Moldova Minorities 4

7/30/2019 Moldova Minorities 4

1/40

Moldova, Minorities

and the International

Community

Renrs Danelsons

LU Akadmiskais apgds


2/40

UDK 323

Da 445

Moldova, Minorities and the International Community

Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI),

University of Latvia

Author: Renrs Danelsons

Editor: Nils Muinieks

Layout: Ieva Zarne

Cover design: Agris Dzilna

Latvijas Universitte, 2008

Agris Dzilna, cover design, 2008

ISBN 978-9984-825-49-6


3/40

Table of Contents

I. Introduction .................................................................................... 5

1.1 Moldova and Latvia .................................................................... 51.2 Moldova: Historical Background and Current Challenges ..... 6

II. The Transnistrian Problem ........................................................ 10III. Gagauzia .......................................................................................... 17

IV. Involvement of Kin-States in Ethnic Relations .................... 19

4.1 Russia .......................................................................................... 194.2 Ukraine ....................................................................................... 244.3 Romania ...................................................................................... 28

V. The Role of Regional Organizations in Preventing EthnicConict ............................................................................................. 305.1 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE) ........................................................................................ 305.2 The European Union ................................................................. 325.3 The Council of Europe ............................................................... 36

VI. Conclusion ....................................................................................... 38

About the author....................................................................................

40


4/40


5/40

5

I. Introduction

1.1 Moldova and Latvia

Moldova has not been the subject of much scholarly interest in Latvia.1However, this could change, as Latvian relations with Moldova haveintensied after Latvias accession to the European Union in 2004. Latviahas identied Moldova as a priority country for development cooperation.Moreover, Latvia has participated in the EU Border Assistance Mission,provided assistance in the implementation of democratic and institutionalreforms, and shared its EU integration experience.

The Latvian national airline Air Baltic opened direct ights fromRiga to Chisinau in March 2008. If previous experience in the region isany guide (e.g., in Azerbaijan, Georgia), one can predict that the openingof a direct ight will be followed by the opening of a Latvian embassyin Chisinau. Moreover, Latvian Foreign Minister Mris Rieksti hassupported the opening of an embassy.2 For the time being, Latvian-Moldovan economic cooperation is weak, as Moldova is Latvias 38thexport partner and 51st import partner,3 though there are some reportsof guest workers from Moldova working in Latvia.

Moldova holds particular interest for Latvia for a number of reasons.

For one, similar to Latvia, Moldova has had difcult relations withRussia since the break-up of the Soviet Union. For Latvia, Moldovasdifculties in Transnistria demonstrate what could have happened hadthe international community not assisted in facilitating the withdrawalof Russian troops from Latvia. Secondly, current Moldovan-Latviancooperation has historical precedents. During the latter years of the SovietUnion, the Latvian national movement assisted Moldova in resurrectingLatin script publications by printing journals in Latvia and smugglingthem into Moldova. Moreover, Moldovan democratic activists drew both

1 The exception is Andris Sprds. See his Regional Ramications of Ukraines OrangeRevolution: Transnistrian Conict Settlement, in Atis Leji, ed., The EuropeanUnions Eastern Neighbours after the Orange Revolution (Riga: Latvian Institute ofInternational Affairs, 2006), pp. 3044, and Moldovas eiropeizcijas iekpolitiskun starptautisk dimensija. Latvijas iespjas un ierobeojumi [The Domestic andInternational Dimensions of Moldovas Europeanization: Latvias Opportunitiesand Limits], in aneta Ozolia, ed., Latvijas rpolitika un robeu paplainana,Stratisks analzes komisijas Zintniski ptnieciskie raksti 1 (7)/2006 (Rga:Zintne, 2006), pp. 154176.

2 At the conference The Contribution of the European Neighbourhood Policy to theDevelopment of Eastern Neighbours on April 25, 2008, Rga, Latvia.

3 http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/Arpolitika/divpusejas-attiecibas/Moldova/.


6/40

6

programmatic and tactical inspiration from the Baltic movements.4At the same time, one of the most notorious gures in Transnistria,Security Minister Vladimir Antiufeev, made his name in Riga, where hewas one of the leaders of the Soviet loyalist Interior Ministry Special

Forces unit (OMON) that killed ve people in Latvia and wounded manymore in January 1991. Finally, Moldova is one of the few places in theregion (along with Georgia) that looks to Latvia for diplomatic support,assistance and Euroatlantic integration lessons.

Latvia and Moldova share a similar historical background ofoccupation by the Soviet Union from the end of the Second World Waruntil independence in 1991. However, Moldova is a new country, whileLatvia was an independent country in the interwar period. Both countrieshave signicant Russian-speaking minorities, a fact which has elicitedRussias interest and provided it with leverage in bilateral relations.Moreover, both have been the object of interest by international andregional organizations involved in conict prevention and the promotionof minority rights.

1.2 Moldova: Historical Background and Current

Challenges

In contrast to Latvia, however, the territorial integrity of Moldova hasbeen in question since 1990, when the so-called Transnistrian Republicof Moldova proclaimed its independence. This separatist regime is stillsupported by Russia, while political opposition is banned in Transnistria.

Although some elements of a market economy have been introducedin Transnistria, it is still primarily a planned economy. Transnistriais also known as a centre of illegal activities, such as smuggling. TheTransnistrian challenge to Moldovas territorial integrity is one of themost serious problems affecting Moldovas international aspirations anddomestic development.

Transnistria has become a particularly interesting object of inquiryafter Kosovos declaration of independence on February 17, 2008.Russia occasionally claims that the international communitys actions inKosovo could set a possible precedent for Transnistria, as well as for the

breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. Anothernew element in the equation is the uncertainty about Russias stancein the region following its withdrawal from the Adapted Conventional

Armed Forces in Europe Treaty.Moldovas foreign policy has been inconsistent and contradictory

during the past 17 years. In constitutional military terms, Moldova is aneutral country. Nevertheless, this neutrality is devoid of true meaningsince foreign troops are still located in the country without the approval

4 See Nils R. Muiznieks, The Baltic Popular Movements and the Disintegration ofthe Soviet Union,Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 47, No. 1, 1995, 326.


7/40

7

of the Moldovan authorities and the size of the Transnistrian securityservices is three times that of the Moldovan army. The ambiguities ofconstitutional neutrality and the situation on the ground led theMoldovan authorities to seek to balance interests between East and

West, hoping that this would enhance domestic stability and elicit foreignsupport in resolving the conict in Transnistria. Deputy Speaker of theMoldovan Parliament Iurie Rosca has even claimed that Moldova willbecome a NATO member after Ukraines accession to this organization.5

At the same time, Moldova has occasionally expressed its willingnessto become a member of the European Union (EU). The ruling CommunistParty lacks a clear foreign policy vision. Prior to the 2001 generalelections, the Communist Party sought to develop closer ties with Russia,and this strategy was pursued for 3 years, but this changed before the2005 general elections, when the Communist Party changed tactics andproclaimed that it would like to develop closer ties with the EU. Thesituation changed again in 2006, when, during the CIS summit in Minsk,Moldova managed to persuade Russia to lift its ban on importing winefrom Moldova.

On 1 January 2007 Moldovas neighbour Romania became a memberstate of the EU. This means not only that the Romanian-Moldovan borderhas now become an external border of the EU, it also means that manycitizens of Moldova became citizens of the EU. Because Moldova was anintegral part of Romania until 1945, Moldovans are entitled to Romaniancitizenship as well, and approximately 1 million Moldovans have availedthemselves of this opportunity.

According to the 2004 census, Moldova has 4.5 million inhabitants.Moldovans (Romanians) constitute 78%, followed by Ukrainians 8%,Russians 6% and Gagauz 4%. Some studies suggest that 1 millionMoldovan citizens live abroad. Only 37% of Moldovans live in urbanareas. In contrast, 84% of Russians live in urban areas. Russians havea higher share of persons with a higher education 21% versus 11%for Moldovans.6 Nevertheless only 12% of Russians speak Moldovan(Romanian), while 87% of Moldovans speak Russian.7 Among Moldovansthe dominant opinion is that relations with Russia were better beforeattaining independence than they are now.

Ethnic diversity in Moldova was formed by two large waves ofimmigration in 1812 and in 1945 both times after annexation by Russia

5 Iurie Rosca, comments to foreign experts, Chisinau, Moldova, April 7, 2008.6 Doru Petruti, An Empirical Model of Interethnic Relations Reected in the

Ethnobarometer, in Arcadie Barbarosie, ed., Ethnobarometer in the Republic ofMoldova (Chisinau: Viorel Cibotaru, 2006), p. 183.

7 David D. Laitin, Seccessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union, ComparativePolitical Studies, Vol. 34, No. 8, October 2001, p. 848.


8/40

8

(Soviet Union).8 According to the 1989 census, the population of Moldovaconsisted of 4,335,733 people, two thirds of whom were Romanianspeakers, 14% were Ukrainians and 13% were Russians.9 Over the courseof 30 years (19591989), the fastest growing group were the Russians

(+92%), followed by the Gagauz (+60%), and only then followed byMoldovans (+48%), Ukrainians (+43%) and Bulgarians (+43%), whilethe number of Jews decreased by a third in those three decades. Thenumber of Moldovans, Gagauz, Ukrainians and Bulgarians increased dueto a natural rate of increase, while the number of Russians increasedprimarily as a result of migration processes.10 Russianization had beenfar reaching throughout Moldova, which was sometimes called LittleRussia, and in Transnistria and Gagauzia, which were called NewRussia.11

After gaining independence the Moldovan government adoptedan inclusive citizenship law and granted extensive rights of culturalautonomy to all minorities. It is difcult to nd a better example in theformer Soviet Union of a new elite and government dominated by thetitular group which was more accommodating to minorities in generaland to the Russian minority in particular than the government that tookpower in Moldova in 1991. Citizenship was immediately granted to all,language policy was both moderate and patient, education was supportedin a variety of languages, and political representation was available to allgroups.12

A lack of consensus between different political groups regardingMoldovas history remains one of the thorniest disputes in the country.

Moldovas ruling Communist Party has developed a concept about thestatehood of Moldovan people.13 However, there are also historians wholook to the historical boundaries of Moldova, with contemporary Moldova

8 Tamara Caraus, The Role of the Nation-State in the Resolution of InterethnicProblems in Moldova, in Arcadie Barbarosie, ed., Ethnobarometer in the Republicof Moldova (Chisinau: Viorel Cibotaru, 2006), p. 87.

9

Liliana Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova: Does Moldovas EasternOrientation Inhibit its European Aspirations?, (Chisinau: IPP, N.D.), p. 16.10 Natalia Chirtoaca, Juridical Study of the Documents Signed in the Course of the

Negotiations Process on the Transnistrian Conict Settlement, (Chisinau: IPP,2001), available at http://www.ipp.md/public/biblioteca/18/en/Chirtooaca_Eng.pdf.

11Wanda Dressler, Between Empires and Europe: The Tragic Fate of Moldova, inDiogenes, Vol. 53, 2006, p. 35.

12 Eiki Berg and Wim van Meurs, Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of Nation-and State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova, Journal of CommunistStudies and Transition Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2002, p. 65.

13 See the history book by Viktor Stepanuk, Gosudarstvennostj moldavskogo naroda,(Chisinau: Tipograa Centrala, 2006).


9/40

9

representing just the eastern part of the traditional Principality ofMoldova.14

With the rapid pace of geopolitical change in the region, Moldovabecame a neighbour of NATO in 2004 and the EU in 2007; Moldova is

also a potential candidate to become a member of these Euro-Atlanticinstitutions, but only following constitutional change and a nation-widereferendum. In addition to the issue of territorial integrity, socio-economicinstability and the lack of adequate public administration capacity hinderthe economic and political integration of Moldova into the EU. Moldovaranks below the global average in the global Human Development Indexand had a score of 0.733 in 2005.15 The primary reasons for this poorshowing are bad governance, high levels of corruption16, an unfavourableinvestment environment and multi-dimensional poverty17 (severedifferentiation of income, unemployment, labour migration, brain drain),particularly in towns and rural areas. EU restrictions on relations withthird countries will not only create additional difculties, it will alsocontribute to widening the gap between Moldova and the other countriesof Central and Southeastern Europe.

14 See the history book by Vasile Stati,Istorija Moldovi (Chisinau: Tipograa Centrala,

2003).15 See the Republic of Moldova National Human Development Report, The Quality of

Economic Growth and its Impact on Human Development (Chisinau: UNDP, 2006),available at http://www.undp.md/publications/2006NHDR/NHDR%20english.pdf.

16According to TI, the Subjective Index of Corruption for Moldova was 2.8 in 2007.Moldova was ranked 111 out of 179 places. See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.

17 For a recent report, see International Development Association/InternationalMonetary Fund, Republic of Moldova Joint Staff Advisory Note on the AnnualEvaluation Report on the Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper,April 28, 2006, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Moldova_JSAN-PRSP(April28-2005).pdf.


10/40

10

II. The Transnistrian Problem

In the late 1980s rumours of the possible reunication of Moldovawith Romania were quite intense. Russians in Moldova complainedopenly that they might be compelled to learn Romanian, as most did notspeak the language. Russians and Ukrainians from the left bank of theNistru river in particular opposed the idea of reunication with Romania,as they did not have any attachment to Romania, but remembered theoccupation of the Romanian army during World War II.

Another important fact generating tension was the Language Lawof August 1989 which required prociency in the Moldovan language by

January 1, 1994.18 Even Transnistrian Moldovans did not feel themselvesa part of the Romanian nation. They had never lived in Romania and wereheavily Russied. Ukrainians mostly lived in rural areas of Transnistria,while Russians lived in towns. Russians were overwhelmingly of recentorigin19 (like Transnistrian president Igor Smirnov, who arrived inTiraspol in 1987). Another ethnic group which is small but prominent intowns is the Jewish community, which in 1990 numbered about 12,000.20

Transnistria21 (Transdniestria, Pridnestrovie) is a territory of4163 sq km along the left bank of Nistru river and the town of Benderi(Tighina) on the right bank. It makes up one-eighth of Moldovas territory.

According to the 2004 census its population comprises 555,000,22

while in1989 it stood at 800,000.23 In 1989 41% of the population of Transnistriawere Moldovans, 31% Ukrainians and only 22% Russians. Moldovanswere a majority only in rural areas. The capital city Tiraspol had 182,000inhabitants of whom Moldovans were only 18%. The former Romaniantown of Tighina was also heavily Russied only 29% of 130,000 peoplewere Moldovans. 24

The de facto independence of Transnistria has had a deleterious impacton Moldovas economy. Transnistria produced one third of Moldovasindustrial output and more than half of its consumer goods. Moldova

18 Cristian Urse, Transnistria:Prospects for a Solution, George C. Marshall EuropeanCenter for Security Studies Occasional Paper Series, No. 7, January 2007, p. 4.

19 Nicholas Dima, The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic: A Geo-Political Game, TheJournal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 1, Spring 1999,p. 41.

20Ibid.21 Called by ofcial Chisinau the Eastern regions of Moldova.22 State Viability of the PMR (Pridnestrovie) Has Been Established, International

Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 18, 2006, p. 108.23 Dima, The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic, p. 40.24Ibid.


11/40

11

received most of its raw materials and energy from Tiraspol. Dubossary hasthe largest hydroelectric power station in Southeastern Europe, Rybnitsahas the most modern steel plant in the ex-USSR, and Transnistria hasthe biggest cognac factory in Moldova Kvint.25 The holding company

Sheriff, run by President Smirnovs elite, has an annual turnover ofaround USD 2 billion, which is 5 times more than the budget of Moldovaand 25 times more than that of Transnistria. The sources of such wealthinclude money laundering, smuggling and trafcking.26

Ethnic cleansing of the Moldovan population started in Transnistriaafter the 1992 war. The leader of the Tiraspol branch of the MoldovanPopular Front Ilie Ilascu and several colleagues were arrested andaccused of murdering two Russians. They were subjected to torture andsentenced to death in a show trial. Subsequently, this case was judged bythe European Court of Human Rights.27

PRIDNESTROVIE

Kamenka

Rybnitsa

Dubossary

Grigoriopol

TiraspolBenderSlobozya

50 km

50 miles

25 Ceslav Ciobanu,NATO/EU Enlargement: Moldova and the Frozen and ForgottenConict in Post-Soviet States, U.S. Institute for Peace Report, 22 June 2004, p. 29.

26Ibid.27 For a summary of the case, see Registrar, European Court of Human Rights, Press

release issued by the Registrar, Grand Chamber Judgement in the Case of Ilascuand others v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=2&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Ilascu&sessionid=5852200&skin=hudoc-pr-en.

Transnistria


12/40

12

In a way, Transnistria became a Soviet Union in miniature, a dreamland for frustrated Russian communists, and a new hope for embitteredSoviet generals.28 It was also a playground for Russian Cossacks, a lawlessweapons supermarket, a neo-Bolshevik autocracy, and a hive of local,

Russian and Ukrainian organized crime syndicates.29

It is difcult to evaluate the ethnic aspect of the conict. On the onehand, it was not an ethnic conict, as there were many Russian-speakingMoldovan policemen who fought on the Moldovan side. On the otherhand, Transnistrian separatists were predominantly Russian nationalists,and the local Moldovan population of Transnistria did not support theemergence of Transnistrian de facto statehood. Neither Chisinau, norTiraspol characterize the conict as ethnic, but it is difcult to agreewith the thesis that the people of Transnistria do not differ in any wayfrom the people on the right bank areas of Moldova.30

The conict was characterized by two cleavages: a linguistic (Russian/Moldovan) chasm, which was fuelled by

different interests as well as by strong symbolism on both sideswhich had strong economic implications;

an ideological (Soviet Union/Western democracy) divide which ranalmost parallel to the linguistic conict.31

Transnistria has proclaimed three state languages: Moldovan basedon the Cyrillic alphabet, Ukrainian and Russian. However, in practice, theRussian language dominates in all spheres of life. Russian is practicallythe only language spoken in the Transnistrian parliament and in the

economy. There is just one local newspaper printed in Moldovan (AdevarulNistrean) and one in Ukrainian (Gomin). Otherwise the Transnistrianinformation space is a Russian language space.32

Not much has changed in Transnistria itself during 18 years of defacto independence. In December 2006 Igor Smirnov was elected forthe fourth time in a row as president. Despite using different religiouscalendars on each bank of the Prut, both Moldova and Transnistria sharea common Orthodox religion and a common national football team whichsometimes plays in Tiraspol. However, on the political level no majorchanges have occurred despite the fact that current president of Moldova

Vladimir Voronin was born in Transnistria.

28 Dima, The Moldavian-Dnestr Republic, p. 42.29Alex Kliment, The Transnistrian Dilemma, in SAIS Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, Winter

2005, p. 72.30 Oazu Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conict Settlement Proposed by

Ukraine- Pros and Cons (Chisinau: Institute of Public Policy, 2005), p. 2.31 Claus Neukirch, Transdniestria and Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr,Helsinki

Monitor, No. 2, 2001, p. 126.32 Promo Lex, Human Rights in Transnistrian Region of Moldova (Chisinau: SRL

Libitum, 2007), p. 164.


13/40

13

There is considerable free movement of persons across theTransnistrian-Moldovan border (unlike the frozen conict in Abkhazia).However, persons under 30 are losing any allegiance they may have toa Moldovan state, since Transnistria has been de facto independent

for so long.33

Many Transnistrians support the idea that the regionshould follow the example of Taiwan.34 Despite a lack of internationalrecognition, Transnistria has developed a functioning government, lawenforcement authorities, an army of 10,000 men, an education system,its own passports, and its own currency.

Around 160,000 Transnistrian residents have become citizens of theRepublic of Moldova, comprising 35% of the total number of voting ageinhabitants in Transnistria.35 Meanwhile President Smirnov and his elitehold Russian citizenship. Some 90% of the population of Transnistria haveanother citizenship in addition to their Transnistrian passports.36

The ethnic structure of the region has changed. The ofcial numbersthat are used by the Transnistrian authorities in 1998 were: 34%Moldovans, 29% Ukrainians and 29% Russians.37 The share of Moldovansis gradually decreasing, as a 2004 Transnistrian census shows that thepopulation of 555,000 divides into 32% Moldovans, 30% Russians and29% Ukrainians.38

Oazu Nantoi, one of Moldovas most respected political analysts,believes that Transnistrias population can be structured into sevengroups: 1) the interested or those deriving personal benet fromTransnistrian independence; 2) the shock detachments or the so-calledelite troops, Cossacks, and security services; 3) the fanatics comprised

mostly of pensioners and disabled persons with nostalgia for Soviettimes; 4) obedient Transnistrian citizens (homo pridnestrovicus); 5) thefunctionaries represented by the local bureaucracy; 6) the amorphousmasses or those who are indifferent; 7) the conscious opposition.39

33 International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, Europe Report No. 175,17 August 2006, p. 18.

34 Oazu Nantoi, About the Situation in the East Districts of the Republic of Moldova(19922000) (Chisinau: IPP, 2001), p. 8.

35 Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conict Settlement, p. 2.

36 Christopher Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conict: Legal Aspects of the SeparatistCrisis in Moldova: A Report from the Association of the Bar of the City of NewYork, St. Johns Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-0045, p. 89. Available atSSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=920151.

37 Oleh Protsyk, Moldovas Dilemmas in Democratizing and ReintegratingTransnistria, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 4, July/August 2006,p. 20.

38 International Crisis Group, Moldovas Uncertain Future, Europe Report No 175,17 August 2006, p. 4.

39 Ceslav Ciobanu, Frozen and Forgotten Conicts in the Post-Soviet States: Genesis,Political Economy and Prospects for Solution (Richmond: United States Institute ofPeace & Virginia State University, 2008), p. 79.


14/40

14

73% of Russians in Transnistria support the idea that Moldovanshould be a required subject in schools and 79% of Russians think thatMoldovan should be one of the languages of education in state schools.40In 2004 Transnistrian authorities unsuccessfully tried to close the last

six Moldovan language schools in the region, but the local Moldovanpopulation strongly resisted this step. At the same time, Transnistriancustoms authorities blocked the roads leading from some villages underthe Moldovan authorities to the farmers elds under Transnistrianauthorities. This suggests that the ethnic aspect in the Transnistrianconict cannot be dismissed out of hand.

In September 2006 Transnistria held a referendum on independenceand possible adherence to Russia. The overwhelming majority was infavour of such an idea. The referendum was not recognized by Moldovaand the international community. Nevertheless the Russian State Dumarecognized the results of the referendum.

Some scholars believe that Moldova has not used the opportunity tochange the situation in Transnistria through the local opposition. Theopposition is weak and disorganised, but there are a number of peoplewho support the idea of a unied Moldova.41 Recently President Voroninhas stated that soon the Transnistrian leaders will go back home (toRussia), since in Moldova they are only on temporary deployment.42

Voronin favours the Transnistrian opposition leader Evgeny Shevchuk,who represents the interests of the holding company Sheriff. Shevchukbecame a speaker of the Transnistrian Parliament in December 2005 afterthe last elections. During his recent visit to Moscow, this Transnistrian-

born politician didnt even rule out the option of a common state withMoldova.43

In recent years, President Voronin has proposed a number ofinitiatives aimed at Transnistria: demilitarization of both banks of theNistru, cancellation of visa and travel limitations for Transnistrianleaders, a joint TV channel, accreditation of the State University ofTiraspol, developing a European corridor from Chisinau to Dubossary.However, the independence of Kosovo, Western recognition thereof, andTransnistrias and Russias reactions have put all new conict resolutionefforts on hold.

40 David D. Laitin, Seccessionist Rebellion in the Former Soviet Union, ComparativePolitical Studies,Vol. 34, No. 8, October 2001, p. 852.

41 Protsyk, Moldovas Dilemmas, p. 15.42 Dumitru Minzazari, The New Transnistria Initiatives of President Voronin:

Breakthrough or Agony? Political & Security Statewatch, IDIS Viitorul, No. 5,October 2007, p. 12. Available at http://www.viitorul.org/public/991/en/PSS_No.5_october2007.pdf.

43 Pridnestrovie Parliamentary Speaker Keeps all Options Open with Moldova,Tiraspol Times & Weekly Review, 1 February 2008.


15/40

15

Transnistrian leader Smirnov supports the comparison withKosovo: Look to international law, and look to the history of this land.Transnistria has a much stronger legal and historical basis for recognizedsovereignty than Kosovo.44 Some Romanian scholars draw comparisons

between Transnistria and Kosovo as well, suggesting that Transnistriabe made an international protectorate for a minimum period of 57years, then, after Transnistrias demilitarization, decriminalization anddemocratization, organising a referendum to decide the status of theregion. The proposed options would be becoming an integral part ofMoldova or remaining an entity similar to Monaco or Liechtenstein whichwould transfer some functions to neighbouring countries (in this case,Russia and/or Ukraine).45 However ofcial Bucharest does not recognizethe independence of Kosovo and does not see any similarities betweenthe conicts.

Just two days after Kosovos declaration of independence, theTransnistrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs came out with a statementthat a new model of conict settlement has been established. Transnistriabelieves that this model will be applied to similar conict zones.46 Notsurprisingly, Moldova expressed its concern after recognition of Kosovosindependence.

Transnistrian leaders believe that independence of the region islawful because of the illegality of Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. However, ifthe pact is declared illegal because it was an act of aggressive expansion,why should the construction of a Moldovan Autonomous Republic(Transnistria), which was no more than a pretext for the expansion,

be viewed as legitimate?47 The leaders of Transnistria try to portrayTransnistria as a small, democratic republic which respects human rights.Recently President Smirnov tabled a proposal to appoint a Transnistrianminister in charge of protecting Transnistrian citizens in the areas underMoldovas jurisdiction.

If Transnistria is to ever unite with Moldova under some form ofautonomy or federation, Moldova must become a much more attractivepartner.48 An important obstacle to building support for reunication isthat Transnistrians believe that their economic situation is better than

44

Ceslav Ceobanu, Political Economy of Frozen Conicts in ex-Soviet States:Challenges and Prospects for the U.S. and Russia, (Chisainau: IPP, 2007), availableat http://www.ipp.md/les/Publicatii/2007/Ceslav_alternative_Stewart_thought_1_.doc. We Have a Stronger Case for Statehood than Kosovo, Tiraspol Times &Weekly Review, March 6, 2007.

45 Adrian Pop, Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglitoiu, Alexandru Purcarus, Romaniaand the Republic of Moldova Between the European Neighbourhood Policy and theProspect of EU Enlargement, European Institute of Romania, Study No 5., 2006,p. 87, available at http://www.ier.ro/PAIS/PAIS3/EN/St.5_EN_nal.PDF.

46 http://www.mfa-pmr.org/eng/?sub_category=5973&cat=news.47 Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conict, p. 28.48 International Crisis Group,Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 12.


16/40

16

that of Moldova, a belief bolstered by free gas deliveries from Russia.However, Transnistrian businessmen are a potentially strong constituencyin favour of reunication, especially since March 2006, when Ukrainebegan to require Moldovan customs stamps on any Transnistrian goods

crossing Ukraines border.Another aspect to be taken into account is the issue of personalsecurity, because some Transnistrian government ofcials, starting withthe Minister of Internal Security Antiufeev, are wanted by Interpol, andthey are not interested in conict settlement.

Reunication of Moldova with Transnistria looks more and moreunlikely. The Moldovan opposition supports the partition of the countryin order to facilitate integration into the European Union. However, thefuture status of Benderi city (the only city under Tiraspol control on theright bank with 80,000 inhabitants) complicates such a plan.

The Communist government, for its part, needs to nd some sort ofsolution for the Transnistrian dilemma, otherwise its prospects for stayingin power after the 2009 national elections are doubtful.49 MoldovanMinister of Reintegration Vasily Shova has declared that Moldova is notgoing to integrate into the EU without reintegration of the country.50President Voronin recently tabled a new proposal (which is the samepackage deal kept secret since September 2006), namely, renouncingany plans to join NATO in exchange for Transnistrias integrationinto Moldova. According to this plan, Transnistria would become anautonomous region similar to Gagauzia inside a unitary Republic ofMoldova. Voronin has even declared that his country could leave GUAM

(Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova).51 On April 8, 2008, Voroninmet with Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov for the rst time in seven

years, suggesting a recent intensication of efforts to settle the conict.While grim, the situation in Transnistria looks more favourable for

reintegration than the other separatist frozen conicts in the formerUSSR (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh), because of theethnic structure of society and the possibility of inter-personal contacts(travel between Transnistria and the rest of Moldova). However, every

year a Transnistrian identity becomes stronger, making efforts atreintegration all the more difcult.

49 Sergiu Panainte, A New Impetus to Moldovas European Hopes: Bridging the Gap,Political & Security Statewatch, IDIS Viitorul, No.5, October 2007, p. 6.

50 During the Second Annual International Conference Settling the TransnistrianConict in the Context of Moldovas Europeanisation, Chisinau, March 2627,2008.

51 Interview in the Russian newspaperKommersant, 13 March 2008.


17/40

17

UKRAINE

ROMANIA

III. Gagauzia

Any discussion about national minorities in Moldova cannot ignorethe Gagauz. During the 19th century, the Gagauz, an Orthodox Turkicpeople, were brought by Russians to the southern part of Bessarabia fromSouthern Dobrudga and Bulgaria, which was still under the OttomanEmpire. The Gagauz were a small ethnic group speaking a Turkic dialect,but sharing the Christian Orthodox faith. This was one of the mainreasons for accepting the protection of the Russian troops.

During the process of perestroika in the late Soviet era, the Gagauzstarted to mobilise and reassert their own identity, and in 1988 created

a movement called the Gagauz People. Their demand was to createan autonomous republic in the southern part of Moldova, a demand forwhich they received political support from Transnistrian separatists.

The Gagauz viewed with concern the prospect of reunication withRomania and advocated a federal structure for the Republic of Moldovaconsisting of Moldova, Transnistria and Gagauzia. In accordance withMoldovas 1994 constitution, the Gagauz achieved the right of external self-determination: in the event that Moldova unites with some other country(Romania), Gagauzia has the right to independence. On December 23,1994 a special Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia was adopted

by the Moldovan Parliament. The Law foresees that Gagauzia or Gagauz-Yeri is an autonomous territorial unit within the Republic of Moldova. Ascan be seen in the map below, the territory is not a compact one.

Gagauzia


18/40

18

The Gagauz from Moldova represent the largest Gagauz communityin the world. Even though Turkey is the linguistic motherland, it isnot the religious motherland. Until Voronins recent proposal, theseconsiderations have been used to justify Gagauz autonomy as a special

right that cannot be granted to other ethnocultural groups fromMoldova.52 Gagauz make up the overwhelming majority of the 170,000people living in the autonomous unit. The unit itself was established outof administrative areas where Gagauz are the majority and/or comprised40%50% of the population and the local population voted in referendafor joining the autonomous unit.

Gagauzia has three ofcial languages Moldovan, Gagauz andRussian. The Moldovan government set up the rst Gagauz universityand pledged to print books and offered courses in the Gagauz language.

A Nationalities Centre was set up to introduce Turkish classes for theGagauz with a system of grants. However, most Gagauz living in thecountryside knew the Moldovan language and did not feel the needto nurture their own language to the same degree as Ukrainians orRussians.

The Moldovan central government believed that the territorialautonomy provided to Gagauzia would serve as a model for Transnistria.Instead, Transnistrians view Gagauzia as a failure and argue thatGagauzia is an example that demonstrates that the Moldovan centralgovernment cannot be trusted to provide meaningful autonomy.53 Gagauzautonomy is criticized as a failed experiment, because it did not foster thenational rebirth of the Gagauz people. Moreover, Gagauz autonomy has

also implied a certain isolationism from the rest of Moldovan society.54Despite its faults, the establishment of Gagauz territorial autonomy

could be described as a success in comparison with Chisinaus relationswith Tiraspol. In comparing Gagauzia and Transnistria, one keydifference stands out minimal interference by the kin-state, which forGagauzia is Turkey. Turkey has primarily been interested in cultural andlinguistic ties with Gagauzia, and does not have a broader political oreconomic agenda.

52 Caraus, The Role of the Nation-State, p. 88.53 Steven D. Roper, Federalization and Constitution-Making as an Instrument of

Conict Resolution,Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 12, Issue 4, Fall 2004, p. 533.54 Oazu Nantoi, Transnistrian Conict: What Could the European Union and the

United States of America Do? (Chisinau:Institute of Public Policy, 2005), p. 5.


19/40

19

IV. Involvement of Kin-States

in Ethnic Relations

Due to historical and demographic reasons, neighbouring states haveplayed a prominent role in affecting Moldovan ethnic policy. In the caseof Moldova, one can speak of the direct involvement of three kin-states:Romania, Russia and Ukraine.

4.1 Russia

The country whose inuence has been most evident in Moldova sincethe late 1980s is Russia. Since its rst hours of independence, Moldovawas dependent on Russia.55 This was the case despite a new geopoliticalsituation in which Moldova does not have a common border with Russiafor the rst time since the Middle Ages.

It is important to note that the Russian government has not criticizedthe Republic of Moldova for discrimination against national minorities,a common charge Moscow has levelled against Latvia and Estonia.The ofcial position of Russia is that it supports the ethnic policy ofMoldova.56 The Moldovan government has provided support for a RussianCultural Centre and for a Foundation for Slavic Culture, and its culturaland ethnic policies towards ethnic minorities are very liberal, especiallytowards Russians. The Russian language is a language of inter-ethniccommunication (its status is close to that of an ofcial language).

It is possible to obtain education in the Russian language, includinghigher education, in state-nanced educational establishments. 22% ofpupils are attending schools with Russian as the primary language ofinstruction.57 The Russian language is mandatory from the second yearof instruction for all pupils. Moldovan legislation has been criticized forestablishing a regime in which the Russian language is the language ofeducation at all levels for Ukrainians, Bulgarians and other national

55 Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 17.56Authors interview with Russian diplomats in Chisinau.on November 8, 2006.57 Council of Europe, Second Report Submitted by Moldova Pursuant to Article 25

Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.Received on 14 May 2004, p. 29. Available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_%28monitoring%29/2._monitoring_mechanism/3._state_reports_and_unmik_kosovo_report/2._second_cycle/PDF_2nd_SR_Moldova.pdf.


20/40

20

minorities, thereby promoting the assimilation of the disadvantaged andsmall national minorities into the Russian-speaking group.58

While Russia has not engaged in trying to inuence Moldovasethnic policy within Moldova proper, it has been the key player in

Transnistria. In addition to segments of the Russian military, red-brown forces in the Russian Parliament have provided strong supportfor Transnistrian separatists, while Russian Presidents Yeltsin and Putinwere more restrained in their public positions regarding the breakawayregion. There is, however, a strong interest from the Russian side inkeeping Moldova within the Russian orbit. Russia can wield severaldifferent kinds of leverage for this purpose: economic (gas, ownershipof Moldovan enterprises), military (the former 14th army) and political(Transnistria).59

A contentious issue in the MoldovanRussian relationship iswithdrawal of the former 14th army from Transnistria. The Russianmilitary presence is very much a factor in maintaining the frozenconict. Under the July 21, 1992 ceasere agreement between Russiaand Moldova, the 14th army was to serve as a peacekeeping force. But theagreement did not foresee an end date for the peacekeeping operation.The 1994 agreement between Moldova and Russia stated that withdrawalof the troops should be implemented within 3 years of the agreementsentry into force. But it also had a clause envisaging that by that date, theTransnistrian conict should be settled. While the Moldovan Parliamentratied the agreement almost immediately, the Russian Parliament failedto do so.

Until 1998 OSCE member states criticized Russia for not fullling the1994 agreement. In 1998 at the Oslo Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE,Russia presented a plan for withdrawal of its troops from Transnistriaby 2005. The 1999 Istanbul Summit of the OSCE approved a documentconcerning Russian troops in Transnistria setting a deadline of the endof 2002 for complete withdrawal of troops.

In April 2004 Russia proposed the Kozak Memorandum advocatingan asymmetric federation as per Moldovas desires, but Voronin stillinsisted on immediate withdrawal of Russian troops. On July 12, 2004at his meeting with Russian ambassadors abroad, President Putin

unusually emphasized that Russia should not assume that it has the rightto dominate its relations with other ex-Soviet states, but should make

58 Resource Center of Moldovan Human Rights NGOs, Shadow Report on theImplementation of the Resolution ResCMN (2003)4 of the Committee of Ministers ofthe Council of Europe by the Republic of Moldova, November 2004, p. 8. Availableat http://www.minelres.lv/reports/moldova/PDF_Moldova_Resource_Center_HR_NGOs.pdf.

59 Claus Neukirch, Transdniestria and Moldova: Cold Peace at the Dniestr,HelsinkiMonitor, No. 2, 2001, p. 134.


21/40

21

Russias relations with CIS members as attractive as possible.60 Therefusal of President Voronin to sign the Kozak Memorandum along withthe Transnistrian economic blockade was mentioned from the Russianside as the main obstacles causing the delay of the troop withdrawal

in 2004 when a special high-ranking OSCE delegation visited Tiraspol.However, it should be noted that the Kozak Memorandum foresaw thepresence of Russian troops for 20 more years.

After the failure of the Kozak Memorandum, Russian policy towardsMoldova changed. Russia started to support the Moldovan opposition,which started to pay frequent visits to Moscow. In 2005, Moscow bannedthe import of Moldovan fruit and vegetables. In 2006 the ban wasextended to Moldovan wines and brandy. That represented a serious blowto the economy of Moldova, as wine exports make up an important partof the countrys income.61 The sanctions hit Moldovan wineries hard,though most belong to Russians: the sanctions cost Moldova about USD200 million in 2006.62

While Russia put economic pressure on Moldova, it also remindedMoldova of the other levers of inuence at its disposal: Russian

Ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov declared in 2005 that the peopleof Transnistria can count on the Russian troops stationed in the region.63However, in 2005 the Moldovan Parliament insisted on the withdrawal ofRussian troops, threatening to unilaterally denounce the 1992 Russian-Moldovan agreement on the presence of Russian troops. The possibletermination of the agreement forced Russia to allow other internationalactors (USA, EU) to participate in the conict settlement process, while

continuing the pressure on Moldova.In January 2006 Russia cut Moldovas gas supply for 16 days and

then negotiated a 100% price increase for future supplies.64 Russia alsothreatened to impose visa restrictions on Moldovan citizens working inRussia. However, Russia needed to regain the initiative in negotiationsand to show itself an active player in the region. Perhaps because of this,during the CIS summit in November 2006, Putin and Voronin agreed onthe lifting of the ban on Moldovan wine to Russia. Subsequently, therewere rumours of a possible Russian-Moldovan deal envisioning settlementof the Transnistrian conict in exchange for Moldovas reconrming its

neutral status and unconditionally recognizing Russian property rightsover Transnistrias assets. Meanwhile Russia signed a cooperation

60 Ciobanu,NATO/EU Enlargement, p. 11.61 Zurab Todua, Russia Must Regain Initiative in Moldova,Russia in Global Affairs,

JanuaryMarch 2007, p. 3.62Ibid, p. 4.63 Borgen, Thawing a Frozen Conict, p. 78.64 See Robert L. Larsson, Russias Energy Policy: Security Dimensions and Russias

Reliability as an Energy Supplier (Stockholm: Swedish Defense Research Agency,2006), pp. 2267.


22/40

22

protocol with Transnistrian leader Smirnov for the rst time recognizingSmirnov as President of Transnistria.

On May 24, 2006 negotiations were held in Brussels on transformingthe present Russian peacekeeping operation into an international one.

A few days later Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov declared thatRussian troops would remain in Transnistria until the conict is settled.65Russia has been content to maintain the status quo, which allows it fullcontrol in Transnistria and important leverage to use from time to timeto pressure Chisinau.66 Russia has given its passports to Transnistrianresidents in great numbers, using a Liberal Democratic Party of Russiaofce in Tiraspol as a de facto consulate.67 Since 1995, the RussianFederal Security Service envoy has used an ofce in the building of theTransnistrian Ministry of State Security.68 It is difcult for Moldova tocompete with Russia in the dissemination of information, because a largepart of Moldovas media belongs to Russia-based companies.

Russia wants to maintain a military presence in the area, portrayedby some as the gateway to the Balkans. The areas strategic locationis another reason why the Russian army positioned in Transnistria isunlikely to be withdrawn anytime soon.69 In 2006 alone Russia providedthe Transnistrian region with aid amounting to USD 77 million. Incomparison Moldova has received nancial assistance from the EU duringthe period of 1991-2006 of about USD 415 million.70

Russian plans for federalizing Moldova have not been abandoned.There is a different approach towards solving the Transnistrianconict from both sides. Moldova is ready to offer extensive economic

and administrative concessions in the hope of reintegrating Transnistria.Meanwhile Russia wants to build such a conguration of power inMoldova that would allow the leadership from Tiraspol to be able tocontrol Moldovas foreign and security policy. This could be a guaranteethat would not allow Moldova to join the EU and NATO.71

Transnistrias comparison with Kosovo is not in Russian interests,as Russia supports the territorial integrity of Serbia, does not want toface international criticism regarding Transnistria and does not neednew tensions with Moldova. Moreover, in the long run an independentTransnistria might become less responsive to Moscows wishes. If

Russia recognizes Transnistrias independence, pro-Moscow politicians65 International Crisis Group,Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 12.66 Urse, Transnistria, p. 6.67 International Crisis Group,Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 17.68 Ciobanu,Frozen and Forgotten Conicts in the Post-Soviet States, p. 83 .69 Svetlana Gamova, Moldova: A Three-Way Split,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

Vol. 50, No. 1, January 1994, p.43.70 George Dura, EU Membership Gives Romania New Opportunities in its Relations

with Moldova, Centre for European Policy Studies Commentary, 10 January 2007.71 Minzazari, The New Transnistria Initiatives of President Voronin, p. 11.


23/40

23

in Chisinau will be severely weakened. Keeping the elite of Tiraspolcompletely dependent on Moscow seems the best strategy that Russia hasso far.72

It cannot be ruled out that Russia seeks a settlement for reunication

of the Republic of Moldova as soon as possible. Russia controls not onlythe economy of Transnistria (a debt of USD 1 billion for gas supplies), butalso a large share of the Moldovan economy. With Latvia and Bulgaria asexamples of EU member states where Russian capital is very inuential,Russia could be keen to see reunication of Moldova and its integrationinto the EU. Another feature to be taken into account is the possibilitythat the so-called Sheriff political group in Transnistria is interestedin playing its own European game without orders from Moscow. The EUhas excluded speaker of the Transnistrian parliament Shevchuk fromthe Schengen black list. If Moldova reunites, there will be membersof the Moldovan parliament from Transnistria through whom Russiacould realize its interests and stop Moldovas integration into the EU.Simultaneous integration into the EU and reintegration of the countryis quite unlikely.

Despite the strong factors militating towards the maintenance of thestatus quo, new initiatives and signals continue to emerge, suggestingthe possibility of some movement in the medium term. During thevisit of Ukrainian President Yuschenko to Moscow on February 13,2008, he spoke with President Putin on the necessity of speeding upbilateral consultations to better coordinate positions on the settlementof the conict. The common positions should include the observance of

Moldovas territorial integrity and a special legal status for Transnistria.During a secret visit to Chisinau and Tiraspol in March 2008, formerRussian ambassador, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council

Yuri Zubakov convinced Tiraspol to return to the negotiating table.73However, ofcial Tiraspol denied that it has accepted any new conictsettlement plan74 and said that there can be no common state withMoldova, as expressed by the Transnistrian people in the referendumof 2006. President Smirnov also revealed his opinion that Transnistriawould be worse off if the Kozak memorandum had been signed.75

72 Urse, Transnistria, p. 14.73 http://www.moldpress.md/default.asp?Lang=en&ID=83198.74 http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1569/print.75 http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1653/print.


24/40

24

4.2 Ukraine

Though Ukraine shares a 452 kilometre border with Moldova andthe number of Ukrainians is roughly the same as that of Russians in

Moldova, Ukraine is much more restrained than Russia with regard tothe situation in Moldova. Ukrainians in Moldova, who mostly came to theborder villages after the Second World War, live in compact settlements:out of 350 border villages in Moldova, around 100 are entirely Ukrainianand 200 are mixed. However, few Ukrainians in Moldova have a strongsense of attachment to Ukraine; elderly Ukrainians are more orientedtowards Russia. According to the 1989 census, 40% of MoldovasUkrainians speak Russian as their mother tongue. While they do notknow Ukrainian, they are also against reunication with Romania. Forthem the Ukrainian state is more of a myth than Russia.76

Although the Ukrainians are the largest minority in Moldova, theywere very passive in reasserting their national identity after the collapseof the USSR. This stems from the fact that Ukrainians were moreassimilated during Soviet times, but also because, apart from borderareas, they were not very concentrated, as opposed to the Gagauz andBulgarians situated in the southern part of Moldova. Thus, the Ukrainianminority did not pose to the central authorities in Chisinau the kind ofchallenges that Russians did, and this issue did not become a problemthat required a solution at the interstate level.77

In 1990 there were no Ukrainian schools in Moldova. When theMoldovan national movement emerged, that realization gave rise to theintroduction of a campaign to encourage the Ukrainian community toopen their schools. Though Ukrainians set up their cultural organizations,they do not believe there is sufcient political will to develop Ukrainianculture in Moldova.78 The Ukrainian language is classied as a regionallanguage and language of a national minority.

Moldova was the second republic after Kazakhstan to welcome bydecree an association of Ukrainians with the support of the Ukrainianstate. It has allowed 86 schools to open, but they lack staff and textbooks.79There is no bilingual or trilingual education available in Moldova.Nevertheless Ukrainian authorities complain about the disproportional

number of Ukrainian schools in Moldova in comparison with Moldovanschools in Ukraine (18 schools for the Moldovan language of instruction

76 Dressler, Between Empires and Europe, p. 44.77Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 32.78Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National

Minorities, Second Opinion on Moldova, adopted on 9 December 2004, para.19. Available at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_%28monitoring%29/2._monitoring_mechanism/5._comments_by_the_states_concerned/2._second_cycle/PDF_2nd_comments_Moldova.pdf.

79 Dressler, Between Empires and Europe, p. 44.


25/40

25

for 240,000 Moldovans).80 This is contrary to a 1992 Agreement betweenMoldova and Ukraine on Good Neighbourly Relations, Friendship andCooperation which guarantees the rights of ethnic minorities to be taughtin their own language. It is important to remember that after the Second

World War Ukraine acquired the Romanian territories of NorthernBukovina and Southern Bessarabia which were densely populated byMoldovans (Romanians).

Ukraine is very supportive of a withdrawal of Russian troops fromTransnistria, to a large extent because Ukraine is facing the same problemin Crimea and is not interested in the presence of Russian troops on itswestern border. However, Kyiv has not been supportive of other Moldovandemands. On 1 August 2004, with a view to overcome the Transnistrianschools crisis, Moldova issued a resolution which stipulated that the onlyTransnistrian goods which would be permitted to cross the state border,including that with Ukraine, would be those for which the relevantTransnistrian companies had paid taxes to the Moldovan budget. Kyivrejected this Moldovan initiative.

Ukraine under President Kuchma treated Transnistria as a de factostate which had the right to exist, including to conduct external economicactivities independently. Kuchmas stance was that Transnistria had twoproblems that needed to be addressed normalization of its relationshipwith Chisinau and lack of international recognition. Agreementsconcluded by Transnistria with some Ukrainian regions required theprior agreement of the Kyiv central authorities. Ukraine has shown anincreasing interest in the northern districts of Transnistria predominantly

populated by Ukrainians. Vladimir Botnar, chairman of the Associationof the Ukrainians of Transnistria has visited Kyiv often, trying to set upin Ukraine a lobby similar to that in Russia.81

The situation changed with the Orange Revolution and ViktorYushchenkos assumption of the presidency in Ukraine. While the newUkrainian elite was not united in its stance towards Moldova, a signicantsubgroup was pro-European and pro-NATO. It had won the elections onan anti-corruption platform and needed the support of the Republic ofMoldova to stop smuggling across the Ukraine-Transnistria border.

After the Orange Revolution, the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan

and Moldova) organizations work was reactivated. All the membercountries had to deal with Russian-supported territorial separatism. OnApril 22, 2005 during the GUAM Summit held in Chisinau PresidentYushchenko presented his version of a settlement of the Transnistrianconict. It was called the Seven Steps Paper and differed from theone discussed with Moldovan authorities beforehand. Seven Stepswas a modernized version of the Kozak Memorandum legalizing theTransnistrian authorities. Yushchenko proposed to hold as soon

80 Interviews with Ukrainian diplomats in Chisinau on November 8, 2006.81 Nantoi, About the Situation in the East Districts, p. 9.


26/40

26

as possible free and democratic elections to the Supreme Council ofTransnistria.82 This was one of the rst major foreign policy initiativesof the new Ukrainian government.

On May 1617, 2005 Ukraine came out with a Plan for Settlement

of the Transnistrian Conict (the Vinnitsa Plan). According to theplan, Transnistria would be a legal entity that would become a republicin the federation of Moldova. Transnistria would have the right totake part in the foreign policy of Moldova in relevant elds of interest.Transnistria would be provided with a right of self-determination incase Moldova were to lose its independence. The plan contained a clauseon international monitoring of Transnistria until Moldova recognizesthe elected authorities of Transnistria. The plan envisaged signing anagreement which would guarantee a law on the special legal status ofthe Transnistrian region in the form of a republic within the Republic ofMoldova with its own constitution, symbols and three ofcial languages(Moldovan, Ukrainian, Russian). The agreement would have to besigned by Moldova, Russia and the OSCE. The plan would be signed inthe presence of the USA and the EU. The Vinnitsa Plan did not providefor any involvement of Romania or say anything about the presence ofRussian troops in Transnistria. The plan was heavily criticized not onlyby Romania, but also by Moldovan civil society.

The Yuschenko plan provoked on June 10, 2005 the declaration ofthe Moldovan Parliament on democratization, decriminalization anddemilitarization of Transnistria. It was followed by immediate adoptionof the Law on the Basic Provisions of the Special Legal Status of

Settlements on the Left Bank of Nistru (Transnistria) by the Parliamenton July 22, 2005. The law established a special autonomous territorialunit Transnistria. It granted legislative and representative powersto the regional Supreme Soviet, which has to be elected under thesupervision of the international electoral commission created under theauspices of the OSCE. The law also required that elections should followMoldovan legislation and be monitored by the Council of Europe.83 Thelaw proclaimed the supremacy of Moldovan laws over Transnistrianones. The law said that detailed legal relations between Moldova andTransnistria would be worked out in a law which would be drafted in

cooperation with a new system of government in Transnistria.In reaction to Yuschenkos proposal on fair elections in Transnistria,the Moldovan government lay out its own requirements for agreeingto such elections: liquidation of the Ministry of State Security, releaseof political prisoners, normal activity of political parties and non-governmental organizations, international monitoring of the elections

82 Nantoi, The Plan for the Transnistrian Conict Settlement, p. 5.83 Oleh Protsyk, Moldovas Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating

Transnistria, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 53, No. 4, July/August 2006,p. 34.


27/40

27

and withdrawal of Russian troops. This was unacceptable to PresidentSmirnov and Russia. The plan was acceptable to the internationalcommunity (the OSCE and the Council of Europe), whose assistanceMoldova was requesting. Following the law a detailed list of social

guarantees for the population of Transnistria was elaborated on July 29,2005.On June 2, 2005 representatives of the Ukrainian president met

in Tiraspol with President Smirnov and asked for a comprehensiveUkrainian presence in Transnistria, rst of all broadcasting UkrainianTV channels throughout Transnistria. This would undermine the Russianinformation monopoly in Transnistria.84 In January 2006 President

Yuschenko got political support to his plan from President Putin in theform of joint declaration on Transnistria.

In March 2006 Ukraine and Moldova agreed upon a commoncustoms regime for the Transnistrian segment of the common border.This move was welcomed by the USA and the EU, but elicited a verynegative reaction from Transnistrian leaders, who called it a blockadeof Transnistria. The new rules allowed the passage of Transnistriangoods through the Ukrainian border only if they were accompanied bythe proper Moldovan customs documentation. Moldova facilitated theregistration of Transnistrian enterprises with the authorities in Chisinau,simultaneously renouncing its rights to tax them.

On May 23, 2006 the GUAM Summit in Kyiv stated that territorialannexations and the creation of enclaves can never become legal,which was a clear reference to the frozen conicts,85 including the one

in Transnistria. While this declaration pleased Moldovas leaders, soonthereafter, the Ukrainian authorities surprised Moldova with a newinitiative. In June 2006 Ukraines foreign minister Boris Tarasyukproposed expanding the existing negotiations format regarding the conictin Transnistria by inviting Romania. Before, Ukraine had proposedincluding the US and the EU in the negotiations. These proposals wereheavily criticized by Transnistria and Russia, who called Tarasyuk a U.S.agent and inspirer of Ukraines anti-Transnistrian actions.86

Subsequently, the destabilization of the political situation in Ukrainedecreased pro-EU and pro-NATO activities in Ukrainian foreign policy,

including its initiatives concerning the situation in Transnistria. However,Ukraine remains a key player in the region and Europeanization is thestrongest ambition for both Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraines policytowards Moldova reects Kyivs desire to play the role of a regional leaderin Eastern Europe. The success of the EU Border Assistance Missionlies very much in the hands of Ukraine. Ukraines new Timoshenkogovernment should cease ofcial bilateral relations with the leaders of

84 Ibid., p. 9.85 Urse, Transnistria, p. 11.86 Ibid, p. 15.


28/40

28

Transnistria, despite the fact that many Ukrainian businessmen supportthe status quo in the region. Ukraine is likely to continue to supportMoldovas demand for a Russian troop withdrawal from Transnistria, asthis would increase Ukraines political impact in the region.

4.3 Romania

Romania was the rst country to recognize Moldovan independencein 1991. However, in the beginning of the 1990s Romania did not possessthe necessary military, nancial and economic resources to play a majorrole in Moldova. Romanias role increased when its European perspectivebecame obvious. Nevertheless relations between the two countrieswere uneasy, especially after Communists came to power in Moldova in2001. Moldovan leaders refused Romanias assistance in the European

integration process, meanwhile asking for equality in the internationalarena.87In 2003 Romania introduced a special fund for Moldova, nancing

cultural and economic projects between the two countries. However,this was characterized by Moldovan leaders as interference in Moldovasaffairs. Nevertheless, improving relations with Romania is the only wayMoldova can become closer to the EU. Bruce Jackson, a former leaderof the US Committee for NATO, has even called for Chisinau-Bucharestrelations to become as intimate as Kyiv-Warsaw or Warsaw-Vilniusrelations.88 However, a public opinion poll in 2004 showed that only 19%of Moldovans believe that developing relations with Romania is a priority,while 41% chose Russia.89

After joining NATO, the Romanian government started to seek a moreactive role in the Black Sea region and in Moldova particular. It was notby accident that new Romanian President Traian Basescu chose Chisinauas the destination of his rst visit abroad following his inauguration inDecember 2004.90 On July 1, 2006 Traian Basescu caused a political stormwhen he said he had offered Moldova the option of joining the EU withRomania. President Voronin quickly ruled this out, but the Transnistriansecurity chief, Vladimir Antiufeev, seized on the comment as evidence of

87 Odette Tomescu-Hatto, Romanian-Moldovan Political and Economic Relations.International Conference Paper Europe and the Transition Process in the Republicof Moldova, July 23, 2004, organized by SudostEuropa-Gesellschaft in cooperationwith the German Federal Foreign Ofce, p. 25.

88Ibid., p. 28.89 Social Monitor, Public Opinion Survey, Institute for Development and Social

Initiatives (ISDI) Viitorul, Chisinau, October 2004, p. 81.90 Marius Vahl, The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conict, Centre for

European Policy Studies Policy Brief, No. 73 / May 2005, p. 1.


29/40

29

continued Romanian claims on Moldova and called for a larger Russianmilitary presence in Transnistria.91

Although Romanian-Moldovan relations have improved in recentyears, Romania has criticized Moldova for insisting on mentioning the

Moldovan language in EU documents. This was the case with the VisaFacilitation and Readmission Agreements, which occasioned harshstatements between Moldovan and Romanian ofcials with Romaniathreatening not to recognize and sign any documents drafted in thislanguage. The language issue could become one of the core disputesin Moldovan-Romanian relations as the Moldovan government hasstarted to publish Moldovan-Romanian dictionaries. At the same time,collaboration in the educational eld is intense, with Romania grantingmany scholarships for Moldovan youth to study in Romania.

When Romania became an EU member state in 2007 Romaniancitizenship became very attractive for Moldovans, because it opened thedoor to travel and work in many European Union countries. There areno statistical data regarding how many Moldovans are simultaneouslyRomanian citizens, but the number usually mentioned is 1 million.Romanian authorities speak only about 100,000 Moldovans whohave acquired Romanian citizenship.92 Other data show that in 7% ofhouseholds in Moldova at least one member holds Romanian citizenshipand in 19% of households, there are members who have already appliedfor Romanian citizenship.93

This means that Romanias role in Moldovas internal affairs isgrowing. It is not difcult to obtain Romanian citizenship and the

Romanian government has not placed any signicant hurdles to thosetaking this step. All descendants of those who were Romanian citizensin 1940 can apply. This is leading to a situation in which Moldova has ashrinking base of citizens, as, in addition to a large number of Romaniancitizens, a signicant number of people have acquired Russian orUkrainian citizenship.

If Moldova continues to move towards the European Union, the roleof Romania will only increase. Very recently Romanian Foreign Minister

Adrian Cioroianu declared that Moldovas accession to the EuropeanUnion is a foreign policy priority for Romania.94 At the same time,

Romanian President Traian Basescu has criticised the EU for not doingmore to solve the Transnistrian conict.

91 International Crisis Group,Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 19.92 Romania/Moldova: Bucharest Has Moral Duty to Help Moldovas EU Ties,

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 12, 2008.93 Barometer of Public Opinion May 2007. Press release, (Chisinau: Institute of

Public Policy, N.D.). Available at http://www.ipp.md/les/Barometru/2007/Rezumat_de_presa_BOP_mai_2007_English.doc.

94 Romania/Moldova: Bucharest Has Moral Duty to Help Moldovas EU Ties,Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, February 12, 2008.


30/40

30

V. The Role of Regional Organizations

in Preventing Ethnic Confict

5.1 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in

Europe (OSCE)

From the early 1990s, the most inuential regional organizationinvolved in Moldova has been the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE comprises all the majorplayers in the region Russia, Ukraine, Romania and the United States.

On February 4, 1993 the OSCE Committee of Senior Ofcials adopted themandate for a mission to Moldova, which opened in April 1993 and is stilloperating.95 The mandate called for consolidation of the independenceand territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its currentborders and a special status for the Transnistrian region. The Missionwas also charged with facilitating an agreement on the withdrawal offoreign troops, observance of international obligations and commitmentsregarding human and minority rights and assistance in monitoring theimplementation of agreements on a durable political settlement.96 It isnot the task of the Mission to ascertain which of the sides was responsiblefor the conict and the 1992 events.

The broad wording of the mandate gave the Heads of the Mission agreat deal of leeway not only in the conduct of day to day operations, butalso in the choice of strategies and instruments. However, some commonground can be seen in the activities of all the Heads of the Mission respect for the territorial integrity of Moldova, an understanding thatbroad autonomy has to be arranged for Transnistria, and the call for thetimely, complete and orderly withdrawal of Russian troops.97

During the summer of 2003 the OSCE Mission was left outside thereal negotiations Russian presidential representative Dmitri Kozak ledwith Moldovan and Transnistrian leaders. In parallel, the 2+3 format

negotiations continued. Meanwhile the Dutch 2003 OSCE Chairmanshiphad declared Moldova to be one of the priorities during its chairmanship.The Kozak Memorandum episode showed Russian tactics in usinginternational organizations when they can be of benet, but acting

95William Hill, Making Istanbul a Reality: Moldova, Russia, and Withdrawal fromTransdniestria,Helsinki Monitor, No. 2, 2002, p. 133.

96 CSCE/19-CSO/Journal No. 3, Annex 3, 4 February 1993.97 Neukirch, Transdniestria and Moldova, p. 127.


31/40

31

independently if Russian interests can be pursued in that way. Moreover,both strategies can be used in parallel.

With the failure of the Kozak Memorandum, Russia faced criticismfor not living up to the obligations it had undertaken in the 1999 OSCE

Istanbul Summit regarding the withdrawal of troops from Transnistria.The OSCE 2002 summit granted a one years delay, which meant thedeadline was the end of 2003. At the time, Russian Foreign Minister IgorIvanov spoke bitterly against the Netherlands (chair of the OSCE at thattime), the United States, the OSCE and the Council of Europe: If wereally want the OSCE to play a dignied role in solving problems, wecannot allow her to change into an instrument of separate states.98

In autumn 2006 the OSCE under the Belgian chairmanship cameout with a new plan for settling the conict in Transnistria. The planwas inspired by Belgian federalism and certain elements from the KozakMemorandum. It included an OSCE mandated peacekeeping operation inTransnistria, the creation of a bicameral parliament of Moldova with anupper chamber with overrepresentation for Transnistria. The plan alsoenvisaged the possibility of Transnistrian independence in the event thatMoldova united with Romania.

In general the activities of the OSCE are often criticized not only byTransnistrian leaders, but also by Moldovan society as being contraryto Moldovas interests because of the role Russia plays inside OSCEdecision-making processes. On July 3, 2004 President Voronin signed acommon statement of CIS presidents that the OSCE does not respectsuch fundamental principles as non-interference in internal affairs and

respect for national sovereignty instead of concentrating on military-political, economic, and environmental elements.99 The OSCE is blamedfor introducing the concept of the federalization of Moldova, though,starting in 1993 when the Mission was established, it was always againstany confederation between Moldova and Transnistria on an equalbasis. Nevertheless, the OSCE has accepted the de facto statehood ofTransnistria, inviting it to the negotiating table. On the other hand, theOSCE has always defended the territorial integrity of Moldova.

The position of the OSCE has not changed over the years. On January17, 2008 the OSCE Chairman-in-Ofce Finnish Foreign Minister Ilkka

Kanerva called for the resumption of talks over Transnistria. He visitedMoldova, including Transnistria, as part of his rst trip in ofce.100Until very recently, the OSCEs role in preventing ethnic conict wasthe most important among various international organizations engaged

98 John Lowenhardt. The OSCE, Moldova and Russian Diplomacy in 2003,Journal ofCommunist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2004, p. 110.

99 Ciobanu,Frozen and Forgotten Conicts in the Post-Soviet States, p. 142.100 OSCE Chairman Calls for Transdniestria Settlement Talks to Restart, Welcomes

Positive Signs from Both Sides, OSCE Mission to Moldova press release, http://www.osce.org/moldova.


32/40

32

in the region. While the OSCE Mission in Chisinau and various ad hoccommissions have engaged Moldova, so has the OSCE High Commissioneron National Minorities (HCNM), who has monitored the Moldovanlanguage teaching programme in Gagauzia. However, contrary to the

situation in the Baltic states, the HCNMs involvement on the groundhas been rather minimal apart from Rolf Ekeuss visit to Tiraspol in 2005after the violent closure of Moldovan Latin-script schools . In general theOSCE Mission has not been able to mediate a political settlement of theTransnistrian conict during 15 years of its work. But this is due to nofault of the OSCE per se, but reects the obstruction of Russia and a lackof political will from other OSCE member states to take a more assertivestance in the conict.

5.2 The European Union

When the Republic of Moldova gained its independence in 1991, theprole of the European Union (EU) was very different from what it is now.There was no European Union, but a European Economic Community,and there was no Common Foreign and Security Policy. Unlike the Balticstates, Moldova did not formulate its foreign policy goal as a journey backto Europe.101 It tried to implement a policy of equidistance regarding theEast and the West. From the perspective of Brussels, Moldova was in thesame basket as Mongolia.

Moldova had no natural friends or allies in Western Europe. Moldovawas too small and economically weak to be an interesting partner. It wasin a completely different situation than the Baltic countries, which hadtheir advocates among the Nordic countries.

Moldova was offered a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement withthe EU only in 1994. The Agreement touched the human dimensionand political stability in the region (including Transnistria), but did notmake any promises of possible membership in the EU. In 2003 whenthe European Commission announced its European NeighbourhoodPolicy, Moldova was put in this ring of friends. This was evidence thatMoldovas chances for EU membership were weak and unclear. For itspart, Moldova requested the EU to open a Commissions Delegation in

Chisinau.In September 2003 Moldova submitted to the EU a Strategy forMoldovas Integration into the EU. At the end of 2003 EnlargementCommissioner Gunter Verheugen visited Chisinau and issued a toughmessage to Moldova that no ex-Soviet Republic would become an EU

101Vitu, Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Moldova, p. 39.


33/40

33

member in the following 20 years.102 However, at the same time, in itscountry report in 2004, the European Commission wrote that the EUhas stepped up its political engagement towards conict resolution overpast years and remains strongly committed to assisting this process.103

The integration of Cyprus into the EU gave President Voroninsadministration hope of joining the EU despite the breakaway region ofTransnistria.104

In 2005 the EU and the USA became observers of the negotiationprocess within the 2+3 format. Due to the consistent efforts made by theEU, on October 5, 2005 the European Commission, Moldova and Ukrainesigned a Memorandum of Understanding on the European Border

Assistance Mission (EUBAM). This breakthrough had become possiblewhen European oriented parties came to power in Ukraine in 2004. TheEuropean Union monitors the Moldovan-Ukrainian border with a view toblock the illegal trafc in arms, drugs and human beings. The mandate ofthe EUBAM mission has been extended until November 30, 2009.

On February 22, 2005 the EU-Moldova Action Plan for the next threeyears was signed, setting priorities for settlement of the Transnistrianconict and reform on a range of primarily domestic issues. After theMarch 6, 2005 national elections in Moldova, all the parliamentary partiessigned a declaration concerning integration into the EU. The declarationalso contains guarantees for national minorities.

On March 23, 2005 the EU Council appointed Adriaan Jacobovits deSzeged as EU Special Representative for Moldova. He previously served asthe special envoy on Transnistria of the 2003 OSCE Dutch Chairman-in-

Ofce. His tasks were to strengthen the EU contribution to settlement ofthe Transnistrian conict and assist in further development of Moldovan-EU relations. The next day the Moldovan parliament adopted a politicaldeclaration regarding European integration. On October 6, 2006 EUCommissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner opened thenew Delegation of the European Commission in Chisinau.

The European Union has been working in the eld of people-to-peoplecontacts, negotiating a visa-facilitation agreement with Moldova andopening a joint visa application centre in Chisinau in 2007. On March 7,2007 the EU Country Strategy Paper 20072013 for the Republic of

Moldova was adopted by the Commission. The subsequent NationalIndicative Programme 20072013 does not contain settlement of the

102Valeriu Gheorghiu, Which Role Can the EU Play to Enhance the Overall Politicaland Economic Situation in the Republic of Moldova?. International ConferencePaper Europe and the Transition Process in the Republic of Moldova, July 23,2004, organised by SudostEuropa-Gesellschaft in cooperation with the GermanFederal Foreign Ofce, p. 30.

103Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy.Country Report Moldova, COM (2004) 373, Brussels 2004, p. 10.

104Adrian Pop, Gabriela Pascariu, George Anglitoiu, Alexandru Purcarus, p. 77.


34/40

34

Transnistrian conict as a priority. However, if necessary, further specicassistance could be allocated for such an activity. On the other hand,the EU Country Strategy Paper states that the EC will continue itscurrent strong engagement in support of a settlement of the Transnistria

conict, in full respect of Moldovas territorial integrity105

and ndinga solution to the Transnistrian conict, in full respect of Moldovasterritorial integrity is a key priority of the Moldovan government.106The EC evaluates its cooperation with the Moldovan government on allquestions related to Transnistria settlement as good.107

However, EU member states cannot agree on sending an EU peace-keeping force to Transnistria. Romania is very keen to be involved inpeacekeeping, while Germany and France, along with High Representative

Javier Solana, are not ready for this step.108 Nevertheless the EuropeanParliament passed a resolution on the territorial integrity of Moldova,denounced the results of the Transnistrian independence referendum,and demanded Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova.

EU integration has become more and more popular in Moldova.If a referendum concerning the accession of Moldova to the EU washeld in summer 2007, 72% of people would have voted for accession.109However, the leaders of the EU have on numerous occasions repeatedthat there is no chance for Moldova to become an EU member state,thereby reducing the leverage of the EU in Moldova. The incentives forcompliance are strongest for the EU accession states and much weakerfor those neighbouring CIS states granted a Partnership and Cooperation

Agreement excluding the option of membership.110

The EU has been a reluctant actor in the frozen conicts, unwillingto directly confront Russia on issues related to the former Sovietspace. This has been the case even though the region is becoming theEUs immediate neighbourhood. One obvious explanation is Europesdependence on Russias energy resources. Another is the difculty inarticulating a coherent, far-reaching European foreign policy.111 Duringhis meeting with President Putin in early April 2005, for instance, HighRepresentative Solana stated that parts of the Kozak Memorandum

105European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Republic of Moldova.Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013, p. 14, available at. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_moldova_en.pdf.

106Ibid, p. 5.107Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2008) 399 Implementation of the

European Neighbourhood Policy in 2007, Progress Report Moldova, p. 2, availableat http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/whatsnew/pdf/moldova_clean_nal.pdf.

108International Crisis Group,Moldovas Uncertain Future, p. 5.109Barometer of Public Opinion May 2007.110Berg and van Meurs. Borders and Orders in Europe, p. 54.111 Urse, Transnistria, p. 16.


35/40

35

were highly appreciated.112 For his part, EU Special Representativefor Moldova Kalman Mizsei in November 2007 said that the differencesbetween Moldova and Transnistria are not just ecomomic, but politicaland emotional. He warned against over-simplication of the conict.113

However, in April 2008 the EU Presidency has noted that theTransnistrian conict cannot be compared with the situation in Kosovo,which issui generis.114

The role of the European Union in Moldova during the last 16 yearshas increased dramatically. In 1992 there was practically no involvementof the EU in Moldova and its conict with Transnistria. The higherprole can be explained with reference to the European NeighbourhoodPolicy adopted in 2003 and most importantly with the enlargement of theEU. Moldova now has advocates in Brussels not only through Romania,but also through other Central and East European countries. Thereare various moves towards establishing a Black Sea Union or EasternEuropean Union, similar to the Mediterranean Union established on theinitiative of France. Along with Ukraine and Georgia, Moldova could beamong the New Neighbourhood states to form such a union.

The EU can become the most inuential international organization inMoldova, but much depends on the ability of its member states to reacha consensus. The EU has at its disposal the tools to act in the region(a travel ban on Transnistrian leaders, the EU Border Mission togetherwith Ukraine, resources, granting market access and visa facilitation),but to enjoy leverage with Moldova, there needs to be a credible promiseof EU membership sometime in the future. Such a prospect could also

change the stance of the population of Transnistria towards a future in aunied Moldova.

Overall the EU remains very weak in Moldova compared to Russia,which can offer market access to Moldovan wine and agricultural products,as well as energy deliveries. Nevertheless the EU doubled its assistanceto Moldova to 254 million euros for the period 2007-2010, thereby makingMoldova the second highest per capita beneciary of EU aid under theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy after the Palestinian Authority.115

Romania and other advocates of Moldova will have to work hardto have Moldova grouped together with the Western Balkan states in

the Stabilization and Association Process, which have an accessionperspective. Currently Moldova does not have such a perspective and,without it, Europeanization is not effective.

112Vahl, The Europeanisation of the Transnistrian Conict, p. 6.113 http://www.tiraspoltimes.com/node/1442/print.114 http://www.azi.md/news?ID=49018.115 George Dura, EU Membership Gives Romania New Opportunities in its Relations

with Moldova, Centre for European Policy Studies Commentary, 10 January 2007.


36/40

36

5.3 The Council of Europe

The Republic of Moldova became the rst CIS country to join theCouncil of Europe in 1995 (at the same time as Latvia). Admission was

more than acceptance into the European democratic family, it actuallyrepresented further recognition on the international level of Moldovasindependence and a consolidation of its statehood. Moldova ratied theEuropean Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in1997.

Two problems characterized Moldovas relations with the Councilof Europe: recognition and legalization of the Metropolitan Church ofBessarabia, and the case of the political prisoners in Transnistrian jails both subjects of trials at the European Court of Human Rights.116

The issue of the Metropolitan Church is related to Moldovas

relations with Romania. During the Soviet era, the Metropolitan Churchwas under the Russian Patriarchy. After gaining independence, theauthorities of Moldova refused to establish the historical authority of theRomanian Orthodox Church over the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church.Nevertheless the European Court of Human Rights established historicaland legal relations between the Romanian Church and BessarabianChurch.

The so called Ilascu group was arrested in 1992 in Transnistriaduring the ghting over the Nistru. Ilie Ilascu himself was a leader of thebranch of the Moldovan Popular Front in Tiraspol. Four men includingIlascu were accused by Transnistrian authorities of terrorism. Ilascu wassentenced to death, while others were sentenced to twelve and fteen

years in prison. Because of pressure from the international com

Moldova Minorities 4

Documents

Transcript of Moldova Minorities 4