Moreau on EXTG

7/31/2019 Moreau on EXTG

1/14

Document Released Under the Access to

Information Act / Document divulquc en vertu

de la loi sur racces a rinfolnlalion

EXERCISE TRILLIUM GUARDIAN 2010

GOC CONFIRMATION REPORT

EXERCISE NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

1. As a reminder of the context within which Exercise Trillium Guard was conducted the national

objectives for this important pre-operation training event are provided:

a. Integration of security, protection and safety measures necessary to support the G8-G20

Summit.

b. Within an integrated all-hazards approach and whole-of-government response framework, the

exercise program was to provide all participating organizations with the ability to become

familiar with, practice, test and confirm operational capabilities and Management and

Coordination arrangements for the four interdependent emergency management based

functions:

i. Prevention and Mitigation

eliminate or reduce the impacts and risks;

mitigate the impact of security and safety related incidents;

ii. Preparedness. Ready to respond and manage consequences;

iii. Response. Respond during or immediately following security and safety related

incidents; and

iv. Recovery. Restore or repair conditions to an acceptable level.

2. Exercise Trillium Guardian was a "Tier 1" exercise and the second of two national level exercises

intended to assist organizations to achieve the required level of readiness to deliver safe and secure G8

and G20 Summits.

AIM

3. The aim of Exercise Trillium Guardian is to confirm a functional integrated command and

coordination structure with effective information and intelligence sharing in support of the Canadian

national security and emergency management framework for the Summits.

Business Confidential

Moreau Emergency Management Consulting Corp. & Public Safety Canada GOC

Intemal use only

000154


2/14

Document Released Undel the Access to

Inlolmahon Act I Doculllenl divtllgue ell v('llu

de 1


3/14


Inforrlwlion Act I Document divulgue en verlu

de la loi sur I'acces a I'infolmahon



6. The TGconfirmation effort was focused by the four overarching confirmation themes:

a. Command and control (C2),

b. Planning,

c. Coordination and

d. Communications (including public affairs).

7. In the preparations for TG, the team analyzed the planned scenario events against this thematic

framework in order to determine those that could be expected to be "high payoff" for our purposes.

The result was that while all events would be followed, particular attention would be paid to the Barn

Exploitation and food contamination scenarios, the Toronto protests, the Westin evacuation, the

highway blockages and the air incursions.

PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA - GOC CONFIRMATION

8. As the Exercise TG Confirmation Team representative inside Public Safety Canada's GOC my.

primary mandate was the same as the entire Team, to focus on the seams in terms of Command and

control, planning, coordination, information flow, and communications. In addition, I elected to add the

aspect of Information Management and Situational Awareness given the GOe's mandate.

9. In order to maximize the training opportunity presented by Exercise TG, I was asked, where it

made sense to do so, to provide feedback and observations on issues internal to the GOe. I focused my

observations on the following functional areas:

a. GOC Command and control;

b. Integration of the planning function;

c. GOC operations;

d. GOe's enabling tools; and

e. Information Management & Situational Awareness.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS UNIQUE TO EXERCISE TG

10. Many of the organizations and individuals involved in Exercise TG where fresh from having just

completed a major operation with the recent conclusion of the Vancouver 2010 Olympics and'-

Paralympics Winter Games. It became very clear that a significant number of Departments and Agencies

under estimated the political dimension of a short duration, high visibility event such as the upcoming

G8/G20 Summit. This was not the case for the GOe. The political dimension introduced a pull for

information to the top not present to the same extent during The Vancouver Winter Games despite the



Internal use only

000156

"'---./


4/14

Doeul1l,l1t Released Ulldel the Aece~~ 10

Inlorrnolion Aet I Doculllt"nl dr"'t1I~IUE'ell ,


5/14

5.15(1)




Information Act I Document divulgue en veJlu

de In Loi Slil I'acces;i !'information

12. Planning Function. The planning function at the National level was not exercised during Exercise

TG. Most planning activities were isolated to SMO and the Security Forces. The Thallium/terrorism

threat scenario could have triggered a planning cycle at the National Level to manage the deployment of

mitigation measures and develop a consequence management plan in cooperation with SMO and

Security Forces in the event the threat did materialize. However, the ability to trigger such a planning

cycle,

a. Observations. Collaborative planning and exchanges of plans between

organizations are the key areas requiring better definition and cooperation in

advance of the Summit.

i. Collaborative Planning. In general the roles and responsibilities regarding pre-event

planning are well understood. However the same degree of clarity did not seem to

apply regarding the conduct of emergency planning during an actual event. The

roles and responsibilities for planning appeared to be especially blurred in the area

of consequence management and planning related to immediate or emerging

potential threat/risk for the purpose of mitigation or response. No planning cycles

where initiated during Exercise TG. This may be due to the fact that required

planning thresholds were never met due to lack of information. However,

discussions surrounding the requirement to plan in support of ADM EMC and DM

SAChighlighted the need for a better collaborative planning environment to be

created between agencies. Consideration should be given to the activation of an

event specific planning group involving representation from all required

Government departments. Using the Liaison Officers present inside the GOC may

not provide the level of organizational knowledge and expertise necessary to

develop mitigation, consequence management or response options in support of

the Government. In addition, conflict could arise with the Liaison Officers primary

role. Presently planning appeared to occur in isolation, back in respective

Departments and Agencies without the benefit of a centrally managed and

coordinated planning effort. The GOC Plans & Logisitcs Group appears to be ideally

suited to lead, manage and coordinate this whole of Government Planning effort

during an event.



Internal use only

000158


6/14

5.15(1)

13.

ii.

Document Released Undel the Access 10

lnloll11


7/14

5.15(1)


Information Act I Document divulgue en vertu

de la Loi SlJrI'acces a !'information



1

b. Information Silos The graphic below illustrate the current flollJ of informatio:r

from various Federal Departments and Agencies and the GOC In general the

information flows in silos With some lateral sharing bet\\'een agencies has required.

Some of that Information flows thought the GOC but the more senSitive information

appears to flow upward to the ADM level or equivalent at each parent organIZation

byoasslng the GOC entirely Critical information is not laterally shared until groups such

as DM SAC and ADM EMC meet.

( Need for Information Sharing. What is clearly miSSing is a forum, most l ikely at

the DG Level. where all relevant ,nformation is shared, classified or not. In order to

generate the situational awareness and assessment of the impact of the threat required

to support the deCISion making process of ADM EMC and DM SAC The Olembershlp to

thIS group must be flexible and tailor made to the nature of the event. A similar group

already exists to deal with Cyber event and could be adopted for other events and

emergencies involving National Security. Their role would be to:

I. Share all pertinent information regardless of the senSitivity or claSSification.

II. Establish Situational Awareness for ADM EMC and DM SAC

Iii. Assess the risk of releasing some claSSified ane sensitive informJ~ion in order to

inform the planning and decision making process to generate J timely responsc.

v Asscss impact of threat and risks to a specific operation.

v. Gui de tre planning cycle.

v, Prepare advice for ADM EMC and D M SAC

Vii Approved a sanitized situation report for release to wider audience for

SituationJI awareness.

000160


8/14

5.15(1)

d.

Documenl Released Under Ihe Access to

Information Act I Document divltlgue en vellu

d e l a l oi S UI racc>s a !'informatioll



Risk Based Information Sharing. The difficulty experience during

Exercise TG surrounding the release and sharing of sensitive but critical

information does not appear to be unique to Exercise TG but have occurred at various

levels during recent real operations and events. This situation highlights the

requirement to establish a clear mechanism to share classified and sensitive information

in a timely manner in order to inform the decision-making process, the situational

awareness process, the planning process and the threat-risk assessment process. The

flow of less sensitive information into the GOCseems to work well

when considering the reiease

and sharing of National Security, Law Enforcement or otherwise sensitive

information:

i. Protecting the chain of evidence

ii. Protecting the source of the information

iii. Operationai Security

Iv. Operational requirements (need to plan and execute a timely response)

CONFIRMATION TEAM OBSERVATIONS -INTERNAL TO GOC

14. Although the provisions of observations regarding the internal procedures and processes of the

GOCwere not the primary focus of the Confirmation Team, it was felt that providing such was feedback

was desired and welcome. The observations presented below are a result of discussions with GOC

members, Liaison Officers and Management as well as my own.

15. Command and Control. During discussions with both GOC Staff and Liaison Officers, the issue

of lack of clarity on the Command and Control inside the GOCwas raised on several occasions. People

felt that they were not sure who was in charge during a given shift. The Command and Control

arrangements might be clear to those who have been around the GOClong enough but this is not the

case for others. Some are under the impressions the SARAhas the lead while others believe the Director

of the GOCis the lead. In order to clarify the C2 arrangements inside the GOC,I offer the following

comments:


Moreau Emergency Management Consulting Corp. & Public Solety Canada GOC

Internal use only

000161


9/14


Information Act I Documenl divulgue en vertu

de la Loi sur I"acces a rinfolmalion



a. Clearly Display inside the GOC who is the Senior Manager on duty along with the roster

for each shift.

b. Include, if not already done, in the GOCtraining for Liaison Officers and new GOCStaff asection on the GOCCommand and Control.

c. Other option would be to keep both DGand DOGout of the minute by minute oversight

of the GOCOperations to act as the Bridge between PSCADM's Office, ADM EMC and

GOe. This would allow them to provide guidance and direction on strategic information

requirements, SA products and decision support products (Info Briefs, Decision Briefs,

Threat/Risk Assessments).

d. The leadership for each shift would come from the four directors. This approach may

be problematic because two of the directors (Cyber and Pians/Logisitcs) have very

specific duties and depending on the event being dealt with may have to focus on

coordinating their group's activity.

16. Planning function. This may have been exercise artificiality but the role of the Planning

Group did not seem to be well understood within the GOCand amongst the Liaison Officers. The graphic

below articulates my current understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the various elements of

the GOCincluding the relationship between them. In summary:

a. GOC's Watch Team(s) main role is to monitor and warning as well as to manage the

flow of information in and out of the GOe.

b. SARA main role is the assess information and to produce Situational Awareness and

Intelligence Products. Their role is to answer the SOWHAT and assessthe impact of

events and situations. Their products are essential to inform and support both the

planning process and decision-making process.

c. Plans & Logistics Group is responsible for emergency, contingency and long terms

planning. Their role is to provide response options based on the SA, impact assessments

and information provided by GOC/SARA.While SARAputs together the Info Brief, the

Plans & Logistics Group should be responsible to produce the Decision Brief and any

documents required to articulate a whole of Government Response. Comments. The

Plans & Logisicts Group must be better linked in with SARAduring the Threat, Situation

and Impact assessment stage in order to initiate a planning cycle early. Criteria and

triggers to initiate an emergency or contingency planning cycle must be clearly

articulate and the required planning guidance must be provided by the GOe Senior

Leadership.



Internal use only

000162


10/14

DOCUl11ellt Released Underlhe Access to

Inlorm;)lion Act f Documenl divulglle en vetlu

de 101Loi sur I'acces a l'informatiOIl



i,e'

ADGO

Corporate/Support

ASSESSMENTS/SA

SARA

Figure 2 - GOC Functional Model

Other Government Departmen:;'.{l""and Agencies

Other Canadia.'H

Internatio~";"" ,,.,,,

OPERATIONS &

COORDINATION

GoeMonitoring & Warning-- .0>";'

,~Cj_";.:);'"

Notification

CCIRC

(Self contained capability)

(VBER Monitoring & Warning

RESPONSE

PLANNING & LOGISTICS

GROUP

Conduct Event Specific

Advanced Planning


Moreau Emergency Management Consulting Carp. & Public Safety Canada GOC

Internal use only

000163


11/14

Document Released Under the Access 10

Inlormalion Act! Documellt divttl(lue ell vettu

de 1


12/14

DocuJlll"nl Rl"leasl"d Undl"! lhl" AcCl"ss 10

Inlo!f1J;)llon Act.l Document drvulguE' en "1"1hi

de I;) Loi SlII I"ncce.sil filllOfmnllOIl



e. Integrated Incident Management System System (log, event templates, geo productsl.

Currently the GOC uses a version of the ETeam Incident Management Software as well as aseparate application called the Canadian Common Operating Picture. ETeam is mainly used

as a log for day to day or event specific. The accessto the Canadian Common Operating

Picture is limited and only a handful of people are training to use it. The GOCshould

investigate Fully Integrated Incident Management Applications capable of integrating the

following tasks:

i. Communications lOG;

ii. Incident/event response templates and checklists;

iii. Dashboard capability to track status of tasks;

iv. Geomatics products;

v. Capability to maintain a Common Operating Picture;

vi. Links to Standard Operating Procedures;

vii. Capacity to rapidly package the information to create an event SA page; and

viii. Handover brief function to faCilitate shift changes.

f, Requirement for Regular Staff Updates Briefs. During Exercise TG, I noticed that the only

formal briefings for the GOCStaff and Liaison Officers occurred at shift change. This may be

sufficient during a slow pace operation or event but may not be sufficient to maintain GOC

Staff SA during a more complex and dynamic event. The GOCshould consider implementing

a GOCStaff Update Brief to take place either at a set interval or when something significant

has occurred requiring the synchronization of the Team. The proposed standard template is

as follows:

i. Situation update to focus on incidents closed or solved since last brief;

ii. Current situation update to focus on key events and activities actively monitored by

the GOCto include latest development of interest;

iii. Update on status of key GOC actions taken or on going (Assessment being produced

by SARA,Decision Brief for ADM EMC, RFIstatus);

iv. Assign new tasks as required or adjust previously assigned tasks;

v. Confirm timelines for next deliverables (SITUATION REPORT,DECISIONBRIEF,INFO

BRIEFetc);

vi. Round table; and

vii. Confirm timing for next update.



Internal use only

000165


13/14

Document Released Undel Ihe Access to

Inlormnlion Act' Docwnenl divulglle en verlu

de In Loi sUll'acces a l'informnlion



18. GOCOperations. Overall the processes and procedures witnessed during Exercise TG worked

well and seemed well understood by most. The following observations are provided in areas where

some improvements could be made to enhance existing capabilities and overall effectiveness of the

GOC;

a. Clear Battle Rhythm. This point was mentioned under enhancements to internal SA but

clearly displaying the GOC's Battle Rhythm for all to see would enhance awareness of

key timings essential for the smooth operation of the GOC;

b. More structure in shift change brief. All the shift change or morning brief I witnessed

focused heavily on reviewing the RFIMatrix or did not appear to follow a set agenda. I

suggest that a structured approach to shift change briefs be implemented in order to

make sure all pertinent information is covered in a logical manner to facilitate a

smooth transition from one team to the other. The structure of the shift handover brief

would be very similar to the GOCStaff Update Brief:

Situation update to focus the past 8 or 12 hours depending on shift duration;

Update on status of key GOCactions taken or on going to complete a smooth

handover of actions in progress or to be initiated by the incoming team;

Confirm timelines for next deliverables (SITUATION REPORT.DECISIONBRIEF.INFO

BRIEFetc);

Confirm new RFlsor request for specific products;

Confirm key events to occur during the next shift; and

Break off to individual work station to complete individual handover.

Formal SOPsto bring in ODG lO. In at least one occasion, I witnessed a liaison Officer

from Transport Canada who had no idea of her role inside the GOc. The responsibility to

prepare the liaison Officer is shared between the individual own Department and the

GOc. I am assuming that clear guidance has been communicated to all Departments and

Agencies required to provide a liaison Officer to the GOC. I will limit my observations to

the reception and integration of the liaison Officers in the GOc. The integration of

liaison Officers into the GOCshould go through four stages:

i.

li.

iii.

iv.

v.

vi.

c.

i. Selection and training by own Department and Agency

ii. Training and GOCfamiliarization training provided by GOCon a cyclical basisiii. Administrative Reception upon activation (Should cover access control, computer

password, assignment of a work stations, shift schedule, phone number and feeding

arrangements.

iv. Operational Reception once the GOCadministrative reception is completed, the liaison

Officer is handed over to a pre-designated member of SARAwho will than brief the


Moreau Emergency Management Consulting Carp. & Public Safety Canada GOC

Intemal use only

000166:

_i;


14/14

5.15(1)

SUMMARY

Document R'leased Ulidel the Access 10

Illlollllahon Act I Ooctlllleni divulgue en ,,('rlu

de-In Loi SUI I'acces a rinfolnUlllon



Liaison Officer on GOCOperations such as Battle Rhythm, LO responsibilities,

contribution to deliverable, Situation update, shift hand over procedures before allowing

them to sit at a desk. Preferably this should coincide with a regular shift handover but

during activation the process may have to be repeated with each Liaison Officer

depending on their level of familiarity and previous exposures to GOC Operations

19. .overall Exercise TG was very successful. The observations and comments contained in this

report are aimed at improving already mature and well established process and procedures. Going

forward, the most pressing issue to address, because of its potential negative impact on the

effectiveness and timeliness of a whole of government response,

Solving this issue is critical for the GOe's

ability to effectively carry out its mandate, on behalf of the Government of Canada, to generate and

maintain situational awareness in support of both planning and decision-making required for the timely

deployment of risk mitigation measures and implementation of response plans.

Prepared by

(original signed by)

Richard Moreau

Moreau Emergency Management Consulting Corp


Moreau Emergency Management Cansulting Corp. & Public Safety Canada GOC

Internal use only

000167'

J

Moreau on EXTG

Documents

Transcript of Moreau on EXTG