Model-based Diagnostics for Wire Health … (Wheeler...Model-based Diagnostics for Wire Health...
Transcript of Model-based Diagnostics for Wire Health … (Wheeler...Model-based Diagnostics for Wire Health...
Model-based Diagnostics for Wire Health Management
Kevin R .Wheeler, PhD - NASA Ames Research [email protected]
Jules Friederich – MCT Inc. at NASA ARC Stefan Schuet – NASA Ames Research CenterDogan Timucin, PhD – NASA Ames Research CenterXander Twombly, PhD – RIACS at NASA ARCPhil Wysocki – ASRC At NASA ARC
NASA Ames Research CenterMoffett Field, CA
National Aeronautics And Space Administration
Ames Research
Center
Dryden Flight Research
Center
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
MichoudAssembly
PlantStennis Space
Center
Kennedy Space Center
Marshall Space Flight Center
Johnson Space Center
Langley Research Center
Wallops Flight Facility
HQ
Goddard Space Flight
Center
Glenn Research
Center
14 Major Centers
19,000 Civil Service Employees
40,000 Contract Employees
14 Major Centers
19,000 Civil Service Employees
40,000 Contract Employees
White Sands Test Facility
Chafing Wire/Harness 37%
Unspecified Short 18%
Broken Wires 11%
Connector Failure 9%
Other 1%
Unspecified Failure6%
Failure Due to Corrosion
5%
Loose Connection 4%Insulation Failure 3%
Circuit Breaker Failure 2%
Crossmating 2%
Short Due to Corrosion 1% Miswire 1%
MOTIVATION: EWIS Agency Fault Summaries
Navy
Breach in Insulation 55%
Wire cut off 14%
Splices (hidden) 9%
Hot stamp 9%
Did not find 9%
Harness not available 4% FAA Wiring Failures
20%
19%
19%
14%
7%
7%5% 4% 4% 1%
Wire Cut / BrokenConn Damaged / BrokenWire Chaffed Components FaultyConn Pin FailureConn CorrodedWire CorrodedMiswireWire ShortedOther
• According to Captain Jim Shaw, manager of the in-flight fire project for the United States Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA), there are on average three (3) fire and smoke events in jet transport aircraft each day in USA and Canada alone, and the vast majority are electrical [ASW2000].
• According to Air Safety Week, "aircraft are making emergency landings, suffering fire damage to the point of being written off etc, at the rate of more than one a month based on the experience of the past few months" [ASW2001].
• Entire U2 fleet grounded in 2007 due to wire chafing evidence.
Coast Guard
APPROACH: Wire Health Management Development
• Fault library development - Develop publicly accessible wire fault database containing electrical signatures of different faults and wire types.
• Inversion algorithm development - Develop inversion algorithms for retrieval of permittivity along length of each wire in harness.
• Requirements analysis and definition – Develop Questions we need to answer.
Philosophy:Data driven - Recreate wire faults in lab and acquire reflectometry dataSimulation - Simulate faults in commercial simulatorTheory - Theoretical wave equation modeling Bayesian inversion – Retrieving the model parameters over time.
Fault Library
InferenceSoftware
RequirementsAnalysis
Requirements
EmpiricalData
Sims EM Theory
BayesianInference
Requirements Analysis & Definition
• What are typical rates of chafe progression?• How do signals change with worsening faults?• What are the EWIS faults priorities and time-of-life requirements?
• What are the best signals to inject for different types of faults, wire types, and harness configurations?
• How often should data be collected?• When should data be collected?
Should we run additional “Canary” lines (fiber optics)?Should we sense for vibrations (piezo wire)?Should we suggest harness configurations (ribbon)?Junction box best practices for microwaves?
Fault progression analyses
Hardware specifications
Harness specifications for health management
Identify sources of chafing• Bulkheads• Conduits• Control cables• Harness clamps • Hydraulic lines• Installation
Time Domain Reflectometry A Primer
Image from Agilent TDR manual
• A voltage step is applied to the circuit under test• The reflected voltage (ex) is measured at input: Reflections contain
information about the health of the insulation.
Non-uniform transmission line with two discontinuities
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.60
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4Coaxial cable
Time in nanoseconds
Vol
ts
InputReflection
Effects of Geometry and FaultsCoaxial Cable
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22Coaxial cable
Time in nanoseconds
Volts
The straight section of wire is 60 mm long, and the bend radiusis 10 mm. Each wire has a 0.25mm radius PEC core and 1.5mm
radius dielectric with e=2.08.
Magnitude of reflection due to bend: 26 mVMagnitude of reflection due to fault: 109 mV
Effects of Geometry and FaultsLamp Cord
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.80
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4Lamp cord
Time in nanoseconds
Volts
InputReflection
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2
0.586
0.588
0.59
0.592
0.594
0.596
0.598
0.6
0.602
0.604
Lamp cord
Time in nanoseconds
Volts
Magnitude of reflection due to bend: 9.6 mV Magnitude of reflection due to fault: 6.5 mV
Model-based Requirements
• How to answer these questions?– Laboratory experiments– Flight data– Simulations– …
Moving beyond the “What is possible?” stage of investigation requires a model-based approach.
THEORY: Non-uniform Transmission LineContinuous Parameters
Voltage at any point can have a right going wave and a left going wave: ),(),(),( txVtxVtxV −+ +=
Incident waveform: )(),0()()0()( tVtGtVatV tcti ∗+= ++
Reflected waveform: )(),0()),0(2()0()( tVtGltVatV tctr ∗+−= −− τ
attenuation propagation time Compact Green’s function transmitted waveboundary condition
Split representation:)(),()()()),0(,( tVtxGtVxaxtxV tct ∗+=+ +++ τ
)(),()),(2()()),0(,( tVtxGlxtVxaxtxV tct ∗+−=+ −−− ττ
Z(0)
Z(L)Nonuniform line
Lx
Vr(t)
0
Vi(t) Vt(t)
Γ1 T1
Γ2 T2
Γ3T3
V
Lundstedt & Strom 1996
Non-uniform Permittivity Profile
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 1600
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
mm
Per
mitt
ivity
V(incident) V(Transmitted)
Validation of Theoretical and Microwave Simulation Models of a Heterogeneous
Transmission Line
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Time (nsec)
Vol
ts
V(transmitted - Greens)V(transmitted- MWS)Residual between V(trans-Greens),V(trans-MWS)V(incident), Greens output and MWS input
Movie of Compact Green’s function step response
x
V(x
,t)
Movie of Compact Green’s function Gauss response
x
V(x
,t)
Non-uniform Transmission Line
Can form mapping between impedance parameters and our representation:
{ } { })(),(),,(),,()(),(),(),( xaxatxGtxGxGxRxcxZ cc −+−+⇔
)()()(
xCxLxZ =where and c(x) is propagation velocity.
Can also form forwards and inverse mappings from observables to model parameters:
{ } { })(),(),()(),(),(),,(),,( tVtVtVxcxaxatxGtxG tricc ⇔−+−+
Forward model
Inverse model (Bayesian inversion)What we really want!
Random uncertainties make inversion stochastic:- wire wiggles, insulation thickness varies - splices introduced- instrumentation noise, wireless packet noise - cables move
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
1.3
1.35
1.4
x 108
c(x) - reconstructed (blue) - 256 Samples - Solution Method: Iterative
- R = 0.275, G= 1e-022
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2-2
0
2
x 105c - reconstruction error - rms error: 71465.7
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.250
52
54
56
Z(x) - reconstructed (blue)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.20
0.005
0.01
Z - reconstruction error - rms error: 0.00216154
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2-500
0
500
Zx(x) - reconstructed (blue)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
Zx - reconstruction error - rms error: 0.0349996
Reconstruction
An Operational Concept
Op Concept:• Collect data every time plane lands (Vi, Vr, Vt).• Transfer data to ground station.• Algorithm infers state of insulation continuously along critical harnesses
(infer model parameters).• Changes in state over days and weeks are used to detect chafing and
to predict remaining useful life.
Unique Approach:• Change interrogation signal based upon type of faults.• Quantify uncertainties (there are no straight wires).• Produce useful remaining life estimates.
Chafing Measurements
• Goal: Detect chafing while only the shielding is being damaged.
• Experiment Methodology– Measure shielded twisted pair without fault
with TDR– Using abrasive apparatus, chafe wiring
specified number of cycles after shield exposure
– Measure with TDR.
Wire Chafing MethodsGoals:
• repeatable by other laboratories• inexpensive setup• allows for shooting TDR • allows for micrometer access• representative of real-world conditions
- vibration based- conductive chafe
Abrasive rod
Wire mountedunderneath
pivot
Chafed Shielding
BMS13-48, Type 24, Class 2, 2 conductor shielded.A.E. Petsche Co.: BMS13-48T24C02G018
Variability in Chafing to Shield
Since shielding is woven strands (not solid), some variability exists in chafing to shield.
Experiment: Vibrated abrasive chafing mechanism at 10 Hz. counted number of cycles until low voltage d.c. current flowed from abrasive rod to shielding.
Two chafing trials
Progressive Chafing Examples(approximately 1 cm stroke)
4K cycles beyond shield short.Shield still relatively intact.
6K cycles beyond shield short.Shield has holes.
8K cycles beyond shield short.Dielectric of inner conductors is exposed.
10K cycles beyond shield short.Inner dielectric is scraped but intact.
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.140
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Histogram of rate of chafing
mm change in chafe depth
Num
ber o
f occ
urre
nces
Rate of Chafing
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 83.7
3.75
3.8
3.85
3.9
3.95
4
4.05Chafing Progression
Thousands of chafing cycles beyond shield exposure
Wid
th o
f wire
in m
m
Consistency in rate of chafing(slope of lines)
Histogram of depth of chafe per2,000 cycles
5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8x 10-8
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
Time in Seconds
Vol
ts
0K cycles 2K cycles 4K cycles 6K cycles 8K cycles 10K cycles
5.2 5.22 5.24 5.26 5.28 5.3 5.32 5.34 5.36 5.38 5.x 10-8
0.134
0.135
0.136
0.137
0.138
0.139
0.14
0.141
0.142
Time in Seconds
Vol
ts
Progressive Chafingon single twisted pair
Chafe location
Started cycle count once shieldingwas first exposed by chafing.
Important to note: Damage is localized to shielding ONLY,No inner conductors were exposed.
Reflection due to
least chafing
Reflection due to
most chafing
TDR Resultsbaseline – shielding exposed
5.2 5.25 5.3 5.35 5.4 5.45
x 10-8
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
x 10-3
Time in Seconds
Am
plitu
de in
mV
Exposed shielding is not detectable from no fault case.
All TDR trials
5.05 5.1 5.15 5.2 5.25 5.3 5.35 5.4 5.45 5.5x 10-8
0.134
0.136
0.138
0.14
0.142
0.144
0.146
0.148
0K cycles 2K cycles 4K cycles 6K cycles 8K cycles 10K cycles
TDR ResultsProgressive chafing – multiple wires
difference from baseline
5.22 5.24 5.26 5.28 5.3 5.32
x 10-8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6x 10-3 Difference from baseline
Time in Seconds
Abs
olut
e di
ffere
nce
in m
V
2K cycles 4K cycles 6K cycles 8K cycles 10K cycles
6K8K
10K
Twisted Pair Geometry
Simulation Results
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
0.07
Time (ns)
Vol
tsSimulated TDR Response for Progressivey Growing
Shield Flaw in Twisted Pair Wiring
Depth 0.6Depth 0.65Depth 0.7Depth 0.75Depth 0.8Depth 0.85Depth 0.9Depth 0.95Depth 1.0Depth 1.1Depth 1.15Depth 1.2
Reality vs. Simulation
5.2 5.22 5.24 5.26 5.28 5.3 5.32 5.34 5.36 5.38 5.x 10-8
0.134
0.135
0.136
0.137
0.138
0.139
0.14
0.141
0.142
Time in Seconds
Vol
ts
0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85
0.05
0.055
0.06
0.065
0.07
Time (ns)
Vol
ts
Simulated TDR Response for Progressivey GrowingShield Flaw in Twisted Pair Wiring
Depth 0.6Depth 0.65Depth 0.7Depth 0.75Depth 0.8Depth 0.85Depth 0.9Depth 0.95Depth 1.0Depth 1.1Depth 1.15Depth 1.2