Monsod Medina Martial Law Petition

8/14/2019 Monsod Medina Martial Law Petition

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESSUPREME COURT

MANILA

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD andCARLOS P. MEDINA JR.,

Petitioners,

- versus - G.R. No. ____________________For: Certiorari under Rule 65

EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in hiscapacity as ExecutiveSecretary,

Respondent.xx -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- xx

P E T I T I O N

PETITIONERS in the above-entitled case, by their undersigned

counsel, and to this Honorable Court, respectfully state:

THE PARTIES

PetitionerCHRISTIAN S. MONSOD is a Filipino, of legal age,

with address at 2304 Morado Street Dasmarias Village, Makati City.

PetitionerCARLOS P. MEDINA JR. is a Filipino, of legal age,

with address at c/o 20 Rockwell Drive, Rockwell Center, Makati City,

1200.

All petitioners are citizens and taxpayers, and may be served


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Respondent EDUARDO R. ERMITA is the Executive Secretary

of the Republic of the Philippines, and may be served with summons

and other processes of this Honorable Court at the Office of the

Executive Secretary, Malacaang Palace, Manila. On 4 December

2009, respondent, acting on orders of President Gloria Macapagal-

Arroyo, issued Proclamation No. 1959 dated 4 December 2009,

entitled Proclaiming a State of Martial Law and Suspending the

Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Province of

Maguindanao, Except for Certain Areas (hereinafter Proclamation

No. 1959), a true copy of which is hereto attached marked as Annex

A and made an integral part hereof.

J U R I S D I C T I O N

A. NATURE OF THE PETITION

The instant petition is for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court and the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court is being invoked

by herein petitioners pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987

Constitution, on the ground that Proclamation No. 1959, declaring a

state of martial law in the province of Maguindanao, except for the

identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front as referred to in

the Implementing Operational Guidelines of the GRP-MILF


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duration of the state of martial law, was clearly issued by respondent

without any factual or legal basis and in gross contravention of the

1987 Constitution, existing law and prevailing jurisprudence.

Hence, as Proclamation No. 1959 is patently offensive and

oppressive not only to herein petitioners as citizens and taxpayers,

but at odds with the Constitution, law and jurisprudence, and have

been issued in obvious excess of respondents jurisdiction and in

grave abuse of his discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction, where appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate

remedy does not lie, resort to the instant petition for certiorari was

rendered necessary to arrest this jurisdictional travesty because in

Lazatin vs. Kapunan,1 this Honorable Court stressed that

It has been said that a wide breadth of discretion isgranted a court of justice in certiorari proceedings. Thecases in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined.Because, to do so would be to destroy itscomprehensiveness and usefulness. So wide is thediscretion of the court that authority is not wanting to

show that certiorari is more discretionary than eitherprohibition or mandamus. In the exercise of oursuperintending control over inferior courts, we are to beguided by all the circumstances of each particular caseas the ends of justice may require. So it is, that the writwill be granted where necessary to prevent a substantial

justice.

x x x. It is better, on balance, that we look beyondprocedural requirements and overcome the ordinary

reluctance to exercise our supervisory powers. And this,to the end that the orders issued below may be controlledto make them conformable to law and justice.


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Stated differently, where, as in the instant case, the issuance of

Proclamation No. 1959 issued by herein respondent is in blatant

disregard of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence, immediate

correction by this Honorable Court is rendered imperative through the

instant special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, consistent with

Demetria vs. Alba,2 which stressed that

x x x where the legislature or the executive actsbeyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomesthe duty of the judiciary to declare what the otherbranches of the government had assumed to do as void.This is the essence of judicial power conferred by theConstitution in one Supreme Court and in such lowercourts as may be established by law [Art. VIII, Section 1of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973Constitution and which was adopted as part of theFreedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987

Constitutional and which power this Court has exercisedin many instances.

Public respondents are being enjoined from actingunder a provision of law which We have earlier mentionedto be constitutionally infirm. The general principle reliedupon cannot therefore accord them the protection soughtas they are not acting within their sphere of responsibilitybut without it.

B. LEGAL STANDING OF THE PETITIONERS

The petitioners are all concerned citizens and taxpayers of the

Philippines, and are therefore entitled under Article VII, Section 18 of

the 1987 Constitution, to petition this Honorable Court to review the

sufficiency of the factual basis of the issuance of Proclamation No.

1959 thus


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Sec. 18. x x x.

x x x.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriateproceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of thefactual basis for the proclamation of martial law or thesuspension of the privilege of the writ or the extensionthereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon with inthirty days from its filing

x x x.

Moreover, the instant case involves issues of paramount

importance as the constitutionality of a declaration of state of martial

law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is in

question, and the very future of our nation is at stake, what with the

possibility of setting a dangerous precedent that may undermine the

fundamental law of the land and lead to the unbridled exercise of

Commander-in-Chief powers in derogation of our most cherished

constitutional precepts and principles.

Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the

nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for certiorari and

prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, regardless whether the

Commander-in-Chief withdraws or terminates the declaration,

brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the

admission of a citizens taxpayers suit, as this Honorable Court held

in David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,3

It must always be borne in mind that the question


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legal tenet of the liberality doctrine on legal standing. Itcannot be doubted that the validity of PP No. 1017 andG.O. No. 5 is a judicial question which is of paramountimportance to the Filipino people. To paraphrase Justice

Laurel, the whole of Philippine society now waits withbated breath the ruling of this Court on this very criticalmatter. The petitions thus call for the application of thetranscendental importance doctrine, a relaxation of thestanding requirements for the petitioners in the PP 1017cases.

C. RIPENESS OF THE PETITION

The instant petition is ripe for adjudication inasmuch as the

respondents issuance of the assailed Proclamation No. 1959,

notwithstanding its patent unconstitutionality, involves a clearly

justiciable controversy, consistent with Francisco, Jr. v.

Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang

Pilipino, Inc.,4 which held that

In Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, questionedwas the power of the President to propose amendmentsto the Constitution on the ground that it was exercisedbeyond the limits prescribed by the Constitution. Holding

that it was a justiciable controversy, this Court made thefollowing disquisition:

The amending process both as to proposal andratification, raises a judicial question. x x x. TheSupreme Court has the last word in the construction notonly of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitutionitself. The amending, like all other powers organized inthe Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence alimited power, so that the Supreme Court is vested withthat authority to determine whether that power has beendischarged within its limits.


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Under the circumstances obtaining and where time is of the

essence, no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy is

available to the herein petitioners in the ordinary course of law and to

whose interests further delay would be prejudicial.

D. TIMELINESS OF THE PETITION

The assailed Proclamation No. 1959 was issued on 4

December 2009. Hence, the instant petition is being filed within sixty

(60) days from the issuance thereof and within the period under

Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On 23 November 2009, a convoy of six (6) vehicles from

Buluan, Maguindanao, with around sixty (60) persons composed of

family members and supporters of Buluan Vice-Mayor Esmael

Mangudadatu, as well as media personalities, were flagged down in

Brgy. Masilay, Ampatuan, Maguindanao, and taken by about one

hundred (100) armed men reportedly led by Datu Unsay Mayor Datu

Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Andal, Jr.) and Police Chief Inspector Zukarno

Adil Dicay, OIC of the Shariff Aguak PNP and concurrent Provincial

Director of the Maguindanao Police Provincial Office. As events

turned out, the passengers of the convoy were killed and their bodies

5


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Andal, Jr. is part of the Ampatuan clan, which holds various

positions in Maguindanao and in the Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM), i.e., Andal, Jr.s father, Andal, Sr., is the

incumbent governor of Maguindanao, while his brother, Zaldy, is the

governor of the ARMM. The massacre is the worst election-related

violence in the Philippines history, and is widely held to have been

undertaken to sow fear into anyone who would challenge the

Ampatuans in the May 2010 elections.

On 24 November 2009, as an immediate response to suppress

lawlessness, the President issued Proclamation No. 1946 declaring

the state of emergency in the provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan

Kudarat and the City of Cotabato and calling out the Armed Forces of

the Philippines to assist the restoration and maintenance of peace

and order in the aforecited areas.6

On 26 November 2009, the government authorities held Andal,

Jr. in their custody, and criminal charges for multiple murder were

eventually filed against him by the Department of Justice.7

All

throughout, Andal, Jr. vehemently denied any participation in the

massacre.

Notably, respondent Macapagal-Arroyos deputy spokesperson,

Lorelei Fajardo, issued a statement on said respondents behalf, to


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wit, I dont think the Presidents friendship with the Ampatuans will be

severed. Just because theyre in this situation doesnt mean we will

turn our backs on them.

From the issuance of the Proclamation No. 1946 on 24

November 2009 up to the issuance of the assailed Proclamation No.

1959, no further incidents of violence occurred as the military had

effectively suppressed the lawless elements in Maguindanao. In fact,

several other members of the Ampatuan clan had, within the said

period, been arrested, and on 2 December 2009, Andal, Sr. and

seven members of the Ampatuan clan were charged with multiple

murder. Moreover, the military had taken over the houses and areas

owned and controlled by the Ampatuans, and had seized a large

cache of firearms and ammunition. Furthermore, the Supreme Court

had directed the courts to proceed with the criminal action against the

Ampatuans.

It must also be stressed that throughout this period, there was

no declaration by the Ampatuans or their supporters of their intent to

overthrow the Government, much less was there any public uprising

by them or any other act that would endanger public safety.

Despite all these, on 4 December 2009, the President, through

respondent Ermita, issued Proclamation No. 1959. Clearly, therefore,


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Hence, this petition.

REASONS RELIED UPONFOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THIS PETITION

The petitioners respectfully submit that they are entitled to the

allowance of this petition, upon the following grounds:

(A)

THE RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION NO.1959 CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELYNO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT AFINDING OF THE EXISTENCE OF A REBELLION THATWOULD WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL

LAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OFTHE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN MAGUINDANAO,BECAUSE:

1. THERE IS NO PUBLIC UPRISING AND TAKINGUP ARMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT; AND

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE UPRISING ORMOVEMENT IS NOT TO REMOVE ALLEGIANCE

FROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THEPROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO, OR TODEPRIVE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WHOLLY ORPARTIALLY, OF ANY OF HER POWERS ORPREROGATIVES.

(B)

THE RESPONDENT COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION, IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION NO.1959 CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO FACTUAL


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THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN MAGUINDANAO,BECAUSE:

1. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT ALLEGED

FAILURE TO FUNCTION OF THE LOCALJUDICIAL SYSTEM AND OTHER GOVERNMENTMECHANISMS IN MAGUINDANAO ENDANGERPUBLIC SAFETY; AND

2. THE EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENTS CALLINGOUT POWER HAS SUFFICIENTLY ENSUREDPUBLIC SAFETY.

D I S C U S S I O N S

(A)

THE RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION NO.1959 CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY

NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT AFINDING OF THE EXISTENCE OF A REBELLION THATWOULD WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIALLAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OFTHE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN MAGUINDANAO.

Article VII, Section 18, of the 1987 Constitution provides both

the necessary conditions and corresponding limits to the power of the

President to impose martial law, thus:

Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines andwhenever it becomes necessary, he may call out sucharmed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,

when the public safety requires it, he may, for a periodnot exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writof habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any partthereof under martial law. x x x. Em hasis and


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It is clear from the foregoing provision that, as constitutionalist

Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. put it, [m]artial law depends on two

factual bases: (1) the existence of invasion or rebellion, and (2) the

requirements of public safety. Necessity creates the conditions for

martial law and at the same time limits the scope of martial law.8

This is in stark contrast to the counterpart provisions in the

1935 and 1973 Constitutions, which provide that the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus could be suspended and martial law could be

imposed in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent

danger thereof, when the public safety requires it.9

Thus, one will note that insurrection has been eliminated as a

ground for declaring martial law or suspending the [privilege of the]

writ of habeas corpus and the phrase imminent danger thereof has

also been deleted. So that under this Article the grounds for

declaring martial law are invasion and rebellion when the public

safety requires it.10

In determining whether or not rebellion exists that would

warrant the imposition of martial law or suspension of the privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus, the framers of the 1987 Constitution refer

to the definition of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.11

8


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Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is

committed as follows

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against theGovernment for the purpose of removing from theallegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory ofthe Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, or anybody of land, naval, or other armed forces or depriving theChief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, ofany of their powers or prerogatives.

The elements of the crime of rebellion are

1. That there be a (a) public uprising and (b) takingarms against the Government.

2. That the purpose of the uprising or movement iseither

a. to remove from the allegiance to said

Government or its laws:

(1) the territory of the Philippines or anypart thereof; or

(2) any body of land, naval, or otherarmed forces; or

b. to deprive the Chief Executive or Congress,wholly or partially, of any of their powers andprerogatives.12

Here, none of the foregoing elements of rebellion are present.

1. THERE IS NO PUBLIC UPRISING AND TAKINGUP ARMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT; AND

It is settled that the crime of rebellion is by nature a crime of

masses, of a multitude. It is a vast movement of men and a complex


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net of intrigues and plots.13 Thus, this Honorable Court had, in the

recent case ofLadlad v. Velasco, reiterated that x x x by its nature,

rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd

action done in furtherance of a political end.14

Here, the issuance of Proclamation No. 1959 is predicated on

the allegation that heavily armed groups in the province of

Maguindanao have established positions to resist government

troops.15 In the Presidents Report, it was stated that [d]etailed

accounts pertaining to the rebel armed groups and their active

movments in Maguindanao have been confirmed,16 and that [t]he

existence of this armed rebellion is further highlighted by the recent

recovery of high powered firearms and ammunitions from the 400

security escorts of Datu Andal Ampatuan Sr.17 Based on the

foregoing, the Presidents Report jumps to the unjustified conclusion

that

Indeed, the nature, quantity and quality of theirweaponry, the movement of heavily armed rebels instrategic positions, the closure of the MaguindanaoProvincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu UnsayMunicipal Hall, and fourteen other municipal halls, and theuse of armored vehicles, tanks and patrol cars withunauthorized PNP/Police markings, all together confirmthe existence of armed public uprising x x x.18

13II Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, supra at p. 74, citing People v. Almazan, CA., 37 O.G.


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However, whether in Proclamation No. 1959 itself or in the

Presidents Report which serves as its factual basis, there is no

allegation of an actualpublic uprising or taking up arms against the

Government. Certainly, the mere threat of a public uprising and

taking up of arms against the Government which isat bestonly

what the Presidents Report seeks to paint, is insufficient.

The President and respondent ought to be reminded that in

rebellion (or insurrection), there must be a public uprising and taking

up of arms.19 Thus, as held in People v. Lovedioro, [t]he

gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against

the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of

the masses or multitudes involving crowd action x x x.20 In this

regard, the landmark case ofPeople v. Hernandezis instructive that

One of the means by which rebellion may becommitted, in the words of said Article 135, is byengaging in war against the forces of the government

and committing serious violence in the prosecution ofsaid war. These expressions imply everything that warconnotes, namely, resort to arms, requisition of propertyand services, collection of taxes and contributions,restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuriesand loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappinessthat war leaves in its wakeexcept that, very often, it isworse than war in the international sense, for it involvesinternal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a

bitterness and passion or ruthlessness seldom found in acontest between strangers. x x x.21


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It is this concept of rebellion that the framers of our 1987

Constitution have adopted, in an effort to return to the traditional

concept of martial law as it was developed especially in

American jurisprudence, where martial law has reference to the

theatre of war.22 Accordingly, under the 1987 Constitution, the

ground of imminent danger of rebellion as basis for the declaration

of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus has been deleted. Thus, the only grounds now for martial

law are actual invasion and actual rebellion.23

Clearly, therefore, there is no factual basis for finding that there

is a public uprising and taking up arms against the government such

that rebellion exists to justify the issuance of Proclamation No. 1959.

2. THE PURPOSE OF THE UPRISING ORMOVEMENT IS NOT TO REMOVE ALLEGIANCEFROM THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THEPROVINCE OF MAGUINDANAO, OR TODEPRIVE THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, WHOLLY ORPARTIALLY, OF ANY OF HER POWERS OR

PREROGATIVES.

It is equally settled that [t]he political motivation for the crime

must be shown in order to justify finding the crime committed to be

rebellion.24 Thus, Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code provides

that the rebellion must be for the purpose of removing from the

allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic


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of the Philippines or any part thereof, or any body of land, naval, or

other armed forces or depriving the Chief Executive or the

Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.


the allegation that heavily armed groups in the province of

Maguindanao have established positions to resist government troops,

thereby depriving the Executive of its powers and prerogatives to

enforce the laws of the land and to maintain public order and safety25

without any allegation of the connective intent between the supposed

acts of rebellion and the result achieved thereby. Similarly, in the

Presidents Report dated 6 December 2009, it is hastily and forcibly

concluded that

Indeed, the nature, quantity and quality of theirweaponry, the movement of heavily armed rebels instrategic positions, the closure of the MaguindanaoProvincial Capitol, Ampatuan Municipal Hall, Datu UnsayMunicipal Hall, and fourteen other municipal halls, and theuse of armored vehicles, tanks and patrol cars with

unauthorized PNP/Police markings, all together confirmthe existing of armed public uprising for the politicalpurpose of:

(i) removing allegiance from the nationalgovernment of the Province of Maguindanao;and

(ii) depriving the Chief Executive of her powersand prerogatives to enforce the laws of the

land and to maintain public order andsafety.26


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However, there is nothing in the assailed Proclamation or the

Presidents Report which would even remotely suggest that the

purpose of the alleged rebellion is political in nature, much less to

overthrow the Government. Not once have the Ampatuans or their

supporters even hinted at overthrowing the Government or depriving

the Chief Executive of her powers and prerogatives. Accordingly, the

charges that have been filed against the Ampatuans are for murder

and not rebellion. Worse, even the President, through her deputy

spokesperson, has expressed her intent to keep the continued

friendship with the Ampatuans.

All these lead to the conclusion that there is no political motive

that would justify a finding of rebellion, as is required by People v.

Lovedioro,27 wherein this Honorable Court held

x x x. In deciding if the crime is rebellion, notmurder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertainwhether or not the act was done in furtherance of apolitical end. The political motive of the act should be

conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases the burden of demonstrating politicalmotive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mindwhich the accused, better than any individual, knows. x xx.

x x x.

[I]t is not enough that the overt acts of rebellionare duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts are

essential components of the crime. With either ofthese elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legallydoes not exist. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoringsupplied)


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(B)

THE RESPONDENT COMMITED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OFJURISDICTION, IN ISSUING PROCLAMATION NO.1959 CONSIDERING THAT THERE IS NO FACTUALBASIS TO SUPPORT A FINDING THAT THE PUBLICSAFETY REQUIRES THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIALLAW AND THE SUSPENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OFTHE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN MAGUINDANAO.

1. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT ALLEGEDFAILURE TO FUNCTION OF THE LOCALJUDICIAL SYSTEM AND OTHER GOVERNMENTMECHANISMS IN MAGUINDANAO ENDANGERPUBLIC SAFETY.

As previously discussed, an essential requisite for the

declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ

of habeas corpus is when the public safety requires it. 30


the allegation that the condition of peace and order in the province of

Maguindanao has deteriorated to the extent that the local judicial

system and other government mechanisms in the province are not

functioning, thus endangering public safety31

This allegation is

expounded on in the Presidents Report, citing the non-functioning by

local government offices, the local civil registrar, and local judicial

system as endangering public safety.


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However, there is no rational explanation or connection given

either in the assailed Proclamation or the Presidents Report dated 6

December 2009 that would show how public safety is endangered by

the closure of local government offices. As to the supposed failure to

function of the local judicial system, which has no immediate

connection to endangering public safety, this Honorable Court has

itself belied such claim and has directed that the cases against the

Ampatuans proceed.

2. THE EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENTS CALLINGOUT POWER HAS SUFFICIENTLY ENSUREDPUBLIC SAFETY.

As previously discussed, an essential requisite for the

declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege to the writ

of habeas corpus is when the public safety requires it. 32


the allegation that the condition of peace and order in the province of

Maguindanao has deteriorated to the extent that the local judicial

system and other government mechanisms in the province are not

functioning, thus endangering public safety33

However, as earlier discussed, neither the assailed

Proclamation nor the Presidents Report dated 6 December 2009


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been addressed by the previous Proclamation declaring a state of

emergency and calling out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to

suppress the lawless violence. In fact, as of the issuance of the

assailed Proclamation on 4 December 2009, the leaders of the

Ampatuan clan responsible for the massacre have been arrested and

charged with multiple murder, and the military has already seized

numerous firearms, ammunition, vehicles, and equipment used by the

Ampatuans. By its own press releases, the government has claimed

it remained in control of the peace and order situation in

Maguindanao.

Under the foregoing circumstances, it is evident that there is no

public safety requirement that would justify the declaration of martial

law and suspension of the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus.

Neither can it be claimed that the President is powerless

against the lawless violence that occurred on 23 November 2009, as

the Constitution itself provides her a graduated power as

Commander-in-Chief, as was held in Integrated Bar of the

Philippines v. Zamora,34

thus

FR. BERNAS. It will not make any difference. Imay add that there is a graduated power of the

President as Commander-in-Chief. First, he can callout such Armed Forces as may be necessary tosuppress lawless violence; then he can suspend theprivilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then he can


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When he judges that it is necessary to imposemartial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus, his judgment is subject to review. We are makingit subject to review by the Supreme Court and subject to

concurrence by the National Assembly. But when heexercises this lesser power of calling on the ArmedForces, when he says it is necessary, it is my opinion thathis judgment cannot be reviewed by anybody.

x x x.

FR. BERNAS. Let me just add that when we onlyhave imminent danger, the matter can be handled by thefirst sentence: The President may call out such armedforces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion

or rebellion. So we feel that that is sufficient for handlingimminent danger.

MR. DE LOS REYES. So actually, if a Presidentfeels that there is imminent danger, the matter can behandled by the First Sentence: The President....may callout such Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence, invasion or rebellion. So we feel that that issufficient for handling imminent danger, of invasion orrebellion, instead of imposing martial law or suspendingthe writ of habeas corpus, he must necessarily have tocall the Armed Forces of the Philippines as theirCommander-in-Chief. Is that the idea?

MR. REGALADO. That does not require anyconcurrence by the legislature nor is it subject to judicialreview.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of theaforementioned powers highlights the intent to grant the

President the widest leeway and broadest discretion inusing the power to call out because it is considered as thelesser and more benign power compared to the power tosuspend the privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus and thepower to impose martial law, both of which involve thecurtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rightsand individual freedoms, and thus necessitatingsafeguards by Congress and review by this Court.

Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the

Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspendthe privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or toimpose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1)there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2)


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becomes necessary, the President may call thearmed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessviolence, invasion or rebellion. The implication isthat the President is given full discretion and wide

latitude in the exercise of the power to call ascompared to the two other powers. (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

In fine, there is absolutely no factual or legal basis for the

issuance of Proclamation No. 1959. Clearly, therefore, the same

should be nullified on the ground that it was issued by respondent

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction.

P R A Y E R

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this

Honorable Court give due course to this petition and, after hearing

the case on its merits, render judgment declaring Proclamation No.

1959 null and void, as well as commanding the respondent to desist

from further implementing the same.

Petitioners likewise respectfully pray for such other just and

equitable reliefs that this Honorable Court may deem just and

equitable under the premises.

Makati City for the City of Manila, 9 December 2009.


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Telephone number: 632-8993632E-mail address: [email protected]

Roll of Attorneys No. 33331PTR No. 1578473, 01/13/2009, Makati City

IBP Lifetime Member No. 00331, Davao City ChapterMCLE Exemption No. II-000125

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATIONOF NON-FORUM SHOPPING

WE,CHRISTIAN S. MONSODand CARLOS P. MEDINA JR.,all of legal age, Filipino, with office address at c/o 20 Rockwell Drive,Rockwell Center, Makati City 1200, after having been duly sworn to inaccordance with law, hereby depose and state that we are thepetitioners in the above-captioned case and we caused thepreparation of the foregoing petition, which we have read, and thecontents of which are all true and correct based on our ownknowledge and/or authentic records.

Moreover, we certify that: (a) we have not heretoforecommenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues inthe Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisionsthereof, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of ourknowledge, no such action or claim is pending in the Supreme Court,the Court of Appeals, or the different divisions thereof, or any othertribunal or agency; and (c) if we should thereafter learn that a similaraction or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the SupremeCourt, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other

tribunal or agency, we undertake to promptly inform the aforesaidcourts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) daystherefrom.

AFFIANTS FURTHER SAYETH NAUGHT.

CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD CARLOS P. MEDINA JR. Affiant Affian

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this 9th day of


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CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD - Passport No.CARLOS P. MEDINA JR. - Passport No.ZZ214109;03/19/07, Manila

NOTARY PUBLIC

Doc. No. _____;Page No. _____;Book No. _____;Series of 2009.

EXPLANATION(Pursuant to Section 11, Rule 13 of the

1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)

Due to lack of personnel to effect personal service, service wasmade by registered mail upon the parties as hereinbelow indicated bythe corresponding registry receipts.

CARLOS P. MEDINA JR.

COPY FURNISHED:

EDUARDO R. ERMITAOffice of the Executive SecretaryMalacaanag Palace, Manila

Monsod Medina Martial Law Petition

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