Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976

COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 5

The dearth of documents and his-torical context has hampered rigorousanalysis of Cuba’s intervention inAngola in 1975. Despite the interestscholars have shown in the episode, thelack of Cuban documents and the closednature of Cuban society have preventedthem from being able to accurately de-scribe Cuba’s actions. I have gone toHavana six times, for a total of sixmonths, since 1993 to research Cubanpolicy toward Africa, and I have gainedaccess to the archives of the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party ofCuba (CC CPC), the Instituto deHistoria de Cuba, the Centro deInformación de la Defensa de lasFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, andthe Ministerio para la InversiónExtranjera y la Colaboración Econ-ómica. Armed with documents fromthese closed and never before used ar-chives, supplemented with interviews,a close reading of the press, and U.S.documents, I can shed new light on theAngola affair.

The new documents clarify theevolution of Cuba’s involvement inAngola and answer the critical questionof whether the Cubans sent troops be-fore or after the South African interven-tion. They also address the vexing ques-tion of Havana’s motivation, particu-larly whether or not it was acting as aSoviet proxy. They document Cuba’slongstanding relationship with thePopular Movement for the Liberationof Angola (MPLA), and they place theAngolan crisis in the broad context ofCuban policy toward Africa. From1959 to 1974 the Cubans intervened inAlgeria, Congo Leopoldville, CongoBrazzaville and Guinea-Bissau. MoreCubans fought in Africa during theseyears than in Latin America, and Cu-ban policy was far more successful inthe former than in the latter. The storyof these fifteen years challenges theimage of Cuban foreign policy—cyni-

Havana’s Policy in Africa, 1959-76:New Evidence from Cuban Archives

by Piero Gleijeses1 cal ploys of a client state—that prevailsin the United States. Yet it has attractedvirtually no attention. It is a significantlacuna. As a Cuban official told me,“Cuba’s intervention in Angola cannotbe understood without looking at ourpast.”2

Whereas those who publish in theBulletin generally use archives that havebeen opened, the Cuban archives I haveused are still closed. This requires, then,an explanation of my modus operandi.

There was no established declassi-fication process in Cuba when I beganmy research. Mindful of the fact thatthe documents I cited would not bereadily accessible to my readers, I de-cided that I would never use a documentunless I was given a photocopy of theoriginal. I badgered Cuban officialsrelentlessly, arguing that in the UnitedStates their word has no credibility, thattheir testimonies are only valid if sup-ported by documents, and that while onedocument would suffice to criticizeCuba, five would be necessary to sayanything positive. Jorge Risquet, amember of the Central Committee, un-derstood. I owe a great debt to his in-telligence and sensitivity. We havecome a long way since the day in 1994when I asked him for all the reportswritten by the Chief of the Cuban Mili-tary Mission in Angola between Augustand October 1975 only to be told, “Youaren’t writing his biography. One willbe enough.” Two years later, I receivedall the others. The Cubans establisheda procedure of which I could only ap-prove: any document they expected tobe declassified they allowed me to readin its entirety, whether in Risquet’s of-fice or in the archives themselves. Thenthe waiting would begin. It could takeless than a hour or more than a year. AsI write, there are several hundred pagesof documents that I have been allowedto read but have not yet been given.

About 80 of the more than 3,000pages of documents that I have receivedwere sanitized after I had read them.

Frequently the edited lines containedthe remarks of a foreign leader criticiz-ing his own political allies; thus, to ex-plain why half a page had been sani-tized [Doc. 5], Risquet wrote, “the con-versation that followed was about in-ternal MPLA matters that [AngolanPresident Agostinho] Neto discussedwith [Cuban official Díaz] Argüelles. Itwould be unethical to make them pub-lic.” 3 In the case of three intelligencedocuments, the sanitized paragraphswould have revealed sources. In othercases the lines (or words) sanitized in-cluded comments about African orAsian countries that, the censors be-lieved, would unnecessarily complicateCuba’s foreign relations.

I have also interviewed 63 Cubanprotagonists, many of them repeatedlyand in relaxed settings. While inter-views without documents would be oflittle use, interviews with documentscan be extremely helpful. Furthermore,many of the interviewees gave me let-ters and journals from their own per-sonal collections, and they alerted meto documents in the government ar-chives, which made it possible to bevery specific in my requests to Risquet.The Cuban authorities were well awareof my freewheeling interviews and tothe best of my knowledge they did noth-ing to hinder me. Currently I amcomplementing my research in Cubawith research in the United States, Eu-rope (particularly Moscow, Berlin, andLisbon), and, of course, Africa.

Cuba’s pre-1975 Africa policy canbe divided into three major phases: pre-1964, when the focus was Algeria;1964-66, when Cuba’s attention wassuddenly riveted by sub-Saharan Af-rica—a heady time characterized byChe Guevara’s three-month trip throughthe continent and the dispatch of Cu-ban columns to Zaire and CongoBrazzaville; and post-1966, a period ofgrowing maturity, highlighted by thelong and successful Cuban involvementin Guinea-Bissau (1966-74). Before

6 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN

discussing Cuba’s role in Angola in1975-76, I will briefly touch on each ofthese phases.

Cuban leaders saw similarities be-tween the Algerian revolution againstFrench rule and their own struggleagainst both Cuban dictator FulgencioBatista and the United States. In De-cember 1961, a Cuban ship unloaded acargo of weapons at Casablanca for theAlgerian rebels. It returned to Havanawith 76 wounded Algerian fighters and20 children from refugee camps.4

The aid continued after Algeriagained its independence. In May 1963,a 55-person Cuban medical mission ar-rived in Algeria. And, as would be thecase for all the missions that followed(until 1978), the aid was free. “It waslike a beggar offering his help, but weknew that the Algerian people neededit even more than we did, and that theydeserved it,” said the then-Minister ofPublic Health, José Ramón MachadoVentura.5 And in October 1963, whenAlgeria was threatened by Morocco, theCubans rushed a special force of 686men with heavy weapons to the Algeri-ans’ aid, even though Morocco had justsigned a contract to buy one million tonsof Cuban sugar for $184 million, a con-siderable amount of hard currency at atime when the United States was tryingto cripple Cuba’s economy.

Cuba’s interest in sub-Saharan Af-rica quickened in late 1964. This wasthe moment of the great illusion, whenthe Cubans, and many others, believedthat revolution beckoned in Africa.Guerrillas were fighting the Portuguesein Angola; armed struggle was acceler-ating in Portuguese Guinea and begin-ning in Mozambique. In CongoBrazzaville, a new government wasloudly proclaiming its revolutionarysympathies. And, above all, there wasCongo Leopoldville (later called Zaire),where armed revolt had been spread-ing with stunning speed since the springof 1964, threatening the survival of thecorrupt pro-American regime that Presi-dents Eisenhower and Kennedy had la-boriously put in place. “The strugglehas just begun, these are its firstflames,” wrote the Cuban weekly VerdeOlivo. “It will, no doubt, be a longstruggle, in Angola and Portuguese

vious to all but the U.S. press and pro-voked a wave of revulsion even amongAfrican leaders friendly to the UnitedStates.7 The Cubans saw the conflict asmore than an African problem: “Ourview was that the situation in the Congowas a problem that concerned all man-kind,” Che Guevara wrote.8

In December 1964, Guevara wentto Africa on a three-month trip that sig-nalled Cuba’s growing interest in theregion. In February 1965 he was in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, which was then,as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agencypointed out, “a haven for exiles fromthe rest of Africa . . . plotting the over-throw of African governments, bothblack and white.”9 After a generalmeeting with the liberation movements[see Doc. 2], Che met separately witheach, and three times with the Congo-lese rebel leaders Laurent Kabila andGaston Soumialot.10

“[Kabila] impressed me,” wroteChe. “I offered him, on behalf of ourgovernment, about thirty instructors andall the weapons we could spare, and heaccepted with delight; he urged us tohurry, as did Soumialot, in the courseof another conversation. Soumialot alsoasked that the instructors be black.”Cuba had “offered aid on condition thatTanzania approve,” Guevara explained.“It did, so we went ahead. The aid wasgiven unconditionally and with no timelimit.” Che left Dar-es-Salaam with“the joy of having found people readyto fight to the finish. Our next task wasto select a group of black Cubans—allvolunteers—and send them to help inthe struggle in the Congo.”11

In April 1965, a Cuban column ofsome 120 men under Guevara beganentering eastern Congo through Tanza-nia. A few weeks later a second Cubancolumn under Jorge Risquet arrived inneighboring Congo Brazzaville at the

request of that country’s government,which lived “in fear” of an attack bythe Congo’s mercenaries; the columncould also, perhaps, assist Che in theCongo. “It constituted . . . a reserveforce for Che’s column, which it wouldjoin if necessary, at the right time.”12

Overall, 400 Cuban volunteers were inCentral Africa in the summer of 1965.

But Central Africa was not readyfor revolution. By the time the Cubansarrived in the Congo, the rebels’strength had been broken. The story ofChe’s column is not one of great battles,but of 120 people thrust into an impos-sible situation, in a totally alien world,who retained their humanity until theend. Their experience is recorded inseveral documents: the manuscript thatChe wrote in the Cuban embassy in Dar-es-Salaam (and which, he said, wouldnot be published “for a long time”13);the journal of his right-hand-man,Víctor Dreke; and the diaries of severalof his men. Guevara could only pre-side over the agony of the rebellion untilthe rebels’ collapse left him no choicebut to withdraw in November 1965.

In Congo Brazzaville, meanwhile,Risquet’s column saved the host gov-ernment from a military coup in June1966 through bluster and diplomacy,without having to shed blood.14 Thenit withdrew, against the wishes of theirhosts. Risquet understood, and madeHavana understand, that there was norevolution in Congo Brazzaville. “Hewas able to get us out at the right mo-ment,” observes his second-in-com-mand. “He was flexible.”15 Althoughthe Cubans withdrew in 1967, they left“something useful in their wake”:16 thedoctors attached to the column con-ducted the first vaccination campaignin the country against polio,17 and 254young Congolese had gone to Cuba tostudy, all expenses paid.18

The late 1960s were a period ofdeepening maturity in Cuba’s relation-ship with Africa. No longer deludedthat revolution was around the corner,the Cubans were learning about sub-Saharan Africa. In those years—indeed,through 1974—the main focus ofHavana’s attention in Africa wasGuinea-Bissau, where the rebels of thePartido Africano da Independência da

Guinea as well, but what matters is thata powerful guerrilla movement hastaken hold in the Congo.”6 (To avoidconfusion, Congo Leopoldville will bereferred to in this essay as the Congo,and its neighbor as Congo Brazzaville.)

To save the Congolese regime, theJohnson Administration raised an armyof more than 1,000 white mercenariesin a major covert operation that was ob-


Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) werefighting for independence from Portu-gal. The PAIGC was “the most effec-tive of the liberation organizations inthe Portuguese African territories,” U.S.reports stressed time and again.19 Atthe PAIGC’s request, Cuban military in-structors arrived in Guinea-Bissau in1966, and they remained there throughthe end of the war in 1974. This wasthe longest Cuban intervention in Af-rica before the dispatch of troops toAngola in 1975. It was also the mostsuccessful. In the words of Guinea-Bissau’s first president,

we were able to fight and triumph be-cause other countries and people helpedus ... with weapons, with medicine, withsupplies ... But there is one nation thatin addition to material, political and dip-lomatic support, even sent its childrento fight by our side, to shed their bloodin our land together with that of the bestchildren of our country.

This great people, this heroic people,we all know that it is the heroic peopleof Cuba; the Cuba of Fidel Castro; theCuba of the Sierra Maestra, the Cuba ofMoncada ... Cuba sent its best childrenhere so that they could help us in thetechnical aspects of our war, so that theycould help us to wage this great struggle... against Portuguese colonialism.20

Some 40-50 Cubans fought inGuinea-Bissau each year from 1966until independence in 1974. Theyhelped in military planning and theywere in charge of the artillery. Theircontribution was, as President Nino,who had been the senior military com-mander of the PAIGC, said, “of the ut-most importance.”21

Just as the only foreigners whofought with the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau were Cubans, so too the onlyforeign doctors were Cubans (with onebrief exception), and there were no na-tive doctors until 1968. From 1966 to1974 there were, on average, sevenCuban doctors in Guinea Bissau. “Theyreally performed a miracle,” observesFrancisca Pereira, a senior PAIGC of-ficial. “I am eternally grateful to them:not only did they save lives, but theyalso put their own lives at risk. Theywere truly selfless.”22

The men who went to Algeria,

Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, and Guinea-Bissau were volunteers. They were cap-tivated by the mystique of guerrilla war.“We dreamt of revolution,” one muses.“We wanted to be part of it, to feel thatwe were fighting for it. We were young,and the children of a revolution.” Fight-ing abroad, they would defend the revo-lution at home. “In all those years webelieved that at any moment they [theUnited States] were going to strike us;and for us it was better to wage the warabroad than in our own country.”23

The volunteers received no publicpraise in Cuba. They left “knowing thattheir story would remain a secret.”24

They won neither medals nor materialrewards. Once back they could notboast about their deeds, because theywere bound to secrecy.

This secrecy notwithstanding,through all these years U.S. officialsknew that Cubans were in Africa—inAlgeria, then in Zaire, in CongoBrazzaville, and finally in Guinea-Bissau. And yet they paid little atten-tion to it. As Robinson McIlvaine, theU.S. ambassador in Conakry, Guinea,from October 1966 through August1969, remarked, “The State Departmentwas not particularly concerned with theCuban presence. It was not a big worryfor us.” This complacency, which con-trasts starkly with Washington’s reac-tion to even the rumor of Cuban com-batants in Latin America, is explainedby the fact that U.S. officials were con-fident that a handful of Cubans couldnot be effective in distant, alien Afri-can countries. In discussing Commu-nist subversion in Africa, the CIA barelymentioned Cuba.25

This helps explain why the UnitedStates was stunned by the Cuban inter-vention in Angola in 1975. “In the 1960sthere was no sense of a Cuban dangerin Africa; their intervention in Angolawas a real surprise,” observes formerState Department official Paul O’ Neil.

During my tenure as Director of South-ern Africa Office [of the State Depart-ment from July 1973 to June 1975] wewere aware that there was some Soviet/East European support for the MPLA,but I don’t recall any discussion of aCuban role before I left. Aside from theSoviet Union, we would discuss the pos-

sible role of East Germany. I don’t re-call any concern about a Cuban role. Be-fore I left, when people in the Africa Bu-reau [of the State Department] talked ofthe Soviet bloc role in Angola, theythought of the Soviets, the East Germans,not of Cuba. I don’t recall that we knewof Cuba’s ties with the MPLA, but evenif we knew it didn’t worry us.26

These ties had begun in 1965, whenChe Guevara had met Agostinho Neto,Lucio Lara, and other MPLA leaders inBrazzaville in a “historical encounter,”as Raúl Castro called it.27 “We spoke,we discussed,” related Lara. “We wantedonly one thing from the Cubans: instruc-tors. The war was becoming difficultand we were inexperienced ... Guevarapromised that he would speak with hisParty and his government so that theywould send us instructors.”28

Risquet’s column trained MPLAguerrillas in Congo Brazzaville in 1966-67 and several of its members joined theMPLA in the Angolan enclave ofCabinda as advisers, instructors, andcombatants.29 There were moments offrustration for the instructors who hadlearned their trade in the exacting schoolof Fidel Castro’s Rebel Army and whofound themselves in a completely alienculture with a very different concept ofdiscipline, and there were also warmmoments of humanity in that inhospi-table forest. “I looked at them all,” wrotethe Cuban Rafael Moracén after deliv-ering a particularly severe scolding inwhich he had given vent to all his frus-trations, “and I was moved, I felt lovefor them. . . . They had such dignity thatI felt it was worth dying with them if Ihad to.”30 Bonds were forged thatwould never be forgotten, and whichexplain why, ten years later, in late 1975,Moracén pestered Raúl Castro to be al-lowed to return to Angola. “I am anAngolan,” he pleaded.31

In 1966, the MPLA withdrew itsforces from Cabinda and opened a newfront in eastern Angola along the Zam-bian border. This meant that there wasno reason for the Cubans to remain inthe Congo, and they were unable to sendinstructors to eastern Angola, as theMPLA requested, because of Zambianopposition. Over the next few years,until the end of 1974, relations between


Cuba and the MPLA were friendly butless close, and Cuba’s support for themovement was limited to training ahandful of MPLA fighters in Cuba and,as the MPLA was convulsed by inter-nal strife, to giving unwavering supportto the group around Agostinho Neto.32

Lack of space precludes an in-depth discussion of the 1975 Cuban in-tervention in Angola. I will focus in-stead on two particularly controversialissues: when Cuba sent its military in-structors and when it sent its troops. Iwill also comment briefly on some ofthe points raised in Odd Arne Westad’sarticle about the Soviet role in Angolain this issue of the Bulletin.

The basic outline of the story iswell known. Upon the collapse of thePortuguese dictatorship on 25 April1974, there were three rival indepen-dence movements in Angola: AgostinhoNeto’s MPLA, Holden Roberto’s Na-tional Front for the Liberation of Angola(FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi’s NationalUnion for the Total Independence ofAngola (UNITA). On 15 January 1975,Portugal and these three movementsagreed that a transitional government,under a Portuguese High Commis-sioner, would rule the country until in-dependence on 11 November 1975.Before independence would come elec-tions for a Constituent Assembly whichwould elect Angola’s first president.

The first high-level contact be-tween the MPLA and Cuba followingthe coup in Portugal was in late Decem-ber 1974, when two senior Cubans ar-rived in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania:Carlos Cadelo, the Communist partyofficial whose portfolio includedAngola, and Major Alfonso Pérez Mo-rales (Pina), who had served, with greatdistinction, with the PAIGC guerrillafighters in Guinea-Bissau. They metNeto and other MPLA leaders in Dar-es-Salaam and asked permission totravel to Angola. Neto approved: “Heasked us to verify everything he had toldus so that we could get an objectiveview of the real situation in Angola.”33

After two weeks in Angola, Cadeloand Pina met Neto again. Their subse-quent report was lengthy (42 pages) andoptimistic: the elections would takeplace; while the FNLA was militarily

stronger than the MPLA in the shortterm, the MPLA was building for thelong haul, and this would bear fruit.“This movement,” they wrote, “is thebest structured politically and militar-ily, [and] as a result it enjoys extraordi-nary popular support.”34 Time favoredthe MPLA.

The report also included a letterfrom Neto specifying the aid he soughtfrom Cuba [see doc. 4]. But Neto was,in fact, uncertain about what he wantedfrom Cuba. He told Pina and Cadelothat “once we know what weapons theSoviets are going to give us, we willhave to adjust our military plans; ex-actly what we ask from Cuba will becontingent on this.”35 A recurring ideaof military instructors floated in the airbut was not precise. As Cadelo noted,“Even though Neto gave us a letter withsome concrete demands, it was not re-ally clear what the best form of coop-eration with Cuba would be, or how andwhen it should be implemented.”36 Onone point, however, Neto was definite:he wanted Cuba to provide the funds toship the weapons the MPLA had in Dar-es-Salaam, its major arsenal, to Angola.Neto “said that he was confident thatthey would receive Soviet aid, but thatit would not arrive for five months andthat it was therefore imperative to movetheir material and equipment from Dar-es-Salaam to Angola.”37 Neto toldCadelo and Pina that he would need$100,000 for the task.38

But Cuba did not send the money,and nothing happened beyond the ar-rival of ten to twelve Angolans in Cubafor special training in March andApril.39 There is no indication in theCuban documents I have seen that theMPLA renewed its requests until May,when Neto met Cuban Deputy PrimeMinister Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville,“and asked [Cuba’s] help to transportsome weapons, and also asked about thepossibility of a broader and more spe-cific aid program.” In late June, Netomet with Cadelo in Maputo,Mozambique, and renewed his re-quest.40

Three weeks later the United Statesdecided to greatly expand the CIA’scovert operation in Angola (increasingaid to the FNLA and initiating support

FIDEL CASTRO’S 1977SOUTHERN AFRICA TOUR:A REPORT TO HONECKER

Editor’s Note: In early 1977, CubanPresident Fidel Castro took a an exten-sive tour of Africa and then continued onto Europe and the USSR. During a stopin East Berlin, Castro recounted his ex-periences to East German Communistleader Erich Honecker. The record ofthose discussions was located in the ar-chives of the former ruling Socialist UnityParty of Germany (SED) by Christian F.Ostermann (CWIHP/National SecurityArchive).

The following excerpt—from a dis-cussion on 3 April 1977 at the House ofthe SED Central Committee in East Ber-lin—contains Castro’s impressions of thesituations in several southern Africancountries, (e.g., Tanzania, Angola,Mozambique, People’s Republic of theCongo), and several guerrilla or libera-tion groups in the region, such as the Af-rican National Congress (ANC), thenstruggling for power in South Africa, andtwo groups fighting to rule Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African Na-tional Union (ZANU) and the ZimbabweAfrican Political Union (ZAPU). Also in-cluded are Castro’s assessments of indi-vidual political leaders, remarks aboutcoordination with Moscow, and an over-all conclusion that Africa was the placeto inflict a major blow against world im-perialism. (For Castro’s remarks at thismeeting on the situation in the Horn ofAfrica, see the excerpts printed later inthis issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.)

Transcript of Honecker-Castro,Meeting, 3 April 1977 (excerpts)

Minutes of the conversation betweenComrade Erich Honecker and Comrade

Fidel Castro, Sunday,3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30

and 15:45 and 18:00, House of theCentral Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen,Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, PaulMarkowski (with Comrades Edgar Friesand Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters),Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cien-

continued on page 18


for UNITA), but there is no evidencethat Cuba and the MPLA knew aboutit. What they knew—and indeed it waspublic knowledge—was that the pro-American Zairean government ofMobuto Sese Seko had sent troops intonorthern Angola on Roberto’s side. ByMay, Portugal was no longer makingany attempt to police even the maincrossing points with Zaire and it wasreported that over one thousand Zaireansoldiers were in northern Angola.41

Angola, warned Neto, “was being sub-jected to a silent invasion by soldiersfrom Zaire.”42

By late July, Angola was in thethroes of civil war and Havana finallygeared into action. From August 3-8, aseven-man Cuban delegation, led by avery senior military officer, Raúl DíazArgüelles, was in Angola. “Their mis-sion was to pin down on the ground withthe leaders of the MPLA exactly whataid they wanted, the objectives theyexpected to achieve with this aid, andthe stages in which the aid should begiven.”43 They also brought Neto the$100,000 he had requested six monthsearlier. [See doc. 5]

Neto wanted Cuban military in-structors. He did not have a precise fig-ure in mind, but he was thinking of nomore than a hundred men who wouldbe spread out among many small train-ing centers. He also wanted Cuba tosend weapons, clothing, and food forthe recruits. On the basis of this request,Díaz Argüelles drafted a proposal for amilitary mission “that would include 65officers and 29 noncommissioned of-ficers and soldiers for a grand total of94 compañeros.”44

This plan was reworked in Havanaafter Díaz Argüelles returned. The re-vised plan contemplated the dispatch of480 men who would create and stafffour training centers (Centros deInstrucción Revolucionaria or CIRs).Some 5,300 Angolans would be trainedin these CIRs within three to six months.Cuba would send the weapons for theinstructors and for the recruits in theCIRs, as well as enough food, clothing,camping gear, toiletries, medicine, cots,and bedclothes for 5,300 men for sixmonths. The CIRs would begin oper-ating in mid-October.45 In other words,

Cuba decided to offer Neto almost fivetimes more instructors than he had re-quested. In Risquet’s words, “If we weregoing to send our men, we had to sendenough to fulfill the mission and to de-fend themselves, because too small agroup would simply have been over-whelmed.”46

Contrary to the widespread imageof the Cuban intervention in Angola,Havana had been slow to get involved.The documents that I have seen do notexplain this delay, and I have not beenable to interview those protagonists whocould provide an answer, notably Fideland Raúl Castro. Perhaps there was,on Cuba’s part, a reluctance to be drawninto what could become an open-endedconflict. Perhaps there was reluctanceto jeopardize relations with the Westwhen, after a long period of isolationand hostility, they were markedly im-proving: for the first time, the UnitedStates was interested in a modus viv-endi with Cuba;47 the Organization ofAmerican States was preparing to liftits sanctions; and West European gov-ernments were offering low interestloans. Perhaps Cuba had feared that thedispatch of military instructors wouldoffend even friendly African countrieslike Tanzania; or perhaps the attentionof the Cuban leaders was distracted bythe preparations for the first Congressof the Cuban Communist party thatwould be held in December. “The revo-lution was institutionalized in 1975,”remarks Risquet. “It was a year ofnever-ending work. This may haveplayed a role. And the situation inAngola was quite confused. In the firstmonths of 1975 there was very littlediscussion in the sessions of the Politi-cal Bureau about Angola. Our focuswas on domestic matters.”48

None of these explanations is verypersuasive. By preparing to host a con-ference for the independence of PuertoRico, Cuba was signalling that therewere limits to the price it would pay forimproved ties with Washington.49 Bysending troops to Syria in October1973—troops that might well have be-come involved in a major clash with theIsraelis—Cuba had demonstrated itscontinued willingness to take risks fora cause it believed just.50 Some may

claim that Cuba did not move sooner tohelp the MPLA because the SovietUnion did not want it to. But can oneseriously argue that Cuba needed So-viet permission to send $100,000 toNeto? Others may repeat the canardthat Cuba sent 200 military instructorsto Angola in the spring of 1975,51 butthe evidence flatly contradicts this. Inthe absence of a satisfactory explana-tion, one can only note that the Cubanleaders were focusing on domestic mat-ters and that relations with the MPLAsince 1967 had not been intense. In JulyCuba finally shifted gears. It was as ifthe music had suddenly changed; Cubahad made its choice, and OperationCarlota was born.

On August 21, Díaz Argüelles wasback in Luanda as the head of the fledg-ling Cuban Military Mission in Angola(MMCA). He reported to Abelardo(Furry) Colomé, the first deputy minis-ter of the Armed Forces. His reportsfrom late August through October (allhandwritten) are kept in the archives ofthe Centro de Información de laDefensa de las Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias and are a very impor-tant source on the evolution of the Cu-ban presence.52

Díaz Argüelles’ first order of busi-ness was to obtain Neto’s approval forthe 480-man military mission and fourlarge CIRs. “Comrade Neto acceptedour offer with great emotion,” he in-formed Colomé in late August. “He wasmoved. He asked me to tell Fidel thatthey accept everything.”53

The members of the MMCA beganarriving in late August, and they keptcoming through September, all on com-mercial flights. There were slightlyover 100 by early October. The otherscame aboard three Cuban ships that hadleft Havana on September 16-20: theVietnam Heroico and the Coral Islanddocked at a beach near Puerto Amboim“where no one lives” on October 5 and8 respectively; the La Plata reachedPunta Negra (Congo Brazzaville) on the11th. Díaz Argüelles described their ar-rival in a lengthy report to Colomé.54

The three ships brought the weap-ons and equipment for the CIRs, includ-ing 12,000 Czech rifles for theAngolans. (They could not give them


Soviet weapons because in 1965 Mos-cow and Havana had signed an agree-ment that Cuba would seek the Sovi-ets’ permission before sending weaponsit had received from them to a thirdparty.) They also brought the trucks totransport the men and materiel to theCIRs. (The Cubans had correctly sur-mised that the MPLA would be unableto provide sufficient transportation.)There were problems, however, with thetrucks that came aboard the VietnamHeroico and the Coral Island, which“arrived in poor condition,” DíazArgüelles told Colomé,

and we had to repair a great many ofthem. . . . When I told you how impor-tant it was that the equipment arrive ingood condition I was thinking about thiskind of problem, because I knew thatwe would have to transport most of themen and material in our own trucks. Thedistances here are very great . . . andthere are neither mechanics nor spareparts ... Comandante, this is the largestoperation we have ever undertaken andwe are doing it in the worst conditionsand circumstances. With little time forplanning and with almost no knowledgeof and experience in the country . . . wehave had to improvise as we go along . . . It is a task of enormous magnitude. . . I have taken the steps necessary tostart the training on October 15 . . . sothat the troops will be ready on Novem-ber 5.55

By October 18-20, almost onschedule, the instructors, recruits andequipment were in place and the fourCIRs were ready to start operations. Onpaper, the MMCA had 480 men, 390 ofwhom were instructors in the four CIRsand seventeen of whom were a medicalbrigade. (There were 284 officers.) Ac-tually, there were almost 500, becausea few civilian pilots had been sent atDíaz Argüelles’ request to fly the smallcivilian planes that the MPLA had ac-quired and some specialists in air traf-fic control and handling cargo at portswere also attached to the MMCA.56

Meanwhile, the civil war contin-ued. The FNLA controlled Angola’stwo northern provinces bordering onZaire, where it had its supply line in menand material (which included, begin-ning in August, equipment sent by the

CIA). “Well armed, the army of theFNLA has but one obsession: Luanda,”reported Le Monde in late August. Oneof Roberto’s lieutenants boasted, “Wehave tanks. There is no force that canstop us from entering Luanda ... We willtake Luanda and it will be a blood-bath.”57 In mid-September, the headof the CIA Task Force on Angola wrote,“Mobutu committed his elite Seventhand Fourth Commando Battalions ...and the tide swung back in favor of theFNLA north of Luanda.”58 The MPLAstopped their advance on September 26,just north of the village ofQuifangondo—at Morro do Cal, 26 ki-lometers north of Luanda. As indepen-dence day (November 11) approached,Roberto’s impatience grew. “Thetroops of the FNLA ... will be in thecapital on Tuesday,” he declared on Fri-day, October 17. Over the next fewdays, he kept repeating that his troopswould enter Luanda “within 24hours.”59

On October 23, Roberto’s forces—about 3,500 men, including some 1,200Zairian troops60—attacked Morro doCal. But the 1,100 defenders, whichincluded about 40 Cubans, held firm.This was the first time that Cubans par-ticipated in the fighting. Five days later,a group of Cuban instructors foughtagain, with the MPLA, east ofQuifangondo to recover the village ofQuiangombe.61

The MPLA had been gainingground on the other fronts. “The presentmilitary situation favors the MPLA,”wrote Díaz Argüelles on October 1.62

U.S. intelligence agreed. In a lengthySeptember 22 report, the Bureau of In-telligence and Research of the StateDepartment warned: “Since the out-break of fighting in Angola in March,the MPLA has achieved an almost un-broken series of military successes ... Itis in complete control of Luanda andthe surrounding areas ... In the past twomonths it has won virtually completecontrol of the coast from Luanda southto the Namibian border and thereby hasgained unimpeded access to five majorports.” It was also in control ofCabinda, from which it could not bedislodged “without strong outside back-ing—i.e., direct Zairian military inter-

vention.” It held key areas in easternAngola (including virtually all the dia-mond-rich Lunda district). From itspositions along the southern coast it wasextending its control “well into the in-terior,” threatening UNITA’s core areas.Finally, the report pointed out, “Of ma-jor political significance is the fact thatthe MPLA controls 9 of Angola’s 16district capitals and is contesting a 10that Luso in eastern Angola.”63

By mid-October, with the MPLAcontinuing to gain ground, a conserva-tive British newspaper observed,“FNLA and UNITA know that theymust improve their positions by No-vember 11 or risk being left out in thecold,” while the Rand Daily Mail re-ported that the MPLA was “making avigorous fourpronged drive on NovaLisboa,” Savimbi’s capital in the cen-tral highlands, and the South Africanmilitary instructors attached to UNITAmused disconsolately “that the UNITAforces . . . are not in a position to offerthe necessary resistance to the FAPLA[the MPLA armed forces] withouthelp.”64 Meanwhile the Portuguesemilitary was pulling its units back to-ward Luanda in preparation for with-drawal by November 11.

It has been said that the MPLA waswinning because of the Cuban troops.But there were no Cuban troops, onlyinstructors, and none had participatedin any fighting until the handful foughtat Morro do Cal on October 23. Thereal explanation for the MPLA’s suc-cess is perhaps provided by the ZambiaDaily Mail, which was unsympatheticto the movement. After noting that theMPLA was “almost certain to emergeas the dominant force” once the Portu-guese departed, it stated: “There is asense of purpose and a spirit of belong-ing among MPLA members and sym-pathizers which the two other move-ments cannot match.”65

The imminent victory of the MPLAforced South Africa, which had beenproviding weapons and military instruc-tors to the FNLA and UNITA since lateAugust, to make a decision. “The choicelay between active South African mili-tary participation on the one hand and—in effect—acceptance of an MPLA vic-tory on the other,” writes a South Afri-


can military historian. Prodded byUNITA, the FNLA, Mobutu and theUnited States, Pretoria decided to es-calate. “The go-ahead was given onOctober 14.” 66

That day, a South African columncrossed into Angola from northeasternNamibia (South-West Africa). For thefirst few days the column moved westjust north of the border. Then it veerednorth-west deep into Angola.67 TheSouth Africans advanced at full speed,sixty or seventy kilometers a day, meet-ing scant and ineffectual resistance. Sada Bandeira (Lubango) fell on October24; Moçamedes, the major port ofsouthern Angola, on the 28th.

At first Díaz Argüelles underesti-mated the gravity of the threat. Therewere no Cubans in the area, and he hadno clear idea of the strength of the en-emy. “The MPLA still has the advan-tage, only ten days before indepen-dence,” he concluded at the end of Oc-tober. “The enemy, ill-prepared anddispirited, including the Zairian armyunits ... is giving us the breathing spaceto train the [MPLA] battalions.”68

On November 2 and 3, Cubans par-ticipated in the fighting for the first timesince the battles for Morro do Cal andQuiangombe on October 23 and 28.This time, the military instructors joinedin the fight to defend Benguela from theadvancing South Africans. “We werefacing the best organised and heaviestFAPLA opposition to date,” wrote aSouth African, Cdr. Jan Breytenbach,who led one of the invading units.69

Outgunned and outnumbered, thedefenders of Benguela withdrew.Savimbi crowed: “Some time ago Ipromised you that there would be mili-tary surprises in Angola,” he told thepress in Kinshasa. “We are now wit-nessing the disintegration of Neto’stroops on Angolan territory. Today Ipromise you even greater surprises be-fore November 11, because we knowthat there are only nine days left.”70 OnNovember 6, Benguela was in SouthAfrican hands. The next day Lobito,twenty miles north of Benguela andAngola’s major commercial port, fell.“We were, evidently, on our way toLuanda,” writes Breytenbach. “Freshtroops were being deployed from South

Africa and the whole campaign wasbeginning to look more South Africanthan Angolan.”71

The South Africans, however, ech-oed by the entire Western press, abso-lutely denied that their troops werefighting in Angola and attributed thevictories to a revived FNLA andUNITA. The MPLA, on the other hand,denounced the South African invasionas early as October 22.72

As the South Africans were clos-ing in on Benguela, the MPLA’s Politi-cal Bureau “met in an emergency ses-sion” and listened to Neto’s proposal:to ask Cuba for troops. “There wasunanimous agreement,” states a well-informed account. Central Committeemember Henrique Santos, who hadstudied and trained in Cuba in the1960s, immediately flew to Havanabearing the MPLA’s request.73 The Cu-bans’ response “was, I can say, imme-diate,” writes an MPLA leader.74 OnNovember 4, Cuba decided to sendtroops to Angola. “That same day thehead of the MMCA was instructed tomake arrangements with the MPLA forour planes to land in Luanda.”75

The first Cuban troops—158 menfrom the elite Special Forces of theMinistry of Interior—left aboard twoCuban planes on November 7, arrivingin Luanda two days later.76 Through therest of November and December theCubans succeeded in holding a line lessthan two hundred miles south of Luandaeven though the South Africans enjoyedsuperiority in numbers and material.(North of Luanda, the Cubans swiftlydefeated Roberto’s motley horde.)There were numerous skirmishes andtwo small battles as the South Africansattempted to break through: at Ebo, onNovember 23—“Black Sunday,” ac-cording to a South African historian—the Cubans scored a significant vic-tory;77 and on December 12, at Bridge14, fourteen miles south of the strate-gic village of Catofe, the South Afri-cans took their revenge, but the Cubansquickly regrouped and stopped thembefore they could reach Catofe. TheSouth Africans were impressed: theCape Times reported on November 21that “FNLA and UNITA commanders[maintaining the fiction that South Af-

rican troops had nothing to do with it]greatly admired the courage of whatthey said were mercenaries from Cubafighting with the MPLA.” The officialSouth African historian of the warwrites, “The Cubans rarely surrenderedand simply cheerfully fought untildeath.”78 By late December, the Cu-bans finally reached rough numericalparity with the South Africans and pre-pared to go on the offensive. [doc. 6]

According to Westad, “After thecreation of the MPLA regime [on No-vember 11] the [Soviet] Politburo au-thorized the Soviet General Staff to takedirect control of the trans-Atlantic de-ployment of additional Cuban troops,as well as the supplying of these troopswith advanced military hardware.”79

The Cuban evidence, however, tells adifferent story. Until January 1976, theit indicates, all Cuban troops and weap-ons were transported to Angola on Cu-ban ships and Cuban planes (Britanniasand IL-18s) without any Soviet involve-ment. It was the Cubans’ inability tofind friendly places in which to refueltheir planes that led them to seek So-viet help in late December. TheBritannias and the IL-18s needed to re-fuel twice en route to Luanda. The sec-ond stop presented no problem: Guinea-Bissau was steadfast in its support. Theproblem was with the first stop. Ini-tially, Barbados agreed, but under U.S.pressure it withdrew its permission onDecember 17; thereafter the Cubansused, in quick succession, Guyana andthe Azores.80 In early January, theSoviet Union agreed to provide its IL-62s, which could fly directly from Cubato Bissau. The first IL-62 left Havanaon January 9 with Cuban troops andSoviet pilots. (The Cubans had not yetbeen trained to fly the plane.)81

Risquet states that on 16 January1976, Cuba and the USSR signed a mili-tary protocol in which the Sovietsagreed to transport weapons for theCuban troops in Angola.82 I have notseen the protocol. I have, however, twodocuments that support Risquet’s state-ment: a January 29 letter from Risquetto Castro [doc. 7] and a January 30 notestating that two Soviet ships had left forAngola with the first shipment of weap-ons for the Cuban troops there.83


It is important to put Westad’s com-ments in context. He writes that “. . .the Soviet General Staff ordered aboutsixty of their own officers to join theCuban forces from Congo. These menstarted arriving in Luanda on theevening of November 12.” In the Cu-ban documents in my possession thereare only six references to Soviet offic-ers in Angola, and all of them are re-lated to the dispatch of Soviet weaponsto Angola [for one, see doc. 7]; nonementions any Soviet input into militarystrategy. Furthermore, I have seen anadditional file of documents that wouldprove conclusively how little Sovietofficials had to do with Cuban militarystrategy and tactics. These are cablesfrom Fidel Castro to the Cuban com-manders in Angola. They demonstratethe extraordinary degree of control thatCastro exerted over the conduct of thewar. In February 1996 I was allowedto read these cables, but, unfortunately,they may never be released—not be-cause they contain controversial mate-rial (even the most ornery Cuban cen-sor would be hard put to find much tosanitize in them), but because only Fi-del Castro can declassify them and heis busy with other matters.

My failure to obtain copies of thesecables is all the more frustrating sincemany, particularly Americans, may readthis story of the early relationship be-tween Cuba and Africa and reflexivelyask, what about the Soviet Union?Wasn’t Cuba acting as a Soviet proxy?

It is a frustrating question, for itrequires one to prove a negative on thebasis of incomplete information. Sinceno available documents bear directly onthe question, I can only offer an in-formed opinion. There are two ways toaddress it. One is to look broadly atCuba’s Africa policy and its overall re-lationship to Soviet policy. The secondis to analyze Cuban motivations in Af-rica.

During the period under consider-ation, Cuban and Soviet policies ranalong parallel tracks in Africa. This wasnot a given: they could have been at log-gerheads, as they were in Latin Americathrough the mid-1960s because ofCuba’s support for armed struggle there.No such clash, however, occurred in

Africa. In Algeria, for example, theSoviets had no objection to Cuba’s veryclose relations with Ahmed Ben Bella’sregime and seem to have welcomedCuba’s decision, in October 1963, tosend a military force to help Algeriarebuff Morocco’s attack. Similarly, inCongo Leopoldville the Soviets musthave welcomed Guevara’s column,since they were themselves helping therebels. These parallel and often mutu-ally supporting tracks are even moreevident in the case of Guinea-Bissau.The Soviets began giving aid to thePAIGC in 1962, well before Cuba did.From June 1966, the Cuban militarypresence complemented and enhancedthe Soviet role, since the Cubans werein charge of the increasingly sophisti-cated weapons provided by the USSR.

It follows, some may say, that theCubans were mere cannon fodder forMoscow. But the fact that their poli-cies ran along parallel tracks during thisperiod did not make Cuba a Soviet agentor proxy. In fact, Cuba was followingits own policy, a policy that happenedto dovetail with that of the USSR. Thecase of Algeria is illustrative. The Cu-bans, at their own initiative, began sup-porting the Algerian rebels in 1961.Havana’s decision to send troops in1963 was taken less than two hours af-ter a direct appeal by Ben Bella, mak-ing it unlikely that Castro would havehad time to consult the Soviets even ifhe had wanted to.84 In the Congo, like-wise, Cuban policy was evidently notcoordinated with Soviet policy. Theconclusion is suggested by the fact thatChe, his men, and their weapons trav-elled to Tanzania via the cumbersomemethod of taking commercial flightseven though they could presumablyhave arrived on the Soviet ships that atabout the same moment were dockingat Dar-es-Salaam.85 A firmer indica-tion of this lack of coordination appearsin “Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria(Congo),” the secret manuscript thatGuevara wrote upon leaving the Congo.And certainly the Soviets played no rolein the Cuban decision to withdraw.Castro left the decision to Guevara, hisfriend and commander-in-the field. [Seedoc. 3] The Soviet Union was not inthe picture.

Cuba’s policy in Africa was guidedby Cuban national interest and ideol-ogy—a fact which U.S. analysts wellunderstood. When Che went to Africain December 1964, U.S. intelligencefollowed his trip closely. “CheGuevara’s three-month African trip waspart of an important new Cuban strat-egy,” wrote Thomas Hughes, the direc-tor of Intelligence and Research at theState Department. This strategy, he ar-gued, was based on Cuba’s belief that anew revolutionary situation existed inAfrica and that Cuba’s own interest layin the spreading of revolution there be-cause in so doing it would gain newfriends who would lessen her isolationand, at the same time, weaken U.S. in-fluence. There was only one referenceto the Soviet Union: “Cuba’s Africanstrategy,” concluded Hughes, “is de-signed to provide new political lever-age against the United States and thesocialist bloc. . . .The Cubans doubt-less hope that their African ties will in-crease Cuba’s stature in the nonalignedworld and help to force the major so-cialist powers to tolerate a considerablemeasure of Cuban independence andcriticism.”86 This was a fair analysisof the pragmatic aspect of the policy,but it omitted the strong idealistic mo-tive that also marked Cuban policy inAfrica. Havana firmly believed that ithad a duty to help those who were strug-gling for their freedom; it was this be-lief—not pragmatism—that led Cuba tohelp the Algerian rebels and risk thewrath of de Gaulle. As a PAIGC leadersaid, “The Cubans understood betterthan anyone that they had the duty tohelp their brothers to become free.”87

This policy would not have beenpossible without the volunteers—menwho freely chose to risk their lives andendure sacrifices in order to serve Cubaand help others. Just as Havana wasnot bowing to Soviet pressure by inter-vening in Africa, so too did individualCubans volunteer of their own free will.In Angola as well, Havana was not act-ing on behalf of the Soviet Union, eventhough President Ford and SecretaryKissinger liked to speak of “the SovietUnion and their Cuban mercenaries.”88

Rather, as former Soviet ambassador tothe United States Anatoly Dobrynin


writes, the Cubans sent their troops toAngola “on their own initiative andwithout consulting us.” His testimonyis supported by other Soviet officials.89

To try to impose a Soviet dimen-sion on the relationship between Cubaand Africa regarding the period andevents examined in this article seemsto me to warp reality to satisfy an ideo-logical bias. Robert Pastor, the NationalSecurity staff member who oversawLatin America during the Carter Admin-istration, wrote much the same to hisboss, National Security AdvisorZbigniew Brzezinski, in September1979:

As we embark on another anti-Castroperiod, let me suggest that we try to usea different term to refer to the Cubansthan that of “Soviet puppet.” My prin-cipal concern with that phrase is that itstrains our credibility and gets peopleinto debating the wrong issue. . . . Theword “puppet” suggests that the Cubansare engaging in revolutionary activitiesbecause the Soviets have instructedthem to do it. That, of course, is not thecase . . . I fear that if you or the Presi-dent use the term “Soviet puppet” in thefuture, you might just open yourselvesto unnecessary charges that our infor-mation or analysis is faulty.90

As former U.S. Undersecretary ofState George Ball has written, “Mythsare made to solace those who find real-ity distasteful and, if some find suchfantasy comforting, so be it.”91

DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT 1: Flavio Bravo, deputycommander of the Cuban forces in Alge-ria, to Raúl Castro, Algiers, 21 October1963, pp. 2-3.

My dear Raúl:Yesterday, we found out that Efigenio

[Ameijeiras] and 170 compañeros are go-ing to arrive tomorrow at 3:00 in two planesand that today, finally!, the ship is going toarrive.92 ...93

The situation demands that the entiresocialist camp send aid. Unfortunately,however, our friends here are not receivingthis aid: promises and more promises, butthe weapons never arrive. Meanwhile,[King] Hassan [of Morocco] has a battalionof Soviet tanks, MIGs and other Soviet

weapons. And so we are going to face thebizarre situation of having to go to waragainst Soviet weapons! Some of the Alge-rian officers are not only worried ... but in-dignant. They ask, and rightly so, how canthe Soviet comrades help feudal kings likeHassan and not understand that a real revo-lution, like Cuba’s, is taking place here ...

As for the socialist countries of east-ern Europe, the less said the better. Accord-ing to compañeros here, “They have be-haved like greedy shopkeepers who want tobe paid in dollars (and at higher prices thanthe Yankees) for the help the Algerian peopleneed.” ...

If you consider it useful, I think youshould share these impressions of mine withour good friend Alejandro [AleksandrAlekseyev, the Soviet ambassador to Cuba].I know that this is not the first time that theAlgerian problem has been raised. I believethat Fidel discussed it there [during his visitto the Soviet Union in spring 1963], butthere is no harm in raising it again. OurAlgerian friends have their own customs andtheir pride. They don’t like asking for help,and they say that they would rather fightwith knives than ask again. They say thatthey have already explained the problem,which in any case is not difficult to under-stand. ...

Aldo [Santamaria, the head of the Cu-ban navy], who has left for Oran, and Papito[Serguera] send you greetings. I think thatour “ebullient” ambassador [SergioSerguera] has scored a great victory and hassaved not our prestige—which was veryhigh—but that of the entire socialist camp.

We will continue to keep you informed.Flavio

[Source: Centro de Información de laDefensa de las Fuerza ArmadasRevolucionaries (CID-FAR), Havana.]

DOCUMENT 2: Excerpt from CheGuevara’s “Pasajes de la guerrarevolucionaria (Congo)” on his meetingwith African liberation movement lead-ers in Dar-es-Salaam in February 1965.

I decided to try to get a sense of the“Freedom Fighters’” state of mind; I had in-tended to do it in separate meetings, infriendly conversations, but because of amistake at the embassy, there was instead a“monster” meeting with at least fifty peoplerepresenting movements of at least ten coun-tries, each divided into two or three factions.I addressed them, discussing the requests forfinancial aid or training that almost all ofthem had made to us; I explained the costof training a man in Cuba—the amount of

money and time that it took—and the un-certainty that the resulting combatantswould indeed prove useful to the movement.I explained our experience in the SierraMaestra, where, for every five recruits wetrained, we ended up, on average, with onlyone good soldier and for every five of thesesoldiers, only one was really good. I arguedas vehemently as I could in front of the ex-asperated “Freedom Fighters” that themoney invested in training would be largelywasted; one cannot make a soldier in anacademy and much less a revolutionary sol-dier. This is done on the battlefield.

I proposed to them, therefore, that thetraining not take place in faraway Cuba, butin nearby Congo [Che is therefore propos-ing that the recruits of non-Congolese guer-rilla movements fight in the Congo] ... Iexplained to them why we considered thewar for the liberation of the Congo to be offundamental importance: victory therewould have repercussions throughout thecontinent, as would defeat. Their reactionwas more than cold; even though most re-frained from making any comment, somebitterly reproached me. They stated that theirpeople, ill-treated and abused by the impe-rialists, would object if they were to sufferlosses to free not their own, but anothercountry. I tried to make them understand thatthe real issue was not the liberation of anygiven state, but a common war against thecommon master, who was one and the samein Mozambique and in Malawi, in Rhode-sia and in South Africa, in the Congo and inAngola, but not one of them agreed. Theirgoodbyes were polite and frosty.

[Source: Guevara, “Pasajes,” 13-14.]

DOCUMENT 3: On 4 November 1965,Che Guevara, who was in the Congo, re-ceived a cable from Oscar FernándezPadilla, head of the Cuban intelligencestation in Dar-es-Salaam. The cable said:

I am sending you, via courier, a letterfrom Fidel. Its key points are:

“1. We must do everything except thatwhich is foolhardy.

“2. If Tatu [Guevara] believes that ourpresence has become either unjustifiable orpointless, we have to consider withdrawing.

“3. If he thinks we should remain wewill try to send as many men and as muchmaterial as he considers necessary.

“4. We are worried that you maywrongly fear that your decision might beconsidered defeatist or pessimistic.

“5. If Tatu decides to leave [the Congo],he can return here or go somewhere else[while waiting for a new internationalist


mission].“6. We will support whatever decision

[Tatu makes].“7. Avoid annihilation.”

[Source: Rafael [Fernández Padilla] toTatu, 4 November 1965, Archives of theCuban Communist Party CC, Havana. Seealso Guevara, “Pasajes,” 118-19.]

DOCUMENT 4: Letter from Neto toCuban leadership, Dar-es-Salaam, 26January 1975

Dear Comrades,Given the situation on the ground of

our movement and our country, and takinginto account the results of the exploratorytrip of the official Cuban delegation [Cadeloand Pina], we are sending you a list of theurgent needs of our organization. We areconfident that you will give it immediateconsideration.

1. The establishment, organization, andmaintenance of a military school for cad-res. We urgently need to create a companyof security personnel, and we need to pre-pare the members of our military staff.

2. We need to rent a ship to transportthe war material that we have in Dar-es-Sa-laam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, ifthis were a Cuban ship, could take placeoutside of the territorial waters.

3. Weapons and means of transporta-tion for the Brigada de Intervención that weare planning to organize, as well as lightweapons for some infantry battalions.

4. Transmitters and receivers to solvethe problem of communication amongwidely dispersed military units.

5. Uniforms and military equipment for10,000 men.

6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic.7. Assistance in training trade union

leaders.8. Cooperation in the organization of

schools for the teaching of Marxism (tosolve the problems of the party).

9. Publications dealing with politicaland military subjects, especially instructionmanuals.

10. Financial assistance in this phaseof establishing and organizing ourselves.

We also urge that the Communist Partyof Cuba use its influence with other coun-tries that are its friends and allies, especiallyfrom the Socialist camp, so that they grantuseful and timely aid to our movement,which is the only guarantee of a democraticand progressive Angola in the future.

Comrades, accept our revolutionarygreetings and convey the good wishes of thecombatants of the MPLA and of the new

Angola to Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

[Source: Neto, “Necesidades urgentes.Lista dirigida al: Comité Central delPartido Comunista de Cuba,” 26 January1975, Anexo no. 3, pp. 22-23, in “Informesobre la visita realizada por el mayorRodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en losdías del 16.11.75 (Frente sur),” n.d., Centrode Información de la Defensa de las FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias, Havana.]

DOCUMENT 5: Raúl Díaz Argüelles tothe Armed Forces minister [Raúl Castro],11 August 1975

Report on the visit to Angola and on theconversations held with Agostinho Neto,president of the MPLA, and the PoliticalBureau of the MPLA, as well as with chiefsof the army staff of the FAPLA [the MPLA’sarmed forces]:

1. We arrived at Luanda, Angola, on Sun-day, August 3 and established contact withthe MPLA. They immediately took us to ahotel. When President Neto heard about [ourarrival], he sent for us and put some of usup in his house and the rest of the delega-tion in another compañero’s house.

In our first conversation with Neto wegreeted him on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief [Fidel Castro] and the Minister ofthe Armed Forces [Raúl Castro], we gavehim the present and the note from the Com-mander-in-Chief and then we explained thepurpose of our visit.

We based our explanation on the fol-lowing points:

a) The request made by the MPLAwhen it was visited by a delegation fromour party and our government in January[Cadelo and Pina] and the request made laterin Mozambique by Cheito, the chief of staffof the FAPLA.

b) These requests were somewhat con-tradictory: during the January visit theyasked for aid and the training of cadres inCuba and in Angola, and later inMozambique they asked only for the train-ing of cadres in Cuba.

c) We were coming to clarify the aidwe should offer, given the FNLA’s andMobutu’s aggression against the MPLA andthe possible course of events before inde-pendence in November. We knew that theforces of reaction and imperialism would trywith all their might to prevent the MPLAfrom taking power, because it would meana progressive government in Angola. There-fore we were bringing Neto the militant soli-darity of our Commander-in-Chief, ourparty and our government, and we gave him

the $100,000.In the course of this conversation, the

Angolans complained about the paucity ofaid from the socialist camp, and they pointedout that if the socialist camp does not helpthem, no one will, since they are the mostprogressive forces [in the country], whereasthe imperialists, Mobutu and ... [one wordSANITIZED] are helping the FNLA in ev-ery way possible. They also complained thatthe Soviet Union stopped aiding them in1972 and that although it is now sendingthem weapons, the amount of assistance ispaltry, given the enormity of the need. Ingeneral, he [Neto] wants to portray the situ-ation in Angola as a crucial struggle betweenthe two systems—Imperialism and Social-ism—in order to receive the assistance ofthe entire socialist camp. We believe thathe is right in this, because at this time thetwo camps in Angola are well defined, theFNLA and UNITA represent reaction andworld imperialism and the Portuguese re-actionaries, and the MPLA represents theprogressive and nationalist forces.

We agreed that we would meet againthe next day, because we needed to finalizethe exact timetables, quantities and detailsetc. of the requests they had made.[Half a page SANITIZED—trans.]

We believe that [the MPLA] enjoys thegeneral support of the population; the popu-lation is organized and ready to fight, butlacks weapons, as well as food, clothing andbasic gear. We believe that we must helpthem directly or indirectly to remedy thissituation which is in essence the resistanceof an entire people against the forces of re-action and imperialism.

Revolucionariamente,

[Source: CID-FAR.]

DOCUMENT 6: Risquet to Fidel Castro,Luanda, 30 December 1975

Commander-in-Chief,I have just returned from a tour of

Quibala, Catofe, Conde, Ebo, Gabela, PointAmboim. The morale of the [Cuban mili-tary] commanders with whom I spoke (Polo[Leopoldo Cintra Frías], [Manuel]Cervantes, [Armando] Saucedo etc. at thesouthern front headquarters; [Romérico]Sotomayor, Calixto Rodríguez Proenza andRené [Hernández Gatorno]; [Jesús] Oviedoin Point Amboim) is very high: they areoptimistic and full of ideas about how tostrike the enemy. The morale of the sol-diers and officers with whom we spoke wasequally high. [Fernando] Vecino [Alegret],[Luis Alfonso] Zayas and, for the first part,Furry [Abelardo Colomé Ibarra], accompa-


nied me.This high morale, the large number of

our troops and the large supply of material,the nature of the terrain, and the materialand psychological condition of the enemylead me to conclude that there are no bigproblems for our [defensive] line atAmboim-Ebo-Quibala-Cariango; that wehave recovered the initiative in the south;that in the next few days our “active de-fense” will gain ground in the south. ...

Risquet.94

[Source: Archives of the Cuban CommunistParty Central Committee, Havana.]

DOCUMENT 7: Risquet to Fidel Castro,Luanda, 29 January 1976

Commander-in-Chief,Regarding the Cuban weapons deliv-

ered by the USSR in Luanda:We have explained the situation clearly toPresident Neto, who understood it perfectlywithout expressing any doubts.

1. “Furry [Colomé]95 and I spoke withNeto alone the day after Furry’s return [fromMoscow where he had gone to report to Fi-del Castro, who was attending the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party ofthe Soviet Union], and we informed him ofyour decision to send more troops, fullyarmed, in order to amass the forces neces-sary both fully to accomplish the goal offreeing the country from the South Africanand Zairian invasions and also to be in a po-sition to counter any possible increases intheir forces.

We told him [Neto] that some of thenew Cuban troops will arrive by boat withtheir weapons and the rest will come toLuanda by plane, where they will pick upweapons that the Soviet Union is going tosend for them.

We explained to him that this will al-low us to avoid the unnecessary time, ex-pense and risk of having the Soviets sendthese weapons to Cuba and then having totransport them to Angola with the troops.

Neto understood and approved with-out any qualm or hesitation.

2. Three days later, the Soviet general[head of the Soviet military mission inAngola] told us he too would like to inform[Neto], on behalf of the USSR, about thedelivery of the Soviet weapons to the Cu-bans in Angola. We agreed that the mostappropriate way would be that he, Furry, andI meet again with Neto alone. And so wedid. The general explained in some detailwhat weapons were being sent.

Neto raised no objection whatsoever,wrote down the most important weapons,

said that he would inform the Political Bu-reau of this increase [of men and arms], andappeared very satisfied with it, as an addi-tional guarantee to counter whatever theSouth Africans, the Zairians and the Impe-rialists might do.

In this meeting, Furry itemized someof the men and materiel that were comingaboard the Cuban ships. He spoke of a regi-ment.

3. Nevertheless, taking into account theconcern you expressed in your cable of yes-terday, in the meeting that Oramas96 and Ihad today with the president to discuss othermatters (SWAPO, Katangans, etc.), I re-turned as if in passing to this matter, and Igave him a list of the weapons that will bearriving on future Soviet ships and that arefor the Cuban troops.

I added that all the weapons that hadarrived in Soviet ships (the 73 tanks, the 21BM-21s, etc.) so far, as well as the ten MIG-17s, belonged to the People’s Republic ofAngola.

[I stressed] that the MIG-21s that werecoming in the AN-22 planes as well as theweapons that were arriving in the Sovietships and that were enumerated in the listthat I had given him were acquired by Cubain the USSR and delivered to Cuba by theUSSR in Luanda.

We told him that the Cuban troops, withall these weapons, would remain in Angolafor as long as it took and for as long as heconsidered necessary, and that we wouldtake care of the training of the Angolan per-sonnel, so that they would be able to oper-ate the tanks, the planes, Katyushas [rocket-propelled grenade launchers], mortars, can-nons, etc. And that if the weapons deliv-ered to the PRA [People’s Republic ofAngola] were to prove insufficient for thefuture Angolan army, the USSR would al-ways be ready to provide what was required,etc., etc.

That is, our conversation was abso-lutely brotherly and without the smallestmisunderstanding or reproach. However,we wanted to be absolutely clear—and weleft the list as written evidence—so that therecould be no misunderstandings, now or inthe future.

We consider this matter to be totallyclear and settled. Let me know whether youbelieve that this task has been accomplishedor whether you think it is necessary to dosomething more about it.

Greetings,Risquet

[Source: Archives of the Cuban CommunistParty Central Committee, Havana.]

1 I would like to thank the John D. and CatherineT. MacArthur Foundation for helping to supportthis research.2 Interview with Manuel Agramonte, Havana, 2July 1994. The only two studies worth citing areWilliam Durch “The Cuban Military in Africa andthe Middle East: From Algeria to Angola,” Stud-ies in Comparative Communism, Spring/Summer1978, 34-63 and Gisela García, La misióninternacionalista de Cuba en Argelia (1963-1964)[The Internationalist Mission of Cuba in Algeria(1963-1964)] (Havana: Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias, 1990). A garbled account of CheGuevara’s struggle in Zaire, based on his unpub-lished manuscript, is Paco Ignacio Taibo et al.,El año que estuvimos en ninguna parte [The YearWe Were Nowhere] (Mexico City: Planeta, 1994).3 Jorge Risquet, note to author, Havana, 13 July1996.4 For full information on sources for Algeria, seePiero Gleijeses, “Cuba’s First Venture in Africa:Algeria, 1961-1965,” Journal of Latin American

Studies (February 1996), 159-95.5 José Ramón Machado Ventura, note to author,Havana, 12 July 1995, 1.6 Verde Olivo (Havana), 28 June 1964, 51-52.7 See Piero Gleijeses, “‘Flee! The White GiantsAre Coming!’ The United States, the Mercenar-ies, and the Congo, 1964-1965,” Diplomatic His-tory, Spring 1994, 207-37.8 Che Guevara, “Pasajes de la guerrarevolucionaria (Congo)” [Episodes of the Revo-lutionary War], Dar-es-Salaam, late 1965, 13 (pri-vate collection, Havana).9 CIA Special Memorandum, “Implications ofGrowing Communist Influence in URTZ,” 29September 1964, 11, Freedom of Information Actrequest (hereafter FOIA) 1977/91F.10 Interviews with Godefroid Tschamlesso, anaide to Kabila (Havana, 30 June 1994) andMarcelino dos Santos, a Mozambican rebel leader(Havana, 27 June 1994).11 Guevara, “Pasajes,” 12-13, 120, 14.12 Quotations from CIA, Office of Current In-telligence, “Brazzaville’s Move to the Left,” 30October 1964, 5, National Security File CountryFile: Congo, box 83, Lyndon B. Johnson Library(hereafter LBJL), Austin, Texas; and “Discursopronunciado por Raúl Castro Ruz en acto por elXX aniversario de la construcción de las columnasde combatientes internacionalistas cubanos quecumplieron misiones en el Congo Brazzaville yel Congo Leopoldville” [Speech by Raúl CastroRuz on the 20th anniversary of the creation ofthe columns of internationalist Cuban fighterswho went to Congo Brazzaville and CongoLeopoldville], 11 November 1965, 7, Archivesof the Central Committee, Havana.13 Guevara, “Pasajes,” 10.14 See Jorge Risquet, “Brizna de paja en la oreja”[Straw in the ear], Brazzaville, 12 July 1966, Ar-chives of the Central Committee, Havana.15 Interview with Rolando Kindelán, Havana,11 March 1996.16 Rodolfo Puente Ferro, head of the medicalbrigade attached to the column, in Luis Hernándezand Félix López, “Africa mía,” Juventud Rebelde(Havana), 3 December 1995, 8-9.17 Helenio Ferrer and Rodolfo Puente Ferro toMachado Ventura, 19 May 1966, Archives of the


Ministry of Public Health, Havana; Ferrer,“Informe sobre campaña de vacunación(Continuación)” [Report on the vaccination cam-paign (Continued)], 27 May 1966, ibid.; inter-views with Jorge Risquet (Havana, 20 June 1994);with the Cuban doctors Rodolfo Puente Ferro(Havana, 21 June 1994) and Rodrigo AlvarezCambra (Havana, 12 March 1996); and with TirsoArcide Reyna (Havana, 5 March 1996), a Cubansoldier who helped in the campaign.18 See Empresa Cubana de Navegación, [recordof the Luis Arcos Bergnes], Manifiesto depasajeros congoleses, Centro de Información dela Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revo-lucionarias, Havana (hereafter CID-FAR); J’Transporte U/M 1546 to J’ Servicios U/M 1546,15 February 1966, CID-FAR; Estado Mayor Gen-eral de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias,“Relación de personal especial que se encuentraen El Cano,” 24 February 1966, CID-FAR. Inter-views with the Cubans doctors Alvarez Cambra,Puente Ferro and Julian Alvarez (Havana, 5 April1994) and with two other Cubans who partici-pated in the operation: Ulises Estrada (Havana,30 March 1994) and Rafael Orlando Duany (Ha-vana, 12 March 1996); Granma (Havana), 5 July1966, 1. See also René Gauze, The Politics ofCongo-Brazzaville (Stanford: Hoover InstitutePress, 1973), 205. and “Brazzaville — Cuba’snew base?” African Review, August 1966, 10.19 “Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1,” 9,enclosed in Department of State to all AfricanDiplomatic Posts, Lisbon, London, Paris, Rome,2 December 1971, FOIA 1982/0426. See alsoBennett (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 3 April 1968,FOIA 1982/0392; Bennett (Lisbon) to SecState,16 July 1969, FOIA 1983/0449; Dept. of State,Bureau of Intelligence and Research, “PortugueseGuinea: Talks About Talks,” 3 March 1970, FOIA1982/1049; “Portuguese Guinea: Guidelines forPolicy,” enclosed in Irwin to U.S. EmbassyLisbon, 2 October 1970, FOIA 1982/1879.20 President Luís Cabral, Nõ Pintcha (Bissau),22 January 1977, 4-6. On the Guinea-Bissaustory, see Piero Gleijeses, “The First Ambassa-dors: Cuba’s Contribution to Guinea-Bissau’s Warof Independence,” Journal of Latin AmericanStudies (forthcoming, February 1997).21 Interview with João Bernardo Vieira (Nino),Bissau, 1 May 1996. The conclusions in this para-graph are based on: a) a great number of Cubandocuments in my possession, the most importantof which are “Ayuda brindada por la Repúblicade Cuba al Partido Africano por la Independenciade Guinea y las Islas de Cabo Verde (PAIGC)”[Help given by the Republic of Cuba to the Afri-can Independence Party of Guinea and CapeVerde], CID-FAR, and Ministerio de las FuerzasArmadas Revolucionarias (hereafter MINFAR),“Realización de la Operación ‘Amílcar Cabral,’”(1974), CID-FAR; b) interviews in Havana withover 20 Cuban protagonists; c) interviews inBissau (25 April-1 May 1996) with the follow-ing senior PAIGC officials: Nino, LeopoldoAlfama, António Borges, Fidelis Cabral, ArafamMané, Joseph Turpin, Vasco Cabral.22 Interview with Francisca Pereira, Bissau, 25April 1996. The exception was the Panamaniandoctor Hugo Spadafora from July 1966 to May1967. In addition to the sources listed in the pre-vious footnote, I rely on three major groups of

sources: a) Luís Cabral, Crónica da Libertação[History of the War of Liberation] (Lisbon:Edições O Jornal, 1984), 253-54 and passim andHugo Spadafora, Experiencias y pensamiento deun médico guerrillero [Experiences and Thoughtsof a Guerrilla Doctor] (Panama City: Centro deImpresió Educativa, 1980), 15-79; b) interviewsin Bissau (29 April-2 May 1996) with the fol-lowing Guinean doctors and physician’s assistantswho served in the war: Paulo Medina, VenancioFurtado, Gaudêncio de Sousa Carvahlo, ErnestoLopes Moreira and Paulo Alves; c) interviews inHavana with the Cuban doctors Luis Peraza (5July 1994), Milton Hechavarría (20 July 1995),Raúl Candebat (12 July 1995), Pablo PérezCapdet and Rubén Pérez de León (both on 28February 1996).23 Interviews with Estrada (Havana, 7 Decem-ber 1994) and Oscar Cárdenas (Havana, 5 De-cember 1993).24 Interview with Víctor Dreke (Havana, 26 June1994).25 Interview with Robinson McIlvaine, Wash-ington, D.C., 5 February 1996. See also Gleijeses,“‘Flee!’” 220-21; CIA, Directorate of Intelli-gence, “Cuban Meddling in Africa,” 24 March1967, 4, FOIA 1996/605; U.S. CIA, Directorateof Intelligence, “Some Aspects of Subversion inAfrica,” 19 October 1967, 9, National SecurityFile Country File: Union of South Africa, box 78,LBJL; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, “TheLiberation Movements of Southern Africa,” 24November 1967, National Security File, NIE, box8, LBJL; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 19October 1971, 2, FOIA 1982/1889; “Policy Plan-ning Memorandum No. 1,” enclosed in Dept. ofState to all African Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon,London, Paris, Rome, 2 December 1971, FOIA1982/0426; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 7January 1972, FOIA 1982/2672.26 Interview with Paul O’Neil, Washington, D.C.,20 February 1992.27 “Discurso pronunciado,” 2.28 Lucio Lara, “A história do MPLA” [A His-tory of the MPLA], n.d., 100. I would like to thankDr. Christine Messiant of the Centre d’EtudesAfricaines of Paris for sharing this important,unpublished document with me.29 Rafael Moracén, who fought in Cabinda, al-lowed me to photocopy his diary, “Diario decampaña de Humberto Vazquez Mancevo.” Inaddition to Moracén (Havana, 21 June 1994), Ialso interviewed several other Cubans who foughtin Cabinda: Osvaldo Fuente Veitía (Havana, 25June 1994); Rafael Orlando Duany (Havana, 12March 1996); Fernando Galindo (Havana, 12March 1996); Tirso Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5March 1996). See also: César Augusto Kiluanji,Trajectória da vida de um guerrilheiro [The Lifeof a Guerrilla] (Lisbon: Editorial Vanguardia,1990), 29-34.30 Moracén, “Diario de campaña,” entry of Sep-tember 1965.31 Interview with Moracén.32 Interviews with Carlos Cadelo, the Commu-nist party official whose portfolio included Angola(Havana, 7 July 1995), and with Félix VélizHernández (Havana, 3 July 1995) and Luis MarioBurgos (Havana, 24 June 1994), who were pre-paring to leave for eastern Angola; MINFAR,“Síntesis histórica de la ayuda internacionalista

de Cuba a la R.P.A. [Summary of the history ofthe internationalist assistance given by Cuba tothe P.R.A.],” n.d., 3, Archives of the Instituto deHistoria de Cuba, Havana. (Hereafter “Síntesis”)33 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto, día 31de diciembre de 1974 [Conversation withAgostinho Neto, 31st of December 1974],” Ap-pendix no. 6, enclosed in “Informe sobre la visitarealizada a Angola” [Report on the Visit toAngola], 21 March 1975, 31, CID-FAR. (Here-after “Informe sobre la visita”)34 “Informe sobre la visita,” 1.35 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizarla visita a Angola” [Conversation with AgostinhoNeto at the conclusion of his visit to Angola], en-closed in “Informe sobre la visita,” 32-33.36 Cadelo, note to author, Havana 15 July 1995,7.37 Conversación con Agustinho Neto, día 31 dediciembre de 1974,” enclosed in “Informe sobrela visita,” quotation on p. 31; interviews withCadelo and Alfonso Pérez Morales (Pina) (Ha-vana, 28 February 1996).38 “Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizarla visita a Angola,” enclosed in “Informe sobre lavisita,” 33.39 Interview with Cadelo.40 Andrés González Ballester, “Estudio de lacolaboración militar cubano-angolana, 1975-1976,” Havana, Instituto Superior de RelacionesInternacionales, 1989, quotation on p. 10; Cadelo,note to author, 10.41 See The Observer, 20 April 1975, 11, and 18May 1975, 5; Le Monde, 3 May 1975, 6.42 Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 21 April 1975,1.43 “Informe sobre las actividades ejecutadas porel Partido Comunista de Cuba y GobiernoRevolucionario para dar cumplimiento a la ayudasolicitada por el Movimiento Popular para laLiberación de Angola [Report on the actions takenby the Communist party of Cuba and the Revo-lutionary Government to deliver the aid requestedby the Popular Movement for the Liberation ofAngola],” (hereafter “Informe sobre lasactividades”), CID-FAR, 1 (quoted); “Síntesis,”5; interviews with Cadelo and Víctor SchuegColás (Havana, 27 February 1996), who weremembers of the delegation.44 “Síntesis,” 6.45 See “Síntesis,” 6-7 and “Informe sobre lasactividades,” 1-2.46 Interview with Risquet, Havana, 15 February1996.47 See the trailblazing article by Peter Kornbluhand James Blight, “Dialogue with Castro: A Hid-den History,” The New York Review of Books, 6October 1994, 45-49.48 Interview with Risquet. In his capacity as amember of the Secretariat of the PCC, Risquetattended the sessions of the Political Bureau.49 The preparatory meeting for the conferencewas held in Havana in late March 1975. TheConferencia Internacional de Solidaridad con laIndependencia de Puerto Rico was held in Ha-vana on September 5-8. (See Granma, 1, 5, 15April 1975, all 1; 5 September 1975, 1; 6 Sep-tember 1975, 8; 9 September 1975, 2.)50 The mission to Syria (October 1973-January1975) is briefly described in MINFAR, “Lasmisiones internacionalistas desarrolladas por las


FAR en defensa de la independencia y la soberaníade los pueblos” [Internationalist missions of theFAR in defense of the independence and the sov-ereignty of other peoples], n.d., 26-34, Archivesof the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana.51 Le Monde, 14 January 1976, 8; Kissinger’stestimony of 29 January 1976 in U.S. Senate,Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommitteeeon African Affairs, Angola, 94th Cong., 2dsess.(Washington, DC: Government Printing Of-fice, 1976), 17; New York Times, 5 February 1976,12; Sunday Telegraph (London), 30 January 1977,8; Fred Bridgland, “The Future of Angola,” SouthAfrica International, July 1988, 32; Christian Sci-ence Monitor, 22 January 1976, 9.52 See Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late Au-gust 1975], 4; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 2 Sep-tember 1975, 14; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 3September 1975, 9 (signed by Díaz Argüelles butthe handwriting is Cadelo’s); Díaz Argüelles toColomé, n.d. [late September 1975], 5; DíazArgüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, 15; DíazArgüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 26; DíazArgüelles to Colomé, 16 October 1975, 2;“Situación militar en Angola. Octubre/75” [Mili-tary Situation in Angola, October 1975], Novem-ber (1?), 1975, 13. Díaz Argüelles also cabledspecific requests. See MINFAR “Solicitud deArgüelles,” 25 August 1975 through 26 Septem-ber 1975, CID-FAR. After Cuba decided to sendtroops to Angola on November 4, a more seniorofficer, Leopoldo Cintra Frías, replaced DíazArguelles as head of the MMCA. He arrived inAngola on November 11.53 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late August1975], 1, 4, CID-FAR.54 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975,2, CID-FAR.55 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975,5, 9-11, 12, CID-FAR. See also MINFAR,“Composición de fuerzas y medios de la unidadincluyendo el incremento del Punto 4,” n.d. [lateOctober 1975]. On the 1965 agreement: interviewwith Estrada, who was a senior intelligence of-ficer at the time, Havana, 18 December 1994.56 MINFAR, “Composición de fuerzas y mediosde la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto4,” n.d. [late October 1975]; MINFAR “Solicitudde Argüelles,” 25 August 1975 through 26 Sep-tember 1975, CID-FAR; “Informe sobre lasactividades,” 3; “Síntesis,” 11-12.57 Quotations from Le Monde, 20 August 1975,4 and 19 August 1975, 3. The best analysis of theUS role in the Angolan civil war is Raymond L.Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (rev. ed.,Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 556-93.58 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIAStory (New York: Norton, 1978), 163.59 Quotations from Elima (Kinshasa), 21 Octo-ber 1975, 1, and 23 October 1975, 1.60 See F.J. du Toit Spies, Operasie Savannah.Angola 1975-1976 (Pretoria: S.A. Weermag,1989), 132 and Sophia du Preez, Aventuur inAngola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldatein Angola 1975-1976 [Adventure in Angola: TheStory of South Africa’s Soldiers in Angola 1975-1976] (Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik 1989), 113.61 Díaz Argüelles, “Situación militar en Angola.Octubre / 75,” November (1?) 1975, 3-5, CID-FAR; “Síntesis,” 14-17.

62 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975,11, CID-FAR.63 Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence andResearch, “Angola: The MPLA Prepares for In-dependence,” 22 September 1975, 4-5, FOIACollection, National Security Archive, Washing-ton, D.C.64 Quotations from: Daily Telegraph (London),10 October 1975, 16; Rand Daily Mail(Johannesburg), 23 October 1975, 1; Spies,Operasie Savannah, 82.65 Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka), 9 October 1975,4.66 Quotations from Helmoed-Römer Heitman,South African War Machine (Novato, Calif.:Presidio Press, 1985), 170 and Dirk and Johannade Villiers, P.W. - A Biography of South Africa’sPresident P.W. Botha (Cape Town: Tafelberg,1984), 251. On the controversial issue ofWashington’s role, a good starting point is ChesterCrocker, High Noon in Southern Africa: MakingPeace in a Rough Neighborhood (New York:Norton, 1992), 49.67 See Spies, Operasie Savannah, 87-95 and duPreez, Aventuur, 65-72. For the South Africancampaign, see Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, Forged inBattle (Cape Town: Saayaman & Weber, 1986);idem, They Live By the Sword (Alberton, S.A.:Lemur, 1990), 18-66; Spies, Operasie Savannah;du Preez, Aventuur.68 Díaz Argüelles, “Situación militar en Angola.Octubre/75,” November (1?) 1975, 10, CID-FAR.69 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, 72.70 Elima, 3 November 1975, 1.71 Breytenbach, Forged in Battle, 108-09.72 For the Western press, see Rand Daily Mail,8 November 1975, 8; Cape Times, 13 November1975, 1; London Times, 6 November 1975, 5;Washington Post, 7 November 1975, 7; Guard-ian (Manchester), 4 November 1975, 3; New YorkTimes, 9 November 1975, 18. For the MPLA’sdenunciations, see FBIS, VIII, 23 October 1975,E2 and Granma, 25 October 1975, 8.73 Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angolain the Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1983), 30.74 Paulo Jorge, “Resposta célere dos cubanos aoapelo de Agostinho Neto,” Jornal de Notícias(Lisbon), 14 November 1995, 14.75 “Informe sobre las actividades,” 5.76 MINFAR, “Batallón de Tropas Especiales,”nd, CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to Colomé (“Informedel cumplimiento de la misión en Luanda entrelos días 4-18.11.75”) [Report on the mission inLuanda on 4-18 November 1975], n.d., 7, CID-FAR; “Resumen de los cables recibidos.Noviembre 75” [Summary of the cables received],entry of 9 November 1975, CID-FAR. The Cu-ban planes, two aging Britannias, refuelled twiceen route to Luanda.77 Du Preez, Aventuur, 142.78 Quotations from Cape Times, 21 November1975, 1, and Spies, Operasie Savannah, 108.79 See Westad article in this Bulletin.80 See “Informe sobre la visita realizada por elmayor Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en losdías del 16.11.75 al 26.11.75 (Frente sur)” [Re-port on the visit to Angola by Major RodobaldoDíaz Padraga on 16-26 November 1975 (South-ern front)], n.d., CID-FAR; Lucas Molina toColomé (“Informe del cumplimiento de la misiónen Luanda entre los días 4-18.11.75 [Report on

the mission to Angola on November 4-18]”), n.d.,CID-FAR; Raúl Pérez Millares and Eliseo MatosAndreu (representatives of Cubana de Aviaciónin Barbados) to Olivio, 17 December 1975, CID-FAR; González Bellester, “Estudio de lacolaboración,” 12-13. On the U.S. campaign toclose airports for the Cuban airlift, see the fol-lowing documents, all in FOIA collection, Na-tional Security Archive: U.S. Embassy Port ofSpain to SecState, 19 December 1975; Kissingerto U.S. Embassy Georgetown, 20 December1975; SecState to all American Republic Diplo-matic Posts, 20 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S.Embassy Georgetown, 24 December 1975;Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Lisbon, 22 Decem-ber 1975; and U.S. Embassy Lisbon to SecState,8 January 1976, FOIA, MF 8904623 S.1. The factthat the Cubans were in charge was well reportedin the Western press: see, e.g., Economist, 27 De-cember 1975, 26; Daily Telegraph, 19 December1975, 4; Le Monde, 18 January 1976, 1; Chris-tian Science Monitor, 22 January 1976, 9; Wash-ington Post, 10 March 1976, 15.81 MINFAR “Conversación con el embajadorsoviético,” 6 January 1976, CID-FAR; GustavoChui (deputy chief of the Puesto de Mando deAngola in the EMG) to Comandante de BrigadaRogelio Acevedo, 9 January 1976, CID-FAR;Raúl Castro to Severo Aguirre, 31 January 1976,CID-FAR.82 Interview with Risquet.83 See Chui (Subjefe del Puesto de Mando deAngola en el EMG) to Cdte Juan Escalona (Jefedel Puesto de Mando), 30 January 1976, CID-FAR.84 See Gleijeses, “Cuba’s First Venture,” 174.85 See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, weeklyreports, “The Situation in the Congo,” 10 March1965, 5-6, 31 March 1965, 4, and 14 April 1965,4, all in National Security File Country File:Congo, box 87, LBJL; CIA, Office of Current In-telligence, “Tanzanian Support for the CongoRebels,” 7 April 1965, 4, ibid.86 Hughes to SecState, “Che Guevara’s AfricanVenture,” 19 April 1965, 1-2, National SecurityFile Country File: Cuba, box 20, LBJL.87 Interview with Turpin.88 Ford, quoted in New York Times, 11 February1976, 1. According to press reports, Kissingerbelieved that the Cubans had intervened on theirown initiative, but he chose the politically morerewarding course of claiming that Cuba “was act-ing merely as the ‘client state’ of the SovietUnion.” (New York Times, 5 February 1976, 12.)See also Kissinger’s 29 January 1976 testimonyin US Senate, Angola, 6-55, quotation on 8.89 In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador toAmerica’s Six Cold War Presidents (New York:Times Books, 1995), 362. See also ArkadyShevchenko, Breaking With Moscow (New York:Knopf, 1985), 271-72; Yuri Pavlov, Soviet-Cu-ban Alliance: 1959-1991 (New Brunswick, NJ:Transaction Publishers, 1994).90 Pastor to Brzezinski, 21 September 1979,White House Central File, box CO-21, JimmyCarter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Carter calledCastro “a Soviet puppet”; Brzezinski dismissedthe Cubans as “proxy military forces” and CIAdirector Stansfield Turner blithely spoke of “Cu-ban mercenaries.” See Carter, Keeping Faith:Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam


Books, 1982), 479; Brzezinski, Power and Prin-ciple: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux,1983), 56, 146, 187; and Turner, Secrecy and De-mocracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston:Houghton & Mifflin, 1985), 86, 92.91 George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern:Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1982), 374. Cuba’srole in Shaba and the Horn go beyond the scopeof this essay. For Cuba and Shaba, see PieroGleijeses, “Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carterand the Invasions of Shaba, “International His-tory Review, February 1996, 70-103.92 The 686 men of the Grupo Especial deInstrucción (GEI) arrived in Algeria aboard twospecial flights of Cubana de aviación that leftHavana on October 21, and on two ships, theAracelio Iglesias and the Andrés González Lines,which reached Oran on October 22 and 29 re-spectively. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the com-mander of the GEI.93 In this article the ellipsis is used to indicateauthor’s editing. Any sanitized words or sentencesare clearly indicated as such.94 On 3 December 1975, Risquet flew to Angolaas head of the Cuban Mission in Luanda. As such,he was above the ambassador (Oscar Oramas) andat the same level as the chief of the MMCA.95 “Because of the growing scope of our help tothe MPLA,” on 25 November 1975 the first vice-minister of the armed forces, Abelardo ColoméIbarra, had flown from Cuba to Angola to becomethe head of the MMCA. (“Síntesis,” 23-24.)96 Oscar Oramas, a senior foreign ministry offi-cial and former ambassador to Guinea Conakry(1966-73), had arrived in December 1975 to serveas Cuba’s first ambassador to Angola.

Piero Gleijeses is Professor of U.S. For-eign Policy at the Johns Hopkins Uni-versity School of Advanced Interna-tional Studies in Washington, D.C. Heis the author of, among other works,Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revo-lution and the United States (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

CASTRO’S TRIP TO AFRICAcontinued from page 8

fuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes[Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him totake the floor—ed.]Fidel Castro: [sections omitted—ed.]

We visited Tanzania because of an oldcommitment. We have built three schoolsthere, sent a medical brigade, and given helpin other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talkabout economic matters above all. The risein oil prices had affected Tanzania tremen-dously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oila year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal andcotton crops has to be used for the purchaseof oil. The Chinese are still present in Tan-zania. They have built a few things there, inparticular the railroad. The armed units ofthe ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tan-zania also carries some responsibility for thesplit of the liberation movement of Zimba-bwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Af-rica armed fighting has begun.

The ANC fighters are trained in Angola.The Chinese had also offered training here.Tanzania considers the developments inZimbabwe in terms of prestige. [Its involve-ment] allows it to negotiate with Great Brit-ain and the United States over Zimbabweand to define a role for itself.

The ZANU has 5000 men in fightingunits trained by the Chinese. The liberationfighters in Namibia are also trained inAngola, however. Cuba and the SovietUnion have both set up training camps forthis purpose. The ZAPU is supported byAngola.

We flew directly from Tanzania toMozambique. There used to be differencesbetween us and the FRELIMO, going backto the times when FRELIMO was in Tanza-nia and Che Guevara had spoken to[Mozambique Liberation Front headEduardo] Mondlane there. At the timeMondlane did not agree with Che and saidso publicly. Thereafter news articles againstMondlane were published in Cuba. LaterMondlane corrected himself, but only inter-nally and things remained somewhat up inthe air. FRELIMO took good positions dur-ing the liberation struggle in Angola. But inour opinion they were not sufficiently com-bative. For a time FRELIMO got close to[Tanzanian President Julius] Nyerere. [Cu-ban Vice President] Carlos Rafael[Rodriguez] had spoken to [MozambicanPresident] Samora Machel in Colombo[, Sri

Lanka, at the Nonaligned Summit Confer-ence in August 1976]. After that we sent aCuban delegation to Mozambique and I wasinvited to visit. FRELIMO accepted all ofour suggestions for the visit. It was keptdiscreet, which was convenient for me.Samora Machel was really a surprise for me.I learned to know him as an intelligent revo-lutionary who took clear positions and hada good relationship with the masses. He re-ally impressed me. We spoke with each otherfor one and a half days. We supportMozambique. Machel asked us to send 300technicians. He was interested in Cuba’sexperiences, especially economic ones. Be-fore this we did not know for sure what in-fluence the Chinese had on him. Now he isgetting closer to the Soviet Union and othersocialist countries. He got a loan from theSoviets for weapons of 100 million rubles.In particular, the Soviets deliver aircraft andanti-aircraft batteries. We were very pleasedwith our visit to Mozambique. I want to saythat we consider this very important.

[Zambian President Kenneth] Kaundaalso wanted me to visit him. I had been inAfrica for a long time, however, and did notwant to extend my stay. Besides which theimperialist penetration has advanced far inZambia. In the Angola matter, Zambia tooka very wrong position, in spite of the factthat she was not forced to do so. We hadagreed with Angola not to visit Zambia. Afew days before my visit to southern Africathe Katanga [Shaba] battles had begun and[People’s Republic of the Congo PresidentMarien] N’Gouabi was murdered. I hadbeen invited to Madagascar, but did not wantto stay in Africa any longer. During a pressconference in Dar Es Salaam I had categori-cally denied that Cuba was in any way in-volved in the Katanga battles. I explainedthat the situation in Angola was differentfrom those in Zimbabwe and Namibia. I hadanswered all questions in very general terms.

Things are going well in Angola. Theyachieved good progress in their first year ofindependence. There’s been a lot of build-ing and they are developing health facili-ties. In 1976 they produced 80,000 tons ofcoffee. Transportation means are also beingdeveloped. Currently between 200,000 and400,000 tons of coffee are still in ware-houses. In our talks with [Angolan Presi-dent Agostinho] Neto we stressed the abso-lute necessity of achieving a level of eco-nomic development comparable to what had

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existed under [Portuguese] colonialism.Over 300 Cubans are working in the healthsystem. Fishing is recovering and the sugarplantations are almost all back in produc-tion. The reconstruction of the transport sys-tem is to be completed within 6 months. Ineducation a lot is being done as well. TheMPLA [Movement for the Popular Libera-tion of Angola] is doing a good job withmass organizing. Women are politically veryactive. There are no grounds for dissatisfac-tion there. Angola has good hard currencyearnings. Oil revenues are about 500 mil-lion dollars a year, without them having todo anything. They also generate about 300million from coffee. Now they are settingup a Party in Angola. The fundamental de-cisions in domestic and foreign policy arecorrect. We are still concerned about onearea: the development of the Army. The De-fense Ministry is doing hardly anything tofight bandits in the north and south of thecountry. The bands are particularly activein the center of the country. With our helpthey could deliver heavy blows againstthem. The Soviet military advisors are ac-tive at the highest levels. Our advisers areactive at the Brigade level and we are help-ing them with the training of military cad-res and the fight against the bandits. TheAngolan Defense Ministry underestimatesthe fight against the bandits [and] they arenot deploying regular troops against the ban-dits. We understand that the Soviet militaryadvisers are primarily requested to help themto organize the regular army and are not in-terested in helping in the fight against ban-dits. It is difficult for us to fight against thebandits on our own. Our comrades have hada lot of difficulties and have spent many bit-ter hours fighting them. The Cubans cannotdo it alone. The state of the army unsettlesus. In one region a brigade has been with-out a commander or chief of staff for a longtime. Until now the Cuban units have beenthe only ones fighting the bandits. The ma-jor share must however be carried out bythe Angolans themselves. The Cuban troopsare above all concentrated in Cabinda andin the defense of the capital, Luanda. I spokewith Neto about the situation of the armyand told him that things had to change. TheDefense Minister [Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira—ed.] is a good old fighter with the MPLA,but that hasn’t helped. An army general staffdoes not really exist. The country may have70,000 men under arms but the army is prac-

tically not organized. The Soviet advisersare primarily concerned with planning. Netowanted us to take the entire army in hand.In practical terms that might have been thebest solution, but not politically. The SovietUnion is the chief weapons supplier and theAngolans must speak directly to the Sovi-ets. Neto himself must solve these problems.We also cannot commit our troops to thefight against bandits because women andchildren are being killed in these battles andwe cannot take on such a responsibility.

Neto made a very good impression. Heis an outstanding personality, very cleverand decisive. He is increasingly the leadingfigure in the Angolan leadership. There arealso opportunists in Angola, however.Sometimes they try to approach us or theSoviets and to spread certain opinions. Weare very clearly taking a line in favor ofAgostinho Neto. There is also evidence ofblack racism in Angola. Some are using thehatred against the colonial masters for nega-tive purposes. There are many mulattos andwhites in Angola. Unfortunately, racist feel-ings are spreading very quickly. Neto hastaken a balanced position here, naming bothwhites and mulattos as ministers. Neto is ofcourse ready to contribute to this questiondecisively. He is open to suggestions andarguments. The Defense Minister is not asstrong. He does not have high standards.Because of this a lot of cadres do not havethe right attitudes. There are cases in whichthe military commanders have not visitedtheir military district for five months. Manyministers were appointed because they wereold war comrades of Neto’s. A fact remains:the army and general staff are not workingproperly. Cadres overall are being developedwell throughout Angola, but the Army is themost important. Things are going well, withthe exception of the army.

We are giving Angola a great deal ofmilitary support. At the end of the libera-tion war, 36,000 Cuban troops and 300 tankswere deployed. The South African merce-naries were quickly demoralized. The USAtalks about 12,000 Cuban soldiers. We arereducing our troop strength continuously.This year we plan to leave 15,000 men sta-tioned there. By the end of 1978 there shouldbe only 7,000, although it’s probable thatthe reductions won’t proceed quite as rap-idly. The main force is stationed in the south.If the Cuban military were not deployed inAngola the situation would be a lot more

complicated.The number of our civilian advisers

and experts will rise to 4,000 this year. Un-til now this aid has been provided free ofcharge. Starting in 1977, however, Angolais committed to paying for the living ex-penses of our specialists, with an additionalincrease in financial responsibilities sched-uled for 1978. Our military aid will remainfree of charge. The Soviet Union has com-mitted itself to supplying the entire mate-rial needs of the Angolan and our units.

While in Angola I also dealt with thequestion of the liberation movements inNamibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.Namibia’s liberation fighters are good, theyare also helping Angola with the anti-ban-dit battles. The South African ANC is a se-rious organization. Its president, OliverTambo, is a serious politician. Three quar-ters of the ANC Central Committee mem-bership is communist. They have a veryclear political position with regards toAngola, the Soviet Union, and other social-ist countries. The people have taken up thestruggle in South Africa, in time the ANCwill be a serious power.

The situation is most complicated inZimbabwe. The ZANU have 1,000 armedfighters. The Chinese and Nyerere are in-fluential with the ZANU. The ZAPU, how-ever, haven’t had any military forces of theirown. The best man in the ZAPU, GeneralSecretary [Jason] Moyo, was murdered [inZambia in January 1977]. During theAngolan war of liberation, the Angolan lead-ership could not give its support to the lib-eration movement in Zimbabwe. At the timeMozambique was leaning against Tanzaniaand supported the ZANU. Today things aredifferent. Angola’s influence is increasingand Mozambique is growing closer andcloser to Angola. The Patriotic Front in Zim-babwe is made up of both the ZANU andthe ZAPU, but this is only a formality.[ZAPU leader Joshua] Nkomo is supportedby Angola, the Soviet Union and the othersocialist countries. [ZANU leader Robert]Mugabe is supported by Tanzania and theChinese. Now there are possibilities for de-priving the Chinese and the Tanzanians oftheir influence in Zimbabwe. Zambia is sup-porting the Zimbabwean liberation move-ment for the prestige factor that’s involvedand because it wants to counteract Angola’sinfluence with Nkomo. With the positivedevelopment of Angola and Mozambique


the prospects of the liberation movement inZimbabwe can only improve. It is possiblethat Angola, Mozambique and Zambia willmove forward together. The ZAPU must es-tablish its own armed forces as soon as pos-sible. There are today 6,000 ZAPU men inAngola, and one could make an Army outof them. That would facilitate uniting theZAPU and the ZANU. I told Neto about thisand he agreed. Above all that would be away to roll back China’s influence. Nkomoalso understands this. He is very intelligentand talks to Samora Machel a great deal.Unfortunately he is very fat, and so hishealth is not good.

I told him and others that the personalsafety of all the liberation leaders was indanger. The imperialists would be movedto try and murder them all. They’ve alreadymurdered N’Gouabi and Moyo. Because ofthis it is absolutely necessary to take stepsto increase security measures for the lead-ers.

The liberation struggle in Africa has agreat future. From a historical perspectivethe facts are that the imperialists cannot turnthings back. The liberation struggle is themost moral thing in existence. If the social-ist states take the right positions, they couldgain a lot of influence. Here is where wecan strike heavy blows against the imperi-alists. The liberation army in Katanga[Shaba] is led by a general. These peopleused to favor Katanga’s secession fromZaire. Later they went to Angola, weretrained by the Portuguese and fought againstthe MPLA, until they went over to Neto’sside; now they could not fall out with Neto.They are good soldiers. Its military leaderis a general in the gendarmerie who nowwants to make a revolution in Zaire. Thesepeople are now saying that they are goodMarxist-Leninists and that they no longeradvocate the secession of Katanga. Theywent off in four different directions with fourbattalions. We didn’t know about this, andwe think that the Angolans didn’t either. Thefrontline states were split 50/50 in favor ofsupporting the Katanga liberation move-ment. We gave them a categorical explana-tion that Cuba was in no way involved inthis. The armed groups are marching for-ward. Their commander sends an open [pub-lic] daily telegram to the Angolan leader-ship and to the Soviet and Cuban embassiesin Luanda describing his advances and ask-ing for support. The Yankees are wavering.

They know very well that there are no Cu-ban units involved. Carlos Rafael Rodriguezis charged with speaking to the French andBelgian ambassadors to protest against theircountries’ involvement and to pressure themto stop. We want them to be worried, sowhen they are organizing their mercenar-ies, and to think that our troops are very near.

Angola has a certain moral duty, and adesire, to support the Katanga liberationmovement. They also desire it because theAngolan leadership is angered by [Zairianleader] Mobutu [Sese Seko]’s behavior.Angola has asked us and the Soviets to givethem weapons for delivery to the Katangans.We should wait for developments, however.Mobutu is an incompetent and weak politi-cian. It’s possible that he will not survivethis crisis. The frontline states are now infavor of supporting Katanga, while Angolafavors direct aid. We don’t want to be in-volved in order not to give the USA an ex-cuse to intervene. As I mentioned we willtry to put pressure on Belgium and France.

It will be a great event if Mobutu falls.In the People’s Republic of the Congo

there is a confusing situation followingN’Gouabi’s murder. The interior and de-fense ministers are competing for the lead-ership. There are also pro-Westerners in themilitary council. It is practically certain thatthe rightists murdered N’Gouabi. But theleft wing was also dissatisfied with him aswell. In other words there was a relativelyuncertain situation there. We sent ComradeAlmeyda to the funeral, and hope that thesituation will stabilize. We were also askedto send a military unit to Brazzaville. Theinternal problems of the country must besolved by the Congolese themselves how-ever. We have stationed a small military unitin Pointe Noire, and another one in Cabinda.

There were several requests for mili-tary aid from various sides: [Libyan leaderMoammar] Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Con-golese leaders. During our stay in Africa wesent Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to Moscow toconfer with our Soviet comrades and toHavana for consultations with our leader-ship. In order to find the best solution wemust think through this question quietly andthoroughly and consider it in terms of theoverall situation of the socialist camp.Above all we must do something forMengistu...[section on Ethiopia printed in“Horn of Africa Crisis” section—ed.] ...Withregard to military aid for the PR Congo and

the Libyans we have not yet come to a deci-sion.

I had consultations with [Houari]Boumedienne in Algeria and asked for hisopinion. He assured me that Algeria wouldnever abandon Libya. Algeria is very con-cerned with the situation in the Mediterra-nean because of its security interests. It isin favor of supporting Libya, as long as mili-tary aid is confined to the socialist camp.That is not only a question between Cubaand Algeria. If we are to succeed in strength-ening the revolution in Libya, Ethiopia,Mozambique, the PDRY [People’s Demo-cratic Republic of Yemen] and Angola wemust have an integrated strategy for thewhole African continent.

Angola is becoming closer to the so-cialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles ofweapons from the Soviets. Boumediennethinks that [Egyptian President Anwar]Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria there isalso no leftist movement any more, espe-cially after the Syrians defeated the progres-sive powers and the PLO [Palestine Libera-tion Organization] in Lebanon.

[Indian President] Indira Gandhigambled away the elections.

In Africa we can inflict a severe defeaton the entire reactionary imperialist policy.We can free Africa from the influence of theUSA and of the Chinese. The developmentsin Zaire are also very important. Libya andAlgeria have large territories, Ethiopia hasa great revolutionary potential. So there is agreat counterweight to Sadat’s betrayal inEgypt. It is even possible that Sadat will beturned around and that the imperialist in-fluence in the Middle East can be turnedback.

This must all be discussed with the So-viet Union. We follow its policies and itsexample.

We estimate that Libya’s request is anexpression of trust. One should not rejecttheir request. Cuba cannot help it alone.[subsequent sections omitted—ed.]

[Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien undMassenorganisationen der ehemaligenDDR im Bundesarchiv” (Berlin), DY30 JIV2/201/1292; document obtained by Chris-tian F. Ostermann (National SecurityArchive); translated for Carter-BrezhnevProject by David Welch with revisions byOstermann; copy on file at National Secu-rity Archive.]


by Odd Arne Westad1

For a period of roughly twentyyears—from the formation of the Cu-ban-Soviet alliance in the early 1960suntil the Red Army got bogged downin the valleys of Afghanistan in the early1980s—the Soviet Union was an inter-ventionist power with global aspira-tions. The peak of Soviet intervention-ism outside Eastern Europe was in themid- and late 1970s, and coincidedroughly with the rise of detente and theeffects of the American defeat in Viet-nam. This period witnessed significantefforts by Moscow to expand its powerabroad, especially in the Middle East,around the Indian Ocean, and in South-ern Africa. But it was also a period inwhich the traditional cautiousness ofSoviet Third World diplomacy was castaway at a peril: By the mid-1980s, manyRussians had started to question thecosts of the Kremlin’s imperial ambi-tions.2

What was behind the new Sovietinterventionism of the 1970s? Whichperceptions and motives led Sovietleaders to involve themselves deeplyinto the affairs of countries outside Eu-rope or their immediate border areas?As the doors to the archives of the Com-munist Party of the Soviet Union(CPSU) open, albeit slowly, we are get-ting new insights into the old problemsof Moscow’s foreign policy behaviorthrough CPSU documents on a multi-tude of international crises. This articleattempts to address some of the issuesrelating to Soviet interventions by re-visiting one of the main African con-flicts of the 1970s: the 1975-76 Angolancivil war.

In the dominant realist interpreta-tion of international relations, the So-viet elite is seen primarily as pursuinga set of interests on the internationalarena. The primary interest of the eliteis the preservation of the Soviet state—an interest which in foreign policy leadsto caution at most times, and expansionwhen possible.3

Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976:A New Pattern of Intervention

Was it the possibilities for expan-sion within the world system of stateswhich prompted Moscow’s involve-ment in Africa and Asia? Some ana-lysts, such as Francis Fukuyama, haveargued that it was the U.S. foreignpolicy of detente and the defeat in Viet-nam which more than anything elsepaved the way for Soviet expansionism.Recent memoirs and Moscow’s own de-classified documents lend support tothis view by showing that the mid-70swas the high-point of a wave of opti-mism in Soviet foreign policy—”theworld,” according to one former seniorofficial, “was turning in our direction.”4

Other scholars have concentratedon the immense expansion of Sovietmilitary and infrastructural capabilitiesduring the late 1960s as a cause for So-viet involvement in the Third World.This instrumental explanation empha-sizes in particular the growth of theSoviet navy, the development of a largefleet of long-distance transport planes,enlarged training facilities, and im-provements in global communica-tions.5

Analysts have also pointed tochanges in leadership and political orinstitutional conflicts within the Sovietelite. Samuel Huntington suggests thateach of the Soviet advances into newforeign policy arenas antedated theemergence of a new leader and becamepart of the new leader’s claim to power.Brezhnev is the prototype for such aleader, and the Soviet policy changesin the 1970s must then be seen as partof Brezhnev’s international agenda.Parallel with Brezhnev’s rise to power,the International Department(Mezhdunarodnyi otdel or MO) of theCPSU Central Committee (CC)strengthened its position as a maker ofSoviet foreign policy at the expense ofthe Foreign Ministry, and, while theMinistry was preoccupied with the tra-ditional arenas for Soviet foreignpolicy—Europe and the UnitedStates—the MO increasingly empha-sized the Third World.6

There are, in particular, two aspectsof the Soviet materials on the Angolancivil war which point away from expla-nations generally offered by realistscholars. First, there is the issue of thenature and importance of ideology inSoviet foreign policy. The Soviet offi-cials who designed the intervention inSouthern Africa were driven by ideasof promoting their model of develop-ment abroad. Their early contacts withthe Angolan left-wing rebels had shownthem that the Movimento Popular deLibertação de Angola (People’s Move-ment for the Liberation of Angola orMPLA) was a likely adherent to Sovietideas of state and society. As theAngolan group came under pressurefrom its enemies, many Soviet officialsused opportunity, capability, and stra-tegic interest as rationalizations of adesire to uphold a regime willing to linkup to the Soviet experience.

Second, there is the ability of So-viet allies—in this case the Angolansand the Cubans—to influenceMoscow’s actions. Luanda and espe-cially Havana pushed successfully forMoscow’s involvement in the civil war,both demonstrating leverage far in ex-cess of their putative “power.” In 1975,Fidel Castro initiated Cuban armed sup-port for the MPLA without Moscow’sagreement or knowledge, and therebyreduced the Soviet leaders’ role for sev-eral crucial months to that of spectatorsto a war in which the Cubans and theirAngolan allies gambled on prospectiveSoviet support to win. Although it cer-tainly was the direction of Soviet for-eign policy itself which poised Moscowfor its Angolan adventure, it was Castroand MPLA President Agostinho Netowho conditioned and shaped the inter-vention.

The main foreign policy aim forSoviet involvement in Africa was toscore a series of inexpensive victoriesin what was perceived as a global con-test with Washington for influence andpositions in the Third World. Politicaltheory—Marxism-Leninism—did play


a role in selecting who should be theSoviet allies in the area, and the largedeposits of mineral resources in South-ern Africa also played a role (prima-rily in terms of denying these resourcesto the US and its allies), but these weresubsidiary parts of the equation.

As the Moscow leadership devel-oped its links with the liberation move-ments, it created African expectationsof further support as well as a sense ofcommitment in its own ranks. Thissense of commitment was particularlystrong among the cadre of the CPSUCC International Department thathandled most of the contacts with Af-rican organizations. In addition, theCuban leadership—who had been in-volved in African affairs since the mid-1960s7—viewed the early Soviet in-volvement as a harbinger of a muchwider East-bloc engagement on thecontinent.

Still, a larger Soviet operation inblack Africa was slow in coming.Moscow’s ideologically inspired at-tempts to influence the policies of thelocal revolutionary movements com-plicated the building of stable allianceswith these groups, and often frustratedSoviet foreign policy aims. The linkswhich the Soviets—often wrongly—assumed existed between many Afri-can militants and the People’s Repub-lic of China contributed to Moscow’scaution. It was not until the Soviet andCuban leaders agreed on their military

plans in Angola in late 1975 that theSoviet Union finally made a major in-vestment in one of its Southern Africanalliances, and thereby made the MPLAa regional ally second in importanceonly to the African National Congress(ANC) of South Africa.

The “African strategy” was devel-oped by the KGB and received the sup-port of the Soviet leadership—andBrezhnev—in the summer and fall of1970. The KGB reports emphasizedthat the regimes and liberation move-ments of Southern Africa were search-ing for international allies, and under-lined the “simplistic” approach most Af-rican regimes had to world affairs, un-derstanding neither the conflict betweenthe two camps nor the nature of Ameri-can imperialism. The black politicalleaders of Southern Africa felt that theirefforts to gain aid from Washington hadfailed, and that the Soviet Union wasthe only major power which could as-sist them in reaching their political andsocial goals.8

The Portuguese colonies—Angola,Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and CapeVerde—were particularly interestingfrom a Soviet point of view both forpolitical and strategic reasons. TheKGB noted the Nixon Administration’srenewed alliance with Portugal, and therecent military setbacks for the colonialforces in their war against the libera-tion movements. KGB Deputy Chair-man Viktor Chebrikov explained that

especially Angola and Guinea-Bissauhad great potential strategic importancefor the Soviet Union, and that both theUnited States and China were trying toincrease their influence with the libera-tion movements in these countries.9

The intelligence organizations sawSoviet rivalry with Beijing over influ-ence in Africa as a major element be-hind their policy recommendations.The main military intelligence bureau—the GRU—reported that China was tar-geting countries and movements whichalready received aid from the SovietUnion. China, the GRU stressed, woulduse its resources to the maximum to at-tract African supporters, and could,within a few years, build its positionsufficiently to control large parts ofAfrica in a loose coalition with theUnited States.10

KGB chairman Yuri Andropov alsohad other reasons for recommending anincrease in Soviet involvement inSouthern Africa. Summarizing a reporton Western estimates of Soviet policyin Africa, Andropov stressed that West-ern experts believe that although theSoviet Union will strive to strengthenits position in Africa, “in the comingyears [it does] not plan a ‘broad offen-sive’,” limiting itself to “securing posi-tions [already] achieved.” These West-ern estimates, Andropov found, were bythemselves good reasons why the So-viet Union should step up its Africanoperations.11

The new emphasis on Africa inSoviet foreign policy was immediatelyput into practice in the case of Angola.After a number of unsuccesful MPLAappeals for increased support in thespring of 1970, Agostinho Neto wasstartled by the scale and scope of whatthe Soviets offered in mid-July. Sovietambassador to Zambia D. Z. Belokolosproposed a series of plans for Moscowto assist the MPLA in terms of militaryhardware, logistical support, and politi-cal training. In addition, the Sovietswere willing to send military advisersand offer political support for Neto’smovement in its conflicts with theneighboring African states: Zambia,Zaire, and Congo.12

The MPLA leadership respondedavidly to this Soviet largesse. In his

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meetings with Belokolos, Netodownplayed MPLA relations with“capitalist countries and social-demo-cratic parties,” and stressed that theSoviet Union was the party’s main in-ternational ally. Neto especially wantedthe Soviets to know that he saw nogrounds for working closely withChina. The Soviet ambassador, in hiscommunications to Moscow, believedthat the MPLA leadership’s positionsreflected the general sentiment in themovement—that the Soviet Union wastheir only likely source of major mili-tary support.13

In spite of their new-found enthu-siasm for African affairs, the Sovietleaders in the 1971-73 period found itincreasingly difficult to work out effec-tive ways of collaborating with theirfavored Southern African liberationmovements, and particularly with theMPLA. The Soviets found that Neto’smovement had more than its fair shareof the poor communications, bad orga-nization, and widespread factionalismwhich, as seen from Moscow, charac-terized all the liberation movements inSouthern Africa—with the possible ex-ception of Moscow’s favorite partner,the ANC.14

By early 1974, the MPLA had splitinto three factions: the Tanzania-basedleadership under Agostinho Neto, theZambia-supported group of DanielChipenda (known as Revolta do Leste[Eastern Revolt]), and a Congo-basedfaction calling itself Revolta Activa (Ac-tive Revolt). As John Marcum pointsout, the discord was not so much due todoctrinal differences as “faulty commu-nication, military reverses, and compet-ing ambitions.” The MPLA had never,even at the best of times, been especiallywell-organized or cohesive, and pres-sure from Portuguese counter-offensives, ethnic tensions, and chal-lenges to Neto’s leadership split themovement. Chipenda, typically, drewmost of his support from his ownOvimbundu ethnic group in the centraland eastern parts of Angola.15

The Soviet envoys spent much timeand effort trying to restore unity to theMPLA and create some kind of libera-tion front between it and the main tra-ditionalist independence movement,

Holden Roberto’s Frente Nacional deLibertaçâo de Angola (FNLA). TheSoviets held on to Neto as their mainAngolan connection, assuring a trickleof military and financial support for thebesieged leadership. More importantly,Moscow invited an increasing numberof Neto’s associates to the Soviet Unionfor military and political training. Still,the Soviets also gave some assistanceto Chipenda’s group, and continued toinvite Chipenda for “confidential” con-versations at their Lusaka embassy upto 1974.16

As Soviet criticism of Neto’s lackof flexibility in the unity talks mounted,their support for his movement gradu-ally declined. In March 1974, just amonth before the Lisbon military coupsuddenly threw the political situation inAngola wide open, the Soviet ambas-sador in Brazzaville drew a bleak pic-ture of the situation in the MPLA. Forall practical purposes the movement hadstopped functioning, and there was littlehope of Neto bringing it together again.The only bright spot was the existencewithin the MPLA of a number of “pro-gressively oriented activists” whowanted close relations with the SovietUnion.17

The April 1974 overthrow of theCaetano regime by a group of radicalPortuguese officers sent Soviet Africapolicy into high gear. By May, Mos-cow was already convinced that thePortuguese colonial empire would sooncollapse. Concerning Angola, the So-viet policy was to strengthen the MPLAunder Neto’s leadership, thereby mak-ing the movement the dominant part-ner in a post-colonial coalition govern-ment. Disregarding previous reports onthe situation in the MPLA, the CPSUInternational Department and the Mos-cow Foreign Ministry instructed Sovietembassies in Brazzaville, Lusaka, andDar-es-Salaam to “repair” the damagedliberation movement.18

This salvage operation turned outto be exceedingly difficult. The MPLAfactions’ views of each other did notchange much with the waning of Por-tuguese power. The Soviet ambassa-dors tried their best in meetings withNeto, José Eduardo dos Santos,Chipenda, and other MPLA leaders—

promising substantial Soviet support toa united MPLA—but to little avail. The“unification congress,” held nearLusaka in mid-August, broke downwhen Neto’s supporters walked out ofwhat they considered a staged attemptto remove the party leadership.19

In the meantime, the MPLA’s ri-vals had substantially strengthened theirpositions in Angola. Roberto’s FNLA,having received supplies, weapons, andinstructors from China, moved itstroops across the northern border fromZaire and started operations in thenorthern provinces. The youngest of theliberation movements, Jonas Savimbi’sUnião Nacional para a IndependênciaTotal de Angola (UNITA), signed aceasefire with the Portuguese in Juneand started recruiting large numbers ofAngolans for military training in theirbase areas in the east. In spite of itsdiplomatic efforts, the Soviet Unionseemed to be losing out in the battle forinfluence in post-colonial Angola.20

In October the Soviets decided todrop the idea of forcing the MPLA fac-tions to unite, and threw their weightsquarely behind Neto’s group. Accord-ing to what ambassador Afanasenkotold José Eduardo dos Santos, therewere two main reasons behind this de-cision. First, Neto had in late Septem-ber managed to convene a rump con-gress inside Angola, in which the mainMPLA guerilla commanders took part.The political manifesto passed by thecongress was to the Soviets’ liking.Second, the new head of the Portuguesemilitary administration in Angola, Ad-miral Rosa Coutinho, was a left-wingerwho openly sympathized with Neto’sviews. But however Afanasenko pre-sented the Soviet views, Neto’s peoplemust have been aware that if Moscowwanted to maintain some influence inAngola, it had little choice but to sup-port the “reconstructed” MPLA.21

The events of the two last monthsof 1974 seemed to indicate that Mos-cow had made the right move. On Oc-tober 21, the MPLA signed a cease-firewith Portugal, and on November 6,large crowds greeted the MPLA veteranLucio Lara when he arrived to open anoffice in Luanda. About the same time,forces of the newly organized MPLA


military wing—the FAPLA (ForçasArmadas Popular para Libertação deAngola)—took control of most of theoil-rich enclave of Cabinda in the north.In the main Angolan cities, MPLA or-ganizers, now free to act, started set-ting up strong para-military groups inpopulous slum areas, drawing on theappeal of their message of social revo-lution.22

Moscow in early December 1974drew up an elaborate plan for supply-ing the MPLA with heavy weapons andlarge amounts of ammunition, usingCongo (Brazzaville) as the point of tran-sit. Ambassador Afanasenko got thetask of convincing the Congolese oftheir interest in cooperating. This wasnot an easy task. Congo had never beena close ally of the Soviet Union—in theruling military junta were many whosympathized with the Chinese—and ithad for some time sponsored bothNeto’s MPLA rivals and a Cabindaseparatist group. The latter issue wasparticularly problematic, and AgostinhoNeto had on several occasions criticizedthe Congolese leader Colonel MarienNguabi for his support of Cabindan in-dependence. Still, on December 4Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the So-viet operation.23

Though noting the flexibility of theCongolese government, Afanasenkoknew that the job of reinforcing theMPLA would not be easy. In a reportto Moscow he underlined the problemsthe MPLA faced on the military side.Both the FNLA, now joined by DanielChipenda’s MPLA rebels, and UNITAheld strong positions and would beequipped further by the Americans andthe Chinese. In the civil war which theambassador predicted, the “reactionar-ies” would initially have the initiative,and the MPLA would depend on “ma-terial assistance from progressive coun-tries all over the world” just to survive.Politically, however, Neto’s group, asthe “most progressive national-libera-tion organization of Angola,” wouldenjoy considerable support. On the or-ganizational side, one should not thinkof the MPLA as a vanguard party, oreven as a party at all, but rather as aloose coalition of trade unionists, pro-gressive intellectuals, Christian groups,

and large segments of the petty bour-geoisie.24

In spite of the skirmishes whichhad already begun between MPLA andFNLA forces in late 1974, African headsof state succeded in convincing the threeAngolan movements to join in negotia-tions with Portugal and thereby attemptan orderly transfer of power in Luanda.These negotiations led to the 15 Janu-ary 1975 Alvor Agreement, in which 11November 1975 was set as the date forthe Portuguese handing over power toan Angolan coalition government.None of the parties took this last attemptat avoiding civil war too seriously, andsporadic fighting continued. The AlvorAgreement was also undermined bothby the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates, who decided to expand their pro-grams of military support for theirAngolan allies.25

The Soviets were prodded in theirwidening commitment to the MPLA bythe Cuban leaders. Cuba had suppliedthe MPLA with some material supportsince the mid-1960s, and Havana hadincreasingly come to regard AgostinhoNeto as its favorite African liberationleader. The Cubans told Moscow thatNeto would not, and should not, acceptsharing power with the other move-ments. Cuba would itself concentratemore on Africa (i.e., Angola) in its for-eign policy, and expected the Sovietsto upgrade their support for the MPLA.Moscow would not be bettered by Ha-vana. Afanasenko told the Cuban am-bassador to Brazzaville that “the Cen-tral Committee of the CPSU is atten-tively watching the development ofevents in Angola and reiterates [its]unity with the progressive forces, inorder to smash the cherished adventuresof foreign and domestic reaction.”26

The Soviet Union was also awareof the increase in the U.S. Central In-telligence Agency’s covert support forthe FNLA starting in late January 1975.The Soviet embassy in Brazzaville con-cluded that the American assistancewould lead Holden Roberto to make anall-out bid for power very soon. Theembassy experts realized that there waslittle the Soviet Union could do to as-sist the MPLA resist the initial attacksby Roberto’s forces. Their hope was

that the further increase in Soviet “tech-nical, military, and civilian assistance”which the Brazzaville ambassadorpromised José Eduardo dos Santos onJanuary 30 would arrive in time. Butin addition to their material assistance,the Soviets also tried to push the MPLAto mend its negotiation strategy. Mos-cow now hoped that a new alliance be-tween the MPLA and Savimbi’s UNITAcould get their Angolan allies out of thedifficult spot they were in.27

Moscow was joined in its wish foran anti-FNLA alliance by many of theindependent states in southern Africa.Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere at-tempted to get the Soviets to increasethe pressure on the MPLA leadershipto make the necessary concessions toforge such an alliance. Nyerere,—sym-pathetic to the MPLA’s political aims,—was exasperated by Neto’s unbendingdemands in the negotiations. TheAngolan leader was “a good poet anddoctor,” Nyerere told the East Germanambassador, but “a bad politician.”Nyerere also warned the Soviets againstdirect involvement in the Angolan con-flict. African countries would reactsharply against any form of foreign in-tervention, Nyerere said.28

By early summer, 1975, the FNLAtroops had mounted limited offensivesagainst the MPLA both along the coastand in the northern part of Angola.Then, in July, as another African-brokered attempt at negotiations brokedown, the MPLA counterattacked. Bythe middle of the month, local FAPLAforces were in control of Luanda, andMPLA troops began attacking theFNLA strongholds in the north. TheSoviets had not foreseen the MPLAmilitary success, although theBrazzaville embassy already in Aprilforesaw an improvement of FAPLAfighting capabilities because of the So-viet aid. However, it did not expect afull scale civil war to break out beforeAngola achieved its independence inNovember.29

Moscow now seemed to have therecipe for success in Angola. By a lim-ited supply of military equipment, it hadsecured the MPLA the upper hand inthe fighting. As the date for indepen-dence approached, Moscow expected


that the rival movements, or at leastUNITA, would return to the negotiat-ing table and become part of an MPLA-led coalition government. The Sovietexperts did not believe that the UnitedStates would stage a massive interven-tion, nor did they give much credenceto MPLA reports of direct South Afri-can or Zairean involvement. Their mainworry was the Chinese, who hadstepped up their FNLA assistance pro-gram from bases in Zaire. Moscowfound particularly disturbing the factthat the Chinese were joined as instruc-tors in these camps by military person-nel from Romania and North Korea.30

The Ford Administration was,however, not willing to let Neto’sMPLA force a solution to the nascentcivil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975,the U.S. president authorized a large-scale covert operation in support of theFNLA and the UNITA. Over threemonths, the CIA was allocated almost$50 million dollars to train, equip, andtransport anti-MPLA troops. In earlyAugust, South African forces, at first inlimited numbers, crossed the border intosouthern Angola, while regular Zaireantroops joined FNLA forces fighting inthe north. By mid-August the MPLAoffensives in the north had been turnedback, and Neto’s forces were retreatingtoward Luanda.31

In addition to its flagging fortuneson the battlefield, the MPLA ran upagainst increasing problems in securingtheir Soviet lifeline through the Congo.The flamboyant and independent-minded Congolese leader, ColonelNguabi, had been angered by Neto’spersistent criticizm of Brazzaville forsheltering Cabindan separatist groups.In an irate message to the Soviet am-bassador, Nguabi informed Moscowthat he would no longer accept thatNeto, “on the one hand, demands assis-tance from Congo, [and] on the othermakes accusations against us.” By earlyAugust the Congolese had informedAfanasenko that they would not acceptSoviet plans for large-scale support ofthe MPLA through Congolese terri-tory.32

It was the threat to the “Congo con-nection” which, in early August,prompted Moscow to ask Fidel

Castro—who had close connectionswith the Congolese leaders—to act as afacilitator for assistance to the MPLA.The Soviet leaders got more than theybargained for. The Cubans had sinceearly spring tried to get Moscow to sup-port an armed strategy on behalf of theMPLA. Already in February, the Cu-ban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam hadtold his Soviet colleague that “Thechoice of the socialist road in Angolamust be made now. . . . In October itwill be too late.” In late summer, Castroused the new Soviet request as a stimu-lus for launching his own plan for theintervention of Cuban forces inAngola.33

Cuba had sent military instructorsto work with the MPLA in its camps inCongo for several years before the col-lapse of the Portuguese colonial empire.By early summer 1975 these advisersnumbered about 250, and—in spite ofnot participating in combat—theyplayed an increasingly important rolein planning MPLA operations. TheCuban officers functioned as a kind ofgeneral staff for Neto and the MPLAleaders. Through their operationaltraining, Castro’s instructors suppliedthe necessary know-how which theAngolan forces lacked, especially re-garding communications, supply-lines,and coordinated operations.34

On August 15, Castro sent a mes-sage to Leonid Brezhnev arguing theneed for increased support for theMPLA, including the introduction ofCuban special troops. The Cubans hadalready developed a fairly detailed planfor transporting their troops to Luanda(or Congo), for supplies, and for howthe Cuban soldiers would be used onthe ground in Angola. Castro wantedSoviet transport assistance, as well asthe use of Soviet staff officers, both inHavana and Luanda, to help in planningthe military operations. The Cubansunderlined to the Soviets the politicalstrength of the MPLA, and the threatwhich foreign assistance to the FNLA/UNITA alliance posed to socialism andindependence in Angola.35

The Cuban initiative was coordi-nated with the MPLA leaders, who nowin turn tried to put pressure on the So-viets to get involved with the Cuban

plan for a direct military intervention.Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA under-ground leader in Luanda, on August 17appealed to Ambassador Afanasenkofor the dispatch of Soviet staff officersto the MPLA General Command, whichhad just moved from Brazzaville toLuanda. “The MPLA Command needsqualified advice on military questionsat the strategic level,” Lara said.Afanasenko, however, could onlypromise technical experts, but agreedto invite MPLA’s defense minister des-ignate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in lateAugust for talks with the CPSU CC In-ternational Department, the DefenseMinistry, and the Armed Forces Gen-eral Staff.36

In spite of their policy to supportNeto’s MPLA, the Soviet leaders werenot pleased with the content of the Cu-ban plan. First of all, they objected tothe use of Soviet officers and even So-viet transport planes in Angola prior toindependence. The Soviet leaders wor-ried that such a move would damagethe policy of detente with regard to theUnited States. They also knew thatmost African countries, including someclose to the Soviet Union, would reactagainst a direct Soviet involvement, aswould some of their political friends inPortugal. Second, the Cubans were, inthe Soviet view, not sufficiently awareof how even a Cuban intervention couldupset great power relations, since theFord Administration would see Cubanforces as proxies for Soviet interests.Third, Moscow was still not sure thatthe military situation in Angola war-ranted a troop intervention in supportof the MPLA.37

In spite of their displeasure, theSoviet leaders found it difficult to maketheir objections known to Castro. Mos-cow knew that the Cuban leader waswary of the Soviet policy of detente, andtheir experience with Havana told themto tread carefully so as to avoid episodeslike the 1968 near-break between thetwo allies. Still, Brezhnev flatly refusedto transport the Cuban troops or to sendSoviet officers to serve with the Cubansin Angola. The Soviet General Staffopposed any participation in the Cubanoperation, and even the KGB, withwhom the policy of paying increased


attention to Africa originated, in August1975 warned against the effects of adirect Soviet intervention on US-Sovietrelations.38

Havana would not be deterred bySoviet hesitation. The first Cuban com-bat troops arrived in Luanda in late Sep-tember and early October onboard sev-eral Soviet aircraft and rebuilt pre-revo-lutionary Cuban cruise-ships. Theyimmediately fanned out into FAPLAunits in the Angolan countryside, andtook charge of much of the fightingagainst the MPLA’s enemies. But theinfusion of Cuban troops was notenough to sustain the MPLA conquestsfrom early summer against the new on-slaught of its combined enemies.39

In September the MPLA continuedits retreat, hard pressed by Zairean andmercenary-led FNLA troops in thenorth and UNITA forces, supported byadvisors and material from South Af-rica, in the south. Savimbi’s incongru-ous alliance with Pretoria had given hismilitary units the equipment they badlyneeded, and they could now exploittheir substantial ethnically-based sup-port in central and eastern Angola. TheMPLA, meanwhile, was by mid-Octo-ber entirely dependent on its support inthe western Luanda-Mbundu regionsand in the cities. It controlled less thanone-fourth of the country, and was los-ing ground, in spite of Cuban reinforce-ments.40

The foreign alliance policies of theMPLA, and thereby its possibilities forwinning the struggle for power inAngola, were saved by Pretoria’s Oc-tober decision to launch an invasion.Moscow knew of the South Africanplans in advance of their implementa-tion in mid-October, and the Kremlinleadership discussed how to respond.The CPSU CC International Depart-ment considered the new stage of theanti-MPLA operations in Angola a jointU.S.-South African effort, and believedthe Soviet Union had to come to the aidof its ally. In the third week of Octo-ber, Moscow decided to start assistingthe Cuban operation in Angola imme-diately after the MPLA had made itsdeclaration of independence on Novem-ber 11. The Soviet aim was to infuseenough Cuban troops and Soviet advis-

ers into Angola by mid-December todefeat the South Africans and assist theMPLA leaders in building a socialistparty and state.41

The Soviet perception of the wid-ening role of the CIA in assisting FNLAforces from bases in Zaire also playeda role in Moscow’s reevaluation of itsAngolan policy. The KGB station inBrazzaville supplied vital informationon the dramatic increase in U.S. assis-tance, and Andropov believed that theAmericans had a long-term strategy ofequipping large groups of Angolan,Zairean, and Western mercenary troopsto be sent into Angola. It was alsolikely, the KGB said, that U.S. “experts”would increase their own cross-borderactivities.42

The reaction of most African coun-tries to the South African invasion ledthe Soviets to believe that it would beless dangerous than before to intervenein the Angolan conflict. Julius Nyerere,an African leader who Moscow re-spected in spite of his often blunt criti-cism of its Africa policies, told the So-viet ambassador on November 3 that inspite of deploring the war in Angola,Pretoria’s intervention had made out-side support for the MPLA necessary.He hoped that many African countriesnow would aid Neto’s movement. Still,he warned against a too open Sovietsupport for the MPLA, and hoped thatMoscow would channel the bulk of itsaid through African governments. TheSoviet ambassador, untruthfully, re-sponded that such would be the case.43

The Soviet military preparationsfor the airlift of Cuban troops to Angolaintensified in early November. TheCPSU secretariat met on November 5and decided to send Soviet naval unitsto areas off the Angolan coast. InBrazzaville, in a striking reversal ofroles within less than two months, theSoviet ambassador now exhorted hisCuban colleague to “intensify”Havana’s preparations for combat inAngola. “But a Cuban artillery regi-ment is already fighting in Luanda,” theCuban ambassador responded, some-what incredulously.44

Agostinho Neto declared the inde-pendence of the People’s Republic ofAngola on November 11, just as the

MPLA was fighting for its very exist-ence only a few miles north of Luanda.In the battle of Quifangondo valley theCuban artillerymen proved to giveFAPLA the crucial advantage over itsFNLA-Zairean opponents. Soviet-sup-plied BM-21 122 millimeter rocketlaunchers devastated the attackingforces and sent them on a disorderlyretreat toward the northern border, giv-ing the MPLA and the Cubans a freehand to turn on the South African andUNITA forces approaching from thesouth.45

During the week before indepen-dence, large groups of Cuban soldiershad started arriving in Luanda onboardSoviet aircraft. The Soviets had orga-nized and equipped these transports,although the operation was technicallydirected by the Cubans themselves.Moscow had made it clear that the pri-mary objective of these forces was tocontain the South Africans along thesouthern border and that they should notbe used for general purposes in the civilwar. For the same reason the SovietGeneral Staff ordered about 60 of theirown officers to join the Cuban forcesfrom Congo. These men started arriv-ing in Luanda in the evening of Novem-ber 12.46

The ensuing two weeks saw therapid advance toward Luanda of theUNITA army led by about 6.000 regu-lar South African troops. By late No-vember, these forces had reconqueredall the territory which Savimbi had lostto the MPLA over the precedingmonths. They had occupied every ma-jor port south of the capital except PortoAmboim, taken control of the Benguelarailway, and were attempting to set uptheir own civilian administration inHuambo. Both the Soviets and the Cu-bans concluded that if the MPLA re-gime was to survive, the Cuban forceswould have to attack in the south assoon as possible.47

After the creation of the MPLAregime the Politburo authorized theSoviet General Staff to take direct con-trol of the trans-Atlantic deployment ofadditional Cuban troops, as well as thesupplying of these troops with advancedmilitary hardware. The massive opera-tion—the first Soviet effort of its kind—


transported more than 12,000 soldiersby sea and air from Cuba to Africa be-tween late October 1975 and mid-Janu-ary 1976. In the same period it alsoprovided FAPLA and the Cubans withhundreds of tons of heavy arms, as wellas T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, anti-tank missiles, and a number of MiG-21fighter planes.48

It is still not possible to chart in anydetail the logistics of the Soviet opera-tion. What we do know is that the gov-ernments of several African countriesagreed to assist with the enterprise.Congo was the main staging ground forpersonnel and arms arriving from Cubaand the Soviet Union (although in somecases An-22 transport planes flew di-rectly from the southern USSR or fromCuba). Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and Tan-zania cooperated with the efforts in dif-ferent ways, even if the Soviets on someoccasions had to push hard to get theircooperation. Moscow also had to pushsome of its East European allies to rushto the defense of “African liberation andglobal anti-imperialism” by supportingthe MPLA.49

By the end of November the Cu-bans had stopped the South African-ledadvance on Luanda, and in two battlessouth of the Cuanza river in Decemberthe southern invaders suffered majorsetbacks. Pretoria then decided to with-draw towards the border, partly becauseof its military problems and partly be-cause the U.S. Senate voted on Decem-ber 19 to block all funding for covertoperations in Angola. Pretoria wouldnot accept being left in the lurch byWashington, with its own men held hos-tage to a conflict they no longer believedthey could win.50

Just as it had opened the gates forAfrican acceptance of Soviet-Cuban aidto the MPLA, the by now defunct SouthAfrican intervention also paved the wayfor African diplomatic recognition ofthe new Angolan regime. By mid-Feb-ruary 1976, most African states had of-ficially recognized Neto’s government,as had the Organization of AfricanUnity (OAU), in spite of attempts byits chairman, Ugandan President IdiAmin, to have the decision postponed.Soviet diplomatic efforts contributedsignificantly to this development, for

instance in the case of Zambia, wherePresident Kenneth Kaunda switchedover to the MPLA’s side after substan-tial Soviet pressure.51

In terms of control of the centralregions, the Angolan war was over byearly March 1976. The capital of theanti-MPLA forces, Huambo, fell toFAPLA forces on February 11. HoldenRoberto had already in January returnedto exile in Zaire and the FNLA hadgiven up its military activities. JonasSavimbi had returned to the bush areasof southeastern Angola with about2.000 guerillas and their U.S. and SouthAfrican advisers, and although he wasto fight his way back to internationalprominence by the early 1980s, in 1976Savimbi himself realized that he couldnot effectively challenge FAPLA andthe Cubans.52

In the spring of 1976 the Sovietleaders felt—with a high degree of cer-tainty and self-congratulation—thatthey had won the Angolan war. TheKremlin was impressed that the logis-tics of the operation had worked so well:over 7,000 kilometers from Moscow theSoviet Union had conducted a cam-paign in support of its allies against thepower of the United States and its strongregional supporters, and come out ontop. For Brezhnev himself Angola be-came a benchmark for “active solidar-ity with the peoples of Africa and Asia”and evidence that the Soviet Unioncould advance socialism in the ThirdWorld during a period of detente withthe United States.53

What did the Soviets believe theylearned from the Angolan conflict?From the reports coming in to the CPSUCC International Department, the mostimportant lesson at the time seems tohave been that the United States couldbe defeated in local conflicts under cer-tain circumstances. First, the Sovietarmed forces must be capable of andready to provide, at short notice, thelogistics for the operation needed.These tasks were primarily assigned tothe navy and the air-force, both of whichwere commended for their efforts inAngola. Second, the Soviet Union mustbe able to organize and control the anti-imperialist forces involved (unlike inVietnam, where the Soviet leaders felt

that disaster had struck again and againbecause of the Vietnamese leaders’ in-ability to follow Moscow’s advice).54

The Soviet cadres in Angola were,by 1976, very satisfied with the wayboth Angolans and Cubans had re-spected Moscow’s political primacyduring the war. According to the em-bassy, Neto realized his dependence onSoviet assistance and, equally impor-tant, that it was Moscow, not Havana,who made the final decisions. Eventhough the embassy still did not trustNeto fully, they admitted that he hadperformed to their liking during thesebattles. In the spring of 1976 he con-tinued to press for more Soviet militaryinstructors, an attitude which the charged’affaires in Luanda, G.A. Zverev, heldup as a sign of the Angolan president’sdedication to the new alliance, even ifNeto had not yet consented to requestpermanent Soviet military bases.55

As to the Cubans, the Soviet rep-resentatives often expressed a certaindegree of surprise to Moscow at howharmonious were relations with thesmall Caribbean ally. The Soviet-Cu-ban “close coordination in Angola dur-ing the war has had very positive re-sults,” Zverev told his superiors inMarch 1976. Soviet diplomats and of-ficers lauded the Cubans for their brav-ery and for their ability to function as alink between Moscow and Luandawhile at the same time “respecting” theparamount role of the CPSU leadership.The overall Cuban-Soviet relationshipimproved significantly in the wake ofthe Angolan operation, up to a pointwhich had not been reached since the1962 missile crisis.56

Moscow and Havana also agreedon strategy in Angola after the mainbattles had ended in the spring of 1976.Both countries wanted to wind downtheir military involvement as soon aspossible, “avoid broad military clasheswith South Africa, and attain their goalby means of political and diplomaticstruggle.” In May, Raul Castro told theSoviet General Staff that he wanted tostart withdrawing Cuban troops rightaway, and that he expected almost15,000 Cubans to have left by late Oc-tober. The Cuban leaders asked Mos-cow to inform Pretoria of their inten-


tions, well knowing that such a demili-tarization of the conflict—albeit with aMPLA government in place—was whatthe Soviets had wanted all along. Ha-vana knew how to placate the greatpower, although, as we will see below,they exacted their price for doing so.57

The second lesson the Soviets be-lieved they had learnt from the Angolanadventure was that the Soviet Union canand must rebuild and reform local anti-capitalist groups in crisis areas. TheMPLA, local Soviet observers postu-lated in 1976, was saved from its ownfollies by advice and assistance fromMoscow, which not only helped it winthe war, but also laid the foundation forthe building of a “vanguard party.” TheAngolan movement had earlier beenplagued by “careerists and fellow-trav-ellers,” but, due to Soviet guidance, the“internationalists” were in ascendance.These new leaders—men like Lopo doNascimento and Nito Alves—under-stood that the MPLA was part of an in-ternational revolutionary movement ledby Moscow and that they therefore boththen and in the future depended on So-viet support.58

It was these “internationalists” whoMoscow wanted to assist in building anew MPLA, patterned on the experi-ence of the CPSU. Noting the poor stateof the MPLA organization in many ar-eas, the Soviet party-building expertssuggested that this was the field inwhich do Nascimento, Alves, and oth-ers should concentrate their activities.By taking the lead in constructing theparty organization they would also bethe future leaders of the Marxist-Leninist party in Angola.59

The Soviets supplied very largeamounts of political propaganda to bedisseminated among MPLA supportersand used in the training of cadre. Theordinary embassy staff sometimesfound the amounts a bit difficult tohandle—a plane-load of brochures withBrezhnev’s speech at the 25th CPSUcongress, two plane-loads of anti-Maoist literature—but in general theembassy could put the materials to gooduse (or so they claimed in reports toMoscow). By summer 1976 they hadrun out of Lenin portraits, and had torequest a new supply from the CPSU

Propaganda Department.60

The transformation of the MPLAturned out to be an infinitely more dif-ficult task for the Soviets than the dis-semination of Lenin busts. Neto’s in-dependence of mind and his claim tobe a Marxist theoretician in his ownright rankled the Russians and made itincreasingly difficult for them to con-trol the MPLA as soon as the militarysituation stabilized. Some of theAngolan leaders whom Moscow dis-liked, for instance FAPLA veteran com-mander and defense minister IkoCarreira and MPLA general secretaryLucio Lara, who was strongly influ-enced by the European left, strength-ened their positions after the war wasover. According to the embassy, theinfluence of such people delayed boththe necessary changes in the MPLA andthe finalization of the developmentplans on which the Soviets and Cubanswere advising.61

Differences between the Soviet andCuban perceptions of the political situ-ation in the MPLA did not make thingseasier for Moscow. Part of the pricewhich Castro exacted for his generaldeference to the Soviets on the Angolanissue was the right to argue for Angolanpolitical solutions which were to his lik-ing. Preeminent in Castro’s politicalequation was the leadership ofAgostinho Neto: whom he considereda brilliant man and a great Africanleader, as well as a personal friend. TheCubans therefore missed no opportunityto impress the Soviets with their viewthat the MPLA president was the onlysolution to Angola’s leadership prob-lems, well knowing of Moscow’s sus-picions of him. “We have the highestregard for President Neto,” Raúl Castrotold Soviet Vice-Minister of DefenseI.F. Ponomarenko. “Cuba wants tostrengthen Neto’s authority,” the headof the Cuban party’s International De-partment, Raúl Valdés Vivó, told theSoviet chargé in May.62

The Cubans were, however, alwaysclever at sweetening their tough posi-tion in support of Neto by underliningthat the Soviet Union of course wasAngola’s primary international ally.“Relations with the Soviet Union willbecome a more important aspect of

Angolan foreign policy in the future,”Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues.He instructed Risquet to “on all ques-tions inform the USSR embassy inAngola and maintain close contact withthe Soviet comrades.” Castro also cas-tigated some of the Angolan leaderswhom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara“displays a certain restraint on questions[of] broadening the collaboration withthe socialist countries. He is reservedand not frank . . . . [and] has avoidedus,” Castro told Ponomarenko.63

But even such measures could notalways convince the Soviets of Cubanloyalty. Reporting on Neto’s visit toHavana in July 1976, the Soviet em-bassy noted with disapproval that FidelCastro had told the Angolans that Cu-ban troops would remain in Africa “aslong as they are needed,” and that Netohad asked for Cuba’s assistance inbuilding a Marxist-Leninist party. Evenworse, Castro had spoken of Angola,Cuba, and Vietnam as “the main anti-imperialist core” of the world. That theCuban president had also mentioned the“central role” of the Soviet Union wasnot sufficient to please the Soviet ob-servers, particularly since Castrocoupled his statement with an endorse-ment of Neto’s own “paramount role”in the MPLA.64

As Philip Windsor has observedabout the Brezhnev Doctrine, the rela-tionship between the Soviet Union andits allies approximated the roles of aking and his vassals in medieval natu-ral law. The Cubans and the Angolanscould set their own agenda, so long asthey subordinated themselves to thegeneral purpose of Soviet foreign policyand used the proper code of addresswhen reporting to Moscow’s represen-tatives. For Soviet cadre at the locallevel the real character of the Moscow-Havana-Luanda relationship compli-cated their efforts at reforming theMPLA, as shown in excess by the spec-tacle of the May 1977 coup attemptagainst Neto, when Nito Alves—a So-viet favorite—found his bid to oust thepresident blocked by Cuban tanks.65

The belief of many Soviet leadersthat they could control domestic politi-cal developments in Third World coun-tries was a misperception with fateful


consequences for Soviet foreign policyin the late Brezhnev era. The Angolanintervention played an important part inupholding this misperception, as thereporting from Luanda shows. In hind-sight, one of the main managers ofMoscow’s African and Asian policiesin the late 1970s, Karen Brutents, hasclaimed that it was Angola which ledto Ethiopia which led to Afghanistan,not in terms of the circumstances andstructure of the interventions—whichcertainly varied—but in terms of theinflated pretensions of control over for-eign left-wing movements which werestimulated by the Angolan affair.Brutents’ point is a good one, althoughwe should still be careful in generaliz-ing about the direction of Soviet foreignpolicy during that period until we havemore documentation on the discussionsof the Politburo and General Staff.66

On the other hand, as I have arguedelsewhere, what Morton Kaplan termsthe “loose bipolar structure” of the ColdWar international system often gaveThird World revolutionary parties achance to enter into alliances with oneof the great powers, a chance which theymay not have been offered in a morecomplex global constellation of states.As the aspiring, anti-systemic power,the Soviet Union was particularly likelyto be the candidate for such alliancesfrom a Third World perspective. Theleaders of some African movements,including the MPLA, knew of thesepossibilities and sometimes knew howto exploit them. In addition to its so-cial and economic message, this poten-tial for a powerful ally was one of theassets of African communism duringthe 1970s, an asset which increased inimportance as their revolutions high-lighted the idea of a socialist victory inthe Third World in Soviet foreign policyideology.67

There is enough evidence in thematerials on Angola, and elsewhere, toindicate that the Soviet leadership wasvery much aware of the strategic op-portunities which the post-Vietnamanti-interventionist mood in the UnitedStates afforded Moscow for activism inregional conflicts. It is likely that thePolitburo would have been much lessinclined to interventions like the one in

Angola if they had been convinced thatWashington would respond in force.The conventional realist approach tointerventions provides adequate expla-nation for this side of Soviet interven-tionism: the Brezhnev leadership sawan opportunity for unchecked expansionand made use of it.68

On local factors, which were cru-cial in the case of Angola, some schol-ars have argued that great power inter-ventions are grounded not so much inmisperceptions—the “slippery slope”theory of growing commitment—as inwhat Charles Kupchan calls the“reputational and intrinsic interest,” ofthe intervening power.69 This is an at-tempt to rescue the case for an interest-driven decision-making process in caseswhere there is a significant discrepancybetween the prior expectations of anintervening power and the outcome ofits action—an argument which ofcourse can only be tested through theevidence.

In the case presented here, woulda clearer perception of the conditionsinside the MPLA—and of Soviet inabil-ity to change these conditions—haveprevented an intervention? Possibly, notleast since much of Moscow’s histori-cal experience pointed away from suchan adventure. Soviet diplomacy was atmost times very cautious outside its owncore area, preferring mutually advanta-geous links with established regimesrather than with revolutionary move-ments. Up to the Angolan intervention,the Soviet Union never gave decisivesupport to a revolutionary movementoutside its neighboring countries. Onecan indeed argue that the United Stateshas supported more successful revolu-tionary movements, even since the mid-1970s, for instance in Nicaragua and inAfghanistan.70

What prevented a “clear view” ofthe obstacles to long-term successfulintervention was primarily Soviet for-eign policy ideology. Its mix of Rus-sian exceptionalism, Marxist-Leninisttheory, and the Soviet experience ofeconomic and political development,created a fertile ground for believingthat difficulties associated with the char-acter of the movements and societiestargeted for intervention could be over-

come, in spite of much contrary infor-mation. In the case of Angola, this be-lief contributed significantly to the in-tervention and sustained the decision tocommit additional men, money, andmaterial to the country in subsequentyears. It even led Moscow’s local rep-resentatives to sum up Angola as a suc-cess, thereby over time encouragingfurther Soviet “limited interventions” inAfrica and Asia, culminating in the Af-ghanistan disaster.71

We need much more evidence fromRussian and foreign sources in order togeneralize about the nature of SovietCold War involvement in Africa, Asia,and Latin America. From what we seeso far, the two faces of Soviet associa-tion with Third World radicals—revo-lutionary patronage and distrustful cau-tion—correspond closely with twofaces of Russian culture and history.One is the elite tradition which hassought to bring Russia into a Europe-anized society of states. The other isthe tradition of defiance of the West, aradical and, in European terms, sectar-ian approach to Russia’s internationalrole. Both are visible during the lastphase of the Soviet experiment: CPSUofficials seem to have felt as uncom-fortable at meetings in the White Houseas when visiting PLO training campsin Syria. Both for historians and politi-cal scientists, the opening of Russianarchives offers opportunities to revisitthese motives of Soviet foreign policyand to expand our understanding of theirrole in the international history of theCold War.

1 I am grateful to Ilya Gaiduk and MaximKorobochkin for their assistance in locating ma-terials in Moscow. My thanks also to the formerhead of the State Archives Service of the RussianFederation, Dr. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, and to the staffof the Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoidokumentatsii (Center for the Preservation ofContemporary Documentation; hereafterTsKhSD) in Moscow for their help during myarchival research. Piero Gleijeses, GeirLundestad, and Iver B. Neumann offered helpfulcomments on a draft version.2 See Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongsto Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991);Valentin Falin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich:Droemer Knaur, 1993); Francis Fukuyama,Moscow’s Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of theThird World. RAND report no. 3337-USDP(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986); AndreiKolosov, “Pereosmysleniie politiki v ‘tretiem


mire’” [Rethinking Policy in the Third World],Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn’ 4 (April 1990).3 A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, “ToIntervene or Not to Intervene,” Foreign Affairs45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an ex-cellent survey of recent literature on Soviet inter-ventions in “Ideology and Learning in SovietThird World Policy,” World Politics 44: 3 (July1987), 429-448.4 Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head ofthe CPSU Central Committee’s International De-partment, interview with author, Moscow, 5 Oc-tober 1993 (hereafter “Brutents interview”). Fora discussion, see Steven R. David, “Soviet In-volvement in Third World Coups,” InternationalSecurity 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36.5 Celeste A. Wallander, “Third World Conflictin Soviet Military Thought,” World Politics 42:1(October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, TheUSSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms andDiplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980 (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. Seealso Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Interven-tion: Americans and Soviets in the Third World,”The National Interest (Spring 1987), 39-47.6 Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention,” 43; onSoviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, “Incre-mental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy:The Role of the International Department of theCPSU Central Committee,” Slavic Review 48: 4(Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider’s viewof one of the institutions, former head of the KGBFirst Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin,Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoirazvedki (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This ar-ticle is in part based on the archives of the Inter-national Department, now kept in TsKhSD. TheInternational Department archives contain a largecollection of materials important to understand-ing Soviet foreign policy history—among themembassy reports, documents created for the Po-litburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence sum-maries, and records of conversations with foreignleaders. A small portion of this material—docu-ments which the Politburo or the heads of the MOwanted to have available for reference purposes—is held in so-called osobye papki or “special files,”most of which are still unavailable to scholars.7 See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere inthis issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.8 KGB to MO [International Department of theCPSU CC], 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5,opis’ (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (ll.) 7-9. Thisreport, primarily an analysis of the preparationsfor the third summit conference of non-alignednations in Lusaka, also notes that this conferencewill mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy,that China’s influence within the group is reced-ing, and that the United States is increasingly iso-lated in the Third World. See also KGB(Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5,op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35. On the KGB’s influenceon Brezhnev’s thinking: author’s interview withOleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassa-dor, Moscow, 14 September 1992.9 KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.62, d. 536, ll. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO,26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535,ll. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evalu-ation of European policies toward Portugal, origi-nating with an analysis of materials from the Brit-

ish Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major re-port on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that thecontinent had become more important for theAmericans both strategically and in terms of itsnatural resources. “Capitalist states,” said theGRU, “are putting pressure on African countriesto enter into base agreements and military assis-tance plans.” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 71-90, 80.10 General’nyi shtab voorushennykh sil SSSR[General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR](Glavnoe razvedivatelnoe upravlenie [Main in-telligence directorate]; hereafter GRU) to MO,15 September 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535,ll. 63-68; GRU to MO, “Po meropriiatiiam,napravlennym na oslablenie pozitsii KNR vAfrike [On Measures (and) Directions to Weakenthe Positions of the PRC in Africa],” TsKhSD, f.5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 96-101.11 KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35, 35.12 V.N. Bezukladnikov (counsellor, Lusaka) toMO and attached letter from Neto to CPSU CCconcerning request for receiving MPLA membersfor military training, 24 June 1970, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 99-102; D.Z. Belokolos toMO, 14 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536,ll. 195-200.13 Belokolos to MO, 25 July 1970, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 215-218; Embassy, Lusakato MO, political letter: “Perspektivy razvitiiaborby naroda Angoly protiv portugalskikhkolonizatorov [Perspectives on the Developmentof the Angolan People’s Struggle Against the Por-tuguese Colonizers,” n.d. (October 1970),TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 219-228, 224.The Soviet intelligence services still suspectedthat Neto kept the China option in reserve. SeeKGB to MO, 8 October 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.62, d. 536, l. 212.14 Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January1973, “K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA iMPLA [On the question of reconciliation betweenthe FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op.66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Belokolos to MO, 10 October1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 121-123.The CPSU CC archives hold large amounts ofdocuments on Soviet relations with all liberationmovements in Southern Africa, especially theANC and the Zimbabwe African People’s Unionin addition to the MPLA (see footnote 6).15 John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution. Vol-ume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962-1976 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 199.16 MPLA (Pedro Van Dunem) to CC CPSU, 11December 1972, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, l.22; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January1973, “K voprosu o primirenii mezhdu FNLA iMPLA [On the question of reconciliation betweenthe FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op.66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa toMO, 12 April 1973, “K voprosu ob otnosheniiakhmezhdu MPLA i FNLA [On the question of rela-tions between the MPLA and the FNLA],”TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, ll. 54-57; Neto toCC CPSU, 23 June 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66,d. 844, ll. 91; Belokolos to MO, 7 February 1974(Conversation with Daniel Chipenda), TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 5-8.17 Belokolos to MO, 25 October 1973, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 118-120; E.I. Afanasenko

(ambassador, Brazzaville) to MO, 30 March 1974,political letter: “O polozhenii v ‘Narodnomdvizhenii za osvobozhdenie Angoli’ (MPLA) [Onthe situation in ‘The People’s Movement for theLiberaton of Angola’ (MPLA)],” TsKhSD, f. 5,op. 67, d. 758, ll. 37-45, 40.18 Iu.A. Iukalov (chargé d’affaires, Dar-es-Sa-laam) to MO, 22 May 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.67, d. 758, ll. 70-71; E.I. Afanasenko to MO, 8June 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 78-81.19 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 245-48.20 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 249-50; George Wright, U.S. Policy Towards Angola:The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976 (Leeds: Univer-sity of Leeds, 1990), 18-23.21 Afanasenko to MO, 10 October 1974,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 121-122; see alsoMarcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 251-253.22 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 253;Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola inthe Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), 109-122, pre-sents the MPLA view of events.23 Afanasenko to MO, 4 December 1974,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 11-12. RaymondGarthoff correctly concludes that the Soviet de-cision “preceded the American funding in Janu-ary 1975, although it probably followed the mili-tary efforts of the FNLA in November.” Détenteand Confrontation: American-Soviet Relationsfrom Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution, 1985), 507.24 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 25 December1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 10-21,21, 17.25 Marcum, Angolan Revolution, vol. 2, 257-58; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, 533-34.26 S.A. Slipchenko (Soviet ambassador, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 30 December 1974 (Conversa-tion with Oscar Oramas, Cuban Foreign Minis-try; later ambassador to Luanda), TsKhSD, f. 5,op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 3-7; Afanasenko to MO, 10January 1975 (Conversation with Cuban ambas-sador A. Columbio Alvarez), TsKhSD, f. 5, op.68, d. 1962, ll. 17-18, 18. See also Jorge I.Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu-tion: Cuba’s Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA:Harvard University Press, 1989), 130-137; Will-iam M. LeoGrande, “Cuban-Soviet Relations andCuban Policy in Africa,” Cuban Studies 10:1(January 1980), 1-48.27 B. Putilin (first secretary, embassyBrazzaville) to MO, n.d. (late January, 1975),TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 10-21;Afanasenko to MO, 30 January 1975, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 26. U.S. support forHolden Roberto—with whom the CIA for sev-eral years had had “an intelligence gathering re-lationship”—was limited to “non-lethal equip-ment” up to July 1975; see “Talking points forsecretary Kissinger. NSC meeting on Angola, Fri-day, June 27, 1975.” National Security Archive(NSArchive Angola collection of documents ob-tained through the Freedom of Information Act(hereafter “National Security Archive AngolaFOIA collection”). The Archive, a non-govern-mental research institute and declassified docu-ments repository, is located on the 7th floor ofthe Gelman Library at George Washington Uni-versity in Washington, D.C.); Robert E. Gates,


From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Storyof Five Presidents and How They Won the ColdWar (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 65-69, has a useful account of CIA initiatives onAngola.28 Slipchenko to MO, 6 February 1975, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 48-54, 51; Slipchenko toMO, 24 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d.1982, ll. 238-246.29 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53, 53. Forthe relationship among the Angolan groups, seeFranz-Wilhelm Heimer, The Decolonization Con-flict in Angola, 1974-76: An Essay in PoliticalSociology (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautesetudes internationales, 1979).30 V.V. Aldoshin (chargé d’affaires, embassy,Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 20 April 1975, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 153-156; Institut AfrikiAkademiia Nauk SSSR (Africa Institute, USSRAcademy of Sciences) to MO, 19 June 1975,“Protsess dekolonizatsii v Angole i politikaimperialisticheskikh derzhav [The DecolonizationProcess in Angola and the Policies of the Imperi-alist Powers],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll.87-110; Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53.31 Nina D. Howland, “The United States andAngola, 1974-88: A Chronology,” in Departmentof State Bulletin 89:2143 (February 1989), 16-19; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIAStory (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 40-57;Paul L. Moorcraft, African Nemesis: War andRevolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010 (Lon-don: Brassey’s, 1990), 76-81. See also AssistantSecretary of State for African Affairs NathanielDavis to Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, 12 July1975, and Sisco to Deputy to the National Secu-rity Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 15 July 1975, bothin National Security Archive Angola FOIA col-lection. The American covert military aid was inaddition to U.S. civilian assistance and militaryand financial aid procured by the United Statesfrom U.S. allies in the region, notably Zaire. (SeeHearing before the Subcommittee on Africa ofthe Committee on International Relations, Houseof Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Ses-sion, 25 May 1978; also Raymond L. Garthoff,Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Re-lations from Nixon to Reagan, rev.ed.; (Washing-ton, DC: Brookings, 1994), 560-70).32 Afanasenko to MO, 14 June 1975, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, l. 137; Afanasenko to MO,ibid., ll. 180-82.33 Afanasenko to MO, 4 July 1975, TsKhSD, f.5, op. 8, d. 1962, ll. 136-38; Slipchenko to MO,10 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982,ll. 44-47, 46. (For an alternate view based onCuban sources, see the article by Piero Gleijeseselsewhere in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.)34 Iu. K. Naumov, (councellor, Dar-es-Salaam)to MO, 2 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d.1982, ll. 226-27; record of conversation,Afanasenko-Congolese Prime Minister HenriLopez, 17 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68 , d.1962 , ll. 113-14. On the Cuban role, see alsoPutilin to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op.68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53. See also Klinghoffer andEdward Gonzalez, “Cuba, the Soviet Union, andAfrica,” in David E. Albright, ed. Communism inAfrica (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press, 1980), and the aforementioned Gleijesesarticle.35 M.A. Manasov (chargé d’affaires, embassy,Havana) to MO, 15 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5,op. 68, d. 1941, l. 122. This document is a recordof the conversation between Manasov and OscarCienfuegos, an assistant to Fidel Castro, whobrought the Cuban leader’s message to the So-viet embassy. No copy of the message itself hasbeen found in the MO records. Georgi M.Kornienko, former first vice-foreign minister,interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993(hereafter “Kornienko interview”); Brutents in-terview; Brutents in Odd Arne Westad, ed., Work-shop on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet ForeignPolicy Toward the Middle East and Africa in the1970s, Oral history transcript, Lysebu, 1-3 Octo-ber 1994 (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1994,hereafter “Lysebu transcript”), 68-69.36 Afanasenko to MO, 17 August 1975, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 196-203, 196.37 Kornienko interview; Brutents interview.38 Ibid. On the 1968 tensions in Soviet-Cubanrelations, see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight,“Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Rela-tions: Fidel Castro’s Secret 1968 Speech,”CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 81-85.39 Georgi Kornienko, the deputy foreign minis-ter, later recalled that the Soviet leadership triedto stop the Cubans: “I read a cable from our am-bassador in Conakry [Guinea] which said, amongmany other things, that the Cuban ambassadorhad told him that the next day some planes withCuban troops will land in Conakry for refuelingon the way to Angola. I asked [Soviet ForeignMinister Andrei] Gromyko, do you know any-thing? He called Andropov, he called Grechko.Nobody knew anything. All of them were againstit and reported it immediately to the Politburo andsuggested that we stop Castro. It took some hoursto write the report, to get the decision, and to sendthe message to Castro. By this time the planeswere in the air. You could rightly ask: How couldit be—Soviet planes, stationed on Cuba, but itwas Soviet planes and we had quite a few mili-tary people there. . .I checked. Well, technically,our people were involved, our planes were therefor Cuban use, our advisers were involved, butthey were completely convinced that a politicaldecision had been taken [in Moscow]”(Kornienko interview). See also Gabriel GarcíaMárquez, “Operation Carlota: Cuba’s Role inAngolan Victory,” Venceremos 4:5 (February1977), 1-8; Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The AngolanWar: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 109-20.40 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 118-121;see Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 83-84. The mili-tary situation in Angola at the time of the Cubanintervention is still under dispute. Piero Gleijeses,who has studied the Angolan war based on Cu-ban documents, believes that through the first halfof October the MPLA was winning the war(Gleijeses, personal communication to author).The MPLA reports to Moscow (and presumablyalso to Havana) are much less optimistic (seeNaumov to MO, 3 and 20 October 1975, TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 268-270, 280-81).41 Kornienko interview; Brutents interview;Slipchenko to MO, 30 October 1975 TsKhSD, f.

5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 313-320; Iu.K. Naumov toMO, 20 October 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d.1982, ll. 280-281. See also comments byKornienko, Brutents and others in Lysebu tran-script; and Jiri Valenta, “Soviet Decision-Mak-ing on the Intervention in Angola,” in Albright,ed., Communism in Africa. Several of the MOdocuments dealing with this issue are not yet de-classified.42 Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, l. 118 (theBrazzaville station also underlined that the FNLAas late as August 1975 was still receiving assis-tance from Romania and North Korea);Kornienko interview.43 Slipchenko to MO, 3 November 1975 (con-versation with J. Nyerere), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68,d. 1962, ll. 305-307.44 Secretariat card index, 192 meeting, 5 No-vember 1975, TsKhSD; Afanasenko to MO, 4November 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962,ll. 230-231.45 Klinghoffer, Angolan War, 26-27; Garthoff,Detente and Confrontation, 512.46 G.A. Zverev (chargé d’affaires, Luanda) toMO, 1 March 1976, political report: “Nekotoryevoprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoiobstanovki v Angole” [On Some Questions Con-cerning the Military-Political and Economic Situ-ation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513(hereafter “Zverev report”), appendix. In look-ing at Cuban documents, Piero Gleijeses finds notrace of Soviet support for the airlift before Janu-ary 1976.47 Ibid.; Moorcraft, African Nemesis, 87-91.48 Zverev report, appendix; Moorcraft, AfricanNemesis, 90.49 Zverev report, pp. 13-23; V.N. Rykov (am-bassador, Algiers) to MO, 20 December 1975,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 1-4; CPSU CCSecretariat card index, 197 meeting, 23 Decem-ber 1975, TsKhSD. See also Moorcraft, AfricanNemesis, 90. The archive of the Soviet GeneralStaff is still not open for scholarly research.50 Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, “TheCase of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Dis-engagement,” in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W.Jentleson and Larry Berman, eds., Foreign Mili-tary Intervention: The Dynamics of ProtractedConflict (New York: Columbia University Press,1992), 163-208.51 B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA [Onthe Situation in the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op.69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34; Klinghoffer, Angolan War,61-71.52 Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 227-248;Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa(London: Coronet Books, 1988), 174-181.53 Brutents in Lysebu transcript, pp. 76-77.54 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 May1976, report on discussions during meeting be-tween Raul Castro and Jorge Risquet (Cuba) andI.F. Ponomarenko and A.I. Dubenko (USSR Min-istry of Defense), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513(hereafter “Castro discussions”), ll. 42-48; onVietnam, Mikhail Kapitsa, former vice-foreignminister, author’s interview, Moscow, 7 Septem-ber 1992. See also Galia Golan, The Soviet Unionand National Liberation Movements in the ThirdWorld (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Mark


Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military Thought(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,1982); Neil Matheson, The “Rules of the Game”of Superpower Military Intervention in the ThirdWorld, 1975-1980 (Washington, DC: UniversityPress of America, 1982).55 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, politicalreport: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoii ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole” [OnSome Questions Concerning the Military-Politi-cal and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-23, 15-16.56 Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, ll. 42-48. Forthe history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, seeDominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolu-tion, 78-84.57 G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, politicalreport: “Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoii ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole” [OnSome Questions Concerning the Military-Politi-cal and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD,f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO,report on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head,General Department for International Relations,Cuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 53-54; Castrodiscussion, l. 45.58 B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27March 1976, report: “O polozhenii v MPLA [Onthe Situation in the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op.69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34.59 Ibid.60 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976,Report: “Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoirabote za II kvartal 1976 g.” [On Information andPropaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976],TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 60-62. The em-bassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of“several” sets of Lenin’s collected works inFrench—not surprisingly, since more than 90 per-cent of all Angolans were illiterate and those whowere able to read mostly did so in Portuguese.61 Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin(councellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 82-83. By theend of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressedto find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde inAngola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador,Havana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memoran-dum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 121-123.62 On Fidel Castro: Marquez, “OperationCarlota,” 1-2; Castro discussions, l. 46; G.A.Zverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum ofconversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev,TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 49-54.63 Castro discussions, ll. 43, 47.64 Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513.65 Philip Windsor, “Superpower Intervention,”in Hedley Bull, ed., Intervention in World Poli-tics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. MichaelWolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the FrontLine (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generallyreliable account of the Alves coup.66 George W. Breslauer, “Ideology and Learn-ing in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann,“Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: OldQuestions, New Strategies, and Important Les-sons,” World Politics 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65;

CWIHP FELLOWSHIPS

The Cold War International HistoryProject awards a limited number of fellow-ship for scholars from countries on “theother side” of the Cold War to conduct up toone year of archival research in the UnitedStates. Recipients are based at the Institutefor European, Russian, and Eurasian Stud-ies, George Washington University, Wash-ington, D.C. Applications should include:CV; letter of nomination and three letters ofrecommendation; research proposal, indi-cating topic to be investigated and sources tobe utilized; writing samples in English wel-comed, though not required. Applicansshould have a working ability in English.Preference will be given to scholars whohave not previously had an opportunity to doresearch in the United States. Applicationsmay be sent or faxed to: David Wolff, Direc-tor; Cold War International History Project;Woodrow Wilson Center; 1000 JeffersonDr. SW; Washington, D.C. 20560 USA;fax: (202) 357-4439.

SOVIET DOCUMENTS ONANGOLA AND SOUTHERN

AFRICA, 1975-79

Ed. note: Following are illustrationsof Russian archival documents on Sovietpolicy toward Angola and Southern Africain the 1970s. Most were culled from the filesof the Center for the Storage of Contempo-rary Documentation in Moscow (TsKhSD;the repository for records of the CentralCommittee of the Communist Party of theSoviet Union [CC CPSU] from 1952 thru1991) and declassified in early 1995 in con-nection with the “Carter-Brezhnev Project.”

This international project, led by thethe Thomas J. Watson Institute for Interna-tional Studies at Brown University, orga-nized a series of conferences bringing to-gether former U.S. and Soviet officials,scholars, and newly-declassified documentsto explore the reasons behind the collapseof superpower detente in the 1970s and itspossible lessons for current and future Rus-sian-American relations. (These documentswere among a much larger collection spe-cifically declassified by Russian authoritiesin preparation for a conference on super-power rivalry in the Third World held in Ft.Lauderdale, Florida, in March 1995.)

The Cold War International HistoryProject and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental research institute anddeclassified documents repository locatedat George Washington University—cooper-ated with the Carter-Brezhnev Project andplayed a major role in obtaining the releaseof these Russian documents and supportingthe translation of some of them into English.The full set of photocopies of Russian,American, and East German documentsobtained by the Project may be examinedby interested researchers at the NationalSecurity Archive, which is located on the 7thfloor of the Gelman Library, George Wash-ington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washing-ton, DC 20037; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax:(202) 994-7005.

* * * * *

Soviet Ambassador to the People’sRepublic of Angola E.I. Afanasenko,Memorandum of Conversation withPresident of the Movement for the

Popular Liberation of Angola Agostinho Neto, 4 July 1975

Brutents in Lysebu transcript, p. 77.67 Morton Kaplan, “Intervention in InternalWar,” in James N. Rosenau, ed. InternationalAspects of Civil Strife (Princeton: Princeton Uni-versity Press, 1967), 110-11; Odd Arne Westad,“Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in theThird World,” Journal of Peace Research 29:4(1992), 455-64. See also Edward Kick and DavidKiefer, “The Influence of the World System onWar in the Third World,” International Journalof Sociology and Social Policy 7 (1987), 34-48;and Kick, “World System Properties and Mili-tary Intervention-Internal War Linkages,” Jour-nal of Political and Military Sociology 11 (1983),185-208; Oran R. Young, “Intervention and In-ternational Systems,” Journal of International Af-fairs 22:2 (1968).68 For other examples, see Alexei Vassiliev, Rus-sian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianismto Pragmatism (Reading: Ithaca, 1993), andMargot Light, ed., Troubled Friendships:Moscow’s Third World Ventures (London: Brit-ish Academic Press, 1993).69 Charles Kupchan, “Getting In: The InitialStage of Military Intervention,” in Levite et al.,eds., Foreign Military Intervention, 259. For Af-ghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad, “Prelude to In-vasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Com-munists, 1978-1979,”International History Re-view 1:1 (February 1994), 49-69.70 The possible exception is of course Vietnam,but even there it is unlikely that Soviet aid wasdecisive for the outcome (see Marilyn Young, TheVietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York:HarperCollins, 1991), 232-253). On perceptions,see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperceptionin International Politics (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1976).71 On Soviet foreign policy ideology, see StephenShenfield in Ideology and Soviet Politics, editedby Stephen White and Alex Pravda (London:Macmillan, 1988), 203-24.


From the diary of SECRETE.I. Afanasenko Copy No. 2

Ser. No. 18121 July 1975

Record of Conference withPresident of MPLA Agostinho NETO

4 July 1975

We received a visit from President ofthe MPLA Agostinho Neto. I informed himthat the Central Committee of the CPSU wasclosely following the development of cir-cumstances in Angola. The Soviet peopleare interested in the victory of democraticforces in Angola. In 1975, significant aidhas been provided to the MPLA. Pursuantto instructions from the Central Committeeof the CPSU, we had a conference with thePresident of the PRC [People’s Republic ofthe Congo] M. Nguabi, in which the issueof rendering aid to the MPLA was discussed.

Neto thanked the Central Committeeof the CPSU for the rendering of assistance.He stated that the leadership of the MPLAhad recently expanded its contacts with gov-ernments of the African countries. In thecourse of these discussions, the MPLA isattempting to increase the number of its sup-porters in Africa. One of the immediateobjectives of the MPLA is to prevent thediscussion of the issue of Cabinda at the up-coming assembly concerned about the factthat this year [Ugandan leader] Idi Amin,who collaborates closely with [Zairianleader] Mobutu [Sese Seko], will becomethe Chairman of the OAU [Organization ofAfrican Unity]. We anticipate, said Neto,that the president of Uganda will come for-ward at the OAU assembly with a proposalto discuss the issue of Cabinda. Our meet-ings in Nigeria and our ongoing negotiationsin the Congo with president M. Nguabi,Member of the Politburo of the CentralCommittee of the KPT [the Russian acro-nym for the Congolese Workers’ Party] A.Lopez, member of the Central Committeeof the KPT Obami-Itu, and Foreign Minis-ter [Charles-David] Ganao, said Neto, aredirected to this very question.

Negotiations between the MPLA andthe KPT are proceeding successfully. Anagreement has been reached to maintainongoing consultations between the MPLAand KPT with the aim of developing a com-mon policy and the conduct of joint effortsin Africa and Angola. In order to enhance

propaganda efforts prior to the establishmentof radio broadcasting facilities in the coun-try, broadcast of the radio program “Struggleof Angola” will be resumed in Brazzaville.

The president of the MPLA stated thatone of the main points in the negotiationswith the KPT was the issue of Cabinda. ThePRC made the decision not to support thedemand of autonomy for Cabinda at theOAU assembly which had been advancedby the Congo and Zaire last February. Asto the change of their position on theCabinda question, the Congolese assured theMPLA delegation that they would terminateassistance to the nationalist Cabindi orga-nization FLEC. Inasmuch as the parties hadreached an agreement on the Cabinda issue,the PRC allowed the MPLA to use its terri-tory for the transport of arms, military equip-ment and other cargo supplied to the Move-ment by the Soviet Union and other friendlycountries. In addition, the Congolese con-firmed their decision to close their land bor-der with Cabinda for the MPLA. In orderto export supplies to Angola, they allottedthe port and airfield at Pointe-Noire. Trans-portation of cargo is to be carried out by theland and sea forces of the MPLA. Neto wasoutspoken in his appraisal of the results ofthe negotiations with the Congolese. Heemphasized that the refusal of the Congo tosupport the Cabindi demand for autonomyrepresented an important step forward in thenormalization of relations between theMPLA and the KPT.

The president of the MPLA proceededto characterize the domestic situation inAngola. He pointed out that the existenceof three national liberation movements inthe country was creating a favorable oppor-tunity for reactionary forces in the country,which in turn was leading to a further inten-sification of political, social, and economicconflicts. Neto pointed to two groups ofreactionary forces acting against Angola.The first group he attributed to domesticPortuguese reactionaries. This group is fo-menting tensions in the country and provok-ing a mass emigration of the white popula-tion from Angola. The departure of largenumbers of technical specialists has resultedin serious damage to the country’s economy.The white reactionaries are capitalizing onthe support of the present Supreme Com-missar of Angola and a large portion of thePortuguese officers. The second group ofreactionary forces consists of foreign reac-

tionaries. Neto also included the FNLA inthat group.

The president of the MPLA said thatthe military conflict which took place lastJune demonstrated the strength of theMPLA’s military detachments. Notwith-standing the numerical superiority of theFNLA’s forces, the MPLA is no weaker thanthe FNLA in military terms. Neto declaredthat the MPLA commands great political in-fluence in the country which is continuingto grow. At the same time, he acknowledgedthat two northwest provinces of Angola havebeen controlled by the FNLA since last June.In addition, UNITA commands major influ-ence in Bie and the surrounding regions,where a large portion of the country’s popu-lation lives.

Neto characterized UNITA as an orga-nization representing the interests of whitefarmers with reactionary leanings. How-ever, UNITA does not command significantmilitary forces and is attempting to play arole as an intermediary between the MPLAand the FNLA. The president of the MPLAspoke in favor of a tactical alliance withUNITA. The desirability of such an alli-ance was advocated to the leadership of theMPLA by numerous heads of African gov-ernments, first and foremost, by the PRC.

The president of the MPLA expresseddoubts about fulfillment of all the agree-ments signed in Nakuru (Kenya). One of thereasons for the likely breakdown of thoseagreements is the aggression of the FNLA,which is unlikely to give up its armed provo-cations. All of this, Neto emphasized, re-quires the MPLA to continue the develop-ment of its armed forces. In this connectionit is counting on aid from the Soviet Union.The MPLA has decided to address the Cen-tral Committee of the CPSU with a requestto furnish additional military and financialaid. At the end of this July, an MPLA del-egation will be dispatched to the USSR,headed by member of the Politburo of theCentral Committee of the MPLA Iko Kareira(commander in chief of the MPLA).

Neto reported that last June, a delega-tion of the MPLA visited the PRC [People’sRepublic of China] at the invitation of theChinese government. Zambia, Tanzania,and the PRC [People’s Republic of theCongo] also took part in the organization ofthat trip. In the course of negotiations inthe PRC, the Chinese assured their delega-tion that they would terminate all forms of


military aid to all three Angolan national lib-eration movements until the granting of in-dependence to Angola.

I thanked the president of the MPLAfor the interesting information. I promisedto communicate to the Central Committeeof the CPSU the request of the MPLA tofurnish additional military and financial aid.

The conference was attended by mem-bers of the Politburo of the Central Com-mittee of the MPLA Lucio Lara and JoseEduardo, member of the governing councilof the MPLA Pedro Van-Dunen, as well asthe first Secretary of the Soviet Embassy inthe PRC Comrade B. G. Putilin.

Ambassador of the USSR to thePeople’s Republic of the Congo

/s/ E. Afanasenko

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll.157-159.]

Soviet Ambassador to the People’sRepublic of Angola B.S. Vorobiev,

Memorandum of Conversation withPresident A. Neto, 4 September1976

From the diary of SECRETB.S. VOROBIEV Copy No. 1

Ser. No. 286

Record of Conversation withPresident of PRA A. NETO

4 September 1976

On 4 September 1976, I visited Presi-dent A. Neto at his invitation.

Neto inquired as to whether any infor-mation had been received from Moscowregarding the Soviet position on issues re-lating to the national liberation movementin southern Africa, and whether that infor-mation could be imparted to him, if possible,in connection with the upcoming meetingof the presidents from five countries(Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique,and Botswana), scheduled for September 15.

I said to him in general that no infor-mation had yet been received. Based onmaterials received from the center [Mos-cow], I told him about the ongoing confer-ence in Moscow of delegations from threenational liberation movements from south-ern Africa.

For my part, I asked the president to

share his thoughts in connection with theupcoming meeting and requested his assess-ment of conditions in the national liberationmovement and of the position of other Afri-can countries. Neto reported that it had beendetermined to hold the meeting of the fivepresidents ahead of schedule (that is, not onSeptember 15 as referenced above), and thatin just two hours he was flying to Dar-es-Salaam. The principal theme of the meet-ing would be the meeting between [U.S.Secretary of State Henry A.] Kissinger and[South African Prime Minister John] Vorsterand its implications for Africa. He, Neto,still did not know exactly what position topropose at the meeting, what policy to adopt.This being his first opportunity for partici-pation in this sort of a conference (Tanza-nia, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswanahave already met repeatedly on these issues),it is apparent that Neto needs to hear theopinions of his colleagues at the meeting,and only after that will he be in a position toformulate his position. For example, it isnot entirely clear to Neto why the participa-tion and assistance of Kissinger is neces-sary. He also does not understand the in-consistency of [Zambian] President [Ken-neth] Kaunda on the issue of the intermedi-ating role of Kissinger in contacts withVorster.

Neto indicated further that, lacking afull understanding of the positions held byTanzania and the other participants in theconference, he is presently having difficultyarticulating any concepts on these issues,although after his return from the meeting,these issues will be clearer to him, and heexpects to be able to inform us about them,so they can be communicated to Moscow.

In the course of our discussion I in-formed the president about the response re-ceived from Moscow regarding the attitudeof the Angolan side toward the issue of thesituation in the South Atlantic, conveyedthrough the Soviet Ambassador by[Angolan] Prime Minister Lopo doNascimento.

President Neto expressed his apprecia-tion for the speedy response. He declaredhis full agreement with all of the positionsheld by the Soviet side and emphasized that,in the recent past, new facts had emergedindicating an increased interest by the USAin the ROZM [Republic of Cape Verde] andby France in the DRSTP [Democratic Re-public of Sao Tome and Principe].

The president further stated that thePolitburo of the MPLA, by special dispen-sation, had empowered Politburo memberand Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento,with responsibility for all important issuesof foreign policy, to prepare additional pro-posals on the issue over further developmentof contacts by the PRA with Sao-Tome andPrincipe. He requested the Soviet Ambas-sador to provide him with detailed positionsof the Soviet side on the issue over the situ-ation in the South Atlantic and relations ofLopo do Nascimento with the ROZM andthe DRSTP.

Neto stated his desire for a continualexchange of information between the PRAand the USSR on international questions,in particular those concerning the situationin Africa and the South Atlantic. He statedthat he intended to address these questionsin his conferences in Moscow.

USSR AMBASSADOR TO THEPEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

/s/ B. VOROBIEV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 65, d. 2513, ll.100-101.]

Soviet Ambassador to Angola, V.P. Loginov, Memorandum of

Conversation with candidate-memberof the Politburo Secretary of the CCMPLA-PT for international issues

P. Luvualu, 27 June 1978

From the journal of SECRETV.P. Loginov Copy no. 2 re: no. 222

20 July 1978

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONwith candidate-member of the PolitburoSecretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT for

international issuesP. LUVUALU

27 June 1978

[I] visited candidate-member of thePolitburo, Secretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberationof Angola—Partido Trabajo] for interna-tional issues, P. Luvualu at his invitation.

P. Luvualu informed me that at the cur-rent time the leadership of the People’s Re-public of Angola has sent several delega-tions to various African countries in order


to explain the Angolan position with regardto Zaire and to gather information on thereal nature of the events in the Zairian prov-ince of Shaba. The delegations should onceagain underscore that neither Angola, northe Soviet Union, nor Cuba bear any rela-tion to the events in the province of Shaba,and that these events are an internal Zairianproblem.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PTdeclared that there are objective factorswhich facilitate the continual occurrence ofconflicts and tension in this region. Thecolonizers, when they drew the borders be-tween states, did not take into account theethnic make-up of the population. As a re-sult, the significant nationality of the Lundawas broken up and in the current time livesin three countries — Zaire, Angola and Zam-bia. Moreover, at the current time there areover 250,000 Zairian refugees in Angola,who are mainly of the Lunda nationality andamong them from 20,000 to 30,000 areformer soldiers, the so-called Katanga gen-darmes. After the war of independence, thecentral authorities in Zaire began to perse-cute members of the Lunda nationality wholived in the province of Shaba. Unlawfularrests took place as well as the executionof Zairian soldiers of the Lunda nationality.

It is necessary to take into account thefact that the province of Shaba is the richestof all Zairian provinces and provides a sig-nificant part of the hard-currency goodswhich enter the country, and that some ofthe largest foreign monopolies have investedcapital in the exploitation of the natural re-sources of the province.

The catastrophic condition of theZairian economy, the dizzying rise of prices,the corruption which has enveloped thewhole machinery of state, including thearmy, the unbearably serious condition ofthe population, particularly of national mi-norities and the greater part of the military,aggravates the conflict between theKinshasa government and the Lunda nation-ality, and lead to the revolts which occurfrom time to time among the soldiers ofLunda nationality in the Zairian army. Dur-ing moments of acute conflict the Lundarefugees in Angola seek to assist their fel-low-tribesmen in the province of Shaba.Moreover, all of the refugees in Angola, itgoes without saying, would like to return totheir homeland in Zaire. It is practicallyimpossible to control the movement of

groups of Lunda nationality from Angolainto Zaire and back, since the border be-tween Angola and Zaire stretches out forapproximately two thousand kilometers.

P. Luvualu underscored that Mobutu,in every instance when an internal conflictarises, strives by using false pretexts, to in-ternationalize it. The Secretary of the CCMPLA-PT [referred to] the interference ofWestern powers—the members of NATO inthe previous conflict in the province ofShaba and their proposal to create an inter-African armed force which would be usednot only to resolve the current tasks of put-ting down the revolt of the Lunda national-ity, [but also for] the preservation of theMobutu regime, and the possibility for for-eign monopolies to continue to exploit theresources of the province of Shaba.

The fact, declared P. Luvualu, that theRepublic of South Africa has expressed adesire to take part in the inter-African forcesconfirms our evaluation of the neo-colonialnature of these forces. This evaluation isalso confirmed by the fact that China hassent military instructors to Zaire and has of-fered equipment for arming the inter-Afri-can forces.

In the estimation of P. Luvualu, thisissue concerns armed forces of internationalimperialism which are being created byNATO with the aim of supporting reaction-ary, unpopular regimes in Africa as well assupporting the struggle against progressiveAfrican countries and national liberationmovements.

The long term goals of the Westerncountries consist of strengthening the posi-tion of NATO in the central part of Africa inorder to break through to the Indian Ocean,i.e. for the neo-colonial conquest of Africa.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PTdeclared that the evaluation by the Angolanleadership of the events in Zaire is con-firmed likewise by the resolution of theWestern countries to offer Kinshasa eco-nomic assistance. The Western countries,as is well known, as a condition for grant-ing such assistance demanded, first, a re-form of the management of the Zairianeconomy and finances according to whichrepresentatives of the USA, France, Bel-gium, and the Federal Republic of Germanywould have full control over the economy,finances, and the actions of the administra-tive apparatus from top to bottom. Secondly,they put forward a demand for the recon-

ciliation of the central Kinshasa authoritieswith the Lunda nationality in order that for-eign monopolies might without resistanceexploit the wealth of the province of Shaba.And, finally, the Western countries persistin seeking the reconciliation of Zaire withAngola in order to renew the transport ofnatural resources from the province of Shabaalong the Benguela railroad.

P. Luvualu remarked in this connectionthat the president of the People’s Republicof Angola, A. Neto, in his declaration of July9, announced that the Zairian refugees willbe led from the Zairian borders into the in-terior of Angola, that Angola will disarm thedetachments of the FNLC [Front for theNational Liberation of the Congo] whichretreat from the province of Shaba intoAngola, and that the Angolan governmentproposes that Zaire, in turn, draw off theUNITA, FNLA, and FLEC bases away fromthe Angolan border. The President of thePeople’s Republic of Angola in this an-nouncement also underscored that the refu-gees may live in any country according totheir choice. This position, said P. Luvualu,is in complete accordance with the charterof the Organization of African Unity andinternational law.

Then the Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT raised the problem of Namibia. He in-formed us that, in appraising the aggressionof the Republic of South Africa towardAngola at Cassinga, immediately followingthe important victory of SWAPO [SouthwestAfrican People’s Organization] in the UN,the Angolan leadership came to the conclu-sion that the aggressive actions of the Re-public of South Africa were made in pur-suit of the following goals: to weakenSWAPO and force it to accept the plan ofthe 5 Western powers for Namibia; to gaintime, in order to create in Namibia a puppetpolitical force which would be able tocounter SWAPO; to scare the People’s Re-public of Angola and weaken Angolan sup-port for SWAPO.

P. Luvualu remarked that events hadfully confirmed the correctness of this ap-praisal of the Angolan leadership. For ex-ample, in the present time in Namibia, theRepublic of South Africa has created the so-called democratic party with the help of therenegade [Andrea] Chipanga and the so-called National Front of Namibia. Vorsterfeverishly attempts to prepare elections,which are falsified from the very beginning,


and to achieve an internal settlement on themodel of the internal settlement of Rhode-sia with the aid of puppets like Chipanga.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PTdeclared that the People’s Republic ofAngola will continue to support SWAPO.The Angolan leadership, he said, considersthat for the peaceful resolution of theNamibian problem the Republic of SouthAfrica should: officially define a deadlinefor the transfer of Walvis Bay to the authori-ties of Namibia, after declaring the indepen-dence of that country; for a period of transi-tion draw off its troops, which are now con-centrated on the border with Angola, to basesin the South of Namibia; immediately lib-erate all political prisoners in Namibia. P.Luvualu likewise remarked that Angola con-curs with the proposed role of the UN in thetransitional period in Namibia.

In conclusion P. Luvualu underscoredthat the maneuvers of Western countriesaround Angola will not succeed in forcingthe MPLA-PT to turn from the path it haschosen. We, he declared, have made a firmand final choice of friends. This is the So-viet Union, Cuba, and other socialist coun-tries. With the assistance and support ofsocialist states, and first and foremost of theSoviet Union and Cuba, Angola will followits chosen path.

[I] thanked the Secretary of the CCMPLA-PT for this information. From myside I handed him the text of the Declara-tion of the Soviet Government on Africa (inPortuguese). I underscored that this is animportant political action in defense of theindependence of African governments, inthe solidarity of the USSR in the struggle ofthe peoples of the continent against the im-perialist interference in their affairs. I notedthat the appraisal contained in it of the situ-ation in Africa coincides with the positionof the People’s Republic of Angola. Then Igave him a translation into Portuguese ofthe Pravda article regarding the externalpolicies ofthe USA.

I handed [him] a film on the first con-gress of the MPLA-PT and the sojourn inthe People’s Republic of Angola of the So-viet party delegation headed by ComradeA.P. Kirilenko.

P. Luvualu expressed his gratitude tothe Soviet government for its unflaggingsupport of progressive forces in Africa. Hesaid that he would immediately bring thetext of the Declaration to the attention of

the leadership of the People’s Republic ofAngola. He likewise expressed his gratitudefor the gift of the CC CPSU.

In the course of our exchange of opin-ions on international problems P. Luvualuasked that I give information about the situ-ation in South Yemen after the unsuccess-ful government coup.

Embassy advisor S. S. Romanov waspresent during this discussion.

USSR AMBASSADOR TO THEPEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

/s/ V. LOGINOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1148, ll.71-75: translated by Sally Kux; copy on fileat National Security Archive.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenMinister-counselor of the Soviet

Embassy in Havana M. Manasov andCuban Communist Party CC member

Raul Valdes Vivo, 7 May 1979

From the journal of SECRETM.A. Manasov copy no. 3

re: no 265“24” May 1979

RECORD OF DISCUSSIONwith member of the CC

Com[munist]Party of Cubacomr. Raul Valdes Vivo

7 May 1979

I met with R.V. Vivo in the CC of theParty and, referring to the instructions of theSoviet ambassador, informed him of the dis-cussion in the International Section of theCC CPSU with the members of the Execu-tive Committee of the Jamaican People’sNational Party (PNP).

R.V. Vivo, having thanked me for theinformation, noted the significance of thismeeting, which will enable the developmentof the connection between the CPSU andthe PNP and, first and foremost, opens thepossibility for the preparation of PNP cad-res in the Soviet Union.

Then, in the course of the discussion,R.V. Vivo spoke about his recent trip to sev-eral African countries, which was carried outon the orders of F. Castro. This trip wasundertaken, continued my interlocutor, be-cause of the fact that the information which

we had received from our embassies in anumber of African countries is of a subjec-tive nature. In this connection I [ValdesVivo] was given the task of becoming ac-quainted with the situation on location, tohave discussions with the leaders of Angola,Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Ni-geria, and likewise with the Soviet ambas-sadors in these countries, in order to receivemore complete and more objective informa-tion about the state of affairs in southernAfrica.

I was tasked, he said, to convey toJ[oshua]. Nkomo [leader of the ZimbabweAfrican Political Union, ZAPU] and R.Mugabe [leader of the Zimbabwe AfricanNational Union, ZANU], that Cuba is un-able to satisfy their request to send pilotsfor the repulsion of air attacks on the train-ing camps for the Patriotic Front armedforces; to clarify the possibility of unifiedaction between ZAPU and ZANU; to layout before their leaders and the leadershipof the front-line governments the Cubanplan for the creation of a provisional gov-ernment in Zimbabwe.

R.V. Vivo meanwhile remarked that inAngola at first there had not been clear co-operation between Cuba and the USSR,whereas in Ethiopia our countries haveachieved the full coordination of our jointactions. The policy of Cuba and the SovietUnion with regard to southern Africa shouldlikewise be coordinated, he underscored.

My interlocutor laid out the essence ofthe Cuban plan, which is summarized asfollows. The declaration of a provisionalgovernment in Zimbabwe is realized not inexile, but in a part of the liberated territoryof the country; J. Nkomo is proposed forthe post of president of the country, R.Mugabe for prime minister; the programplatform of the provisional government pro-vides for the realization of a series of so-cial-economic transformations, secures theinterests of those countries which recognizeits government; the rights of the white partof the population are guaranteed, electionsare planned for the legislative organs of thecountry; constitutional guarantees are pro-claimed, etc.

According to the words of R.V. Vivo,J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe have agreed withthis plan, as have the leaders of the front-line states. The provisional government, inthe estimation of the Cuban side, wouldpossibly be recognized at first by 30 coun-


tries.The active interference of England in

the affairs of Zambia may ensure the vic-tory of the puppet government, which wouldpossibly lead to a conflict between ZANUand ZAPU if the unity of their actions arenot achieved, noted my interlocutor.

He reported that the armed forces ofthe ZANU and the ZAPU include in total24 thousand people (12 thousand in eachorganization), but unfortunately, these forcesare as yet inactive. In the ranks of merce-naries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2thousand whites.

R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the contentof his discussion with the Soviet ambassa-dor in Mozambique. According to hiswords, during the discussion of the situa-tion in southern Africa, our ambassadornoted that according to the theory of Marx-ism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerateevents in a country where there is not a revo-lutionary situation and where there is notcivilization. “To that I responded in jest tothe Soviet ambassador,” said R.V. Vivo,“that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F.Castro decide that our countries will takepart in the operations in Rhodesia, then wewill participate in them.”

By my request R.V. Vivo briefly in-formed me about the work of the last ple-num of the CC Comparty of Cuba. He re-ported that the plenum summed up the ful-fillment of the resolutions of the First PartyCongress, revealed the deficiencies in thedevelopment of the national economy of thecountry, and set its course to overcome them.In view of the fact that the project for theresolution of the plenum on the given ques-tion did not reflect all aspects of the eco-nomic situation, the corresponding sectionof the CC of the Party was tasked with itsreworking and with its publication.

With regard to the resolution of the ple-num of the CC concerning the appointmentof Lionel Soto [Prieto] as a member of theSecretariat of the CC of the Party, R.V. Vivospoke very highly of him (“He is no GarciaPelaes,” he said) and reported, that L. Sotowill be occupied with the issues of the partyleadership of the country’s economy; alongthe party line he is tasked with responsibil-ity for Khuseplan, the National Bank, GKES[State Committee for Economic Coopera-tion], and other central organs of the nationaleconomy.

COUNSELLOR-MINISTER OF THEEMBASSY OF THE USSR

IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA/s/ M. MANASOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 834, ll. 82-84.]

Transcript of CPSU CC PolitburoMeeting, 18 October 1979 (excerpt)

[...]9. Telegram from Havana Spec[ial]. #

741 and 744

SUSLOV. Comrades, you have readthese telegrams. In one of them a questionis raised that in a conversation with our am-bassador, Raul Castro told about difficul-ties that had emerged with regard to replace-ment of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia. Inthe second conversation Raul Castro said theAngolans in all probability would appeal[probably to us] with a request to take overthe maintainance [i.e., costs—trans.] of theCuban troops in Angola. Secondly, he saidthat the Angolans treat the Cuban represen-tatives rather tactlessly.

The next question concerned the assis-tance with arms to SWAPO. He remarked,that Soviet comrades assist SWAPO witharms but the SWAPO men absolutely do notfight and do not want to fight. Then onewonders, why we should help them withweapons[?] In one word, there are a num-ber of very important principled questionswhich we should consider. I think that weshould order the Defense Ministry and theInternational Department of the CC to con-sider these questions advanced in these tele-grams, taking into account the exchange ofopinions that took place at the meeting ofthe Politburo, [and] the proposals will beintroduced to the CC.

ALL. Agreed.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 6, ll.1-1; copy obtained by David Wolff; trans-lation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

ZUBOK, PLESHAKOVWIN GELBER PRIZE

The Cold War International HistoryProject congratulates Vladislav M.Zubok and Constantine M. Pleshakov,two Russian historians who have beenassociated with the Project since its in-ception, for receiving the 1996 LionelGelber Prize for their book, Inside theKremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin toKhrushchev, published by Harvard Uni-versity Press. Zubok is currently basedat the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute anddeclassified documents repository lo-cated at George Washington University;Pleshakov lives in Moscow, where heuntil recently worked as a researcher atthe USA/Canada Institute of the Rus-sian Academy of Sciences. Established in 1989, the $50,000Lionel Gelber Prize, given by a Foun-dation named for the late Canadian dip-lomat, historian, and writer, is awardedannually to the winning author of a non-fiction book in the field of foreign rela-tions. It was presented to Zubok andPleshakov in Toronto on 7 October1996. The jury citation read:

“Zubok and Pleshakov, two membersof the young generation of Russian his-torians, have mined recently availabledocuments to provide new insights intothe inner workings of the Kremlin dur-ing the critical postwar period. Theirsis a significant contribution to the lit-erature: a fresh and superbly researchedappraisal of the ideological, strategicand human foundations of the Cold War,from the Soviet side. This is a praise-worthy book in the best traditions ofwhat Lionel Gelber sought to encour-age on behalf of readers everywhere:impressive without being intimidating;learned without being impenetrable;engaging without being superficial.”


ANATOMY OF A THIRD WORLD COLD WAR CRISIS:

NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ONTHE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-1978

Editor’s Note: The Russian and East German documents presented below illuminate the “other side”—other sides, really—of one ofthe key events that hastened the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente in the mid-1970s: the Horn of Africa Crisis of 1977-78, in which aregional rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as domestic political instability in both countries, became entangled with super-power rivalry and competition for influence in the Third World. While Ethiopia and Somalia had a long-standing dispute over theirborders, the immediate causes of the crisis dated to 1974, when a leftist revolution overthrew Ethiopian leader Emperor Haile Selassie,who had been a pillar of Western influence for decades, and to early February 1977, when the Ethiopian revolution took a more militantcourse when Haile Mengistu Mariam seized control of the ruling “Derg” and eliminated his chief rivals for power, including TeferiBante, the revolution’s erstwhile leader.

The Ethiopian Revolution opened up new possibilities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region, where its chief allyhad been Somalia, with whom it had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As the documents show, the Soviet Union andits allies, notably Cuban leader Fidel Castro, attempted persistently to keep both Ethiopia and Somalia within the socialist camp. This,in practice, meant trying to damp down Ethiopian-Somali hostility and, in particular, the territorial ambitions of Somali leader MohammedSiad Barre, who claimed that ethnic Somalis were being persecuted in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia and deserved liberation andincorporation into Somalia proper. In the course of trying to mediate the dispute, Moscow and Havana found that appeals to socialistinternational solidarity could only go so far in overcoming deep-seated national and even tribal disagreements.

Still—as demonstrated by a relatively cordial discussion between U.S. and Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa in early 1977—thesimmering regional hot-spot did not erupt into a full-blown superpower clash until the late summer, when Somalia launched an offensiveto capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia. By then, sensing that the Ethiopian leadership was tilting toward Moscow, both the Siad Barreregime in Mogadishu and the Carter Administration in Washington were exploring the possibility of improving U.S.-Somali ties to thedetriment of the Soviet Union, and Siad Barre evidently believed that Washington had flashed him at least a dim green light to attackEthiopia (a claim which U.S. officials denied).

The Somali attacks of July-August 1977, shattering a Soviet mediation effort then taking place in Moscow, quickly achieved majorsuccess at thrusting into Ethiopian territory; by September-October, Somali or Somali-backed forces had captured most of the Ogaden.The Somali advances prompted desperate pleas from Mengistu for Soviet-bloc military support, and at some point that fall the SovietUnion and Cuba, which had already been providing some weapons to the Derg, decided that it would be unacceptable to allow Ethio-pia—a strategically significant country seemingly poised to become an important member of the socialist bloc—to suffer a militarydefeat at the hands of a country (Somalia) which despite protestations of socialist orientation seemed to be quickly shifting into the“imperialist” camp.

The decision by Moscow and Havana to come to Mengistu’s rescue became evident between November 1977 and February 1978, asSoviet planes and ships transported roughly 15,000 Cuban troops and large supplies of Soviet weaponry, and a USSR military missionled by Gen. Vasilii I. Petrov helped direct Ethiopian-Cuban military activities. The massive Soviet-Cuban airlift spurred an Ethiopiancounter-offensive which evicted Somali forces from the Ogaden and entrenched the Mengistu regime in power.

At the same time, these developments cemented both Somalia’s defection from the Soviet-bloc (in November, Mogadishu abrogateda 1974 Somali-Soviet friendship treaty) and Ethiopia’s dependence on that same Soviet-bloc for military aid, and elevated the conflict toa superpower crisis, as Washington charged Moscow with employing Cuban proxy forces to expand its influence in Africa. Moscow andHavana maintained that they had only helped Ethiopia defend itself from a U.S.-backed assault from Somalia (and various “reactionary”Arab countries supporting it), whereas Carter Administration hardliners (notably National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) as-serted that the Horn crisis, coming on the heels of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, revealed a rising international assertivenesson the Kremlin’s part, a danger requiring a tough American response—if not a direct military involvement to stem the Soviet-Cubanrecapture of the Ogaden (or a perceived threat to Somalia), then in the form of a closer relationship with the People’s Republic of China,the USSR’s bitter communist foe.

This new dispute between the USSR and United States flared up in late 1977 just as it seemed that, after a rocky start, the Carter andBrezhnev leaderships were finally beginning to make some progress toward improving relations, and, most importantly, toward conclud-


ing a SALT II treaty. Instead of finishing up the arms control treaty—which the Soviets had made a prerequisite for a Carter-Brezhnevsummit meeting which the American leader eagerly desired—the Horn Crisis exacerbated superpower tensions and, just as important,seemed to tilt the balance of power within the Carter Administration away from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who stressed reachingagreements with Moscow, and toward Brzezinski, who favored “linkage” between progress toward bilateral accords and Soviet behaviorin the Third World. The charges and countercharges between Washington and Moscow, along with disagreements on other areas such ashuman rights, the Middle East (where the Kremlin accused Washington of backing off an agreed-approach in favor of backing a bilateralEgyptian-Israeli accord), and relations with China, helped stall progress in the SALT II negotiations and generally embitter U.S.-Sovietrelations in the first half of 1978. Thus was it said that SALT, or more generally detente, “lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.”

Exploring why the U.S.-Soviet detente of the mid-1970s was side-tracked by such seemingly obscure and peripheral issues as theregional crisis in the Horn of Africa was one purpose of the “Carter-Brezhnev Project.” Spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of theCenter for Foreign Policy Development at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, the Carter-Brezhnev Project gathered scholars, former Soviet and American officials, and newly-released documentation for a series of oral historyconferences to examine the reasons behind the collapse of detente, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and futureRussian-American relations. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project’s efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American,Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documentsrepository based at George Washington University, and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), based at the WoodrowWilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

In this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, we are pleased to present a sampling of the Russian and East German documents on the 1977-78 Horn of Africa Crisis that were gathered for the Carter-Brezhnev conference on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, held in Ft.Lauderdale, Florida, on 23-26 March 1995. (A much smaller selection was included in a briefing book assembled by the NationalSecurity Archive and CWIHP for use during the conference.)

Both the Russian and East German documents were obtained and translated via the collective efforts of the National SecurityArchive, CWIHP, and the CFPD. Most of the Russian documents printed below emanated from the Center for the Storage of Contempo-rary Documentation (TsKhSD in its Russian acronym), the repository for the post-1952 records of the Central Committee of the Commu-nist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), located in the former Central Committee headquarters in Old Square in Moscow; someadditional documents came from the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF); all were specially declassified by Russianauthorities for the Carter-Brezhnev Project. For their assistance in working out the details of locating and obtaining these materials,CWIHP would like to thank N.G. Tomilina, Director of TsKhSD, and her staff, and Vladislav M. Zubok and Malcolm Byrne of theNational Security Archive.

The East German documents printed below are drawn from a larger collection obtained from the East Berlin-based archive of theformer ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), and translated from German, byChristian F. Ostermann, a researcher based at the National Security Archive and the incoming CWIHP Associate Director. These EastGerman documents include reports of communications with Soviet and Cuban officials—including a lengthy excerpt from the transcriptof an April 1977 conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and visiting Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had recentlyattempted a mediation effort between Somalia and Ethiopia—and accounts of an abortive East German effort in 1978 to mediate theongoing dispute between the central Ethiopian government and the separatist Eritrean guerrilla movement. As with the conflict betweenEthiopia and Somalia, both contestants in the Ethiopia-Eritrea clash professed allegiance to socialism, and Moscow hoped to subsumetheir differences in order to consolidate an anti-Western bloc on the Horn of Africa.

All of the photocopied Russian and East German documents printed below, and many other, still-untranslated East-bloc documents(as well as declassified U.S. government documents) concerning the Horn Crisis, are on file and available for scholarly research at theNational Security Archive. The Archive is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, andcan be reached at (202) 994-7000 (telephone); (202) 994-7005 (fax); and [email protected] (e-mail).

To assess the significance of these materials for understanding the Horn of Africa Crisis, the CWIHP Bulletin has solicited commen-taries from three scholars: Ermias Abebe, an Ethiopian-born scholar who obtained his Master’s degree at Moscow State University andrecently received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, has completed a dissertation on Soviet foreign policy in the Third World inthe 1970s, using Russian, American, and Ethiopian sources; Paul B. Henze, author of The Horn of Africa from War to Peace (Macmillan,1991) and during the Carter Administration a staff member of the National Security Council, and currently a researcher affiliated withthe Washington, D.C.-office of the Rand Corporation; and Christian F. Ostermann, currently completing a dissertation for the Univer-sity of Hamburg on U.S.-East German relations in the 1950s, is a researcher based at the National Security Archive and the incomingCWIHP Associate Director. Their commentaries begin below, preceding the section of translated East-bloc documents.

In the future, CWIHP hopes to organize additional activities, including a scholarly conference or workshop, to gather furthersources and perspectives on the international history of the Horn of Africa Crisis. These would include still-missing pieces of the puzzlefrom the Russian and American archives, materials from the region such as Ethiopia and Somalia, and, if possible, Cuban records thatcould clarify Havana’s actions and motivations during the crisis.

—James G. Hershberg


laboration would not only enable thenew Ethiopia to take deserved creditfrom the international scholarly com-munity, but also to reap the intellectualreward of a better understanding of aregime that it fought so gallantly andwith immense sacrifice to topple.

My specific comments on thesedocuments will focus on three majorthemes—Soviet influence on: (a) themilitary regime; (b) the Ethio-Somaliwar and; (c) the Eritrean secessionistmovement.

I. Soviet relations with the PMAC

Soviet interest in winning a posi-tion of strength on the Horn of Africadates from the 1960s. Probably, themajor explanations are related to thearea’s strategic value. First, two impor-tant international confrontations cutacross the Horn: the Arab-Israeli con-flict, and the Sino-Soviet rivalry, whosegeographic expression involved thewhole area stretching from the WesternPacific, to Southeast and South Asia,and into the Indian Ocean littoral. Also,the Horn’s strategic location along East-West communication and transportationroutes enables it to serve as a criticalvantage point to command or interdictoil shipments from the Middle East andelsewhere. Furthermore, in the post-colonial setting, newly liberated Afri-can states had increasingly become tar-gets for Marxist-Leninist ideologicalexpansion to alienate “Western imperi-alist states.” As Soviet leader Leonid I.Brezhnev had once remarked, “Africa[had become] a main field of battle forcommunism.”1 Moreover, in one of thedocuments published here, Cuba’s Fi-del Castro reinforces this idea in anApril 1977 meeting with his East Ger-man counterpart, Erich Honecker, bystating that “in Africa we can inflict asevere defeat on the entire reactionaryimperialist policy. We can free Africafrom the influence of the USA and ofthe Chinese . . . Ethiopia has a greatrevolutionary potential . . . So there is agreat counterweight to [Egyptian Presi-dent Anwar] Sadat’s betrayal in Egypt. . . We must have an integrated strat-egy for the whole African continent.”Thus, the Soviet Union along with its

allies apparently hoped to anchor them-selves firmly on the Horn in an attemptto position themselves to play impor-tant political and/or military roles in thewhole volatile region.

Nevertheless, at the beginning ofthe Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, Mos-cow was slow to react to the overthrowof imperial rule and the military take-over in Addis Ababa led by the Provi-sional Military Administrative Council(PMAC) or Derg. This hesitancy mightbe explained by a legitimate Soviet re-luctance to antagonize Somalia, espe-cially in light of recent setbacks theSudan and Egypt, where Moscow hadlost influence in spite of massive eco-nomic and military aid to these coun-tries. It must be remembered here thatSomalia had a territorial dispute withEthiopia over the Ogaden and that theUSSR, at this time, had already culti-vated a strong presence in Somalia.That presence was cemented with Gen.Mohammed Said Barre’s successfulmilitary coup in October 1969 afterwhich he turned his country’s orienta-tion sharply toward Moscow, signing aSoviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship andCooperation in 1974. Under the treaty,the Somali government was generouslysupplied with military aid and the So-viets acquired access to the strategicport of Berbera. With all this at stake,Moscow had reason to be prudent inassessing the PMAC’s reliability beforeconsidering a new commitment.

The PMAC, on the other hand, hadtwo serious problems of its own whichinhibited it from seeking an immediateembrace from Moscow. One was thatinitially it was unclear about its ideo-logical preference and international ori-entation. An illuminating account ofthis confusion is provided by MajorDawit Wolde Giorgis, a high rankingofficial of the military regime who laterdefected to the United States and wrotea book. In it he stated that the PMACwas so “ignorant in the realm of ideol-ogy that at one point in the early stageof the revolution delegations were sentto Tanzania, Yugoslavia, China, andIndia to shop for one for Ethiopia.”2 Itis important to note that the SovietUnion was apparently not even consid-ered as a possible source of ideological

The materials presented here aspart of a collection of recently declas-sified documents from the former East-ern bloc begin to shed invaluable lighton the intricacies and evolution offormer Soviet, East German, and Cu-ban interpretations of and influence onthe politics of the Horn of Africa be-tween 1977-1978. The word begin isemphasized because, at the same time,these documents are far from compre-hensive in that a number of very criti-cal events and developments during thisperiod find scant or no mention. Someof these issues will be mentioned in thiscommentary. Nevertheless, reviewingthese documents, it will be difficult in-deed to underplay the crucial signifi-cance of the East-West standoff whichserved as the context in which theformer USSR and its allies compre-hended and attempted to shape the poli-tics of the region. Ultimately, this prismled to the gradual choice of cultivatingclose ties and rendering decisive sup-port to the military government inEthiopia beginning in 1976. In turn, thischoice molded that regime and guaran-teed its survival until 1991 when onlythe end of the Cold War and diminishedSoviet support coupled with the Eritreanand Tigrean liberation front victories ledto its collapse.

The publication of these documentsshould therefore serve as a valuablestimulus for international scholarship onsuperpower involvement in Africa dur-ing the Cold War and also arouse schol-ars on Ethiopia in particular to reexam-ine and enrich conventional wisdomabout the political history of theMengistu era. Furthermore, the fact thatthe country now has a completely dif-ferent leadership which is not taintedwith the atrocities of Mengistu and theDerg means, at least theoretically, thatit will have nothing to lose by collabo-rating in international research effortsand releasing pertinent documents fromEthiopian archives (unlike Angola forexample). On the contrary, such a col-

THE HORN, THE COLD WAR,AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE

FORMER EAST-BLOC:AN ETHIOPIAN VIEW

by Ermias Abebe


inspiration by the military rulers at anearly stage.

The other problem was that theCouncil engaged in three major succes-sive rounds of bloody power strugglesbefore Mengistu emerged as the uncon-tested leader. In providing a very shortaccount of these struggles, an importantpoint to underline at the outset is thatunlike some of the contenders he ulti-mately managed to annihilate, Mengistuhad neither educational exposure to norinterest in communist ideology and/orthe Soviet Union prior to the PMAC’sformation. As he admitted in one inter-view, his first encounter with Russianshappened only after the revolution. Per-haps one of his phenomenal abilities layin his capacity to understand quicklyand adopt new ideas when they serveda useful purpose in his quest for power.

The first round of weeding out op-ponents was carried out in November1974 when Gen. Aman Andom, the firstPMAC chairman, along with a fewother members of the Council and morethan 50 former high-ranking officials,were summarily executed, shockingboth Ethiopians and the internationalcommunity. The second round of ex-ecutions occurred in July 1976. Thistime the victims were active educatedofficers within the PMAC, like MajorSisay Habte and Lieutenants BewiketuKassa and Sileshi Beyene, who main-tained connections with radical ele-ments among university students, teach-ers, and labor organizers and who wereinstrumental in initially steering theCouncil to the Left from its originalnationalist orientation. A major restruc-turing of the PMAC in December 1976,when its members voted to stripMengistu of power and institute “col-lective leadership,” served as the pre-lude to the third and decisive round ofkillings. The architects of the restruc-turing included respected PMAC mem-bers like the nominal chairman whosucceeded Aman Andom: Gen. TeferiBanti, Maj. Alemayehu Haile and Capt.Mogus Wolde Michael. Again, espe-cially the last two, like those mentionedearlier, were important figures in intro-ducing socialism to the Council. How-ever, on 3 February 1977 Mengistuembarked on a sudden and swift retali-

ation. With the help of the chief of thepalace security force commander, heessentially carried out a mafia-stylecoup by simply ambushing and execut-ing the ringleaders of the restructuringwho were unsuspectingly preparing fora regular Council meeting in the palacegrounds. The following day he was“unanimously voted” chairman by theremaining PMAC members.

The documents from the Commu-nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)and Socialist Unity Party of [East] Ger-many (SED) presented here begin withactivities dating from early February1977. Notably, the first two documents,the memorandum of conversation be-tween Soviet Counselor-Minister inEthiopia S. Sinitsin with the PoliticalCounselor of the US Embassy in Ethio-pia Herbert Malin as well as the CPSU’sThird African Department Report onSomali-Ethiopian territorial disputes areboth dated February 2, i.e., one day be-fore Mengistu’s bloody coup. It willbe recalled that at the time it was widelyreported that the USSR Ambassador toEthiopia Anatolii Ratanov was the firstperson to congratulate Mengistu imme-diately after the carnage, leading tospeculation by some Western authorsthat the Soviets might have had a handin the affair by providing intelligencesupport or, at least, had prior informa-tion and might have provided tacit ap-proval before the killings occurred.3 Ifthat were the case, certainly these docu-ments shed no light. In fact, the firstdocument distinctly mentions the visitof an Ethiopian delegation to Moscowin July 1976 and the resulting joint So-viet-Ethiopian communique as the pre-lude to closer ties between the twocountries after the Ethiopian revolution.On the Ethiopian side, that delegationwas led by Mogus, one of the casual-ties of Mengistu’s coup. It seems theSoviets would have been unlikely tohighlight this information had theyknown about the impending events. Ofcourse, one can also argue that giventhat the Soviet Counselor-Minister wasdealing with his American counterpart,disinformation would have been theorder of the day.

It might be valuable to point out apossible Soviet displeasure with the

Ethiopian leadership prior to the coupwhich is implied between the lines ofone of the discussions of the CPSUThird African Department Report. Thisrefers to a late-1976 Cuban and SouthYemeni initiative to provide mediationin the Ethio-Somali dispute. The reportmentions that the Somali government,while not rejecting the proposal, hadspoken out in favor of including directSoviet participation in the negotiations.Ethiopia, on the other hand, the reportnotes, regarded the mediation initiativefavorably, but “did not express an analo-gous wish” (about Soviet participation)and thus the Cubans and Yemenis (ontheir own) were taking diplomatic stepsto organize mediation. Could this havebeen a factor causing Soviet apprehen-sion about the Ethiopian leadership’sreliability prior to Mengistu’s consoli-dation of power? The answer at thispoint can only be conjecture.

The first head of state from thecommunist bloc to meet with Mengistuafter his coup was Castro. He visitedAddis Ababa on March 14-15, just alittle more than a month later. On March16 he then flew across the Red Sea toAden, South Yemen, to co-chair a jointCuban-Yemeni mediation effort to settlethe Ethio-Somali dispute to whichSomali’s Barre as well as Mengistuwere invited. It is not clear from thedocuments whether this meeting hadbeen prearranged before the coup orwhether it was hastily scheduled afterit. Whatever the case, a few weeks later,on 3 April, Castro went to East Berlinto report about his African mission andconsult with the East German leaderErich Honecker. The transcript of thatmeeting presented here records Castro’svivid first impressions about Mengistu,revealing the latter’s apparent successin winning over both the heart and sup-port of the Cuban leader in such a rela-tively short time. Castro spoke ofMengistu as a “quiet, honest, and con-vinced . . . revolutionary leader . . . anintellectual personality who showed hiswisdom on February 3.” His massacreis portrayed and condoned as “a turn-ing point in the development of theEthiopian revolution when . . . a conse-quential decision was made to meet thechallenge by rightists” in the PMAC.


To the extent that the communist statesshared information with each other andwith Moscow to devise and coordinatepolicy, as it is assumed they did,Castro’s account provided an excellentreport card for Mengistu. Furthermore,as it is known from other sources thatCastro later flew to Moscow to reporton his trip, one may presume that hepresented the same glowing assessmentof Mengistu to the Soviet leadership.

Mengistu also indulges in a diplo-matic contribution to widen the emerg-ing rift between Somalia and the social-ist states by discrediting the revolution-ary potential of its leadership. In onerecord of conversation held on March18, his head of foreign affairs, Maj.Berhanu Bayeh, quotes the Egyptiannewspaper Al-Ahram to point out toSinitsin the possibility of Somalia join-ing Sudan, Egypt and Syria in a unifiedpolitical command. He adds that Barrehad been on record declaring that So-malia achieved its revolution indepen-dently and can acquire help from othercountries besides the Soviet Union andits allies. Given the recent Soviet lossof Egypt and Sudan, this informationwas probably intended to arouseMoscow’s apprehension.

Supporting his own professed com-mitment to Marxism-Leninism and theSoviet Union with practical deeds, atthe end of the following April Mengistuordered the closure of the U.S. commu-nications station in Asmara, the U.S.Information Service (USIS) center, andthe American military assistance advi-sory offices, and abrogated the Ethio-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agree-ment—the official treaty of alliancewith the United States dating from1953. It is also remarkable howMengistu was apparently successful inprojecting himself to the Soviets as agenuine, pro-Soviet, revolutionaryleader constantly challenged by nation-alist elements within his own Council.In one May 1978 conversation report,Rotislav Ulianovskii, an influential se-nior Third World policy analyst in theCPSU, instructs his East German coun-terpart Friedel Trappen, arguing:

Mengistu deserves to be regarded byus as a man who represents internation-

alist positions. By contrast to him,Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie aswell as Legesse Asfaw and others aremarked by nationalism although theyare faithful to him . . . I emphasizeagain, we have to apply maximum cau-tion, circumspection and tactfulness to-ward Mengistu so that the nationalistswill not grasp him by the throat.

According to the views of manyEthiopians, including former insiders inthe Mengistu regime such as Dawit(cited above), nothing could be furtherfrom the truth except for the remark onloyalty. First of all, between Februaryand November 1977 Mengistu had con-solidated absolute power. Secondly, hewas raised and trained in the traditionalAmharised Ethiopian military traditionand therefore, by background, the mostardent nationalist of them all. After therevolution he had repeatedly and suc-cessfully maneuvered between dressingup as an ideologue and as a nationalistwhenever each was politically expedi-ent. Mengistu evidently fostered thismisperception apparently to bolster hisown image (as an internationalist) and,at the same time, to limit demands andpressures from the socialist community.

Interestingly, Mengistu’s regimerepeatedly employed the “China card”to attract Soviet support. In one docu-ment discussing Ethiopia’s desire to ac-quire U.S.-manufactured arms fromVietnam with Soviet help, Berhanuemphasizes that “in contrast to the pastthe PMAC intends to consider this is-sue with the Vietnamese directly, ratherthan running to the People’s Republicof China [PRC] for mediation.” Thereference to the past alluded to the left-ist elements of the Military Council whowere liquidated in the coup. In anotherconversation report, in July 1977,Cuba’s military specialist in AddisAbaba, General Arnoldo Ochoa, con-veys to Soviet Ambassador Ratanovthat Mengistu had personally assuredhim about the decline in Ethiopian-Chi-nese relations following the PMAC’sfinding that the PRC was providingmilitary assistance to the EritreanPeople’s Liberation Front (EPLF).Mengistu, according to Ochoa, had ex-plained the decision to limit all relations

with Beijing to the minimum and todevise measures against Chinese ideo-logical penetration in Ethiopia. Thatsame month, yet another conversationrecord, this time between Mengistu andRatanov, reveals Soviet apprehensionabout the dissemination of anti-Soviet(Maoist) literature in Addis Ababa. ThatSeptember, the Ethiopian Foreign Min-ister Felleke Gedle Giorgis “especiallydwelled on the Chinese position on theEthiopian Revolution” in his talks withRatanov. Admitting to PRC economicaid at the initial stage of the revolution,he noted the changing Chinese stand asthe revolution deepened (perhaps allud-ing to the forging of closer ties with theUSSR). China then began to rendercomprehensive assistance to Somaliaduring the military conflict. By Febru-ary 1978, according to a joint report bythe CPSU Third Africa Department andthe Political Department of the GDREmbassy in Moscow, the Soviets noted(presumably with satisfaction) Beijing’shostile attitudes toward the Ethiopianleadership as well as the minimal popu-lar support enjoyed by pro-Maoistgroups in the country.

Another noteworthy issue dis-cussed in three documents concerns“Operation Torch”—an alleged impe-rialist conspiracy spearheaded by theCIA to assassinate Ethiopian leadersand destabilize the revolution in Sep-tember-October 1977 with the help ofregional forces hostile to the country.Again allegedly, Ethiopian authoritiesreceived a letter revealing the pendingplot from unknown sources in Africaand then conveyed this threat to theambassadors of the socialist countries.A few days later, the Permanent Secre-tary of the Foreign Ministry, DawitWolde Giorgis, visited the Soviet em-bassy and provided a copy of the letterto Ratanov. Interestingly, Dawit men-tions this incident in his book.4 Henotes an unsuccessful attempt by theEthiopian government to verify the let-ter through follow-up inquiries and de-scribes the great sense of panic and sus-picion it had created in the Foreign Of-fice. Moreover, while he alludes to thepossibility that the letter may have beenfabricated, he unfortunately does notstate a likely source. The mysterious


letter provides the names of two Ameri-can officials, alleged masterminds of theplot, with their ranks and positions atthe U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.If it is true, as Paul Henze asserts in thispublication, that even the names are fic-titious, it is odd that the Ethiopian au-thorities convened a socialist ambassa-dors’ meeting in panic instead of easilyverifying through elementary diplo-matic inquiry and concluding that it hadbeen a fabrication. The theory of a cha-rade—a make-believe drama enacted onfalse information—will thus have toinclude the Ethiopians as well as So-viet authorities as actors if it is to beconsidered a plausible explanation.

In addition, a few other documentsprovide accounts of some early reser-vations the Soviet Union and its allieshad about Mengistu’s handling of cer-tain issues. It should be noted that inearlier Western writings, some of thesereservations were usually associatedwith a later period, after Gorbachev as-sumed power in Moscow in 1985. Butas early as December 1977, a conver-sation between the East Germans andRatanov points toward the need forEthiopia to adopt a mixed economyalong the lines of the Soviet NEP (NewEconomic Program) of the 1920s. Theleadership’s perception of the nationalbourgeoisie as an enemy of the revolu-tion and the alienation and exclusion ofthis group as well as of the liberal-minded functionaries of the state appa-ratus from the economy and national lifeis criticized as a dangerous trend withnegative consequences. In another con-versation the following February, a cen-tral player in the CPSU’s Africa policygroup, Boris Ponomarev, expressed hisconcern over extremes in the EthiopianRevolution—the mass executions ofprisoners and the government’s RedTerror—directing the transmittal ofthese concerns to Mengistu using vari-ous channels.

Finally in this section, the issue ofMoscow’s relentless prodding ofMengistu to set up a Marxist-Leninistvanguard party to institutionalize therevolution as well as to transform thecountry into a reliable Soviet ally is asubject addressed by many authors andthe focus of my own study.5 Primarily

because of Mengistu’s resistance, andto the disappointment of the Soviets, theparty didn’t come into existence until1984. Two documents presented hererefer to Soviet anxiety about repeateddelays from the Ethiopian side in ac-cepting the arrival of “a specially se-lected group of experienced CPSUcomrades” to help in the party forma-tion process. One of them notes that“Mengistu apparently has no concept ofthe cooperation with the advisers [andthat] it is necessary to convince him thatthey could be a real help and relief.”Obviously, at this early stage in therevolution, the Soviets did not realizethat Mengistu was intentionally pre-venting Moscow’s infiltration into hispower structure before completing aprolonged process of weeding out po-tential contenders and adversaries.

II. Ethio-Somali War

A substantial number of the docu-ments presented here address the So-viet bloc’s involvement in the conflict.Indeed, for Moscow, Barre’s aggressionagainst Ethiopia, which began in early1977 under the guise of a Western So-mali Liberation Movement and whichescalated into full-scale intervention thefollowing July, was both a welcomeevent and a potentially dangerous de-velopment. On one hand, it providedthe Soviets with the opportunity to rap-idly penetrate Ethiopia, the prized stateof the Horn, while, on the other hand, itentailed a potentially painful risk of los-ing another state where Moscow hadalready built a presence: Somalia. Thedocuments help in tracing Moscow’spolicy in the region which began in1976 as a strategy of courting “Social-ist Ethiopia” without disturbing itslongstanding friendship with Somalia.By 1978 it had gone through a completesomersault with the Soviet ejectionfrom Mogadishu and its entrenchmentin Addis Ababa after a massive supplyof arms which decided the outcome ofthe conflict in favor of Ethiopia. Mycomments, however, will only brieflyfocus on three particular issues.

One is on the 16 March 1977 Cu-ban-Yemen effort at creating a Marx-ist-Leninist confederation consisting of

Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen.In his meeting with Honecker the fol-lowing month, Castro provides a de-tailed report about the attitudes of thetwo leaders, Mengistu and Barre, to-ward the proposal. Mengistu is referredto in glowing terms while Barre is de-scribed as a chauvinist whose principalidea is nationalism, not socialism. Thereport vividly shows Castro trapped asa victim of his own ideology. Havingerroneously assumed an absolute con-nection between perceived globaltrends—depicting socialism as theworld’s dynamic force—and the localsituation in the Horn, he had expecteda successful outcome to his efforts. Hissharp disappointment in Barre’s person-ality, on which the report dwells, shouldhave been subordinated to the more cru-cial realization that national and ethnicrivalries peculiar to the region haddoomed the confederation from the out-set. Also in this document, the Cubanleader, perhaps for the first time, force-fully raised the impending dilemma fac-ing the Soviet bloc in the Horn of Af-rica. He tells Honecker, “I see a greatdanger . . . if the socialist countries helpEthiopia, they will lose Siad Barre’sfriendship. If they don’t, the Ethiopianrevolution will founder.” Faced withan either/or situation within six-eightmonths, Moscow bet on Ethiopia at therisk of irretrievably losing Somalia.

Another issue warranting mentionis a probable justification for theKremlin’s massive air- and sealift ofmilitary equipment (worth about onebillion dollars), 12,000 Cuban combattroops, and about 1500 Soviet militaryadvisers to Ethiopia in November-De-cember 1977. This measure immedi-ately followed Somalia’s unilateral ab-rogation of the 1974 Treaty of Friend-ship and Cooperation with the USSR.Why was such an overwhelming showof force necessary? Moscow’s appar-ent objective in this spectacular movewas to guarantee the swift and decisiveend of the Ethio-Somali war with aquick and unconditional withdrawal ofSomali forces from Ethiopian territory.Two documents, the joint memorandumof the CPSU Third Africa Departmentand the Political Department of theGDR Embassy in Moscow, and the So-


viet Foreign Ministry/CPSU CC Inter-national Department report on the So-mali-Ethiopian conflict, shed light on aprobable motive: “to avoid a situationanalogous to the one in the MiddleEast”—where Sadat was taking his ownspectacular initiative in making an un-precedented visit to Jerusalem—fromarising in the Horn.

According to the documents, theSoviet Union wanted to avert at all coststhe internationalization of the conflictand the possible involvement of the UNSecurity Council which it believedwould be in the interest of Western pow-ers. Such an outcome, Moscow argued,would be possible if an armistice werereached without the withdrawal of So-mali troops from occupied Ethiopianterritory while Western powers simul-taneously pushed for Security Councilinvolvement. A takeover by the Secu-rity Council, moreover, would delay aresolution of the conflict in a similarfashion as in the Middle East, possiblyincreasing the danger for superpowerconfrontation as the West and other un-friendly states demanded Soviet exitfrom the region as a precondition andblame it for causing the conflict. Thesignificance of this logic is better ap-preciated when recalling Sadat’s dra-matic announcement in early Novem-ber that he would visit Israel. It was amove that crushed plans for multilat-eral talks on the Middle East at Genevaand suddenly removed the Soviets froma direct role in the Arab-Israeli peacetalks. In the face of such a setback,Moscow apparently showed its deter-mination to anchor just at the other endof the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia in adesperate attempt to balance, in somedegree, the loss of influence in Egyptby consolidating a strong presence inthe greater Middle East conflict zone.

The final issue of interest in thissection addresses one of Mengistu’sfirst reactions about the possible Sovietuse of Ethiopian port facilities in thelikely event of the Somalia’s denyingMoscow access to the port of Berbera.He addresses this issue with Ratanovin a conversation dated 29 July 1977.He, interestingly, doesn’t provide a clearcut commitment to provide the USSRaccess to its ports. Instead he states an

understanding of the Soviet dilemma:rendering military assistance to Ethio-pia at the risk of losing its opportunityin Somalia. He also articulatesEthiopia’s revolutionary indebtednessand obligation to take Moscow’s inter-est in the region into account. The docu-ment doesn’t make clear whether hewas responding to a Soviet request; but,particularly if he raised the issue on hisown initiative, the fact he makes suchan indirect commitment appears to havebeen subtle and timely maneuver to at-tract Moscow toward Ethiopia.

III. The Eritrean Secessionists

An interesting paradox in theEthiopian revolution can be noted. Withthe exception of the Ethiopian Demo-cratic Union (EDU) (an entity associ-ated with the remnants of the Selassieera), the other four major organizationswhich struggled to topple Mengistu’sregime all ironically professed alle-giance to Marxism-Leninism, just liketheir principal adversary. While two ofthem, the Ethiopian People’s Revolu-tionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethio-pian Workers’ Movement (MEISON),all but perished during the violent con-frontations of the late 1970s, the othertwo, the Eritrean People’s LiberationFront (EPLF) and the Tigrean People’sLiberation Front (TPLF) ultimately suc-ceeded in coordinating their efforts torenounce Marxism after the late 1980s,dislodge Mengistu from power in 1991,and establish two independent states—Eritrea and the Federal DemocraticRepublic of Ethiopia—by 1993-1994.

To what extent these various (pre-viously?) revolutionary organizationshad forged parallel relations with Mos-cow and other socialist countries re-mains an interesting question to explore.The EPRP claims to have establishedcontacts with the CPSU as early as1972.6 MEISON had purportedly de-veloped links through associations withEuropean Communist parties in the1970s.7 Until the Ethiopian revolution,the EPLF had been openly assisted bycountries like Cuba, possibly offeringindirect ties to Moscow. The TPLF, asan organization founded after Ethiopiajoined the Soviet orbit, probably didn’t

have any relations with the USSR, butit went on record as advocating Alba-nian-style socialism, thus relations withAlbania or China are not altogether in-conceivable. The few documents pre-sented here shed some light on Sovietand East German links with the EPLFand its much smaller rival organizationin Eritrea—the Eritrean LiberationFront (ELF)—in the context of the twosocialist countries’ efforts at facilitat-ing mediation with the Mengistu re-gime. In particular, in 1978 the EastGermans had arranged two direct high-level talks between Mengistu’s repre-sentative, Berhanu Bayeh, and EPLFleader Issaias Afeworki, the results ofwhich were promptly communicated byHonecker to Brezhnev.

What is clear from these docu-ments is the fact that the EPLF had ap-parently maintained well-establishedcontacts with the SED and Issaias talkeddirectly with Honecker as a leader of arevolutionary party. This level of con-tact may well not have been toMengistu’s liking. On the other hand,Moscow apparently exhibited sensitiv-ity to the views in Addis Ababa in thatthe ELF and its leader AhmedMohammed Nasser were less closelylinked with Moscow through theUSSR’s Solidarity Committee. More-over, in one of the documents,Ulianovskii rejects an East German pro-posal that Issaias meet with him inMoscow so that the CPSU could exertpressure on the EPLF to compromisewith Mengistu. Nevertheless, it is clearthat both Berlin and Moscow had ap-parently coordinated a concerted effortat finding a political solution to theEritrean problem by pressuring both thegovernment of Mengistu as well as therebel movements toward constructivedialogue. The results, however, had notbeen encouraging.

In conclusion, the documents pre-sented here are indeed important con-tributions to the study of the politics ofthe Horn during 1977-1978 in the con-text of the Cold War. Their value is notso much in the amount of “new” infor-mation they present, although there issome. Rather, they are priceless in pro-viding unique first-hand insight into theperceptions and attitudes of the major


actors involved in the decisions thatshaped political outcomes.

Interestingly, the documents fromthe Russian archives appear to havebeen carefully selected to elide signifi-cant “blank spots” even on the issuesand period covered. By contrast, theformer East German materials, thoughlimited in number, seem more insight-ful in the concentrated details they pro-vide on one issue in particular: theEthio-Eritrean high-level mediation.

Nevertheless, within the two-yearperiod covered in these documents thereare significant issues that find scantcoverage. From the Soviet side theseinclude materials pertaining toMoscow’s intelligence assessment andpossible involvement during the Ethio-pian power struggle; relations with or-ganizations other than the PMAC; mili-tary reports from General Petrov andothers in the Ogaden; and early mili-tary planning involvement in Eritrea.From the East German side, materialsrelated to its assistance in restructuringthe Ethiopian security services wouldbe of high interest. Beyond 1978, So-viet and other socialist countries’ in-volvement in the Ethiopian vanguardparty formation process would, ofcourse, be of critical importance.

1 Cited in P. Margushin, “Sovetskii Soyuzv Afrike,” Novoe Russkoe Slovo, 4 October1979.2 Dawit Wolde Giorgis, Red Tears: Fam-ine, War, and Revolution in Ethiopia, (Tren-ton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989), 21.3 Robert Patman, The Soviet Union in theHorn of Africa (Cambridge, Eng.: Cam-bridge University Press, 1990), 193; ReneLefort, Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?(London: Zed Press, 1983), 206.4 Giorgis, Red Tears, 35-36.5 Ermias Abebe, “The Vanguard Party: Im-perial Instrument of Soviet-Third WorldPolicy (1976-1986),” Ph.D. Dissertation,University of Maryland (College Park),1994.6 See EPRP founding member KifluTadesse’s The Generation, (Silver Spring,MD: Independent Publishers, 1993), 98.7 Bereket Habte Selassie, “Political Lead-ership in Crisis: The Ethiopian Case” Hornof Africa 3:1 (Jan.-Mar. 1980), 7.

MOSCOW, MENGISTU, ANDTHE HORN: DIFFICULT

CHOICES FOR THE KREMLIN

by Paul B. Henze

The Russian and East Germandocuments reproduced here constitutea useful contribution to the history ofthe Horn of Africa during the criticalevents of 1977-78. They provide in-sights into the Soviet relationship withthe authoritarian leaders of Ethiopia andSomalia at that time, ChairmanMengistu Haile Mariam and PresidentMohammed Siad Barre, as well as intothe motivations of these men and someof their associates.

Both Mengistu and Siad Barrewere stubborn and ambitious leaderswho confronted the Kremlin with diffi-cult choices, which it tried to avoid foras long as possible. Siad comes acrossas a more blatant liar than Mengistu,who appears to have been more genu-inely devoted to “socialism.” WhileSiad seems totally mendacious and de-vious in his manipulation of the Sovi-ets, Mengistu is shown with his back tothe wall. He was determined to winSoviet support by vigorously profess-ing his loyalty to “socialism” and mak-ing clear his readiness to serve Sovietaims throughout the Horn and in theworld at large. The documents occa-sionally reveal Soviet concern thatMengistu and his Derg associates weremoving too fast, and these concernswere sometimes expressed to him. Butas the Horn crisis developed, they be-came more concerned about preservingMengistu’s power than Siad’s. The rea-son, undoubtedly, is that Ethiopia wasa much more important country thanSomalia. The Soviets originally estab-lished themselves in Somalia becausethey were unable to do so in Ethiopia.

To those knowledgeable of the de-tails of Ethiopian history during thisperiod, enthusiastic Soviet references tothe “decisive action” Mengistu took on3 February 1977 are noteworthy. Inspite of repeated protestations of peace-ful desires, these references show thatSoviets had no reservations about ap-proving violence as a means of settlingdifferences. Though there are no ex-

plicit references to this action in thesedocuments, Soviet AmbassadorAnatolii P. Ratanov was reliably re-ported at the time to have been the firstto congratulate Mengistu after the spec-tacular bloodbath in the Derg when sev-eral challengers of Mengistu, most no-tably Head of State Teferi Bante, wereshot. As a result, Mengistu emergedinto the open as the dominant figure asChairman of the Provisional MilitaryAdministrative Council (PMAC), i.e.the Derg.

The documents provide useful in-formation on the activities of Cuba asjunior partner to the Soviets in Ethio-pia during this period. A long near-ver-batim report from the archives of theformer German Democratic Republic ofa meeting between Fidel Castro andErich Honecker on Castro’s return fromAfrica in early April 1977 gives us vividdetail that confirms what has long beengenerally known of Castro’s unsuccess-ful effort to mediate the developingHorn crisis in mid-March 1977. A sub-sequent briefing by Soviet AmbassadorRatanov of Cuban Gen. Arnaldo Ochoaprovides a remarkably frank, and notentirely positive, appraisal of Ethiopia’smilitary and political predicament andperformance as of mid-summer 1977.

The Soviet Union was remarkablyuncreative in its efforts to deal with thesituation provoked by Siad Barre’s at-tack on Ethiopia. Siad felt his way cau-tiously at first, operating behind a fa-cade of what he claimed were only guer-rilla operations. But by July 1977, So-malia was openly invading Ethiopiawith regular military forces.1 Never-theless, Somali officials adhered to thepretense well into 1978 that the opera-tion was entirely the initiative of guer-rillas. Even though Soviet officials inboth Somalia and Ethiopia had to bewell aware of what was happening,Moscow—on the surface at least—per-sisted on the course adopted early in theyear: trying to bring the Somalis andEthiopians together to compose theirdifferences. Long reports by SovietDeputy Foreign Minister LeonidIlychev of almost four weeks of meet-ings with a Somali delegation in Mos-cow from late July through the thirdweek of August chronicle an elaborate


charade of negotiations. Unfortunatelythe documents available to us here donot include parallel reports of dealingswith the Ethiopian delegation that wasin Moscow during the same period, butit appears that the Somalis and theEthiopians never even engaged in pre-liminary face-to-face talks. The reasonwhy is easy to see in written statementseach delegation gave the Soviets of itscountry’s position, for neither left anyroom for compromise or even discus-sion with the other.

While the independence of erst-while French colony of Djibouti causedimmediate worry, both Ethiopia andSomalia behaved with caution. Ratanovdid not react to an offer by Mengistu tosupport intervention in Djibouti. Ethio-pia lacked the strength to intervenealone.

The biggest problem looming inthe background of the discussions re-ported in these documents is Eritrea. Itwas already the most intractable prob-lem of all for Moscow in its relationswith Mengistu. Ethiopian military per-formance in meeting the Somali inva-sion was inhibited by the predicamentwhich Mengistu had got himself into inEritrea. The Soviets were not impressedwith the performance of Mengistu’sarmy in Eritrea. An East German docu-ment from December 1977 reveals whatappears to be Ambassador Ratanov’sirritation at Mengistu’s intransigence onEritrea as well as the hope that some-how a basis for negotiation with therebel movement there might be devel-oped. This became a major Soviet aimduring the next decade and led to re-peated East German efforts (and someItalian Communist attempts) to bringEritrean and Ethiopian Marxists to-gether.

In response to Mengistu’s urgentpleading, the Soviets agreed during July1977 to send in urgently needed trans-port equipment to enable the Ethiopi-ans to utilize some of the tanks and gunsthe Soviets had already provided as aresult of agreements reached duringMengistu’s December 1976 and May1977 visits to Moscow, but the Krem-lin was still apparently hoping to limitits commitment. Politburo minutes of4 and 11 August 1977 confirm decisions

to provide Ethiopia support to defenditself against Somalia, but details havenot been declassified. This, neverthe-less, appears to be the point at which,de facto, Moscow finally made an irre-vocable decision to opt for Ethiopiaover Somalia.

Whether or not AmbassadorRatanov agreed with Moscow’s contin-ued insistence on further efforts to bringthe Somalis and Ethiopians together innegotiations at “the expert level,” hefollowed Moscow’s orders and repeatedthis position as late as 23 August 1977in a meeting with Cuban Ambassadorto Ethiopia Perez Novoa. The Sovietswere even more hesitant on the ques-tion of manpower, for the main purposeof this meeting with the Cuban envoywas to chastise him for permitting Cu-ban Gen. Ochoa to promise Mengistuthat more Cuban technicians would becoming: “The decision to send Cubanpersonnel to Ethiopia does not dependon Havana, but on Moscow.” Ratanovexpressed the Soviet fear that a large-scale introduction of Cubans into Ethio-pia could provoke the Eritreans or So-malis to call in troops from supportiveArab countries such as Egypt.

Taken as a whole, these Russiandocuments seem to have been madeavailable to give a picture of a well-in-tentioned and relatively benign SovietUnion confronted with a situation itneither anticipated nor desired. TheSoviets are shown to be surprised bythe crisis, reluctant to choose betweenEthiopia and Somalia, and trying todelay hard decisions as long as possible.This does not fit with the general atmo-sphere of Third World activism charac-teristic of the Soviet Union at this time.While there seems to be no reason toquestion the authenticity of the docu-ments themselves, there are obviouslylarge gaps in this documentation. Wefind nothing about differing viewsamong Soviet officials or various ele-ments in the Soviet bureaucracy, norabout different interpretations of devel-opments between the Soviet establish-ments in Mogadishu2 and Addis Ababa.We see no reflection of options andcourses of action that must have beendiscussed in the Soviet embassies in theHorn and in Moscow as the crisis in-

tensified. We get no comparative evalu-ations of officials with whom the Sovi-ets were dealing in Mogadishu andAddis Ababa.

The documents also lack any directreference to intelligence. It is hard tobelieve that Soviet officials did not re-ceive extensive KGB and GRU report-ing from agents in both Somalia andEthiopia. There is, in fact, good reasonto believe that the Soviets were re-in-suring themselves during this period bymaintaining contacts with politicalgroups opposed to Mengistu in Ethio-pia as well as opponents of Siad Barrein Somalia. They, the East Germans,the Cubans, and perhaps other socialistcountries must also have had contactsamong Eritrean factions. We do findtantalizing references to opposition tothe Derg and to the strain under whichMengistu found himself as a result. Attimes the Soviets seem to be more ap-prehensive of Mengistu’s staying powerthan U.S. officials were at the time.

The final portion of Ratanov’s 18March 1977 meeting with BerhanuBayeh sheds indirect light on attitudesamong the Ethiopian public. MajorBerhanu asks to have the Soviets ar-range for a scholarship for his youngerbrother to study in Moscow and ex-plains that the young man has been un-able to complete his work at a presti-gious Addis Ababa secondary schoolbecause, as the relative of a Derg mem-ber, he became the object of harassmentby other students. Even at this relativelyearly stage of the Derg’s history, itspopularity with the student populationseems to have been quite low.

Nevertheless, most of the basicquestions about Soviet policies and cal-culations during 1977 which I identi-fied as still needing clarification in mydiscussion of this period in a 1991study3 remain open so far as these docu-ments go. The Russian documents stop,for the most part, at the point when hardSoviet decisions about action andimplementation began to be made: atthe end of September 1977. For ex-ample, they shed no light on how thesedecisions were arrived at and carriedout, or how risks were assessed. Themassive airlift and sealift of Cubantroops and equipment that startled the


world from November 1977 onward, orthe decision to send General V. Petrovto Ethiopia to oversee operationsagainst the Somali forces, get scantmention, as does Mengistu’s “closed”or secret trip to Moscow in October1977 at which the imminent Soviet-Cuban military effort was undoubtedlythe chief topic of conversation. [Ed.note: Both are mentioned in passing inthe 3 April 1978 Soviet Foreign Minis-try background report on Soviet-Ethio-pian relations printed below; a gener-ally-worded Soviet report to the EastGerman leadership on Mengistu’s tripis also included.] Likewise these docu-ments are devoid of reference to thedecision to shore up Ethiopian forcesby transferring South Yemeni armoredunits to Ethiopia in late summer 1977to blunt the Somali advance.

The most curious aspect of thisbatch of documents concern three thatdeal with “Operation Torch”—an al-leged American plot to assassinateMengistu and attack Ethiopia fromSudan and Kenya. Ethiopian leaderspresented what they described as docu-mentation of the plot to Soviet-bloc dip-lomats in early September 1977, andclaimed that it was planned to belaunched on 1 October 1977. The textof the description of the plot, suppos-edly conceived and directed out of theU.S. Embassy in Nairobi, reads like afourth-rate pulp thriller. Nothing in it,including the names of the Americanofficers who were supposedly directingit, bears any relation to known or plau-sible facts. Perhaps the oddest featureof “Operation Torch” is its lack of di-rect connection with Somalia or withEritrean rebels.

If the Soviets actually took this “re-port” seriously, why did they not chal-lenge all the countries supposedly co-operating in mounting it—Kenya,Sudan, and the United States? It bearsall the marks of a disinformation op-eration of the kind that the Soviets (of-ten through Bulgaria or Czechoslova-kia) frequently undertook during thisperiod. Whatever specific purpose itwas designed to serve is unclear. Onepossibility is that it may have been in-tended to heighten the paranoia ofMengistu and his Derg colleagues and

make them more amenable to Sovietmanipulation. In its crudity, it is insult-ing to the intelligence of the Ethiopi-ans. They did not take it seriouslyenough to bring it to the attention of theUnited States toward which they wereshowing some warmth at this very pe-riod in hopes of getting previously or-dered military equipment and spareparts released. It is hard to believe thata seasoned and experienced officer suchas Ratanov was not engaging in a cha-rade in reporting this grotesque schemeand discussions of it with senior Ethio-pian officials to Moscow.4

Limited as they are in what theyreveal of the debates and actions ofSoviet officials in Ethiopia, Somalia,and Moscow in 1977-78, these Soviet-bloc documents are worth more detailedexamination and analysis, a task whichI hope to undertake at greater length andalso encourage others to do. More suchdocuments may eventually becomeavailable, as well as a potentially richcollection of Ethiopian materials fromthis period that has been assembled inAddis Ababa for use in the trial offormer Derg officials (the future statusof these documents is unclear, but it isto be hoped that they will be made avail-able to scholars). Access to these ma-terials, as well as additional U.S. gov-ernment documents still awaiting de-classification and still-inaccessible Cu-ban and other sources, may enable a farbetter understanding of the Horn of Af-rica Crisis of 1977-78.

1 Though Siad told me on meeting with him inMogadishu in September 1977 that Somalia hadno regular military personnel in Ethiopia, theUnited States never took his claims seriously.Neither, so far as we can tell, did the Soviets.2 Moscow had up to 4000 advisers in Somalia asof the beginning of 1977. There was also a siz-able Cuban presence in Somalia.3 Chapter 5, “Crisis and Degeneration”, pp. 133-167 in The Horn of Africa from War to Peace(London/New York: Macmillan, 1991).4 I served as the officer responsible for Horn af-fairs in the U.S. National Security Council dur-ing this period. No scheme remotely resembling“Operation Torch” was ever considered by theU.S. Government.

EAST GERMANY AND THEHORN CRISIS: DOCUMENTS

ON SED AFRIKAPOLITIK

By Christian F. Ostermann

The documents from the archivesof the former Socialist Unity Party ofGermany (SED)—the Stiftung “Archivder Parteien und Massenorgan-isationen der SED” im Bundesarchiv,Berlin—included in the selection ofRussian and East German materials onthe Horn of Africa crisis in 1977-78demonstrate the usefulness ofmultiarchival research for an under-standing of Soviet and Cuban policy.Given the difficulties with access to theSoviet and Cuban archives, the formerlytop-secret documents from the EastGerman Communist party archives,among them high-level discussions be-tween CPSU, SED and Cuban party op-eratives, help to understand Moscow’sand Havana’s interests and actions, inways that usefully supplement and gobeyond what is currently available fromthose countries, in this regional flare-up that become a superpower crisis.

The documents also provide newinsights into the East German role inthe Cold War in Africa. By the mid-1970s, Africa had become an increas-ingly important arena for GDR foreignpolicy. Prior to the “wave of recogni-tion” following the Basic Treaty be-tween East and West Germany in 1972,East Berlin’s primary interest in Africawas to enhance its international stand-ing and prestige. The decolonizationprocess seemed to offer plenty of op-portunities for the regime of SED firstsecretary Walter Ulbricht to undermineand circumvent the “Hallstein doc-trine,” Bonn’s post-1955 policy to con-sider the establishment of diplomaticrelation with the GDR by any thirdcountry to be an “unfriendly act” to-wards the Federal Republic. Groundedin the belief that the West German gov-ernment was the only government trulyrepresentative of the German nation, the“Hallstein doctrine” effectively man-aged to deny the GDR international le-gitimacy outside the Soviet bloc.

East German efforts to subvert theHallstein doctrine in Africa by gaining


ported East Berlin’s claim to aSonderrolle (special role) within the so-cialist camp as Moscow’s most trustedand perhaps most significant ally. At thesame time, increased trade with Afri-can countries decreased the GDR’s de-pendence on Soviet economic supportand provided valuable foreign curren-cies and markets. Finally, the GDR’sincreased presence on the African con-tinent reflected a growing East GermanSendungsbewusstsein (missionary zeal)among many SED officials who per-ceived the export of Soviet-style social-ism to Africa to be a crucial element inthe growth and eventual success ofworld communism.

East German leaders seized theopportunity for increased involvementon the Horn of Africa when the end ofimperial rule in Ethiopia in 1974 threwthe region into turmoil. Despite the suc-cess of the New Democratic Revolutionin Ethiopia in April 1976, Moscow’sposition in Addis Ababa remaineddeeply troubled. To the south, Somalia’sputatively socialist leader, MohammedSiad Barre, took advantage ofEthiopia’s weakness and seized theOgaden region from Ethiopia. Despiteits interest in the strategically importantSomalia harbor of Berbera, Moscowgrew increasingly uncertain and waryof its close relations with Siad Barre.More significantly, Moscow’s long-standing support of the Eritrean libera-tion movements against Addis Ababanow had to be balanced with its inter-est in the survival—and thus territorialintegrity—of the Ethiopian Revolution,led, until early 1977, by a military juntaof uncertain ideological convictions.Not until February 1977, when Lt.-Col.Mengistu Haile Mariam, the FirstDeputy Chairman of the ProvisionalMilitary Administrative Council, seizedthe post of PMAC chairman, did Mos-cow throw its full weight behind theEthiopian regime.

The GDR’s embroilment in the cri-sis was to some extent the result of for-tuitous circumstance. Walter Lamberz,SED politburo member and ErichHonecker’s trouble shooter for Africa,happened to be in Addis Ababa on theeve of the coup which brought Mengistuto power and was immediately on hand

to reassure the new leader of the Sovietbloc’s and, in particular, the GDR’s,continued interest in close relations.Within weeks, a representative from theGDR Ministry for State Security wassent to Addis Ababa to negotiate mili-tary (and intelligence) support (includ-ing the sending of East German mili-tary cadres) for the Mengistu regime.As the documents show, East Berlin’shigh hopes for Mengistu were sooncrushed by his reluctance fully to adoptthe Soviet model and in particular hisrefusal to establish an avant-gardeMarxist-Leninist party. Given its pres-ence on the scene, and the missionaryzeal and the long-standing ties of itsemissaries, East Berlin was determinedto change Mengistu’s mind. Followingseveral personal visits by Lamberz toAddis Ababa, the Ethiopian leaderagreed to receive a SED Central Com-mittee mission which would work to-wards the formation of a workers’ party.East Berlin’s efforts in socialist nation-building, however, proved futile. Fed upwith Mengistu’s intransigence, his all-encompassing preoccupation with thewars with Eritrea and Somalia, and thePMAC’s suspicion against any rival or-ganization, the East German missionleft in November 1978 after a nine-month stint in the Ethiopian capital.2

The East German presence in theregion - and East Berlin’s longstandingties with Siad Barre in particular - alsoproved advantageous when Soviet re-lations with Somalia plummeted in thecourse of the Somali-Ethiopian War(1977-1978). Soviet military support ofthe Mengistu regime and Moscow’s in-creasing suspicions regarding SiadBarre’s collusion with the West exacer-bated tensions between the two coun-tries, and in November 1977 Siad Barreexpelled Soviet and Cuban advisers andabrogated the three-year old Treaty ofFriendship and Cooperation with theUSSR. By contrast, Somali-East Ger-man relations initially remained stable,providing Moscow with an ongoingchannel of communication. AsHonecker explained to Castro in April1977, “we are pursuing the goal of keep-ing up the dialogue with Siad Barre andtieing him to us as much as possible.”Nevertheless, GDR aid to Ethiopia soon

diplomatic recognition were only par-tially successful. In the wake of the1956 Suez crisis, East Berlin managedto get its foot in the door in Egypt,largely because of its outspoken con-demnation of West German support forIsrael as well as its demonstrative soli-darity with the Egyptian people in theform of large long-term loans. Suchovert support did not go unnoticed inCairo. In the months after Suez, Egyp-tian President Gamel Abdul Nasseragreed to the establishment of an Egyp-tian trade mission in East Berlin. Shortlyafterwards, the East German trade mis-sion in Cairo was upgraded to a consu-late-general. Under special plenipoten-tiary Ernst Scholz, the mission soondeveloped into East Berlin’s Africanheadquarters for its quest for recogni-tion.

Despite increased East Germanpropaganda against the “imperialist”Federal Republic in the 1960s, however,Ulbricht’s efforts continued to fall shortof formal recognition, largely due toWest German economic pressure andthe threat of the Hallstein doctrine. MostAfrican leaders, even the ones rated“progressive,” were indifferent to com-plexities of the German question. Lesquerelles allemandes, however, persis-tently plagued East Berlin’s relationswith African countries. Alhough WillyBrandt’s Neue Ostpolitik freed theGDR’s interlocutors from the fear ofWest German political sanctions, anyrapprochement with East Berlin stillbore the risk of economic reprisals.1

Africa remained a field for com-petition with the Federal Republic fol-lowing the diplomatic breakthrough ofthe early 1970s, but with recognitionwidely secured, other aspects of theGDR’s African policy assumed greaterimportance. GDR political, ideological,and military support for liberationmovements and countries with a social-ist orientation demonstrated to Moscowand other East-bloc countries EastGermany’s growing importance and al-lowed the SED leadership to develop amore distinct international profile, en-hancing both the regime’s internationaland domestic legitimacy. Close cultural-ideological ties and economic-militarycooperation with African states sup-


prove futile. Mengistu had no confi-dence in the talks with the Eritreans, andthe “Cuban comrades have doubts aswell,” Lamberz reported to Berlin.7

Disaster struck in March 1978.Lamberz, whose personal relationshipwith Mengistu had made the talks pos-sible, died in a helicopter crash in Libya.The negotiations in March proved evermore acrimonious. With the war withSomalia subsiding, the PMAC, by June,went on the offensive in Eritrea, rout-ing the EPLF forces. The SED was,CPSU officials informed their SEDcounterparts, trying to “square thecircle” in Ethiopia. Once the PMACwas on the offensive, the Soviets ad-vised, “an attempt on our part to stopthe Ethiopian leadership in its militarycourse is a very delicate problem.”8

With interest in a political settlementwaning on all sides, the third round oftalks (10 June 1978) in Berlin wasdoomed to fail. The SED had to ac-knowledge that “the meeting reflecteda further hardening of the positions andmutually exclusive positions.”9 Moreclearly than the second meeting, theself-appointed SED mediators had toacknowledge, “it was evident that thePMAC has the intention to seek a mili-tary solution.” According to an internalSED report, Berhanu now consideredthe “liberation of Eritrea, of coursethrough force,” as the only option.10

The East Berlin negotiations on Eritreathus ended in failure. The “best resultof the meeting[s] was that the SED com-rades are starting to give up on their il-lusions,” one Cuban leader, somewhatgloatingly, related Berhanu’s reaction tothe break-down of the Berlin talks.11

Subsequent mediation effortsproved similarly futile, and the issuewas not resolved until 1991—when themilitary defeat and overthrow of theMengistu regime allowed the Eritreanrebel forces to triumph and achieve na-tional independence, which was subse-quently ratified by popular referendum.

1 For a good survey of the East-West German ri-valry in Africa see John Winrow, The ForeignPolicy of the GDR in Africa (New York: Cam-bridge University Press, 1989), 54-120. See alsoJude Howell, “The End of an Era: the Rise andFall of G.D.R. Aid,” The Journal of Modern Af-rican Studies 32:2 (1994), 305-328.

2 See the confidential “Memorandum of Conver-sation between Comrade Hermann Axen and thehead of the SED Central Committee WorkingGroup in Ethiopia, Comrade Herbert Graf, on 2August 1978 in the CC Building,” Stiftung“Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationender SED” im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (SAPMO-BArch) DY 30 IV 2/2.035/127.3 East German drafts of the envisioned agreementcan be found in SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/2.035/127. See, e.g., Klaus Willerding (Dep. For-eign Minister) to Lambert, 30 January 1978, ibid.4 “Memorandum on the Conversation betweenthe General Secretary of the CC of the SED, ErichHonnecker, and the Delegation of the ProvisionalMilitary Administrative Council of Ethiopia(PMAC), headed by Berhanu Bayeh on 31 Janu-ary 1978, in the Residence of the Central Com-mittee,” Berlin, 31 January 1978, ibid.5 Both parties agreed to seek a peaceful solutionof the conflict. “Information on the Conversa-tions between the Representatives of the Provi-sional Military Administrative Council (PMAC)of Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean People’sLiberation Front (EPLF) under participation ofrepresentatives of the Socialist Unity Party ofGermany (SED) at the end of January/early Feb-ruary 1978 in Berlin,” Berlin, 6 February 1978,ibid.6 Memorandum, 23 March 1978, ibid.7 Memorandum of Conversation between Com-rade Lamberz and the Cuban Ambassador inEthiopia, Comrade Pepe, on 3 March 1978 (basedon notes by Comrade Gen. Maj. Jaenicke),” 4March 1978, ibid.8 “Memorandum of Conversation between Com-rade Friedel Trappen and Comrade R.A.Uljanowski on Thursday, May 11, 1978, 11:00am to 1:30 pm in the CPSU Central Committee,”ibid.9 Information on the Third Meeting between therepresentatives of the PMAC of Socialist Ethio-pia and the EPLF in Presence of the delegate ofthe SED Central Committee on 10 June 1978 inBerlin, ibid.; on 10 June 1978 in Berlin, ibid.10 Ibid.11 Memorandum by Hermann Graf on a 16 June1978 Conversation with Valdez Vivo, 21 June1978, ibid.

surpassed previous commitments toSomalia.

East Germany’s increased statureon the Horn was also reflected in theSED’s efforts to mediate between thePMAC and the Eritrean liberationmovements. Preliminary talks withMengistu, held in late 1977, and withSiassi Aforki, general secretary of theRevolutionary People’s Party of Eritreaand deputy general secretary of theEritrean People’s Liberation Front(EPLF), in January 1978, led to threesets of secret negotiations between thewarring parties in East Berlin in Janu-ary/February, March, and June 1978.Eager to avoid further Eritrean-Ethio-pian confrontation that would onlyserve Western interests, the SED soughtto engineer a peaceful and comprehen-sive settlement that included Eritreanautonomy and Ethiopian territorial in-tegrity.3 The fact that the PMAC andEPLF agreed to negotiations at all—thefirst since the conflict had erupted 17years earlier—was in itself a remark-able achievement. SED leaders spentmuch energy and personal leverage inswaying both sides to the negotiatingtable, at one point causing BerhanuBayeh, a member of the PMAC Execu-tive Committee to agree to meet Aforki“since he, as we can tell, appeals to you[the East Germans].”4

Getting both sides to negotiate inBerlin was one thing, substantiveprogress another. Despite a successfulfirst round,5 SED expectations soon so-bered. Mengistu remained more inter-ested in a military solution of theEritrean problem and proved unrespon-sive to East Germans calls to conceptu-alize a political solution that would ac-commodate Eritrean interests. TheEritreans, for their part, remained stead-fast in their desire for full independence,unacceptable to both East Berlin andAddis Ababa. Following the secondround of talks in Berlin on 23 March1978, “the opposing points of view re-mained unchanged,” the East Germannegotiators noted.6

East Berlin’s efforts to mediate be-tween the warring factions raised eye-brows, at least in Havana. As the Cu-ban ambassador in Ethiopia, Pepe, toldLamberz, the GDR’s efforts would


ABBREVIATIONS USEDIN THE DOCUMENTS

APRF—Archive of the President of theRussian FederationCC—Central CommitteeCPSU—Communist Party of the SovietUnionELF-RC—Eritrean Liberation Front (Revo-lutionary Command)EPLF—Eritrean People’s Liberation FrontEPRP—Ethiopian People’s RevolutionaryPartyEDU—Ethiopian Democratic UnionFTAI—French Territory of the Afars andIssas, i.e. DjiboutiMEISON—All-Ethiopia Socialist Move-mentMFA—Ministry of Foreign AffairsOAU—Organization of African UnityPDRY—People’s Democratic Republic ofYemen, i.e. South YemenPMAC—Provisional Military Administra-tive Council (of Ethiopia); the DergPRC—People’s Republic of ChinaSAPMO-BArchSA—Stiftung “Archiv derParteien und Massenorgan-isationen derSED” im Bundesarchiv, BerlinSDR—Somali Democratic RepublicSED—Socialist Unity Party of East Ger-manySRSP—Somali Revolutionary SocialistPartyTsKhSD—Center for the Storage of Con-temporary Documentation, MoscowUAR—United Arab Republic; EgyptUN—United NationsUNGA—United Nations General Assembly

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Counselor-Minister in EthiopiaS. Sinitsin with Political Counselor of

the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia Herbert Malin, 2 February 1977

From the diary of SECRET, Copy No. 2S.Y. Sinitsin 4 February 1977

Ser. No. 41

NOTES OF CONFERENCEwith Advisor for Political Issues

of USA Embassy in EthiopiaHERBERT MALIN

2 February 1977

I met today with Malin in the USAEmbassy by preliminary arangement. Thefollowing points of interest were discussed.

Concerning the situation in Ethiopia,Malin noted the tension of the situationcaused by the activation of forces opposedto the Derg, especially in the northwesternregion of the country which is siding withthe Sudan. He directed attention to the“harsh pronouncements” of the Chairmanof the PMAC, Teferi Banti, of January 29and 30 of this year, addressed to the leadersof the Sudan and Somalia, who are pursu-ing an anti-Ethiopian policy, as well as tohis call for a union of “all progressive andpatriotic forces” for the defense of “the revo-lution and the fatherland,” in this connec-tion not mentioning the anti-governmentleftist organization “Ethiopian People’sRevolutionary Party” (EPRP). However,Malin feels that the EPRP will hardly agreeto support the call of Teferi Banti, due to itsdisagreement with the policy of the Derg.

At the same time, he continued, theopposition forces are not united and theirjoint opposition to the existing regime has atemporary and tactical character. Even ifthe opposition forces should succeed inoverthrowing this regime, a struggle forpower will erupt between them, especiallybetween the pro-monarchy “EthiopianDemocratic Union” and the “EthiopianPeople’s Revolutionary Party” and otherleftist groups. The PMAC, in his opinion,continues to be the only real common na-tional power in contemporary Ethiopia, al-though its policy does not enjoy supportamong a significant portion of the popula-tion. It is further undoubted that, despitethe declarations of the Sudanese and Soma-lis, present day Ethiopia does not harbor “ag-gressive designs” in relation to its neighbors,and in any event lacks the opportunity forthe same in view of its complex internalproblems.

Concerning circumstances in the Mili-tary Council itself, after the implementation

of its partial reorganization in the end ofDecember [1976] with the aim of reinforc-ing “collective leadership” of the country,the opinion predominates in Addis Ababathat the policy of the PMAC will acquire a“more moderate” character. However, tojudge by the declarations of Teferi Banti,that has not occurred.

In sum, according to Malin’s opinion,circumstances in Ethiopia will continue tobe complicated and tense for a long time tocome.

For his part, he noted that the deterio-ration of existing circumstances in the coun-try is tied in significant part to the open in-terference in the internal affairs of Ethiopiaby the community of Arab countries andother forces, who are aligned in hostility tothe policy of the PMAC and are supportingforces opposed to it. He noted further that,in the final analysis, what is at issue is notmerely Ethiopia itself, but the situation inthe region as a whole, the efforts of certainArab circles to establish complete controlover the Red Sea, which constitutes an im-portant international maritime route, and thepossible eruption here of a completely tensesituation and even armed conflict. In thisconnection the opinion of Malin on the con-dition of American-Ethiopian relations andprospective development of circumstancesin the given region was of interest.

Malin said that until now the Ameri-can administration, owing to the presiden-tial elections, had not had an opportunity toinvolve itself to the extent warranted in thedevelopment of its policy in this region.Since the change of regime in Ethiopia in1974, American-Ethiopian relations havehad a relatively complex and contentiouscharacter. The USA cannot ignore the peri-odic outbreaks of anti-American activity inthe country. Thus, on 27-28 January of thisyear, in the course of anti-government dem-onstrations by young protesters in AddisAbaba, glass was broken and gas bombswere hurled at the department of the USIS[United States Information Service] build-ing, in addition to which leaflets of the“Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party”were distributed. Similar bombs werehurled at the building of the MAAG [Ameri-

RUSSIAN & EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTSON THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-78


can Military Advisory Group]. In the courseof a demonstration of by a group organizedby the Military Council on 3 January inAddis Ababa in connection with the above-noted pronouncements of Teferi Banti, anti-American performances by an array of ora-tors were also seen, along with anti-Ameri-can placards and so forth, although officialdeclarations, including those by Teferi Bantihimself, contained no such direct anti-American missives.

At the same time, Malin continued, theEthiopian government displays an interestin continuing to receive various forms ofassistance from the USA, especially mili-tary assistance, and frequently talks aboutthe timetable for the delivery of militarysupplies and so forth. Prior to the changeof regime in Ethiopia, American militaryassistance was at an annual level of 10-12million American dollars and was adminis-tered preferentially on an uncompensatedbasis (deliveries of arms, ammunition, spareparts, etc.). In recent years, owing to the newpolicy of the USA in the area of militarycooperation with foreign governments,American military assistance to Ethiopia hasbeen granted preferentially on commercialterms, and it includes several types of moreadvanced armaments, in connection withwhich the value of the assistance has grown.Thus, the signing of a multi-year contractin 1975 envisions the supply of armaments,spare parts and ammunition in the approxi-mate sum of 250 million American dollars.Already in 1976 the USA supplied Ethiopiawith part of those arms, including several“Phantom” fighter planes. This year a sup-ply of several additional fighter planes iscontemplated, as well as supplies for theEthiopian navy, and radar defenses.

Malin noted further that the new Ethio-pian administration is pursuing a policy ofseeking methods of receiving military as-sistance from other sources as well, possi-bly on terms more advantages to it, includ-ing from the USSR (he is aware of the visitby the Ethiopian military delegation to Mos-cow in December of 1976), as well as thePRC [People’s Republic of China], althoughhe doubts that the Chinese are capable ofsupplying Ethiopia with “serious arma-ments.”

The USA, Malin emphasized, does notoppose the “socialist choice” of new Ethio-pia and, as before, firmly supports the prin-cipal of respect for its territorial integrity,

and is against the partition of Ethiopia. TheUSA, it is understood, is interested in theguarantee of stability in that region and free-dom of navigation in the Red Sea.

Responding to pertinent questions, hesaid that the American-Ethiopian agreementof 1953 “on mutual security guarantees”concerned the preferential supply of assis-tance by the USA to the armed forces ofEthiopia and the guarantee of “certainAmerican interests,” first and foremost ofwhich was the operation of the “center ofcommunications” in Asmara, which was ofgreat importance at the time (that center hasnow been curtailed in significant part); but,as he understands it, [the agreement] doesnot call for the direct involvement of Ameri-can armed forces in the defense of Ethiopia’ssecurity, for example, in the case of aggres-sion against it or a threat to its territorial in-tegrity.

Concerning the present deterioration inEthiopian-Somali relations, as far as Malinknows, the USA has not undertaken any dip-lomatic steps toward its normalization orrestraint of anti-Ethiopian actions by theArab countries, and in fact the Ethiopiangovernment itself has not raised the issuewith the USA.

One of the potential sources for aneruption of a conflict in that region, inMalin’s opinion, is the independence ofDjibouti that has emerged this year, inas-much as a serious disagreement exists be-tween Somalia and Ethiopia regarding thefuture policy of Djibouti. In recent months,the Somalis have succeeded in reinforcingtheir political influence in Djibouti, and theirties with its present leaders, which has seri-ously worried the Ethiopians. It is evident,as well, that after its declaration of indepen-dence, Djibouti will enter the League ofArab Nations, both in political and economicrespects, inasmuch as the position ofDjibouti will be complicated following thedeparture of the French. An array of Arabnations has already established consulatesthere. The USA also intends to do this priorto the declaration of independence, havingrequested appropriate permission from thegovernment of France.

In the course of the discussion, Malinexpressed interest in the state of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, having come upon ru-mors concerning the upcoming visit to theUSSR of First Deputy Chairman of thePMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam, and also

in connection with the negative, as he un-derstands it, attitude of Somalia toward theprospective development of Soviet-Ethio-pian cooperation.

I told Malin that our traditionallyfriendly relations with Ethiopia have a ten-dency to develop further, as evident fromthe joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique of14 July 1976, resulting from the visit toMoscow of an Ethiopian state delegation;the growth of Soviet technical assistance toEthiopia (teachers in the University, doctors,etc.); the work here during the second halfof last year by Soviet economic experts, andso forth. It was pointed out that the con-tinuation of contacts between the two coun-tries at a high level would be the naturalprocedure under such conditions, although,however, that question had not come up inrespect to a concrete plan. I said further thatwe are aware of the disagreements betweenSomalia and Ethiopia, and that our unwa-vering position in that connection is to serveas a motivation for both countries to movetowards a peaceful resolution of these dis-agreements at the negotiating table, in or-der to prevent a deterioration of circum-stances in this region. This relates as wellto our position in connection with the cur-rent complication in Sudanese-Ethiopian re-lations. As concerns the future of develop-ments in Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation, it isunderstood that this cannot be directedagainst Somalia, with whom we are alsodeveloping friendly relations, as the Somalileadership is well aware.

Malin asked, in my opinion, in whatspheres would the interests of the USA inEthiopia not be counter to the interests ofthe Soviet Union.

I replied, that in my view, these sphereswould first and foremost encompass theconduct of a policy of respect for the sover-eignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia;noninterference in its internal affairs; a re-alistic approach to the social-economic andpolitical transformations taking place in thecountry by the will of the people; the build-ing of peace and security and a halt to thegrowth of tensions and conflicts between thecountries of that region; and adherence tothe principle of unrestricted navigation inthe Red Sea, in accordance with recognizedstandards of international law and the inter-ests of peaceful relations in general.

Thanking me for the conference, Malinexpressed a desire for continuation of fur-


ther contacts and exchanges of opinions re-garding the questions discussed, as to which,for his part, he stated his agreement.

COUNSELOR-MINISTER TO THEUSSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA

/s/ S. SINITSIN

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll.28-33; translated by Bruce McDonald.]

Third African Department, SovietForeign Ministry, Information Report

on Somali-Ethiopian TerritorialDisputes, 2 February 1977

SOMALIA’S TERRITORIALDISAGREEMENTS WITH ETHIOPIAAND THE POSITION OF THE USSR

(Brief Information Sheet)

Somalia claims a significant part ofEthiopian territory (the Ogaden region) onthe basis of the fact that a large number ofSomalis live there (around 1 million people).

Ethiopia totally rejects the territorialclaims of the SDR, basing its position onthe fact that the borders with Somalia wereset by international agreements, particularlythe Agreement on the demilitarization of theEthiopia-Somalia border, which was signedin 1908 between Ethiopia and Italy. Theyalso refer to the resolution of the OAUwhich was accepted in Cairo in 1964, whichsays that all African states must recognizethe borders which existed at the momentwhen they were granted independence.

The tension in relations with Somalialed imperial Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya(the Somalis did not decline either fromdemanding the unification with Somalia ofthe Northern border region of Kenya, whichis populated by Somalis) on an anti-Somalibasis. In 1963 there was a Treaty on jointdefense signed between the two countries.

At the beginning of 1964 a direct mili-tary confrontation broke out between Ethio-pia and Somalia, although the conflict wassoon settled through the mediation of theOAU. The Soviet government also calledon both sides with an appeal to quickly ceasefire and to resolve all disputed issues in apeaceful way.

During 1970-71 a series of Ethiopia-Somalia negotiations were conducted whichended without result. At the end of 1972-beginning of 1973 a series of border inci-

dents broke out (in the regions of Washen,Bongol, Dolo, and others) which weresmoothed over by peaceful means.

The tension in relations between Ethio-pia and Somalia many times attracted theattention of the Organization of AfricanUnity. However, efforts to find a mutuallyacceptable solution to the territorial argu-ment between Ethiopia and Somalia withinthe framework of the OAU so far haveyielded no result.

At the session of the OAU Assemblywhich took place in Addis Ababa in Janu-ary 1976, two meetings took place, at SiadBarre’s initiative, between him and the chair-man of the PMAC of Ethiopia, during whichthe question of bilateral relations was raised.The leaders of both countries asserted thatthe exchange of opinions was productive,and expressed the intention to continue thedialogue. Practical steps in this direction,however, were not undertaken.

The Somali leaders, though they stressthat the issue must be resolved by peacefulmeans, as in the past do not repudiate thedemand about the unification of the Ogadenwith Somalia. According to available in-formation, the Somalis continue their activ-ity in the Ogaden, throwing their armed de-tachments in there under the command ofline officers.

The new Ethiopian leadership, refus-ing to discuss the territorial issue, expressesreadiness to conduct negotiations on thedemilitarization of the existing border andspeaks out in favor of the development ofeconomic, cultural, and other relations withthe SDR.

Relations between the two countriesare becoming more complex also becauseof Djibouti - a French territory of Afars andIssa (FTAI), to which France intends to grantindependence this year. For Ethiopia thisterritory represents a vital interest in viewof the fact that Djibouti is the terminus ofthe railway from Addis Ababa, by way ofwhich the basic part of Ethiopia’s foreigntrade freight is carried. The Somalis, fortheir part, consider the FTAI, or, as they callthat territory, “French Somalia,” one of fiveparts of “Greater Somalia,” in view of thefact that its population to a significant ex-tent consists of tribes which are related tothe Somalis.

At the XXX session of the UN GA, aresolution was accepted in which was as-serted the unconditional right of the people

of Djibouti to quick and unconditional in-dependence, and also contained an appealto all states to “desist from any claims what-ever on that territory and declare null andvoid any actions in support of such claims.”Both Ethiopia and Somalia voted for thatresolution.

At the same time the government ofthe SDR does not hide its hopes that oncehaving become independent the populationof Djibouti will come out in favor of unifi-cation with Somalia. This was displayed,in particular, at the XIII Assembly of theOAU (July 1976), where the Somali repre-sentatives did not support the demand ofEthiopia for a joint declaration to repudiateterritorial claims, asserting that the sover-eignty of Djibouti should not depend on“threats of police actions from the power-guarantors.” In December 1976, PresidentSiad, in a communication to the heads ofAfrican states, declared even more preciselythat “if the goal of these guarantees willforce Somalia to reject our blood ties, thecommon history and culture which tie uswith the people of Djibouti, then we declare,that is impossible.”

Nonetheless, Somalia, just like Ethio-pia, voted for the resolution of the XXXIsession of the UN GA of 23 November1976, on Djibouti, which once again af-firmed the right of the people of that terri-tory to independence. Representatives ofboth countries to the UN declared that theirgovernments will recognize, respect, andobserve the independence, sovereignty, andterritorial integrity of Djibouti after it re-ceives independence.

However, in the course of the discus-sion at the UN General Assembly session,the speeches of the Somalia and Ethiopiadelegations showed that, as in the past, se-rious disagreements remain between thesecountries about the ways to resolve theDjibouti problem. They showed particularlyon the issue of the return to the territory ofpolitical refugees. The Ethiopians accusedthe Somalis of intending to send to Djiboutitheir own citizens, disguised as refugees, soas to ensure as a consequence its joining withthe SDR.

The position of the Somali leadershipregarding Eritrea also leaves a negative im-print on Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Pro-viding support to Eritrean separatists, So-malia, to all appearances, is counting on thefact that the separation of Eritrea from Ethio-


pia will lead to a split of the multinationalEthiopian state, which will facilitate the uni-fication of the Ogaden territory with Soma-lia.

The Somali government recently hasactivated its propaganda against Ethiopiaand its activity in the international arena,with the goal of enlisting support for its po-sition vis-a-vis the new Ethiopian regime,which, as it believes, is conducting in rela-tion to Somalis the former imperial “colo-nial policy.” This point of view was ex-pressed by the vice president of the SDR[Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar during hisvisit last year to a number of European so-cialist countries and to Cuba. However, inno instance did it meet with understanding.Somalia is also taking certain steps in Arabcountries so as to receive support for itsclaims to Ogaden and Djibouti. In this re-gard the Somalis point to the fact that thejoining of Djibouti to the “Arab world”(SDR is a member of the Arab League)promises it not insignificant benefits in re-alizing plans to turn the Red Sea into an“Arab lake.”

Arab reaction supports and heats up theaspirations of the Somalis, with the goal ofputting pressure on the progressive Ethio-pian leadership. President of Somalia Siadintends in the beginning of 1977 to com-plete a trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, theUnited Arab Emirates, Sudan and severalother Arab countries. As he left in January1977 for Khartoum to prepare for this visit,Member of the Politburo of the CC of theSomali Revolutionary Socialist Party[Ahmed] Suleiman [Abdullah] public ex-pressed himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopianthrusts. Suleiman openly spoke out in sup-port of the Eritrean separatists, and also infavor of a proposal to move the headquar-ters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to an-other capital, a proposal for which Sudanand several African countries with a pro-Western orientation recently expressed sup-port.

Beginning in the 1960s, in almost ev-ery instance of a serious aggravation ofEthiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia andSomalia have appealed to the Soviet gov-ernment with a request to assert influenceon the government of the other country withthe goal of normalizing the situation. Re-cently, both Somalia and Ethiopia have re-peatedly called for more active participationby the Soviet Union in settling their bilat-

eral relations. In this regard each of them iscounting on the Soviet Union to supportprecisely their position, using for this itsauthority and friendly relations with theopposing side.

In January 1976, Siad Barre informedthe Soviet government of [Somalia’s] inten-tion to enter into negotiations with the Ethio-pian leadership about the creation of a Fed-eration of Somalia and Ethiopia. In this re-gard the President requested the Soviet sideto join the negotiations as a mediator. Inso-far as the goal and character of a federation,as well as the possible position of Ethiopia,were not clear, it was decided to avoid de-fining our attitude to this initiative and me-diation on this issue. In November 1976Siad Barre expressed the wish that the So-viet side would report to the Ethiopian lead-ership about the wish of the SDR to begin apeaceful dialogue with Ethiopia on the dis-puted issues which they have. This wishwas brought to the attention of the Chair-man of the Committee of the PMAC forpolitical and foreign affairs through the So-viet Embassy in Addis Ababa.

At the end of 1976 the Cubans andSouth Yemenis came out with an initiativeto provide mediatory services towards asettlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations.The Somali government, not rejecting thisproposal, spoke out in favor of the SovietUnion as well participating directly in themediation. The Ethiopian side, regardingthe mediation initiative favorably, did notexpress an analogous wish. Cuba and thePDRY through diplomatic channels are tak-ing certain steps to organize meetings be-tween the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia.

The position of the Soviet Union onthe question of the Ethiopia-Somalia terri-torial dispute, which many times has beenbrought to the attention of the governmentsof both countries, is that Ethiopia and theSDR must take all possible measures tosettle their disagreements by means of ne-gotiations and to find a way to lessen thetension in Ethiopia-Somalia relations.

The friendly advice of the USSR gov-ernment, aimed at a settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, has been favorably ac-cepted by the governments of both coun-tries. In responses to our appeals both Ethio-pia and Somalia have announced their readi-ness to resolve all disputed issues by meansof negotiations and not to allow the unleash-ing of a new armed conflict.

Third African DepartmentMFA USSR

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll.39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff;note revisions to this document added in lateMay-early June, printed below.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador in Ethiopia

A.P. Ratanov and Cuban Ambassadorin Ethiopia Jose Peres Novoa,

10 February 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2From the diary of “30” March 1977RATANOV, A.P. Issue No. 129

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONWith the Ambassador of Cuba in Ethiopia

JOSE PERES NOVOA10 February 1977

During a conversation which tookplace in the Soviet Embassy, Jose PeresNovoa reported that on 8 February he hadvisited Mengistu Haile Mariam at the latter’srequest.

Mengistu requested that the Ambassa-dor pass on to Fidel Castro a verbal mes-sage in which the PMAC requests Cuba toprovide assistance to the Ethiopian People’sMilitia via deliveries of small arms. In thisregard Mengistu declared that the Ameri-cans had already refused to provide spareparts for tanks, [and] had suspended deliv-eries of spare parts for all kinds of weap-ons, and that the PMAC expects the USA,after the events of 3 February to apply evenharsher sanctions against Ethiopia. At thesame time the USA is providing militaryassistance to Sudan, [and] Kenya, and isencouraging officials of the these and othercountries to act against the Ethiopian re-gime.

The PMAC, reported Mengistu, in-tends to follow Cuba’s example of creatingin factories and agencies, and in villages,committees for defense of the revolution,which will act in close contact with detach-ments of the people’s militia, which areformed under the supervision of urban andrural associations. However, the effective-ness of these measures will depend onwhether the PMAC has available and at itsdisposal the necessary quantity of weapons.


USSR AMBASSADOR IN ETHIOPIA/s/ A. RATANOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, l.85; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Soviet Embassy in East Germany,Report for CPSU CC Summarizing

Visit to Somalia on 31 January-1February 1977 by Delegation of the

GDR Socialist Unity Party (SED) CC,18 February 1977

USSR EMBASSY INGERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

SECRET, Copy no. 118 February 1977

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CC CPSU comrade B. N. PONOMAREV

We send to your attention according toclassified procedures this report concerningthe trip to Somalia, Mozambique, and Ethio-pia (January 31 - February 11 of this year)by a delegation from the German Demo-cratic Republic, headed by Politburo mem-ber, Secretary of the CC SED, comrade W.Lamberz.

ATTACHMENT: above-mentioned docu-ment of 41 pages, secret.

USSR AMBASSADOR TOGERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

/s/ P. ABRASIMOV

[attachment]

SECRET, Copy no. 1Attachment to no. 122

18 February 1977Translated from German

REPORT concerning a trip to the Democratic

Republic of Somali by a delegation fromthe CC SED from

31 January-1 February 1977

From 31 January to 1 February a del-egation from the CC SED, headed by Polit-buro member, Secretary of the CC, WernerLamberz visited Mogadishu at the invita-tion of the leadership of the Somali Revo-

lutionary Socialist Party (SRSP). The del-egation comprised: CC Member Kurt Tidke,Candidate-Member of the CC EberhardHeidrich, Deputy Chief of the CC SectionFreidel Trappen.

In accordance with its instructions, thedelegation conveyed from the SecretaryGeneral of the CC SED Erich Honecker tothe Secretary General of the SRSP and tothe President of the Democratic Republicof Somalia, Mohammed Siad Barre, a mes-sage in response to the letter from Barredated 24 November 1976, and concluded anagreement on collaboration between theSED and the SRSP for 1977-78.

The delegation received MohammedSiad Barre, with whom they engaged in adetailed discussion.

Werner Lamberz conveyed greetingsfrom the Secretary General of the CC SEDand Chairman of the State Council of theGDR, Eric Honecker, and conveyed someexplanations regarding his message. At thesame time he stated the SED position withregard to the progressive development in So-malia and reported on the decisions of ourparty leadership, which were made as a re-sult of the discussions of comrade [GDRVice President Willi] Stoph in Somalia withcomrade Samantar in the GDR. It was de-clared that the SED will now and in the fu-ture, to the extent of its abilities, offer sup-port to the Republic of Somalia. At the sametime, particular attention was drawn to theconcurrence of the party.

Mohammed Siad Barre expressed histhanks for the message from Eric Honeckerand expressed his gratitude for the GDR’smanifestation of solidarity with the anti-imperialist liberation struggle. Somalia con-siders the help, which has been offered bythe SSNM brigade in the preparation of spe-cialists, to be particularly useful. Siad Barrein detail elucidated the internal situation inSomalia and, at the same time, particularlyunderscored the difficulties in realizing theparty program.

In connection with the statement byWerner Lamberz concerning relations be-tween the SDR and Ethiopia, Barre first andforemost affirmed the necessity of reachinga peaceful settlement of the problem withEthiopia. However, at the same time, it wasnotable that his position on this question wascontradictory and not free of nationalist fea-tures. He expressed doubt about the revo-lutionary nature of development in Ethio-

pia and characterized the Ethiopian leadersas chauvinists, and as connected to Zionistforces. Progressive forces in Ethiopia, in-cluding Marxist-Leninists, are persecutedand destroyed.

In the course of further conversation,in particular after the statement setting forthour position regarding the necessity ofreaching agreement between progressiveforces in Somalia and Ethiopia, and of theinadmissibility of any possibility that theimperialists should profit from the discordbetween the two states, Barre declared thathe was prepared to study seriously anyproposition of the Ethiopian leadership, inparticular, from Mengistu. (Attachment 1).[not printed—ed.] (During the meeting be-tween members of the Somali party and stateleadership and the delegation, at which am-bassadors of the socialist countries were alsopresent, the Soviet ambassador toMogadishu informed me that at the end ofJanuary [1977] comrade Brezhnev had like-wise sent a message to Siad Barre, contain-ing an urgent request that Barre reconsiderthe Somali position with regard to Ethiopiaand that they avoid any exacerbation of theconflict.)

During the discussion of the project fora party agreement proposed by the SED, atfirst clarity was achieved with regard to thenotion that the central content of such anagreement should be cooperation in the po-litical-ideological area and that cooperationbetween our parties comprises the nucleusof all relations between our states andpeoples. However, the SRSP delegation,headed by Politburo Member AhmedSuleiman Abdullah, came forward with arequest which greatly exceeds the ability ofthe SED (to build five fully equipped re-gional Party schools, to equip 82 regionalParty committees with radio technology andsupply with typographical machines, to ac-cept an exceedingly large number of stu-dents for study at SED institutes of highereducation, etc.), with which it was not pos-sible to agree. In spite of these unrealisticrequests, we succeeded in concluding anagreement which is realistic and which rep-resents significant assistance and support forthe Somali Party (Attachment II).[notprinted—ed.]

It was strikingly apparent that, bothduring the time when our delegation touredaround the city and during the negotiationson a Party agreement, mention was made


repeatedly of the assistance and supportwhich Somalia receives from China.

According to various [sources of] in-formation, apart from a strongly progressivecore in the Somali leadership, there is alsoa pro-China force which leans to the side ofreactionary Arab states. (Last year Somaliawas accepted into the Arab League as itsyoungest member.)

/s/ comr. R. A. Ulianovskii

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 77, d. 1618, ll. 1-5.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Somalia G.V.

Samsonov and Somali President SiadBarre, 23 February 1977

EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THEDEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF

SOMALIA

From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 2G.V. SAMSONOV Orig. No. 101

11 March 1977

NOTES FROM CONVERSATIONwith President of the Democratic Republic

of SomaliaMOHAMMED SIAD BARRE

23 February 1977

Today I was received by PresidentSiad.

In accordance with my orders I in-formed him about the considerations of theSoviet leaders, and Comrade Brezhnev per-sonally, concerning the situation develop-ing around Ethiopia.

The President thanked me for the in-formation. Then he pointed out that certainpeople in the SDR, encouraged from abroad,speculated that Soviet cooperation withEthiopia was allegedly carried out to thedetriment of Soviet-Somali relations. Ac-cording to Siad, he had to condemn such apoint of view in his speech at the KhalanMilitary School in particular, he had to saythat such statements should be consideredanti-Somali propaganda aimed at subversionof the Somali revolution. The Presidentemphasized that the assistance that the So-viet Union and other socialist countries pro-vide for the Ethiopian revolution was notonly justified, but also necessary. The So-

viet Union, as we understand it, the Presi-dent said, is trying to help Ethiopia stabi-lize on the road of socialist orientation, andthose goals of the Soviet Union completelycoincide with Somali interests. The SDR hasan interest in having a socialist, not a capi-talist, neighbor.

Characterizing Chairman of the PMACH.M. Mengistu, President Siad called hima firm and consistent proponent of the pro-gressive change in Ethiopia. However, ac-cording to Siad, Mengistu does not abideby Leninist principles in the nationality is-sue. He must give the nations living inOgaden, including both the Eritreans and theSomalis, the right to self-determination.According to the President, it is importantthat Mengistu resolves the territorial prob-lem right now, or at least gives assurancesthat he is ready to consider this questionpositively in the future. Siad alleged that thestruggle for power in the Ethiopian leader-ship was still going on, and that there wereno positive changes in the state apparatusof that country. The President thinks thatMengistu is unwilling to meet with him. Hementioned the fact that the Chairman of thePMAC did not give an immediate responseto the [Tanzania President Julius] Nyerereletter, which was delivered to Addis Abababy Vice President [Aboud] Jumbe of Tan-zania, and in which, according to Siad, theidea of his meeting with Mengistu was putforth.

Responding to the Soviet remarks con-cerning statements of certain Somali states-men in Sudan, President Siad alleged thatmember of the Politburo CC SRSP Suleimanhad only expressed an opinion on the situa-tion in Ethiopia, and that Minister of PublicHealth Rabile God was just giving his per-sonal views, and that his statement was, al-legedly, provoked by the Sudanese. Themain threat to Ethiopia was arising fromSudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya, notfrom the SDR, emphasized the President.According to a reliable source, Siad said,the internal reaction, represented by theEthiopian Democratic Union headquarteredin London and supported by the CIA, wascarefully preparing a broad terrorist cam-paign against the leadership of the PMACand against other progressive Ethiopianleaders. Siad denied the information thatspecial units trained in the Somali territory,which also included Somali servicemen,were being transferred to the Ogaden. The

SDR was not going to start a war with Ethio-pia over the Ogaden, stressed the President.Such a conflict would be detrimental to bothcountries. Only imperialists and the Arab re-actionaries would win in such a case. Weunderstand this very well, said Siad. How-ever, we will support the struggle for unifi-cation with the Fatherland of the Somalisliving in the Ogaden, emphasized the Presi-dent. He said that the people living in theOgaden were their brothers and sisters, andthat his leadership could not reject them ifthey appeal to them for help. The people ofSomalia would not understand its leaders ifthey were to suppress their struggle for lib-eration from the Ethiopian colonial yoke.

I explained to Siad the CPSU policyon the nationality issue.

Responding to my question concern-ing Somali-American contacts, the Presidenttold me about his meeting with USA repre-sentative at the UN [Andrew] Young in Zan-zibar in early February 1977. He mentionedthat the meeting was held at the Americaninitiative. According to Siad, Young in-formed him about the “new approach” ofthe Carter Administration in their policy to-ward Africa, and stressed the USA readinessto cooperate with all African countries. SiadBarre said to Young that the peoples of Af-rica will judge the “new” American policyby the practical actions of the Americanadministration. First of all, the United Statesmust withdraw its support for the white mi-nority regimes in South Africa. Respond-ing to Young’s question, why the SDR wasalways acting from an anti-American posi-tion, Siad said that it was the United Statesthat was always conducting a vicious anti-Somali policy. The SDR decisively con-demned the USA position on the MiddleEast, and also the support that the USA gaveto various reactionary forces in their struggleagainst progressive regimes, and the foment-ing of military conflicts in various regionsof the globe.

The President told me that recently arepresentative of the USA State Departmentvisited Mogadishu, arriving from Khartoum.He had a meeting with General DirectorAbdurrahman Jama Barre of the MFA of theSDR. The American requested to have meet-ings with several Somali state leaders of hischoice, including First Vice PresidentSamantar. His request was denied. Accord-ing to the President, the American left theSDR dissatisfied.


Touching upon his initiative for coop-eration between the USSR and the SDR, thePresident repeated the suggestion he madeearlier (17 January 1977) that the SovietUnion take on the development of the landsof the Fanole project. According to the Presi-dent, Somalia had neither the necessary ex-perts, nor technology, nor resources, and thatit would be incorrect to invite other coun-tries to carry out those tasks. Siad said thatthe provision about development of thoselands had not been included in the originalagreement on Fanole project constructiononly because of the incompetence of the So-mali representatives who signed that docu-ment.

The President also reminded me of hisrequest concerning construction of a navalbase in the region of Mogadishu, and alsoof docks in Berbera and Kismayu, whichwas stated in the memorandum delivered toMoscow by First Vice President Samantar.Those projects are still in force and the So-mali leadership is expecting the Soviet gov-ernment to examine them favorably.

Speaking about the military airfield inBerbera which had been opened recently,Siad said that it had been built without tak-ing into account the prospects of its possiblecivilian utilization. This airfield should servenot only the interests of the USSR, but theinterests of the SDR also. In order for thisairfield to be used by civil aviation in thefuture, it would be necessary additionallyto build a control tower for air traffic con-trollers, a room for transit passengers, othernecessary services of a modern airport, andalso a hotel for 200-300 rooms in the city,in which the Soviet air crews and navalcrews could also stay. Those additional con-structions would serve as a kind of coverfor the military airfield.

Having given a high evaluation of theSoviet assistance in the organization of fish-ing cooperatives, President Siad made a re-quest that the Soviet side provide resourcesin the form of commodity credits to coverthe local expenses in those cooperatives,since the SDR was experiencing shortagesnot only of material, but also of financialresources for those projects. Specifically, theSomali leadership was asking the SovietUnion to take responsibility for providingthe minimum living standard for the fami-lies of transfer workers in the cooperatives,and to apportion up to 10 shillings perworker per day, mentioned the President.

According to the President, he gave direc-tives to certain Somali organizations to pre-pare official requests on the questions justmentioned.

President Siad expressed his warmgratitude to the CC CPSU for the decisionto provide assistance in construction of theparty school at the Central Committee of theSRSP. He said he considered that assistancea show of fraternal care from the CPSU forthe SRSP which was undergoing a difficultformative period. He also thanked Moscowfor the attention to the request for more So-mali citizens, especially for people fromDjibouti, to be given an opportunity to studyin the Soviet Union, and for the decision tosatisfy the request in the 1977-78 academicyear.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR IN THE SDR /G. SAMSONOV/

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1621, ll.10-14; translation by S. Savranskaya.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Acting Charge d’affaires inEthiopia S. Sinitsin and Ethiopian

official Maj. Berhanu Bayeh, 18 March 1977

TOP SECRET Copy No. 2From the journal of 30 March 1977SINITSIN, S.Ia. Issue No. 124

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONwith the member of the Permanent

Committee of the PMACMajor BERHANU BAYEH

18 March 1977

This evening I visited Berhanu Bayehin the office of the PMAC at his request.

Referring to an instruction of the lead-ership of the PMAC, he informed me fortransmission to Moscow of the following.

I. The meeting in Aden which tookplace March 16 between Mengistu HaileMariam and Siad Barre, with the participa-tion of [Cuban President] Fidel Castro and[People’s Democratic Republic of YemenPresident] Rubayi [Ali], ended without re-sult in view of the position which Siad Barretook at the meeting.

As Berhanu Bayeh said, the Presidentof the SDR in arrogant terms expressedSomalia’s territorial claims against Ethio-

pia, called Ethiopia a “colonial power,” anddeclared that Somalia will continue its cur-rent policy in relation to Ethiopia, “whileall Somalians have not received freedom.”Siad Barre displayed disrespect to MengistuHaile Mariam, crudely saying that that heallegedly is carrying out the same policy ashad Haile Selassie. The Somali leader alsodeclared that if Ethiopia considers itself asocialist state, then it must rapidly transferthe Ogaden to the SDR. As the basis of asettlement of the Ethiopian-Somali disagree-ment, Siad Barre suggested the creation ofa confederation of the two countries on an“ethnic basis,” i.e., with the preliminarytransfer by Ethiopia of the Ogaden toSomalia’s benefit. This proposal was re-jected not only by Mengistu Haile Mariam,but Fidel Castro and Rubayi also expressedthemselves against such an approach, whichserved as grounds for disrespectful state-ments to them by Siad Barre.

In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, in thecourse of the meeting Siad Barre declaredthat if the socialist countries want to splitwith Somalia, that is their affair: the Soma-lian people carried out its revolution with-out outside help and “if the socialist coun-tries will not help the Somalis, then reac-tionary countries can help them.”

At the meeting Mengistu Haile Mariamstressed the necessity of a consolidation ofprogressive forces in this region so as tooppose jointly the maneuvers of reaction andimperialism. In this regard, he underlinedthat no genuine revolution can successfullydevelop without the support of other pro-gressive, especially socialist, states.

Despite such results of the meeting,Berhanu Bayeh said, the Ethiopian leader-ship believes that the meeting brought anindisputable diplomatic success to Ethiopia,insofar as it visibly and in the presence ofthe leaders of Cuba and the PDRY revealedthe true position of Somalia not only towardsEthiopia, but also in regard to the generaltasks of the struggle with imperialism andreaction. In the opinion of Berhanu Bayeh,which, he said, is expressed also by the Cu-ban comrades, Siad Barre had taken suchan uncompromising position at the meetingwith Mengistu Haile Mariam, that he appar-ently had previously secured promises ofsupport from reactionary Arab states.

2. In the evaluation of the leadershipof the PMAC, Berhanu Bayeh continued,in light of the results of the Aden meeting it


is possible to assume a sharp activization ofanti-Ethiopia activity by Somalia in closecooperation with reactionary Arab states.According to information which the PMACreceived from Mogadishu, the President ofSudan [Ja’afar Mohammed al-]Nimeiryshould arrive in Somalia in a few days. Inthis regard the PMAC pointed to a report inthe Egyptian newspaper “Al Ahram” to theeffect that in current conditions the possi-bility is created that Somalia with join thepolitical command of Sudan, Egypt, andSyria. It is also well known, said BerhanuBayeh, that Saudi Arabia is continuing toseek an end to Somalia’s cooperation withthe Soviet Union, including in the militaryarea, promising in exchange to provide So-malia with the necessary assistance.

The leadership of the PMAC also is onguard about the intensified infiltration in theOgaden by Somali armed groups, whichmoreover now include regular Somali troopsdisguised in civilian dress, armed with mod-ern weapons. This, observed BerhanuBayeh, has determined the extremely stub-born nature of recent armed conflict in theregions of Harar and Jijiga, as a result ofwhich the Somalis managed to put out ofaction several armored vehicles of the Ethio-pian Army. On 17 March, a Somali AirForce MiG fighter plane completed a pro-vocative flight over Ethiopian territory inthe region of Jijiga.

In light of all this, Berhanu Bayehreguested that a PMAC request be sent tothe Soviet government to take all possiblemeasures to restrain Somalia from anti-Ethiopia actions. The PMAC does not ex-clude the possibility that Somalia at thepresent time may be preparing a seriousarmed provocation against Ethiopia, andtherefore would be grateful for any infor-mation about that which it could receivefrom the Soviet side.

From my own side I pointed out toBerhanu Bayeh the need in this situation forEthiopia to display fortitude. Further, I un-derlined the principled line of the SovietUnion of all-round support for the Ethio-pian revolution and our diplomatic steps inthis regard which were taken recently instates which border on Ethiopia.

Berhanu Bayeh said that Ethiopia doesnot intend to aggravate its relations withSomalia or to toughen its own position.With satisfaction he noted the support of theSoviet Union for the Ethiopian revolution,

particularly underlining the significance ofthe early deliveries of Soviet arms.

In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, at thepresent time the PMAC is confronted withthe critical issue of the uninterrupted sup-ply to the Ethiopian Army of ammunitionand spare parts for weapons which it pos-sesses. The Americans are procrastinatingon previously-agreed deliveries, and also de-liveries of weapons on a commercial basis,referring in this regard to a required reviewof certain contracts in view of an increasein prices for these or some other types ofweapons. The leadership of the PMAC, asin the past, is counting on the Soviet Unionto provide Ethiopia with the necessary var-ied military assistance, but it understandsthat time will be required to master Sovietmilitary equipment. Therefore, the PMACis now urgently seeking out the possibilityof receiving weapons, ammunition, andspare parts of American manufacture, inso-far as the Ethiopian Army for now is armedby the USA.

To this end, said Berhanu Bayeh, thePMAC in the coming days will send its owndelegation to the Socialist Republic of Viet-nam, which has at its disposal significantreserves of American trophy weapons. Inthis regard Berhanu Bayeh in the name ofthe PMAC leadership expressed a wish thatthe Soviet side will convince the Vietnam-ese comrades to provide, according to theircapabilities, the necessary assistance inAmerican arms, either on a grant basis oron a combined grant and commericial ba-sis. In this regard he noted that in contrastto the past the PMAC intends to considerthis issue with the Vietnamese directly,rather than running to the PRC for media-tion. For my part, I promised to sendthrough channels the wishes and requestswhich had been expressed by BerhanuBayeh.

At the end of the conversation BerhanuBayeh made a personal request that hisbrother Abraham Bayeh (19 years old) beaccepted into one of the educational insti-tutions of the Soviet Union. Counter-revo-lutionaries, including among the studentpopulation, threaten his brother with reprisalfor familial relations with the “fascist junta,”because of which Abraham cannot go toschool and must hide at another brother’shouse (Fisseha Bayeh, jurist). In these cir-cumstances it would be desirable if AbrahamBayeh could be sent to the USSR as soon as

possible. The level of his education — 12th(graduating) grade of high school[;] how-ever, because he currently is not able to at-tend classes (he studies at home with ateacher) and take the examinations, he evi-dently will not manage to receive an offi-cial certificate for finishing high school (hestudies in the Wingate school, where untilrecently instruction was led by teachers fromEngland).

I told Berhanu Bayeh that I would bringhis wish and thoughts regarding his brotherto the attention of the Soviet ambassador.On a personal plane, I noted that resolvingthat issue would require consultation withthe appropriate Soviet agencies.

MINISTER-COUNSELOR OF THEUSSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA

/S. SINITSYN/

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll.93-97; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Report from CPSU CC to SED CC,Results of N.V. Podgorny’s Visit toAfrica, late March 1977 (excerpts)

Strictly confidential

On the results of an official visit of N.V.PODGORNY to Tanzania, Zambia,

Mozambique, and also of an unofficialvisit to Somalia and a meeting with the

leaders of the national-liberation organiza-tions of the South of Africa that took place

in Lusaka on 28 March [1977]

[Received on 19 April 1977]

During the negotiations between N.V.Podgorny and the leaders of the mentionedcountries they discussed issues of bilateralrelations and relevant international issues.The main results of the visit were coveredin published communiques, as well as injoint declarations. In addition, we would liketo inform You in a confidential manner aboutthe following.... During the talks they discussed the issuesof the situation in the African Horn with re-gard to the aggravation of Ethiopian-Somalirelations. The presidents, particularlyNyerere and [Mozambican PresidentSamora] Machel, voiced their concern at thegrowing enmity between the two progres-sive countries and expressed regrets regard-


ing the unfriendly position of the Somalileadership towards the “revolutionary re-gime” in Ethiopia. In the opinion of Nyerere,for the foreseeable future one cannot expectthe establishment of a friendly relationshipbetween Somalia and Ethiopia. The maxi-mum one can achieve is to avoid an openclash between Ethiopia and Somalia, by per-suading both sides of the need to maintainmutual restraint. Nyerere and Machel saidthat satisfaction of the territorial demandsof Somalia would automatically result in thecollapse of the progressive regime in Ethio-pia. All three leaders evaluated very highlythe position of the Soviet Union and agreedwith our opinion that progressive states mustmore actively come out in support of theEthiopian revolution and advocate the nor-malization of Ethiopian-Somali relations.... The main topic of conversation [ofPodgorny] with Siad Barre was the issue ofthe relationship between Somalia and Ethio-pia, and also the situation emerging in thisregion of Africa in connection with activi-ties of reactionary Arab forces. Exchangeof opinions revealed that the Somali leader-ship adheres to its old positions regardingits territorial demands on Ethiopia. SiadBarre justified this stand [by referring] tothe pressure of internal nationalistic circlesof Somalia. At the same time Siad Barre did not denythat there were progressive developments inEthiopia. He distanced himself from reac-tionary leaders of Arab countries: Sudan,Egypt, Saudi Arabia, who sought to liqui-date the progressive regime in Ethiopia. Siadcalled the President of the UAR [Anwar]Sadat a convinced adherent of capitalism, areactionary, anti-Soviet schemer. In theopinion of Siad, Nimeiry is a man withoutprinciples who fell under the influence ofSadat [and] the leadership of Saudi Arabia,as well as the Americans and the British. Siad declared that Somalia, now as be-fore, seeks to expand cooperation with theUSSR. He said that he deems it advisableto hold a meeting with Mengistu with themediation of the USSR and underscored thatonly the Soviet Union which possesses greatauthority and experience could help Soma-lia and Ethiopia to work out “a formula ofhonor” that would allow both countries tofind a road to reconciliation without losingface....

[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained

and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]

Transcript of Meeting between EastGerman leader Erich Honecker and

Cuban leader Fidel Castro, East Berlin, 3 April 1977 (excerpts)

Minutes of the conversation between Com-rade Erich Honecker and Comrade FidelCastro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House ofthe Central Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen,Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, PaulMarkowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries andKarlheinz Mobus as interpreters), CarlosRafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cienfuegos,Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes

Comrade Erich Honecker warmly wel-comed Comrade Fidel Castro and the Cu-ban Comrades accompanying him to this in-ternal conversation on behalf of the CentralCommittee.

We are very pleased about your visitto the GDR and the opportunity to exchangeviews about the result of your visit to sev-eral African and Arabian countries. On be-half of the Politburo I want to repeat thatwe consider your visit to these countries asimportant. I ask Comrade Fidel Castro totake the floor.

[first 16 pages omitted--ed.] Statements by Comrade Fidel Castro:

[...] Before my departure from Aden we dis-cussed with the PDRY leadership the needto do everything possible to arrive at an un-derstanding between Somalia and Ethiopia.I was well received in Somalia. I had askedthem not to have any public demonstrations.Siad Barre was very friendly during our firstdinner. Prior to my arrival, I had receivedhis reply to a letter of mine regarding thequestion of relations between Somalia andEthiopia. I had also sent an envoy to Soma-lia for discussions with Vice PresidentSamantar and Interior Minister Suleiman.Samantar held to leftist positions, whileSuleiman was a representative of the rightwing. The discussion of our representativewith him was very severe. I had alreadyreceived considerable information in thePDRY regarding the situation in Somalia.The power and influence of the rightistgroup continue to increase. The InteriorMinister, Suleiman, is doing everything pos-sible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia

and the imperialist countries. Samantar islosing influence. Everything seems to indi-cate that he is being driven into a corner bythe right.

My first evening I wanted to clarify mythoughts about Siad Barre and the Somalirevolution. No serious political discussiontook place at this dinner; [Siad] Barre ex-plained to me the evolution of the Somalirevolution. The next day, we had an exten-sive sight-seeing program. We went to aCuban-built militia training center, an agri-cultural school, a school for nomad children,etc. We were taken around for hours, al-though we had not yet had a political dis-cussion, and a mass demonstration had beenscheduled at noon in the stadium. I under-stood that they wanted to avoid such a con-versation prior to the demonstration. As thedemonstration began, Siad Barre and I hadstill not had a private conversation, and be-cause of this I was very careful. Siad Barrewas very arrogant and severe; maybe hewanted to intimidate us.

In my speech to the mass meeting Italked about imperialist policy in the MiddleEast, the reactionary role of Saudi Arabia,and the actions of other reactionary pow-ers. I did this even though I knew that therewas a considerable trend in the country infavor of closer relations with these coun-tries. I talked about the PLO’s struggle, theEthiopian revolution, and the Libyan revo-lution, and of progressive Algeria that theywant to isolate. I talked about Mozambique,and only at the end about how imperialismis doing everything to reverse the progres-sive order in Somalia. Siad Barre introducedme to participants of the mass meeting with-out saying a political word.

Before the mass meeting they hadplayed half of a soccer game. It is unknownwhether the soccer game was simply an ap-pendage to the demonstration or vice versa.My speech went against the right wing ten-dencies and supported the left wing. Weobserved that almost all of the Central Com-mittee members applauded, with the excep-tion of Suleiman and his people. Samantarwas very satisfied, and even Siad Barreseemed content. Nevertheless, the massmeeting was not broadcast live on radio orTV.

Only that evening did we begin to dis-cuss specific problems, at my residence. Itwas clear to me that we had to be carefulbecause surely the interior minister had in-


stalled bugs. This same evening Siad Barrefinally talked about Ethiopia. He comparedit to the Tsarist Empire and said that Ethio-pia was the only surviving colonial power.Thanks to Lenin’s wisdom, the Tsarist Em-pire had disappeared, but it lived on in Ethio-pia. He had proposed to the Ethiopians,some time ago, to establish a federation oreven a unification of the two countries.Ethiopia had not reacted then, but was nowitself proposing this solution. He spoke veryenthusiastically about his efforts to reach asolution with Ethiopia. I used the occasionto tell Siad Barre that I would travel to Ethio-pia the next day and asked him if he wouldbe willing to meet with Mengistu. Heagreed.

The next day I flew on to Ethiopia. Wehad earlier agreed that there would be nogreat reception for me, since at the time theywere still fighting the civil war. Shots con-stantly rang out. Mengistu took me to theold Imperial Palace and the negotiationsbegan on the spot. I found the informationthat I already had to be confirmed. We con-tinued our negotiations on the following day.Naturally we had to take extensive securityprecautions. The Ethiopians had come upwith a division, and I had brought a com-pany of Cuban soldiers with me. The day ofmy arrival there were rumors of a coup. Itdid not happen.

I developed the impression that therewas a real revolution taking place in Ethio-pia. In this former feudal empire, lands werebeing distributed to the peasants. Eachfarmer got 10 hectares. There were also re-forms in the cities. It was established thateach citizen could only own one house. Plotswere made available for housing construc-tion.

There is also a strong mass movement.In the capital, 500,000 people can be rap-idly mobilized. In February, our study del-egation, after inspecting the army divisions,had determined that of the hundreds of gen-erals, all but two should be chased out. Theofficers and NCOs have taken over the lead-ership of the country. Currently, the leader-ship is considering creating a Party. Thereis a harsh class struggle against the feudalistsin the country. The petit bourgeois powersare mobilizing against the Revolution. Astrong separatist movement exists in Eritrea.Threats are coming from the Sudan, whileSomalia claims 50% of Ethiopia’s territory.There have been border clashes in this area

for 500 years.Mengistu strikes me as a quiet, seri-

ous, and sincere leader who is aware of thepower of the masses. He is an intellectualpersonality who showed his wisdom on 3February. The rightists wanted to do awaywith the leftists on 3 February. The preludeto this was an exuberant speech by the Ethio-pian president in favor of nationalism.Mengistu preempted this coup. He called themeeting of the Revolutionary Council onehour early and had the rightist leaders ar-rested and shot. A very consequential deci-sion was taken on 3 February in Ethiopia.The political landscape of the countrychanged, which has enabled them to takesteps that were impossible before then. Be-fore it was only possible to support the left-ist forces indirectly, now we can do so with-out any constraints.

I asked Mengistu whether he was will-ing to meet with Siad Barre in Aden. Weagreed. After concluding my talks I flew onto Aden.

Siad Barre had arrived in Aden thatmorning. Mengistu did not arrive until theafternoon. I had a conversation with SiadBarre in which he bared his claws. He toldme that if Mengistu was a real revolution-ary he should do as Lenin, and withdrawfrom his territory. Siad Barre took a veryhard position. I asked him whether he feltthat there had been no real revolution inEthiopia and that Mengistu was not a realleftist leader. He told me that there had beenno revolution in Ethiopia. While inMogadishu he had shown me a map ofGreater Somalia in which half of Ethiopiahad been annexed.

After my talk with Siad Barre, I toldMengistu about Barre’s attitude, and askedhim to remain calm. I already felt bad abouthaving invited Mengistu to Aden while therewas still a powder keg situation back in hiscountry and that in such a tense situation hewas to hear out the Somalis’ territorial de-mands.

With regards to my question about thesituation of the Ethiopian army, Mengistusaid that there were still difficulties but thathe didn’t think that there was an acute dan-ger of a coup.

When the meeting started, Siad Barreimmediately began speaking. Siad Barre isa general who was educated under colonial-ism. The revolution in Somalia is led by gen-erals who all became powerful under colo-

nial times. I have made up my mind aboutSiad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist.Chauvinism is the most important factor inhim. Socialism is just an outer shell that issupposed to make him more attractive. Hehas received weapons from the socialistcountries and his socialist doctrine is [only]for the masses. The Party is there only tosupport his personal power.

In his case there is a bizarre symbiosisof rule by military men who went throughthe school of colonialism and social appear-ances. Something about socialism appealsto him, but overall there is still a lot of in-equality and unfairness in the country. Hisprincipal ideas are nationalism and chauvin-ism, not socialism.

His goal is old fashioned politics:sweet, friendly words. Siad Barre speaks likea wise man; only he speaks. He is differentfrom the many political leaders that I know.[Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat, [Alge-rian President Houari] Boumedienne,[Mozambique President Samora] Machel,[Angolan President Agostinho] Neto andmany others are strong characters. They canalso listen and do not take a dogmatic atti-tude. One can speak with them. Siad Barrereally thinks that he is at the summit of wis-dom. Until now everything has gonesmoothly for him. The Italians and the Brit-ish made him a general. The revolution wasaccomplished in a minute, with hardly a shotfired. He put on a socialist face and got eco-nomic aid and weapons from the SovietUnion. His country is important strategi-cally, and he likes prestige. Barre is veryconvinced of himself. His socialist rhetoricis unbearable. He is the greatest socialist;he cannot say ten words without mention-ing socialism.

With this tone he began to speak in themeeting with Mengistu. He began giving alecture on Ethiopia and demanded fromMengistu to do as Lenin had done: do awaywith the Ethiopian Empire. Mengistu re-mained quiet; he said that Ethiopia wasready and willing to find a solution and thatthere needed to be the first concrete stepson both sides to achieve a rapprochement.

Siad Barre theatrically responded thathe was disappointed with Mengistu and thathe displayed the same attitude as the Ethio-pian Emperor. The Ethiopian revolutionaryleadership had the same mentality as HaileSelassie. The meeting had begun at 11 PMand a solution was not in sight.


[Cuban Vice President] Carlos RafaelRodriguez then proposed the establishmentof a standing commission with representa-tives from Ethiopia, Somalia and the PDRYto find ways to a solution. All the other par-ticipants drafted us against our will into thiscommission.

Siad Barre carried on with his greatwise man act, as the great Socialist, the greatMarxist. At the same time he spoke dema-gogically as only one member of the “col-lective leadership” with a mandate from thePolitburo and the need to consult with themon all matters. After a brief recess for con-sultations with his delegation he proposeddirect talks between Mengistu and himself.

Mengistu, who had already becomemore insulted and mistrustful during SiadBarre’s previous statements, said that he waswilling to do so, but not at this time. Firstthe question of the commission had to beresolved.

We continued the meeting at 3.15 inthe morning. Siad Barre had prepared thetext of an agreement in which the idea ofthe commission was accepted but which di-rected that its main purpose should be tosolve the outstanding territorial questionsbetween Somalia and Ethiopia. The com-mission would thus take this approach fromthe start. How were the Ethiopians supposedto react to such a provocative proposal?

During the break I had spoken withMengistu, who did not hide his rejection ofSiad Barre. I also spoke with Siad Barre andasked him whether he was really interestedin finding a solution. He said that Mengistuwould have to answer that. He went on withhis revolutionary rhetoric, about how realsocialists, revolutionaries, and Marxistscould not deny realities. He said thatMengistu was in fact a drastic man, one whohas taken drastic measures: why could henot decide similarly drastically right hereand now to resolve the question?

In this setting I was faced with the com-plicated question of either speaking mymind about Siad Barre’s position or keep-ing it to myself. I concluded that I had tospeak out for the following reasons:

1. Keeping quiet would have meantendorsing the chauvinistic policy of Soma-lia, and its consequences. It would also havemeant supporting the rightists in Somalia.

2. Not responding to Siad Barre wouldmean that any subsequent aid from social-ist countries to Ethiopia, no matter how

small, would be termed by Siad Barre as abetrayal.

3. In what kind of a situation wouldthis put the PDRY, about to support Ethio-pia with tanks, trucks and artillery with thehelp of a Soviet ship?

In addition, Siad Barre had not onlybeen insulting, he was resorting to subtlethreats. At a certain point he said that onecould not know where all of this could lead.

Because of this, I spoke up. I explainedthat Siad Barre did not believe that there hadbeen a real revolution in Ethiopia, that theevents of 3 February had totally answeredthis question and that Mengistu was a revo-lutionary leader. I went on to say that weconsidered the events in Ethiopia as a revo-lution, that the events of 3 February were aturning point, and that Mengistu is the leaderof a profound transformation. I declared thatwe could not possibly agree with SiadBarre’s position. I said that Siad Barre’sposition represented a danger to the revolu-tion in Somalia, endangered the revolutionin Ethiopia, and that as a result there was adanger of isolating the PDRY. In particularI emphasized that Siad Barre’s policies wereaiding the right wing in Somalia itself in itsefforts against socialism, and to deliver So-malia into the arms of Saudi Arabia and Im-perialism.

I said that these policies were weaken-ing Somalia’s relations with the socialistcountries and would have to lead to the col-lapse of the revolution in Somalia. I ap-pealed to Siad Barre’s and the entire Somalileadership’s sense of historical responsibil-ity. I said that I did not think that this wouldcome to a war between Somalia and Ethio-pia but that I was worried, since war wouldbe a very serious thing. I do not believe thatthere are people who would provoke a warbetween the peoples.

Immediately after my speaking sofrankly, Siad Barre took the floor. He saidthat he would never want war and that as asocialist and revolutionary he would nevertake this path. If the socialist camp wantedto cut itself off from Somalia then that wasthe affair of the socialist camp. I had putpressure on him, Siad Barre, but not de-manded from Mengistu, to come to thismeeting.

Now, I pointed out that I had supportedthe summit between Siad Barre andMengistu but did not talk about Siad Barre’sinsults vis-a-vis Mengistu. I said that Cuba

had no intention of cutting itself off fromthe Somali Revolution, rather, we supportedit. The whole meeting ended without anyresults.

If we now give our aid to Ethiopia, SiadBarre will have no moral right to accuse usof betrayal, etc. I told him very clearly thatthere was a revolution in Ethiopia and thatwe had to help it.

In any case I had detected during mymeetings with Siad Barre a certain irritationon his part with the Soviet Union. He wasagitated that the Soviet Union was not de-livering spare parts or tractors and that oilcame too late from the Soviet Union, in spiteof repeated promises. The Soviet ambassa-dor has explained the state of affairs to us.The Somalis were repeatedly changing theirminds about their requests, which had de-layed the matter. In addition, unfortunatelythe Soviet oil tanker had sunk on its way toSomalia.

As I told Siad Barre this, he called theSoviets liars. He said this was not the posi-tion of the Soviet politburo, but rather theresult of sabotage by bureaucrats. His irri-tation and criticism of the Soviet Union alsoshowed in other cases. He went on to saythat there was not enough drinkable waterin his country and that cattle were dying,the bananas were ripening too late, all be-cause the pumps provided by the Soviets didnot work.

Because of this attitude of Siad Barre Isee a great danger. That is why I consideredit appropriate to give you my impressionstruthfully, without euphemisms.

I wanted to discuss my point of viewfrankly. The socialist countries are facedwith a problem. If they help Ethiopia, theywill lose Siad Barre’s friendship. If they donot, the Ethiopian Revolution will founder.That was the most important thing aboutthese matters.[comments on southern Africa, omitted here,are printed earlier in this Bulletin--ed.]

There were several requests for mili-tary aid from various sides: [Libyan LeaderMoammar] Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Con-golese leaders. During our stay in Africa wesent [Cuban Vice President] Carlos RafaelRodriguez to Moscow to confer with ourSoviet comrades and to Havana for consul-tations with our leadership. In order to findthe best solution we must think through thisquestion calmly and thoroughly and con-sider it in terms of the overall situation of


the socialist camp. Above all we must dosomething for Mengistu. Already we are col-lecting old weapons in Cuba for Ethiopia,principally French, Belgian and Czech hand-held weapons. About 45,000 men must besupplied with weapons. We are going to sendmilitary advisers to train the Ethiopian mili-tia in weapons-use. There are many peoplein Ethiopia who are qualified for the army.We are supporting the training of the mili-tia. Meanwhile the situation in Eritrea is dif-ficult. There are also progressive people inthe liberation movement, but, objectively,they are playing a reactionary role. TheEritrean separatist movement is being sup-ported by the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, andEgypt. Ethiopia has good soldiers and a goodmilitary tradition, but they need time to or-ganize their army. Mengistu asked us for 100trainers for the militia, now he is also ask-ing us for military advisers to build up regu-lar units. Our military advisory group is ac-tive at the staff level. The Ethiopians haveeconomic means and the personnel neces-sary to build up their army. Rumors havebeen spread lately that the reactionaries willconquer Asmara in two months. The revo-lution in Ethiopia is of great significance.With regard to military aid for the PR Congoand the Libyans we have not yet come to adecision.

I had consultations with Boumediennein Algeria and asked for his opinion. He as-sured me that Algeria would never abandonLibya. Algeria is very concerned with thesituation in the Mediterranean because of itssecurity interests. It is in favor of support-ing Libya, as long as military aid is confinedto the socialist camp. That is not only a ques-tion between Cuba and Algeria. If we suc-ceed in strengthening the revolution inLibya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY,and Angola, we have an integrated strategyfor the whole African continent.

Algeria would move closer to the so-cialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles ofweapons from the Soviets. Boumediennethinks that Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syriathere is also no leftist movement any more,either, especially after the Syrians defeatedthe progressive powers and the PLO in Leba-non.

[Indian President] Indira Gandhigambled away the elections.

In Africa, however, we can inflict a se-vere defeat on the entire reactionary imperi-alist policy. One can free Africa from the

influence of the USA and of the Chinese.The developments in Zaire are also very im-portant. Libya and Algeria have large na-tional resources, Ethiopia has great revolu-tionary potential. So there is a great coun-terweight to Egypt’s betrayal. It might evenbe possible that Sadat could be turnedaround and that the imperialist influence inthe Middle East can be turned back.

This must all be discussed with theSoviet Union. We follow its policies and itsexample.

We estimate that Libya’s request is anexpression of trust. One should not rejecttheir request. Cuba alone cannot help it.[remainder of conversation omitted--ed.]

[Source: Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien undMassenorganisationen der ehemaligenDDR im Bundesarchiv” (Berlin), DY30 JIV2/201/1292; document obtained by Chris-tian F. Ostermann and translated by DavidWelch with revisions by Ostermann.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Acting Charge d’affaires inEthiopia S. Sinitsyn and PoliticalCounselor of the U.S. Embassy in

Ethiopia, Herbert Malin, 9 May 1977

From the journal SECRET, Copy No. 2of Sinitsyn, Ya.S. 26 May 1977

Original No. 203

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATIONwith the Political Counselor of the USA

Embassy in Ethiopia, Herbert Malin9 May 1977

Today at the reception at the PakistaniEmbassy, Malin (acting Charge d’Affairesin connection with the recall of the latter toa meeting in Abidjan of USA ambassadors)characterized the state of Ethiopian-Ameri-can relations in the following manner:

The decision of the PMAC about theclosing in late April of a number of Ameri-can organizations in Ethiopia (a group ofmilitary attaches, the strategic radio centerin Asmara, a biological laboratory of theUSA Navy, and an information center inAddis Abba), and also the abrogation be-ginning on 1 May of this year of the 1953agreement “On the preservation of mutualsecurity” (the Embassy received a verbalcommunication from the Foreign Ministryof Ethiopia about this) came at an unex-

pected time for the USA and raised the ques-tion of the formulation of a new USA policytowards Ethiopia in light of these conditions.This policy, Malin stated, was not yet for-mulated. Although the Ethiopian authori-ties exhibited the necessary correctness to-wards personnel assigned by American or-ganizations, and with the exception of presscampaigns, no hostile actions whatsoeveragainst American citizens were observedhere, nonetheless the Embassy of the USAis aware that the USA would find it difficultto institute stable business-like relations withthe current Ethiopian regime. The closingof the USA economic assistance missionhere [USAID] cannot be excluded. Obvi-ously, relations in the military sphere willbe broken off, although some Ethiopianmilitary personnel continue to be trained inthe USA (pilots, etc.). Under the presentconditions, Washington probably will nothurry to name a new ambassador to Addis-Ababa.

According to Malin, however, all thisdoes not mean that the USA intends to “getout of Ethiopia,” considering the signifi-cance of this country for the African conti-nent and the strategically important Red Searegion. The USA, as before, is opposed tosplitting off Eritrea from Ethiopia and infavor of the freedom of navigation in theRed Sea, and has made the Ethiopian gov-ernment aware of this repeatedly. At thesame time the USA is concerned about thepossibility of the development of a crisissituation between Ethiopia and neighboringcountries and about the obvious lack of trustby the Ethiopian government in Americanpolicy in this region.

Malin considered the visit [to Moscow]by Mengistu to be a “Soviet success” and areflection of the transition by the currentEthiopian regime to an orientation prima-rily towards the Soviet Union, above all inthe military sphere and with the specific aimof obtaining modern weaponry. In his view,however, the Ethiopian-Soviet rapproche-ment could complicate relations between theUSSR and Somalia and some other Arabstates, and, at the same time, enhance insta-bility in the region.

For my part, I told Malin that our policytowards Ethiopia is principled, not directedagainst any third countries, and responds tothe interests of strengthening peace and se-curity in the region.

NOTES: In private conversations with


us, American representatives, relying on“various sources in Washington,” do nothide the fact that they are irritated by the“Ethiopia’s recent anti-American actions,”and this country’s lack of trust in the USA.At the same time, comments by Western-ers reveal that in the back of their minds theyare wondering whether the Soviet Union“could assume the entire burden of assis-tance to Ethiopia.”

It is obvious that, pursuing a policy tothe detriment of the Ethiopian revolution,the USA and other Western countries willstill try to maintain certain spheres of influ-ence in this country. Thus, during the ses-sions of the IBRD’s [International Bank forReconstruction and Development’s] “Inter-national Development Association” a no-interest credit of $40 million was extendedto Ethiopia for the purpose of road buildingand irrigation.

ACTING CHARGE D’AFFAIRS OF THE USSR IN ETHIOPIA

/s/ S. Sinitsyn

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll.142-144; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

CPSU CC to SED CC, Information onVisit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to

Moscow, 13 May 1977

Confidential

ON THE RESULTS OF THE OFFICIALVISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OFTHE ETHIOPIAN STATE DELEGA-TION LED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF

THE PROVISIONAL MILITARYADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (PMAC)

OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIAMENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

In the course of negotiations the Sovietleaders and Mengistu discussed the issuesof bilateral relations and relevant interna-tional questions. The main results of the visit were cov-ered in the Declaration signed on the initia-tive of the Ethiopian side about the founda-tions of friendly relations and cooperationbetween the USSR and the Socialist Ethio-pia, and in the joint communique, as well asin the published news releases on the courseof the visit. Beside the declaration about the founda-

tions of friendly relations and cooperationbetween the USSR and Ethiopia, [the twosides] also signed an agreement on culturaland scientific cooperation, a consular con-vention, a protocol on economic and tech-nical cooperation which envisages assis-tance to Ethiopia in [construction] of a num-ber of industrial and agricultural objects,provision of buying credit and the commis-sion of Soviet experts. According to the wishes of the Ethiopianside, an agreement was signed on some ad-ditional deliveries of armaments and mili-tary equipment to Ethiopia. The visit of the Chairman of the PMACMengistu Haile Mariam to the USSR hadan obvious goal - to establish direct personalcontacts with the Soviet leaders and to en-sure the support of the Soviet Union for thecause of the protection and development ofthe national-democratic revolution in Ethio-pia. On May 6 of this year Mengistu was re-ceived by General Secretary of the CCCPSU L.I. Brezhnev. At this talk he in-formed L.I. Brezhnev on the activities of thenew Ethiopian leadership who took a coursetoward the socialist orientation of the coun-try. On behalf of the Ethiopian people theChairman of the PMAC expressed profoundgratitude for the assistance the Soviet Unionrenders to Ethiopia in the defense of [its]revolutionary conquests. L.I. Brezhnev underscored our principledposition with regard to progressive transfor-mations in Ethiopia and declared that theSoviet Union, which from the very begin-ning came out in favor of the Ethiopian revo-lution, intends to continue this course andto give, as much as it can, political, diplo-matic, and other forms of assistance to thenew leadership of Ethiopia. L.I. Brezhnevdrew Mengistu’s attention to the fact it wasimportant, in order to advance the revolu-tionary process, to create a party of theworking class, the intention that the leaderof the Ethiopian state had voiced, and to thenecessity to activate the international affairsof Ethiopia with the aim of foiling the en-croachments of imperialist and other reac-tionary forces. L.I. Brezhnev expressed con-cern about the continuing deterioration ofrelations between the two progressive statesthat are friendly to us - Ethiopia and Soma-lia, and pointed to the urgent need to takemeasures for the improvement of these re-lations.

Mengistu voiced profound satisfactionwith the meeting and the frank, comradelycharacter of the talks. During negotiations with N.V. Podgorny,A.A. Gromyko, and other Soviet comradesthe head of the Ethiopian delegation in-formed them about the roots of the Ethio-pian revolution and its course at the presentstage, about internal and external difficul-ties the new leadership of the country expe-riences today. Mengistu said that the Ethio-pian leadership stands on the platform ofMarxism-Leninism and regards the Ethio-pian revolution as part of the world revolu-tionary process. He stressed his intention tocreate a working class party in Ethiopia.However, he said, the Ethiopian revolutionis going through a complicated, one caneven say, critical phase. Rightist, as well asultra-leftist elements, are rising, de facto, ina united front against the revolution. Theyunleashed a virtual civil war in some prov-inces of the country. These actions of do-mestic counterrevolution are linked to theactivities of imperialism and other externalreactionary forces directed against the newEthiopia. Mengistu underlined that a spe-cial role in these coordinated activities be-long to the anti-Communist regime ofNumeiri, and behind its back lurk reaction-ary Arab countries, first of all Saudi Arabiaand Egypt. The head of the Ethiopian delegation saidthat Ethiopia will not overcome external andinternal counterrevolution alone, and for thatreason it relies on support on the part of theSoviet Union and other socialist countries.He expressed a wish to develop all-facetedcooperation with the USSR. Mengistu supplied detailed informationon the policy of the Ethiopian leadership onthe nationalities question, on his intentionto resolve it on a democratic basis in theframework of the unified multinational state.The Ethiopian side judges that the separat-ist movement in Eritrea, which receivesmassive support from the Arab countries,acquired a reactionary character after thevictory of the national-democratic revolu-tion in Ethiopia. Mengistu spoke with concern about theposition that the Somali leadership took to-wards the Ethiopian revolution. He favorednormalization of relations between Ethio-pia and Somalia and the united efforts ofthe two progressive states in the struggleagainst imperialism and reaction.


The Soviet side expressed understandingof the difficulties the new Ethiopian leader-ship encounters inside the country and out-side its frontiers. The Ethiopian delegationwas informed about the measures the So-viet leadership undertakes in support ofEthiopia in the international arena, in par-ticular in connection with the anti-Ethiopianposition of the ruling circles of Sudan andto the arms supplies to the Eritrean separat-ists from a number of Arab states. The So-viet Union was said to continue henceforthto give assistance to the new Ethiopia. [The Soviet side] explained our positionon major international issues, including therelaxation of tensions, the situation in theSouth Africa, in the Middle East; in responseto the Ethiopian side we informed her aboutSoviet-American and Soviet-Chinese rela-tions. Mengistu spoke about common viewsbetween Ethiopia and the Soviet Union onthe crucial issues of international affairs. Hesaid that he shared the viewpoint of the So-viet side regarding the essence of differencesbetween the USSR and China and, on hispart, pointed out to the difference of posi-tions between Ethiopia and China on a num-ber of issues, including the situation in theAfrican Horn. Mengistu gave the impression of a seri-ous figure who firmly believes in his cause,although he still lacks sufficient political andstate experience. In particular, it seems thathe and other Ethiopian leaders do not de-vote due attention to vigorous measures inthe international arena in order to foil theattempts to drive Ethiopia into internationalisolation, [and] to win over world publicopinion, first of all in the progressive statesof Africa. Mengistu and the members of the Ethio-pian delegation estimated highly the resultsof the negotiations in Moscow and ex-pressed thanks for the understanding withwhich the Soviet side addressed their needs.They expressed the opinion that the resultsof their visit will contribute to the furtherimprovement of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. We in the Soviet Union believe that thevisit and talks with the Ethiopian state del-egation was fruitful and useful. The Ethiopian leadership, in our opinion,should be granted the support of the Social-ist Commonwealth.

[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtainedand translated from Russian by Vladislav

M. Zubok.]

Additions to 2 February 1977 Report byThird African Department, SovietForeign Ministry, on “Somalia’s

Territorial Disagreements with Ethiopiaand the Position of the USSR,”

apparently in late May-early June 1977

[...] On 16 March 1977, a meeting tookplace in Aden between President Siad andPMAC Chairman Mengistu with the partici-pation of Fidel Castro and the Chairman ofthe Presidential Council of South Yemen,Rubayi-i-Ali.

Mengistu appealed to Siad for the co-ordination of actions to rebuff imperialistand reactionary forces which simultaneouslythreaten both Ethiopia and Somalia. Siadheld to an intransigent position, putting forththe annexation of the Ogaden to Somalia asan immutable condition for normalizingSomali-Ethiopian relations. He demandedthat the issue of the transfer of the Ogadento Somalia be quickly resolved, with thesubsequent formation of a federation be-tween Somalia and Ethiopia. At the meet-ing Siad declared that if the socialist coun-tries would not support Somalia on the ter-ritorial issue, then he would be required toappeal to Arab and Western states for assis-tance.

The representative of South Yemen putforward a proposal to create a committeemade up of high-ranking representatives ofEthiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Cubafor resolution of disputed Somali-Ethiopianissues. Siad refused to work in that com-mittee. However, until now that proposalremains in force.

[...]At a meeting of the Chairman of the

Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet,N.V. Podgorny, with Siad Barre which tookplace at the beginning of April of this yearduring his brief visit to Somalia, Siad ex-pressed readiness to continue the search fora mutually acceptable formula for resolv-ing the problems facing Ethiopia and So-malia and requested the Soviet Union toprovide help in organizing a meeting withMengistu.

At Soviet-Ethiopian negotiationswhich took place during the official visit tothe Soviet Union of the official Ethiopiandelegation headed by the Chairman of thePMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam during 4-8

May 1977, the Ethiopian side was informedof N.V. Podgorny’s recent conversation withSiad Barre. In accord with the wish of Presi-dent Siad, we proposed to Mengistu thatthrough our good offices we organize andconduct in the Soviet Union a summit meet-ing for the establishment of good-neighborlyrelations between Somalia and Ethiopia.Mengistu accepted that suggestion with sat-isfaction and expressed agreement with thethoughts that had been expressed to him inthis regard. However, in a conversation withthe Soviet Ambassador on 17 May of thisyear, President Siad declared that he is notready at the present time to sit at the negoti-ating table with Mengistu. [...]

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1619, ll.61-68; translated by Paul Henze.]

Report from CPSU CC to SED CC,Information about the Visit to the

Soviet Union of Somalia Vice PresidentSamanta, late May-early June 1977

Strictly Confidential

[notation: “EH 6.6.77”]

I N F O R M A T I O Non the visit of the First Vice-President ofSomalia Mohammad Ali Samantar to the

Soviet Union in the end of May-early June

At first Samantar was in Moscow unoffi-cially, then at joint agreement it was decidedto publicize the fact of his presence in theSoviet Union. Samantar held conversations with the CCCPSU Politburo member, Minister of For-eign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and the alter-nate member of the CC CPSU Politburo, CCCPSU Secretary B.N. Ponomarev. Uponconclusion of these talks Samantar was re-ceived by General Secretary of the CCCPSU L.I. Brezhnev. They discussed on aprincipled level the main directions of theSoviet-Somali relations and reaffirmed apolitical line of the USSR and the SDR,aimed at the development of cooperationbetween them in various fields. In the course of conversations in Mos-cow, aside from the issues of the Soviet-So-malian relations, a major focus was on theissues connected to the situation in the areaof the African Horn, on which [issues] ourside laid out the position that is well known


also to the Ethiopian leadership. Soviet-Ethiopian relations, for understandable rea-sons, took a special place in the conversa-tions. Samantar concentrated his attention onthe disagreements between Somalia andEthopia on the territorial question. In justi-fying the positions of the SDR he mentionedthe well-known Somalian arguments.Samantar did not dispute the revolutionarycharacter of the regime of Ethiopia, as theSomalis have done before. Yet he hinted thatnot everything is normal in the domesticsituation in Ethiopia, that the rights of thepersons of Somalian extraction who live inOgaden are still allegedly impinged upon.Samantar said that the leadership of Ethio-pia, instead of turning to persuasion as themain tool of bringing the population [ofOgaden] over to its side, all too often re-sorts to arms. Our side repeatedly underscored the ideathat the main thing now is to avoid militaryconfrontation between Somalia and Ethio-pia. We drew [his] attention to the perver-sity of a situation when two states - Soma-lia and Ethiopia - who set themselves on thepath of revolutionary development are atloggerheads. Of course, we know about thedifferences of opinion between Somalia andEthiopia, first of all on the territorial issue.But if a war breaks out between them, onlyimperialist forces would gain from this.Such a war not only would lead to graveconsequences, it would also turn againstSomalia and would allow reactionary forcesto put a noose around its neck. L.I. Brezhnev stressed in this regard thatone should not allow a military confronta-tion to flare up between the two progres-sive states of Africa, and that all issues anddisputes between them should be resolvedin a peaceful way, at the negotiation table. As to the domestic situation in Ethiopia,we declared it was not our business to dis-cuss such issues. The Ethiopians themselvesshould resolve them. In our opinion, there were two importantpoints that surfaced in the course of thediscusions. First. If earlier we had the impression thatthe Somali leadership vacillated with regardto a meeting with the leadership of Ethiopiaand to a mission of good-will on the part ofthe Soviet Union in the organization of sucha meeting, now Samantar declared that theSomalis are ready for this.

In response to our direct question whenand on which level the Somalian side wouldexpect to hold such a meeting, he said thatany time would be good for them, but didnot mention any dates. In Samantar’s opin-ion, at first there could be a ministerial meet-ing, and a final stage could be held as a sum-mit. At the same time, Samantar let us un-derstand that before the organization of sucha meeting we should define a range of is-sues for discussion, by emphasizing that forthe Somalis in the focus is still the territo-rial issue. Concerning the participation ofSoviet representatives in a meeting,Samantar did not define their level, did notsay that it [the level] should be high. Second. Of great importance isSamantar’s declaration that the Somali lead-ership would not on its own initiative un-leash an armed conflict with Ethiopia. Hesaid it twice during his meetings with A.A.Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev. He made asimilar pronouncement in his conversationwith L.I. Brezhnev. True, Samantar spoke about a scenario ofprovocation of such a conflict on the part ofexternal imperialist forces or their helpers.To this we reacted in the following way: ifsuch forces were around, then both sides,Somalia and Ethiopia, should not respondto such a provocation, but should displaystate wisdom and vigilance. On the whole, the visit of Samantar toMoscow was, in our opinion, usful. It showsthat the leadership of Somalia does not dropthe idea to begin, with assistance of the So-viet Union, a dialogue with the leaders ofEthiopia in order to normalize relations be-tween the two countries.

[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtainedand translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.

Ratanov and Mengistu, 29 June 1977

SECRET, copy No. 2From the journal of 18 July 1977Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 255

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATIONwith the President of the PMAC,MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

29 June 1977

Today I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam

and, as authorized by the Center [Moscow],outlined the Soviet position on Ethiopian-Somali relations, highlighting the threat thatmilitary conflict between Ethiopia and So-malia would pose to the revolutionaryachievements in both countries.

Mengistu then thanked the Soviet lead-ership for its efforts in pursuit of the nor-malization of Ethiopia-Somali relations andstated the following:

The PMAC’s position on Ethiopian-Somali relations remains unchanged - it sup-ported and continues to support the improve-ment of relations with Somalia through ne-gotiations and the restoration of cooperationwith this country in the struggle against acommon enemy - imperialism. In light ofthis, the PMAC assumes that, unlike Sudan,which completely went over to the side ofimperialism, Somalia remains a countrywhich claims to adhere to scientific social-ism and has friendly relations with socialiststates, a situation which would create favor-able conditions for the restoration of friendlyrelations and cooperation between Somaliaand Ethiopia, and also influences the studyof Marxism-Leninism and the establishmentof close cooperation with the Soviet Unionand other socialist states.

In response to the appeal from the So-viet government, the PMAC would like toemphasize once more that Ethiopia does nothave any aggressive intentions with respectto Somalia. The PMAC already informedthe Soviet government that it has acceptedthe proposal by Siad Barre to organize a So-mali-Ethiopian meeting on an expert level.Clearly, Ethiopia will not go to this meetingas a supplicant, but as an equal partner.

Ethiopia is prepared to contribute to theefforts of the Soviet Union to prevent So-malia from shifting to the right, as can beobserved today. As far as Ethiopia is con-cerned, Somalia is already engaged in sub-versive activities against it in the guise of aFront for the Liberation of Western Soma-lia, the headquarters of which is located inMogadishu. Armed units of this front havetaken some villages in eastern Ethiopia.These units are even armed with Soviet-made anti-aircraft missiles. Naturally,Ethiopian forces must combat the units ofthis force.

In conclusion, Mengistu made a re-quest to the Soviet government to lend itssupport to efforts to achieve a withdrawalof Somali forces from Ethiopian territory.


Responding to a question from the Sovietambassador, Mengistu said that relationsbetween Ethiopia and the Republic ofDjibouti were not bad, but that the leader-ship of this Republic, fearing annexation byEthiopia or Somalia, agreed to a Frenchmilitary presence. Under these conditions,said Mengistu, if it were possible to restorecooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia,then these countries could affirm that theyguarantee the independence and territorialintegrity of the Republic of Djibouti, whichwould facilitate the withdrawal of Frenchforces from Djibouti and the developmentof this state along a progressive path.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSRIN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A RATANOV


Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Ethiopia

A.N. Ratanov and Cuban militaryofficial Arnaldo Ochoa, 17 July 1977

TOP SECRET Copy No. 2From the journal of 24 August 1977A.P. RATANOV Orig. No. 297

REPORT OF CONVERSATIONwith the head of the Cuban military

specialists Division GeneralARNALDO OCHOA

17 July 1977During the discussion held at the So-

viet Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador out-lined the following considerations on themilitary and political situation in Ethiopia.

The capture of several strategicallyimportant objectives in Eritrea and in theeastern regions of Ethiopia by the separat-ists and by the Somalis has showed that thePMAC:

1. Underestimated the military capa-bilities of the Eritrean separatists, and thusdid not take serious measures to strengthenthe group of troops in Eritrea. At the sametime the PMAC was hoping that it wouldbe able to persuade the leadership of theEritrean organizations to take part in nego-tiations on the political settlement of theEritrean problem.

2. Did not expect that the units of theSomali regular army in Ogaden would par-

ticipate directly in the military actions. It issignificant that the Ethiopian command didnot take measures for building a defensivebarrier in the regions adjacent to Somalia.Apparently, the PMAC was concerned thatsuch measures could be perceived by So-malia as an Ethiopian refusal to settle theirdisagreements with Somalia peacefully.

3. Overestimated its own military ca-pabilities. Did not take into account the factthat the old army practically did not gothrough the school of revolutionary struggleeven though it took part in the revolution,since the main demands of the rank and filesoldiers were for a raise in pay and for im-provement of the retirement pensions, anda certain part of the officer corps was againstthe Revolution altogether.

It should be also mentioned that in re-lation to Eritrea, during the three years sincethe Revolution the Ethiopian command hasnever attempted any offensive military op-erations against the Eritrean armed forces,and that the troops of the Ethiopian regulararmy were practically dwelling in their quar-ters.

Only two or three months ago thePMAC, having received weapons from thesocialist countries, hastily began to organizenew units of the regular army, and thepeople’s militia.

Currently the armed forces of Ethio-pia consist of 6 divisions of the regular army(55 thousand people), 8 divisions of thepeople’s militia (about 100 thousandpeople), and police formations (40 thousandpeople). However:

1. The Ethiopian army is inferior to theSomali army in the quality of armaments.

2. The members of the people’s militiahave not had a sufficient military trainingyet.

All this led to the situation where theseparatists were able to establish controlover 75-80% of the Eritrean territory, includ-ing the cities of Keren, Nacfa, Karora,Decamere, Tessenei. Their armed forcesconsist of 18 thousand people.

The Ethiopian command in Eritrea has20 thousand soldiers of the regular army, andit is currently transferring there 5 divisionsof the people’s militia. This should give itthe opportunity to establish control overEritrea assuming that Sudan does not intro-duce its armed forces there.

If the military effort in Eritrea is suc-cessful, the PMAC hopes that the separat-

ists and the Arab countries who support themwould have to agree to a political settlementand accept internal autonomy for Eritrea.

In the Ogaden the detachments of theFront of for the Liberation of Western So-malia (up to 5 thousand people), introducedmainly from Somalia, have recently estab-lished control over the most part of the ter-ritory. The front is engaged in combat nearthe cities of Harar, Jijiga, Gode, Dire Dawa.

The PMAC has up to 10 thousandpeople in the Ogaden. Currently detach-ments of the people’s militia are being trans-ferred there. The Ethiopian command con-siders the situation in the Ogaden most dan-gerous since Somalia continues to transferits military personnel and heavy weaponryto that region.

Therefore, the PMAC has a opportu-nity to change favorably the military situa-tion in Eritrea as well as in the Ogaden,However, it would need to solve the follow-ing problems.

1. To provide the armed forces with themeans of transportation (helicopters, trucks,etc.) for aquick transfer of the reserveswhen and where they are needed.

2. To create fuel reserves and to obtainmeans of transportation for them.

3. To create reserves of food and medi-cines.

Also it is necessary to strengthen thepolitical work in the armed forces, for whichthey would need cadres of political work-ers, which are currently insufficient.

In socio-political terms the forces ofthe revolution predominate over the forcesof the counterrevolution. Still, even thoughthe PMAC undertook certain measures forthe organization of the peasant and urbanpopulation (peasant and urban associationshave been created everywhere), the level ofpolitical consciousness of the broad massesof the population (mostly illiterate) remainsvery low.

Elements of confusion can be observedin the Defense Council. Mengistu HaileMariam still remains the main leader of theEthiopian revolution. The PMAC needs tosolve the following political tasks:

1. To take additional measures tostrengthen its social base. In order to achievethis it is necessary to make the socio-eco-nomic policy more concrete, so that it couldassure the peasants that the land would re-main in their possession, and that the regimewould not rush with collectivization. In ad-


dition, some measures in order to, as a mini-mum, neutralize the national bourgeoisie,are necessary to assure it that the regimewould not expropriate its property.

2. To develop the nationality policy andto make it more concrete (to create autono-mous national regions), even though now itwould not be an easy task because cadresfrom non-Amhara nationalities whichwere discriminated against before the revo-lution have not been prepared yet.

3. To create a political party and a broadpeople’s front with participation of not justworkers and peasants, but also with the na-tional bourgeoisie.

4. To conduct a more active foreignpolicy, especially toward African countries,to provide supportfor Mengistu’s state-ments at the OAU Assembly in Libreville[Gabon] that Ethiopia was not going to ex-port its revolution, and that it would followthe course of nonalignment; to make theprogram for political settlement of the Ethio-pian-Somali disagreements more concrete.

In the course of further discussion wecame to common conclusions that the diffi-cult situation dictated the necessity of cre-ating in some form a state defense commit-tee, which would be authorized to mobilizeall forces of the country for the defense ofthe revolution; of organizing the highestmilitary command, and at a minimum, oftwo fronts (Northern and Eastern) with cor-responding command and headquartersstructures.

We also agreed that the current struc-turing of the armed forces should be reor-ganized in the future according to modernmilitary concepts applicable to Ethiopianrealities. However, the military incompe-tence of the officer corps and conservatismof a certain part of it present obstacles tothis restructuring. For example, the GeneralStaff currently nurtures ideas of creatingtank divisions and an anti-aircraft defensesystem of the country by removing thosekinds of weapons (tanks, anti-aircraftlaunchers) from existing infantry divisions.

On July 16 the Cuban comrades foundout that at the last moment before the groupof [PMAC General Secretary] Fikre SelassieWogderes was about to leave for Moscowit was decided to ask the Soviet Union tosupply tanks, armored cars, and the like at atime when they have not yet prepared theircadres for work with the technology theywere receiving from the Soviet Union ac-

cording to the agreements signed earlier.Arnaldo Ochoa told Mengistu that such alight-headed approach to serious businessmight undermine the prestige of the Mili-tary Council. Arnaldo Ochoa had the feel-ing that Mengistu understood what hemeant.

Another example of such a light-headed, even irresponsible, approach to themilitary questions is the idea that somebodyis suggesting to Mengistu about the neces-sity of preparation of a offensive on Hargeisa(Somalia), which would give Somalia a rea-son to start a more massive offensive in theOgaden with tanks and aircraft, not to men-tion the catastrophic political consequencesof such a step for Ethiopia.

Arnaldo Ochoa said that the militaryfailures in Eritrea led to certain disagree-ments within the PMAC. A significant partof the Council proposes that they shouldnow, before any military measures are taken,try once more to engage in negotiations withthe Eritrean organizations. The majority ofthe Council, however, thinks that in the ex-isting circumstances, when the separatistsare on the offensive, they would not agreeto negotiations, or they would present ulti-mata demanding the separation of Eritrea.Therefore, the majority of the Council be-lieves a combination of military and politi-cal measures should be undertaken, i.e. topropose negotiations to the Eritrean organi-zations only after having achieved somemilitary successes.

Arnaldo Ochoa also informed me thatin one of their recent conversationsMengistu said that Ethiopian-Chinese rela-tions were becoming more and more com-plicated with every day. The PMAC foundout that the PRC was providing military as-sistance to the People’s Front of EritreanLiberation. In relation to this, the PMACmade a decision to limit all relations withBeijing to the minimum without engagingin an open confrontation, and to devise mea-sures against Chinese ideological penetra-tion in Ethiopia.


[signature] /A RATANOV/

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll.141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya.]

Record of Negotiations between Somali

and Soviet Officials in Moscow,25-29 July 1977 (excerpts)

From the journal of Secret. Copy no. 10L.F. Ilichev 11 August 1977

No. 2148/GS

Record of a Conversationwith the Minister of Mineral and Water

Resources of Somalia, Head of Delegationof Experts

HUSSEIN ABDULKADIR KASIM (first level)

The Somali Delegation of Experts arrivedin Moscow on 24 July 1977. Meetings tookplace at the residence of the Somali Del-egation from 25-29 July 1977.

25 July

In a one-on-one conversation whichtook place on the initiative of H. A. Kasim,before the beginning of the first meeting theMinister announced that the Somali delega-tion had arrived in Moscow with a feelingof good will and with absolute faith in theefforts of the Soviet Union to offer its goodservices toward the resolution of disputedissues between Somalia and Ethiopia. TheSomali delegation, in the words of Kasim,experiences doubt, however, as to the can-dor and good intentions of the Ethiopianside, taking into account that Somalia hadrepeatedly proposed to Ethiopia to resolvethe disputed issues within the framework ofcreating a federation of the two govern-ments, to which Ethiopia reacted by pub-lishing the protocols of secret negotiationsbetween the two sides and by carrying out acampaign attacking Somalia in the press.

As is well known, other African andnon-African countries attempted to play therole of mediator in the settlement of the dis-puted questions between the two countries,but these efforts were not crowned with suc-cess.

The Somali delegation considers thatthe object of discussion at the forthcomingmeeting of experts, in addition to the sub-stance of the disputed issues between thetwo countries, should include neither thetension in relations between the two coun-tries, nor the questions of demarcation or ofchanging the borders, but rather the colo-nial situation which currently characterizea part of the Somali territory and the popu-


lation living there, which is under the colo-nial government of Ethiopia. The Somalidelegation considers that no country shouldcall itself a socialist country, or a countrywhich adheres to a socialist orientation, ifthis country continues the colonial oppres-sion of a people and a part of the territory ofanother country. This colonial situationarose in the time of the existence of theEthiopian Empire and up to Somali inde-pendence. In the opinion of the Somali side,the changing of the name Abyssinia to Ethio-pia, and the Ethiopian Empire to SocialistEthiopia did not change in the slightest de-gree the state of affairs. This is why theSomali delegation considers that the centralquestion for discussion at the forthcomingmeetings of the delegations of experts fromthe two countries is the question of grant-ing self-determination and independence tothe oppressed Somali minority, which liveswithin the borders of Ethiopia.

At the forthcoming negotiations, con-tinued the Minister, there are two alterna-tives: either [his aforementioned proposedtopic, or] to limit the discussion to a rangeof secondary problems, which would be tan-tamount to simply beating about the bush.Somalia considers, that the military actionscurrently being conducted are the actions ofSomali patriots in the colonial territory whoare struggling for their right to self-deter-mination and independence, therefore thefirst question on the agenda of the forthcom-ing meeting of experts should be the ques-tion of decolonialization, and, only havingresolved that question, will it be possible tomove on to the discussion of other second-ary questions, such as the lessening of ten-sion in relations between the two countries.

H.A. Kasim noted that the currentlyexisting situation is a result of the fact thatEthiopia, over the course of many years,violated the territorial integrity of Somalia,[and] oppressed and annihilated Somalis,living in the colonized territory.

In conclusion, H.A. Kasim under-scored the readiness of the Somali delega-tion to assist the Soviet side in fulfilling itsmission of offering its good services at themeeting of the delegations of experts fromSomalia and Ethiopia.

For my part, I declared that the tensionwhich has been created in the relations be-tween two countries, with both of whom weare friendly, is the cause of great alarm andanxiety. I underscored the impossibility of

resolving the disputed questions by meansof the application of force, particularly giventhe contemporary global situation. I tooknote of the real danger that such tensionmight be used by enemies of Africa, enemiesof progressive transformations in Somaliaas well as in Ethiopia. I remarked that thereare no questions in the interrelations of so-cialist countries or countries of socialistorientation, which could not be resolvedwithout the application of force, by peace-ful means. The Soviet side, offering its goodservices, sees its task at the forthcomingmeeting of the delegations of experts in thefollowing:

1) To create an atmosphere of good-will between the two countries;

2) to ensure an understanding of thefact that it is impossible to resolve dis-puted questions through force;

3) to undertake efforts to ensure thatas a result of the meetings of expertsthere would be recommendationselaborated to the governments of bothof these countries with the goal of cre-ating a situation of friendship and goodrelations as a basis for resolving thedisputed questions which exist betweenSomalia and Ethiopia.

I indicated that the Soviet side did notintend to impose any particular resolutionof the disputed questions between the twocountries.

After the conclusion of the one-on-oneconversation a meeting of the Soviet repre-sentatives and the Somali delegation of ex-perts took place.

I greeted the delegation of Somali ex-perts and expressed satisfaction with the factthat the Somali and Ethiopian parties haddecided to begin a dialogue toward the nor-malization of their relations in Moscow.

I announced that, having concurredwith the request of President Siad that weoffer our good services in organizing andleading the meetings between representa-tives of Somalia and Ethiopia in Moscow,the Soviet side was guided exclusively byits international obligations to offer assis-tance to countries with whom we are onfriendly terms, by its interests in the devel-opment and strengthening of all-around co-operation with them.

I noted that we treat the parties with-out biases of any sort, in a friendly and can-did manner.

I expressed the hope that the forthcom-

ing Somali-Ethiopian meeting would leadto positive results. I said, that it would notbe candid for us not to say that the currentsituation in the region had grown compli-cated and that decisive and immediate mea-sures were necessary. We would hope thatthe two delegations would strive from thevery beginning to create a business-like at-mosphere, to show their good will, [to takea] constructive approach and not to takecategorical positions, which have the natureof ultimatums, and would rule out even theslightest possibility of conducting negotia-tions.

We are convinced that the normaliza-tion of the situation in the Horn of Africaand the establishment of friendly relationswith Ethiopia is in the interest of Somalia.It is clear that a peaceful situation, andfriendly ties with Ethiopia would createmore favorable conditions for the success-ful resolution of complicated problems per-taining to the national economy, which con-front this country, in its attempts to raise thewell-being of the Somali workers.

I said that we would like hear the fullopinion of the Somali delegation concern-ing the range of questions, which the del-egation considers necessary to submit to ajoint discussion, and likewise concerning theprocedure for the meeting, in particular, withregard to its general duration, and other pro-cedural questions. From our side, we haveno intention of imposing any temporal limiton the meeting and are prepared to take intoaccount, insofar as it is possible, the wishesof the two parties in this regard.

I noted further that, as we know, theSomali side proposes to discuss the issue ofthe Ethiopian government’s concession ofthe right to self-determination of nationalgroups. We are unable to predict before-hand what might be the position of the Ethio-pian government, but we can surmise, thatsuch a formulation of the question will mostlikely be interpreted by the Ethiopian gov-ernment as interference in the internal af-fairs of a sovereign state.

We know, as you do, that the Ethio-pian leadership in its programmatic docu-ments announced its intention to resolve thenationalities question on a democratic ba-sis. It goes without saying that the realiza-tion of such a program requires the appro-priate conditions.

To our mind, the examination of theissue of normalizing relations between the


two countries at the meeting of experts, andprecisely this, as we understand, is their firstand foremost task, should not be made con-ditional upon the preliminary resolution offundamentally disputed questions. This isa point of view which we have expressedmore than once to the Somali leadership andit was not met with objections by their side.

The meeting of the delegation with thegood services of our side would be genu-inely successful if it was concluded by theelaboration by the experts of recommenda-tions to their governments concerning thesteps which would lead to the normaliza-tion of Somali-Ethiopian relations.

The Soviet side is prepared to cooper-ate and to offer all possible assistance to theexperts of both sides in their elaboration ofrecommendations for their governments, butdoes not plan to insist on any particular po-sition. We are prepared to assist actively inthe search for a mutually acceptable resolu-tion. If the desire should be expressed, theSomali and the Ethiopian delegations maymeet without the participation of the Sovietrepresentatives.

We would be prepared after the meet-ing with the Ethiopian delegation, if itshould be deemed necessary, to engage infurther discussion with the Somali expertswith the objective of working out a unifiedapproach, of identifying a range of ques-tions, which would be appropriate to dis-cuss, and likewise of identifying proceduralquestions.

The views which might be expressedin this connection by our delegation, maybe reduced, in summary, to the following;

1) the acknowledgment that the con-tinuation of tensions between the twocountries is not consistent with the in-terest of the Ethiopian and Somali na-tions;2) the renunciation by the two sides ofthe use of force in the resolution of dis-puted questions; the attempt to applyevery effort to their settlement bypeaceful means, by means of negotia-tions;3) the obligation of the two sides tomaintain peace and security on theirborders, to abstain from every sort ofhostile activity, from engaging in hos-tile propaganda against one another bymeans of the mass media and to foster,in every possible way, those effortswhich will lead to the development of

friendly relations;4) the efforts of the two countries totake measures which are directed at de-veloping economic, trade, and culturalrelations, at developing connectionsbetween voluntary organizations in thetwo countries, the exchange of experi-ence, etc., and, in particular, the readi-ness of the two sides to conduct regu-lar mutual consultations at all levels.

It goes without saying that first andforemost it is necessary to cease militaryactivities on both sides.

The principled efforts of the SovietUnion toward the development of all-aroundcooperation with the Somali Democratic Re-public are well known. Our country hasnever been guided in its policy by opportu-nistic considerations. The Soviet Union willcontinue in the future to strengthen itsfriendship and revolutionary solidarity withthe nation of Somalia, to offer assistance andsupport in full accordance with the Treatyof Friendship and Cooperation between ourcountries.

July 26

[...] [I] Remarked for my part, that theinterlocutor repeated all of those factors,which had been expressed by him duringthe previous discussion. Meanwhile, thesituation in the Horn of Africa continues tobecome more complicated and explosive.We think that this situation dictates the ne-cessity of introducing certain amendmentsto the considerations of the two parties.

From the declaration of the Somalidelegation it follows that the delegation pos-sesses the authority to discuss only territo-rial problems. We were told that the effortsof the Somali leadership, the efforts of theleaders of certain African countries, and like-wise the efforts of Comrade F. Castro in thesettlement of the disputed problems of So-mali and Ethiopia did not meet with suc-cess. From this [fact] should the conclu-sion be drawn that, insofar as the efforts ofthird countries have not been successful, thedisputed questions must be resolved with theassistance of arms, by means of open mili-tary actions? Our point of view is that alldisputed questions should be resolved bypeaceful means, by means of negotiations.For the sake of this objective no efforts ofany sort should be begrudged.

The Soviet side regarded with satisfac-

tion the declaration of President Siad thatSomalia would never, not under any circum-stances, attempt to resolve disputed ques-tions with the assistance of arms. This wasdiscussed in the message to L.I. Brezhnev,and the same declaration was made by theSomali party-state delegation which visitedthe USSR in the previous year. In a word,we have been assured of this more than onceand on various levels. We have treated thisdeclaration with complete faith.

However, certain information we pos-sess bears witness to the fact that open mili-tary actions have currently commenced.Regular military units in Somalia, usingtanks and aviation, have crossed the Somali-Ethiopian border. I want to stress, that weare discussing concrete facts, not conjecture.

From our point of view, in order to re-solve any sort of problem which has arisenbetween states, first and foremost it is nec-essary to have a favorable atmosphere. We,as the party which is offering its good ser-vices, consider that the central task shouldnow comprise the cessation of military ac-tions. This is the appeal we make to boththe Somali and the Ethiopian sides.

It is our opinion that the issue currentlystands as follows: either the Horn of Afri-can will become an arena where imperialistand reactionary intrigues are carried out, orby our common efforts we will succeed inturning the Horn of Africa into a region offriendly relations and peace.

We appeal to both delegations to takea seat at the negotiating table, to speak forththeir own views and, correspondingly, to lis-ten fully to each other’s point of view, hav-ing devoted their full attention to the searchfor a path to the normalization of the rela-tions between the two countries.

This is our point of view.[...] Returning to the bilateral Somali-

Ethiopian meeting, H.A. Kasim said, that ifthe question should be raised concerning themilitary actions of Somalia against Ethio-pia, that the Somali delegation would havenothing further to discuss at the negotiatingtable. A war is going on between Ethiopiaand the liberation movement of the Somalipeople who live in occupied territory. Thestruggle is being conducted precisely by thismovement, and not by the Somali Demo-cratic Republic.

What military actions should beceased? After all we are discussing astruggle for liberation, and, as is well known,


from the moment of the Great October so-cialist revolution the Soviet Union has in-variably supported liberation movements inall corners of the globe. The very activitiesof the Soviet Union in the United Nationsare a testimony to this fact.

I would like to repeat once more thatwe are prepared to sit down at the negotiat-ing table, if the Ethiopian side will discussthe territorial dispute as a fundamental is-sue, but if the Ethiopian side will only putforward the issue of the alleged Somali mili-tary actions, then there will not be anyprogress either in the work of this meeting,or in our bilateral relations.

I do not know, H.A. Kasim said in con-clusion, whether the Soviet Union will beable to do anything under these circum-stances. Unfortunately, we have the dismalexample of the mediation of F. Castro, whenMengistu Haile Mariam declared the inex-pedience of raising the territorial question,but was prepared to discuss any other ques-tions of secondary importance.

Trust in our candor, we will regret it ifthe good services of the USSR do not leadto a positive result.

July 29

[...] Taking into account the separate ex-changes of opinion taking place with themain Somali and Ethiopian delegations, theSoviet representative, by way of offering hisgood services, will introduce for consider-ation in the course of the work an idea ofthe first steps, which would lead toward thenormalization of relations between Soma-lia and Ethiopia:

1) The renunciation of the applicationof force in the resolution of disputedquestions. The assumption of imme-diate measures in the cessation of mili-tary and other hostile activities.2) The assumption by both parties ofthe obligation to maintain peace andsecurity on the borders.3) To abstain from conducting hostilepropaganda against one another bymeans of the mass media, to encour-age efforts which would lead to the de-velopment of friendly relations.4) The acknowledgment by both par-ties of the fact that maintaining tensionsbetween Somalia and Ethiopia is notconsistent with the interests of theirpeoples and impedes the unification of

their efforts in the struggle against thecommon enemy, imperialism.5) The two parties express their agree-ment to establish and maintain contactswith each other at a variety of levels inthe interests of reaching the above-mentioned goals.

[I] underscored the fact that we regardthis as a working document which containsthe recommendations of the Soviet side,which is fulfilling its mission to offer goodservices. It goes without saying that we areproceeding from the assumption that it willbe brought to the attention of the Somaligovernment.

H.A. Kasim declared that the Somalidelegation had nothing to add to the con-siderations which the delegation had ex-pressed earlier, and offered his assurancethat the recommendations which were ex-pressed by the Soviet side, would be broughtto the attention of the Somali leadership.

[...] [I] thanked H.A. Kasim for hiscommunication and said that I would liketo make note again of certain elements,which were contained in the message of re-sponse from L.I. Brezhnev to Siad Barre’sappeal to him in May of this year. “In agree-ing to offer our good services,” announcedL.I. Brezhnev, “we approach this matter withseriousness and a sense of responsibility. Wethink that it should be possible to begin adialogue on a broad basis with the goal ofestablishing good relations between Soma-lia and Ethiopia. We consider that the keywhich might open the road to cooperationin the search for a settlement to difficult dis-puted problems lies in neighborly relationsin the Horn of Africa.”

It is hardly necessary for me to com-ment on this text; it speaks for itself.

The Soviet Union offered its good ser-vices even before the exacerbation of rela-tions between Somalia and Ethiopia. Buteven after this exacerbation we consider itnecessary to continue our mission, in orderto achieve the improvement of relations be-tween the two countries, to create a favor-able atmosphere for the successful discus-sion of all disputed issues.

Meanwhile, while our consultations aregoing on, the Soviet leaders have appealedtwice with a personal message to PresidentSiad. As recently as yesterday, L.I.Brezhnev sent President Siad a personalmessage, the substance of which, in brief,consisted of his desire that the Somali side

should take the appropriate steps and shouldstop the escalation of tension.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. 3-31; translation by Sally Kux.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.Ratanov and Mengistu, 29 July 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2From diary of 9 August 1977 A. P. RATANOV Ser. No. 276

NOTES OF CONVERSATIONwith Chairman of PMAC of EthiopiaHAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU

29 July 1977

We received a visit from Mengistu andtransmitted to him a message from Com-rade L. I. Brezhnev in response to a com-munication from Mengistu, which was pre-sented to Comrade Brezhnev for ComradeA. P. Kirilenko by the General Secretary ofthe PMAC, Fikre Selassie Wogderes.

Mengistu asked that we convey toComrade Brezhnev his deep appreciation forthe fraternal and candid message. Weagreed, and conveyed to Mengistu the ad-vice contained in the communication.

Mengistu placed great value on the factthat the Soviet Union is rendering supportto Ethiopia, notwithstanding that this is lead-ing to definite complications in Soviet-So-mali relations. We understand, saidMengistu in this connection, that the SovietUnion is confronted with a complex di-lemma: rendering military assistance toEthiopia, it risks a loss of its opportunity inSomalia (e.g., Berbera). We are consider-ing these questions, said Mengistu, and con-sider ourselves accountable to the revolu-tionary debt inhering in the obligation to takeinto account the interests of the Soviet Unionin this region. Together with this, he ob-served, we hope that the victory of the Ethio-pian anti-imperialist revolution will contrib-ute to the common revolutionary cause.

In response to the representations of theSoviet Ambassador (the conference withMengistu was one on one) that it is neces-sary to struggle not against Somalia, but insupport of Somalia, Mengistu said that heagreed with this. So far, for example, thePMAC has not rendered support to theforces in Somalia which are operating


against Siad Barre and seeking assistancein Ethiopia. We are not organizing, saidMengistu, partisan movements in Somalia,although specific opportunities for that havepresented themselves and continue to do so.At the same time, representations of Eritreanorganizations have been established inMogadishu, along with a people’s revolu-tionary party, the Ethiopian DemocraticUnion, and Fronts for the Liberation ofTigray and Oromia, not to mention the head-quarters of the “Revolutionary Front ofWestern Somalia.”

In response to the representations of theSoviet Ambassador, following on the direc-tives of communications from Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, concerning the need for pres-ervation of a dialogue with Somalia,Mengistu proclaimed that he was in agree-ment with the concepts and representationsof Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. We accepted,he continued, the suggestions of the SovietUnion regarding the organization of a So-mali-Ethiopian meeting in Moscow, whenSomalia cut short its subversive activity inthe Ogadan, and [we] are agreeable to con-tinuing those discussions now, even as So-malia has stationed a portion of its regulartroops on the territory of Ethiopia. Togetherwith this, the PMAC will not grant territo-rial concessions to Somalia, although thisis because in such a case the present Ethio-pian government will fall. Already at thistime, Mengistu noted in this connection,there is talk among the people, and even inright-wing circles, to the effect that thePMAC is not up to the task of defendingeither Ethiopia or the Ogadan, and that itshould therefore be deposed. BerhanuBayeh, Mengistu continued, has been sum-moned to Addis Ababa for consultation, andafterward he will return to Moscow with-out delay, inasmuch as the PMAC has en-gaged and continues to engage in friendlynegotiations with the Somalis over questionsrelating to the establishment of multi-fac-eted Ethiopian-Somali cooperation.Mengistu promised to consider the form (forexample, his interview with the Ethiopiannews agency) for additional presentationsof the PMAC program for peaceful resolu-tion of Ethiopian-Somali disagreements, aswell as the Eritrean problem.

The Soviet Ambassador directedMengistu’s attention to the anti-socialist andeven anti-Soviet (Maoist) propaganda whichis being disseminating by certain private

publishing houses.Mengistu declared that implementation

of the program of propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas has indeed been unsatisfac-tory. For this reason, the PMAC has reor-ganized the Provisional Bureau of MassOrganization Affairs [POMOA] and re-placed its leadership.

Concerning the Chinese, Mengistunoted that they are not only disseminatingliterature, but are rendering direct supportto Eritrean separatists and extremists.

In the course of the discussion, a num-ber of questions were touched upon in con-nection with the structure of the Ethiopianarmed forces.

In conclusion, Mengistu stated as fol-lows: “We are attentive to the advice of ourSoviet comrades in connection with thesearch for political solutions to both domes-tic and foreign problems. We will continueto strive for this in the future, and have al-ready been required to execute many per-sons or place them in prison. At the presenttime I, for example, am restraining thosewho are proposing repressive measures, in-cluding those against errant organizationswho proclaim their adherence to Marxism-Leninism but who are struggling against thePMAC. The main goal at the present timeis to create a political party and a newworker-peasant army, inasmuch as the oldarmy has displayed its weakness, and it turnsout that in military terms the counter-revo-lution is stronger than the PMAC had sup-posed.”

For his part, the Soviet Ambassadoragain laid emphasis on the need to preserve,no matter what, contacts with the leadershipof the SDR.

The Soviet Ambassador additionallydirected Mengistu’s attention to the fact thatthe representations in his letter to ComradeBrezhnev concerning the supposed inad-equacies of military supplies did not corre-spond to reality.

Mengistu responded to that by statingthat, evidently, the translation of those re-marks was inexact, inasmuch as he had inmind not the inadequacy of supplies of oneor another sort of weapon, but rather a re-quest to augment them with supplies of adifferent technical sort, in particular, that thesupply of tanks be augmented with suppliesof trailers for their transport from port, con-veyance to their place of destination, etc.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TOSOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ RATANOV


Transcript of CPSU CC PolitburoMeeting, 4 August 1977 (excerpt)

Top SecretSingle copy

Minutes

MEETING OF THECC CPSU POLITBURO

4 August 1977

Chaired by: Com. KIRILENKO, A.P

Attended: Comrades Y.V. Andropov, F.D.Kulakov, K.T. Mazurov, A.Y. Pel’she, P.N.Demichev, B.N. Ponomarev, M.S.Solomentsev, M.V. Zimianin, Y.P. Ryabov,K.V. Rusakov.

8. About the address to the leadership of theprogressive African states in relation to thesharpening of Somali-Ethiopian relations.

KUZNETSOV reports that the Ethio-pians have sent a complaint to the Organi-zation for African Unity, and that our ad-dress to the leadership of the progressiveAfrican states with an appeal to take stepstoward the normalization of Somali-Ethio-pian relations would be very tlmely.

PONOMAREVsupports Kuznetsov’sproposal.

KIRILENKO: The situation which wehave here with these two countries is ex-tremely complicated. We have no reasonsto quarrel with either the Somali side or theEthiopian side, but we have only limitedcapabilities to influence their mutual rela-tions. We need to make a decision.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 37, ll. 44,48; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversa-

tion with Mengistu, 5 August 1977

SECRET, copy No. 2From the journal of “11” August 1977


Ratanov, A.P. Issue No. 284

RECORD OF CONVERSATION with Chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia

MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM5 August 1977

I visited Mengistu at his invitation(Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the Perma-nent Committee of the PMAC, also took partin the conversation).

After thanking the Soviet Union forrendering assistance to Ethiopia, includingthe decision about the delivery of trailers,helicopters, and vehicles, Mengistu askedme to convey the following to the Sovietleadership and to comrade Brezhnev in par-ticular:

The PMAC has attentively studied theadvice in comrade L.I. Brezhnev’s reply, andwill follow it, in particular: to aim for thepolitical resolution of Ethiopian-Somali dif-ferences. On August 8, Berhanu Bayeh, aswell as governmental advisers Mikael Imruand Getachew Kibret, will fly to Moscowto continue negotiations with the Somali del-egation.

Despite this, Mengistu continued, So-malia is continuing its escalation of mili-tary actions against Ethiopia. At present itis conducting systematic bombing raids oncities in the Ogaden (Dollo - on the borderwith Kenya), and the PMAC is anticipatingthat Harar, Dire-Dawa, etc. will be bombed.As a consequence of these bombing raids,industrial and agricultural firms and infra-structure are being destroyed. Thus farEthiopian air forces have limited their bomb-ing raids to Somali tanks and artillery, andair battles with Somali planes, and has re-frained from bombing Somali cities becausethis would create a major military confla-gration in this region. We do not intend toattack Somalia, Mengistu emphasized.

In connection with his statement,Mengistu requested that the Soviet govern-ment consider taking additional measures toinfluence Somalia, even some type of eco-nomic sanctions, and at the same time con-vey to the Somali government that Ethiopiais prepared to hold talks with Somalia withthe participation of the Soviet Union. Whatis important now is to bring about a halt inSomali air attacks because these attacks de-moralize the army as well as the peacefulpopulation and could cause a political cri-sis in the regime.

In conclusion Mengistu requested thathe be kept informed of possible steps thatthe Soviet Union would take.

During the course of the negotiations,the Soviet ambassador informed Mengistuabout the decision of the Soviet governmentto deliver trailers for the transport of tanks,helicopters, and vehicles, from the port ofentry to their destinations.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSRTO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA(signature) /A. RATANOV/


Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversa-

tion with Mengistu, 7 August 1977

From the journal of TOP SECRETA. P. RATANOV Copy no. 2

16 August 1977re: no. 292

Record of Conversationwith the Head of the PMAC

MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM7 August 1977

I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam(Legesse Asfaw, member of the PermanentCommittee of the PMAC, also took part inthe conversation).

1. In accordance with my instructionsfrom the Center [Moscow], I informedMengistu about the measures taken by theSoviet leadership in support of Ethiopia.

Mengistu requested that I convey hisdeep gratitude to the Soviet leadership andpersonally to L.I. Brezhnev for the infor-mation about these measures. We deeplytrust the Soviet Union, he said, and are re-lying on its future support, since the situa-tion in the border regions of Ethiopia is be-coming more and more complicated. So-malia continues daily to bomb the cities ofDolo and Barre [sic]. There are Somalitroops in the western Ogaden and we arenow observing the movement of Somaliunits into the northern part of this region.Ethiopian troops have seized arms whichappear to be NATO arms. According to cer-tain, as yet unverified information, the

French have begun use their aircraft to de-liver French arms to Mogadishu. TheSudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, under thecover of Eritrean separatist organizations,are transferring their detachments and armsinto Eritrea. Sudan is supplying the sepa-ratists with American arms as well as armsthey have recently received from thePeople’s Republic of China.

Our struggle, Mengistu underscored,has the nature of a class struggle, and weare doing all we can to defend the revolu-tion and to bring it to a victorious conclu-sion. At the same time, taking into accountthat the Ethiopian revolution is just a partof the larger revolutionary struggle,Mengistu continued, I feel a need to con-tinue the consultations with Comrade L.I.Brezhnev which began in May of this year.I likewise appealed, he noted at the sametime, with a letter to Comrades Fidel Castroand Erich Honecker in which I proposed thatI meet with them in Berlin in the hope thattogether we might travel to Moscow to meetwith Comrade L.I. Brezhnev in order to dis-cuss in greater detail the situation in the in-terior and exterior of Ethiopia.

Mengistu did not answer the questionof the Soviet Ambassador as to whether thecurrent situation would allow him to leavethe country. He confined himself to the re-mark that the old machinery of State re-quired replacement[;] however, the PMACwas currently not yet in a position to do thisdue to the lack of revolutionary cadres, etc....

In the course of further conversationMengistu asked [us] to examine the possi-bility of offering assistance likewise in for-tifying the region of the Red Sea coast (sup-plying coastal batteries).

Mengistu likewise spoke out in favorof sending a Soviet military delegation toEthiopia in the immediate future in order tostrengthen contacts between the armedforces of the two countries in accordancewith the previously approved plan of ex-changes in the area of the military. In hisopinion, an Ethiopian military delegationmight visit the Soviet Union with the goalof familiarizing themselves later, when themilitary situation had been stabilized.

2. [I] carried out my instructions re-garding the question of the Soviet-Ethiopiannegotiations on opening a direct sea routebetween the ports of the Soviet Union andEthiopia.

Mengistu spoke in favor of the open-


ing of such a route and of concluding anagreement on this issue as well as on theissue of an intergovernmental agreement onshipping.

3. [I] carried out my instructions re-garding the question of the Republic ofSouth Africa’s impending nuclear arms test-ing. Mengistu welcomed the Soviet Gov-ernment initiative on this issue (TASS an-nouncement). At the same time he remarkedthat at the last OAU [meeting], Ethiopia hadproposed to include on the agenda for theAssembly the issue of the threat of the cre-ation of a nuclear arsenal in the Republic ofSouth Africa with the assistance of Westernpowers; however, the bloc of the so-calledFrancophone countries rejected the Ethio-pian proposal. At the current time, saidMengistu, it is imperative that the socialistand progressive African countries developa campaign to prevent the fortification ofthe military power of the Republic of SouthAfrica which threatens all of Africa.

In conclusion, Mengistu requestedonce again that we convey his gratitude tothe Soviet leadership and to Comrade L.I.Brezhnev.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSRTO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A.RATANOV/

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, l l .102-104.]

Ethiopian Aide-Memoire to SovietOfficials in Moscow, 11 August 1977

Delivered by the Ethiopian delegation to the Soviet

delegation at the receptionon 11 August 1977

Translated from English

AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. During the course of discussionsbetween comrades Mengistu Haile Mariamand Nikolai Podgorny in April 1977 in Mos-cow, the Soviet Union first came up withthe idea for a joint meeting of the leaders ofEthiopia and Somalia in an effort to dimin-ish the possibility of conflict and create thepreconditions which could lead to harmo-nious cooperation between the two states.

2. In mid-July 1977 the provisional

military government of socialist Ethiopiareceived a communication from the Sovietambassador in Addis-Ababa that the meet-ing would take place in Moscow on an ex-pert level from 26-28 July 1977. The samecommunication noted that prior to and dur-ing the course of the meeting both Ethiopiaand Somalia should refrain from any stepsthat would complicate matters. Ethiopiaalso received assurances that Somalia wouldnot begin military actions.

3. On 23 July 1977, three days beforethe beginning of the Moscow meeting, So-malia began open and direct aggressive ac-tion against Ethiopia, thereby repudiatingthose very conditions necessary for the suc-cess of the meeting.

4. The Ethiopian delegation, headedby Major Berhanu Bayeh, of the permanentcommittee of the Provisional Military Ad-ministrative Council, came to Moscow atthe appointed time to explain to the Sovietgovernment that the situation that had arisenat that time as a consequence of Somalia’sactions involved a range of factors whichwould have a negative impact on the pro-posed meeting, and, accordingly, that therewas no practical purpose in holding such ameeting.

5. The Ethiopian delegation noted itssurprise at the fact that Somalia insisted ondiscussing what it called the “territorialquestion.” Ethiopia has no territorial dis-pute with Somalia; moreover, Ethiopia con-siders it inappropriate to hold talks underduress.

6. The working document that the So-viet Union presented to the Ethiopian del-egation was studied attentively and deliv-ered to Addis-Ababa. It was also taken intoaccount that the situation which led to ag-gressive actions by Somali had not changed.The OAU’s offer of its good offices to Ethio-pia and Somalia at the Committee sessionfrom 5-8 August 1977 in Libreville, Gabon,is very significant; at the session a series ofrecommendations were passed, which re-solved the following:

“1) Affirms resolution 16(1) and reso-lutions 27(2), obligating member-states, in accordance with the OAUcharter, to respect the borders existingat the time of independence, and alsoto respect the basic principles of theinviolability of sovereignty and terri-torial integrity of member-states.2) Calls on the sides of the conflict,

Ethiopia and Somalia, in accordancewith the provisions and principles ofthe Charter, to cease all military ac-tions.3) Affirms the non-agreement of theOAU with intervention by any foreignpowers, and, in particular, by non-Af-rican powers, in the internal affairs ofmember-states of the OAU; calls forthe rejection of any non-sanctioned in-tervention in accordance with the de-cision of the XIV assembly of the headsof states and governments.4) Calls upon all states to refrain fromany actions which could be detrimen-tal to the achievement of understand-ing between the sides in the conflict,increase tension and conflict, andthreaten the peace, security, and terri-torial integrity of the two neighboringstates.5) Recommends in connection with theserious proposal by the executive or-gans of the president of the Commit-tee of the OAU to offer its good of-fices to enter into contact with theheads of state of Ethiopia and Somaliain an effort to achieve a cease-fire andcreate a situation that would be con-ducive to the peaceful resolution of theproblem.”

7. Taking the aforementioned into ac-count, it was decided that the Ethiopian del-egation should take part in the Moscow dis-cussions on the basis of the recommenda-tions of the OAU, made in Libreville, andthe Soviet working document consisting ofthe following ideas about the first steps nec-essary for the normalization of relations be-tween Ethiopia and Somalia:

1) The two sides should refrain fromthe use of force to resolve their dis-putes. Measures should be taken to endmilitary and other hostile actions.2) The two sides should take steps topreserve peace and security on theirborders.3) They should refrain from hostilepropaganda in the mass media againstone another and stimulate efforts whichwould lead to the development offriendly relations.4) The two sides should recognize thefact that continued tension betweenSomalia and Ethiopia is not in the in-terest of their peoples, and presents anobstacle to their combining forces in


the struggle against the common en-emy - imperialism.5) The two sides should agree to theestablishment and maintenance of con-tacts between them on various levelsin the interests of achieving the statedgoals.It would be desirable to maintain theorder of the points, as they were writ-ten in the working document.

8. The Ethiopian delegation hopes thatagreement to the aforementioned will leadto a cessation of military actions as well asto the liquidation of the consequences of ag-gression in the context and spirit of the cor-responding decisions of the OAU.

Translated by S. Berezhkov (signature)

Original No. 2290/GS


CC CPSU Politburo transcript,11 August 1977 (excerpt)

Top SecretSingle Copy

Minutes

MEETING OF THECC CPSU POLITBURO

11 August 1977

Chaired by: Comrade KIRILENKO, A.P.

Attended: Comrades Y.V. Andropov, F.D.Kulakov, K.T. Mazurov, A.Y. Pel’she, P.N.Demichev, M.S. Solomentsev, I.V.Kapitonov, M.V. Zimianin, Y.P. Riabov, K.V.Rusakov.

[. . .]11. On additional measures for normal-ization of the situation in the Horn of Africaand on assistance and support for the lead-ership of Ethiopia. (The issue was presentedby comrades Andropov, Kuznetsov,Sokolov).

KIRILENKO: Leonid llych[Brezhnev] requested that the Ethiopianappeal be considered as soon as possible,and to do everything possible to give themthe necessary assistance. He entrusted Com-rades Gromyko, Ustinov, and Andropov toprepare proposals. The Comrades have ful-

filled the assignment.MAZUROV, ANDROPOV, PELSHE

emphasize the importance of the proposedmeasures for assistance to Ethiopia.

The resolution was adopted.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 37, ll. 51,56; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

Record of Soviet-Somali Talks, Moscow,12 August 1977 (excerpts), with Somali

aide-memoire, 10 August 1977

From the journal of Secret. Copy no. 8L.F. Ilichev 26 August 1977

No. 2289/GS

Record of a Conversationwith the Minister of Mineral and Water

Resources of Somalia,Head of Delegation of Experts

HUSSEIN ABDULKADIR KASIM(second level)

The head of the [Somali] delegationreturned to Moscow from Mogadishu on 7August 1977. Meetings took place at theresidence of the Somali Delegation from 8-12 August 1977. On 13 August the head ofthe delegation returned to Mogadishu.

12 August

[H.A. Kasim stated:] [...]As regards theposition of the Soviet delegation, it has be-come clearly defined for us in the course ofthe conversations which have taken place.We have noted your reaction to the Somalipoint of view concerning the Soviet work-ing document.

We would like, in the spirit of com-radeship, H.A. Kasim added, to express ourdeep thanks to the Soviet side for the enor-mous efforts which it has made in the searchfor a common platform at the Somali-Ethio-pian meeting. Our delegation fully sharesthe view that the Soviet mission of goodservices is continuing. However, given thecurrent situation the Somali delegation con-siders it imperative to return to Mogadishuto report on the situation, which has takenshape during the negotiations to the CCSRSP and to the government of Somalia.

[I] underscored that the Soviet Unionintends to continue its good services mis-sion. I thanked my interlocutor for his highestimation of the efforts of the USSR in the

search for a mutually acceptable resolution,directed at the normalization of Somali-Ethiopian relations.

At the same time, I ascertained, as aresult of the separate meetings and conver-sations which had taken place with the So-mali and the Ethiopian delegations, that bothparties still maintained uncompromising andvirtually mutually exclusive positions.

Nonetheless, the Soviet delegationconsiders, as before, that in the developmentof events nothing has happened whichwould make unrealizable the execution ofthe Soviet working document. This docu-ment remains valid and in fact acquires evenmore significance, insofar as the escalationof military actions continues. It goes with-out saying that the Soviet side is aware ofthe difficulties which have arisen and un-derstands the approach of each of the del-egations in their consideration of the cur-rent issues. But it would obviously be hastyto come to conclusions of any sort whichwould “slam the door.” On the contrary,the door is open to the search for a rationalsolution to the questions which stand be-tween the two countries, with both of whomthe Soviet Union has friendly relations.

I expressed my gratitude to my inter-locutor and to the members of the Somalidelegation for their cooperation with theSoviet side. The discussions which tookplace were characterized by candor, as be-fits discussions between friends. I also ex-pressed the hope that, after their consulta-tions with their leadership, the Somali del-egation would once again return to Moscowin order to continue this exchange of opin-ions.

In conclusion, I inquired as to when theSomali delegation intended to return toMogadishu.

H. A. Kasim responded, that the del-egation would depart on the Aeroflot flighton Sunday, August 13.

Having expressed his thanks for thehospitality which was accorded to the So-mali representatives in Moscow, H. A.Kasim requested that we continue our dis-cussion privately.

In a tete-a-tete conversation, H. A.Kasim said the following.

First: The Somali delegation had re-ceived an alarming communication aboutcertain schemes concerning Ethiopia. As iswell known, Somalia values the fact thatEthiopia maintains friendly relations with


the Soviet Union and that Ethiopia has pro-claimed the principles of socialist orienta-tion. In spite of the fact that Somali dis-agrees with Ethiopia’s evaluation of theseprinciples and that, in the Somali view,Ethiopia has not yet found the path of genu-ine anti-imperialism, nonetheless, one mayhope that the steps which Ethiopia has takenat the present time will lead to constructiveresults.

Although the available informationpresents a picture which is far from com-plete, it is considered in Mogadishu thatEthiopia could “slip through our fingers”and go over to the other camp. It would beshameful for history if, at the very momentwhen efforts are being undertaken to orga-nize negotiations between Somali and Ethio-pia concerning significant issues, Ethiopiashould return to the camp of its traditionalallies in the West.

[My] Interlocutor said that as the So-viet side knows, Somalia hopes to create astrong government in East Africa, whichwould unite Ethiopia and Somalis on a so-cialist basis. This hope is expressed not withthe intention of tossing about catchwords,but on the strength of the fact that these twocountries are close in terms of ethnicity, ge-ography, and, Somalia hopes as before, ideo-logically. If the creation of such a unitedgovernment should be successful, it wouldrepresent a force and a buttress which isimperative for the socialist development ofEast Africa.

This is why in Somalia we are con-cerned by such communications and con-sider it imperative to bring them to the at-tention of the Soviet side.

Second: Ethiopia has come forwardwith rather resolute declarations in the pressand on the radio to the effect that Ethiopiaintends to teach Somalia a lesson whichSomalia will never forget, and also to theeffect that Ethiopia intends to lead an openwar against Somalia, having received in themeantime, assistance from socialist coun-tries, including, among others, the SovietUnion. The Somali delegation would liketo ask the Soviet representatives, in theircapacity as friends, if there is a measure oftruth in this. The Somali side considers thata force is at work in Ethiopia, if not in gov-ernment circles, then in other sorts of circlesin Addis Ababa, which is creating a war hys-teria. That is why the delegation considersit imperative to inform the Soviet side about

this.[I] expressed thanks for the informa-

tion. I noted that the initial communicationof the Somali delegation was of an exces-sively general nature. The schemes of im-perialist and reactionary Arab circles andtheir intentions are generally well known.Imperialism and reactionism intend to strikea blow not only at Ethiopia, but also at So-malia. They are not happy with the social-ist course which has been proclaimed in bothof these countries. Naturally, it is impera-tive to be vigilant.

The situation, which has developed inthe relations between Somalia and Ethiopia,in the view of the Soviet side, is favorableto the realization of the goals of imperial-ism and reactionism. The path down whichSomalia has started with the aim of creat-ing, in your words, a “socialist monolith”in East Africa, is likely to undermine thegoals you have placed before yourself. Weare aware of the fact that in Ethiopia thereare reactionary forces, that there is an inter-nal counter-revolution, that there is astruggle going on in Ethiopia.

However, according to our informa-tion, the core leadership of Ethiopia is tak-ing a progressive course. Here, unfortu-nately, we disagree with you in our evalua-tion.

As is well known, in a discussion withthe Soviet ambassador, Siad Barre declaredthat the Somali government did not opposethe granting of assistance to Ethiopia by theSoviet Union within the framework of theagreement which exists between the twocountries. We offer assistance to Ethiopia,just as we offered assistance to Somalia, but,as you are aware, this assistance is intendedto serve the aim of defense, not aggression.

[I] said that I had not happened to seein the press declarations of the Ethiopianleadership to the effect that they intend to“teach Somalia a lesson.” It is possible, thatthis matter is the work of the mass media.Unfortunately, the mass media in both coun-tries has strayed too far in their mutual ac-cusations. Therefore the Soviet Union hasappealed not to give free rein to emotions,but rather to act with reason, proceeding notfrom national interests, but rather from in-ternational interests, from the interests ofstrengthening the position of progressiveforces. A dangerous situation has now beencreated and if it is not gotten under controlit may develop into a serious conflict, the

irreversibility of which would be fraughtwith serious consequences.

Therefore the Soviet leaders, as friends,advise your leaders to weigh all of the cir-cumstances and to approach this matter froma broad public and international position.The Soviet Union hopes to avoid a conflictin the relations of two countries, with bothof whom it has friendly relations. The mostimportant task now is to stop the escalationof tension, to put an end to the bloodshed.It appears to us that there is no other basisfor a settlement now than that one whichwas proposed by the Soviet side in the work-ing document, which the Ethiopian side hasaccepted and which, unfortunately, the So-mali side has refused to accept.

Up to this point the course of negotia-tions, as it appears to us, does not satisfyyour two delegations, but the Soviet side isalso not satisfied, although the Soviet sideis taking all possible steps. Nonetheless, weconsider it imperative to continue our ef-forts toward reaching a turning-point in theevents which would be satisfactory to theinterests of the forces of progress and so-cialism.

H.A. Kasim noted that Siad Barre, in aconversation with the Soviet ambassador,had indeed said that Somalia did not objectto assistance, including military assistance,offered by the Soviet Union to Ethiopia.However, he also spoke of the necessity ofmaintaining proportions. My interlocutordeclared that he would like to express hiscandid hope that the Soviet Union wouldapproach with understanding the issue that,until the time has arrived when the questionof the part of Somali territory has been re-solved, the Somali revolution will be in dan-ger. Moreover, this danger does not comefrom within, but rather from the very partof the Somali territory which is now underEthiopian rule. A similar danger is causedby the enormous efforts to achieve nationalliberation made by Somalis, who are livingon territory which does not form a part ofSomalia. In order for Somalia to contributeto the building of socialism all over theworld, all of the Somali nation must standfirmly on its legs.

At the meeting of Siad Barre with theformer president of the PMAC of EthiopiaTefere Bante, it was proposed that the lattershould become the leader of a federation ofSomalia and Ethiopia in order that this mightresolve the national question. However,


Ethiopia responded negatively to this propo-sition and, as a result, the situation whichhas been created in Western Somalia is al-ready getting out of control. H.A. Kasimexpressed the hope that the Soviet side fullyunderstands the meaning of these words.

[I] declared that I could only repeatwhat I had already said and that I hoped thatits meaning was correctly understood by theSomali side. I added, that it is necessary torealize all of the responsibility which willlie on Somalia, if there is no cessation ofmilitary actions.

The following people were present atthe discussions: on the Soviet side was thehead of the DPO of the USSR Ministry ofForeign Affairs, O. N. Khlestov; the headof the Third African Department of theUSSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. A.Ustinov; on the Somali side was member ofthe CC SRSP, Director of the Somali De-velopment Bank, Jama Mohammud; mem-ber of the CC SRSP, Head of the Depart-ment of Agriculture and Animal Husbandryof the CC SRSP Ahmed Mohammed Duale,the Ambassador of the Somali DemocraticRepublic to the USSR, Ali Ismail Warsma,the Military Attache of the Somali Demo-cratic Republic to the USSR Salah Hadji.

The discussions were translated by theThird Secretary of the Translation Depart-ment of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs, S. V. Berezhkov, and transcribed bythe Third Secretary of the Third AfricanDepartment of the USSR Ministry of For-eign Affairs, R. A. Ibragimov.

Deputy MinisterUSSR Foreign Affairs(signed and typed) L. Ilichev

[attachment]

Delivered by the Somalidelegation to the Soviet

delegation at the meeting of10 August 1977*

Translated from English [into Russian]

Taking into account the fact that the Somaligovernment has appealed to the governmentof the USSR to offer its good services to-ward the resolution of the territorial disputebetween Somali and Ethiopia with the ob-jective of reaching a fair, peaceful, and stableresolution of this territorial dispute;

Likewise taking into account the concur-rence of the USSR in carrying out its inter-national socialist obligations to undertake asimilar mission of good services after re-ceiving the full concurrence of the govern-ments of Somalia and Ethiopia;Taking into consideration that the govern-ment of the Somali Democratic Republic hasempowered this high level delegation to rep-resent itself in discussions and negotiationson the aforementioned question;Taking into consideration likewise, the ex-change of opinions between the Soviet andthe Somali sides in the course of the lastweek of July and 8 August 1977;Responding to the appeal of the Soviet rep-resentative, made to the Somali delegationon 8 August 1977 to present a working docu-ment which might serve as the basis for dis-cussions;Recognizing the fact that the colonializationby Ethiopia of a significant portion of So-mali territory and its population representsthe sole reason for the tension which hasbeen created at the current moment in theHorn of Africa and that such tension with-out any doubt is not consistent with the in-terests of the people of the given region, butrather only serves the interests of their com-mon enemy, international imperialism andneocolonialism;Being firmly convinced that the primarycause of the lengthy dispute between So-malia and Ethiopia is the continuingcolonialization and military occupation byEthiopia of a significant portion of Somaliterritory and its population and that thedecolonialization of this territory takes ab-solute priority over all other questions;Taking into consideration the fact that a dis-cussion of the consequences of the colonialoccupation, which is being carried out at thepresent time by Ethiopia, without a discus-sion of the central question of decolon-ialization makes it impossible and futile toconduct constructive negotiations;Proceeding from the Leninist principle ofthe inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination, human dignity, liberty andnational sovereignty, a principle which isclearly fixed in the United Nations Charterand which was subsequently reflected inResolution 1514 of the UN General Assem-bly, and likewise from the fact that anypolicy of Ethiopia, which is directed at theperpetuation of colonial rule over the afore-mentioned Somali territory and its popula-

tion, is in clear contradiction to this nobleprinciple;

The Somali delegation proposes thefollowing in the capacity of a basis for dis-cussion:

“The decolonialization of the Somaliterritory and its population, which finds it-self under Ethiopian rule.”

* When the head of the Somali delegationdelivered the document, he called it a work-ing message, laying out the views of thedelegation regarding the principal question.--S.B.

Translated by S. Berezhkov

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll,32-59; translated by Sally Kux.]

Record of Negotiations between Somaliand Soviet Officials in Moscow,15-19 August 1977 (excerpts)

From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 8L.F. Ilichev 31 August 1977

No. 2325/GS

Record of Conversationwith the Minister of Mineral and Water

Resources of Somalia, Head of Delegation of Experts

Hussein Abdulkadir Kasim(third level)

The head of the Somali delegation ofexperts returned to Moscow on 14 August1977. Meetings took place at the residenceof the Somali Delegation from 15-19 Au-gust 1977. On 20 August the delegationreturned to Mogadishu.

15 August

[...] Moreover, in confidence it hadbeen said to the head of the Somali delega-tion, that the Soviet leaders and L.I.Brezhnev in person had appealed once againwith a message to President Siad, in whichwas expressed the point of view of the So-viet side with regard to the events, whichwere taking place in the region of the Hornof Africa. This had been done before thepublication of the TASS statement.[...]

17 August


[...] [I] underscored that the Soviet goodservices mission, as follows from the ex-change of messages between L.I. Brezhnevand Siad Barre, is not charged with facili-tating the discussion of any particular con-crete question or questions which havearisen in relations between Somalia andEthiopia, such as, for example, the territo-rial question, for the parties which are inconflict are more familiar with the substanceof the matter. In the current situation it isdifficult to imagine how it will be possibleto resolve any sort of concrete question.After all, in order for that to happen it isnecessary to create the appropriate condi-tions. Therefore the Soviet side sees its goodservices mission first and foremost in as-sisting in the creation of conditions, underwhich it would be possible to resolve allquestions at the negotiating table.

18 August

A tete-a-tete conversation took placeat the request of the head of the Somali del-egation.

H.A. Kasim reported that:1. He was charged by the Somali gov-

ernment to inform the Soviet governmentthat new factors had arisen in the develop-ment of the situation in East Africa, whichbear witness to the attempts to expand in-ternationally and to escalate the conflict andalso to the interference of non-African gov-ernments in the conflict. Several days be-fore President Siad in his declaration hadspoken of the interference of a friendlycountry, part of the socialist community,whose leaders and policy enjoy great author-ity in Somalia. According to informationreceived by Mogadishu, Cuban military of-ficials are involved in the conflict betweenthe Western Somali Liberation Front andEthiopia. As President Siad declared fur-ther, Somalia does not intend to remain neu-tral in the face of this situation, when citi-zens of Somali nationality in the Ogaden areperishing at the hands of non-Africans.

2. He discussed the campaign of insinu-ations which was being carried out intheimperialist press and declared that Somaliawill not become the victim of such a cam-paign, that, as before, Somalia will adhereto socialist principles and to the course ofstrengthening friendly relations with theSoviet Union, in spite of the ruses of impe-

rialist propaganda.At the same time he expressed alarm

at the “avalanche of declarations and com-mentary appearing in the Soviet press,” be-ginning on 14 August, noting, that such dec-larations are pouring oil on the fire of impe-rialist propaganda at the very moment whenthe Soviet Union is conducting a good ser-vices mission, whose aim is to assist in find-ing a solution to the situation which has beencreated in East Africa. Such reports hardlyfurther the fulfillment of the good servicesmission and they could not have beenprinted without the consent of the Sovietgovernment. In his words, the campaign inthe Soviet press does not promote the cre-ation of a situation which would be favor-able to reaching a peaceful resolution of thequestions which have arisen between Soma-lia and Ethiopia. If this campaign does notcease, said my interlocutor, the Somalipeople will begin to ask why statements inthe Soviet press contain accusations ad-dressed at Somalia and why the Somali gov-ernment does not react to them.

He assured me further, that Somaliawould not be deceived by any such ruses ofimperialist propaganda, but warned that oth-ers might swallow the bait.

[I] asked about the degree of trustwor-thiness of the intelligence which served asthe basis for the declaration that, “Cubanmilitary officials were involved in the mili-tary conflict.” Is it possible that you areswallowing the bait of imperialist propa-ganda? Moreover, would it not be prefer-able to clarify this sort of question directlywith our Cuban comrades?

H.A. Kasim. We are not speaking idly.Contacts have already been established withthe Cubans as regards this question.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll.60-80; translated by Sally Kux.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov

and Cuban Ambassador to EthiopiaJose Perez Novoa, 23 August 1977

SECRET, Copy No. 2From the journal of 6 September 1977Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 324

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONwith the Cuban ambassador to Ethiopia

JOSE PEREZ NOVOA

23 August 1977

During the course of the conversation,which took place at the Soviet Embassy, JosePerez Novoa, on his own initiative, openedthe conversation with a question about send-ing Cuban military personnel to Ethiopia inaccordance with Mengistu’s request. Afterthis he asked the following: “You had di-rected attention to the inappropriateness ofthe announcement by the leader of the Cu-ban military specialists in Ethiopia, ArnoldoOchoa [to the effect that] ‘you were rightthat the decision to send Cuban personnelto Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, buton Moscow.’ This was the case, as the Cu-ban ambassador to Addis Ababa found out.Raul Castro, in the course of his recent con-sultations with Soviet leaders in Moscow,did not raise the issue of the possibility ofsending Cuban military personnel to Ethio-pia, and, consequently, A. Ochoa did nothave any basis to make the aforementionedstatement to Mengistu. We decided to tellyou this because we would like our relationswith Soviet comrades to be open and clear.”

I thanked Jose Perez Novoa. Concern-ing the essence of the matter, I noted thatthe question of inviting Cuban military per-sonnel is a difficult one not just for socialiststates, but also for the leadership of thePMAC, in that the invitation of combat unitsfrom foreign powers, particularly non-Af-rican ones, could be used by Somalia andthe Eritrean separatists to involve militarypersonnel from the Arab states in militaryactions at much greater levels than is oc-curring now.

Jose Perez Novoa did not try to dis-pute the Soviet ambassador’s statements.This time he also did not dispute the Sovietambassador’s statements about the neces-sity of working with the Ethiopian leader-ship to continue the Somali-Ethiopian ne-gotiations in Moscow on an expert level.

In the course of the conversation JosePerez Novoa assured that [he would con-vey] to all Cuban diplomats and specialiststhe instructions given to him about the ne-cessity of clarifying the decisive importanceof the assistance rendered by the SovietUnion to defend the revolutionary achieve-ments of the Ethiopian people and the terri-torial integrity of the country.

USSR AMBASSADORTO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA


(signature) /A. Ratanov/


Memorandum of Conversation, SovietAmbassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov

with U.S. Charge d’Affaires A. Tienkin,3 September 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2From the journal of 6 September 1977Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 339

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONwith USA charge d’affaires in Ethiopia

A[RTHUR] TIENKIN3 September 1977

By previous agreement I met with A.Tienkin at the Soviet Embassy. During thediscussion he made the following com-ments.

- American-Ethiopian relations. Theyare not as good as they could be. Nonethe-less, there have been some signs of improve-ment in these relations recently, [which is]what the USA has been seeking. For ex-ample, the other day the USA announcedits readiness to continue economic aid toEthiopia. We raised the issue of maintain-ing staff at the embassy in Addis-Ababa,above all staff in the economic and trade sec-tions (the PMAC, as is well-known, in Mayof this year liquidated a group of Americanmilitary attaches and a military adviser, anddemanded that the embassy staff be reducedby one half). This time, it seems to Tienkin,the Ethiopian government will be inclinedto satisfy the American request.

The USA informed the Ethiopian gov-ernment that it does not and would not in-terfere in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia,including in Eritrea. At the same time, saidTienkin, given Ethiopia’s current socialistpolicy, the USA is not convinced that it(Ethiopia) is able to maintain normal rela-tions with capitalist countries.

- In the American view, the PMAC “isgoing too fast” on questions of social trans-formation, and in Ethiopia there are forceswhich would like to go even faster than thePMAC along the path of turning Ethiopiainto a socialist state. In particular, the greaterradicalism of the leadership of the All-Ethio-pian Socialist Movement [MEISON], asTinkin suggests, was a reason for the “dis-

appearance” of that leadership, in compari-son with the PMAC.

- Of all of Ethiopia’s domestic prob-lems, the most difficult is Eritrea; in com-parison with this even the problem of theliberation of the Ogaden seems easy.

- Ethiopia, of course, will not be dis-membered and will secure its border withSomalia, however, he (Tienkin) did not seeany possiblity for the normalization ofEthiopian-Somali differences, insofar asSomalia is unlikely to renounce its territo-rial pretensions to Ethiopia.

- American-Somali relations. They areimproving. The USA even “agreed in prin-ciple” to the delivery of defensive weap-ons. The USA announced, however, thatthese deliveries cannot take place at presentbecause of the military actions in theOgaden. The USA also emphasized thattheir agreement to military deliveries doesnot mean that they do not recognize the ter-ritorial integrity of Somalia.

- Tienkin is aware of the rumours thatIsrael is supposedly rendering military aidto Ethiopia, but he did not see any clear in-dications that would confirm these rumors.However, even if Israel were doing some-thing like this, said Tienkin, it would bedoing this on its own initiative, i.e. withoutconsultation with the USA on such ques-tions.

For his part the Soviet ambassadoremphasized that the Soviet Union supportsEthiopia, but at the same time aims to con-vince Somalia and Ethiopia of the need toseek peaceful regulation of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and that the Soviet Unionconsiders Ethiopia to be a non-aligned state,having the right, as all other states do, tohave normal relations with socialist statesas well as with the Western states. He addedthat the support of the Soviet Union forEthiopia’s socialist orientation is defined bythe fact that it [this policy] was chosen byEthiopia itself and answers to the needs ofits socio-economic development. However,this policy of socialist orientation presup-poses normal economic and trade ties withall countries, the existence of a private sec-tor, mixed state-private firms, etc.

Tienkin remarked that he agreed withthis, that the Ethiopians themselves chosethe path of socialist orientation. In Tienkin’sview, the Ethiopian leaders have really be-gun to emphasize their non-aligned coursemore than they had in previous statements.

During the discussion, Tienkin did nottry to reproach the Soviet Union and did noteven show any interest in Soviet militaryaid to Ethiopia. He was most interested inthe issue of Soviet-Somali relations (the re-sults of Siad Barre’s trip to Moscow, etc...)

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TOSOCIALIST ETHIOPIA /s/ A. Ratanov


Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov

and Mengistu, 5 September 1977

From diary of SECRETA. P. Ratanov Copy No. 2

6 September 1977

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION with Chairman of PMAC of EthiopiaHAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU

5 September 1977

I received a visit from Haile MariamMengistu (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of thePermanent Committee of the PMAC, tookpart in the discussion) and, pursuant to in-structions, informed him about the resultsof the visit of President Siad Barre of theSDR to Moscow.

1. Having listened, Mengistu asked toconvey his appreciation to the Soviet lead-ership, and personally to Comrade L. I.Brezhnev, for the correct line followed indiscussions with Siad Barre, and for thecomprehensive assistance rendered to Ethio-pia. In this connection, Mengistu noted thatat the present time, especially in regard toSoviet supplies of trailers for the transportof tanks, the balance of forces betweenEthiopia and Somali was beginning to movein favor of Ethiopia.

Assessing the demarche of Siad Barreas a political maneuver (departing for Mos-cow, Siad Barre issued an order for an at-tack on Jijiga), Mengistu announced that anessential condition for Ethiopian-Somalinegotiations would be the complete with-drawal of Somali forces from Ethiopian ter-ritory. Siad Barre is now attempting to leadastray not only the Soviet Union, but alsothe PDRY, the intermediation of which hehad only recently requested, as well asMadagascar. However, said Mengistu, al-


though the Soviet comrades and comradesfrom PDRY are taking a principled line inthe Somali-Ethiopian conflict, friends in theRepublic of Madagascar do not understandeverything in the conflict and are inclinedto believe the demagogic pronouncementsof Siad Barre.

2. Mengistu, who returned on 4 Sep-tember from Jijiga, told about the battle out-side that population center (“the most pow-erful tank forces in Africa”). On Somalia’sside, four motorized mechanical brigades (5,8, 9 and 10) took part in the fighting. Afterthe Somali attack on Jijiga, which was re-pelled, Ethiopian forces counter-attackedand repelled the Somalis, completely de-stroying one tank battalion. The fighting inthat region is continuing. It is possible,Mengistu noted in this connection, that SiadBarre counted on a victory outside of Jijigafor the purpose of forcing the Ethiopians intonegotiations from a position of strength, andin the event of a defeat, to “demonstrategood will in the eyes of the Soviet Union.”

3. Responding to a question from theSoviet Ambassador (a “good question”),Mengistu stated that up until recently thegovernment of the Republic of Djibouti hadtaken an unfriendly position toward Ethio-pia in respect to the Somali-Ethiopian con-flict, by prohibiting the landing of Ethio-pian aircraft in Djibouti, rendering medicalassistance to wounded Somali soldiers, andso forth. Now, however, that the Republicof Djibouti is suffering a serious economiccrisis as a result of Somali aggression and,in particular, now that Somali saboteursstopped the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroadfrom operating, its government has ex-pressed a readiness to enter into a trade re-lationship with Ethiopia. Mengistu is cer-tain that this positive development in thepolicy of the Government of the Republicof Djibouti will gain strength.

In Djibouti, Mengistu continued, at thepresent time there are three groups of po-litical forces: (1) the party of the People’sIndependence Movement (Marxist-Leninist), advocating independence and cre-ation of a progressive government; (2) theparty of the National Union for Indepen-dence, advocating nationalist positions forindependence; and (3) the right-wing partyof the African People’s League, advocating,in the final analysis, if not annexation toSomalia, then at least the establishment ofspecial relations with it.

Ethiopia is supporting the People’s In-dependence Movement and advising thatparty to unite with the National Union forIndependence for the establishment of an in-dependent existence for the Republic ofDjibouti. The People’s IndependenceMovement does not exclude the possibilitythat in the future that party will be requiredto resort to armed methods of conflictagainst the present government, which ispersecuting it.

In the opinion of Mengistu, the SovietUnion and other socialist countries could,with the help of Ethiopia, if necessary, es-tablish contact with the People’s Indepen-dence Movement and render support to thatparty. Toward this end the Soviet Commit-tee for Solidarity of the Countries of Asianand Africa could dispatch a delegation toAddis-Ababa or receive in Moscow a del-egation of that party. It would be worth-while to join forces for this purpose,Mengistu stated, in order to prevent the re-turn of Djibouti to the imperialist bloc.

4. In response to related representationsof the Soviet Ambassador, Mengistu an-nounced his readiness to meet with the So-viet Chief Military Advisor and asked to beexcused for the fact that, being occupiedwith the leadership of military operations,he had not been able to do this sooner.

5. As concerns the All-Ethiopian So-cialist Movement, Mengistu stated that themovement had now split into two groups,one of which was inclined toward coopera-tion with the PMAC. The PMAC will con-tinue its advocacy of the merger of all Marx-ist-Leninist organizations and groups into asingle party and of the creation of a nationalfront.

6. Responding to a question of the So-viet Ambassador, Mengistu stated that thePMAC was preparing to reexamine theranks of the All-Ethiopian Committee onPeace, Friendship and Solidarity. Subse-quently the PMAC will inform the Embassyas to the manner in which it would be mostproductive for the Soviet Committee onSolidarity of the Countries of Asia and Af-rica to render cooperation to that Commit-tee. In this connection, as relates to assis-tance which the Soviet Committee intendsto render to Ethiopia, it would be possibleto direct this assistance to the address of theEthiopian Committee on Peace, Friendshipand Solidarity, simultaneously apprising thePMAC about this.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A. RATANOV


Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.Ratanov, Memorandum of Meetingwith Mengistu, 10 September 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2From the journal 29” September 1977RATANOV, A.P. Issue No. 350

RECORD OF CONVERSATIONwith the Chairman of the PMACMENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

10 September 1977

On September 10, together with theheads of the diplomatic missions of Bul-garia, Hungary, the GDR, PDRY, Poland,Czechoslovakia, Romania, PDRK [People’sDemocratic Republic of Korea; North Ko-rea], Cuba, and Yugoslavia, I was invited tovisit Mengistu Haile Mariam. From theEthiopian side, Atnafu Abate and BerhanuBayeh, Deputy Chairman of the PMAC andmember of its Permanent Committee, re-spectively, took part in the meeting, alongwith the Minister of Foreign Affairs, FellekeGedle-Giorgis.

Mengistu said that the goal of thismeeting was to inform the governments ofthe socialist countries and the PDRY,through their representatives in Addis-Ababa, about the discovery by the PMACof an imperialist plot against the Ethiopianrevolution, in which to some extent or an-other are participating the USA (the initia-tor of the plot), Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,Kenya, and Somalia.

According to the document, which fellinto the hands of the PMAC “from trustedsources,” CIA official E. Kelly from theUSA Embassy in Nairobi has worked out acoordinated plan of action of domesticEthiopian counterrevolutionary forces andthe countries which support them, whichenvisages a range of acts at the end of Sep-tember - beginning of October of this year,which have as their goal the overthrow ofthe PMAC and the creation of a pro-West-ern, reactionary government. Terrorist acts


in Addis-Ababa against members of thePMAC leadership and the organization of acombined attack of military formations pre-pared on the territories of Sudan and Kenya,and also a continuation of Somali aggres-sion, are parts of the plan.

In this regard Mengistu Haile Mariamsaid that in the aforementioned documentthere are listed various types of military sub-units and their specific tasks are set forth.The attack would begin simultaneously fromthe north-west, west, and south in the direc-tion of Addis-Ababa. In fact, as far as So-malia is concerned, its forces which are lo-cated on the territory of Ethiopia, on 10 Sep-tember of this year again attacked Jijiga, inthe event of the capture of which they areplanning an attack on the administrativecenter of that region, Harar, and the greatindustrial center Diredawa. Battles for Jijigaare continuing.

Among the number of parties and or-ganizations which are participating in theplot, Mengisu named the Eritrean separat-ist organization, the Ethiopian DemocraticUnion, [and] the Movement for the Libera-tion of the Afars (detachments of this move-ment would attack Assab).

In conclusion, having declared that thePMAC is taking measures now to explodethe schemes of the participants in the plot,Mengistu expressed the hope that the social-ist countries, whose assistance is decisivefor Ethiopia, will provide it at this criticalmoment the necessary political and militarysupport. In this regard he noted that one ofthe most serious problems for Ethiopia maybe the problem of fuel, since the Arab coun-tries intend to apply an embargo on deliver-ies of fuel to Ethiopa (which are realizedthrough the company Mobil).

The heads of the diplomatic missionspromised to bring the information whichMengistu had provided to the attention oftheir governments.


/s/ A. RATANOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll.139-40; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenSoviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.

Ratanov and Ethiopian ForeignMinister Felleke Gedle Giorgis,

14 September 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2From the journal of 29 September 1977Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 354

Memorandum of Conversation with theMinister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia,

FELLEKE GEDLE GIORGIS14 September 1977

On 14 September of this year, the So-viet delegation taking part in the celebra-tions of the occasion of the third anniver-sary of the Ethiopian revolution (comradeYezhov, I.M.) had a meeting with FellekeGedle-Giorgis.

During the course of a detailed con-versation, after expressing his deep recog-nition to the Soviet Union for its compre-hensive support and assistance to Ethiopia,the minister made the following statements:

Considering the extremely difficultsituation in Ethiopia, particularly in connec-tion with the military intervention by So-malia, the Ethiopian government is takingand will take measures which will aim tostrengthen cooperation with states that sup-port Ethiopia, to receive support from con-servative regimes, and even to divide thosestates, including Arab states, which areopenly hostile to the Ethiopian revolution.As a long-term goal, Ethiopia will even aimto restore contacts with Syria, Iraq, Sudan,et al.

As a whole, the positions of the over-whelming majority of the member-states ofthe OAU are favorable to Ethiopia as far asmaintaining its territorial integrity is con-cerned, although many African states are notreconciled to the Ethiopian revolution andits socialist orientation. The OAU and theCommittee created to provide good officesfor the resolution of the Somali-Ethiopianmilitary conflict continue their efforts to endit and come out on the side of Ethiopia.However, Sudan blocks their activities.

The position of Sudan is very duplici-tous now: on the one hand, Sudan activelysupports Eritrean separatism, on the otherhand, it fears that in case of some form ofsecession by Eritrea, this would create adangerous precedent which could encour-age separatism in southern Sudan. There-fore Sudan appears to vacillate and Ethio-pia intends to use this. Under these condi-tions Egypt encourages intervention by

Sudan in Eritrean affairs and has sent 40,000men to Sudan to exert influence on theSudanese leadership and to show its (Egyp-tian) support in the event of the activationof the separatists in southern Sudan. Thishas enabled Sudan to send 4,000 of its ownsoldiers to Eritrea.

Ethiopia intends to activate its ties withthe West European states, particularly withthe Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Fin-land, et al.), which haven’t always formed abloc with the main imperialist powers and,for example, took a position favorable toVietnam during the period of American ag-gression. To this end, a mission to the afore-mentioned states is contemplated.

About the USA—the USA and otherimperialist states aim to overthrow theEthiopian regime (the minister claims thatthe USA has prepared a plot to do this).Despite this, the minister said, Ethiopia aimsto use the contradictions among the West-erners in the interests of the Ethiopian revo-lution, and also the fact that officially theUSA and other Western states have comeout in support of the territorial integrity ofEthiopia and [express] the desire to havenormal relations with it.

At the same time, the diplomatic ac-tivity of the PMAC will develop coopera-tion with communist and socialist parties ofthe USA and Western Europe (to this endthe PMAC invited representatives of thecommunist parties of the USA, Italy, andPortugal to take part in the celebrations), andalso with the international democratic,labour, women’s and youth organizations(World Peace Council, Movement of Afro-Asian Solidarity, etc..).

The minister especially dwelled on theChinese position on the Ethiopian revolu-tion. At the beginning of the revolution, thePRC provided economic assistance to Ethio-pia, and sent its economic experts. How-ever, as the Ethiopian revolution deepened,the Chinese began to change their position,practically rendered comprehensive assis-tance to Somalia during the Somali-Ethio-pian military conflict, and, it seems, intendsto give it (Somalia) conventional battlefieldweapons.

Recognizing the great significance ofthe diplomatic activity of the Soviet Unionin support of Ethiopia, the minister ex-pressed the hope that the Soviet Unionwould continue it in the future, and, in par-ticular, would use its own friendly relations


with Algeria and influence in the Arab worldand with African states, and also with thecommunist and progressive organizations inWestern, African, and Arab countries.

Felleke Gedle-Giorgis expressed hisgratitude for the clear position of the USSRin the Somali-Ethiopian military conflict. Inlight of this, the minister emphasized thatEthiopia does not aim to dismember Soma-lia and does not intend to interfere in itsinternal affairs. The minister also said thatEthiopia supports the improvement of co-operation with Somalia. This being said,the Ethiopian government proceeds from thefact that Somalia has progressive forces,which are also striving for the restorationof neighborly relations and peaceful coop-eration with Ethiopia.

For his part, comrade Yezhov, I.M. andthe Soviet ambassador reaffirmed the posi-tion of the Soviet Union on the problem ofthe Somali-Ethiopian conflict and directedattention to the necessity of activatingEthiopia’s diplomatic efforts in variouscountries. They reminded the minister ofthe diplomatic steps taken by the SovietUnion in support of Ethiopia (demarchestowards the leaders of Somalia, a range ofArab states, et al.).

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSRTO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A. Ratanov


Memorandum of Conversation withEthiopian Foreign Secretary DawitWolde Giorgis, 17 September 1977,

with Attached Memorandum onOperation “Fakel” (Torch)

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2From diary of 29 September 1977A. P. Ratanov Ser. No. 352

Memorandum of Conversation withPermanent Secretary of the Foreign

Ministry DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS17 September 1977

We received a visit from Dawit at hisrequest. Pursuant to instructions from theChairman of the PMAC [Mengistu], he fur-nished a document concerning an imperial-ist conspiracy against Ethiopia designated

by the code name “Fakel” [Torch], whichwas brought to the attention of the ambas-sadors of the Socialist Bloc Countries at ameeting with Haile Mariam Mengistu thattook place on 10 September 1977. Thisdocument consists of a summary presenta-tion of instructions and telegrams, sent dur-ing the period of 12 February through 4 Juneof this year by the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi(under the signature of D. Wardner, and laterE. Kelly), to the American Embassies inKhartoum and Dar-es-Salam.

According to the document, the aim ofperpetrating “intervention and destabiliza-tion of circumstances in Ethiopia” is to becarried out by three groups: (1) Nuba (2)Anyanya, to be carried out in the southwest-ern region of Ethiopia (in the territory ofthe Sudan); and the third group consistingof “hostile elements in southeastern Ethio-pia” (in Kenyan territory). The training andarming of these groups, primarily withAmerican weapons, is to be carried out by16 September of this year. Commencementof operation “Fakel” is planned for 1 Octo-ber 1977.

The starting point for all operations isto be the assassination, on 1 October of thisyear, of the Chairman of the PMAC, as wellas that of his Deputy, to be followed by anattack by Groups 1 and 2 from Sudaneseterritory. Two weeks thereafter, an attackby the third group from Kenyan territory isplanned. The establishment of a third frontof military operations, as contemplated bythe instigators of the plan, will lead to an“automatic attack by Ethiopia on Sudan.”In the event of a retaliatory attack on Kenya,it is contemplated that the marines (the docu-ment does not specify of what nationality)and forces of “other moderate countries”will be used.

Attachment: see four-page list ap-pended hereto.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A. RATANOV

cc: 3 AFODefense Ministry, CC CPSUUOMPUPVM9/26/77

[Stamp]Attachment to Doc. No. 352

dated 9/29/77

Translated from English [into Russian]

OPERATION “FAKEL”

Preparation of the creation of a para-military unit for the execution of interven-tion in Ethiopia and destabilization of cir-cumstances there shall commence on 14April 1977. According to information avail-able to us, all preparations, including thedelivery of materials necessary for militaryoperations, and training of a reserve contin-gent, shall be completed by 16 September1977. The operation, which shall commenceon 1 October 1977, is designated by the codename “FAKEL.”

The forces to be implemented in thesaid operation shall consist of three sepa-rate groups:

Force No. 1 - Nuba group.Force No. 2 - Anyanya group.Force No. 3 - Hostile elements from

the southeastern region of Ethiopia.Forces No. 1 and 2 will operate in the

southeastern region of Ethiopia and, accord-ing to the plan, shall direct their attentiontoward adaptation to conditions in the givenlocation.

In the preparatory period, Group No.3 will operate mainly in Kenya, but afterthe commencement of military operations,responsibility for it shall be transferred toSomalia.

The above information constitutes theessence of telegrams and instructions of theU.S. Embassy in Nairobi to the AmericanEmbassador in Dar-es-Salaam during theperiod between 12-26 February 1977, sentby Dixon Werdner, an employee of the po-litical section of that embassy, who is be-lieved to be a CIA agent.

Subsequent communications, sentfrom the American Embassy in Nairobi tothe U.S. Ambassador in Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam under the signature of MajorEddy Kelly, describe the make-up of thestaff, the preparation, and the objectives ofthe said operation. It is known that MajorEddy Kelly, who apparently has replacedDixon Werdner, leader of operation “Fakel,”is none other than Edmund Kelly, the thirdsecretary of the political section of the U.S.Embassy in Nairobi.

The first communication from Kelly,dated 4 May 1977, indicates that militaryfortifications are located en route toMombasa (Kenya) and that the dispatch of


materials to designated points shall beimplemented at night and by separate par-ties in order to prevent the leak of informa-tion. Fortifications shall be delivered to thenorthwestern region of Kenya, i.e., to thelocation of the prospective conflict, within20-30 days from day “X”.

His second communication, dated 18May 1977, indicates that the materials nec-essary for military operations were dis-patched from the northwestern region ofKenya to the designated point in the Sudan.Recognizing that fortifications of the prin-cipal strike force are undergoing intensivepreparation, Kelly emphasizes the need forabsolute secrecy and the paramount concen-tration of attention on the principal objec-tive (Ethiopia) and rapid preparations.

On 23 June 1977, Kelly dispatched atelegram to the American Embassy inKhartoum, demanding the completion of thefollowing four specific assignments:

-assessment of the strength of enemyforces;-determination of the actual dispositionof military forces in conformance withcommunist military doctrine, as wellas the quantity, methods and means forthe transfer of reinforcements;-confirmation of the receipt of materi-als as soon as they are delivered; and-completion of all preparations by 16September 1977, in order to avoid anyalteration of the plan.On 2 July 1977, Kelly sent two tele-

grams to the U.S. Embassies in Khartoumand Dar-es-Salaam.

In the first telegram, the objective andplan of action, projected for day “X”, areset forth as follows:

Objective: Carry out the assassinationof the head of the Ethiopian governmentwith the aim of creating a panic situation inthe country. Following that will be the co-ordination of an attack by forces hostile toEthiopia, from the southwest and east.

Plan of action: Forces No. 1 and 2 willcommence operations on 1 October 1977.Force No. 3 will commence military actiontwo weeks thereafter.

Rear section and fortification: supportfor the southwestern group shall be providedfrom “Point No. 1.” Force No. 3 will re-ceive support from the side of a friendlycountry on the southeast of the country.

A command and support group for theforces of No. 1 and 2 will be located in the

region of Juba and Lyuan [sic], and, for theforces of No. 3, in a friendly country.

Timetable for operation: Hour “X” andthe signal for commencement of operationswill be communicated later.

The second telegram describes the con-duct of operations envisioned in the firsttelegram:

- Assassination of the head of govern-ment will lead to chaos and disorder inEthiopia. Following that the advancementof Forces 1 and 2 into the southwest willensue.

- Establishment of this second frontwill prevent the Ethiopian forces from fo-cusing attention on the other front. This willcreate a desirable opportunity for an attackfrom the southeast and will result in a two-pronged conflict.

- Ethiopia will automatically attack theSudan, and the intensification of activity inthe southeast will, within two weeks, leadto a similar situation in Somalia.

- The center of the rear forces and ma-terial fortification in Mandera will providefor support to Forces 1 and 2.

- If Kenya suffers an attack, then sub-divisions of the marines and forces of othermoderate governments will be deployed tothis region.

On 4 July 1977, Kelly sent four tele-grams to Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam.

Two of these telegrams contain a de-tailed enumeration of the military fortifica-tions which are already delivered or are lo-cated en route from the USA and a “Coun-try of apple juice.” In sum, this includes16,000 rifles, 559,000 rounds of ammuni-tion, as well as an undisclosed quantity oftear gas canisters, tracer bullets, bombs,mines, and propaganda materials. Thisequipment will be stored for transport andwill be delivered to “Point One” by “friendlyhands.” Transportation will begin on 27August and the equipment will arrive at“Point One” on 30 August 1977.

Two other telegrams are addressed tothat portion of the operation which relatesto elimination of the head of the government.The assassin, as they refer to him, from theNuba group (Force No. 1), will liquidate thehead of the government (Bomen) on 1 Oc-tober 1977, during his trip to southwesternEthiopia, scheduled for September. Thesecond participant (referred to in the text asthe “third”), to be selected for completionof this assignment, will be offered by the

Nuba group (Force No. 1).In the event thatthe trip to the southwest is cancelled, themeans must be found to send all groups toAddis Ababa for execution of the operation.In the event that the assassination of the headof the government (Bomen) is unsuccess-ful, then his deputy is to be killed. N.B. -Kelly has repeatedly warned that all prepa-rations must be completed by 16 Septem-ber 1977, that the date for execution of theoperation - Day “X” - is set for 1 Octoberthat it is necessary to maintain this timetable,and that it is essential to do everything inorder to ensure the success of this opera-tion.

At the end of all his telegrams, Kellyalso instructs those who receive them to di-rect their responses to the Division of Co-vert Operations for Eastern and Central Af-rica of the State Department.

Transmitted by: /s/ V. Mishachev/s/ V. Mikhailov


CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on30-31 October 1977 Closed Visit of

Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,8 November 1977

Confidential

With regard to the request of the chair-man of the Provisional Military Adminis-trative Council (PMAC) of EthiopiaMengistu Haile Mariam, he was receivedin Moscow on 30-31 October, this year, ona closed [zakritii] visit. On 31 October hehad a conversation with L.I. Brezhnev, A.N.Kosygin and A.A. Gromyko. Mengistu informed in detail about the do-mestic political situation in Ethiopia, aboutthe grave situation on the northern, easternand southeastern fronts, where the battle israging against the Eritrean separatists, [and]counterrevolutionary formations and regu-lar units of the Somali army. The separat-ists succeeded in seizing the main cities ofEritrea, except for Asmara and the port ofMassawa. Somali troops occupied in effectthe whole Ogaden, with exception of Hararand Dire Dawa. Mengistu spoke about the hostile activityof Sudan and other reactionary Arab stateswho plan in connection to the unification of


the three separatist states in Eritrea to set upan Eritrean “government” and to proclaim“an independent state.” Mengistu confirmedthe aspiration of Ethiopia to settle Ethiopian-Somali relations in a peaceful way. He de-clared that Ethiopian armed forces set thegoal of the liberation of Ethiopian territoryand do not intend to cross the frontiers oftheir country. Mengistu pointed out that an inauspicioussituation on the battlefields and the threatof partition that [hangs over] the Ethiopianstate has wrought a negative influence onthe economic and domestic political situa-tion of the country, undermine faith in thevictory of the Ethiopian revolution, [and]encourage activities of internal reactionaryforces. Revolutionary Ethiopia, in Mengistu’swords, finds itself now in the enemy’s en-circlement and aspires to support of first ofall the socialist states. By referring to theneed to improve Ethiopia’s defense underthese circumstances, Mengistu made a re-quest to broaden Soviet military assistance. Expanding on all this, Menquistu spokeabout his confidence in a final victory ofthe revolution, stressing that the masses ofpeople firmly support the revolution and itsachievements that are being accomplishedin the interests of the people. On our side we confirmed the principledline of the Soviet Union to give all-sidedsupport to the Ethiopian revolution and tocontinue the further expansion of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. Mengistu also receivedan agreement to supply during this year anadditional amount of Soviet armaments andmilitary equipment. He also received theprincipled assurances of the Soviet side togrant the PMAC assistance in working outplans of social-economic development ofEthiopia, including the dispatch to AddisAbaba of certain specialists. As a comradely advice, [the Soviet side]shared with Mengistu ideas in favor of theaccelerated creation in Ethiopia of a partybased on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which would further the mobili-zation of masses to defend revolutionaryconquests and to promote the revolution. Itwas stressed to be important for the PMACto adopt practical measures to resolve thenationalities question in Ethiopia in orderto ensure the support of the progressive re-gime on the part of national minorities. For the moment, we are left with the defi-

nite impression that in the existing situationin Ethiopia and around it, the PMAC ur-gently needs further assistance of our fra-ternal countries through the mechanism ofbilateral relations, as well as on the interna-tional arena.

[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtainedand translated from Russian by VladislavM. Zubok.]

Conversation between East GermanSocialist Unity Party (SED) official F.

Trappen and CPSU CC official K.Brutents, 7 November 1977 (excerpt)

Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Friedel Trappen and

Comrade Karen Brutents, Deputy Head ofthe International Relations Department of

the Central Committee of the CPSU, 7 November 1977

[Names of other participants]Comrade Brutents thanked [Trappen]

for the interesting information. The Sovietcomrades completely agree with our policy.The information they just received [from theSED] contains several new aspects. Therehas been only little information on the de-velopments within the Eritrean LiberationMovement, in particular concerning theMarxist forces within this movement. Itwould be of extraordinary importance ifthese contacts would make possible contactsbetween the Eritrean movement and theEthiopian leadership which could lead to anarmistice and pave the way for a peacefulpolitical solution.

So far the Ethiopian leadership has notexhausted all possibilities for such a solu-tion. It is necessary to support them in this,and in this sense the contacts facilitated bythe SED are of great importance.

It now is important to utilize activelythese contacts for fruitful political work infavor of a peaceful and political solution.

In the talks between the comrades ofthe CPSU and the Ethiopian delegation itwas repeatedly emphasized that nationalproblems cannot be solved militarily.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/126; obtained and translated by ChristianF. Ostermann.]

Memorandum of Conversation, East

German official with Soviet Ambassa-dor to Ethiopia Ratanov, Addis Ababa, 6 December 1977 (dated 7 December)

Comrade Ratanov gave the followinginformation:

Militarily, the Eastern front is presentlythe most difficult problem for the Ethiopianside. Due to the correlation of forces theinitiative is with the Somali side. The Ethio-pian troops are forced onto the defense. TheEthiopian side is making all-out efforts tomobilize around 60,000 to 70,000 men.About 20,000 men will already be availablewithin the next few weeks. They will betrained in short training courses. The Ethio-pian side will be able to go on the offensivein about 1 1/2 to 2 months.

The technical superiority of the Somalitroops is most prominent in heavy artillery.Although the Ethiopian side has - due toSoviet deliveries - at its disposal over 510heavy guns while Somalia only has 126,there is a lack of soldiers who can handlethe heavy artillery. The training is still tak-ing time.

300 Cuban military experts (artillery,tank drivers, pilots) are expected to arrivesoon.

The Ethiopian side currently has about137 tanks on the Eastern front. The Somaliside has about 140.

40 Ethiopian tanks cannot be used inbattle due to minor repairs. Though theserepairs would normally be done by the tankdrivers themselves, they are not capable ofdoing so. On the Somali side such repairsare possible because the Soviet Union hadestablished the necessary repair station.

In recent days, the Ethiopian side hasfor the first time launched air attacks onmobile objects using the MiG 21. The nega-tive opinion about the MiGs has meanwhileimproved (the [U.S.] F-5 is a much im-proved model with a wider operationalrange).

Comrade Ratanov gave the followingexplanation of the Eritrean problem:

If it were possible to give the Ethio-pian side a breathing-spell in Eritrea, it couldfocus its efforts on the Eastern front. A dia-logue has to be initiated. This has not beendone so far. In this regard, it would not beadvantageous to show all our cards rightaway.

It is of critical importance that theEthiopian side is not willing to grant the


Eritrean population autonomy within thebounds of its old territories. They assumethat other peoples still reside in Eritrea (e.g.Tigre and Afars). This has to be taken intoconsideration. Therefore they want to trimEritrean territory. The area of the Afarsaround the port of Assab as well as the Tigreare to be separated. This would be almosthalf of Eritrean territory.

Should the Ethiopian leadership stickwith this point of view, it will be difficult tofind a common ground for negotiations.(Various peoples live, for example, inDagestan and Georgia. There are autono-mous territories within the individual repub-lics of the [Soviet] Union.) The most im-portant thing is to get both parties to thenegotiating table.

The first point of the 9-point programon Eritrea states autonomy with respect totribes/peoples but not with respect to terri-tories. Mengistu has stated in a previousspeech that Ethiopia would be willing togrant more autonomy to Eritrea than it hadhad before. But he has not yet stated whathe meant by this.

On the correlation of forces within thePMAC:

Mengistu has further consolidated hisposition since the elimination of [Co-chair-man of the Coordinating Committee of theArmed forces (DERG) Lt. Col.] AtnafuAbate. He has further gained stature as arevolutionary statesman. One senses inspeaking with him that he views things re-alistically. At the same time one has toreckon with his complicated character.

On the establishment of the Party:One has to convince the Ethiopian side

that it is an illusion to be able to create amonolithic party from the start. The partycan only be created in the fight against thevarious currents. It has to develop on thebasis of social conditions. [...]

There will be risks involved in the es-tablishment of the party which have to betaken into consideration. During the estab-lishment of the party one has to deliberatethe question of co-option.

The PMAC presently has about 80members. 30 of them are a burden. Thesemembers hardly have any education and caneasily become victims of the counter-revo-lution. Mengistu intends to send them to theUSSR, Cuba, and the GDR to turn them intorevolutionaries. Only 25 to 20 men belongto the active inner circle. It is therefore nec-

essary upon the establishment of the partyto add to the leadership other capable forcesfrom outside. There will be a fight about theleadership positions within the central com-mittee of the party. If the forces aroundMengistu do not succeed in this fight, thenthe CC will not be an improvement in qual-ity over the present PMAC. The Ethiopianleadership has lately devoted much atten-tion to the establishment of the party. Therestill exists great confusion with respect toideological questions as well as strategy andtactics. For example, they have only diffuseideas about the class basis.

The workers, the peasants, the left wingof the petit-bourgeoisie as well as anti-feu-dal and anti-imperialist elements belong tothe forces which support the Revolution.There is no talk about a national bourgeoi-sie. From the start it has been perceived asan enemy. There are also a great number ofhonest people among the state apparatus andthe officers corps. The minister for agricul-ture has stated that they would probablysome day appoint him ambassador in orderto get rid of him. Many people have goneabroad out of fear. Not all of them werecounterrevolutionaries.

On the question of non-capitalist de-velopment with Socialist orientation: Withinthe leadership there is nobody who knowswhat this state of development really means.It is presented as a Socialist revolution. Forexample, the development of kulaks is re-jected. 75% of the rural population is stillinvolved in a produce-based economy. Whoshould develop agricultural production?There are no social statistics on which thedevelopment of the Ethiopian village couldbe based. There are regulations for privateinvestments but they are not propagated. Thebourgeoisie has money but is afraid to in-vest because it fears nationalization. Oneshould follow the example of the USSR anddevelop a NEP [New Economic Policy],thus providing a prospect for all socialclasses.

Atnafu was criticized for problemswhich he rightfully brought up. He favoredthe development to a mixed society. It wasanother thing that he opposed socialism al-together. Now nobody dares to say anythinganymore. The mood of the workers andpeasants is extremely leftist. It will take greatpersuasion to convince them of the neces-sity of a NEP. On the other hand there is thedanger that the PMAC will become too dis-

tant from the people.On the national question:One has to try — through political

work and by a intelligent policy towards thenationalities — to make all members of in-dividual ethnic groups to feel as Ethiopiansfirst. Members of all ethnic groups shouldbe represented in ministries and other insti-tutions on an equal basis. The various indi-vidual nationalities have not even been rep-resented in the PMAC. Its composition cameabout by accident. The popular mood is di-rected in particular against Amharen. There-fore Mengistu was elected chairman. Heevolved as the strongman. The Soviet mili-tary experts have come to realize that nodecision is made without his agreement.

[Source: SAPO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/126; document obtained and translated byChristian F. Ostermann.]

Memorandum of a Conversationbetween East German leader Erich

Honecker and Siassi Aforki, GeneralSecretary of the Revolutionary Party of

Eritrea, in Berlin, 31 January 1978(dated 3 February 1978)

Honecker: [Welcoming remarks]Aforki: We are very proud and very

happy about this meeting. It is a historicalmeeting. The first visit of our comrades inthe GDR already brought very positive re-sults. [...] We highly appreciate the goodoffices of your country and your party. Whatwe have achieved so far is already a turn-ing-point in our fight. The results of themeeting with the Ethiopians are still uncer-tain, but in any case it will be a historicmeeting. In the past 17 years a fierce battlehas been waged. Not one meeting took placebetween Eritreans and Ethiopians. If some-thing developed from this first meeting, thiswill not only be good for our two countriesbut for the peoples of the entire world. Theonly pre-condition for it is goodwill on theEthiopian and on our side.

[Short review of the Eritrean-Ethiopianconflict.]

Comrade Erich Honecker: For the firstdialogue with the Ethiopians it will be deci-sive to consider in which direction one hasto become active in the interest of the Revo-lution. We are deeply interested in the suc-cess of the Ethiopian Revolution and in theobjectives of the Eritrean People’s Libera-


tion Movement. Both sides have the goal torepel the imperialist intervention and builda new humane social order. It is very pain-ful that comrades who are ideologicallyclose are involved in such a conflict. Wewelcome the fact that Comrade Aforki hasthe determination and mandate to come toBerlin to find out together with the repre-sentatives of the DERG how the problemscan be solved. We have used our influenceas much as possible to make sure that youwill be heard. Now much depends on thedialogue which - after 17 years - can lead toa turning-point. As I understand ComradeAforki, he is moving in this direction. In hisconversation with Comrade WernerLamberz, Comrade Mengistu indicated hisreadiness to grant the people of Eritrea fullautonomy within the Ethiopian state. Whatform this should take is a matter to be dealtwith by both sides. The national questionhas immense importance for the wholeEthiopian Revolution. Its solution is alsohindered by Somalia’s aggression. Somaliacurrently receives the support of all imperi-alist governments. Concerning the Eritreanquestion, one has to see the opportunitygiven by [the similarity of] the contents ofthe Eritrean Liberation Movement and theEthiopian Revolution. I agree with ComradeAforki that a solution would be of great sig-nificance not only for the peoples of Ethio-pia and Africa but also for all peoples. Weaccord great significance to the currentlyarranged contact and the incipient dialogue.We hope it will lead to agreement. The revo-lutionary streams belong together. ComradeAforki has rightly stated that one can thenproceed together against the imperialists.From my point of view, the full autonomywithin the Ethiopian state is the correct so-lution in order to pursue together the com-mon task of economic build-up and the cre-ation of a progressive social order in Ethio-pia and Eritrea. Your forthcoming meetingcan be successful. It is a historic meeting. Iam interested in the question if you, Com-rade Aforki, in the case one might come toan agreement, will have the strength toimplement it. Besides you, there are twoother movements in Eritrea. In case of anagreement one would have to carefully planall steps.

Comrade S. Aforki: The main problemis in how far Ethiopia is willing to meet ourdemands. It is clear from the start that ifEthiopia is not bringing along new propos-

als, a solution will not be possible. There isno point in discussing the possibility of uni-fying both revolutions. What we need areguarantees that the fight against imperial-ism and reaction will continue. Only oneprincipal question is of importance. Every-thing depends on the capabilities and tac-tics of our organization. We won’t be pickyin minor questions. It is totally clear to usthat in the case of an actual agreement itsimplementation is the important thing. Thenwe will check the details and implementthem patiently. Eritrea has many enemieswithin and without. If they all find out aboutit, we will have many difficulties. But weare preparing for it. It is true that we are notthe only organization. That, however, doesnot worry us. Because of our great influ-ence and military strength we can succeed.The other two organizations in Eritrea haveallied themselves with the imperialists andthe reaction in the Arabic region.

We have to expect that the imperialistswill take advantage of the situation in caseof a solution of the Eritrean problem andescalate the situation and heighten the con-flict. Therefore it is necessary that the So-cialist countries will guarantee a peacefulsolution. In the case of an agreement pru-dent tactics are necessary not to allow thereactionaries to exert their influence. InEthiopia as well there are forces which arepowerfully fighting against a just solution.The current regime cannot proceed againstthese forces by itself. This is an importantquestion.

Honecker: [Report on GDR domesticand foreign policy]

[Concluding remarks]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated byChristian F. Ostermann.]

Memorandum of Conversation betweenEast German official Paul Markovskiand CPSU CC International Depart-

ment head Boris N. Ponomarev inMoscow, 10 February 1978(dated 13 February 1978)

[Markovski informs Ponomarev ontalks between PMAC (Ethiopia) and EPLF(Eritrea)]

Comrade B.N. Ponomarev thanked M.for the valuable information, said that theyappreciated the GDR initiative and ex-

plained the attitude of the CPSU in this ques-tion: the CPSU is also of the opinion thatEthiopia’s position in the Eritrean questionis different one from its relationship withSomalia. Somalia is an aggressor who at-tacked Ethiopia. The Soviet and Cuban com-rades have declared together with the Ethio-pian leadership that no Somali territory willbe entered in the course of the Ethiopiancounter-offensive. This information was alsogiven to the USA.

In his talk with Comrade Ponomarev,President Carter emphasized the situation onthe Horn of Africa and pretended to be con-cerned about Soviet arms deliveries to Ethio-pia. In response Ponomarev pointed to themuch larger US arms deliveries to Iran, acountry neighboring on the USSR. He re-pudiated Carter’s insinuations that Cubanand Soviet troops were fighting in Ethio-pia. The Soviet military were advisers whohad been sent at the request of the Ethio-pian government. Carter said he favored aspeedy settlement of the conflict. He ex-plained that the USA would neither now norin the future deliver arms to Somalia. It waspointed out to Carter and [U.S. Secretary ofState Cyrus R.] Vance that the Soviet Unionhad tried over a longer period of time toconvince Siad Barre, Samantar and otherSomali leaders not to begin a war. Their ef-forts, however, proved to be in vain.

With respect to the situation in Eritrea,Comrade Ponomarev mentioned the conver-sations between the Soviet leadership andMengistu Haile Mariam in the course ofwhich it was recommended to Mengistu toseek to a political solution to the problemand to grant autonomy to the Eritreans. Sincethen no new discussions between the So-viet side and the Ethiopians have takenplace. Mengistu has been silent. Up to nowhe has not done anything to follow our ad-vice. The Cuban comrades have unequivo-cally told the Ethiopian leadership that Cubawould not intervene in the Eritrean conflict,in a domestic Ethiopian conflict. The bestthing would be a peaceful solution. Bothsides need to take the right attitude towardsthe problem. Mengistu is, however, waver-ing according to the military situation. Asthe military pressure the rebels were exert-ing on Massawa and Asmara was increas-ing, he was ready for a compromise. Nowthat this situation has become a bit morestable, he is silent or makes pungent state-ments. We have to continue to work on him.


Any solution has to be found within theframework of the Ethiopian state althoughthis is uncomfortable for the Eritrean move-ments. Comrade Ponomarev read a telegramfrom Belgrade on an information [report]by the head of the bureau of the PLO [Pal-estine Liberation Organization] in Baghdad,Abu Nidal (he belongs to the left wing ofthe Fatah). Abu Nidal has traveled throughEritrea. According to his information, allregions except for Massawa and Asmara arein the hands of the Eritreans. The coastalarea is controlled by EPLF under the lead-ership of Aforki while Western Eritrea is un-der the control of the ELF (MohammedAhmed Nasser). The Eritreans want fullautonomy but are also willing to accept anEthiopian corridor to the sea. The majorityof Aforki’s organizations consist of Marx-ist-Leninist elements. Abu Nidal was in-formed that Aforki was at a meeting in Ber-lin. He was willing to meet with representa-tives of the CPSU. Abu Nidal emphasizesthat it would be necessary to quickly find asolution since Saudi Arabia and other reac-tionary forces were exerting strong pressureupon the Eritrean movements.

Comrade Ponomarev stated that theCPSU did not think a meeting with Aforkiwas necessary after a meeting between himand the SED had just taken place. The SEDwas to continue its conversations with theEritreans.

Comrade Ponomarev informed me thatthe Ethiopian leadership recently ap-proached the CPSU with a request for sup-port in the build-up of the party. A group ofexperienced comrades of the CPSU has beenselected. Its head is a member of the CC.Later, however, Mengistu requested to holdoff the sending of these comrades since mili-tary questions were the top priority. Com-rade Ponomarev favored close cooperationbetween the Soviet comrades, the Cubancomrades, and the SED group in order toassure maximum efficiency and coordinatedstrategy.

Comrade Ponomarev expressed hisconcern over the extremes in the EthiopianRevolution. In talks with Mengistu, [Cuban]comrade Raul Valdes Vivo has already statedthat such events as the mass executions ofprisoners led by the “Red Terror,” whichwould not be advantageous to the Revolu-tion, are incomprehensible.

Much now depends on what attitudeMengistu himself will take towards the

Willy] Brandt or [prominent SPD figureHerbert]Wehner.

There has been no response to the re-spective notes by Comrade Brezhnev toCarter and other Western chiefs of state.



SED CC, Department of InternationalRelations, 16 February 1978, Report on

Conversation with [Vice-president]Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of

the Politburo of the CP Cuba, inHavana, 13 February 1978

[Participants: Comrade Polanco, DeputyHead of CC Department for InternationalRelations CP Cuba; Comrade Heinz Langer,Extraordinary Plenipotentiary and Ambas-sador in Cuba]

[Welcoming remarks]Rodriguez: The initiative and the ef-

forts of the SED merit the highest recogni-tion. The [Ethiopian-Eritrean] meeting inBerlin was of great historical importance.We fully agree with the strategy of the SED;this fully conforms with our common con-cept of efforts towards a peaceful solutionof the Eritrean problem as agreed betweenus. I would like to emphasize that there iscomplete agreement among us and that thepolitburo of our party completely approvesof the strategy, the estimate, the argumentsand the conclusion in this matter.

The leadership of our party has forsome time expected a declaration byMengistu on the Eritrean problem. This hadbeen agreed up between him and comradeValdez Vivo in the 5-point program at theend of last year.

Comrade Werner Lamberz had detailedthis still more in his talk with Mengistu andthere was, as you know, the affirmation thatthis declaration would still come in Decem-ber. Obviously the Ethiopian comrades havenot been sufficiently ready for it and stillhave numerous reservations against a deci-sive step towards the solution of the Eritreanproblem.

We also completely agree with theview that the Ethiopian leadership appar-ently does not have a clear concept, eitheron a general solution of the national prob-

Eritrean problem. It has to be expected thatas L. I. Brezhnev told Mengistu - the na-tional question cannot be solved militarily.

Comrade Ponomarev agreed with theproposal communicated by ComradeMarkovski to consult on the burning Afri-can questions among the six close friendsat the forthcoming conference of the CCSecretaries in Budapest.

Comrade Ponomarev reported on hisrecent visit to the USA as the head of a del-egation of parliament members. In his re-port to the politburo, he proposed to con-tinue to work with the USA Congress. Con-gress nowadays has greater importancesince the prestige of the USA administra-tion is lower than ever before due toWatergate and Vietnam and since Carter hasnot shown enough stature [profil]. There arerealistic forces in Congress, but also the“hawks”, the obstinate defenders of the neu-tron bomb (Strand [sic; perhaps a referenceto conservative Democratic Sen. John C.Stennis or Sen. Richard Stone], [DemocraticSen. Henry] Jackson et al.). He, ComradePonomarev, made a total of 25 speeches.There were useful talks with Carter andVance. The visit showed that there are pos-sibilities for a dialogue. They have to beutilized by the common efforts of the So-cialist countries. In this respect, ComradePonomarev pointed to two problems:

1. The forthcoming (May) UN SpecialMeeting of the UN Plenum should be usedby the active appearance of all 9 friendlySocialist countries for the fight against theneutron bomb and for effective disarmamentmeasures. The level of participation shouldbe cleared in time. In these questions onecan count on the Non-Alignment Move-ment. At the same time it offers the possi-bility to effectively expose and isolate Chi-nese policy.

2. In Europe, especially in the FRG,the fight against the neutron bomb needsfurther strengthening. In the Low Countries,Denmark, and Norway there already existbroad movements whereas France has so farkept out. If a broad movement which wouldexert influence on the government could bebrought about in the FRG, this could be agreat success. We all should contribute tothis, including the DKP [West German Com-munist Party]. It is important to use all pos-sibilities and to also work with personali-ties like [former West German Chancellorand Social Democratic Party (SPD) official


lem in Ethiopia nor on the specific prob-lems in Eritrea. They have until now notreally seriously believed in it and have notseriously concerned themselves with it butinstead only considered the demand for apeaceful solution as [in itself] a kind of po-litical solution.

They probably still have the thoughtin the back of their minds that a peacefulsolution of the Eritrean problem will meana capitulation by the Eritrean movements,which means that the military solutionwould be the preparation for a further peace-ful strategy.

One can certainly not neglect the mili-tary measures in this matter, but the Ethio-pian comrades still do not have the deep rec-ognition of the necessity of a political, i.e.peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem.Thus just as much as one can certainly ar-gue that the leadership of the EPLF doesnot have an understanding of the historicimportance of the Ethiopian Revolution, onecan also argue that the awareness of the re-sponsibility for the Revolutionary develop-ment in the entire region is not deeply rootedin the Ethiopian leadership.

[...]It is necessary that we continue ourintense efforts on this common line in orderto have all participants make a common ef-fort. In this respect the written agreementthat was achieved is of enormous signifi-cance. The further strategy in the Ogadenwill be decisive and of utmost importancefor the question of how things will continue,probably also for the solution of the Eritreanproblem. Comrade Mengistu certainly didnot want to make any concessions on thisquestion as long as he seemed close to be-ing defeated on all fronts. It will be impor-tant not to have a growing feeling of capitu-lation. From this point of view his reserva-tions and hesitation with the promised dec-laration are understandable.

Now we are rapidly approaching an-other situation which will lead to certaindecisions. There are two possibilities whichmight be expected after the success againstSomalia on the eastern front. On the onehand [there could be] a generous, calm, ob-jective, and thought-out approach to a peace-ful solution of the Eritrean problem, an ap-proach which is not caused by coercion,[but] which is based on the authority of vic-tory and which therefore can take advan-tage of a vastly new possibilities for a peace-ful solution. This would be a strategy in con-

formity with a remark by Aforki which re-lates to the generosity which they - theEritreans - had expected from the Ethiopi-ans. We would encourage this way of pro-ceeding which would be in conformity withour views. On the other hand, however, aworsening of the situation is possible.

Based on the success at the easternfront and carried by the euphoria of victoryand given the possibility to withdraw strongand experienced Ethiopian units, the Ethio-pian leadership could aspire to a decisiveand quick military solution in Eritrea. Un-fortunately there are significant forceswithin the PMAC calling for such a solu-tion.

Comrade Mengistu has now asked theleadership of the CP Cuba for the secondtime not only to give military support inOgaden but also to deploy Cuban units inEritrea.

Towards the end of last year he dra-matically called on us, arguing that Cubantroops should immediately intervene inEritrea since otherwise the final loss of thisarea was imminent and hence would haveincalculable consequences for the EthiopianRevolution. In close consultation with theSoviet comrades, Comrade Fidel Castro fa-vored a massive intervention in the Ogadenagainst the Somali invasion. He emphasizedthat this now was clearly a domestic Ethio-pian matter and that we would have theOAU, the African states, international lawsand conventions, as well as the UN on ourside. Comrade Castro refused to intervenein Eritrea. We have promised every kind ofaid except for military units to our Ethio-pian comrades. We have based this on theview that this was a justified national causeof the Eritrean people which could not besolved militarily. Now, a few days ago,Comrade Mengistu has asked again andspoke of a dramatic and dangerous devel-opment in the situation; again he demandedto have Cuban units deployed at the Eritreanfront.

Comrade Fidel Castro and all the mem-bers of our politburo are of the opinion thatwe cannot afford to make any mistakes inour handling of the Eritrean question. Awrong move now could endanger our en-tire policy and important positions in Af-rica. We would be confronted by the major-ity of African states, the Arabs, internationalorgans, probably also the countries of theNon-Alignment Movement, and others.

Therefore we continue to oppose a militaryintervention in Eritrea. In coordination withour Soviet comrades we have agreed to oc-cupy the entrance to the Mits’iwa Islandsfrom where a certain degree of control canbe exerted and from where in an extremeemergency a limited military interventionwould be possible.

In this connection it is very importantthat we immediately think about Aforki’sdemand for a guarantee by the Socialistcountries. It might be necessary to work outa common basic view with the Soviet Unionbefore the next meeting because it is to beexpected that Aforki will not only presentconcrete proposals but will also expect fromthe representatives of the Socialist countriesa concrete response. Our view is based onthe fact that we have and will take on a moralobligation towards the Eritreans when weurge upon them the political and peacefulsolution according to the concept agreedamong us. They could certainly then notwithhold the pressure of the enemy on theirown. There is the danger here too that theEthiopian comrades may not pay attentionto the changed situation and are looking foran easy success which would be costly forus in political and moral terms with othercountries.

Comrade Rodriguez also informed usabout some other questions:

- [Iraq]- A few days ago, Comrade Nagere,

member of the politburo of the Meisongroup [All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement,defeated by Mengistu] (supposedly in thesecond rank of this organization behind Prof.Haile Fidda) has asked the Cuban comradesfor consultation. The Cubans have consultedwith Mengistu who did not oppose such ameeting but characterized Negere as a trai-tor. He will come in the next few days toHavana, and our Cuban comrades will in-form us immediately about these talks viaour ambassador.

- On the situation in the Ogaden, Com-rade Rodriguez informed us that a largecounter-offensive had been in preparationsince 25 December 1977. There have beentwo major campaigns in recent days whichcaused losses of more than 3000 men on theother side. It is a serious problem that theEthiopian comrades do not want to take pris-oners of war and thus act very cruelly. Theseblows have caused the enemy large mate-rial losses as well while our own have been


very small. In the last movement in theNortheast there was a smaller loss of hu-man life but the material losses have beenvery great. The Somalis have over 40 tanks,numerous medium-weight and heavy weap-ons, flack artillery, armored cars and a greatamount of weapons and munitions. In part,they have left behind NATO war materialwhich was not even unwrapped. In the fightsaround Dire Dawa, the Somalis had to pullback, leaving almost their entire armament.

Up to now, there have been only pre-paratory blows. Most of the units markedfor action have not been deployed yet, andthe main blow has not even yet begun. Theenemy is fleeing and giving up positionsfaster than had been expected. We are there-fore in a situation where we have to under-take a series of fast actions so that the en-emy will not have time to rebuild his forces.It is our plan to complete the main actionsby the end of February 1978. This meansthat by early March we can expect a greatvictory at this front. This is, as is wellknown, the time for the next meeting. Thiswill have a great effect. As agreed upon withour Soviet comrades, in no case will wetransgress Somali borders.

[Final remarks.]


Embassy of the GDR in the USSR,Political Department, 17 February

1978, Memorandum of Conversationwith the Dep. Head of the MFA ThirdDepartment (Africa), Comrade S. J.

Sinitsin, 16 February 1978

[...] Comrade Sinitsin gave his estimateof the situation in Ethiopia and on the Hornof Africa.

1. The counteroffensive of the Ethio-pian armed forces against the Somali troopsin the Ogaden is considered positive. We arecurrently not dealing with a general offen-sive but the recovery of important strategicpoints which will then allow for the com-plete expulsion of Somali military fromEthiopian territory. So far, a 30 km to 70km deep zone has been recovered. The airsuperiority of the Ethiopian forces has agreat impact. Comrade Sinitsin consideredthe prospect for a successful conclusion ofthe fighting for the Ethiopians rather good;

he also emphasized, however, that militaryencounters will intensify. Such factors as thegeneral mobilization in Somalia and in-creased arms deliveries by the West willhave some effect. Also, one cannot forgetthe fact that significant parts of the Ethio-pian armed forces have to be kept in theNorth and are involved in fighting counter-revolutionary groups in Eritrea. Another partof the army is necessary to guarantee secu-rity towards the Sudan. The Ethiopian armycan still not be considered a homogeneousunit. Large parts of the cadres, in particularthe officer corps, were taken over from theimperial government. Sabotage, insubordi-nation, even withdrawal without fighting areserious occurrences. Great attention is there-fore paid to the reorganization of the armyand the concerted build-up of a popular mi-litia. The biggest problem here is once againthe cadres and their training. One should alsonot underestimate the problems caused bythe change-over in the army from Westernto Socialist weapons systems which have tobe managed and deployed efficiently.

Finally, a number of problems withregard to the revolutionary development inEthiopia need to be solved. The situation inthe countryside is characterized by a height-ening of class warfare. In contrast to otherdeveloping countries with a Socialist orien-tation, there is a strong social differentia-tion in Ethiopia and the implementation ofclass principle requires permanent relentlessstruggle. Although the necessity of an avant-garde party has evolved, there are currentlyno grounds for such a party. [...] Althoughthere have evolved political groups at a lo-cal level which in the future could lay thefoundations for a party, there exist a num-ber of sectarian groups which at times exertlarge influence.

Simultaneously with the problem ofbuilding up a unified political organizationwith a broad popular basis, the questionarises with regard to a state apparatus whichis loyal to the new leadership. Army andstate apparatus - both taken over from im-perial times - still are divided in two camps.Many decisions taken by the revolutionarymilitary leadership are already sabotagedwithin the government, even in the defenseand foreign ministry. The enemies of thepeople’s forces enjoy the full support ofWestern countries. Since there is a lack oftrained progressive cadres, no radical solu-tion can be pursued. All these factors point

to the conclusion that a long developmentalstage will be necessary to solve the basicproblems in favor of a Socialist Revolutionin Ethiopia.

2. The international situation of theconflict at the Horn of Africa is character-ized by the efforts of the imperialist coun-tries to keep a crisis atmosphere on the Af-rican continent in order to achieve their long-term objectives. These plans are bound tofail with the increasing progress towards amilitary solution of the conflict in favor ofEthiopia. Western counter-efforts can clearlybe recognized. Although the Barre regimeis embarrassing to the Western powers, theyare using it as a tool in their attempt to pur-sue their interests.

They use the lie of alleged aggressivedesigns on Ethiopia’s part in order to con-ceal their direct activities in support of So-malia. The declaration of Western powersthat they would not make weapons avail-able to Somalia is refuted by arms deliver-ies via third, in particular reactionary Arabcountries and via “private” firms. Simulta-neously, the Western countries are increas-ing their politico-diplomatic pressure for the“independence” of the Ogaden to at leastachieve a partial success which would im-prove the prospects for the realization oftheir long-term goals.

From this point of view we have tounderstand the willingness of the Westernpowers to attain an armistice without thewithdrawal of Somali troops from Ethiopianterritory. It is their goal to give Somalia theopportunity to consolidate its position onEthiopian territory and to achieve, throughprotracted negotiations, a situation like theone in the Middle East. Therefore the So-viet Union and the Socialist countries fullysupport the basic Ethiopian position: armi-stice, withdrawal of Somali troops, and po-litical negotiations.

The direct and indirect [Western] sup-port for Somalia illustrates the demagogiccharacter of the declarations of the Westerngovernments, which shows itself in the com-parison of Somalia with Ethiopia, the com-parison of an aggressor with its victim, andthe attempt to blame the Soviet Union andthe Socialist countries for the heighteningof the conflict and thus to keep them fromfurther supporting Ethiopia. The Ethiopianleadership is carefully observing the attitudeand actions of the imperialist states and dif-ferentiates between them. In this respect one


has to view Mengistu’s declaration announc-ing to the United States, Great Britain, andthe FRG that he would break diplomaticrelations if they continued their direct sup-port of Somalia. Hence he is clearly consid-ering with subtle difference states such asItaly, which as a former colonial power iscurrently taking on a flexible position inEthiopia, and France, which is above all in-terested in the consolidation of its positionin Djibouti.

3. The conflict in the Horn of Africahas led to a strong polarization and differ-entiation among the African and the MiddleEastern countries. The situation in Ethio-pia is made more difficult by the encircle-ment by reactionary regimes of states whichdepend upon them. While South Yemen isaltogether taking a positive position onEthiopia, the other, even many progressive,Arab nations, have considerable reservationsabout supporting Ethiopia. In particular, theArab nations differ in their attitude towardsEritrea which ranges from open solidarityto direct support of the separatists in Eritrea.Reservations are also held against Libya andAlgiers who do not even support the revo-lutionary development in Ethiopia to a fullmeasure. Differences of opinion also existbetween Syria and Iraq on the one hand, andEthiopia on the other hand.

While the OAU has continued to de-fend, in the framework of its own decisionsand in full agreement with Ethiopia, the in-tegrity of Ethiopian borders, one has to dif-ferentiate the attitude of individual Africancountries toward the conflict.

The countries of Black Africa fullysupport the Ethiopian position. But theunanimous condemnation of Somalia as anaggressor was not achieved. Thus, just as anumber of member states of the OAU repu-diated the clear condemnation of the aggres-sion against Angola, they also differ in theirposition in the evaluation of the situationon the Horn of Africa. One can also not over-look such influences as that exerted by Ni-geria which favors the independence of theOgaden.

In general, the Soviet comrades ac-knowledge the positive fact that the OAUwill continue its activities for a settlementof the conflict. This fact is also especiallyimportant because some powers continue topursue attempts for a settlement of the con-flict by the UN Security Council. Like Ethio-pia, the Soviet Union is against an interven-

tion by the Security Council since this wouldpromote the internationalization of the con-flict as intended by the Western countries.One should also remember that a takeoverby the Security Council would delay a reso-lution of the conflict - in a similar fashionas the Middle East conflict - to an uncertainpoint in the future. Furthermore, a UN in-volvement would lead to a great power con-frontation [and] would aggravate the situa-tion within the UN which would have anegative effect upon the main problems nowconfronting the UN.

Although a treatment of the conflict hasso far not been put before the Security Coun-cil by the Western powers, it cannot be pre-cluded that such attempts will be under-taken. One thing is clear, they would havean anti-Soviet impetus.

With regard to Beijing’s attitude to-wards the conflict between Somalia andEthiopia, one can detect - as has been ex-posed in Soviet publications and mass me-dia - a clearly hostile attitude against theEthiopian leadership. Beijing supports, asall over the world, reactionary regimes in-asmuch as this serves anti-Sovietism. Al-though China openly shares Somalia’s pointof view, its direct material support is alto-gether rather moderate. Besides direct armsdeliveries, Beijing is supporting Somalia inthe construction of roads and irrigation sys-tems and delivers medical aid.

Existing pro-Maoist groups in Ethio-pia exert very little influence and have nobroad popular basis.

4. With regard to the demand by So-malia to recall its students in the USSR,Comrade Sinitsin informed us about the fol-lowing: Upon request of the Somali gov-ernment, the Somali embassy in Moscowdelivered a note to the MFA in Moscowcommunicating the intention to recall allSomalis residing in the USSR. The SovietUnion was asked to help with the return ofthe students which is to be carried out onspecial planes. The MFA of the USSR re-sponded by arguing that the recall of stu-dents in ongoing training programs wouldbe a violation of existing agreements andthus the financial burden had to be carriedby Somalia.

The students’ return aboard specialplanes itself was not refused. [...]

[Signed: Vogel]


Memorandum of Conversation of SEDComrade Lamberz with Cuban

Ambassador to Ethiopia, ComradePepe, Addis Ababa, 3 March 1978

(dated 4 March 1978)

(Based on notes of Comrade GeneralMajor Jaenicke.)

[Introductory remarks]Comrade Pepe’s estimate of the situa-

tion.There is a good development in the

East. There are still Somali troops in thearea of Jijiga, Dire Dawa, and Harar havebeen liberated. Currently [there is] a con-centration on the Ethiopian side againstJijiga.

Regular Somali troops are withdraw-ing to the border; [they] intend to leave guer-rilla fighters in Jijiga as a bridgehead. Theproblem of the Ethiopian troops not takingany prisoners was discussed with Mengistu;it was Mengistu’s concept to take prisonersbut it had not yet achieved complete aware-ness among the troops.

A train route was opened in the East,inhabitants return [to their homes]. The Issarand Afars were displaying good behavior;Issar in part fought on the side of the Ethio-pians.

On the trip of the envoy [U.S. deputynational security advisor David Aaron] ofUSA President Carter to Addis Ababa: TheAmerican desire to keep the trip secret wasnot accepted. The USA was concerned thatEthiopia would break off diplomatic rela-tions. The USA would be ready to respectthe revolutionary development in Ethiopiaand grant aid to Ethiopia if its neutrality wasguaranteed. They would perhaps be willingto deliver money and spare parts.

Problems in the Ethiopia-USA relation-ship were not the fault of the Carter Admin-istration but of its predecessor (for examplenon-compliance with weapons and materialdeliveries).

The United States’ main concern wasthe Soviet and Cuban presence. The UnitedStates would not support Somalia as longas Ethiopia was operating on its own terri-tory.

Mengistu explained to the USA envoy:It was his right to ask for advisers to come


to Ethiopia, and they would stay as long asnecessary. The Carter administration was toblame for the strained Ethiopian-USA rela-tionship (role of the CIA etc.). He empha-sized the neutrality of Ethiopia which woulddevelop toward socialism. He would not beready to switch allies.

Mengistu’s response was so good thatthe USA envoy immediately withdrew thedemand for the immediate removal of So-viet and Cuban advisers; he demanded thewithdrawal of the Cubans after the end ofthe Somali aggression; then the withdrawalwould be necessary since otherwise thiswould result in a threat to USA strategic in-terests.

The United States attempts to get aneconomic foothold in Ethiopia. Possiblydeliveries of arms, equipment etc. wouldfollow to “further confuse the situation.”

Comrade Pepe pointed to the fact thatafter the situation in the East would clearup some forces could try to perform anchange of course in Ethiopia. (Somethingsimilar to [pro-Soviet and anti-AmericanMPLA faction leader Nito] Alves inAngola.)

At the request of the Cuban comrades,Mengistu spoke publicly about the presenceof Soviet and Cuban advisers. Nevertheless,the press continually claims that Ethiopia isstill fighting by itself. The reason for this[is] unclear.

With respect to the “Red terror,” Com-rade Vivo mentioned this to Mengistu. Nowthere is a certain positive change. There istalk of “revolutionary legality.”

[Mengistu and MEISON]With regard to Eritrea it was attempted

to convince Mengistu that a program forEritrea had to be worked out. It would benecessary to create foundations and goalsfor which one could fight in Eritrea in orderto be able to influence the lines of divisionamong the various [Eritrean liberation]movements. Mengistu is not very convincedin this question. He fears other split-offswhich would result in the destruction of theEthiopian state.

Mengistu has little confidence in thetalks with the Eritreans. Cuban comradeshave doubts as well. Nevertheless the talksbegun by the SED were very important.Perhaps they would create pre-conditions fora necessary program.

Territorial integrity and central author-ity had to be guaranteed. Danger of an in-

ternationalization of the conflict existed inthe North, in particular in Massawa.

There are doubts about the Aforki’srole.

If Massawa finally falls, one could ex-pect that USA ships would show up in theport and Soviet ships would have to leave.

The enemy’s main blow can be ex-pected in the North. Mengistu’s attitudemakes it easier for the enemy. Mengistushould not be confronted with the possibil-ity of Eritrean independence. One has to payattention to ensure that the Eritrean prob-lem will not lead to a worsening of relationswith the Socialist countries. Comrade RaulCastro has made it clear to Mengistu thatthe Cubans would not participate in thefights in the North.

Even in case of an internationalizationof the conflict Cuban troops could not in-tervene, given the lack of any program.



Minutes of CPSU CC PolitburoMeeting, 9 March 1978 (excerpt)

Top SecretOnly copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF THE CCCPSU POLITBURO

9 March 1978

Chaired by Com. BREZHNEV, L.I.Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kirilenko,A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D.,Mazurov, K.T., Pel’she, A.Ya., Demichev,P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N.,Solomentsev, M.S., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin,M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V.

[. . .] 12. About Measures to Settle the Ethio-pia-Somalia military conflict

BREZHNEV. All comrades, evidently,have read the last telegrams from Ethiopiaand Somalia in relation to Siad Barre’s re-quest concerning our mediation. At first,Mengistu’s reaction to the thoughts we ex-pressed about that issue was basically posi-tive. But he has promised to give a finalresponse only after he will consult with his

colleagues in the leadership. Thus far thatresponse has not been received.

Siad Barre’s reaction to the thoughtswhich we expressed to him in regarding hisrequest suggests that he, as in the past, isplaying a dishonest game. He obviouslywould like to leave some part of the forcesin the Ogaden disguised as “patriotic detach-ments” and not to accept as a starting pointfor negotiations the principle of mutual re-spect, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-violation of borders, and non-interferencein the internal affairs of one another. Hedeclares that these principles should be thesubject of the subsequent negotiations.

On the other hand, Siad Barre’s re-sponse in no way rejects the possibility oforganizing a Somali-Ethiopian meeting, ifEthiopia will agree to it. Therefore, ifMengistu will give his consent to this meet-ing, then it seems expedient to continue ourwork aimed at organizing it. Simulta-neously, it will of course be necessary toconfirm to Siad Barre our principled ap-proach regarding the withdrawal fromEthiopia of all Somali sub-detachments andabout the principles of a settlement whichare mentioned above.

I believe that it is necessary for us tocontinue working in this direction.

MFA USSR, the Committee of StateSecurity, the Ministry of Defense and theInternational Department of the CC CPSUare assigned to continue working in the di-rection of a settlement of the military con-flict between Ethiopia and Somalia and tosubmit possible proposals to the CC CPSU.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 39, ll. 97,114; translated by Mark Doctorff.]

SED Memorandum of a Conversationwith Comrade [Soviet Ambassador toEthiopia Anatoly P.] Ratanov in Addis

Ababa, 13 March 1978

On 13 March 1978, [GDR diplomat]Eberhard Heinrich met with the SovietAmbassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Ratanov,for an two-hour conversation.

[Other participants; opening remarks]On the attitude towards Somalia, Com-

rade Ratanov explained that they had in-formed Mengistu on 7 March about SiadBarre’s offer of negotiations. Mengistupromised to have this immediately discussedwithin the PMAC. He said that it would not


be bad if Somalia could be brought back intothe Socialist camp regardless of the govern-ment in that country.

One had to make efforts to tear Soma-lia away from the imperialists and certainlythere were positive forces influencing SiadBarre. Perhaps he has also acknowledgedsome mistakes.

The discussion within the PMAC wasapparently difficult, and there was no re-sponse the next day. On 9 March, the Cu-ban comrades approached Mengistu with amessage from Fidel Castro which containedsimilar recommendations. On 13 March,Ratanov met again with Mengistu and thenreceived the written response of the Ethio-pian leadership. (For a translation see ap-pendix [not printed--ed.]). ComradeRatanov said, in the conversation in which[Maj.] Berhanu Bayeh [Chairman of the le-gal and administrative affairs committee andof the special commission on Eritea] par-ticipated, that it was right to demand guar-antees from Somalia and that it had to re-frain from its territorial demands. At thesame time it was necessary to employ thecorrect political tactics. We lose nothing ifwe agree to negotiations. One cannot de-mand everything in advance. This wouldpractically mean to call for political suicide.After all Siad Barre wants to save his skin.Moreover, the Ethiopian positions could notwell be presented as logical before worldpublic opinion. At first Ethiopia declares thatit would be willing to negotiate if Somaliawithdraws its troops. Now that they [theSomalis] are willing to do so, the Ethiopi-ans are retreating from their position. Thisattitude could well be a gift for the imperi-alists because Siad Barre can claim thatEthiopia was not willing to negotiate andinstead was preparing for new attacks inpursuit of its goals. After consultation withMengistu, the Soviet Union responded toSiad Barre in the following way: Ethiopiais willing to enter into negotiations withSomalia with the Soviet Union participat-ing. It will be expected from Somalia todeclare its readiness in the course of thenegotiations to abandon its anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban, and anti-Ethiopian position. Soma-lia had to prove by its actions before do-mestic and world public opinion that it isindeed assuming a really new position. Un-der such conditions Ethiopia is willing todevelop comprehensive cooperation be-tween both countries.

On the Eritrean question, ComradeRatanov stated that the development in So-malia was not the only thing complicatingthe situation. There are people within theEthiopian leadership who, based on differ-ent positions, act in immature, arrogant, andnationalistic ways.

In a conversation, Comrade Mengistuindicated that the Socialist countries, to hismind, did not really understand the Eritreanproblem. It was not a national but a classproblem. He referred especially to an inter-view given by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, amember of the politburo of the CP Cuba, toan English journalist on 12 February. In thisinterview, Rodriguez indicated in responseto a corresponding question that the Eritreanproblem had to be dealt with differently thanthe other questions in Ethiopia. It was con-cluded that the Eritrean problem was a do-mestic Eritrean [sic-Ethiopian?--ed.] prob-lem.

Mengistu thought that this statementhad practically given the separatists a guar-antee.

The Cuban comrades have declaredthat Comrade Rodriguez should not be in-terpreted in this way.

The movements in Eritrea which aredirected against the Ethiopian Revolutionare objectively counter-revolutionary. Thereare, however, national factors which haveto be acknowledged. The Arab countries aretrying to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia andto make it a member of the Arab League.This would mean that Ethiopia would be cutoff from the Red Sea. Mengistu has to un-derstand that we fully understand this andalso the dangers evolving from the nation-alist and separatist Eritrean movements. Onehas to anticipate the plans of the imperial-ists and the reaction. It is correct that themovements have lost much of their nationalcharacter but there remain genuinely na-tional forces. It is correct that Eritrea is nota nation but this also applies to other Afri-can countries. In proceeding towards a so-lution in the Eritrean problem, we shoulddistance ourselves from the separatists.

Mengistu is so far not willing to callfor progressive action in Eritrea and to worktogether with the progressive forces. To him,Eritrea is exclusively an Ethiopian matter.He favors a continuation of military actionsin order to bring under his control in par-ticular the centers and the road to Massawa.

Currently there is a process of differ-

entiation taking place among the Eritreanmovements and forces are appearing whichare interested in a unification with the revo-lutionary Ethiopian forces.

The Ethiopian troops in Eritrea are nowtired of fighting, and even the victory of theOgaden has not changed much. Despite thesuccess, no significant units can be with-drawn from there and a fast change in themilitary situation in Eritrea is not to be ex-pected.

On the development of the Party,Mengistu has promised that a group of So-viet advisers could arrive at any time. Therehave been a number of delays in this ques-tion. Mengistu apparently has no conceptof the cooperation with the advisers. It isnecessary to convince him that the adviserscould be a real help and relief. [...]

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated byChristian F. Ostermann.]

Soviet Foreign Ministry, BackgroundReport on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations,

3 April 1978

Secret. Single copyorig. No. 167/3 ag

03.IV.78

SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS(Reference)

Diplomatic relations between theUSSR and Ethiopia were established on 21April 1943.

Soviet-Ethiopian political cooperationbefore the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 de-veloped on the basis of the historical tiesbetween the peoples of the USSR and Ethio-pia, both countries’ participation in thestruggle against Fascism during World WarTwo, and also taking into account the posi-tive position that Ethiopia held in thestruggle against colonialism and racism, inthe questions of strengthening global peaceand international security.

Former Emperor Haile Selassie I vis-ited the Soviet Union in 1959, 1967, 1970,and in 1973.

The Provisional Military Administra-tive Council (PMAC) announced its coursefor a Socialist orientation and its intentionto develop comprehensive cooperation withthe USSR after it came to power on 12 Sep-


tember 1974.The Ethiopian leadership emphasized

the fact that it saw the Soviet Union as themain source of their support internationally.The positions of the PMAC on the majorityof major international problems coincidewith or are close to those of the USSR.

In January 1975 the PMAC leadershipraised in principle the question of develop-ing Soviet-Ethiopian relations. It was an-nounced by our side that the Soviet Unionregarded sympathetically the measurestaken by the PMAC for building a new so-ciety on progressive principles, and that weshared their opinion about the need to de-velop comprehensive contacts betweenEthiopia and the Soviet Union.

Political relations. On 6-11 July 1976an Ethiopian state delegation led by formerChairman Mogus Wolde Michael of thePMAC Committee of Ethiopia came to theSoviet Union on an official visit. The So-viet delegation at the negotiations was ledby Comrade A.A. Gromyko. Members ofthe Ethiopian delegation were received byComrade A.N. Kosygin.

On 4-8 May 1977 a state delegation ofEthiopia led by Chairman Lieutenant-Colo-nel Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMACcame to the Soviet Union on an officialfriendly visit. Mengistu Haile Mariam wasreceived by Comrade Brezhnev.

Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations in whichthe sides considered the status and the pros-pects for further development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the situation in Africa,and other international problems of mutualinterest were held.

The sides adopted a Declaration of theBasis for Friendly Relations and Coopera-tion between the USSR and Ethiopia in thename of further strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. A joint Soviet-Ethiopiancommunique was published on the resultsof the visit of the state delegation of Ethio-pia to the USSR. During the visit the sidessigned an Agreement on Cultural and Sci-entific Cooperation, a Consular Convention,and the Protocol on Economic and Techno-logical Cooperation of 6 May 1977.

On 30-31 October 1977 ChairmanMengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC ofEthiopia came to the USSR on a closed visit.During the conversation that Comrades L.I.Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, and A.A.Gromyko had with him, it was emphasizedthat the USSR was going to continue to pro-

vide comprehensive assistance and supportfor the Ethiopian revolution in the future.

Comrades L.I. Brezhnev and MengistuHaile Mariam repeatedly exchanged per-sonal letters, which also contributed to astrengthening of bilateral relations.

An Ethiopian delegation led by mem-ber of the Permanent Committee of thePMAC Berhanu Bayeh attended the celebra-tion of the 60th anniversary of the GreatOctober Socialist Revolution [in November1977].

In the difficult situation which emergedaround revolutionary Ethiopia and in thecountry itself the Soviet Union has providedEthiopia with constant political and diplo-matic support, for which the leadership ofEthiopia has repeatedly expressed its deepgratitude.

Responding to the PMAC request toprovide support for the peaceful settlementof the Eritrean problem the Soviet Unionaddressed several leaders of Arab countriesand of Somalia on that issue. The SovietUnion has also made a presentation to theIraqi government concerning the smalltransfers of Soviet-made weapons to theEritrean separatists from Iraq throughSudan.

In the situation of the war unleashedby Somalia against Ethiopia and the occu-pation of a significant portion of its terri-tory the Soviet Union took the position ofdecisive support of Ethiopia, and providedit with all kinds of assistance, including theassistance in strengthening its capability todefend itself. In our official statements andaddresses to a number of African and Arabcountries, and also in our contacts with theWestern countries, we consistently advo-cated the necessity of an immediate cessa-tion of the conflict by, first and foremost,an unconditional withdrawal of the Somalitroops from the territory of Ethiopia.

In July-August 1977 the Soviet Unionprovided its good offices for the settlementof the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. However,during separate meetings with the represen-tatives of both countries who came to Mos-cow it became clear that the two sides helduncompromising mutually exclusive posi-tions. In those circumstances both delega-tions left for their countries, and the mis-sion of good offices was suspended.

Party Contacts. At the request of thePMAC, 120 active members of the PMACtook courses on party building, organization

of labor unions, women’s and youth move-ments, solving nationality and other issuesat the CC CPSU in the Soviet Union. In1977, 50 people were accepted to thosecourses. In March 1978, a group of fourSoviet party officials went to Ethiopia to as-sist the PMAC in creating a vanguard partyof the working class.

Military Cooperation. In December1976 in Moscow Ethiopia and the SovietUnion signed an agreement on the transferof some defensive weapons and militaryequipment from the Soviet Union to Ethio-pia in 1977-1980. Upon request from theEthiopian side part of the weapons was de-livered immediately; and in February 1977some rifles were supplied for the Ethiopianpeople’s militia in form of gratuitous assis-tance. We also gave our consent to the gov-ernments of CzSSR [Czechoslovakia], VNR[Hungary], PNR [Poland], and Cuba to sup-ply Ethiopia with rifles produced under So-viet licenses, and to the government of thePDRY [People’s Democratic Republic ofYemen] to transfer Soviet-made tanks andarmored personnel vehicles to Ethiopia.

Later, after a new request from Ethio-pia, the Soviet side made a decision addi-tionally to supply Ethiopia with weaponsand military equipment, and also with riflesfor the People’s militia in 1977-1980. Inaddition, we supply Ethiopia with technol-ogy for general civilian use, and Ethiopianservicemen have been accepted for study inthe Soviet Union.

During the closed visit of MengistuHaile Mariam to Moscow in October 1977,the Soviet side agreed to provide urgentlyadditional supplies of weapons and militaryequipment to strengthen the capability ofEthiopia to defend itself in the situation ofthe Somali aggression.

A group of Soviet military advisers andspecialists currently works in Ethiopia.

A state delegation led by Army Gen-eral V.I. Petrov has been staying in Ethiopiasince November 1977 on a closed visit. Thetasks of the delegation include devisingmeasures jointly with the Ethiopian side toassist the PMAC in building the Ethiopianarmed forces, for faster mastering of theSoviet military equipment by the Ethiopianarmy, and in the planning of military opera-tions in the Ogaden and Eritrea.

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll.24-32; translation by Svetlana Savran-


skaya.]

Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CCInternational Department, Background

Report on the Somali-EthiopianConflict, 3 April 1978

Secret, Copy No. 3Issue 164/3afo

IV.03.78

ABOUT THE SOMALIA-ETHIOPIACONFLICT

(Information Sheet)

Since the time of the formation of anindependent Somalian state in 1960, therehas been tension in inter-state relations onthe Horn of Africa. Its source is the aspira-tion of the leadership of Somalia to unitethe lands populated by Somali tribes in asingle state and the claims it has made inthat regard to certain regions of Ethiopia(Ogaden), Kenya, and the territory of theRepublic of Djibouti.

Relations are particularly sharp be-tween Somalia and Ethiopia. On multipleoccasions border incidents and military con-flict have broken out between them.

The revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 didnot lead to an improvement in Somalia-Ethiopia relations. More to the point, Presi-dent Siad and other Somali leaders, usingas a cover demagogic declarations about theright of nations to self-determination, rightup to secession, have intensified their pres-sure on Ethiopia. The Somalis in essencehave demanded the partition of the multi-national Ethiopian state on the basis ofethnicity. These demands were obviouslyaimed against the interests of the Ethiopianrevolution and poured grist on the mill ofinternal and external reaction.

In these conditions the USSR and othersocialist states undertook efforts to normal-ize relations between Ethiopia and theDemocratic Republic of Somalia (SDR). InMarch 1977, at the initiative of Fidel Castrowith the participation of the chairman of thePresidential Council of the PDRY S. RubayiAli, a meeting took place in Aden betweenthe Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu HaileMariam and the President of the SDR Siad,which due to the unconstructive position ofthe latter ended without result.

The Soviet Union more than once ap-pealed to the leadership of Somalia and

Ethiopia with a call to normalize their rela-tions and proposed a constructive programwhich would lead to a settlement, and indi-cated its readiness to make available its goodoffices. In July-August 1977, in the courseof separate meetings with representative ofSomalia and Ethiopia who were visitingMoscow, it was found that the sides wereoccupying mutually-exclusive positions;moreover the Somalis were continuing toinsist on wresting the Ogaden away fromEthiopia.

Insofar as plans to obtain the Ogadenwithout the application of force did not cometo fruition, the Somali leadership, in whichchauvinistic moods came to dominate, setabout the practical realization of its expan-sionist plans, counting on achieving successin relation to the domestic political situa-tion in Ethiopia, which was aggravated atthat time. The Arab reaction also pushedthem to this, and also imperialist states, inparticular the USA, which, according toSiad’s own admission, had promised to pro-vide military assistance to Somalia.

On 23 July 1977, Somalia unleashedon the African Horn an armed conflict.Under cover of the Front for the Liberationof Western Somalia (FLWS)—which hadbeen created by the Somali leadership it-self—it sent its own forces into the Ogaden,and they occupied a significant part of theEthiopian provinces of Harar, Bale, andSidamo, and only through the bitter fightswhich unfolded in October-December 1977were they stopped at the approaches to theimportant centers of Harar and Dire Dawa.

After appropriate preparation, theEthiopian armed forces went on the counter-attack in February of this year. In the be-ginning of March of this year the strategi-cally important city of Jijiga was liberated,and a major grouping of Somali forces wasshattered. Cuban military personnel tookpart in the military actions, while Sovietmilitary advisors participated in working outthe plan of military operations. To thepresent, the liberation of all territory has infact been completed, and Ethiopian troopshave reached the border with Somalia.When the Somalis were on the edge of amilitary catastrophe, the leadership of theSDR made the decision to withdraw itsforces from the Ogaden front. At the sametime the representatives of the FLWS an-nounced that they would not stop militaryactions on the territory of the Ogaden.

Confronted with the decisive refusal ofthe Soviet Union and the other countries ofthe socialist commonwealth to support theterritorial claims on Ethiopia, the Somalileadership on 13 November 1977 unilater-ally announced the annulment of the 1974Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship andCooperation and demanded the recall fromSomalia of all Soviet military and civilianadvisors. In Somalia an anti-Soviet cam-paign was unfolded. Diplomatic relationswith Cuba were cut off.

At the same time the Somali leader-ship began actively to search for supportfrom Muslim states, winning from them as-sistance which included arms deliveries andthe sending of forces for participation incombat actions against Ethiopia under thebanner of “Islamic Solidarity.” The visit ofthe President of Somalia, Said Barre, to Iran,Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Oman, and also Iraqand Syria, at the end of December 1977-beginning of January 1978, served just suchgoals.

As the conflict went on, the Somalileaders many times called out to the USAand other Western powers with persistentappeals to provide assistance to Somalia andto interfere in events on the African Hornaimed at a “peace” settlement to the con-flict and the “defense” of Somalia from ag-gression which allegedly was being pre-pared against it from the direction of Ethio-pia.

Following the collapse of its adventurein Ogaden, Somalia has not retracted its ter-ritorial claims against Ethiopia, and puttingforth various conditions it continues to seekthese same goals by other means. The So-mali leadership called on the great powerswith an appeal to secure recognition and therealization of self-determination for thepopulation of the Ogaden. In this regard itcalled on the great powers to undertake ur-gent measure to settle the conflict throughnegotiations, and by securing the withdrawalof “all foreign forces” from the AfricanHorn, having in mind the Cuban militarypersonnel and Soviet military advisorswhich had been invited by the Ethiopiangovernment as a means to strengthen the de-fense capability of the country. Somalia alsospoke out for sending “neutral forces” to theOgaden.

The Ethiopian leadership evaluated theactions of Somalia as an act of armed ag-gression and in relation to this on 8 Sep-


tember 1977 broke off diplomatic relationswith the SDR.

During the armed conflict, the PMACexpressed readiness to settle the conflictpeacefully within the framework of theOAU, putting forth as an absolute conditionthe beginning of negotiations with the So-malis on the withdrawal of their forces fromEthiopian territory. Simultaneously theEthiopian leaders declared many times inpublic speeches that Ethiopia did not intend,after the liberation of the Ogaden territory,to carry military actions beyond the limitsof their own borders.

After the destruction of the Somalitroops, the Ethiopia MFA asserted in its dec-laration on 12 March of this year the aspira-tion of the Ethiopian government to estab-lish peace and stability on the African Hornin accord with the Charters and decisionsof the U.N. and the OAU, on the basis ofobservation of the principles of non-use offorce as a means of solving internationalarguments, and non-interference in the do-mestic affairs of other states. In the decla-ration it was further pointed out that the es-tablishment of peace on the African Horn ispossible only in the event of Somali retrac-tion of its claims for part of the territory ofEthiopia and Kenya, and also Djibouti, [and]observation by it of international agree-ments. In it are rejected the attempts of theUSA government and its allies to tie thewithdrawal of Somali forces to a resolutionof issues which fall under the sovereigntyof Ethiopia (the presence on its territory offoreign military personnel invited there bythe Ethiopian government, the proposal tosend foreign observors to the Ogaden).

Regarding Somalia’s demand that thepopulation of the Ogaden be presented withthe right of self-determination, the Ethio-pian leadership declares that a resolution ofthat issue is a domestic affair of Ethiopiaand that therefore it cannot be a conditionfor a settlement of the Somalia-Ethiopiaconflict. The Ethiopian side also raises theissue of compensation from Somalia for thelosses caused by the military actions in theOgaden.

Somalia’s position in the conflict withEthiopia does not meet, as a rule, with sup-port from the members of the OAU, whosupport the preservation of existing stateborders in Africa.

The special committee of the OAU forsettlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations

(under the chairmanship of Nigeria), whichmet in session in Libreville [Gabon] in Au-gust 1977, refused to accept the Front forthe Liberation of Western Somalia as a na-tional-liberation movernment, [and] calledon the governments of both countries to stophostile actions and to settle their disagree-ments by peaceful means, on the basis ofthe principle of the inviolability of the bor-ders of African countries. In a resolutionaccepted by the the committee there wascontained a call on everyone, particularynon-African countries, to refrain from in-terference in the conflict.

Efforts which have until now been un-dertaken by several African countries andthe OAU to mediate an end to the conflicthave not led to any positive results in viewof the contradictory positions taken by thesides.

Over the course of the conflict, the re-actionary Muslim regimes have taken a po-sition in support of Somalia. However, ac-cording to information which we have, atthe time of the conduct of military actionsin the Ogaden, President Siad was not suc-cessful in getting their agreement to sendtheir forces to that region, although SaudiArabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Egypt did co-vertly send arms to Somalia.

On the other hand, such Arab countriesas the PDRY, Algeria, and, to an extent,Libya, provided support to Ethiopia. In thisregard the PDRY sent weapons and militarypersonnel to Ethiopia.

Over the course of the conflict, Sudan’sposition underwent change. For a varietyof reasons it refused to take an extreme anti-Ethiopian course.

Leading Western countries, while ver-bally supporting a political settlement to theSomalia-Ethiopia conflict and stressing theirown neutrality, in fact have tried to use theconflict to undermine the revolutionary re-gime in Ethiopia and to rout the progres-sive forces in Somalia, and also to weakenthe presence of the USSR in that region ofthe world. In fact, the Westerners have con-ducted a policy of veiled assistance to So-malia. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasonsthey have not set out to provide Somalia withdirect military assistance. Primarily they didnot want to decisively push Ethiopia awayfrom them, counting on reestablishing theirpositions here in the future. They also couldnot but take into account that the actions ofSomalia had not met with support from Af-

rican states, but [in fact] Kenya, which hastight contacts with the West, sharply con-demned them.

At the present time, from the side ofthe Westerners, particularly the USA, effortsare being undertaken to take into their ownhands the initiative for a settlement of theconflict in the interests of strengthening theirown positions on the African Horn. Underconditions of the occupation of the Ogadenby Somali forces they put forth proposalsfor a quick beginning to negotiations, so thatthe Somali side could speak at them from aposition of strength. Another of their ideaswhich they put forth was to pass consider-ation of the issue of the conflict to the UNSecurity Council, where the Westernerscounted on putting pressure on Ethiopia.

The decision of the SDR to withdrawSomali forces from the Ogaden was quicklyused by the USA leadership for a declara-tion about the need for the quick withdrawalfrom Ethiopia of Soviet and Cuban militarypersonnel. The Western powers also spokein favor of the idea of sending to the Ogadenforeign “neutral observers” to supervise thewithdrawal of troops from that regions andto ensure the security of its population.

The Chinese leadership has expresseditself from an anti-Soviet position in rela-tion to the conflict, trying to heap all theresponsibility for the ongoing events on theSoviet Union. While not openly express-ing its attitude to the conflict, at the sametime it has essentially supported the posi-tion of Somalia. There is information thatthe PRC has delivered small arms to Soma-lia.

The countries of the socialist common-wealth have in relation to the conflict takena position of censuring the aggressive ac-tions of Somalia and providing Ethiopiawith internationalist assistance and support.

Cuba acted particularly actively in thisdirection, sending, in response to a requestfrom the government of Ethiopia and as of-ficially announced by F. Castro on 16 Marchof this year, its own tank operators, artilleryspecialists, pilots, and also sub-units ofmechanized infantry, to provide assistanceto the armed forces of that country whilethe Ogaden was under conditions of occu-pation by Somali forces. During the Ethio-pian counter-attack, Cuban solders wereused in the main lines of attack. The SovietUnion and Cuba are in constant contactaimed at coordination of their actions in


support of the Ethiopian revolution.The attitude of the Soviet Union toward

the Somali-Ethiopia conflict is determinedby the fact that that conflict contradicts theinterests of progressive forces in that region,and creates a danger of turning the AfricanHorn into a hotbed of serious internationaltension.

After the outbreak of armed conflict onthe African Horn, the Soviet Union cameout in favor of its quick cessation, for thepeaceful settlement of relations between So-malia and Ethiopia by means of negotiationson the basis of mutual respect by the sidesof sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviola-bility of borders and non-interference ineach other’s domestic affairs, noting that anabsolute condition of such a settlement mustbe a cessation of military actions and a quickand unconditional withdrawal of Somaliforces from the territory of Ethiopia, and thatotherwise a situation analagous to the onein the Middle East might arise on the Afri-can Horn.

Our principled line in relation to thesituation on the Horn of Africa was preciselyexpressed in the speeches of comrades L.I.Brezhnev of 28 September 1977 on the oc-casion of the visit to the USSR of the Presi-dent of the People’s Republic of Angola A.Neto, and A.N. Kosygin of 12 January 1978on the occasion of the visit to the USSR ofthe President of the APDR [AlgerianPeople’s Democratic Republic] H.Boumedienne, and also in the TASS Decla-ration of 18 January 1978.

The Soviet Union spoke out againstefforts of the Western states to submit theissue of the situation on the African Hornfor consideration by the UN Security Coun-cil, which they could use in particular tounleash a hostile campaign against theUSSR and Cuba. At the same time the So-viet Union believes that the Organization ofAfrican Unity should continue its efforts toprovide assistance on a settlement of the So-mali-Ethiopia conflict, insofar as it has notexhaused its possibilities in this area.

The position of the Soviet Union to-wards the Somali-Ethiopia conflict hasmany times been brought to the attention ofthe leadership of progressive African andArab states, and also to a range of Westernpowers.

The Soviet Union consistently followsa firm line in providing the utmost assis-tance and support to the revolutionary Ethio-

pian regime. During the conflict, supple-mentary, urgent measures were undertakento strengthen the defense capability of Ethio-pia, which had become a victim of aggres-sion. We brought deliveries of combat ma-teriel, weapons, and ammunition to Soma-lia to a halt. After the Somali side under-took unfriendly actions in November 1977,the Soviet Union stopped economic andtrade cooperation and ended military coop-eration with Somalia.

In the beginning of March of this yearPresident Said appealed to the Soviet Unionwith a request to provide mediatory servicesto settle the Somali-Ethiopia conflict andexpressed readiness to establish friendlyrelations between Somalia and the USSR.

From our side agreement was given toimplement mediatory efforts if the leader-ship of Ethiopia would view that favorablyand in the event that Somalia took a realis-tic position on a settlement of the conflict.In this regard Siad’s attention was drawn tothe fact that the various preconditions putforth by the Somali side (giving self-deter-mination to the population of Ogaden) onlydelay the possibility of holding negotiationsto bring an end to the conflict, insofar asthey cannot be acceptable to any sovereignstate and complicate the realization by usof mediatory efforts.

As far as the establishment of friendlyrelations with Somalia is concerned, fromour side there was expressed readiness forthat in principle and under the clear under-standing of the fact that Somalia will takespecific steps to establish a genuine peaceon the African Horn.

In response to our information aboutSiad’s proposal, the Ethiopian government,having expressed doubt about the sincerityof the intentions of the Somali leadership,at the same time expressed readiness to be-gin negotiations with Somalia in Moscowwith the participation of the Soviet Union,on the condition that the Somali represen-tatives are prepared to declare in due coursethe rejection of their anti-Ethiopian, anti-Soviet, and anti-Cuban positions; to declarerespect for the territorial integrity of Ethio-pia and to give agreement to the demarca-tion of the Ethiopia-Somalia border on thebasis of existing international agreements;to stop their support of underground move-ments directed against the territorial integ-rity and unity of Ethiopia; and lastly, in someway or another to inform public opinion of

their own country and world public opinionabout Somalia’s new position.

So far the Somali leadership rejectsthese proposals and continues to insist onits own conditions.

The outcome of the war in the Ogadenessentially was reflected in the domesticpolitical situation of its participants. Thesituation in Somalia was sharply exacer-bated. On the grounds of a worsening ofthe economic situation and a decline in thestandard of living, dissatisfaction with thecurrent leadership grew among variousstrata of the population, including the army.This dissatisfaction, which has assumedopen forms, is being suppressed by Saidwith the help of executions and repressions.In Ethiopia the military victory facilitated,on the one hand, the consolidation of thepatriotic, progressive forces, and thestrengthening of the position of Mengistuand his supporters, and, on the other hand,enlivened nationalistic elements, includingin the leadership of the country, which areputting forth the idea that the Somali threatshould be “done away with” once and forall.

Overall, the situation on the AfricanHorn remains complex and tense. The ces-sation of military actions on the ground hasnot yet been ratified in any way, and the con-tinuing Somali claims to the Ogaden, and[to] part of the territory of Kenya and theRepublic of Djibouti, create a situationfraught with the outbreak of a new armedconfrontation. Such a situation creates anopportunity for maneuvers of imperialist andreactionary Arab circles in this region ofAfrica, and therefore the establishment thereof peace and the achievement of an agree-ment between Somalia and Ethiopia on stop-ping the conflict corresponds to our inter-ests.

Third African DepartmentMFA USSR

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll.13-23; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

SED Archives, Memorandum on SovietReaction to Libyan Proposal on Somali-

Ethiopian Conflict, 4 April 1978

The Soviet Ambassador in Tripoli re-ceived instruction to communicate the fol-lowing to [Libyan Prime Minister Abdul


Salam] Jalloud:The proposals of the Libyan leadership

on the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopianconflict have been carefully examined inMoscow. We have communicated to theEthiopians the recent Libyan desire to re-ceive in Tripoli the chairman of the Provi-sional Military Administrative Council(PMAC), based on the fact that only theEthiopian side itself can make a decisionsin this respect. The Ethiopian side had pre-viously communicated to us that Mengistucould not come to Libya at the end of Feb-ruary for negotiations with Siad Barre, forreasons which the PMAC chairman told youpersonally.

The Libyan side is aware of the Sovietposition with respect to the procedure for apolitical settlement in the area of the Hornof Africa. We have fully explained our pointof view during your recent visit to Moscow.There is only one just basis for the settle-ment of the conflict - this is the mutual re-spect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, andnon-interference in domestic matters of theother side. All attempts to achieve a politi-cal settlement on any other basis were boundto destabilize such a solution and burden itwith new difficulties.

The withdrawal of Somali troops fromthe Ogaden is only a step in the right direc-tion, conditioned by the existing situation.The conditions for a settlement as officiallyannounced by the Somali leadership, in ouropinion, only served to postpone the startof negotiations. These conditions, as isknown, touch upon the sovereign rights ofEthiopia and upon problems which lie in itsdomestic realm. The solution of the nationalquestion in the Ogaden belongs to this.

One cannot disregard the fact that theUSA and other Western powers, which ver-bally favor a settlement of the conflict atthe Horn of Africa, in fact seek to make sucha settlement more difficult in order tostrengthen their position in this area.

In our opinion the main task now is toput the settlement of the conflict at the Hornof Africa on the tracks of peaceful negotia-tions. The solution of this problem can notdepend on whether Ethiopia and Somaliacan achieve agreement on all other problemsin their relationship. It is now especially im-portant to influence the Somali leadershipto assume a constructive position and toavoid giving the imperialist and other reac-tionary forces the opportunity to exploit

Somalia for their designs.With respect to the situation in Eritrea,

the Soviet Union has viewed and still viewsthis in conformity with the UN and OAUresolutions as an internal Ethiopian matter.We favor a political solution of this ques-tion by negotiations between the central gov-ernment and the Eritrean organizations. Itis our strong conviction that the current at-titude of the Eritrean organizations whichfavor the separation of Eritrea from Ethio-pia contradicts the interests of the EthiopianRevolution and the progressive forces in thisarea and is only of advantage to the imperi-alists and the reaction.

Libya and other progressive Arab statescan use their authority and influence to con-vince the Eritrean organizations to terminatethe fighting and go the way of a peacefulsolution of the Eritrean problem in theframework of a unified Ethiopian state.


SED official Hermann Axen to E.Honecker, 18 April 1978, enclosing

Draft Letter from Honecker toBrezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks,

19 April 1978

Enclosure: Honecker to Brezhnev, 19April 1978

Esteemed Comrade Leonid IlyichBrezhnev!

On 23 March 1978, the second meet-ing between the representatives to the Pro-visional Military Administrative Council ofSocialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean Libera-tion Front took place. Upon request by thePolitburo of the CC of the SED, ComradeHermann Axen, member of the Politburoand CC secretary, participated in the talks.

[Berhanu Bayeh and Aforki declaredagain their desire to terminate the bloodshedand to do everything to solve the Eritreanproblem by peaceful means.]

Despite this declaration made by bothnegotiators, the political negotiationsshowed that the positions on both sides hadbecome stiffer.

The representative of the ProvisionalMilitary Administrative Council was in-clined to favor a predominantly militarysolution of the Eritrean problem. They didnot make any concrete or constructive pro-

posals for a peaceful and political solutionalthough Comrade Werner Lamberz hadagreed with Mengistu Haile Mariam onworking papers in December 1977.

The attitude of the representatives ofthe Eritrean Liberation Movement illus-trated, on the other hand that, under the pres-sure by the leadership of the Sudan and theArab reaction, there has been a strengthen-ing of nationalist, openly separatist forceswithin the Eritrean movements, especiallyby means of the coordination between theEritrean People’s Liberation Front and theEritrean Liberation Front (RevolutionaryCouncil).

The leader of the Eritrean People’s Lib-eration Front, Aforki, presented the demandfor a separate Eritrean state in even harsherterms. Only after long sharp discussion washe willing to agree to this second meetingand to the further examination of the pro-posals made by the SED. Thus it was pos-sible to hold the second meeting. In thecourse of the meeting, the representativesof the Ethiopian leadership and the EPLFreiterated their known positions. They ac-cepted the SED proposal - this proposal was,as is well known, agreed to by the CC ofthe CPSU - to put the following four pointsbefore the Provisional Military Administra-tive Council and the Central Committee ofthe EPLF as recommendations for a settle-ment:

1. Both sides confirm their resolve tostop the bloodshed immediately and bringabout a political solution.

2. The Provisional Military Adminis-trative Council of Ethiopia will make a pub-lic declaration expressing its concrete pro-posals for the implementation of regionalautonomy for Eritrea in the framework ofthe Ethiopian state and under inclusion ofall willing positive forces in Eritrea.

The Central Committee of the EPLFrecognizes the achievements of the Ethio-pian Revolution and declares itself ready forcooperation in the interest of implementa-tion of regional autonomy.

3. Revolutionary Ethiopia’s secure ac-cess to the Red Sea must be guaranteed byits uninterrupted access lines and its con-trol over Asmara and the ports of Massawaand Assab.

4. Both sides form a common commis-sion for the purpose of implementing theabove points and all other steps for the se-curity of the Revolution in Ethiopia and re-


gional autonomy in Eritrea.It was agreed to inform the leadership

organizations of Ethiopia and of the EPLFand have them communicate their positionson the results of the second meeting and theproposals of the SED at a third meeting inthe GDR in mid-May.

Thus the second meeting underminedall attempts by the representatives of theEPLF to break off all political contacts andnegotiations with the Provisional MilitaryAdministrative Council of Ethiopia [as theyhad previously intended to do].

But the situation involves the acutedanger that the fighting over Eritrea willescalate and that the Arab reaction and theimperialists will intervene even further andattempt to internationalize the conflict. Thiswould severely endanger the revolutionarydevelopments in Ethiopia.

The Politburo of the CC of the SED isof the opinion that everything has to be doneto achieve a political solution of the Eritreanquestion. The safeguarding of the revolu-tionary process in Ethiopia and its territo-rial as well as political integrity is a neces-sary precondition for this. The ProvisionalMilitary Administrative Council mustdoubtless have reliable control over its freeaccess to the Red Sea. This, however, mustbe safeguarded by political and militarymeans. It is our impression following therecent meeting that the Provisional MilitaryAdministrative Council is only oriented to-wards the military tasks in this matter and,despite repeated verbal assurances, has notmade any concrete political steps in win-ning over the Eritrean population for theimplementation of regional autonomy.

We therefore think that the ProvisionalMilitary Administrative Council shouldwithout further delay address an appeal toall willing forces in Eritrea for the peacefulpolitical solution of the Eritrean problem. Itwould have to render more precisely theproposals it has made so far by concretesuggestions on the implementation of theright for self-determination of the differentnations within Ethiopia in order to speed upthe process of differentiation within theEritrean population and to isolate the reac-tionary, separatist forces in Eritrea.

Based on the results of the last meet-ing, the Politburo of our Party proposestherefore that the Soviet comrades, in con-junction with representatives of our Party,work out internally possible solutions to the

regional autonomy of Eritrea in the frame-work of the Ethiopian state in order to com-municate them at the appropriate time to theChairman of the Provisional Military Ad-ministrative Council, Mengistu HaileMariam.

[Closing remarks]


Memorandum of Conversation between[SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen andSoviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in

the CC of the CPSU, 11 May 1978

[Other participants]Ulyanovsky:As Comrade B.N. Ponomarev has al-

ready pointed out in the last conversationwith the comrades of the SED, the CC ofthe CPSU considers the talks of the SEDwith the Eritrean movements and the Ethio-pian side very useful and positive. We canstill say this today. On this basis one shouldapproach the next meeting in June as wellas other meetings. We consider the fourpoints agreed on at the last meeting as posi-tive. If both sides really take the four pointsas a starting point, this would be positivefor further development. We are of the opin-ion that the following main points shouldbe emphasized:

a) The political solution of the prob-lem and an end to the bloodshed.

b) The granting of regional autonomyfor Eritrea, but, however, no separate na-tional independence.

c) The unconditional use of Ethiopia’scommunications with the ports on the RedSea.

d) The increased unification of the pro-gressive forces on both sides.

This would be a deeply satisfying plat-form which could be developed further.

The points agreed upon in the Marchmeeting are contained in these proposals andhence could be developed further at the Junemeeting. This would create a real founda-tion for the rapprochement of both sides. Themain question is, how honestly, how genu-inely, and how deeply both sides will com-ply with these points. If one could say to-day that the four points are fulfilled by bothsides or will soon be fulfilled, this would bea great relief for us.

The CPSU also works in this direction.It agreed to receive an ELF-RC delegationled by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser at thelevel of the USSR Solidarity Committee ona confidential internal basis around 20 May1978. We will use these contacts in order toinduce the representatives of the ELF-RCto have direct contact with the ProvisionalMilitary Administrative Council. The objec-tive is to find an appropriate solution forEritrea within the framework of the Ethio-pian state. We do not have the intention tohide from Ahmed Nasser our policy towarda unified Ethiopia. The policy of the CPSUis aimed at the unity of Ethiopia. We willtry to convince Ahmed Nasser that the fu-ture development of the Eritrean people canonly evolve in a unified Ethiopian state. Inthe discussions we will continue to pursuethe line of emphasizing the unity betweenthe Marxist-Leninist forces and national-democratic forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

We would like to stress that we haveto be extremely tactful in our relations withMengistu Haile Mariam and the PMAC, inparticular with respect to the Eritrean ques-tion.

Mengistu Haile Mariam does not havean easy stand within the PMAC in this re-gard. In connection with the well-known Dr.Negede [Gobeze] affair tensions haveheightened within the PMAC and this hasnot made Mengistu’s task any easier.

We would like to emphasize that allconcrete initiatives on the Eritrean questionshave to originate from Ethiopia. This doesnot mean that the Eritrean side is free of anyinitiatives. If we put the entire weight onthe Mengistu Haile Mariam’s shoulders andfree Ahmed Nasser or respectively Aforkiof any responsibility, this would be one-sided. The Ethiopian side is watching withgreat jealousy the actions of the CPSU andthe SED. Here as well one has to see theconnection between Mengistu HaileMariam’s position and the people aroundhim. Mengistu Haile Mariam deserves to beregarded by us as a man who represents in-ternationalist positions. By contrast to him,Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as wellas Legesse Asfaw and others, for example,are marked by nationalism although they arefaithful to Mengistu Haile Mariam.

All steps and initiatives on the part ofthe CPSU, the CP Cuba, and the SED mustbe put forward extremely tactfully and care-fully not to cause any protests. Frankly, the


problem lies to a certain degree in the factthat we all attempt to square the circle. Theone side of the problem is - and we are bothworking on this - to solve the problem onan internationalist basis. On the other handthere are efforts to solve it on a nationalistbasis. This is precisely why, I emphasizeagain, we have to apply maximum caution,circumspection, and tactfulness towardsMengistu Haile Mariam so that the nation-alists will not grasp him by the throat.

In our contacts and talks with AhmedNasser we intend to make it unmistakablyclear to him that it is necessary that all revo-lutionary forces join together and that theEritrean problem is not only a national butabove all a class problem which has to besolved by the common fight against the im-perialists and the Arab reaction.

Efforts to split up Ethiopia and createa separate Eritrean state, to refuse to giveEthiopia access to the ports on the Red Sea,to drive the Soviet Union and the other So-cialist countries out of this region, are notsimply a national problem but a problem ofinternational class warfare, not to speak ofthe fact that such a separate state would bemanipulated by the Sudan and Saudi Arabiaand their petrol dollars.

We will therefore point out to AhmedNasser, who claims to be a Marxist, the na-tional and international dimension of theEritrean problem.

Concerning the questions put forwardby Comrade Trappen I would like to addthe following consideration:

The basic difficulty is the fact that sepa-ratist ideas have been rooted in Eritrea for along time. These ideas are very popularamong the population, especially among theworkers. This factor, the factor of the erringof the masses based on nationalism, is agiven one. The main difficulty therefore isthat the mass of the Eritrean population doesnot understand the difference between theimperial regime of Haile Selassi and thepolicy of the PMAC.

The fight continues as in earlier timesunder the imperial regime. This creates thegreat necessity for intensified political workby the PMAC and above all by MengistuHaile Mariam towards the Eritrean popula-tion. It was particularly this point that Com-rade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev discussed withMengistu Haile Mariam during his trip toMoscow.

The PMAC is confronting a decisive,

great, and huge task to get the people ofEritrea on the side of the Ethiopian Revolu-tion. Preparations have been made but noconcrete steps and measures. The Sovietcomrades have told Mengistu Haile Mariamand Legesse that it was now important toshow the Eritrean people that the PMAC isnot identical with the regime of EmperorHaile Selassi and the interests of the Ethio-pian Revolution are in harmony with theinterests of the progressive forces in Eritrea.Unfortunately, forces in the PMAC andMengistu Haile Mariam himself havecaused a slow-down of this necessary po-litical work towards the people of Eritrea.Mengistu Haile Mariam is passive.

We completely agree with the estimatethat military actions for the solution of theEritrean question alone are pointless and,moreover, dangerous. They would widen thegap between the Eritrean people and theEthiopian Revolution and create new inten-sified hatred. This does not mean that thePMAC should completely abandon militaryactivities. We think that it is necessary toexert military pressure on the Eritrean sepa-ratists forces. This especially since in regardto military matters the current situation inEritrea is not favorable for the PMAC. It istherefore necessary to talk but at the sametime to act militarily on the part of thePMAC. This applies in particular to the safe-guarding of important military strategic po-sitions and especially of the communica-tions with the ports of Massawa and Assabwell as the capital Asmara, the citiesAkordat, Keren, and Barentu. These mili-tary actions have to serve political measures.

It was emphasized in the talk betweenComrade L.I. Brezhnev and Mengistu HaileMariam that it is necessary for the PMACto address itself to the Eritrean people. Thispolitical initiative is extremely acute todayas never before. We deem it necessary thatboth the CPSU and the SED together exertinfluence on Mengistu Haile Mariam in thisrespect. We have to take into considerationthat the position of the Eritrean movementshas not become any less obstinate, becausethey still demand the separation of Eritrea.This shows that there are no honest effortsfor a political solution on the part of theEritrean representatives. Therefore it is cor-rect to work for a change in the current po-sition of the Eritrean movements. It is espe-cially necessary to receive from them a dec-laration pledging that self-determination for

the Eritrean people will be achieved withinthe framework of a Ethiopian state. We re-ceived an information [report] in early Mayaccording to which direct contacts had beenestablished between the PMAC and theEPLF. We do not know anything about thesubstance of these contacts. With respect tothe concrete question whether it makes senseto continue the negotiations or to await mili-tary actions, Comrade Ulyanovsky statedthat both sides had to be induced to [takepart in] further negotiations and that at thesame time a certain limited military pres-sure was quite useful, meaning that evenwith the continuation of the negotiation ef-forts certain military actions could not beprecluded.

Concerning the question on the con-crete coordination between the CPSU, theSED, and the Cuban CP, ComradeUlyanovsky emphasized that all bilateralcontacts with the Cuban CP are excellentand that the same applied to the SED. Therehas been no exchange of opinion with thePeople’s Democratic Republic of Yemen onthe part of the CPSU. They have, as is wellknown, pulled their troops out of Ethiopia.One has to take into consideration that thesituation in the PDR Yemen is difficult. ThePDR Yemen has to be protected.

Comrade Ulyanovsky agreed to put theproposal for the creation of a mechanismfor consultation and coordination before theleadership of the CPSU. Concerning thequestion of a possible later public announce-ment of our parties on the Eritrean question(in some form), it is expedient to examinethis in the light of the Moscow talks withAhmed Nasser and the planned third meet-ing of the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides withthe SED.

With respect to the question of expertconsultations on variants of a solution, it ispossible at any time for GDR scientists [spe-cialists] to consult with Soviet comradesabout concrete questions. ComradeUlyanovsky thinks that at this point thesecontacts should be limited to the level ofthe International Relations Departments ofthe Central Committees. With respect to theinvolvement of CPSU experts in the con-sultation and negotiations at the third meet-ing, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that hewould put this question before the partyleadership for decision. Concerning theguarantees called for by the Eritrean side,one can only get more precise on this point


after concrete results have been achieved onthe question of what, who, and to whom insome matter guarantees might be given.

Finally, Comrade Ulyanovsky pointedout that the attempt to keep the Ethiopianleadership from its military advance throughus was a very delicate matter. The PMACwas predominantly of the opinion that evena political solution of the Eritrean questionwas not possible without a strengthening ofEthiopia’s military positions in Eritrea andthat the liberation of above-mentioned portsand cities can only be achieved by militarymeans. The PMAC assumed that only then[would] actual and basic conditions exist fornegotiations with the separatists.[...]


SED Department of InternationalRelations, Information on talks of

Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSRSolidarity Committee, 7- 8 June 1978

We received the following informationfrom the CC of the CPSU:

The representatives of the Soviet Com-mittee for Solidarity explained the USSRposition which is based on the assumptionthat the solution of the Eritrean question hasto be achieved within the framework of aunified Ethiopian state by means of nego-tiations.

In effect, the three talks which wereheld with Ahmed Nasser proved that theEritrean friends are not yet willing to ap-proach the question by giving up the sloganof independence for Eritrea. Their argumen-tation is that neither side should coerce theother one into negotiations and a solutioncould only be a result of unconditional ne-gotiations.

In the first conversation on 7 June, A.Nasser indicated that the ELF-RC wouldpossibly consent to a federation. In the fol-lowing talks it was not mentioned again, andby the time the third talk took place on 8June, the position of the Eritrean friends hadeven hardened.

Generally they were at pains to provethat the ELF was the best, the [most] Marx-ist-Leninist of the Eritrean movements.They pointed out their advantages as fol-lows:

1. The ELF recognizes the progressive

character of the Ethiopian Revolution.2. It acknowledges the importance of

the Soviet-Cuban support.3. It does not demand preconditions.4. It is willing to negotiate.5. It favors the unification on a com-

mon democratic basis.The Soviet comrades estimate that the

attitude of the ELF appears to be slightlymore flexible as those of the other Eritreanmovements but this is, however, only an ap-pearance.


Winkelmann, SED CC Department ofInternational Relations,

to Hermann Axen, 9 June 1978

[Introductory remarks]Comrade Ponomarev is sending cordial

greetings to you. In his opinion, Mengistu’srecent speech does not allow for any [new]conclusions with respect to the [Ethiopian-Eritrean] talks in Berlin. Everything shouldbe done as agreed upon. Even after thisspeech there is no reason for any nervous-ness.

Comrade Ponomarev had a long talkwith Comrade Valdez Vivo on 9 June inwhich he also had an exchange of viewsabout Mengistu’s recent speech. The speechis considered as mostly positive. It corre-sponds for the most part with the recom-mendations of the Soviet and Cuban com-rades with respect to the current situationand the necessary measures. It is in harmonywith the agreements which have been madewith Mengistu.

Mengistu’s speech, which contains thenecessary elements for a peaceful solutionof the problem, is the basis for the furtherwork. Mengistu will travel in the next daysto Asmara. It is planned to hold a meetingwith the population in which Mengistu willexplain his program for a peaceful solu-tion. His recent speech is the prelude to thisaction.

[Concluding remarks.]


GDR Embassy in Moscow, 19 June

1978, Memorandum of a Conversationbetween [SED] Comrade Grabowskiand the Head of the Third AfricanDepartment of the [Soviet] MFA,

[CPSU] Comrade Sinitsin

On Mengistu’s speech of 14 JuneThe speech contains statements which

can hardly be read without concern. One stillhas to assume that the military actions ofthe separatists have to be energetically op-posed, that full and effective control by thePMAC and the Ethiopian armed forces overthe cities in the north of the country and theiraccess lines has to be assured. But obviouslythis was not everything that the speechmeant to convey. Intentions for a completemilitary solution of the Eritrean problemshine through. One cannot recognize anynew constructive or concrete suggestions onhow to proceed politically. But this is ex-actly what would be necessary in the cur-rent situation and in the context of corre-sponding necessary military actions.

Obviously those forces within theEthiopian leadership which have alwaysfavored a one-sided military solution havegained ground. It also seems important thatthere is heightened concern about the pos-sibility of a new delay of a solution of theproblem contributing to a renewed destabi-lization of the revolutionary regime.

On Ethiopia’s international situationThe predominant majority of Arab

states is increasingly moving against Ethio-pia. One should under no circumstancesunderestimate the danger involved in theclash between the positions of the reaction-ary and progressive Arab regimes in theEritrean question which is heightened by thepresent policy of the Ethiopian leadership.Basically, only the People’s DemocraticRepublic of Yemen is granting real supportfor the Ethiopian Revolution. Algeria is act-ing in a very reserved way: while acknowl-edging the achievements of the EthiopianRevolution, it does hardly anything concretein support. Syria and Iraq have clearly ex-pressed once more in recent days that theyintend to give support to the [Eritrean] sepa-ratists, including military supplies. The Iraqileadership is also interested in strengthen-ing in every way the pro-Baathistic elementsin Eritrea. The Libyan position is quite un-clear. Even though they rhetorically recog-nize the achievements of the EthiopianRevolution, they, however, less and less ex-


plicitly oppose the separation of Eritrea. Theimpression that the Libyan leadership basi-cally favors the Arabization of Eritrea is notfar off. In no case does it want to see rela-tions among the Arab states, especiallyamong the countries of the rejection front,be burdened by the Eritrean question. Thepressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and Egyptcan definitely be felt. It is difficult to saywhether Arab countries will be willing todeploy troop contingents in Eritrea againstEthiopia. They will undoubtedly take intoconsideration that the predominant major-ity of African countries would oppose sucha move. In their view, Eritrea is a part ofEthiopia. A separation of Eritrea would runcounter to their national interest as strongseparatist movements exert de-stabilizinginfluence in many African countries.

It is remarkable that similar consider-ations make even [Sudanese President JafaarAl-] Numeiri waver. His attitude towardEthiopia has become more careful, despitepressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Be-sides the Southern problem, several otherquestions (refugees from Eritrea, interest inthe use of the Nile) impel him to keep upsomewhat normal relations with Ethiopia.

The African countries are in principleopposed to a change of borders. In this ques-tion the progressive [countries] and thosecountries which are largely dependent on theWest coincide in their views, though the lat-ter fear the revolutionary changes in Ethio-pia. The common danger has even led to arapprochement between Ethiopia andKenya. Kenya appears more aggressive andpositive [in this question] than some pro-gressive African states. Tanzania’s attitudehas a very positive effect as it consistentlyand convincingly opposes the separation ofEritrea. Nigeria, which is under strong pres-sure by the USA and in which the OAU has,as is well known, much influence, alreadyshowed itself to be wavering during the ag-gression by Somalia. Guinea, which has re-cently repeatedly pointed out the war of na-tional liberation by the Eritrean people,gives Ethiopia more headaches than support.

In sum it can be said that the OAU doesnot want to allow for a confrontation and islooking for ways to confirm the inviolabil-ity of borders and the territorial integrity.How little consistent and passive the OAUis, is proved by the fact that Ethiopia hasreceived little support and that - due to thefear of a possible split - even Somalia’s ag-

gression was not condemned.Nevertheless, an intervention by the

Arab countries in Eritrea should run intoconsiderable opposition within the OAU.This is in part the effect of the still deeplyrooted traditional fear and resistance of theAfrican states against Arab expansionism.At the same time, none of the African coun-tries seriously wants to endanger its rela-tions with the Arab states. This altogethervery passive and inconsistent attitude ofmany African countries and of the OAU wasnot an unimportant factor which led theEthiopian leadership to recognize that inpractice only the Socialist countries areEthiopia’s real and principal allies.

Among the imperialist countries, onehas to pay particular attention to the effortsand activities of the USA, Italy, and France.Their situation in Ethiopia and also withrespect to the Eritrean question is quite deli-cate. All imperialist countries, of course, areinterested in the elimination of the Revolu-tionary achievements in Ethiopia and in theestablishment of a pro-Western regime.They are putting all their efforts toward thisgoal. The NATO countries, led by the USA,base their efforts on the sober assumptionthat a frontal attack would hardly help toachieve their goals, would only foster thebasic anti-imperialist mood of the Ethiopianpeople and its leadership and drive Ethio-pia even closer into the hands of the Social-ist community of states. The USA in no casewants to burn all its bridges to Ethiopia. Tothe best of their abilities, they want to de-stabilize the situation in Ethiopia and therevolutionary regime, and undermine andsubvert the revolutionary development inEthiopia. The imperialists aspire to take ad-vantage of ethnic conflicts, exploit the so-cial instability of the leadership, and encour-age nationalist feelings in an effort to fur-ther stiffen the Ethiopian attitude in theEritrean question and thereby aggravate thesituation of the revolutionary regime. Onealso has to take quite seriously the skillfulattempts, in particular by the USA, to launchsuch arguments as “why should the solu-tion of the Eritrean problem be done onlyby way of cooperation with the Soviet Unionand the Socialist countries,” “a certain co-operation with the USA and the West couldcertainly be useful,” “the USA after all haveconsiderable possibilities in effectively in-fluencing Saudi Arabia, Egypt and otherArab countries,” “the West has to offer quite

constructive solutions.” It is remarkable thatAhmed Nasser has pointed to this questionduring his talks with the Soviet comradesin Moscow. The Soviet comrades, however,have no indication that these advances areactually effective. One has to assume thatthe USA would prefer a unified, reaction-ary Ethiopia to a divided Ethiopia. By us-ing the unity slogan, they are trying to acti-vate those reactionary and nationalist forces,which no doubt still exist, against the revo-lutionary regime.

Considering all these aspects it is notsurprising that the USA, Italy, and Francehave officially opposed Eritrean separatism.It is also symptomatic that the United Statesis making obtrusive efforts to prove that itwas they who recommended to Siad Barreto withdraw his troops from Ethiopia. Thecautious handling of aid to Somalia alsoshows that the USA on no account intend tokeep their relations with Ethiopia - in thelong run - strained. The USA and China areusing Somalia and the provocative actionsby Somalia against Ethiopia - which areabove all intended to have a de-stabilizingeffect—more for anti-Soviet than anti-Ethiopian purposes. They understand thatsupport of the Eritrean separatists would alsobe directed against the reactionary forces inEthiopia.

With respect to Somalis, the USA areintent on establishing a foothold and bring-ing the leadership of the country under theirfirm control. In this regard attention has tobe paid to the fact that they also do not con-sider Barre a solid partner. They assume thathe would deceive even the West. Neverthe-less, it is to be expected that Barre will soonmake a trip to the USA. He wants to gainmilitary support in the amount of $1 billion.There are indications that the USA is will-ing to give $50 million.

With respect to similar “military ab-stention” by China, without doubt othermotives play a role: the Chinese leadershipdoes obviously not consider it opportune todisplay its military weakness in public - andespecially in such a burning spot of interna-tional politics. Light arms are less reveal-ing, yet they will not allow Somalia to wagea large war against Ethiopia. In addition,China does not want to strain its relationswith Africa any further.

With respect to the domestic situationin Somalia, one has to first emphasize thatBarre is continuing to exploit nationalist slo-


gans and considerable tribal feuds to elimi-nate progressive elements from the state andparty apparatus and to replace them withpeople faithful to him. This is facilitated bythe fact that the party is without a broad so-cial basis and in practice was organized byBarre from above. Barre is careful not toexpound a pro-Western course. He has toacknowledge that the progressive develop-ment in the past cannot simply be crossedout. The country still has sufficiently pow-erful progressive forces which for now aresilent. He thus prefers to leave many thingsoutwardly as they have been. Officially, theprogram and the organization of the partyare retained. The party organization is evenbeing activated.[Signed] Grabowski.


Minutes of Meeting of CPSU CCPolitburo, 14 July 1978 (excerpt)

MEETING OF THE CC CPSU POLITBURO

14 July 1978

Chaired by Com. KIRILENKO, A.P.

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V.,Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Demichev,P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev,B.N.,Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y.,Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P.,Rusakov, K.V

[...] 9. About Measures for the FutureStrengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian Relations

KIRILENKO. Coms. Gromyko,Andropov, and Ponomarev have presentedthis issue.

MAL’TSEV says that the Ethiopiansare behaving incorrectly in Eritrea. Theyare campaigning against providing au-tonomy to Eritrea. They have begun mili-tary actions there. There are not conduct-ing an entirely correct policy in the Ogadeneither. Military actions are taking placesomewhere there against Somalia.

KIRILENKO. Mengistu is still notsufficiently experienced, but at the sametime he is a very sensitive person, thereforeit is just necessary to educate him, to teach

him.ANDROPOV. It is in the same way

important to show Mengistu that we are onhis side.

PONOMAREV. Yesterday the Secre-tary of the CC of the Communist Party ofCuba, Vivo Valdez visted me. He had beenin Ethiopia. In Cuba he received instruc-tions. He is returning there. Vivo said thatCuba will not undertake to do anything inEthiopia without the preliminary agreementwith the Soviet Union.

In relation to the fact that our Ambas-sador in Ethiopia Com. Ratanov has takenill, and has been in Moscow for three monthsalready, it is apparently necessary to thinkabout sending another comrade there.

ANDROPOV. Ambassador to Ethio-pia Com. Ratanov has already gotten bet-ter, he can go. But overall it evidently makessense for the MFA to think about a newambassador.

KIRILENKO. I think that, you, Com.Mal’tsev, will take measures now to sendthere one of the comrades, say, an advisor,the most experienced, who could help Com.Ratanov.

The draft of the resolution is accepted.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 40, ll. 45,10-12; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision,14 July 1978

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P112/IXTo Comrades: Brezhnev, Kosygin,Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Mazurov,Suslov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov,Katushev, Baibakov, Martynov, Zolotukhin,Patolichev, Skachkov, Garbuzov,Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 112 of the CCCPSU Politburo session of 14 July 1978

About measures for the future strengthen-ing of Soviet-Ethiopian relations

1. Agree with the thoughts containedin the note of the MFA USSR, the Interna-tional department, CC CPSU, and KGB

USSR of 11 July 1978 (attached).2. Affirm the draft of instructions to

the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa (at-tached)

3. Assign Gosplan USSR, GossnabUSSR, [Minzag] USSR, the Ministry ofForeign Trade, the KGB USSR, and theGKES to review the request of the Ethio-pian side and within three weeks in the pre-scribed manner to submit correspondingproposals, including one about providingassistance to Ethiopia in relation to thedrought and one about a delay in paymentfor the general civilian goods which weredelivered for the Ethiopian army.

Assign the appropriate agencies andorganizations to confirm the progress madein fulfilling the obligations of the Soviet sideon agreements and contracts that were con-cluded. Accelerate the realization ofachieved agreements with the governmentof Ethiopian regarding the creation of So-viet-Ethiopian commission on economic co-operation.

Assign the permanent Soviet represen-tative at the Council of Mutual EconomicAssistance to present ideas regarding theprovision by the members of the CMEA ofassistance to the economic development ofEthiopia on a multilateral basis.

CC CPSU SECRETARY

[attachment]Re: Point IX Prot. No. 112

Secret

CC CPSUAccording to the communication from

the Soviet Ambassador in Addis-Ababa, andalso according to the information from theCuban friends, facts are taking place whichbear witness to manifestations of national-istic moods among certain parts of the Ethio-pian leadership following the victory overSomalia in the Ogaden, which already is be-ginning to exert a negative influence onEthiopia’s relations with several countriesof the Socialist community (spec. No. 695of 6\30\78). From the Ethiopian side, inparticular, a certain dissatisfaction is beingexpressed regarding the progress of coop-eration with these countries above all in theeconomic area, complaints connected withthe development of trade-economic rela-tions, not always grounded in fact, are be-


ing put forth. This type of mood in one wayor another shows up in the approach of theEthiopian leadership to a resolution of theEritrean issue.

The MFA USSR, the CC CPSU Inter-national Department, and the KGB USSRconsider it expedient to implement a rangeof steps from our side in order to neutralizethese types of moods in the Ethiopian lead-ership. It would make sense to assign theSoviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa to havea conversation with the chairman of thePMAC, during which in an open andfriendly way opinions would be exchangedabout the future development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, stressing theimmutablity of the policy of the SovietUnion of multi-sided support and assistanceto the Ethiopian revolution.

Taking into account the conversationwith Mengistu it would be possible to re-view the issue of conducting a comradelyexchange of opinions with the leadership ofCuba and the GDR about the current situa-tion in Ethiopia.

Assign the corresponding Soviet agen-cies to carefully review the requests of theEthiopian side vis-a-vis economic issues,and to submit proposals aimed at improv-ing Soviet-Ethiopian economic cooperation.

Please review.

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov B. Ponomarev

11 July 1978

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 91, d. 272, ll. 140-143; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia, back-ground report on “Ethiopia’s Relationswith Western Countries,” August 1978

USSR EMBASSY TOSOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

Re: no 27514 August 1978

ETHIOPIA’S RELATIONS WITHWESTERN COUNTRIES

(Information)

Before the revolution, Ethiopia wasprimarily oriented toward the Western coun-tries, first and foremost toward the USA andthe countries of the “Common market” (Fed-eral Republic of Germany, Italy, England,

France). This determined the external poli-cies of the country, although formally Ethio-pia belonged to the nonaligned countries.

The connection of Ethiopia’s economyand trade as well as its defense to the capi-talist governments was a key factor in theinfluence of the Western countries on Ethio-pia. Until the revolution in 1974 developedcapitalist countries occupied the predomi-nant position in the external trade activityof Ethiopia. Thus, for example, in 1973,they represented approximately 70% of thevolume of external trade (by comparisonwith 3% for the group of socialist countries).

Military supplies were completely de-pendent on the United States.

Meanwhile, the West took into consid-eration first and foremost the significantstrategic position of Ethiopia in the regionof the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and Af-rica as a whole in terms of a confrontationwith the USSR, and likewise the visible situ-ation of the country on the continent in po-litical terms.

At the same time, even during the im-perial regime, between various Westerncountries and, first and foremost, betweenthe USA and the “Common market,” therewas a contradiction with regard to Ethiopiain the area of the economy and, to a certaindegree, in the area of policy. The countriesof the “Common market” were dissatisfiedwith the dominant position of the USA inEthiopia. From a certain point Japan alsoentered the playing field as a competitor.Until the revolution, the sum total of for-eign investments in the country’s economycomprised 504 million rubles.

After 1974 the situation in the regionconcerning political and, particularly, ideo-logical relations with the Western countrieschanged in a fundamental way in connec-tion with the fact that Ethiopia set its coursetoward a socialist orientation and took onas a ruling ideology Marxism-Leninism, andlikewise declared its intent to create a Marx-ist-Leninist party.

The external political course of thecountry also changed. Ethiopia began toconduct an anti-imperialist policy, with thesupport of the countries of the socialist campand, first and foremost, of the USSR. Theposition of foreign capital in Ethiopia wasseriously undermined in connection with thenationalization of the property of Westernfirms in the country and its transfer to theState sector. The capital of the industrial

enterprises which were nationalized in Feb-ruary 1975 (72 enterprises of the manufac-turing industry), in which a foreign compo-nent was dominant, made up 41% of thegeneral sum of paid capital in this branch ofthe national economy. In addition, the Stategained a controlling package of the stocksof another 29 private companies. In ques-tions of defense, Ethiopia practically cut offrelations with the capitalist countries and setits course toward re-arming its army withSoviet weapons.

At the same time, it would be incor-rect to consider that Ethiopia was fully lib-erated from its dependence on Westerncountries, particularly in the economicsphere. The state of Ethiopian debts to theWest in May 1978 comprised 351 millionrubles. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, as a rule, paysoff its debts and credits in a timely fashion,as well as the interest on them, and allotsannually approximately 13 million rubles tothis end, which comprises approximately5% of the annual export earnings and doesnot represent a burden for the country’s fi-nances. Such a policy makes it easier forEthiopia to receive new means for the de-velopment of the country’s economy. Ethio-pia has an acute need for economic assis-tance, particularly since the socialist coun-tries have not taken the place of and do notintend fully to take the place of the economicassistance and technical collaboration withthe Western countries. From the generalvolume of foreign economic assistance, theassistance of the Western countries and in-ternational organizations which are undertheir control in the form of loans and cred-its comprised 75% (status as of May 1978).

It is precisely the economic factor thatthe Western countries are bearing in mindas they pursue a long-term struggle forEthiopia. They will push Ethiopia towardeconomic collaboration with the West,which would enable them to use this factorin pursuit also of political goals, to encour-age the Ethiopian leadership, if not to sup-plant, then to cut back on the influence ofthe USSR.

The other factor which the Westernpowers are counting on, is the inescapable,in their minds, growth of bourgeois nation-alism, or at the very least, of revolutionarynationalism, which would be accompaniedby a break with the socialist countries, anerosion of Marxism-Leninism, and the con-duct of a policy of equal distance from the


East and the West.The Westernizers are making use of the

fact that certain of the socialist countries areconducting themselves with restraint withregard to the development of economic col-laboration with Ethiopia. These countriesinclude Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and alsoRomania, although this is for different rea-sons.

The leadership of the PMAC regardsresentfully and with a lack of understand-ing the fact that the Council for Mutual Eco-nomic Aid [Comecon], to which Ethiopiaappealed with a proposal for the develop-ment of collaboration not only on a bilat-eral, but on a multilateral basis in March1977, has since that time not made any con-crete resolutions, but has rather confined it-self to a declaration of the desire for suchcollaboration.

The Western countries place serioushopes on the fact that the make-up of theState apparatus, as well as a significant partof the officer staff of the military forces ofEthiopia, remains as before. Many of thebureaucrats and officers received their edu-cation in the West, and are subject to theinfluence of bourgeois ideology, and as aconsequence of this they regard unfavorablythe course of the country toward a socialistorientation and the primary development ofrelations with socialist countries. The Ethio-pian leadership, which understands this well,is unable to replace the State apparatus dueto the lack of cadres which have receivedthe appropriate preparation. The regimeremains transitional in the country, new or-gans of authority have not yet been put intoplace. The country’s leadership has onlybegun the work of creating a basis for this.

Drawing a general conclusion, one cansay with certainty that a long-term coursefor the USA and the Western countries forthe struggle for Ethiopia is being plotted.This is evident if only from the fact that, inspite of the Somali adventure, they do notintend to exchange Ethiopia for Somalia.While creating their position in Somalia,they are setting their strategic sights onEthiopia. This can be seen both from thedegree of patience with which the USA,England, and the Federal Republic of Ger-many are regarding the sharp anti-imperial-ist attacks in the speeches of the Ethiopianleaders and in the press.

The head of the government, MengistuHaile Mariam, in a speech he delivered at a

ceremony in honor of the graduates of thecapital’s university, spoke about the impe-rialist plot headed by the USA in the pres-ence of the new American ambassador. ThePeople’s Republic of China acts as an ob-jective and actual ally of imperialism in thestruggle against the countries of socialistcollaboration with Ethiopia. The Western-izers attempt as much as possible to use thisfactor, and do not disdain even to use anti-Soviet propagandistic slogans, which areinvented by the Chinese.

From the other side, in spite of the pres-ervation of the anti-imperialist course, whichwas manifest in the speeches of the Ethio-pian delegation at the Session of the Coun-cil of Ministers and the Assembly of theheads of government of the Organization ofAfrican States in Khartoum, and likewiseat the conference of nonaligned countriesin Belgrade, we cannot consider that thestruggle is over in the ruling circles of thecountry about questions of the external po-litical orientation and the essence of a policyof nonalignment. In this struggle a signifi-cant role is played by the petit-bourgeois in-fluence, which is still quite strong in theofficers’ circles.

Before turning to the nature of Ethio-pian relations with individual Western coun-tries, it is worth noting that in the frame-work of the general anti-imperialist course,Ethiopia continues to distinguish betweenthe USA and the countries of the CommonMarket.

The central flame of anti-imperialistpropaganda is directed against the USA,England, the Federal Republic of Germany,and, to a lesser degree, against France, Italy,and the Scandinavian countries.

The relations of Ethiopia with the USAhave undergone the greatest changes. [TheAmericans] have eliminated their militaryobjects from the territory of the country,their propaganda apparatus, their militarymission; they have cut by one half the staffof the American embassy. The Ethiopiangovernment delayed the agreement for thenew American ambassador by three monthsand gave it only after a serious discussion,in the course of which the Ethiopians warnedthat if the anti-Ethiopian campaign in theUSA, connected, in part, with human rightsissues, was not brought to an end, that theywould seek to break off diplomatic relations.After this the United States was forced toreach a certain compromise.

In order to preserve whatever remainedof their former position in Ethiopia, the USAis trying to use all of the factors enumeratedabove (economic pressure, Ethiopian na-tionalism, ties which remain to the state ap-paratus). To a large extent the condition ofEthiopian finance depends, in particular,upon whether or not the United States buyscoffee, the income from which made up in1977 approximately 75% of the general ex-port earnings of the country. The USA per-sists in offering economic assistance toEthiopia, in particular in answer to the cir-culated appeal from the Ethiopian commis-sion on assistance to the population of theOgaden and Wollo. At the same time, theyunderscore that America offers mainly hu-manitarian aid, while the USSR is generousonly as regards military supplies. Mean-while, in spite of the fact of the worseninggovernmental relations, economic assistancefrom the USA to Ethiopia is growing. Thus,according to information of an AmericanCongressional commission, which visitedthe countries of the Horn of Africa with theaim of collecting information about the situ-ation in the region, if in 1977 this assistancereached 11 million dollars, then in 1978 itreached 15 million dollars.

In July of this year the USA announcedthe delivery in September and October ofthis year of assistance at a level of 12.5 thou-sand tons of food products, valued in sumat 7 million Ethiopian birr. In accordancewith information from the American Em-bassy, philanthropic assistance from theUSA to Ethiopia for the period from 1975reached 75 million Ethiopian birr.

The relations of Ethiopia with thecountries of the Common Market is deter-mined by their mutual interest in maintain-ing economic and commercial ties. Tryingto keep Ethiopia in the sphere of their inter-ests, the Western European countries haveregarded the revolution with patience. Asdoes the USA, they make declarations re-garding their support for the territorial in-tegrity of Ethiopia, both in the event of So-mali aggression and with regard to Eritrea.The new French ambassador, upon convey-ing his letters of credentials to the Head ofthe PMAC, Mengistu Haile Mariam, evendeclared that France respects the path of de-velopment chosen by Ethiopia in the frame-work of a policy of socialist orientation. TheFederal Republic of Germany did not un

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Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976

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