Mosaic Warfare · 2020. 10. 22. · Mosaic Warfare: Example. NIFC-CA. SoSITE. TBD: TBD....

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27 July 2018 Mosaic Warfare Dr. Tim Grayson Director, DARPA/STO Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited UNCLASSIFIED

Transcript of Mosaic Warfare · 2020. 10. 22. · Mosaic Warfare: Example. NIFC-CA. SoSITE. TBD: TBD....

  • 27 July 2018

    Mosaic WarfareDr. Tim Grayson

    Director, DARPA/STO

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • 2

    Asymmetric Advantages ErodingUNCLASSIFIED

    •Adversaries have had 25+ years after Desert Storm to analyze U.S. playbook and

    develop competing weapon systems

    Chinese KJ-2000

    Chinese PL-15 Missile

    Russian S-400 IADS

    Iranian Fateh-110 SRBM

    IRBM: Intermediate Range Ballistic MissileSRBM: Short-Range Ballistic Missile

    © 2009 Zhenguan Studio

    © lt.cjdby.net Source: UMNICK

    Source: M-ATF

    Chinese J-31 Stealth Fighter

    Russian PAK-FA (T-50) Stealth Fighter

    North Korean Musudan IRBM

    Russian SS-N-26 Cruise Missile

    © 2011 Alex Beltyukov

    © 2010 EPA

    Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0

    GNU Free Documentation License, Version 1.2

    ChineseSpace Robotics

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    Source: Wired

  • 3

    A modern complication: a slow reactionUNCLASSIFIED

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

  • Time to field exquisite DoD systems untenable,but there is hope

    4

    Shown: post-WWII new start aircraft developments

    Sources: DARPA/TTO 2012 TTM study. D. Patt. “Start” defined as receipt of contract.

    Tim

    e-to

    -Mar

    ket

    It’s not simply complexity or

    software content driving increased time-to-market

    time between projectsDistribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • How we win – pivot to lethality

    5

    • lethality through diversity of options• impose cost/penalty for any adversary action• adversary left without good options – doesn’t play

    • cannot expect to continue to cover down with invulnerable monolithic systems

    • incremental improvement on current paradigm is untenable

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    UNCLASSIFIED

  • 6

    The promise and payoff of distributed, disaggregated SoS

    senseC2

    kill

    sense1

    sense2

    C2

    kill

    first principlessee first ● shoot first ● wintake action with minimal riskbe resilient and adaptable (OODA)

    Limitations:Vulnerable to evolving adversary kill-chainsDifficult to upgrade

    Advantages:See first, shoot first via distributionHeterogenousAdaptableSpreads riskCan break adversary kill chain

    UNCLASSIFIED

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  • Distributed systems must be Mosaic to win

    pieces, interfaces painstakingly engineered can only be assembled in one way

    creates a distributed monolithretains legacy vulnerabilities, introduces new set

    pieces, interfaces engineered for interoperabilitycan be assembled in many ways

    creates an adaptable, resilient, distributed systemretains, improves legacy capability, mitigates vulnerabilities

    7

    UNCLASSIFIED

    © Dotti Stone© Kyoshino

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

  • How do we make “joint multi-domain battle” fast and adaptive?8

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • Mosaic Warfare = joint multi-domain lethality at speed9

    Supplier

    Consumer

    S1

    S12

    S2C2

    C1

    S3

    S4C3

    S5

    S6C4

    S7C5

    S8

    S9

    S10

    S13S11S14

    S15 S16S17 C6

    C7

    S18

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • Mosaic technologies must address the entire combat lifecycle

    10

    todaymonths -

    years

    goaldays -

    months

    • What effects applied where will meet objectives?• How should assets be provisioned?• How, when will assets get there?

    todaymonths -

    years

    goalhours -days

    • What elements can deliver desired effect?• How can effects delivery be “verified” at mission-planning

    speed given situation uncertainty?

    todaydays -months

    goalhours

    • Employ effects chains during campaign• Integrate autonomous, semi-autonomous effects chains• Train humans to operate with Mosaic elements, chains

    todayhours -days

    goalmins -hours

    • What assets are assigned to what effects chain• Optimize resources against competing demands, objectives• Abstract assets for allocation decision making

    Decision

    Composition

    the

    Mos

    aic

    “Sta

    ck”

    Mission Planning

    Resource Management

    Task Planning

    Execution

    todayhours -days

    goalsecs -mins

    • Task assignment for specific systems (e.g. within a swarm)• How can tasking be distributed to heterogeneous systems

    in a way it can be understood?

    todaymins -hours

    goalms –secs

    • How are systems physically connected (e.g. comms links)?• Can non-native software run on systems?• How can execution be monitored, verified in real-time?

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  • The Pathway to Mosaic Warfare

    11

    Distributed Kill Chain System-of-Systems Adaptive Kill Web Mosaic Warfare

    Example NIFC-CA SoSITE TBD TBD

    Description Manual integration of existing systems

    Systems prepped for multiple battle configurations

    Semi-automated ability to select a pre-defined effects web prior to mission

    Ability to compose new effectswebs at campaign time

    Benefits • Extends effective range• Increases engagement

    opportunity

    • Enables faster integration and more diverse kill chains

    • Allows pre-mission adaptation• More lethal, imposes

    complexity on adversary

    • Adaptable to dynamic threat and environment

    • Scaling to many simultaneous engagements

    Challenges • Static• Long to build• Difficult to operate and scale

    • Each architecture static Limited ability to adapt

    • Cannot add new capabilities on the fly

    • Difficult to operate and scale

    • Static “playbook”• Limited number of kill chains• May not scale well

    • Scaling limited by human decision makers

    t=1t=n

    t=0

    Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    UNCLASSIFIED

  • 12Distribution A: Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited

    Mosaic WarfareAsymmetric Advantages ErodingA modern complication: a slow reactionTime to field exquisite DoD systems untenable,�but there is hopeHow we win – pivot to lethalityThe promise and payoff of distributed, disaggregated SoSDistributed systems must be Mosaic to winHow do we make “joint multi-domain battle” fast and adaptive?Mosaic Warfare = joint multi-domain lethality at speedMosaic technologies must address the entire combat lifecycleThe Pathway to Mosaic WarfareSlide Number 12