Modes of Professional Campaigning

Modes of Professional Campaign for European Parliamentary Elections

In recent years, political parties have reacted to far-reaching transformations in

their media and socio-cultural environments. These changes and adaptations, often assembled

under the catchword “professionalization,” become most apparent during electoral campaigns.

However, the campaign professionalism of political parties has not yet been systematically

“measured,” having been examined mostly in single case studies. Against this background, I

present an empirical test of the party-centered theory of professionalization. It is a comparison of

the campaign structures and strategies of political parties during the most recent European

parliamentary elections. The analyses demonstrate a wide variety in professional electoral

campaigning. There are differences in campaign structures that not only point to country specifics

but also to the impact of the size of the parties. There are questions regarding differences between

parties owing to their position on a right–left scale. The findings point to some general trends in

electoral campaigning that seem to be typical of societies with democratic corporatist media

systems. Those similarities and country-specifics should be taken into account in future empirical

analyses, which might benefit from this methodological approach.

In most European Union member states, turnout for the European parliamentary

(EP) elections has always been considerably below the participation rates in national elections.

Furthermore, EU-wide, participation has dropped steadily, from 63 percent in 1979 to 43 percent

in 2009. On one hand, such shrinking turnout reflects the EU’s geographic and political

expansion to young democracies that lack long traditions of electoral participation. On the other

hand, the increasing unwillingness of voters to cast their ballots points to growing deficiencies

across the EU in creating electoral publics and mobilizing voters, especially younger ones. In

fact, the number of voters who view EP elections as second-order national events has grown over

the last three decades (Steinbrecher and Huber 2006). In the perception of these voters, there is

less at stake than in first-order national elections and referenda. Moreover, even in EU elections,

the national political arena seems to be more important than the European one (de Vreese et al.

2006).

Low levels of attention and prevailing domestic frameworks in the minds of voters

cannot be isolated from the campaign environment in which EP elections take place. Thus, the

engagement of the mass media and the commitment of political parties to EP campaigns have

increasingly become topics of investigation (see, e.g., Maier et al. 2011; Maier and Tenscher

2006). As numerous studies have demonstrated, in most EU countries, the EP campaign coverage

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is rather marginalized, low in visibility and common European content (see, e.g., de Vreese et al.

2006; Schuck et al. 2011). But the mass media are not the only ones to blame for the second-

order coverage; the political parties as well are responsible for their second-order campaigning

(Bicchi et al. 2003; Cayrol 1991; de Vreese 2009). Faced with both a rather uninformed and

disinterested citizenry and a relatively restrained media environment, political parties have

repeatedly campaigned in a “low heated and half-hearted” way (Tenscher 2006) for the European

Parliament, spending considerably less money and fewer efforts in EP elections than in domestic

elections, while turning EP elections into national events.

Although the notion of half-hearted enthusiasm vis-à-vis EP elections is

widespread, there is a far-reaching deficit in empirical studies that directly compares (cross-

nationally or longitudinally) with EP campaigns (Bicchi et al. 2003; Bowler and Farrell 2011; de

Vreese 2009). Existing comparative studies habitually refer to countries as units of analysis.

Although this macro focus is widespread in political communication research (Swanson and

Mancini 1996; Negrine et al. 2007; Norris 2000; Plasser and Plasser 2003), it conceals

differences in campaigning within countries.

While differences on the macro level are quite reasonable, owing to diverse

political cultures, political, party, media, and voting systems, variations on the meso level seem to

be plausible, given the backdrop of distinct party cultures, campaign goals, party structures, and

—last but not least—financial and personal resources (Gibson and Römmele 2001). Respective

differences and particularities become obvious when we change the perspective from the macro

to the meso level of politics, namely, to the political parties and their campaign activities. Some

notable efforts have been made. (Gibson and Römmele 2009; Strömbäck 2009), yet these have

been restricted to (1) single case studies, (2) first-order national campaigns, and (3) analyzing

campaign structures, thereby neglecting campaign strategies.

Against this background, I will change and widen the focus to a cross-country

comparison of political parties’ campaign structures and strategies in the EP elections of 2009.

The interest is not on single symptoms of campaigning or in the impact of electoral campaigns

(Norris et al. 1999: 97-113). Rather, I investigate modes of professional campaigning and look at

explanations for differences in EP campaigning. Thereby transfer for the first time some party-

related assumptions about first-order campaigning (Gibson and Römmele 2009; Strömbäck 2009)

to a second-order context. Despite the national peculiarities of the electoral arena, the

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synchronous timing of these elections offers an excellent opportunity to test professional

campaigning at a particular moment in time (Bowler and Farrell 2011). Such a test not only

demonstrates differences between parties and countries but also helps detect factors on the macro

and the meso levels that impede or foster professional campaigning.

In this study, the focus is on multiparty systems. We believe that the party level is

most productive in terms of finding explanations for campaign professionalism, and for this we

need a number of parties. Thus, with a few countries having a multiparty system, this objective

can be reached. The countries chosen are quite similar with regard to their political, media, and

party systems. Austria, Finland, Germany, and Sweden belong to the so-called North/Central

European or democratic corporatist model of media and politics (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 143-

97), facilitating comparisons on the political parties’ meso level. Yet the countries also show

some relevant differences, thereby making the country-level analysis meaningful. Before we look

at the empirical findings, we briefly substantiate the concept of professional campaigning from

which a model of campaign measurement will be derived. Finally, our findings are summarized

and discussed.

It is common wisdom that the way electoral campaigns are planned, organized,

and conducted has changed profoundly in recent years (de Vreese 2009: 7-9; Farrell and Webb

2000; Plasser and Plasser 2003). Faced with fundamental changes in the socio-cultural, political,

and media environment, political parties have initiated substantial transformations, both in their

organizational structures and in their communicative strategies. First, they have made remarkable

efforts to address the needs of the electoral market, the voters, the campaigns, and electoral

success (“electoralization”; see Lilleker and Lees-Marshment 2005; Plasser et al. 1999). Second,

political parties have been broadening their focus in recent years, from party to media logics

(“mediatiza-tion”; Asp and Esaiasson 1996; Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999; Strömbäck 2008).

Third, they have striven for an enduring, strategically planned, rational, and sustainable campaign

management (“professionalization”2; Farrell and Webb 2000; Strömbäck 2009). Such

transformations are indispensable, and they reflect political parties’ reac-tions and adaptations to

the modernization-related transformations mentioned above (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999;

Plasser and Plasser 2003: 22-24).

From the literature cited above, I have identified a set of alleged trends in political

campaigns that are presented as being salient in first-order electoral campaigns, both

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organization-wise and with respect to political parties’ campaign strategies, as follows:

1. Expanding structural, financial, and personal capabilities for cost-intensive

long-term campaigning or permanent campaigning (Blumenthal 1980; Gibson and Römmele

2001; Mair et al. 1999).

2. A shift toward externalization and commercialization of specific campaign tasks

by resorting to hired professionals (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999; Farrell and Webb 2000;

Negrine 2007: 33-35; Plasser and Plasser 2003: 5).

3. A change from “selling” to “marketing” the political product (see, e.g., Lilleker

and Lees-Marshment 2005; Norris 2000: 171), including the use of market intelligence,

opposition research, feedback tools, opinion polls, etc. (Gibson and Römmele 2001; Holtz-Bacha

2007:71; Nord 2007).

4. Increased focus on free media channels, particularly the broad spectrum of

television formats, including entertainment and talk shows, based on professional event and news

management (Norris 2000: 170-72; Plasser and Plasser 2003: 4-6).

5. Intensified use of paid media platforms such as TV or radio spots, posters, ads,

etc. (de Vreese 2009; Plasser and Plasser 2003: 294-98; Wring 2001).

6. Segmentation of the voters into target groups, which are contacted by nar-

rowcasting and micro-targeting (e.g., direct mails, direct e-mails, direct call-ings, canvassing)

(Gibson and Römmele 2001; Römmele 2002).

7. Strategic focus on the frontrunner, who acts as a principal agent of the political

party (“personalization”) (see, e.g., Blumler and Kavanagh 1999: 213-14; Campus 2010; Farrell

and Webb 2000:122).

Many of these features may be operationalized to indicators for respective

changes. It can be assumed that the more these elements are integrated into an electoral

campaign, the more “professional” is the campaign. Furthermore, the manner and speed with

which political parties turn to these components of professional campaigning might reflect their

size, their organizational structure and culture, their parliamentary role, and even their ideological

orientation (Gibson and Römmele 2001: 37-38). To test these assumptions, a model is needed

that is independent of temporal or spatial conditions, allows international and longitudinal

comparisons, and adequately reflects differences in the campaign efforts of political parties. Such

a party-related model or index was introduced by Gibson and Römmele (2001, 2009) and slightly

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adjusted by Strömbäck (2009). Although its general applicability, the so-called “CAMPROF

Index,” is biased toward “new” media technologies, which impedes longitudinal comparisons, it

is nevertheless an index that looks exclusively at campaign structures (finances, personnel,

infrastructure, and communicative resources), thereby neglecting strategic adaptations. As

mentioned above, however, it is the organizational and strategic level on which political parties’

transformations take place, irrespective of whether it is a first- or second-order election

campaign. Metaphorically speaking, the structure reflects organizational preconditions for

campaigning, much like campaigns’ “hard-ware,” while the strategic conducting of the campaign

stands for a political party’s campaign “software”.

Against this background, I introduce a modified and expanded index, which

consists of two sub-indices: campaign structures and campaign strategies. Both indices

incorporate a number of components, which are measured on different scales and added to those

indices (see the appendix). Generally speaking, the more extensively a campaign element is used,

the higher it scores on the indices.3 The “campaign structure” index consists of eight items4: the

size of the election campaign budget, the size of the campaign staff, the degree of centralization

of the campaign organization, the degree of externalization, the differentiation of internal

communication structures, the nature and degree of feedback, the degree of opposition research,

and the duration of the campaign. The “campaign strategy” index consists of seven items: the

degree of audience targeting, the degree of narrowcasting activities, the relevance of paid media,

the relevance of free media, the relevance of talk shows, the degree of event and news

management, and the degree of personalization.

Most of these items are objectively measured variables. However, for the strategic

side of a campaign, it is not only the objective “reality” that is relevant but also the

intersubjectively shared perceptions of a party’s reality that matters. For that reason, we have

included some subjectively measured variables, such as the relevance of free media, paid media,

or talk shows. For those variables, we turned to evaluations of the campaign managers in charge

whom we contacted in the after-math of the EP elections in 2009. Even though their statements

might have been “edited” in light of the electoral outcome, these materials seem to offer the most

valid way of obtaining insights into the campaign reality to date (see also Gibson and Römmele

2009).

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All of those components are measured by scores, with a score of 24 being the

maxi-mum for the campaign structure index and 26 for the campaign strategy index (details can

be found in the appendix). For the analyses, absolute scores were first transformed into z scores,

which equalize differences of scales and distributions of single items. Second, as the z scores

have no clear low or high ends, both scales were forced onto the 0 to 100 range. Cronbach’s

alpha was calculated for both indices. For the structural index, Cronbach’s alpha was .60.

Although this value fails to reach the .70 level commonly taken as the standard, we decided to

keep the index intact for theoretical reasons. The strategy index was more reliable (α = .74).

The following hypotheses guided the empirical investigation (the first two deal

with campaign structure, the next three are concerned with campaign strategy, and the last two

concern both campaign structure and campaign strategy):

Hypothesis 1: Campaign structures in the two Central European countries, Austria

and Germany, are assumed to be more elaborate than in the two Scandinavian countries. This

assumption comes from single case studies of national elections in Germany (Holtz-Bacha 2007;

Tenscher 2007, 2011), Sweden (Nord 2006, 2007; Strömbäck 2009), Austria (Lederer 2010), and

Finland (Moring and Mykkänen 2009).

Hypothesis 2: Bigger political parties are assumed to score higher on the cam-

paign structure index than smaller ones. The rationale behind this assump-tion is that bigger

parties benefit from their size, both in regard to financial resources and the number of party

members.

Hypothesis 3: There is no significant country impact on campaign strategies in any

of the four countries because professional campaign strategies are assumed to form an important

part of a common campaign culture in Northern and Central Europe.

Hypothesis 4: Smaller political parties are assumed to score almost as high as their

bigger competitors on the campaign strategy index. This is based on the assumption that smaller

parties try to compensate for their structural short-comings by focusing on campaign strategies

(Tenscher 2006).

Hypothesis 5: Catch-all parties are assumed to score higher on the campaign

strategy index than client parties. The rationale behind this assumption is that catch-all parties are

encouraged to use as many media channels as possible in order to get in touch with their voters,

while niche parties might concentrate on just a few channels.

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Hypothesis 6: Right-wing parties are assumed to score higher than left-wing par-

ties, both on the campaign structure index as well as on the campaign strategy index. This

assumption is based on Gibson’s and Römmele’s party-centered theory of professional

campaigning, which associates right-wing parties with “business-like practices” (Gibson and

Römmele 2001:37).

Hypothesis 7: Parties that have experienced an external or internal shock in the

form of an electoral defeat or a change in the party leadership before an election will score higher

on both the structural and the strategy indices. This assumption is likewise based on the party-

centered theory of professional campaigning: After an electoral defeat, a party will be anxious to

retain its previous support; after a change of party leader, the party is likely to intensify

campaigning to secure the position of the new leadership.

After empirical analysis, it appears that the Central European parties invest more

in their campaign structures than do their Northern counterparts. Large parties show more signs

of structural professionalization than do midsized or small parties or par-ties that had an electoral

defeat in recent memory. In terms of campaign strategy, we were able to prove that country and

party size were not relevant factors in explaining the parties’ strategic choices. The catch-all

dimension, party ideology, and change of party leadership failed to produce the predicted results

and seem to be unrelated to campaign professionalism. In the question of campaign strategies

alone, this seems to indicate that parties in general are more or less decidedly, if not uniformly,

moving toward adopting similar strategic means in conducting their campaigns.

In general, the results show a variety of professional campaign activities, even

within the largest cluster of parties. That supports our assumption that the differences in

professional campaigning between countries are smaller than the differences between political

parties within one and the same country. This finding clearly holds true for the two Nordic

countries, Finland and Sweden. It also appears that smaller parties, independent of geographic

origin, choose a strategic way to adapt to media logic and attract public attention on a short-term

basis, while bigger parties tend to invest in organizational transformations that promise stable

relationships (1) within parties and (2) between parties and the media/public. This organizational

approach meets the criteria of political marketing (Lees-Marshment 2001) but does not guarantee

short-term success on election day.

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Interestingly, this analysis produced results that fit quite poorly or only partially

with the party-centered theory of campaign professionalism (cf. Gibson and Römmele 2001;

Strömbäck 2009). Although this study was not primarily designed for testing the party-centered

theory, it is quite clear that campaigns are more complex than the theory states. In the second-

order electoral contexts of our study, catch-all parties— which prefer vote maximization over

policy goals—did not stand out as particularly professional, contrary to the predictions of the

theory. Neither did “business-oriented” right-wing parties or parties that had experienced a

change of leadership prior to elections, which, according to the theory, should trigger

professionalized campaigning as part of the consolidation of the new rule. Only an electoral

defeat seemed to explain the parties’ resorting to professionalism, but only in terms of their

campaign structures. In this sense, the hunt for good explanatory variables continues.

Still, this study adds some noteworthy empirical findings to the rapidly evolving

“theory” on the professionalization of political communication (cf. Negrine et al. 2007). First, it

supports the assumption that there is something like a “Western European style of campaigning”

(cf. Plasser and Plasser 2003: 285-87)—at least in a strategic, though not in a structural sense.

These are two distinct dimensions of campaign professionalization that are associated with

different explanatory models of campaigning. Campaign structures seem to have a logic of their

own, which is only partly connected with what parties do strategically. The correlation between

the two variables is low (r = .41, p = .03). In many ways, professional strategy is commonly

shared by almost all parties, irrespective of their material base.

Second, although there is a Western European style of professional campaigning,

it might be restricted to second-order elections that simultaneously take place in all EU member

states. At least to some extent, that might reflect transnational endeavors in campaigning in which

the European branches of the political parties (“Europarties”) take a leading role (cf. Carter and

Poguntke 2010). Yet, it has to be explored to what extent electoral campaign professionalization

is transferable to first-order election contexts or routine phases of political communication. It is

an open question whether professionalization is more of a learning process irrespective of the

type of election or if there are two levels in professionalization: an upper level with higher

degrees of professional communicative activities at national first-order elections and a lower

level at European and other second-order elections. If the latter case is true, such a limited degree

of professionalism might explain not only media’s reluctance to cover EP elections, but also

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voters’ rising discomfort against EP election campaigns. That also has to be taken into account in

future research, both theoretically and empirically.

As a consequence, there should be a differentiated understanding of campaign

professionalization. Macro-level studies should be combined with meso-level analytical

approaches in separating structural from strategic elements, distinguishing between electoral

campaign contexts (first- vs. second-order elections) as well as explaining variances with

intraparty and external factors. Ultimately, the evolving “theory” of the professionalism of

political communication and the process of professionalization will benefit from comparative

analyses both in a longitudinal and cross-national sense. Concerning these matters, this study

offers the first example of refocusing political communication research.

Last but not least, future analyses need to look not only for campaign efficiency

but also for the impact of specific campaign features. Such evaluation studies have to control for

political parties’ primary objectives (Gibson and Römmele 2001), and they might even have to

reflect campaign content with respect to its “tonality.” There is, however, much variation.

Campaign “success” might mean high levels of media out-put, maximizing votes, positive

evaluations of campaign pundits, or financial donations. Ideally, all of these aims should be

quantified, and they would have to be put in a causal relationship with specific campaign

structures or strategies. Although much still remains to be done, it is in the interest of political

campaign research to follow this route; it is a useful way to approach a campaign’s “reality”

comparatively, to assess its causes and consequences, and to begin a line of research that has a

clear potential for accumulation of knowledge.

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Modes of Professional Campaigning

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