlet 20-230 r e f e r s t o

t h i s

as

the scorched-ear th concept

75) .

Through

mid-August, Army

Group

North had

destroyed

12-15

Soviet

divis ions

during

f igh t ing

west of the Dvina River (Anders

39) . The three-pronged a t t ack t h a t t had launched

aga ins t

Leningrad on 10 August 1941 was meeting

s t i f f

re s i s t ance

(Blau

65) .

Through

mid-August, Army

Group Center

had cap tured 289,874

pr isoners ,

2,585

tanks ,

and 1,449 guns

in the Bialystok-Minsk

pocket (Anders 39). At the Smolensk pocket , t had cap tured

185,487

pr i sone rs ,

2,030

tanks ,

and

1,918

guns (Anders

43) .

And

a t

the Roslavl

pocket ,

t

had cap tured approximnte ly 38,000

pr isoners ,

200

tanks ,

and 200 guns

(Anders

48). By 8 August

1941,

Army

Group Center

had removed a l l

of i t s

panzer asse t s

from

the

l i n e

fo r r e f i t t i n g

(Blau 65). This l e f t Army

Group Cente r ' s

in fan t ry un i t s to press the a t t ack in the d i rec t ion of Moscow.

From

22

June

through

mid-August, Army

Group

South had

encountered

s t i f f Sovie t oppos i t ion and had advanced s lowly

(Blau

65).

From

i t s sanctuary in the Pr ipe t Marshes, the Fi f th Sovie t

Army had con t inua l ly a t t acked Army Group South ' s l e f t

f lank

(Anders

44).

In add i t ion ,

Army

Group

South

had met

cons iderab le


11/31

8

Soviet opposi t ion around Kiev

and

was

unable to

capture

the c i t y

Blau

65).

However, a t the

Uman

pocket , t had managed to

dest roy 22 Sovie t

d iv i s ions ,

k i l l i ng 200,000 so ld ie r s

and

cap tu r ing

ano ther

100,000 Anders

49) .

According

to

Turney,

on

21

August 1941, H i t l e r

s igned

Fuhrer

Direc t ive Number 34 81) . This

d i rec t ive

es t ab l i shed the

fol lowing as pr io r i t y object ives : the

Crimea, t he

Donets

Basin ,

cu t t i ng o f f Russian o i l supply

from

the

Caucasus,

Leningrad, and

l ink ing up with Finnish forces 81) .

Captur ing Leningrad

and

l i nk ing up with Finnish

fo rces

were

to

occur

in

Army

Group

North ' s a rea of

opera t ions .

The

o the r pr io r i t y

ob jec t ive s

were

a l l

in Army

Group

South ' s a rea

of

opera t ions . Army

Group

Center ,

with no p r i o r i t y

ob jec t i ves ,

was to

defend

i t s

pos i t i ons

and

r e l ease

un i t s to a s s i s t

Army

Group South (81) .

Afte r Army

Group

North

accomplished i t s missions and Army

Group

South made

s ign i f i can t

progress , the a t t a c k on Moscow could cont inue 81) .

n

25

August 1941,

Army

Group

Center ' s

Second

Army

and

2nd

Panzer Group turned

southward

Encyclopedia Americana 424) .

On

14 September 1941, a f t e r t h ree weeks

of

f i gh t ing , these un i t s

reached a

poin t

about

120

miles

e a s t of

Kiev Anders

54) . There ,

they

l inked up with

Army

Group

South ' s

1s t

Panzer Group,

which

had

moved northward from the Dnieper bend

Encyclopedia

Americana

424) . This l ink-up

completed

the encirc lement

of seve ra l Sovie t

armies

Blau

73). When t h i s pocket was ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ on 26

September

1941, Army

Group

South

captured 665,212 pr i sone r s Fugate 270) .

In add i t ion ,

t captured

3,718 guns, 884

tanks ,

and

a grea t

amount

of war mater ie l Anders 55) .


12/31

According to Anders,

H i t l e r

i ssued Fuhrer

Order

Number 35 on

6

September 1941 (52) . This d i r e c t i v e

. .

ordered t he r ap id

bui ld ing up of Army Group Center , which was to launch the

dec is ive of fens ive

agains t

Moscow

(52) .

H i t l e r

wanted

the

opera t ion to

begin

in

8-10

days (52) . However, t h i s

was

impossib le because impor tant un i t s of Army Group Center were

st ll

f igh t ing a t the Kiev

pocket

(52).

Operat ion TAIFUN ( Typhoon ) d i rec t ed

. the encirc lement

and

des t ruct ion

of the Red Army on the

f ront

of Army Group

Centre (Keegan 198) . Only a f t e r Army Group

Center

dest royed

these forces

.

were t he a t t ack

fo rces

to launch a pursu i t

in

the

d i rec t ion

of Moscow along a f ront extending from the Oka

River on the r igh t t o the

upper

Volga on the l e f t

(Blau

75) .

The Army High Command ordered t he t r a ns f e r of t he 4th Panzer

Group from

Army

Group North to

Army

Group

Center

(Blau 76) .

Army

Group South t r ans fe r r ed t he

2nd Panzer Group

and Second

Army

back

to

Army

Group

Center

(Blau

76).

For

Operat ion

TYPHOON

Army

Group

Center

a l so had the

3rd

Panzer

Group and t he

Four th

and

Ninth

Armies (Anders 56) .

On 30

September 1941, t he

2nd

Panzer

Group

advanced

from

t he

southwest toward Orel (Anders

56) .

This maneuver

sk i r t e d

t he

l e f t f lank of the Sovie t

defense

fo rces

in f ront

of Moscow,

tak ing them

by complete

su rp r i s e (Anders

56) .

This

was

a prelude

to

the beginning of

Operat ion

TYPHOON (Anders 56) .

According to

Anders, t he

main

a s sa u l t

of Opera t ion

TYPHOON

began a t 0530, 2 October 1941 (56) . The i n i t i a l impetus o f the

of fens ive was

tremendous

mainly due to t he grea t e f f o r t of

the


13/31

10

i n fan t ry

d iv i s ions

which raced along in t he wake of

the

tanks

(56) .

with in

two weeks, Army

Group Center

completed t h ree

l a rge

encirc lements of Soviet forces , two near

Bryansk

and one near

Vyazma

(Encyclopedia

Americana

425) .

Liquida t ing these

pockets

was t ime consuming, bu t yie lded . 663,000 pr i soners , 5,412

guns,

1,242 tanks , and

an

immense booty

in

war m ate r i e l (Anders

58)

Then, on 7

October

[1941] , the autumn

r a ins began t u rn ing

the ground in to a sea of mud (Blau 80) . In genera l ,

the

per iod

from 7

to 20

October was

marked by heavy f i gh t ing ; hot

pursu i t

of

a

defea ted enemy

gradua l ly

tu rned i n t o

a despera te e f f o r t to make

headway in r a in ,

snow, and

mud (Blau

80) .

The

Sovie ts

threw

everyth ing t ha t they could

in to t he b a t t l e

(Anders

59) .

Through

the beginning of

November, Army

Group Center

made

no

fu r the r

progress (Anders 59) .

During the n ight from November 3 to 4,

the

f i r s t f ro s t

came.

On

the 7 th ,

the

Germans

suffered

the

f i r s t

severe cases of

f ro s t b i t e . On

the

12th , t he tempera ture dropped to 5 degrees

(Fahrenhei t) , and on

the

13th to 8 degrees below zero (Anders

60) .

On 17 November,

with

the ground now f rozen , Army

Group

Center resumed

i t s of fens ive

(Anders 61) . t pushed

forward

and

immediately began

developing a

sweeping

double

envelopment ,

which it in tended to close

e a s t

of

Moscow

(Encyclopedia

Americana 425) . Through t he

end of November,

t he two enveloping

forces advanced

s lowly agains t s t i f f opposi t ion

(Blau

87) .


14/31

11

During November

and December 1941, the German

advance

ceased

to be

e f fec t ive .

The German mi l i t a r y commanders r ea l i zed t h a t

the

snow and

harsh

weather

had

s topped

t h e i r offens ive for

the

win te r .

Soon,

keeping

the

German

Army

supp l ied

became

a

ser ious

problem. The dispers ion of the German fo rces made t d i f f i c u l t

to

move mater ia l s

along

such

an ex tens ive

f ron t

(Compton's

CD-ROM .

From 1 to 5 December the e n t i r e offens ive

gradual ly

bogged

down. winter came

suddenly with tempera tures down to -40 degrees

Fahrenhei t . The German t roops were in a s t a t e

of

almost

complete

exhaust ion

(Blau 87). On 2 December, the f ina l German at tempt

to

reach

Moscow began. The Russians ended

H i t le r s

plans o f

taking Moscow wi th

a

massive coun tera t t ack of

a

hundred

div i s ions . The coun tera t t ack

l e f t the German l eaders debat ing

the

quan t i ty of reinforcements the Russians

could

produce.

After

the

Sovie t

coun tero f fens ive , many of H i t le r s

top commanders

p\J

e i t h e r

res igned

o r

asked

to

be

r e l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

(Liddel l

28-30) .

The German offens ive aga ins t Moscow was over;

the

nor thern

forces had come

within

21 miles of the c i t y and the southern

fo rces wi th in 40 miles

(Encyclopedia

Americanna 426) .

Hit le r and hi s

s t a f f

had overes t imated the

ab i l i t y

of the

German Army and underest imated the a b i l i t y o f

the

Sovie t Army.

This

i s

one

fac to r

t h a t

caused

Germany

to

lose

not

j u s t

a t

Moscow, but the e n t i r e

war aga ins t

the USSR.

The German mi l i t a r y

s t a f f

did not r e s p ec t

the

Sovie t Army

or

the

Soviet s o ld i e r . Since the

i n i t i a l planning

phases

fo r

Operat ion

BARBAROSSA

H i t l e r had

expected

a

quick vic to ry

over


15/31

12

t h e Sovie t

Army.

The

German m i l i t a ry s t a f f had es t imated t h a t

t h e

German Army would win the

e n t i r e

war withirj 8-10

weeks

(Blau

20).

. . ever s ince

the Red

Army

had

performed so

badly

dur ing

t h e

campaign

aga ins t

Finland

in

the

w in te r

of

1939-40,

the

average

German

General

S t a f f

o f f i c e r

had

a low opin ion of

the

m i l i t a ry p o t e n t i a l of the

Sovie t Union

(Blau

14) .

H i t l e r

expec ted

t h a t the

Sovie t Army would

co l l apse ea r ly

on (Blau 78) .

H i t l e r under took

hi s

war aga ins t

the

Sovie t Union even

though the

Wehrmacht

had

no

numerica l supe r io r i ty over the

Sovie t

Army

(Anders 19) .

The

German Army's mobi l i ty

was

not much b e t t e r

t han

t h a t

of the

Sovie t

Army (Anders 19) . But H i t l e r

was

ce r t a in

t h a t

the German so ld i e r s and t h e i r commanders were v a s t l y

su p e r io r to t h e i r Sovie t

coun terpar t s

(Anders 19) .

However,

t h e

German Army found

out o the rwise

in combat.

An

ana lys i s of Russ ian combat methods revea led t h a t

the

Red Army

o f fe red

s t rong re s i s t ance

and

exp lo i t ed every oppor tun i ty

to

coun tera t t ack .

What

as tounded

the

Germans was

t h e

s t r en g t h

di sp layed

by the

Russians, t h e i r a b i l i t y to improvise

quick ly

in

any

given s i t u a t i o n ,

the apparen t ly inexhaus t ib le f low of new

div i s ions a r r iv ing a t

t h e

f ron t , and the absence

of any

t r u e

symptoms of

di s in t egra t ion (Blau

78) . The Germans

found

t h a t

t h e Sovie t

fo rces d i sp layed unwavering

de te rmina t ion

and an

unwi l l ingness to admit

defea t (Blau

88) .

Despi te

ts

l a rge

l o s s es , the Sovie t Army was a powerful

adversary (Blau

78) .

H i t l e r underest imated

the

w i l l of both

the

Sovie t s o l d i e r

and

the

Sovie t c i t i z e n

to r e s i s t .

According to Blau, H i t l e r

assumed

t h a t t h e people

in the areas r ecen t l y

occupied

by the


16/31

13

USSR w ~ ant i -Russ ian and ant i -communis t (14) . He

assumed

t h a t

d i s sa t i s f a c t i o n in the Ukraine, the

Crimea,

and the

Caucasus

was

equal ly rampant

(14) . Fur ther ,

H i t l e r bel ieved t h a t

the

Sovie t

purges

of

1937

were

evidence

of

the

vu lnerab i l i ty

of

the

USSR

14 ) .

However, H i t l e r had

underest imated

the i n t e r n a l

po l i t i ca l

s t ab i l i t y of S t a l i n s

regime (Blau

88) .

The Sovie t

c i t iz e n s

inna te read iness to defend

Mother

Russia was s t ronger than hi s

assumed avers ion

to

the communist

regime

(Blau 88).

H i tl e r s

barbar ic p o l i c i e s toward Sovie t pr i soners and the loca l

populat ion only s t reng thened the average Sovie t c i t iz e n s w i l l t o

r e s i s t (Anders

172, 216). Most Sovie t so ld ie r s

would

r a th e r

f igh t to the death than sur render to the German Army (Anders

172). Also, hundreds of thousands of c iv i l i a ns , most ly women,

helped prepare the defenses

around Moscow

(Seaton

178) .

Hit le r and hi s mi l i t a r y s t a f f vas t ly underest imated the

mobi l iza t ion

c a p a b i l i t i e s

of

the

USSR.

They

es t imated

t h a t

the

USSR would be ab le to mobi l ize a maximum of

140

div i s ions

in

the

event

of

war

( Barbarossa

1802).

During the summer of

1941

alone, the Sovie t Supreme Command

sent

324

new div i s ions

to the

f ront

( Barbarossa 1802). During

the f i r s t

week of

October

1941, 14 div i s ions , 16

t ank

brigades ,

and

40

a r t i l l e r y regiments

arr ived

a t Moscow ( Barbarossa 1810).

In mid-November,

Sovie t

re inforcements

fo r Moscow

included

100,000 men, 300

tanks , and

2,000

guns ( Barb arossa 1811). At

the beginning of December, Sovie t re inforcements fo r Moscow

inc luded

the 1 s t ,

10th,

and

20th Armies

( Barbarossa 1811).


17/31

14

H i t l e r

and his

mil i t a ry

s t a f f overes t imated the

a b i l i t i e s

of

the German Army. Their

es t imate

of conquer ing the USSR in 8-10

weeks

i s

evidence of t h i s .

H i t l e r

was so conf ident of his forces

t ha t

Operat ion

B RB ROSS

made

no

provis ions

for

s t r a t e g i c

bombing by

the

Luf twaffe Blau 25) . H i t l e r gave the

Luftwaffe

a

ground-support

miss ion and equipped t accordingly

Blau

25) .

According to Blau, by

November

1941, t he combat e f f i c i e n c y

of the German rmy had dropped t remendously . In in fan t ry

d iv i s ions , e f f i c i ency was down 35

percen t

83) . In

armored

d iv i s ions , e f f i c i ency was down

40

to 50 percent 83) .

The tank

a t t r i t i o n r a t e va r i ed from 65 to 75

percen t

83) .

Thus,

the

rea l

combat

value of t he

136

d iv i s ion on the Eas te rn Front was

equiva lent to

83

fu l l - s t rength div is ions 83) .

The 58 German div is ions a t tack ing Moscow

presen ted

a r e a l

combat

value of about 33 div is ions Seaton 203) . At Moscow, 91

Soviet div is ions in prepared defensive pos i t ions

opposed

the

German

force

Seaton 203) .

In

addi t ion , the

Sovie t fo rces

were

rece iv ing

f resh un i t s da i ly .

The grea t di spa r i ty of the

two

forces

demonstra tes

H i t l e r ' s

overes t imat ion

of the a b i l i t y of h i s

forces.

According to

Blau,

H i t l e r

and h i s

m i l i t a r y

s t a f f over

es t imated t he

usefu l lness of

b l i t zk r i eg t a c t i c s in

the vas tness

of the USSR 89) .

Time

and t ime again , t he

panzer

un i t s had to

ha l t and wai t for t he i n fan t ry un i t s

to

ca tch up 89) . The

German rmy

did not

have adequate motor t r anspor t

for

ts

so ld i e r s or suppl ies 89) . Panzer

un i t s

by themselves could not

e f fec t ive ly des t roy

enc i rc l ed

enemy uni t s . They

needed

in fan t ry


18/31

15

support

to accomplish

tha t mission. But

the in fant ry

uni t s could

not keep up with

the

fa s t moving

panzers.

The Soviet Army was able to f i e ld large

numbers of

replace-

ment

forces.

This

i s

another

fac tor

tha t

caused

the

German

Army

to

lose

i t s campaign against Moscow

Support

from

the

United

States

and England

helped

the

Russians to maintain the ab i l i t y to move t roops. To understand

the

fu l l

impact

of

the

war

from

October

to December

1941, you

must re turn to 11

March

1941. n tha t date, President

Roosevelt

signed the Lend Lease

Act.

The Lend Lease

Act allowed the

uni ted

States

to

provide support to Russia in the war agains t Germany.

Roosevelt determined tha t the defense of

Russia

agains t

aggression

was v i ta l to the defense of the United

Sta tes .

The

Lend Lease Act

enabled

the

uni ted

States to provide defense

ar t ic les , defense serv ices , and defense information.

These

i tems

included

weapons,

munitions,

a i r c ra f t ,

water vesse ls , and boats .

This

also

meant

tha t

the uni ted

States

would

supply

any and

a l l

repai r par t s to

repa i r

any

of

the i tems.

The

Act

also included

things to help in agr icu l tura l

needs

and indus t r ia l repa i r or

setup of fac tor ies . The bottom l ine was

to

supply

Russia

with

everything

and anything tha t would help in a f ight agains t

Germany Ste t t in ius 335 .

In

June

1941, Hi t l e r launched

an

at tack on

the

Soviet Union.

This

at tack strengthened the

support from the

uni ted Sta tes

and

England

toward

Russia. The policy of these countr ies

put

i n to

operat ion a

plan tha t

provided immediate aid

to

Russia. This


19/31

16

plan r e l eased about

$9,000,000 wor th

of

supp l i e s

fo r

shipment

to

Russia (S t e t t i n i u s

119-122) .

By

June 1941, t h e Germans

had i n f l i c t e d l a rg e amount

of

damage on

t he

Russ ian

fo rces .

Russ ia

sen t

r e que s t

to

t h e

Pr e s i de n t

of

t he

Uni ted St a t e s fo r an

ad d i t i o n a l $21,940,000

in

suppor t mat e r i a l s . This

reques t r ece ived

approval overn igh t

(S t e t t i n i u s

123-124) .

In August

1941, t h e B r i t i s h s t a r t e d

moving arms

to

Russ ia

more qu ic k ly and

began

develop ing major supply ro u te s th rough

I r an . The irst s t e p began

with

improving t h e

p o r t s in

t h e

Pers ian Gulf to handle t h e

i nc reased

sh ipp ing . The r a i l r o a d

from

t he

Gulf to Tehran

could no t

begin to handle t h e heavy t r a f f i c of

suppl i e s

needed

by

Russ ia . So

t h e reques t went ou t fo r

locomot ives , f l a t c a r s ,

boxcar s , r a i l r o a d

t r a c k , and

r a i l r o a d

t i e s . England, Canada, In d ia ,

and

t h e Uni ted

St a t e s

responded)

and by

November

t h e irst thousand c a r s were on t h e way

to

I r an .

Once

in

I r an ,

they

t r a n s f e r r e d

t he supp l i e s

to

t ru ck s

and

moved

them

to Russia (S t e t t i n i u s 124-125, 128, 213-214).

Next, t h e emphasis was fo r ma te r i a l s and t o o l s fo r t h e arms

f ac t o r i e s i n Russ ia . War had damaged many of t h e p l an t s needed

f o r t he S o v i e t ' s own

produc t ion of war

mate r i a l s and

r esupply

ope r a t i ons . Admiral Akul in asked ,

Please

send us raw mate r i a l s

and manufactur ing equipment ,

with

t h i s you ac t u a l l y i n c rease t h e

combat s t r en g th of the Red Army. By

t h e end of September

t h e

suppor t o f

Russ ia had grown

to

$145,710,823

(S t e t t i n i u s

125-127,

222-224).


20/31

17

with t h i s increased amount, the United Sta t e s

ca l l ed

a

conference

wi th Russ ia to

discuss

a repayment

plan.

Repayment

terms

inc luded no

i n t e r e s t

charge , wi th

repayment

to begin f i v e i

years

a f t e r

the

war.

On

October

1941,

Moscow

agreed

to

these

repayment

te rms, known as the Fi r s t Russian Pro toco l

( S t e t t i n iu s

129-130 .

By now the supp l ies shipped in Ju ly and August began to

a r r ive . This

inc luded B r i t i s h t anks and

two squadrons

of

Hurr icanes

with

p i l o t s and ground crews to

t r a i n the Russian

Air

Force. Also,

28

sh ips s a i l ed

from the United Sta t e s with

130,000

tons

of

cargo fo r Russia

and

a r r ived

in

mid-October .

wi th

the

la rge

l os s

of

l ives tock,

the Russian Army needed a

l a rge

amount

of

l e a the r fo r boots . In l a t e

October 1941,

the un i t ed Sta t e s

sen t

10,500

tons

of shoe

l ea the r

to

Russ ia for shoes . But the

Russian fac to r i e s could not

keep

up with the

needs of

the

Army.

To help wi th t h i s shortage

of boots ,

the United Sta t e s

sen t

four

mil l ion

pa i r s

and England

sen t

t h ree

mil l ion

pa i r s .

These

ar r ived

in

Russ ia

in l a t e

November 1941.

In addi t ion , the United

Sta tes setup the

Tsar ' s boot fac to ry to he lp wi th the

product ion of the boots (S te t t in ius 126-129, 203-215 .

The

f i r s t

shipment

of c u r t i s s

P-40 f igh te r

a i r c r a f t

l e f t

from

England

in l a t e

September

and

a r r ived

in Russia in October .

By

the

end

of

November, the

un i ted Sta t e s sen t 79

l i g h t

tanks ,

59

P-40

f igh te r s , and

over

a 1,000

t rucks

( S t e t t i n iu s

124-125 .

After

the a t t ack on Pear l

Harbor

in

December 1941,

suppl ies

from the uni ted Sta tes

slowed

grea t ly , but

d id

not s top .

The

Japanese did not bother Russian sh ips in the

Pac i f i c

so the


21/31

18

Russians moved the supp l ies . Aside from the planes t anks and

t rucks the

u n i t ed

Sta t e s sen t a l o t

of

raw mate r i a l s .

Some

of

the most impor tant th ings sen t by the un i t ed Sta t e s

were:

f i e l d

te lephones

and

te lephone

wire

m i l i t a ry

barbed

wire

Thompson

.45 sub-machine guns,

and mil l ions of pa i r s of boots .

The

f i e l d phones and

the

wire enabled

the

Russian Army to

mainta in

good communications along

i t s

2,000

mile f ron t .

They

could then more quick ly

d i r e c t t he i r fo rces

to

the most impor tant

and c r i t i c a l poin t s

on

the ba t t l e f i e ld .

t

a l s o l e t the Russ ians

pass informat ion on what

the

Germans were doing. This l i n k

played

a

g rea t

ro l e in the

defense of

Moscow.

The u n i t ed

Sta t e s

and

England

sen t Russ ia a t o t a l

of 189,000

f i e l d phones and

670,000 miles

of wire.

The

barbed

wire helped

setup the defense

of

Moscow.

This

proved

to be

a

g rea t

asse t

when the

Germans

a t t ack ed

in the

winter of 1941. The

u n i t ed

Sta t e s sen t

216,000 miles

of barbed

wire

to

Russia .

The

Russian so ld i e r s

took

a grea t l i k ing

to

the Tommy gun

and they k i l l e d many

Germans

with

them. The

uni ted Sta t e s sen t

50,000 of

them

by

the

end

of

December

1941.

The

boots

t h a t

the

uni ted

Sta t e s

made and sen t to Russ ia

played a grea t

ro l e in the

winter

f ight ing .

The Germans

had

come

to Russ ia

ill

prepared and had very little winter

c lo th ing .

The

Russians on

the o ther hand had heavy winter boots and t h i ck coa t s

to

p ro tec t

them from the co ld . This l e t the Russian so ld i e r s

mainta in a

fit force

while the Germans

f roze .


22/31

19

The

raw m a t e r i a l s t h a t

t h e B r i t i s h and

o th e r

a l l i e s

sen t

helped in t h e produc t ion of many

war

i t ems . The Russ ians made

t i r e s

from

38,000

t ons o f rubber . The Sov i e t s used t h e

fo l lowing

to

make

muni t ions :

18,000

t ons of

l ead ,

8,000

t ons o f

t i n ,

13,000

t ons of j u t e , and

60,000

t on

of b ras s . Besides

meta l s ,

the Western A l l i e s a l s o sh ipped many chemica l s and

over

100,000

t ons o f gunpowder and T T fo r

bombs.

Once

these supp l ies r eached

Russ ia ,

t h e problem of g e t t i n g

them to where t he y had to go l ay ahead. The

Russ ian

peop le knew

how t o l i v e and work

in

t h e wi n t e r c o l d . They would move t h e

supp l i e s by t ru ck

as f a r

as t h e road

would

l e t them. Once t h e

t ru ck s

became s tuck

o r t h e road r an o u t , t hey w ould swi tch to

t r acked

v eh i c l e s . Once

t h ese

could

no l onger

move

e f f e c t i v e l y ,

they

used

pack animals and

ca r t s o r s l ed s .

Using

a l l

of

t h ese

d i f f e r e n t modes of t r an s p o r t a t i o n , t he y moved a l a rg e amount o f

supp l i e s

very

f a s t and

very f a r .

These

combinat ions

a l s o

worked

in

t h e

moving

of

t ro o p s .

They would

use

whatever

motor

t r an s p o r t was av a i l ab l e . I f

motor

t r an s p o r t was

imposs ib le

o r u n av a i l ab l e , they used c a r t s o r

s l ed s .

This

worked q u i t e wel l

because

they cou ld

move

a squad of

t roops with every v eh i c l e . wi th s p ec i a l equipment

l i k e widened

t r a c k s and grouse rs , t anks

could

go th rough

t h r ee

to four

f e e t

of

snow

Corotnef f 10-12) .

Using

horses ,

c a r t s , o r

s l ed s

i s a l o t q u i e t e r t han us ing a

v eh ic l e .

This a l lowed

t h e Russians to r esupply t h e i r

t r oops

without a l e r t i n g t h e Germans t o what was happening Corotne f f

12) .


23/31

20

When moving t roops

and

suppl ies the

Russ ians

used a

few

common ru les :

1.

When moving in a

column

format ion in deep snow with a

tank,

make

your

own

t r a cks .

2.

When using a

t ruck ,

always s tay in the t r acks .

3. When using a horse and c a r t ,

walk

ahead of the c a r t

to

make sure the rou te i s

sa fe .

sv

4. When moving t roops in snow, use sk ie s .

5. Always

use

enemy

equipment

to help

you

in n ~ y it can.

6. When cross ing a f rozen r i v e r or s t ream, cu t a hole in

the i ce

to

see how

th ick

the i c e i s . I f the

i ce i s too

t h in ,

pour

water on the i c e and l e t

it

f reeze . Repeat t h i s ac t i o n

u n t i l

you get the th ickness t h a t you

need

Corotneff 9-12).

Before the war the Russ ians had done exper imenta l

work

and

t r a in ing

to

condi t ion t h e i r men and

machines

fo r the co ld . with

t h i s

t r a in ing they were ab le to keep

more

t roops and

equipment a t

the f ron t

and

in

reserve

Corotneff 10-11) .

The

horse mounted

Cavalry used

i t s grea t

mobi l i ty

to move

t roops and

to

s t r i k e f a s t with ex tens ive f i repower. with

up-to-date

weapons these men could move with littl o r no support

Gorodovikov 3-4) .

By using

the suppl ies

t h a t the United

Sta t e s

and England

~

sent ,

the Russ ians w ~ well p r p r ~ f o r the German a t tacks .

_

_ _ ~ _

Under S t a l i n s in s t ruc t ions ,

these

armies moved t roops and

suppl ies

in , around, and through the Germans.

S ta l i n

would

hold

his

fo rces in reserve

to

the l a s t minute. By doing t h i s , he was


24/31

21

sure

t ha t t he Germans

had commited a l l of t h e i r forces and

could

not

win Shilovsky

55) .

The

ea r ly

onse t

of t he severe

Russian win ter dra s t i c a l l y

impeded

t he

ef fec t i veness

of

rmy

Group

Center .

This

i s

another

f ac to r

t ha t caused the German rmy to l o se ts

campaign aga ins t

Moscow.

Hit l e r

ordered the

assembly

of h i s army along t he

f r o n t i e r s

of

the USSR ear ly in

1941.

H i t le r s

i n i t i a l

a t t ack would begin

in May, but t he invas ion of Greece and Crete caused a six-week

delay . Six weeks of good weather probably made a l l t he

di f ference

to t he outcome of the 1941

campaign agains t Russia .

Hit l e r

expected

a whir lwind

v ic to ry aga ins t

t he

huge but l e s s

well -equipped

and supposedly i l l - l e d Russian forces Chandler

37) .

The German so ld ie r t ha t crossed in to Russ ian

t e r r i t o r y

f e l t

t ha t he had ente red a di f fe ren t world. His opposi t ion was not

only

the

fo rces

of

t he

enemy,

but

a l so

the

fo rces o f

na ture .

The

e lements of

na ture were

more d i f f i c u l t to conquer because

t h e i r

f

v

fury and

e f f e c t

were not

fu l ly r e c o q n i z ~ g ~ _ The Germans were

ne i the r t r a i n e ~

nor

~ ~ p e ~ to withs tand them (Hi s to r i ca l Study:

Ef fec t s

of

Climate on Combat in

European Russia 1) .

Before t he

war

began, the German

high

command

be l ieved

t ha t

the

USSR

would

l o se with in

8-10 weeks.

The German

high command

bel ieved

t ha t t he re would be no

need

for conduct ing opera t ions

in

the co ld , snow, and mud.

H i t l e r

would not permit German

f ac to r i e s to switch product ion to co ld weather equipment,

mainta ining

t ha t t would

not

be necessary .


25/31

22

Movement during

war

i s

very d i f f i c u l t

in deep snow. Because

of the extreme cold , some

men

st ll

in

summer uniform

were

f reez ing to death a t t h e i r

posts .

Foot marches in

twenty

inches

of

snow

are

slow;

in

depths of

more

than

twenty

inches they

are

exhaust ing. Movement on foot or with wheeled veh ic les

i s

impossible

in snow

depths

of

fo r ty

inches . The Germans

used

----

d e t a i l s to

t ramp

down

snow

t r a i l s . Ski t roops ~ e r e a l s o ~ s e d

as

t r a i l breakers .

The Russians used t h e i r T-34 tanks

to

pack

down

snow.

The Germans discovered t h a t the t r a cks were too

narrow

fo r

t h i s purpose.

The winter

of 1941-42

was the

most

severe in European

Russia

in a

hundred

years . The

mean

tempera ture in the a rea of

nor thwest

Moscow

was

minus 3

F. The same

area

saw

the lowest

recorded

tempera ture of the e n t i r e Russian Campnign minus 63

F.

Soviet sk i t roops and Russian armor went on the o f fens ive dur ing

a

coun tera t t ack in

Moscow

in December 1941. The Russians were p

i n f in i t e ly

b e t t e r

e q u i p E ~ ~

fo r winter

warfare .

This

type

co ld

reduced the

e f f i c i ency

of men equipment and weapons

His to r i ca l

Study:

Effec ts

of Climate on

Combat

in European Russia 18).

The snow-covered landmarks

and t e r r a in made or ien ta t ion very

d i f f i c u l t . The para lyz ing co ld prevented the German t roops

from

5

?

aiming

t he i r r i f l e s .

Bolt mechanisms

j a m m e d s t r i c k e r ~

0

~ _ ~ /

sha t te red , and machine guns became encrus ted with i ce . Recoi l

l iqu id froze in guns and ammunition supply

f a i l ed . Mortar s h e l l s

detonated in deep snow with

a hollow

harmless thud and mines

were no

longer

re l i ab le .


26/31

23

Maintenance of

weapons

i s

d i f f i c u l t

in the win te r . The

German s

automatic

weapons froze and

would only f i r e

s ing le

sho t s .

The i r

an t i t ank ammunition would not

it

i n t o the breach

because

the

packing

grease f roze

s o l i d . German

r i f l e s and

machine guns

malfunct ioned because the grease and o i l

were

not

c. _ ./ )

co ld

r e s i s t a n t . St r ike s and

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ p r n s broke l i k e glass}

and f lu id in a r t i l l e r y

r eco i l

mechanisms so l i d i f i e d .

The need

fo r

spa re motor

veh ic le and

t ank par t s increases

during

low t empera tu res . The

Germans

had

to cann iba l i ze b r o k e n -

down and abandoned veh ic les

to

get

spa re p a r t s .

The

Russ ian

winters

render

s e l f - s t a r t i ng veh ic les use le s s . The Germans b u i l t

f i r e s under veh ic les

to

keep engines warm. During a l e r t s , the

Germans

f requen t ly l e f t

motors

running fo r hours .

C3-

The Russian winter

t f f e c t e d

t h e German so ld ie r t h e

worst .

Lacking s u i t a b l e c lo th ing ,

any sen t ry who f e l l

as l eep on

duty

,,> L-

- - ~ - - - . ~

r i sked f r eez in g to death . The

fewrwinter

c lo th in9 . . the Germans

had,

i

they

had any

a t

a l l ,

were

fo r

w in te r

wear

in

Germany.

Fros tb i t e

cas u a l t i e s

were numerous. A

panzer

div i s ion had

up

to

e ight

hundred f ro s t b i t e cas u a l t i e s a day. To keep warm,

some Germans so ld iers

acquired

R u s ~ ~ n ~ ~ ~ f u r

caps,

which

proved dangerous . The

wearers ~ o f t n ~ i s ~ ~ k e n fo r the enemy

and

f i r ed upon

by t h e i r own t roops His to r i ca l

Study: E f fec t s of

Climate on

Combat in

European Russia

18) .

The Germans

found t h a t

a t extreme low

t empera tu res , shor t

hauls from the f i e l d ki tchens tu rned food i n t o

lumps

of i c e .

V J

But ter

had

to

be

~ q t _ wi th a saw o r

served

wi th an axe. Boi l ing


27/31

24

soup froze s o l i d i n

60

seconds . For so ld ie r s to

defeca te

in the

open

i nv i t ed

death .

The German t roops

advanced to

with in f i f t e e n miles o f

Moscow.

Their

aim

was

to

cap ture

the

Russian

c a p i t a l

before

the

fu l l fury of winter

s t ruck.

However, the t enac i ty of the Russian

re s i s t ance had s topped them in t h e i r t r a cks by ea r ly December

Chandler 116) .

The Russian supply

l i n e s

were

sa fe r .

Their t r anspor t

was

l i g h t e r

lessening the

danger

of having

it s ink ing i n to the snow.

The Russians equipped a l l wheels wi th

chains . The

Russ ians

l ub r i ca t ed

machinery with

o i l

t h a t

did

not f reeze .

Dysentery r idd led

the

German t roops and

t he re

were

more

than

100,000 cases of f ro s t b i t e . Many

committed

su ic ide most by

holding

a

hand grenade

aga ins t the stomach. This was

the only

,C C \

sq a

c

weapon ce r t a in t o

funct ion in such cond i t ions .

German

casua l t i e s i nc luded

a t

l e a s t

1,073,006

e i t h e r k i l l e d

wounded,

missing

in ac t ion

taken

pr i sone r

o r v ic t im

o f

f ro s t b i t e . The

Russ ians never announced

t h e i r l os se s but the

most informed

es t imates places them in excess of 2 ,000,000.

n December, German

uni t s

forced t h e i r way

onto

Kuntsevo,

a sou theas te rn suburb of Moscow.

Men, women,

and

ch i ld ren

fought

a g u e r r i l l a type engagement aga ins t the

exhausted Germans.

t

appeared

t h a t

the

Germans

would penet ra te the Russ ian bar r i cades

and would gain en t ry in to the c i t y i t s e l f . The Germans were

so

c lose t h a t they could see the Kremlin. But t ~ t ammunition and

fuel

gave

out .

This

would

be

the l a s t at tempt

to

se ize the

communist cap i t a l Turney 150) .


28/31

25

A

v i c t o ry by

the

German

Army

may have hung on

a s ing le

a r t i l l e r y

s h e l l

o r a

malfunct ioning machine gun. Perhaps maybe

even

a

s l a i n

o f f i c e r

o r noncommissioned o f f i c e r , whose

dea th

a t

a

c r i t i c a l

moment

demoral ized

the

l iv ing .

On 6 December 1941, the tempera ture

stood

a t an i nc red ib le

f i f t y

degrees below zero.

The

Russian reserve fo rces

launched

a

t remendous,

wel l - t imed

coun tera t t ack aga ins t the

exhaus ted German

fo rces along

the

Moscow

f ron t .

The German t roops abandoned

t h e i r

t anks ,

whose

motors re fused

to

run.

The i r

l i g h t and heavy guns

re fused

to func t ion . They did not run,

fo r t h a t

was impossible

in

the f rozen Russian

t e r r a i n . They

did

not

rou t o r pan ic ,

as

they had no

more energy

l e f t .

They

could

not

a t t ack anymore.

The

at tempt to conquer Moscow in

1941

had f a i l ed (Turney

151-153).

On 8

December, the German

Armed

Forces High

Command

announced t e r s e ly : Due to

the

onse t of

the Russian

winter the

opera t ions

in

the

East

are

being

cu r t a i l ed .

The German Army

l o s t

ts October-December 1941 campaign

aga ins t Moscow because of

t h ree

fac to rs . F i r s t , H i t l e r and his

mil i t a ry

s t a f f overest imated

the

a b i l i t y of the German Army and

underest imated the a b i l i t y

of

the

Sovie t

Army.

Second,

the

Sovie t

Army

was ab le to f i e l d l a rge numbers of replacement

fo rces .

And

t h i rd , t h e

ea r ly

onse t o f t h e severe

Russian

winter

d r a s t i c a l l y

impeded

the

e f f ec t i v en es s of

Army

Group Center .

The German

Army s campaign aga ins t Moscow

can

serve

as

a

l esson fo r

a l l commanders

and war

planners .

At a

s t r a t eg i c

l eve l ,

commanders

must accura te ly

access

the c a p a b i l i t i e s

and the


29/31

6

l imi t a t ions of t h e i r fo rces .

Commanders

must have access

to

r e l i a b l e

in te l l igence

data regarding the

c a p a b i l i t i e s

and

l imi t a t ions

of

the opposing fo rces . War planners must have

accura te

data

regarding

t h e

capab i l i ty

of

the

opponent

to

mobi l ize fo rces and

to

produce war mate r i a l s . F ina l ly

commanders must understand

t h a t

weather

i s

c r i t i c a l fac to r i n

planning

prepar ing

fo r

and conduct ing

combat

opera t ions .


30/31

27

Works Cited

Anders,

Wladyslaw.

Hi t l e r ' s Defeat in

Russia .

Chicago: Henry

Regnery

Company,

1953.

Barbarossa . Purne l l ' s History of

the 20th

Century. London:

Purnel l & Sons,

1972. 7:

1801-1811.

Blau,

George

E.

His to r ica l

Study: The

German

Campaign in

R u ss ia - P la nn in g and Operations (1940-1942) . D

Pam

20-261a,

Mar.

1955.

Washington: GPO,

1960.

Chandler ,

David

G.

Bat t l es

and Bat t l escenes of World War Two.

New

York: Macmillan, 1989.

Cochran,

Alexander

S.

J r . Time Out For Another Conquest .

World War I I May 1991: 39-44.

Corotneff , N. Red Army Tanks in

winte r .

The Cavalry Journal

Jan. -Feb. 1943:

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Fugate ,

Bryan

I . Operation

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CA: Pres id io Press ,

1984.

Gorodovikov,

O.

J .

Soviet Cavalry

Fights .

The

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Jul . -Aug. 1942: 4-7.

Lidde l l , Hart B. H. How Hi t l e r

Fai led

At Moscow. Marine Corps

Gazet te Mar. 1957: 28-30.

Moscow or

Kiev .

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Seaton,

Albert .

The Russo-German War 1941-45. New York:

Praeger

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Shilousky, E.

Mili tary

Art

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the Red

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New

York: The Macmillan,

1944.


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Trask, David F. ,

Ear l

F. Ziemke,

and

Magna E. Bauer . Moscow to

Sta l ingrad:

Decision in

the

East . Center

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Mi l i t a ry

History. Washington: GPO

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Turney,

Alfred

W

Disas te r

a t

Moscow:

Von

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Campaigns

1941-1942. Albuquerque: The Univers i ty of New Mexico Press ,

1970.

uni ted Sta tes . Center

for Mi l i ta ry

History. His to r ica l

Study:

Effec ts

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Climate on

Combat

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- - - .

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Army.

Russian

Combat

Methods in World

War I I . DA Pam 20-230,

Nov. 1950.

Washington: GPO 1950.

World

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In te rac t ive

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Timothy A.

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Moscow Campaign

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