MODERNITY AND COLONIALISM ON THE HISTORICAL … · Leno F. Danner, Fernando Danner e Agemir...

SOFIA, VITÓRIA (ES), V.6, N.1, P. 17-47, JAN./JUN. 2017

MODERNITY AND COLONIALISM: ON THE HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL BLINDNESS OF THE THEORIES OF MODERNITY1

MODERNIDADE E COLONIALISMO: SOBRE A CEGUEIRA HISTÓRICO-SOCIOLÓGICA DAS TEORIAS DA MODERNIDADE

LENO FRANCISCO DANNER2 UNIR- Brazil

[email protected]

FERNANDO DANNER3

UNIR- Brazil [email protected]

AGEMIR BAVARESCO4 PUC-RS- Brazil

[email protected]

ABSTRACT: This paper is aimed at analysing, from a philosophical and sociological point of view, the process of Western modernization in terms of a critical social theory. In order to do that, I will criticize the historical-sociological blindness characterizing contemporary theories of modernity (as in those of Weber and Habermas). The historical-sociological blindness regarding the reconstruction of the process of Western modernization is basically characterized by the separation between European cultural modernity and European social-economic modernization, to the deletion of colonialism as basis and consequence of the process of Western modernization, which leads to the idea that European modernity is a self-referential, self-subsistent and endogenous process of development. The central argument of this paper is that the theories of modernity cannot provide a normative paradigm for critical social theory based on cultural modernity because of this historical-sociological blindness. Therefore, the elaboration of a normative concept for critical social theory should start by unveiling, denouncing and deconstructing this historical-sociological blindness of the theories of modernity.

KEYWORDS: Modernity. Modernization. Colonialism. Historical-sociological blindness. Decoloniality.

RESUMO: Critica-se no artigo a cegueira histórico-sociológica assumida pelas teorias da modernidade contemporâneas (por exemplo, em Weber e Habermas), com o objetivo de tematizar filosófico-sociologicamente o processo de modernização ocidental em termos de uma teoria crítica da sociedade. A cegueira histórico-sociológica acerca da reconstrução do processo de

1 This research is supported by FAPERO-CAPES. 2 Professor of Philosophy and Sociology at the Department of Philosophy of the Federal University of Rondônia (UNIR-Brazil). 3 Professor of Philosophy at the Department of Philosophy of the Federal University of Rondônia (UNIR-Brazil). 4 Professor of Philosophy at the Undergraduate Program of Philosophy of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUC-RS).

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SSIÊ ÉTICA E PO

LÍTICA – VO

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18 Modernity and Colonialism


modernização ocidental é caracterizada basicamente pela separação entre modernidade cultural europeia e modernização socioeconômica europeia, bem como pelo apagamento do colonialismo como base e consequência do processo de modernização ocidental, o que conduz à ideia de que a modernidade europeia é um processo de desenvolvimento autorreferencial, auto-subsistente e endógeno. A partir disso, o argumento central do artigo consiste em que as teorias da modernidade não podem fundar um paradigma normativo para a teoria social crítica baseado na modernidade cultural por causa de sua cegueira histórico-sociológica. Assim, se nós queremos um conceito normativo para a teoria social crítica, nós devemos partir exatamente do desvelamento, da crítica e da desconstrução dessa cegueira histórico-sociológica.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Modernidade. Modernização. Colonialismo. Cegueira histórico-sociológica. Decolonialidade.

INTRODUCTION

This paper argues that the European theories of modernity, such as those

proposed by Max Weber and Jürgen Habermas, lack the normative ability or

epistemological-political instruments to grasp the phenomenon of colonialism due

to a basic historical-sociological blindness regarding the understanding and the

foundation of the process of Western modernization. This blindness is

characterized by four correlated methodological-normative options, or principles,

which define the main dynamics of these theories in order to conceptualize and

frame the process of Western modernization, namely: (a) European culture, society

and consciousness is a very differentiated and singular process of rationalization

of metaphysical-theological foundations when compared to traditional societies to

a point that there seems to be a strict division between European modernity and

the rest of the world–the rational and universal European modernity and the

contextualist traditional societies worldwide (traditional as attached to specific

contexts of emergence); (b) there is a separation between European cultural

modernity and the Realpolitik of the social-economic modernization, that is,

between a normative model of modern culture, associated with rationalism and

universalism (communicative reason, lifeworld), and the institutional

modernization (modern social systems, as bureaucratic-administrative State and

capitalist market–instrumental reason); (c) Western modernization, or European

modernization, is an endogenous, self-referential and self-subsisting process of

societal, cultural and epistemological development, excluding colonialism from the

theoretical-normative reconstruction offered by European theories of modernity;

and (d) European modernity is associated with human development,

modernization, rationalization and universalism as the basis of human evolution,

which endows modernity with the epistemological, political and normative

legitimacy to frame, judge and guide all particular contexts, practices, values and

subjects; in other words, European modernity becomes the normative umbrella

both within and without itself.

Therefore, the central argument of this paper in its criticism of the historical-

sociological blindness of the theories of modernity is that a normative concept for

providing the groundwork for a sociological analysis and political praxis of a

critical social theory cannot be based on European cultural modernity, as found in

Leno F. Danner, Fernando Danner e Agemir Bavaresco 19


theories of modernity such as those by Weber and, mainly, Habermas. This

historical-sociological blindness–the separation between European cultural

modernity, on the one hand, and, on the other, social-economic modernization

and colonialism–allows European cultural modernity to affirm its self-reflexivity

regarding social-economic modernization and colonialism. This process results in

an ability for self-correction from within and sustains its pretension of a universal

epistemological-moral normative paradigm that can serve as a normative umbrella

both for a critical social theory of Western modernization and for an international

politics that has as its philosophical, sociological, and historical basis the model of

culture, society and institution constituted by Western modernization as the apex

of human evolution.

Therefore, this article argues that European cultural modernity can only

ascertain its epistemological and moral universalism as a model of institutional

development if the historical-sociological blindness remains the theoretical-political basis and methodological option for the theories of modernity. In other words,

only from an uncritical theoretical-political starting point can the process of

Western modernization be assumed by theories of modernity as a philosophical-

sociological basis from which the criticism, the framing and the emancipation of

modernity itself and of international politics are legitimized and carried about.

Now, an alternative theoretical-political position regarding Western modernization

and its correlation with colonialism can start to be built exactly from unveiling,

criticizing and deconstructing the historical-sociological blindness sustained by

theories of modernity as the condition to their sociological understanding of the

process of Western modernization and philosophical foundation for a normative

notion of cultural modernity as the basis for social criticism and political praxis. This alternative theoretical-political understanding and praxis can (a) associate

cultural modernity and social-economic modernization, rejecting their separation;

(b) sustain that there is a very deep imbrication between Western modernization

and colonialism legitimized by cultural modernity; and finally (c) affirm that cultural

modernity cannot serve as a normative paradigm for a critical social theory and for

international politics. From here, the concept of reparation for colonialism will be

introduced as a normative option seen as more critical than that of cultural

modernity, since it associates cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization with colonialism, eschewing the historical-sociological blindness

resulting from this separation between culture and material civilization made by

contemporary theories of modernity.

1 THE THEORIES OF MODERNITY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF WESTERN MODERNIZATION

The reconstruction of European modernization is the key and the epistemological-

political option for understanding the process of Western modernization proposed

by the theories of modernity, as well as for their formulation of a concept of social

normativity or epistemological-moral universalism for guiding both social analysis

and political praxis. So, in this paper, European modernization is the theoretical-

political platform for understanding the constitution and the sense of the theories



of modernity, including their contradictions. Now, how did we become modern?

What is the process of Western modernization? We became modern from an internal process of progressive rationalization of the cultural images of the world–

a process whose basic principle-praxis is rationalism, which has enabled the

deconstruction and delegitimation of the metaphysical-theological essentialist and

naturalized foundations of traditional worldviews (see WEBER, 1984, p. 11-24;

HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 20-94). By this process of deconstruction and delegitimation,

Europe has progressively denaturalized and politicized societal, cultural and

institutional constitution, grounding and evolution, insofar as it instituted a strong

notion of reflexive individuality as the epistemological, political and normative

basis for the sense of the world and society (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 139-142).

Such characteristics of modern Europe appear more clearly when it is compared

to traditional societies–and it is not a coincidence that both Max Weber and Jürgen

Habermas base their theories of modernity in the comparison and differentiation

between these two models of society (see WEBER, 1984, p. 11-24; HABERMAS,

2012a, p. 94-109).

Traditional societies are marked by a strong imbrication between nature or

objective world, culture or society and individuality, in the sense that nature is

anthropomorphic, and society is naturalized. Accordingly, individuality is

subsumed into anthropomorphic nature and naturalized society (see HABERMAS,

2012a, p. 94, p. 101). All natural dynamics and societal-cultural practices, relations

and authorities are grounded on and streamlined by magic and religious beliefs

and practices; as a consequence, there is an absence of social criticism and political

praxis regarding the status quo and the foundations of institutions in the traditional

societies, since society and culture are naturalized and there is no reflexive

individuality which is autonomous in the same sense that modern individuality

(Descartes’ cogito, ergo sum; Kant’s transcendental subjectivity) (see HABERMAS,

2012a, p. 109). In other words, traditional societies lack cultural-institutional

secularism as well as a notion of reflexive individuality separated from nature and

society. Therefore, there is no social criticism and mobility in the form of a political

praxis fostered and streamlined by individuals and social groups that do not

recognize such a naturalized and mythological dimension of social institutions,

allowing them to question and even abolish institutions or at least demand their

political foundation, not their metaphysical-theological grounding, as occurs in

traditional societies. In this point, traditional societies are not rational, since they

do not enable rational praxis–the reasons of societal, cultural and institutional

constitution, legitimation and evolution are not required (see HABERMAS, 2012a,

p. 106). Magic and religious beliefs and practices are sufficient means for the

organization and evolution of traditional societies. And, since magic and religious

beliefs and practices are dogmatic, they do not need to be discussed, they are

vertically imposed by an absolute institutional authority.

At this point, both Weber and Habermas argue that modern Europe is a

form of rational culture, society and consciousness which generates social

rationalization and a rational way of directing life (see WEBER, 1984, p. 11;

HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 94-95). Now, what is rational in modern European society?



And what does the fact that modern Europe leads to a rational form of life and

practice mean? By the consolidation of cultural-institutional secularism and

reflexive individuality, modern Europe has denaturalized and politicized societal

constitution, legitimation and evolution, as said above. The modernization of

society and culture means that those living within modernity no longer have a

totalizing society whose parts are imbricated, as occurs in traditional societies. In

modern societies, based on cultural-institutional secularism and reflexive

individuality, nature, society and individuality are clearly separated. Now, by such

a separation, nature basically becomes a material sphere with no magical

principles, practices and beings; society, with its institutions and structures,

becomes wholly profane; and reflexive individuality is the only epistemological,

political and normative basis of foundation (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 140-141;

HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 87). Modern society, its institutions and structures, as its

subjects, become political, since its character, instead of magical or religious, is

fundamentally profane, rational and political. Modern society, therefore, is a political society, without magical, religious or metaphysical basis, principles and

subjects of constitution, legitimation and evolution. As a political society without

an essentialist and naturalized foundation, it must constitute and streamline a

political procedure of foundation of the binding social values and practices, which

is the only normative condition for the legitimation of modern epistemological-

political foundations. It is in this sense that European modern society, culture and

consciousness becomes rational and generates a rational form of life.

As a political society and culture with no essentialist and naturalized foundations,

in modern society the political abilities and agency of individuals and social groups

become the condition for institutional and cultural regulations. Modern political

subjects have to interact in order to reach a normative-political basis both for social

institutions and culture and for the daily life of these individuals and political

subjects themselves. How can they reach a fair and binding social agreement? First,

by interacting fairly with each other, without authoritarian imposition of a particular

worldwide to the society as a whole; second, by talking and talking based on

reasons related to political legitimacy and institutional and cultural foundations;

third, by arguing and acting with impartial, neutral and formal procedures and points of view, which means that modern individuals and social groups must learn

to think, talk and act based on formal principles and practices in order to reach

political agreement. An impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism basically

implies that modern individuals and social groups cannot argue and act socially

and politically based on a particular and comprehensive doctrine, to use Rawlsian

terms (see RAWLS, 2002; HABERMAS, 1989; HABERMAS, 1991). They must use

abstract principles which can subsume all particular forms of life into such formality

and generality.

As a consequence, modern culture, through secularism and reflexive

individuality, leads to the consolidation of a post-traditional and post-conventional

consciousness, that is, a form of living, thinking and acting which is not marked

by the imposition and maintenance of a particular form of life as the basis of

institutional, societal and cultural constitution, legitimation and evolution; it is



actually characterized by an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism which

leads to a non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric form of culture, society and

consciousness based on communicative reason. Now, a non-egocentric and non-

ethnocentric culture, society and consciousness is a rational one; it is based on and

streamlined by the rationalization of all practices, values and subjects, which also

means that modern individuals and social groups must use reason–they must

speak and argue and act based on rationalized codes and practices. Modern

European society is rational and generates a rational culture and form of life

because it basically requires the reasonable thinking and talking praxis as the

fundamental basis for the foundation of social normativity and institutional

structures (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 249).

Here, Habermas’ concept of linguistification of the sacred means that

modern culture, society and consciousness has politicized and denaturalized

institutional foundations and daily life at large, which signifies that the notion of

social normativity and political praxis regarding institutional foundations are

defined and streamlined from both the politicization of social life and social dialog

and interaction between individuals and social groups that must argue and act

based on an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism which is non-egocentric

and non-ethnocentric in terms of the normative-political grounding of institutions

and social life. Here, modern individuals and social cultural groups must think and

act in the name of all humanity, from a post-conventional consciousness which is

totally formal concerning particular forms of life (see Habermas, 2012b, p. 196).

Here, modern society, culture and consciousness, by its impartial, neutral and

formal proceduralism, its non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric dynamics and

constitution, becomes universalist, differently from the traditional society, culture

and consciousness, which is egocentric and ethnocentric. Indeed, that modern

society, culture and consciousness entails a universal form of life is the conclusion

resulting from the theories of modernity’s reconstruction of modern Europe’s

internal cultural development.

Two important points arise from Weber’s and Habermas’ position regarding

modernity. Throughout this paper, Habermas’ theory of modernity will be used in

order to discuss the correlation between modernization and colonialism, although

many of what will be discussed applies to Weber’s theory as well. The first point

is that, after this process of cultural rationalization of the religious or metaphysical-theological images of the world, the modern institutions or social systems have

emerged and developed (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 588; HABERMAS, 2012b, p.

275). European modern culture is revolutionary and explosive and it has

deconstructed traditional societies’ totalizing imbrication of all social spheres and

subjects into one comprehensive worldview. Modern society, in opposition to

traditional societies, has separated nature, society and individuality, politicizing and

denaturalizing social foundations and political institutions. From this general

normative context allowed by modern cultural rationalization, which constitutes

the lifeworld as a normative sphere, the modern social systems or institutions–

like the bureaucratic-administrative State and the capitalist market–have emerged

and consolidated themselves as particular social spheres (see HABERMAS, 2012b,



p. 278). First of all, therefore, modern society is no longer a normative totality

imbricated in its parts, as traditional societies (see HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 17-18).

Second, modern society, from the process of cultural rationalization, becomes

particularized and divided into different and closed institutions or social systems

which are characterized by a technical-logical way of functioning and programming

(see HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 365; HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 61; HABERMAS, 2003b, p.

23). Therefore, cultural modernity, cultural rationalization, which is normative, is the ontogenetic condition for social-economic modernization, for instrumental reason, and not the contrary (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 140-141, p. 384, p. 588-

590; HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 44; HABERMAS, 2003b, p. 83). The only possible link

between them is the ontogenetic place of cultural modernity in the emergence and

development of the modern social systems.

Therefore, the process of Western modernization is understood as a dual evolutionary process: a cultural rationalization, or cultural modernity; and a social-

economic modernization, or institutional modernity (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 09-

11, p. 588-591; HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 278-280; HABERMAS, 1997, p. 140-153). In

the first case, there is normative reason; in the second, there is instrumental reason.

Such dual process signifies, first, that modern society emerged and developed from

cultural rationalization and as cultural rationalization; after that, the societal

differentiation into particular, closed and self-referential technical-logical social

systems took place and defined the fact that modern society is constituted by

particularized and opposed institutions with a technical-logical way of functioning

and programming that is basically internal to institutions and streamlined by a

technical-logical legal staff. As a consequence, side by side with cultural modernity,

the theories of modernity include a process of Western social-economic

modernization that could be defined as self-differentiation, self-referentiality and

self-subsistence of technical-logical social systems or institutions. If the lifeworld is

a normative sphere with normative principles, practices and subjects, the social

systems are technical-logical spheres with non-political and non-normative

principles, practices and subjects–that is, they are basically instrumental. A

contradiction between a normative and a technical-logical sphere emerges and

defines the sense and the form both of modern social pathologies and of modern

political praxis. The lifeworld, cultural modernity and cultural rationalization

constitute a social life based on normative principles and practices, as streamlined

by normative subjects, which require both a political praxis based on social

normativity and a normative organization of social systems (see HABERMAS, 2012a,

p. 587-591). However, social systems are technical-logical, depoliticized spheres,

which means that, on the one hand, they reject political-normative intervention

and framing, as they, on the other hand, have the tendency to instrumentalize (the

normative) lifeworld, colonizing it (see HABERMAS, 2012b, p. 331, p. 355).

In this case, the lifeworld as a purely normative sphere constituted basically

by pure normative-political principles, practices and subjects, offers a normative

paradigm; it is a normative paradigm from which Western modernization can be

understood and framed, and from which social systems in particular can be

measured and framed in terms of reification and instrumentalization of the



lifeworld itself. The important point here is that cultural modernity or lifeworld is

a pure normative-political sphere with no direct link with and dependence on

instrumental, technical-logical social systems, especially with social systems’

instrumental reason and pathologies. Cultural modernization indeed has

deconstructed traditional societies’ totalizing constitution, particularizing the

modern social spheres and differentiating them into individualized social systems

or institutions. However, cultural modernity cannot ground or generate the

pathologies of social systems based on instrumental reason, on technical-logical

colonization of the lifeworld. The pathologies of social systems are caused by the

social systems’ technical-logical functioning and programming, so they are

responsible for their own irrationality. The normative sphere constituted by the

lifeworld allows a critical perspective on the functioning and programming of social

systems exactly because it is separated from them, because it is non-dependent of

their technical-logical structuration. But the contrary is not true: the social systems

depend on the lifeworld’s normative constitution, and that is the reason why the

lifeworld as a normative sphere offers the critical frame from which a critical social

theory can enable at the same time a theoretical analysis and a political praxis regarding Western social-economic modernization (see HABERMAS, 2012b, p.

355).

The second important point arising from a theory that conceives of cultural

modernity as a universalist form of life and epistemological-moral paradigm is its

association between modernization, rationalization, universalism and emancipation

(see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 142, p. 146, p. 683; HABERMAS, 2003a, p. 20, p. 34, p.

44; HABERMAS, 2002a, p. 01-24; HABERMAS, 2002b, p. 07-08; HABERMAS, 1990a,

p. 99-100; HABERMAS, 1999, p. 41). Both Weber and Habermas are clearly based

on this understanding that modern Europe treats all of its questions from a

rationalized, historicized and universalist point of view and range, which requires

rationalization and social dialog-interaction as a basis for the binding foundations,

since modernity politicizes and historicizes all spheres of life and society, rendering

all of them profane. In other words, by the consolidation of a modern culture,

society and consciousness which is post-conventional, non-egocentric and non-

ethnocentric regarding its epistemological-moral foundations, and finally which is

based on an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism concerning its

institutional-cultural groundwork, modern Europe has become a universal culture

and form of life which offers for the first time a paradigm that is really universal

and adequate to a post-metaphysical time–a universalism without essentialist and

naturalized foundations (see HABERMAS, 1989; HABERMAS, 1990b; HABERMAS,

1991; HABERMAS, 2002a; HABERMAS, 2002b). How could that be achieved? First

of all, Habermas is very emphatic in affirming that modern Europe is not a

particular form of life like traditional societies. Indeed, Europe is a universal

civilization and culture and form of life. Therefore, modern Europe becomes the

apex of human evolution–an evolution that has started with traditionalism and

has arrived at modernization, seen as the ending point of human evolution. It

should, then, be stressed that modernization means the consolidation of both a

post-conventional culture and consciousness and of the social systems or

institutions. Does that mean that modern Europe is a cultural, societal and



epistemological evolutionary process that will eventually be arrived at by all

peoples and cultures?

Habermas answers positively to this question. According to him, if all

traditional cultures and societies had an epistemological-cultural context similar to

that of modern Europe, they would certainly follow the path of modernization (see

HABERMAS, 2012a 119-146, p. 326). This is the path of human evolution–

overcoming traditionalism and consolidating a modern culture, society and

consciousness, and Habermas–as Rawls, Giddens, Honneth and Forst–does not

hesitate in using moral psychology in order to argue that a mature and

emancipatory culture and consciousness is a post-conventional one, that is, a

culture and consciousness which acts, works and thinks from an impartial, neutral

and formal proceduralism, from a non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric dynamic

(see HABERMAS, 1989; HABERMAS, 1990b; HABERMAS, 1991; HABERMAS, 2002a;

RAWLS, 2003; HONNETH, 2003; HONNETH, 2007; FORST, 2010; GIDDENS, 2001).

The result of the use of moral psychology in order to justify a concept of cultural

modernity which is strongly linked to rationalism, universalism and human

evolution is exactly the justification of modernity itself as a universalist form of life

and culture, and the delegitimation of traditionalism as the basis for a universal

epistemological-moral paradigm.

Similarly, Habermas uses both philosophy and sociology to prove that

modern European culture is universal as is the form of life associated to it and not

only a simple particularized culture and form of life, as traditionalism. In

sociological terms, the reconstruction of the process of Western modernization has

shown that human evolution has started with traditionalism in its strong imbrication

and intersection of nature, society and individuality, an anthropomorphized nature

and a naturalized society, having gradually consolidated a modern society as the

definitive overcoming of traditionalism through the development of a culture,

society and consciousness which, by acknowledging pluralism or multiculturalism

and denaturalizing culture and society, has instituted rationalization as the basis of

a societal and cultural constitution, legitimation and evolution and also for the

praxis of individuals and social groups. Accordingly, human evolution starts as

traditionalism and becomes modernization, tending to continue on the path of

modernization, without a return to traditionalism. The development of modern

Europe, philosophically and sociologically reconstructed, has proven and shown

that human evolution starts as traditionalism and becomes modernization, leading

to modern society, culture and consciousness, and Europe is an example of this

(see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 355). That is a definitive evolutionary condition of

modernization, and Habermas insists, against post-modernists and traditionalists,

that the only route for modernity, for the resolution of modern problems by

modernity itself is more modernization, more reflexive modernity (see HABERMAS,

2002a, p. 122).

In philosophical terms, Habermas tries to show that all cultures and societies

have a similar structure and dynamic of foundation of their internal values, that is,

all of them need to impose objective values and practices as the condition for their

normal daily evolution. In order for that to be ensured, they must institutionalize a



public process of justification which leads to permanent argumentation and

education regarding the objectivity of socially binding values and practices in each

culture. Thus, there is a tendency toward rationalization in all cultures, since they

have at least a minimal inclination to universalism insofar as all societies need

objective values that are inculcated from a public process of interaction. Therefore,

they have objective values (they presuppose a soft and initial version of

universalism) as they establish an institutional and public process of argumentation

regarding such values (they have a soft and initial version of rationalization, of

communicative reason). Now, the structure of the epistemological-moral

foundation and its public process in traditional societies are similar to the universal

sense and range of European modernity, although European cultural modernity is

universalist, due to its impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism which forms the

basis of its post-conventional culture and consciousness (see HABERMAS, 2012a,

p. 326). Similarly, sociological reconstruction of the process of European

modernization has shown and proven that modern Europe, by overcoming

traditionalism, instituted a universal and rational-rationalized form of life which at

the same time, to use a Hegelian term, contains the moments that is has overcome,

that is, contains traditionalism.

Therefore, human evolution in general, and the evolution-constitution of

modern Europe in particular shows three basic characteristics: (a) all cultures and

societies have a universal sense and range (the objectivity of the values and

practices socially binding); (b) there is an institutionalization of a public process of

argumentation and education to inculcate these objective values and practices; and

(c) in the case of Europe, the post-conventional society, culture and consciousness

is at the same time universal (an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism) and

contains within itself traditionalism as a moment that has been surpassed. By these

three characteristics, modern Europe can offer a normative basis for a universal

epistemological-political paradigm–for both its internal foundation and for the

world at large. As a consequence, it can become the normative umbrella, the judge

and the guide of international politics as well. As a universal culture and form of

life based on a post-conventional praxis, based on an impartial, neutral and formal

proceduralism, modern Europe enables social criticism to a critical-social theory in

its study of the social-economic modernization, as it allows the universal

epistemological-moral paradigm to guide and frame international politics.

Such philosophical-sociological reconstruction of the development of

modern Europe shows a very interesting and problematic point of view which is

shared both by Weber and Habermas–and also by Honneth and Forst–in their

understanding of the correlation between modernity and universalism, namely the

view that there is Europe and the rest of the world; there is the rational and

universalist Europe versus all particular and closed traditionalisms. Human

evolution leads to universalist Europe as a post-conventional society, culture,

consciousness and paradigm. This radical separation between Europe and the rest

of the world (associated with traditionalism) marks the development of the theories

of modernity and their stylization of the process of Western modernization as the

apex of human evolution, overcoming traditionalism in favor of a modern culture,



society and consciousness, which is universal and rational-rationalized. From here,

the construction of both a sociological diagnosis of modernity-modernization and

a philosophical foundation of a normative concept of cultural modernity as the

basis of a critical social theory emerges. By such separation, by the association of

human evolution, modernization, rationalization, criticism and universalism, the

culture and consciousness of modern Europe allow not only the grounding of a

universal epistemological-moral paradigm, but also–and as consequence of that–

the legitimation of the idea that Europe, from its universal epistemological-moral

paradigm and form of culture-life, is the normative basis for judging, framing and

guiding the international political context. Furthermore, the division of the process

of Western modernization, proposed by the theories of modernity, into pure and

holy cultural modernity and evil social-economic modernization redeems cultural

modernity of all sins committed by social-economic modernization, so that cultural

modernity can develop a self-reflexive praxis regarding social-economic

modernization and, as a consequence, it can continue as a pure and holy universal

epistemological-political paradigm, maintaining its association of modernization,

rationalization, criticism, universalism and emancipation, which is the basis of the

normative-political understanding of modernity itself, as well as its practical

application in current problems and subjects, within and beyond itself.

2 MODERNITY AND COLONIALISM: ON THE HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL BLINDNESS OF

THE THEORIES OF MODERNITY

What is the place of colonialism in a theory of modernity? Habermas excludes it

from his philosophical-sociological reconstruction of a normative-sociological

concept of Western or European modernity-modernization. What could be the

reasons for this and what does it mean to a theory of modernity? Is European

modernity a colonialist culture, society, mindset and form of normativity? In order

to answer these questions, a very problematic theoretical-political basis should be

investigated from which Habermas’ theory of modernity is constructed and

streamlined both sociologically and philosophically. This basis is what we call the

historical-sociological blindness of the theories of modernity and it exhibits some

important features. Firstly, Western or European modernization is an evolutionary

societal and cultural development process marked by the rationalization of the

cultural images of the world and of the metaphysical-theological foundations which

are proper to traditional societies, cultures and consciousness. In this sense, the

evolutionary process of Western-European modernization implies an overcoming

of traditionalism through the consolidation of modern society, culture and

consciousness, which is rational and generates rational forms of living, thinking

and acting. Secondly, and as a consequence, if traditional society, culture and

consciousness is fundamentally attached to its own context of emergence and

development, if traditional consciousness is, because of that, egocentric and

ethnocentric in its epistemological-political foundations, European modern society,

by its internal process of rationalization, is formalistic with regard to its material

context of emergence. It is, therefore, universalist, since it, through the very process

of rationalization of the cultural images of the world, has instituted a formalistic,



impartial and neutral procedure as the foundation of socially binding values and

practices which is not dependent on or attached to its material context of

emergence and development. Modern culture, society and consciousness appeals

only to universalist values and practices, thinking and acting from impartial, neutral

and formal procedures, codes and practices, and becoming non-egocentric and

non-ethnocentric regarding epistemological-moral foundations and political praxis

(see Habermas, 2012a, p. 148).

Thirdly, since this universalist culture and consciousness resulted from the

cultural rationalization of the traditional world, the human evolution is

modernization, it becomes cultural modernization, insofar as human evolutionary

process leads to European cultural-societal rationalization, as to modern

epistemological-moral consciousness as the final destination of human evolution.

In this sense, human evolution is modernization as an overcoming of traditional

society (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 119). Fourthly, there is association and

dependence involving human evolution, modernization, rationalization, criticism

and universalism, insofar as cultural modernity, as the apex of human evolution,

serves also as a normative paradigm from which social-economic modernization

and international politics can be measured, framed, criticized and even changed

from the use of the normative paradigm of modernity by modern epistemological-political subjects. European cultural modernity allows a critical normative paradigm

due to the fact that it is the ending point of human evolution as an impartial, neutral

and formal proceduralism, as a non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric society,

culture and consciousness. It is here that universalism takes its place. Fifthly,

cultural rationalization of the traditional world is the normative basis of modern

society, culture and consciousness, having enabled the process of consolidation of

modern institutions or social systems (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 355). The

development and the consolidation of modern social systems occur in the wake of

the process of cultural rationalization, of cultural modernity, being caused and

streamlined by it. As a consequence, cultural modernity is the general normative

context from which modern technical-logical social systems have emerged and

been consolidated. The process of Western modernization becomes, here, a

complete sociological-philosophical framework characterized at the same time by

the division and the correlation between cultural modernity (as a normative

context) and social-economic modernization (the institutional context), and from

here both modernity as a normative paradigm and social-economic modernization

as an institutional structure acquire meaning, having defined their specific core and

role in terms of a theory of modernity.

Indeed, from this division, it is possible to discuss both the epistemological,

political and normative core-role of cultural modernity and the dynamics,

functioning and programming of institutional modernization, as its social

pathologies. From this division the viable normative correlations between them can

be addressed as well. Now, in the first place, the core-role of cultural modernity is

universalist, due to being constituted and streamlined based on rationalization,

which has instituted a post-conventional culture, society and consciousness which

is impartial, neutral and formal regarding particular forms of life–and that is the



present and future of human evolution, that is, to become post-conventional and

rational-rationalized. In the same way, such a universalist core-role of cultural

modernity is fostered by the fact that it is not directly linked to social-economic

modernization, to modern social systems, in the sense that it does not legitimize

the irrationalities of modern social systems and pathologies. On the contrary, it

enables a critical and normative framework to measure, criticize and frame the

programming and functioning of social systems, as its normative constitution allows

a perspective based on use values–to use a Marxist term–from which the

technical-logical structuration of social systems, as well as their functioning and

programming are framed, changed and streamlined. These two conditions and

characteristics of European cultural modernity–a post-conventional rationalized

culture-society-consciousness and the lack of correlation between cultural

modernity and social-economic modernization–enable the universalist and critical

core-role of cultural modernity, so it can serve as a normative paradigm for

understanding, framing and changing of social and economic modernization, and

as a normative paradigm for the international politics as well (see HABERMAS,

2002a, p. 227).

On the other hand, social-economic modernization is characterized by a

process of self-differentiation, self-referentiality, self-subsistence and autonomy of

particularized and closed social systems or institutions, as the modern State and

the capitalist market. These social systems or institutions are technical-logical, non-

political and non-normative structures which are streamlined from an internal

instrumental programming and functioning assumed by institutional elites and

technicians. Now, it is this technical-logical structuration, functioning and

programming of the social systems, by the imposition of an instrumental rationality

into the normative context represented by the lifeworld, that causes and originates

social pathologies, by substituting social normativity for technical-logical dynamics.

Here, cultural modernity as a normative paradigm offers the normative basis from

which it is possible to measure, by the analysis of the normative constitution of the

lifeworld, the intensity and the damages caused by the systemic imposition of an

instrumental rationality over that normative context. In this process, cultural

modernity allows, as a consequence, a political praxis from civil society or lifeworld

that is directed to the framing and moderation of the technical-logical dynamics of

social systems, correlating exchange values (the basis of programming and

functioning of social systems) with use values (the lifeworld’s basis of constitution

and evolution). Such a separation also enables cultural modernity’s self-reflexivity

and internal critical capability of self-correction, in the sense that, by these

separation and non-correlation between cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization, cultural modernity can serve as a normative paradigm to social-

economic modernization and to international politics, as it has epistemological-

political power to impose normative values and practices to technical-logical social

systems. Without such a separation between cultural modernity and social-

economic modernization, cultural modernity could not serve as a universal and

critical normative paradigm, both for social-economic modernization and

international politics.



It is here that the historical-sociological blindness of the theories of

modernity emerges as the basis of their philosophical-sociological reconstruction

of the process of Western modernization as a whole, as a basis of their normative

stylization of European societal-cultural development. Such a historical-sociological

blindness is, firstly, the fundamental theoretical-political option of theories of

modernity both to conceive of the specificity of European modernization in face

of other societies and cultures (wherein Europe stands for modernity while the rest

of the world represents traditionalism) and to establish a normative paradigm

founded and rooted on cultural modernity as the basis for a critical and social

theoretical diagnosis and political praxis and understanding of international

politics. In other words, the epistemological, political and cultural stylized

specificity of European modernization concerning traditionalism is what allows

placing European modernity at the pinnacle of human evolution and establishing

it as the normative paradigm of modernity and international politics. Secondly, the

historical-sociological blindness found in the theories of modernity as the core of

their philosophical-sociological reconstruction of the process of Western

modernization presupposes the necessity to differentiate Western modernization

from all the other societies, cultures and epistemologies, which leads to the notion

that European modernization constitutes a new, universal stage when compared to

traditional societies. Such a new and more developed universal stage of human

evolution both subsumes and integrates traditional societies and, as a consequence,

by its formalistic, impartial and neutral proceduralism regarding particular contexts

and foundations, by its non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric epistemological-

normative constitution and dynamics, it leads to the consolidation of a universal

epistemological, political and normative basis from which all differences are

promoted and inserted, as well as on which criticism, framing and changing are

based and streamlined (because criticism, framing and change are possible only

from a universal epistemological-political-normative paradigm–and here cultural

modernity as the apex of human evolution takes a very fundamental core and role).

Thirdly, the historical-sociological blindness of the theories of modernity

presupposes that the critical point of view is possible only from a normative

paradigm with a universal core-role. Such a universal normative paradigm must be

correlatively pure in normative and political terms and independent of particular

material contexts. Particular material contexts, the moment they are closed

worldviews streamlined by essentialist and naturalized foundations, cannot think

and act on universal terms and from a non-egocentric and non-ethnocentric

perspective which is purely formal. In other words, particular material contexts, by

their essentialist and naturalized foundations, cannot develop and articulate an

impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism as the basis of their institutional,

cultural, societal and epistemological constitution, legitimation and evolution, since

these cannot be rationalized. The historical-sociological blindness of the theories

of modernity, the moment it separates cultural modernity from social-economic

modernization, can correlatively purify cultural modernity of its material relations

with social-economic modernization, rendering it universal by its association with

modernization, rationalization and universalism from the idea that European

cultural modernity constitutes itself as a post-conventional culture, society and



consciousness grounding an epistemological-political paradigm which is

independent from contextual and material presuppositions and associations–a

purely formalistic paradigm.

Such a separation between cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization enables self-reflexivity regarding social-economic modernization,

and correlatively leads to the fact that cultural modernity–its normative

paradigm–is basically an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism that takes

into account humankind as a whole as the basis of its dynamic and grounding–

an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism which can exist in all contexts,

societies and cultures with reflexivity in order to frame, criticize and orientate these

particular contexts, societies and cultures in relation to their internal

epistemological-political constitution, legitimation and evolution (see HABERMAS,

2012a, p. 227). The reason for that was explained above, that is, the fact that

European cultural modernity is the apex of human evolution insofar as it

overcomes traditionalism with a modern worldview that is independent on

particular material contexts, impartial, neutral, formal and procedural regarding

epistemological-political foundations. In this sense, in overcoming traditionalism

and its closed culture and consciousness based on essentialist and naturalized

foundations, cultural modernity as a universal culture, society and consciousness

preserves in itself the periods that have been overcome. Within such an

understanding, the historical-sociological blindness of the theories of modernity

can sustain cultural modernity as a universal epistemological-moral paradigm and

societal-cultural form of life correlatively, overcoming traditionalism, as a process

of modernization that has no return and, on the other hand, can guide and frame

traditionalism, intermediating the legitimation of both social-economic

modernization and particularized material contexts.

So, this historical-sociological blindness is the epistemological-political

starting point of the theories of modernity for a strong and decisive reason, that is,

to ground a normative paradigm which puts universalism as the condition of

criticism, framing and orientation of particular material contexts, within and

without modernity. This is the case of Habermas’ theory of modernity, and it can

be perceived also in the critical social theories of Axel Honneth and Rainer Forst

(see HONNETH, 2003; FORST, 2010). In Habermas’ case, the separation between

cultural modernity and social-economic modernization and the association of

modernization, rationalization, universalism and human evolution, as the meaning

of European modern society, culture and consciousness as post-conventional, these

points are important characteristics of modernization as the apex of human

evolution, as a sociological-philosophical paradigm, and as a universal form of life,

culture, society and consciousness. (a) Cultural modernity is a pure normative

principle-praxis of current life, and it is very explosive epistemologically and

politically, since it is purely and basically normative. (b) As a pure normative

principle-praxis, it is not contaminated by social-economic modernization’s

instrumental, technical-logical reason, and that is the reason why it can serve as

normative paradigm for framing, criticizing and orienting modern institutions or

social systems. (c) Cultural modernity is independent of the social-economic



modernization, in the sense that a normative reason is not directed by or committed

to technical-logical rationalization, since it is not committed to any material

principle, so it becomes an abstract and formalistic principle-praxis that can be

used epistemologically, politically, normatively by modernity itself in order to

control its internal pathologies (internal pathologies caused by social-economic

modernization!), as it can be used by cultural modernity and from a modern point

of view and by a modern epistemological-political subject with the purpose of

framing and guiding international politics and the dynamics of constitution,

legitimation and evolution of particular contexts, of all particular contexts. It is important to remember that cultural modernity as a universalist normative

paradigm serves to criticize, frame and change both social-economic modernization

and international politics. This is the meaning of Jürgen Habermas’s recovery and

renewal of the concept of modernity-modernization as opposed to post-modern

theories and conservatism as a whole: modernity-modernization is a philosophical-

sociological concept which is very productive to a critical social theory, because it

is correlatively the apex of human evolution in societal-cultural and

epistemological, political and normative terms.

The historical-sociological blindness found in contemporary theories of

modernity involves an ambiguity concerning the use of the concept of modernity-

modernization which is used here with the same meaning, that is, the concept of

modernity or modernization is understood as the correlative consolidation of

European modernity as a cultural-institutional process of evolution, as a secular

culture and individual freedom, and as an institutional framework–this is the

Habermas’s understanding of the process of Western modernization. Now, what is

the fundamental ambiguity observed in the theories of modernity in order to justify

the self-reflexive core and role of modernity regarding itself and in terms of

international politics? The ambiguity lies exactly in the fact that Western

modernization is not a totalizing and unidimensional process of cultural-

institutional evolution totally linked in terms of cultural modernity and social-

economic modernization. Indeed, cultural modernity is ambiguous because, on the

one hand, it has enabled the emergence and the consolidation of technical-logical

institutions or social systems; yet, on the other hand, it is basically a normative field

(lifeworld) which has no direct association to and dependence on this social-

economic modernization (see HABERMAS, 2012a, p. 290-291). So, if what is posited

by Habermas is indeed true, then cultural modernity is a normative sphere that

enables internal self-reflexivity, despite its constitution of modern social systems.

As a consequence, in the moment that cultural modernity allows internal criticism

and self-reflexivity by its separation and independence regarding social-economic

modernization, it can streamline and ground an internal radical and critical praxis based on normative-political principles directed to framing and changing the

pathologies caused by social-economic modernization. Such an ambiguity–to

generate modern social systems and not to be directly linked and attached to

them–leads to cultural modernity’s capability of progressive and permanent

diagnose and purification of the pathologies originated from social-economic

modernization.



So, the possible accusation that modernity legitimizes social-economic

modernization can be countered on the grounds that cultural modernity cannot be

subsumed to social-economic modernization, since it cannot be directly linked to

modern technical-logical social systems or institutions. If the pathologies and

irrationalities observed in social systems can be attributed to modernity’s normative

paradigm, it can be argued that such pathologies are caused by modern technical-

logical social systems, and not by cultural modernity as a pure normative sphere,

principle and praxis. Actually, cultural modernity as a pure normative sphere,

principle and praxis offers an epistemological-political framework to

understanding, measuring, framing and changing the dynamics, the structuration,

the social effects and the relationships of social systems. This is what allows the

exercise of critical and political praxis concerning modern institutions or social

systems, that is, the lifeworld as a basically normative sphere, in the moment that

it is affected by the technical-logical colonization carried about by social systems,

can serve as a normative platform and sociological framework both to analyze the

intensity of social pathologies and to ground a correlative political praxis which

aims to moderate and control the technical-logical colonization of the lifeworld by

the modern social systems. As a conclusion, the process of Western modernization

is ambiguous insofar as it is at the same time emancipatory and pathologic, purely

normative and strongly technical-logical. But that can be explained by the division

found in Western modernization between cultural modernization and social-

economic modernization, and from this division we can understand, on the one

hand, modernity’s problems and pathologies, and, on the other, modernity’s

universalism, the explosive, emancipatory and rational-rationalized principle-praxis

constituted by cultural modernity itself.

As Habermas said, we cannot throw away modernity as a whole; we cannot

throw away the baby with the dirty water (see HABERMAS, 1997; HABERMAS,

2002a). In other words, this ambiguity of Western modernization–the division

between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization–ensures cultural

modernity’s self-reflexivity and, as a consequence, its internal permanent self-

criticism and self-correction, which also enables the maintenance of modernity’s

affirmation as a universal epistemological-political paradigm and as a cosmopolitan

society and culture. However, criticism regarding modernity is not a question of

“throwing away the baby with the dirty water,” but of a realistic analysis and

political praxis concerning the process of Western modernization. Therefore,

criticizing Western modernization involves first and foremost calling the correct

comprehension, framing and changing of the Western modernization. What

Habermas does not see, firstly, is that his argument that a criticism regarding

modernity means throwing away modernity as a whole is false, since it

presupposes that there is a part of Western modernization that is not affected by

the problems caused by it–a part of modernity that is untouched by the

pathologies of social systems and by social criticism. On the contrary, Habermas

argues, it is a part of modernity–cultural modernity–that is the condition for

criticizing, framing and changing social-economic modernization. Secondly,

therefore, Habermas must assume the historical-sociological blindness regarding

the comprehension and stylization of the process of Western modernization as if,



by the separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization,

there was a fundamental theoretical-political sin with a radical criticism against

modernity as a whole. According to Habermas, indeed there is a fundamental

theoretical-political sin with a radical criticism against modernization, since it is the

final stage of human evolution, which furnishes the universalist epistemological-

moral paradigm–the fundamental condition for any kind of social criticism and

political praxis. So, speaking against modernity means not recognizing the fact that

the universal normative paradigm is the condition of social criticism and political

praxis — to criticize modernity’s constitution and movement implies in affirming

modernity’s normative paradigm (that is our only condition for social criticism and

political praxis regarding Western modernization) (see HABERMAS, 1997;

HABERMAS, 2002a).

Now, the historical-sociological blindness of the theories of modernity and its three

main points developed throughout the paper–(a) the association of

modernization, rationalization, universalism and human evolution; (b) the

separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization; and

(c) modern universalism (based on the idea that European modernization is the

apex of human evolution) as the only condition for social criticism and political

praxis, both within and without modernity–leads to the failure of cultural

modernity in pursuing a universalist and critical sense and remaining conservative

and uncritical. Modern political elites can use its tenets to argue that cultural

modernity as universal and as the apex of human evolution has a purely normative

and political content directed to counteracting traditionalism. As was explained

throughout the paper regarding Habermas’s theory of modernity, (1) the separation

between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization and (2) the

association between modernization, rationalization and universalism with the final

stage of human evolution entail two fundamental points that legitimize modernity’s

normative paradigm and the modern epistemological-political subjects as basis and

pathway of any social criticism, political praxis, and normative framing possible.

The first point is that pure normative cultural modernity remains untouched by the

pathologies caused by social-economic modernization, so that it cannot be

associated with modern pathologies or colonialism. The second point is that, due

to the fact that cultural modernity is itself universalist, and universalism is the only

groundwork for social criticism and political praxis, then the criticism of

modernization cannot counter cultural modernity. On the contrary, any social

criticism regarding modernity and international politics must use cultural modernity

as a normative paradigm; it must be based on modern epistemological, political,

and normative conditions if it intends to be effectively critical and political. That is

the reason why Habermas posits that any criticism regarding modernity can only

be possible if based on modern universalism, modern normativism, because

cultural modernity is universalism itself, the apex of human evolution, by the

correlation of modernization, rationalization and universalism with human

evolution. Therefore, the normative paradigm of modernity remains the only basis,

condition and possibility of social criticism and political praxis. Modernity’s

normative paradigm becomes critical in relation to everything, but not concerning



itself, since it is pure normativity, pure universalism. It is the theoretical-political

condition of all theoretical-political conditions.

Some questions asked above should be resumed: is there a link between

Western modernization and colonialism? If there is, then which is the core-role of

cultural modernity regarding colonialism? Which is the place of colonialism in a

theory of modernity? Is Europe a colonialist society, culture and mindset? Is there

a correlation between the historical-sociological blindness of the theories of

modernity and colonialism? Is colonialism an accident of Western modernization?

First of all, the historical-sociological blindness of the theories of modernity, in

separating cultural modernity from social-economic modernization, a pure

normative concept of cultural modernity and a pure technical-logical concept of

social systems, leads to the notion that there is no direct link between cultural

modernity and colonialism, in the same sense that there is no link between cultural

modernity and social-economic modernization. This can be proven by the fact that

the term colonialism does not appear at all in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action as a fundamental point of the process of Western

modernization, neither in the reconstruction of the process of emergence and the

development of modern Europe nor in the thematization of the consequences of

the evolution of Western modernization–it does not appear as a pathology

originated from the instrumental colonization of the lifeworld by modern social

systems as well. Now, if the modern social systems are basically technical-logical

structures, and if the modern lifeworld is fundamentally a normative sphere, and if

there is no mediation between a purely normative and a purely technical-logical

sphere, the same can be said about colonialism, that is, it is a ghost with no

carnality and politicity, or even technicality, in the theory of modernity. What could

be the reason for this? As we think, colonialism is both a normative and a technical principle and practice that requires epistemological-political foundations as the

core from which a superior civilization is violently imposed. In other words, if

colonialism is a consequence of the process of Western modernization, then it

cannot be justified only from technical-logical explanations, as it occurs with the

pathologies of social systems. Indeed, colonialism is first and foremost a normative

phenomenon, as it presupposes from the beginning such a normative justification

(see DUSSEL, 1993).

Therefore, if colonialism is a consequence of the process of Western

modernization, it is also a consequence of cultural modernity, or at least it

presupposes the correlation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization–a point that Habermas does not admit at any moment. That seems

to be the reason why Habermas uses the term colonization of the lifeworld in a

technical-logical or instrumental and not in a normative sense. Even here, in the

thematization of the internal constitution, legitimation and dynamics of the process

of Western modernization, the modern social pathologies have technical-logical or

instrumental meaning, effects and range, but not a normative justification–modern

social normativity is independent from the instrumental reason and its basic aim is

to serve as a paradigmatic principle-practice for the measurement of the intensity

of the impacts caused by social systems in the lifeworld. As said before, if such a



technical-logical explanation of modern social pathologies could hardly be

accepted, it becomes impossible to accept that colonialism is a result of a technical-

logical expansion of modernization into other societies and cultures, a technical-

logical expansionist movement and practice with no normative or political basis

and legitimation. On the contrary, colonization results from practical needs that

require instrumental actions, but there is a normative justification which

presupposes the superiority of a civilization and culture and its emancipatory and

universalist core-role regarding the colonized people with its culture and

consciousness (see FANON, 1968; BHABHA, 1998). Likewise, colonialism and

political and cultural interventions are justified based on values of a superior

order–values, codes and practices that are regarded by the so called superior

culture and society as universal (see DUSSEL, 1993; SPIVAK, 2010). It is in this

sense, for instance, that European colonization was justified based on the sword

and the cross, that is, the correlation between violence and normative justifications.

The war on terror and against fundamentalism, on its turn, was based on the

defense of free peoples, human rights and civilizational values as a normative

framework (see Danner, 2016). Even economic-political globalization is based on

a normative justification and legitimation founded on the idea of fair, free and

equal development for all (see PIKETTY, 2014). In other words, in colonialism

there is no separation between normativity and technicality, cultural modernity and

social-economic modernization. Colonialism actually includes a deep, mutual and

indestructible link between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization,

between normativity and technicality. In colonialism, there is not a pure normative

and a pure technical-logical sphere completely separated one from the other, but

direct dependence, mutual support and mixture between them. This is why

colonialism, as an imbrication between cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization, does not appear in the theories of modernity in general and in

Habermas’s in particular. Therein lies the historical-sociological blindness found in

the theories of modernity in their reconstruction of a normative concept of cultural

modernity which is directly associated and fused with rationalization, universalism

and human evolution.

Indeed, if colonialism were to be seen by theories of modernity as a

consequence of the development of Western modernization, if it were linked to

cultural modernity and social-economic modernization as imbricated and

interdependent moments of a same societal-cultural totalizing process of

rationalization, then the renewal and the recovery of a normative and universalist

pure concept of cultural modernity could not be used as the normative and critical

framework to understanding, framing and changing the social-economic dynamics

of modern social systems and international politics. Even when discussing modern

social pathologies caused by modern social systems or institutions, Habermas uses

the term colonization of the lifeworld in a technical-logical sense, in an

instrumental sense, exactly with the aim of purifying the concept of cultural

modernity of any kind of irrationality or direct imbrication with the concept of

social system or social-economic modernization. The reason for that is very clear:

to separate cultural modernity from social-economic modernization and render it

autonomous; by doing that, cultural modernity can be conceived of as a pure and



universalist normative concept that offers the critical point of view to a social theory

in terms of diagnosis both of the Western modernization’s internal dynamics and

of the global world’s political-cultural dynamics. The critical concept of cultural

modernity, in its purity and chastity, is used to critically frame modern social

systems, the cultural-societal pathologies around the world, around other societies

and cultures and colonialism. However, colonialism is completely denied as a

fundamental part of the philosophical-sociological reconstruction of the process of

Western modernization, insofar as it is erased from such philosophical-sociological

reconstruction. It appears as a question which can be framed, criticized and

changed by the use of the normative and universalist concept of cultural modernity,

and only by that.

Now, if the theories of modernity saw colonialism as an intrinsic part and

consequence of the evolutionary process of Western modernization, then the

fundamental presupposition of these theories would be destroyed and they would

lose their normative and universalist basis, which is correlatively (a) the separation

between Europe and the rest of the world, (b) the separation between a pure

normative and universalist concept of cultural modernity and a technical-logical or

instrumental concept of social systems, and finally (c) the association between

modernization, rationalization and universalism with human evolution. Colonialism

undermines such an ingenuous idealization and selective stylization of the dual

process of Western modernization since it associates cultural modernity and social-

economic modernization, by intrinsically linking the normative understanding of

Western modernization and the technical-logical structuration and functioning of

social systems as dependent and mutually supported moments of one same

totalizing societal, cultural and epistemological dynamics of colonial globalism, as

can be seen since the 16th century and especially from the 20th century. So, the

theories of modernity imply a historical-sociological blindness which divides

Western modernization in cultural modernity and social-economic modernization,

erasing the phenomenon of colonialism of the constitution and development of

Western modernization as a whole. Similarly, they have to deny the emergence

and the consolidation of European modernization regarding any relational

perspective concerning other societies and cultures, as if such an evolutionary

societal-cultural process was a fundamentally internal one, closed, self-referential

and self-subsisting. The idea of European modernization as an internal, self-

referential and self-subsisting process of evolution reinforces the historical-

sociological blindness of the theories of modernity by showing that Western

modernization must be conceived of firstly and basically from its internal dynamic,

from the emergence and development of cultural modernity and after from the

emergence and development of modern social systems. Once more, colonialism as an external phenomenon regarding the self-referential, self-subsisting and internal

movement of Western modernization is erased from any theoretical-political

correlation with European modernization.

Of course, the theories of modernity do not deny the fact of colonialism, something

they could not do realistically! But they can, by separating cultural modernity and

social-economic modernization and sustaining this historical-sociological



blindness, regarding colonialism as an accident caused by the technical-logical

social-economic modernization, or even as a problem external to cultural

modernity, since it is not committed or directly linked to social-economic

modernization, being primarily an internal and self-referential process of

constitution and development. In other words, the historical-sociological blindness,

which is the very theoretical-political starting point of the theories of modernity in

their philosophical and sociological reconstruction of the process of Western

modernization, separates these three moments which constitute the process of

Western modernization as a whole and render them autonomous: cultural

modernity, social-economic modernization and colonialism. By separating and

rendering them autonomous, these theories can associate Western modernization,

rationalization, universalism and human evolution, so that Western modernization

becomes the apex of human evolution both in societal-cultural and in

epistemological, political and normative terms. As a consequence, Western

modernization becomes the final point of human evolution, allowing it to assume

the role of universal judge and guide as a whole. Likewise, by separating these

three moments, the theories of modernity can purify–which is their intention–

cultural modernity regarding social-economic modernization and colonialism,

putting it as the pure and universal normative paradigm par excellence, the only theoretical-political-normative condition for a critical social theory and for an

emancipatory political praxis. And this clearly and directly entails the very

fundamental theoretical-political starting point: if we want to use critical concepts

and to ground and perform an emancipatory political praxis, both within and

without Western modernization, then we must use the modern theoretical-political

normative concepts, practices and codes. In other words, if we want to build a

critical and emancipatory social theory and political praxis, then we must use

cultural modernity as a universalist normative paradigm, since there is no

alternative. This is the result of the historical-sociological blindness implied in the

theories of modernity: their separation of cultural modernity, social-economic

modernization and colonialism entails the disjunction of the process of Western

modernization as an interdependent cultural, institutional and normative-political

process. Now, the independence and autonomy of these moments make cultural

modernity uncritical with regard to itself, in relation to social-economic

modernization and colonialism. There is, then, a pure and holy normative notion

of cultural modernity, an evil notion of technical-logical social systems, and finally

an external and accidental phenomenon of colonialism in relation to cultural

modernity.

CONCLUSION

What is the meaning of colonialism for a theory of modernity, for our evaluation

of a theory of modernity? As said above, it is very problematic for a theory of

modernity to assume a dual, not necessarily a complementary, explanation about

the process of Western modernization, a non-dependent explication of its

emergence and development. In the same sense, it is very problematic for a theory

of modernity that it does not thematize colonialism or thematizes it from the radical



separation of cultural modernity, social-economic modernization and colonialism

itself, viewing cultural modernity as a pure normative concept and social-economic

modernization as a pure technical-logical or instrumental concept, wherein

colonialism is effaced, although there is the use of the concept of colonization of the lifeworld in a technical-logical or instrumental sense and dynamic, even if

directed to Western modernization’s internal pathologic dynamic and social

pathologies. There is not, in this kind of theory of modernity characterized by this

historical-sociological blindness, a correlation and dependence between

normativity and institutionalism, between lifeworld and social systems, because

normativity or cultural modernity is always independent in relation to social-

economic modernization and vice-versa. Therefore, the theoretical explanation of

and the political praxis related to both the pathologies of social systems and

modern colonialism are reduced to technical-logical problems, without any

normative legitimation or justification. How is it possible to explain and to frame

technical-logical pathologies and technical-logical colonialism from normative

presuppositions? If there is a barrier between them–and a very strong one–,

political praxis cannot implement any change, as a critical social theory cannot

provide any diagnoses, since social explanation and institutional action are solely

technical-logical.

Now, the separation between cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization renders critical social theory uncritical insofar as it depoliticizes the

pathologies of social systems, resulting in a number of basic consequences. First,

a pure normative paradigm cannot frame a pure technical-logical concept of social

systems, even if these social systems have emerged from cultural modernity. They

have become technical-logical spheres characterized by self-differentiation, self-

referentiality and self-subsistence, by their autonomy and delimitation regarding

cultural modernity or the lifeworld. So, here, it is not possible to criticize, frame

and change technical-logical social systems from a pure concept of social

normativity as a basis of political praxis. Habermas, who is conscious of this

problem, argues that it is only possible to provide an indirect political-normative

intervention into the technical-logical social systems as the very basis of a radical

democracy for contemporary Western modernization (see HABERMAS, 2003b, p.

147-148). But the truth is that only an indirect theoretical diagnosis based on

normativity in relation to technical-logical social systems is possible, because they

are non-political and non-normative instances which have basically an instrumental

functioning and programming that is totally internal, self-referential, centralized

and monopolized by institutional elites. As a consequence, social-economic

modernization becomes depoliticized by its technical-logical constitution,

legitimation and evolution. It remains untouched, uncontrolled and unchanged by

a critical social theory that separates cultural modernity as a pure normative sphere

and social-economic modernization as a pure technical-logical sphere. The

correlation between them is based on, accomplished and streamlined by the social

systems’ own rules, by the strong institutionalism. Both politically and

economically, the social systems’ rules, procedures, elites and technicians provide

the political dynamics, defining what politics can and cannot effectively do.



Finally, the separation between cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization, which constitutes the historical-sociological blindness of the

theories of modernity, leads to the fact that, by the inexistence of any correlation

between them, cultural modernity is liberated from any criticism against its

independence and position in relation to social-economic modernization. In other

words, cultural modernity remains untouched by the pathologies of social-

economic modernization, so it always preserves its self-reflexivity, its capability of

self-criticism, of internal criticism, becoming purified and constantly purifying itself

against the dangers of irrationality and unreasonableness. In truth, irrationality and

unreasonableness belong to social-economic modernization and to technical-

logical social systems, and not to cultural modernity. It is from here, from the

separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization, that

cultural modernity maintains its self-reflexivity and, then, its capability of self-

change and self-criticism, sustaining, as a consequence, its claimed status as a

universalist normative paradigm that serves both to the internal dynamic of Western

modernization and to all the particular contexts, to the global order as a whole.

However, this methodological-political separation between cultural modernity and

social-economic modernization offered by theories of modernity renders cultural

modernity highly uncritical regarding both its link with social-economic

modernization and the correlation between cultural modernity and colonialism.

Indeed, a colonial mind-paradigm permeates the philosophical-sociological

reconstruction of the European or Western modernization, namely in some

important aspects: the division between modern Europe–rational, post-

conventional, universalist–and the rest of the world as traditionalist (traditionalism

as a form of life, culture, thinking and acting attached to its own context of

emergence and development); the fact that cultural modernity, in particular, and

Western modernization, in general, is the apex of human evolution, so that human

evolution becomes modernization; the fact that, by its post-conventional culture,

consciousness and normativity, cultural modernity is the only theoretical, political

and normative basis for social criticism and for a radical and emancipatory political

praxis, within and without modernity. Cultural modernity is a soft colonial mind-

paradigm exactly because any possible social criticism and emancipatory political

praxis needs to assume the epistemological, political and normative principles,

practices and subjects of cultural modernity, that is, they need to use the normative

paradigm of modernity as a universal epistemological-political basis which allows

social criticism and political praxis without any possible alternative.

Now, an uncritical cultural modernity becomes independent of social-

economic modernization and regards colonialism as an accident or an external

political, cultural and epistemological phenomenon. This is the basis of the

historical-sociological blindness found in theories of modernity in order to ground

a normative concept of cultural modernity that is universalist and can favor a critical

social theory of the Western modernization and to an international political

intervention. Here, the critical social theory cannot thematize colonialism and,

more importantly, cannot offer a normative basis to think, frame and change the

pathologies within and without modernity. By conceiving of colonialism as an

accident or a phenomenon external to Western modernization in general and to



cultural modernity in particular, the theories of modernity must conclude that the

only way to frame the question of colonialism is by modernity-modernization itself,

that is, the only theoretical, political and normative possibility to face and solve the

problem of colonialism is from the colonial-modern heritage, from the colonial-

modern cultural, epistemological and political mindset and paradigm. As argued

along the paper, the basic presupposition of the theories of modernity–their

historical-sociological blindness–is that the process of Western modernization is

the apex of human evolution, containing traditionalism. Modernity, here, becomes

the normative paradigm for judging, framing and guiding all particular contexts.

Likewise, the separation between cultural modernity and social-economic

modernization, between a pure normative concept and process and a pure

technical-logical concept and process leads to the absolution of cultural modernity

regarding the sins of the technical-logical social-economic modernization (it leads

also to a Manichean understanding of the dual Western modernization — a pure

normative cultural modernity highly emancipatory and critical, and a pure

technical-logical and instrumental social-economic modernization, highly

pathological). Finally, colonialism does not appear in the philosophical-

sociological reconstruction of the process of Western or European modernization,

in the theories of modernity marked by the historical-sociological blindness

discussed above. As a consequence of this approach, the theoretical, political and

normative framework within which the social criticism and the emancipatory

political praxis are possible–the only one–is cultural modernity itself. Now, what

can be perceived here is exactly that the fundamental presupposition to thematize

and frame colonialism is, we repeat again, cultural modernity, which is uncritical

regarding itself, regarding its link with both social-economic modernization and colonialism.

If social-political problems in general and the phenomenon of colonialism

in particular is to be criticized and changed, the epistemological-political

presuppositions of cultural modernity have to be assumed. These presuppositions

do not involve only the idea of a post-metaphysical foundation performed from an

impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism concerning the epistemological-moral

grounding. More importantly, they involve the necessity to assume the historical-

sociological blindness as the conceptual core from which it is possible to think and

act regarding both social-economic modernization and colonialism, absolving

cultural modernity of any relationship with them and placing it as universalism

itself, as the only condition for social criticism and for a reflexive political praxis.

In other words, the colonial culture, mindset and normativity is found both within

and without Western modernization as the very epistemological-political basis in

order to frame and change their internal pathologies and mutual interactions-

tensions. The historical-sociological blindness found in theories of modernity

erases the connections and mutual dependence between cultural modernity and

social-economic modernization, effacing the phenomenon of colonialism of

Western modernization as a whole. So, in order to criticize Western modernization

and colonialism, the presuppositions assumed by Western modernization as the

basis of its self-comprehension, legitimation and evolution are to be used, namely:

(a) its opposition in relation to the rest of the world as traditionalism (the



correlation between modernization, rationalization, universalism and human

evolution); (b) its direct association with the apex, with the final stage of human

evolution, which allows cultural modernity to assume the condition of

epistemologically, politically and normatively guiding, framing and changing all

particular contexts; (c) the radical separation between cultural modernity and

social-economic modernization, which absolves cultural modernity from the

pathologies of social-economic modernization, maintaining cultural modernity’s

claim as a universal culture, society, consciousness and epistemology that is the

condition of any possible social criticism and reflexive political praxis; and finally,

(d) the argument that, by such separation and the correlation between

modernization and the final stage of human evolution, cultural modernity is the

only paradigmatic basis for the framing, criticism and changing of modernity itself

and for international politics.

Here we have, as we think, the contemporary version of a colonial mind-

paradigm which can at the same time (a) affirm its self-referentiality and self-

subsistence (in the sense that the evolutionary process of Western modernization

is an internal process of constitution and development), (b) associate itself with

human evolution as a post-conventional and rationalized culture, society and

consciousness, becoming the judge and guide of all particular contexts (there is

the universal modernity and all the rest of particular contexts characterized by

traditionalism), and (c) assume that the only normative basis for theoretical-political

reflection is the colonial mind-paradigm itself, that is, a kind of thinking, acting

and grounding from an impartial, neutral and formal proceduralism which is

independent regarding contextual and particularized epistemological-moral

foundations, regarding traditionalism. Such a contemporary soft version of a

colonial mind-paradigm that insists on recovering a universal epistemological-

moral paradigm from the use of the notion of human evolution as a unitary and

progressive process starting with traditionalism and arriving at modernization, such

a colonial mind-paradigm argues again that the more developed stage of society,

culture and consciousness contains in itself the moments that it has overcome, and,

as consequence, that it is so embracing that it can at the same time take into

account and judge-orientate the particular and less developed moments that it has

overcome. Now, this kind of contemporary soft colonial mind-paradigm has no

shame and no problem in speaking and acting thus, because, as was shown

throughout the paper, the historical-sociological blindness found in theories of

modernity, by separating cultural modernity and social-economic modernization,

can stylize a normative concept of European modernity that can adapt to all

epistemological-political matters, as it can escape from all forms of criticism

regarding this association with social-economic modernization and colonialism,

because it is a pure normative concept, a very impartial, neutral and formal

proceduralism which is not compromised a priori with particular contents and, in

our case, with social-economic modernization and colonialism. The soft colonial

mind-paradigm conceives again of the association of modernization, rationalization

and universalism both as the present and the future of human evolution and as the

supreme normative basis for any type of social criticism and political praxis within

and without modernity. In the same way, the evolutionary process of human



development as modernization, rationalization and universalism becomes the

ending point of human constitution, so that it is a totalizing process which all

peoples, cultures and societies will achieve, especially if they are guided by the

normative paradigm of modernity, consequentially arriving at similar experiences

(the rationalization of the cultural images of the world). The globalization guided

by Western modernization is a fact, a consequence of the general process of

development of Western modernization as a universal worldview of human

evolution (see HABERMAS, 1997, p. 143-144). That is the reason why it is possible

to use modernity’s normative paradigm, despite its historical-sociological-

blindness, as the main epistemological-political basis for international politics.

Indeed, that is the reason why it is necessary to affirm the historical-sociological blindness as the core of a contemporary political theory, of a contemporary social

criticism–it erases the intrinsic correlation of cultural modernity, social-economic

modernization and colonialism, liberating cultural modernity from its link and

placing it as the ending point of the human evolution. So, Western modernization

is the only epistemological, political and normative ground and praxis for itself and

for globalization as a whole (see MIGNOLO, 2007).

Can we use an alternative normative-sociological concept for understanding,

framing and changing the process of Western modernization and streamlining

international politics? Is there such an alternative normative-critical concept to

cultural modernity in order to think, frame and act regarding both Western

modernization as a whole and international politics? In the rest of the paper, the

concept of reparation for colonialism will be presented as a more critical normative

concept for grounding, framing and guiding both the process of Western

modernization and international politics. It should be said that this work is in its

initial stages and, thus, is not fully explained and clarified. First of all, the concept

of reparation for colonialism intends to link cultural modernity, social-economic

modernization and colonialism as interdependent and imbricated moments of a

general and unitary evolutionary process. It aims to unveil, denounce, criticize and

overcome the historical-sociological blindness found in the theories of modernity

to construct their philosophical-sociological concept of Western modernization as

a universalist societal, cultural, institutional and normative evolutionary process

which becomes the ending point of human evolution and the supreme judge and

guide of particular cultures by assuming a stylized notion of cultural modernity as

a post-conventional society, culture and consciousness (and associating such a

post-conventional society, culture and consciousness with the apex of human

evolution). It rejects the separation between a pure normative concept of cultural

modernity and a pure technical-logical concept of social-economic modernization

proposed by the theories of modernity as much as it rejects the effacement of

colonialism as a fact linked to the process of Western modernization.

Indeed, by beginning with the direct unveiling and denouncing of the

historical-sociological blindness found in contemporary theories of modernity as

the basis of their reconstruction of a normative concept of cultural modernity as a

universalist culture, society and consciousness, as of an institutional notion of

Western modernization as the object of sociological analysis, the normative-



sociological concept of reparation for colonialism points to the imbrication

between cultural modernity, social-economic modernization and colonialism as the

basic core from which a critical social theory, correlatively philosophical and

sociological, can frame the constitutive and evolutionary process of Western

modernization in particular and its correlations with international politics in

general. In this sense, the critical social theory based on that normative-sociological

notion of reparation for colonialism conceives of the process of Western

modernization as a unitary and mutually dependent totalizing movement toward

globalization in the sense that it, by conceiving of itself as the final stage of human

evolution with conditions to unify and intermediate humankind by cultural-

epistemological rationalization, can assume the core-role of judge, guide and

shepherd of all cultures, societies and epistemologies. Therefore, the concept of

reparation for colonialism does not deny the two basic characteristics of the self-

comprehension of the theories of modernity, namely the correlation between

cultural modernity, rationalization, universalism and emancipation, and the

association between Western modernization and human evolution as a universal

standpoint from which it is possible to frame, criticize and guide all particular

contexts from and by cultural modernity itself in the name of humankind. On the

contrary, the concept of reparation for colonialism affirms that this is the real

intention of the normative paradigm of modernity–modernization, rationalization,

post-conventionalism, universalism and human nature-evolution. However, such a

universal core and moment assumed by modernity itself is, in the concept of

reparation for colonialism, the real problem that must be faced nowadays, because

it takes a totalizing, uncritical and depoliticized role and action regarding modernity

itself and in terms of international politics. Indeed, the great contemporary

epistemological-political problems are caused by such a totalizing and colonialist

imposition of an unpolitical normative paradigm of modernity as the basis of all

kinds of epistemological, political and normative groundwork within and without

modernity. As a consequence, the only alternative to modernity, as Habermas

argues, is more and more reflexive modernity, a form of self-reflexive and critical

modernity that can always purify itself and continue its totalizing movement toward

universalism, by means of its epistemological, cultural, political, economic and

military form of societal, cultural, institutional and normative instruments and

subjects–in other words, by means of the affirmation of the historical-sociological

blindness of the normative paradigm of modernity, from the affirmation of the

historical-sociological blindness by the modernity’s normative paradigm. By the

separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization, as by

correlating modernization, rationalization, universalism and human evolution, the

normative paradigm of modernity cannot be delegitimized or affected by any kind

of suspicion. On the contrary, as Habermas says, if we want to act and think about

modernity and international politics, we must assume the normative paradigm of

modernity as a basis. There is no epistemological, political and normative

alternative to cultural modernity.

Now, human evolution is not a natural and therefore essential process of

evolution toward universalism, that is, toward Western modernization as a

universal form of society, culture, life, consciousness and paradigm. It is a



construction, as is shown by the association among cultural modernity, social-

economic modernization and colonialism. We question whether human evolution

is indeed a universal evolutionary process. This is the theoretical-political

presupposition assumed by the theories of modernity in general and by Habermas’s

in particular in order to posit cultural modernity as a universal epistemological,

moral and normative paradigm, as a universal society, culture and consciousness.

This theoretical-political presupposition, added to the division between cultural

modernity and social-economic modernization, which constitutes the historical-

sociological blindness found in theories of modernity, correlatively puts Western

modernization as a universal society, culture, consciousness and paradigm and

purifies cultural modernity of any kind of contact with modern social systems and

with the phenomenon of colonialism. It allows the unification of all cultures,

societies and normative paradigms into one basic whole, which is the concept of

cultural modernity. Such unification enables cultural modernity to assume the core-

role of judge and guide of these particular cultures, societies and paradigms as a

normative umbrella that can intermediate and ultimately frame all particular

contextual dynamics, codes, practices and subjects. Now, the concept of reparation

for colonialism denies, by unveiling, denouncing and criticizing the historical-

sociological blindness of the theories of modernity, by unifying cultural modernity,

social-economic modernization and colonialism as an interdependent process, that

human evolution is a process toward modernization, as it denies that human

evolution has a natural and essential process of evolution with Western

modernization as its final stage, which ends in cultural modernity. As a

consequence, it also denies that the correlation between modernization,

rationalization, post-conventionalism, universalism and human evolution can put

modernity as a final stage of human evolution and, therefore, as the only normative

paradigm that can be used in order to conceive of modernity itself and international

politics–universalism. From now on, if we want to think and act with regard to

the process of Western modernization and its international or global moments and

relations, then we must correlate cultural modernity, social-economic

modernization and colonialism, as we must refuse the association between Western

modernization and human evolution, human evolution as Western modernization,

Western modernization as the apex of human evolution.

We must again correlate cultural modernity, social-economic modernization

and colonialism in order to understand, frame and change the process of Western

modernization and international politics: this is the first basic step taken by a critical

social theory based on the normative-sociological concept of reparation for

colonialism, contrarily to a critical social theory which is based on modernity’s

normative paradigm and on the correlation between modernity, rationalization,

universalism and human evolution. If modernity’s normative paradigm includes the

historical-sociological blindness as the theoretical-political condition for grounding

a normative and universal notion of cultural modernity that is the epistemological-

political groundwork for both Western modernization and international politics,

the concept of reparation for colonialism does not need to assume an uncritical

point of view and a blind, uncritical and depoliticized starting point based on the

separation and opposition between cultural modernity and social-economic



modernization. Indeed, if the theories of modernity proposed by Habermas,

Giddens, Honneth and Forst must assume that (some or all of these points) (a)

such a separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization,

(b) the construction of a pure normative notion of European cultural modernity

and (c) the direct correlation between modernization, universalism and human

evolution, the concept of reparation for colonialism can link from the beginning in

a same theoretical-political analysis and praxis the normative justifications, the

material and institutional constitution and the totalizing movement toward

universalism (that is, toward colonialism) as the basis for constitution, legitimation

and evolution of the process of Western modernization. In other words, the

concept of reparation for colonialism does not understand and assumes this

separation as possible or necessary in theoretical and political terms, because this

separation between cultural modernity and social-economic modernization, due to

the historical-sociological blindness, becomes uncritical regarding the process of

Western modernization and takes a soft colonial mind regarding international

politics. In this sense, modernity is always excused of its sins, of its colonial

tendency; in this sense, modernity, as a universal form of culture, society,

consciousness and epistemology, becomes the judge and guide of itself and of the

rest of the world. Now, in substituting the concept of cultural modernity as

normative basis for a critical social theory, the concept of reparation for colonialism

seeks the frame and restraint of Western modernization as the fundamental core-

role of our theoretical-political praxis, since our great challenge in the present days

and in the future is the constitution, legitimation and evolution of Western

modernization, within and without itself, as a theoretical-political totality which

does not separate cultural modernity, social-economic modernization and colonialism.

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