International Phenomenological Society

Aesthetics, Signs, and IconsAuthor(s): Charles Morris and Daniel J. HamiltonSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Mar., 1965), pp. 356-364Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2106096Accessed: 13/12/2010 09:44

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AESTHETICS, SIGNS, AND ICONS

In 1939, Charles Morris, one of the co-authors of the present paper, published two articles on aesthetics and the theory of signs.' Since that date, numerous comments, suggestions, and criticisms have appeared con- cerming, first, the feasibility of applying a theory of signs in aesthetics, and, secondly, how such a theory, if practicable, should be formulated.

For purposes of presentation, this current paper is divided into three main sections. The first section briefly restates the major points of Morris' early position. In the second section, some of the suggestions and criticisms which have been made concerning this earlier position are noted and discussed. Finally, the third section deals with the present status of the relationship between aesthetics and a theory of signs.

I

Morris' early position, with regard to aesthetics and the theory of signs, characterized the work of art as a sign, which was, in all but the simplest cases, itself a structure of signs. A sign situation was formulated as any situation in which one thing takes account of something else, which is not directly causally efficacious, through the mediation of a third some- thing. This "third something" is that thing which operates as a sign and is called the sign vehicle. The act of mediated taking account of, per- formed by an interpreter, was called, an interpretant. That which is taken account of mediately was called the designatum. By definition, a sign must designate, but it need not denote. For example, a certain whistle causes one to act as if an otherwise unperceived train were approaching; the sound then signifies an approaching train to the person hearing the whistle, and therefore, functions as a sign. However, one may take account of an approaching train (act as if a train were approaching)

' "Esthetics and The Theory of Signs," The Journal of Unified Science (Er- kenntnis), Vill, #1-3 (1939), 131-150 and "Science, Art, and Technology," Kenyon Review, 1, (1939), 409-423.

356

AESTETICS, SIGNS, AND ICONS 357

when in fact no train is coming; in this case the whistle designates but does not denote.2

Aesthetics, when formulated in terms of signs, becomes a branch of semiotic or the general theory of signs. Within semiotic, aesthetics is dis- tinguished from other sign-functioning activities by regarding the aesthetic sign as a distinct kind of sign. First, the aesthetic sign is, an iconic sign. An iconic sign is one which denotes any object which has a certain col- lection of properties it itself has. In addition, the aesthetic sign designates values and such values are considered as properties of an object or situa- tion relative to an interest. Hence, when an interpreter apprehends an aesthetic sign vehicle which is, by definition, iconic, he apprehends directly what value or values are signified. Thus, both mediated and unmediated taking account of these value properties occur.

Since semiotic contains as sub-branches the sciences of semantics, syn- tactics, and pragmatics, aesthetics may also be characterized as aesthetic semantics, aesthetic syntactics, and aesthetic pragmatics. The study of the relation of aesthetic signs to what is designated or denoted may be called aesthetic semantics; the study of the relations of aesthetic signs to inter- preters may be called aesthetic pragmatics; and the study of the relation of aesthetic signs to other aesthetic signs may be called aesthetic syn- tactics.

Many of the details of Morris' 1939 proposal have been eliminated in the above summary. Nevertheless, the major points, as presented, will serve as a point of reference for examining the numerous comments and criticisms which, through the years, have appeared in answer to Morris' outline of an aesthetic semiotic.

II

Some of the many articles and books which have dealt directly or in- directly with Morris' proposal of an aesthetic semiotic can be broadly classified as follows. First, one group of these is representative of those who oppose a theory of aesthetic signs on the basis that such a theory, however formulated, has no application to art, or, in some instances, has no application to certain forms of art. A second group of writers, on the Other hand, expresses the view that a theory of signs would be useful in an analysis of the arts, but questions certain aspects of the notion of iconicity in art. This second group of writers, therefore, is in basic agree-

2 The formulation of semiotic summarized here is contained in detail in C. W. Morris' monograph, Foundations of the Theory of Signs (University of Chicago Press, 1938). This monograph constitutes Number 2, Volume 1 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.

358 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

ment with certain parts of Morris' general position, and differs from him with respect to how such a theory of signs should formulate the role of the iconic sign in aesthetics. A third group can be considered as pre- senting various other criticisms against a semiotically-based aesthetics. Each of these three groups will be considered.

Arguments against considering the work of art as a sign. The most basic argument against a semiotic theory of art is the argument that a work of art is not a sign. If this argument holds, then the application of a semiotic in the area of aesthetics is greatly reduced, if not completely eliminated.3 One writer who argues that all semiotic theories are system- atically defective when applied to aesthetics is Richard Rudner.4 He argues that if a work of art is considered as a sign, then one cannot characterize the aesthetic experience as both an "immediate taking account of" and a "mediated taking account of." If we characterize the aesthetic experience as an immediate taking account of something, such as a work of art, then the work of art, at that time, is not functioning as a sign. If, on the other hand, we characterize the aesthetic experience as a process of "mediated taking account of," Rudner maintains that there is no way to distinguish the aesthetic experience from other experiences which involve mediation.

One way to combine the mediate and immediate aspects of the aesthetic experience, and, therefore, meet this criticism of Rudner, is to argue that the work of art involves both a sign vehicle and its functioning as a sign.5 The sign presents values mediately, while the sign vehicle presents the same values immediately. This is the position taken by Morris in his earlier articles. Such a position depends on the sign being iconic, how- ever, and there are many problems with the notion of iconicity, as will be shown.

Another way of answering the problem of combining mediation and immediacy is given by Charles Stevenson.6 He asserts that if the inter- pretant of the aesthetic sign process is considered as a disposition to respond, rather than an actual response, it can be maintained that the work of art, to the extent that it involves an interpretant, is functioning

3 One could, of course, maintain that even though the work of art is not a sign, it is composed of signs, and, therefore, a semiotic could still have some application in aesthetics.

4 "On Semiotic Aesthetics," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, X (Sept., 1951), 67-77. See also Kingsley Blake Price, "Is a Work of Art a Symbol?,"Journal of Phil., L, (1953), 485-503.

5 For an additional treatment of this problem see Edward G. Ballard, "In Defense of Symbolic Aesthetics," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, XII (Sept., 1953), 38-43.

6 "Symbolism in the Representational Arts," Language, Thought, and Culture, ed. Paul Henle (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 226-257.

AESTHETICS, SIGNS, AND ICONS 359

as a sign (is mediational), and at the same time results in no subsequent overt behavior, and is, to that extent, an immediate experience.

Stevenson presents this theory of an interpretant as a disposition in showing how symbolism functions in the representational arts. He further maintains, however, in another article, that there is no need to consider the non-representational arts as symbolic.7 His main purpose in this article is to show that an alternative framework can be constructed to examine the non-representational arts, which does not require treating them as symbolic. Stevenson, in effect, limits the application of a semiotic to the representational arts, and in doing so, reduces the area of practi- cable application for a semiotic in aesthetics.

Abraham Kaplan, in setting forth a theory of aesthetics different from Stevenson, also attempts to limit the application of semiotic to the repre- sentational arts. Kaplan asserts that all art is expression, and in the representational arts, referential aspects of art support and contribute to such expressions In the non-representational arts, however, no reference is involved. Hence, Kaplan also attempts to explain the symbolic aspects of representational art, and, at the same time, deny that non-represen- tational art has any symbolic features.

Problems concerning iconicity. Many writers have agreed that a semi- otic would be useful in aesthetics, but have questioned various aspects of Morris' emphasis upon the aesthetic sign as an iconic sign, and also questioned the concept of iconicity in aesthetics. Benbow Ritchie,9 for example, accepts the notion of iconicity in art, but desires to amplify what he calls "formal iconicity." In explaining what is meant by "formal iconicity," Ritchie divides aesthetic value into formal values and extra- formal values. A formal value is a value which satisfies an interest which has been aroused by some aspect of the aesthetic object. An extra-formal value, on the other hand, is a value which satisfies an interest which has been brought ready-made to the work of art. Iconic signs are then clas- sified as formal icons and extra-formal icons, depending on whether they signify a formal value, or an extra-formal value.

Since Ritchie emphasizes the importance of formal values for the over-

7 Charles Stevenson, "Symbolism in the Nonrepresentational Arts," ibid., pp. 196-225.

8 "Referential Meaning in the Arts," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, XHI (June, 1954), 457-474. An additional example of emphasis upon expression in art can be found in Isabel C. Hungerland, "Iconic Signs and Expressiveness," The Problems of Aesthetics, ed. E. Vivas and M. Krieger (New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1953), pp. 234-239.

9 "The Formal Structure of the Aesthetic Object," The Problems of Aesthetics, ed. E. Vivas and M. Krieger, pp. 225-233.

360 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

all appreciation of art, he places major importance upon the formal iconic signs in art. Accordingly, semiotic should formulate more clearly the role of formal icons of value within a work of art.

Another writer, Louise Roberts,1o also considers the function of the iconic sign in the aesthetic experience as important. She does not, how- ever, maintain that a semiotic can furnish a complete analysis of art. Furthermore, she considers Morris' formulation of iconicity as essentially ambiguous in various places. The major problems center around the relationship between conventional signs and iconic signs, and the distinc- tion between signs as they function within a work of art, and the work of art itself, considered as a sign. She says.

A work of art as a whole may be an iconic sign in a simpler sense of imita- tion.... It is a product of the selections of the artist and as such is indicative of his values.... Furthermore, a work of art, beside being an iconic sign, may contain other iconic signs.... A syntactical problem lies in the organi- zation of signs within a work of art. This is complicated by the fact that some of these signs may be conventional, some may be both conventional and iconic, others may be predominantly iconic with little conventionalization. It is further complicated by the relation between these signs and the iconic function of the work of art as a whole."

Roberts concludes that the notion of iconicity is useful in aesthetics, but the above complications and problems show that a detailed analysis of iconicity, and its function in art, is necessary.

An additional treatment of the questions raised by Ritchie and Roberts concerning the difference between the work of art as an iconic sign, and iconic signs as component parts of the work of art, can be found in an article by Clifford Amyx.12 Amyx maintains that the concept of iconicity as originally formulated was a semantical concept. The concept was semantical to the extent that a sign's denotata had to be considered in determining whether such a sign was iconic, and questions about a sign's denoting are questions of semantics. Amyx then argues that many writers, such as Ritchie, in attempting to develop a theory of iconicity within a work of art, have had to consider the relation between iconic signs as they function as component parts of a work of art. This, according to Amyx, is a syntactical problem, rather than a semantical problem.

While we may not agree that this is a syntactical problem, Amyx's dis- cussion does again point up the problem of clearly formulating the rela-

10 "Art As Icon: An Interpretation of C. W. Morris," Tulane Studies In Philos- ophy, IV (1955), pp. 75-83.

11 Ibid., p. 82. 12 "The Iconic Sign in Aesthetics," Journal of Aes and Art Crit, VI (Sept.,

1947), 54-60.

AESTHETICS, SIGNS, AND ICONS 361

tion between the work of art as an iconic sign, and iconic signs within the work of art. It also indicates that additional work is required in for- mulating the roles of aesthetic semantics and aesthetic syntactics within an aesthetic semiotic.

- A further problem associated with the role of iconic signs in art is the difficulty of determining which signs are to be considered as iconic. An iconic sign, as originally formulated by Morris, was a sign whose sign vehicle possessed certain properties, in common with the properties of those objects which the sign did or might denote. The major problems with this formulation are, first, what common properties are to be con- sidered as relevant to iconicity, and, secondly, how many properties must be found to be common in order to call the sign iconic. These problems indicate that some study is required in order to distinguish between an iconic sign and a non-iconic sign.

One method of partially avoiding the above problems would be, to eliminate the dichotomy between iconic signs and non-iconic signs, and replace it with a scale of iconicity. Such a scale would be broadly for- mulated, having at one end signs with little or no iconicity, and at the other end, signs with a high degree of iconicity. In between these two extremes, signs could be placed depending upon their degree of iconicity. This would emphasize the fact that iconicity of a sign is, to a large extent, a matter of degree, and not governed by a strict rule. Furthermore, such a scale would eliminate the, problem of determining how many common properties a sign vehicle and its denotata must possess in order to call the sign iconic. Unfortunately, a scale of iconicity would not eliminate the necessity of determining just which properties are essential to iconi- city. This, presumably, would vary with different sign situations, for properties which are relevant to the iconicity of a sign vehicle in one situation need not be relevant in another situation.

Stevenson, in attacking symbolism in the non-representational arts, argues against iconicity by asserting that under one interpretation, every- thing can be considered as an iconic sign of itself, and, therefore, the notion of iconicity within art is trivial. He says,

Moreover, since a sign becomes iconic in virtue of a similarity between itself and its designatum, we need only the principle, "everything resembles itself," to conclude that a Greek border can be an iconic sign of itself. Note that the same thing can be said of anything on earth, provided that it is perceivable and of sufficient interest to get a second look.13

The difficulty of distinguishing between an iconic sign and a non-iconic sign is pointed up by Stevenson's criticism. Furthermore, it seems to lend support to the desirability of formulating a scale of iconicity.

13 Stevenson, "Symbolism in the Nonrepresentational Arts," p. 200.

362 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

One final point which is of interest may be mentioned as relevant to iconicity within aesthetics. In Morris' early formulation of semiotic, as was noted previously, all signs, by definition, must designate, but they need not denote. The iconic sign, however, was said to have its sign vehicle among its denotata. Therefore, an iconic sign, under this formu- lation, will always denote at least one object, its own sign vehicle, and this is in contradiction to the previous position that all signs must designate but need not denote. Obviously, the whole question of the denotation of iconic signs needs careful investigation.

Additional problems within an aesthetic semiotic. As has been noted, the main arguments which have been presented against a semiotic for aesthetics have attempted to show, first, why a work of art should not be considered as a sign, and, secondly, why Morris' formulation of the aesthetic sign as an iconic sign presents certain problems. In addition to these two main areas of disagreement, however, various other isolated problems have been raised in connection with applying a semiotic in aesthetics.

For one example, Allen Tate,14 and others, argue that Morris' pro- posal of a semiotic does not adequately take into account the role of cognition in the aesthetic experience. In his formulation, Morris main- tained that value properties of an aesthetic object, in some sense, "stand out" for inspection, and the perceiver, therefore, has a "direct appre- hension" of such value properties. Tate's main criticism is that the use of terms, such as stand out and direct apprehension, does not show how the interpreter apprehends value properties without performing some act of cognition.

Tate's criticism suffers somewhat from his use of the word cognition, which he never adequately interprets. Nevertheless, his criticism does point up certain difficulties in using terms, such as direct apprehension of value properties, and indicates that additional clarification is neces- sary on this point, such as the inclusion of various examples taken from the arts.

Another issue is concerned with extending the subdivisions of semiotic (syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics) into the area of aesthetics. Such an extension, as has been previously noted, results in characterizing aesthetics as aesthetic syntactics, aesthetic semantics, and aesthetic prag- matics. For example, John Ransom 15 maintains that the pragmatic factor of an aesthetic semiotic is of considerably less importance than is the

14 Reason In Madness (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1941), pp. 20-62. 15 The New Criticism (Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1941).

AESTHETICS, SIGNS, AND ICONS 363

semantic factor. Furthermore, both Ransom and Stevenson question the importance of syntactics for aesthetics. Ransom says,

He [Morris] claims that art is especially interested in the syntactical dimension of discourse, but offers almost no study of how art makes a syntax out of its peculiar mixture of pure symbols and iconic signs.... Is its syntactical validity comparable with that of science? Is its syntactical validity comparable with its own semantical validity . . . ? 16

Stevenson, questioning the same point, says, Presumably, the syntactical rules of music are no more than the rules of harmony and counterpoint, together with those broader rules of composition that concern the form of the sonata, the fugue, etc. And it is not clear that these familiar disciplines, once they are classified as "syntax," will have enough in common with the syntax of ordinary languages, or the syntax of logic, to make the classification useful.'7

These criticisms make evident the fact that additional work may be necessary in characterizing aesthetic syntactics, aesthetic semantics, and aesthetic pragmatics, in order to insure the usefulness of the distinction.

Although other criticisms have been raised against applying a semiotic within aesthetics, those selected for examination in this section seem to be the more significant ones. With these criticisms and suggestions in mind, it is now advantageous to examine the present status of the rela- tionship between aesthetics and a theory of signs.

III

The early formulation of a semiotic for aesthetics can be considered as a general proposal of a terminology for talking about art, and, because of its generality, many individual points and issues were not elaborated. One way, perhaps, to determine the significance of a proposal is to examine the amount of comments and criticisms it engenders, for it is these subsequent suggestions and criticisms which point up weaknesses and also areas which need expansion. For this reason, the large number of discussions which appeared following Morris' early articles on semiotic and aesthetics is gratifying.

In general, this article has not been concerned with answering criti- cisms, nor in preparing a defense of an aesthetic semiotic. Also, it has not in most cases offered any expansion of troublesome issues which were indicated in the various suggestions by other writers. This would be a task for a later, and more extensive, study. Nevertheless, the exami- nation of critical material and suggestions in the preceding sections does indicate certain generalizations.

'6 Ibid., p. 287. 17 Stevenson, "Symbolism in the Nonrepresentational Arts," p. 201.

364 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

First, it is evident that to what extent a semiotic can be applied within aesthetics is an open question. At present, it is not maintained that aesthetics can be exhaustively analyzed through a semiotic. However, it is apparent that signs do function in art, and, in this respect a semiotic would be helpful.

Moreover, in the early formulation, emphasis was placed upon the, role of the iconic sign in art. Subsequent criticisms and suggestions now make it evident that serious problems are, associated with the notion of iconi- city, and additional analysis is required here. It is, believed at this, time that the iconic sign functions significantly in art, although the degree of this significance is, again, an open question.

More detailed work is required to show the role of signs in art. Stevenson, in his article on symbolism in the representational arts, has attempted to elaborate and analyze in detail the way in which signs function in art and also enrich the aesthetic experience. The results of such work are encouraging, and it is hoped that it will be continued.

In conclusion, the major requirement, at present, seems to be recog- nition that a theory of signs offers one possible framework for analyzing works of art. The degree, of significance of such a semiotic in the area of aesthetics is a question which cannot be resolved until additional study, along the lines indicated, is completed.

CHARLES MORRIS

DANIEL J. HAMILTON. UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA.