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Mixed Representation and Legitimacyin the European UnionMoa Mårtensson aa Department of Government , Uppsala University , SwedenPublished online: 04 Dec 2007.

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European IntegrationVol. 29, No. 3, 285–302, July 2007

ISSN 0703–6337 Print/ISSN 1477–2280 Online/07/030285-18 © 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/07036330701442281

ARTICLE

Mixed Representation and Legitimacy in the European Union

MOA MÅRTENSSON

Department of Government, Uppsala University, SwedenTaylor and Francis LtdGEUI_A_244110.sgm10.1080/07036330701442281Journal of European Integration0703-6337 (print)/1477-2280 (online)Original Article2007Taylor & Francis293000000July 2007MoaMartenssonMoa.Martensson@statsvet.uu.se

ABSTRACT A central critique against the European Union’s (EU’s) system of represen-tation is that it strikes an uneven balance between the three traditional channels ofrepresentation. Directly elected representatives are said to be uniquely powerless in rela-tion to territorial representatives and representatives of organized interests. In the arti-cle, this argument is scrutinized within a comparative framework, using a selection ofexisting data on democratic systems from around the world. The study confirms thatthe EU’s system of representation attributes great importance to territorial representa-tion. However, the main finding is that it is not unique in this regard. Moreover, orga-nized interests at the European level do not seem exceptionally powerful, in terms oftheir capacity to act collectively to influence policy. These findings are interpreted in thelight of current research on the EU’s legitimacy, resulting in two additional conclusions.While the EU’s formal legitimacy would be enhanced by a push towards electoral poli-tics at the European level, its social legitimacy hinges on a continued existence of terri-torial representation. Striking the proper balance between channels of representation atthe European level stands out as a future challenge to researchers and political actors.

KEY WORDS: Mixed representation, European Union, electoral politics, bicameralism, organized interests, legitimacy

Introduction

Many observers judge the European Union (EU) to differ critically fromnational political systems with respect to the balance that it strikes betweenelectoral, territorial and interest-based representation (see, for example,Hurrel & Menon 1996, 386; Bartolini 2005; Mair 2005, 17). In fact, a keyaspect of the ‘democratic deficit critique’ of the EU is the argument that “thetransformation of societal preferences into governmental action at the

Correspondence Address: Department of Government, Uppsala University, Box 514, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. Email: Moa.Martensson@statsvet.uu.se

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supranational level ought to take place through the same types of institu-tional mechanisms as those found at the national one — i.e., elections, partiesand a parliament” (Coultrap 1999, 108; see also Katz 2001 and the refer-ences therein). The underlying assumption in this critique is that in nationalsystems, political competition within the electoral channel determines policyto a much greater extent than do alternative channels of representation,while elections to the European Parliament are comparatively irrelevant as ameans of controlling EU policy making. Despite the centrality of this claimto students of the EU, it has yet to be evaluated systematically.1 To whatextent would the EU’s system of representation stand out as unique whencompared with those of national political systems?

As pointed out by Bartolini (2005), the development of representation atthe European level resembles that within nation-states in several importantrespects. The first representative institutions to make a difference in nationalpolitics were territorial and interest-based in kind, and originated in the assem-blies of feudal systems and the representative bodies of middle-age city-states(Birch 1971, 22–29; Bartolini 1999, 2005, 248–249). Territorial representa-tion is still an important feature of national politics, especially in federal andcon-federal states (see, for example, McKay 2001, 4). Interest-based repre-sentation also remains institutionalized in many national systems, despitedebates of its possible decline (see, for example, Lijphart 1999, 171–175).Over time, however, the electoral form of representation has come to domi-nate the other two traditional forms in national states. Parties and partysystems have managed to incorporate important territorial lines of division,along with conflicts of interest that cut across territories. In other words, polit-ical parties and their organizations developed “long arms” that “extendedacross all three forms of representation” (Bartolini 1999, 64).

At the European level, an influential territorial channel of representationhas formed around national executives and ministers in the various forma-tions of the Council and its surrounding structures. Having remained, at leastto some extent, a cooperative arrangement between sovereign states, the EUattributes important decision-making powers to territorial representatives(see, for example, Hix 2005, 72ff). Representatives of interest groups havealso turned their attention to Brussels (see, for example, Beyers & Kerremans2004), perhaps especially when dissatisfied with political responses receivedat the national level (Richardson 1996, 173). Clearly, there is an interest-based channel of representation, through which representatives of organizedinterests exert influence on European policy making on behalf of a multitudeof clients. Since 1979, the EU also has an electoral channel of representation,where directly elected members of the European Parliament represent thecitizenry. At the European and national levels alike, the three channels ofrepresentation have distinct origins, different ways of functioning and holddifferent shares of policy-making power.

This paper has two specific purposes. The first is to sort out to what extentthe EU’s system of representation differs from national systems in terms ofthe balance of power between its main channels. Is the electorally basedEuropean Parliament uniquely powerless and the territorially based Council

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uniquely powerful? And are interest-based arrangements of representationuniquely strong at the European level? In order to answer these questions, itis useful to view the three main channels of representation emphasized byBartolini (2005) as constituting a closed system — a ‘system of representa-tion’. Using this conceptual framework, and a selection of existing data ondemocratic states, conclusions will be drawn about how the EU’s system ofrepresentation compares with those of national political systems. The secondpurpose is to evaluate what — if any — consequences the make-up of theEU’s system of representation can be expected to have for its legitimacy as apolitical regime. Is it reasonable to believe, like some scholars do, that theEU’s particular mix of representational channels is causing its legitimacydeficit?

Comparative Framework: ‘Systems of Representation’

A ‘system of representation’ can be defined as the ensemble of structures thatorganize competition over inputs within a political system, by upholding arepresentational relationship between those representatives that participatein the policy process and those who they formally represent. As noted above,three structures of this kind have emerged in modern democracies and at theEuropean level alike. For reasons of space, not every aspect of the above defi-nition will be discussed here, but a few explanatory remarks are in order.First, ‘organized competition over inputs’ can take several forms. The demo-cratic competition between ideological platforms within the electoral chan-nel is one example of such competition; and the competition betweeninterest-based representatives to be selected or elected to participate in thepolicy process on behalf of others is another. This type of mechanism deter-mines what concrete political demands (input, that is) will reach and affectthe policy process.2 The ‘policy process’ referred to is assumed to be one thatleads to what Easton (1967, 385) called “binding decisions for a society”.Moreover, the definition restricts attention to the system of relationshipsbetween representatives and those who they ‘formally’ represent. This isintended to point out that several types of actors in a political system are‘non-representatives’. Bureaucrats in the European Commission and judgesin the European Court of Justice, for example, may be influential players inthe European policy process, but they are instructed to stand free of politicalinfluences from any specific constituency. Their functions are formally ‘non-representative’, and so are not considered here to form part of the EU’ssystem of representation.

Why, then, are the three mentioned channels of representation assumed toconstitute a ‘system’? What is the use of making such an assumption? Theadvantages of thinking of the three main channels of representation as linkedtogether in a system, are much the same those seen by Easton with regard topolitical systems as wholes. First, it makes it more feasible to separate activitiesof representation from other political phenomena. In other words, it allowsexamination of the system of representation “as though for the moment itwere a self-contained entity, surrounded by, but clearly distinguishable from,

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the environment or setting in which it operates” (Easton 1967, 384).3

Secondly, by separating activities of representation from other political activ-ities, comparison across systems becomes more feasible. The objects ofcomparison are clearly singled out at the conceptual level and, in consequence,their empirical referents in various political systems become more identifiable— above their apparent differences. And, thirdly, the channels within a systemof representation are linked together in such a way that “no one part can befully understood without reference to the way in which the whole itselfoperates” (cf. Easton 1967, 383).4 In other words, representational channelshave certain properties because they form part of a system, and are betterunderstood as such.

The latter point is explained well by Stefano Bartolini, who portrays thetheoretical relation between territorial, interest-based and electoral represen-tation as a zero-sum game within each political system:

In principle, and in their pure form, the three are, in fact, incompatible.If territorial external representation were to dominate, little room wouldbe left to express conflicts of interest … that transcend the local commu-nity or divide it internally. For the supporters of the pure corporatiststate, no further room is left for ideological conflicts cutting across thelines of the (recognized and licensed) system of interests once represen-tation is organized along them. No other principle of representationcapable of undermining the corporative negotiated outcomes is accept-able. Finally, in a radical majoritarian view of representation — theRousseau tradition — corporate and territorial interests are perceivedas sectional and illegitimate interferences in the formation of themajority’s will … based on the principle of one person, one value, onevote (Bartolini 2005, 250).

Put differently, the power-relation between the three traditional channels ofrepresentation is seen as one where the policy-making power gained by onechannel of representation is simultaneously lost by one or both of the othertwo channels. Against this background, it seems useful to analyse therelationship between representational channels in systemic terms. They arelinked closely in theory and it would be interesting to study their connec-tions empirically.

What follows below are suggestions on how to measure the relativeimportance of the territorial, electoral and interest-based channels of repre-sentation in national systems and the EU. This starts with a comparativeanalysis of the trade-off that is made between electoral and territorial repre-sentation in the European Union and other political systems. The followingsection moves on to consider the importance of interest-based representationin the EU and other political systems. On both points, effort is made to drawon the wealth of knowledge about political systems that already exists.Consequently, discussions are focused around variables that are amenable tocomparison, in the sense that comparable data can be found for severalother political systems, and calculated or found for the EU.5

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The Trade-off Between Territorial and Electoral Representation

At the European level, an influential territorial channel of representation hasformed around the national ministers in the Council of Ministers and theheads of state and government in the European Council. Since 1979, the EUalso has an electoral channel of representation; with increasing powers thedirectly elected members of the European Parliament represent the citizenryin the legislative process. In its legislative role, the Council of Ministers is afunctional equivalent to upper chambers in national parliaments.6 Likeupper chambers in federal states, it gives representation to the componentterritorial units of the political system. Likewise, the European Parliament’srole as co-legislator has made it functionally comparable to lower chambersin national systems.

Due to this institutional resemblance, the study of electoral and territorialrepresentation at the European level can draw on a long-standing traditionof research on relative house power in bicameral systems at the national level(see Tsebelis & Money 1997, 15–43; Lijphart 1999).7 Comparative studiesof bicameral legislatures have identified three factors that determine thestrength of upper chambers vis-à-vis lower chambers (Lijphart 1999).8 First,the formal constitutional powers of the two chambers. Secondly, theirmethod of selection or election. Directly elected upper chambers are assumedto gain importance by means of their democratic legitimacy and be morepowerful than their indirectly elected or appointed counterparts. Thirdly, thesimilarity of composition between chambers. The power of the upper cham-ber is assumed to increase to the degree that it is explicitly designed to over-represent minorities or smaller territorial units in the political system. Theunderlying logic of the last criterion is that the potential for diverging pref-erences and political conflict between chambers increases when they differ incomposition. Moreover, recent research shows that institutional devices (forexample, conference committees or shuttle systems) that guide the process ofconflict resolution between upper and lower chambers are important deter-minants of their relative power over legislative outcomes (see, for example,Tsebelis & Money 1997). So far, this comparison of the EU and nationalsystems relies exclusively on the first three factors, since they are the onlyones for which cross-country data (Lijphart 1999) are readily available.9

Making use of the first two criteria mentioned above, Lijphart (1999, 206)classified bicameral legislatures as either symmetrical or asymmetrical, where“symmetrical chambers are those with equal or only moderately unequalconstitutional powers and democratic legitimacy” and “asymmetrical cham-bers are highly unequal in these respects”. Belgium and the USA are amongthe countries whose bicameral legislatures are symmetrical in this regard,while the legislatures in, for example, France and the UK are asymmetrical.Lijphart’s third indicator of upper chamber strength relates directly to thetrade-off made between different principles of representation in the twochambers. In his classificatory terms, incongruent chambers differ in compo-sition since they embody different principles of representation. Conversely,congruent chambers are based on the same principle of representation. In

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federal systems, the degree of incongruence is estimated using the Gini-indexof inequality — a summary measure that reflects the extent to which territo-rial representation takes precedence over electoral representation in theupper chamber. The end result of Lijphart’s classificatory efforts is a four-point scale of bicameralism. It ranges from ‘unicameralism’, where all legis-lative power is concentrated in the lower chamber, to ‘strong bicameralism’,where the two chambers are equally strong and differ in composition so thatthere is a potential for political conflict between them.

What can be said about the Council and the European Parliament, basedon the comparative degrees of congruence and symmetry that shape theirrelative powers as legislators? Let us begin with the symmetry between themin terms of the treaty provisions that regulate their relationship. Althoughmany scholars hold that the European Parliament (EP) and the Council haveequal powers under the EU’s main decision-making method, co-decision (see,for example, Shackleton & Raunio 2003; Hix et al. 2006), their general viewis that the EP remains a less powerful institution than its upper chamber (Hixet al. 2003, 196 with further references). Hence, in this respect the relation-ship between the Council and the EU could be described as an ‘inverselyasymmetrical bicameralism’. Contrary to the general rule in nationalsystems, the upper house is more powerful than the lower house. The secondcriterion for symmetry is that the chambers are similar in terms of democraticlegitimacy. There is considerable disagreement among academics regardingthe democratic legitimacy of the Council (see, for example, Moravcsik 2002;Hix 2004).10 However, Lijphart’s criterion clearly singles out direct electionas the main source of democratic legitimacy and this is a kind of powerresource that the Council clearly lacks in relation to the EP. That the EPenjoys more social legitimacy is also confirmed in recent opinion polls.According to the first Eurobarometer (2006, 22) report in 2006, 52 per centof European citizens trust in the EP, while only 43 per cent trust in theCouncil. Even though both figures are low, the difference between them isquite substantial.

Moving on to the issue of congruence, Table 1 compares the EU andnational systems, with regard to the over-representation of smaller territorialunits in the upper house. The Gini-index of the Council of Ministers when itacts under QMV is somewhat lower than that of the German Bundesrat. Thisreveals that the inequality of representation in the Council of Ministers isconsiderably lower than, for example, that of the Swiss Council of States andthe US Senate. In more concrete terms, the 10 per cent most favourably repre-sented voters in the EU hold about 23.6 per cent of the votes in the Councilof Ministers, while 30 per cent of the best represented hold more than amajority (51.5 per cent) of the votes. The USA attributes considerably moreimportance to territorial representation in the upper house; the 20 per centbest represented voters, who come from the smallest states, hold 55 per centof the seats in the Senate.11

When the Council of Ministers acts under unanimity, by contrast, citizensin smaller member states are uniquely over-represented in the EuropeanUnion’s upper chamber, in terms of both seats and votes. It may be argued,

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though, that this is a reflection of the smaller states’ ‘power to block’decisions rather than their ‘power to change’ legislation (cf. Steunenberg &Dimitrova 1999, 2). Overall, the inequality of representation in the Councilis quite high in a comparative perspective.

To sum up, the EU’s system of representation would be classified as ‘strongbicameralism’ within the scheme advanced by Lijphart — a label which givesthe impression that the territorial and electoral channels of representationare equally influential in the legislative process. This comparative classifica-tion is illustrated in Table 2. As argued earlier, however, a more suitableconceptualization of the relationship between the Council and the EP mightbe that of an ‘inversely asymmetrical’ bicameral system. For the powerrelation between the two chambers at the European level is the reverse imageof that in asymmetrical systems at the national level, in which lowerchambers dominate weaker upper chambers (cf. Lijphart 1999, 45).

Still, it is not a unique trait of the EU that the upper chamber has exclusivecompetences in some areas, or that it is decisive on some financial matters(cf. Stepan 1999). According to Stepan (1999, 33), the Brazilian Senate is theworld’s most powerful federal upper house. It has exclusive competences intwelve policy areas (among them is the authority to approve state borrowing)and no area is beyond the Senates competence. Ideally, therefore, a classifi-cation of the EU should be substantiated with more in-depth accounts ofbicameral relations in symmetrical systems (for example, Brazil and theUSA), where upper chambers are known to have exceptional powers. So far,

Table 1. Inequality of representation in national political systems and the EU, illustrated by

vote share held by percentages of most favourably represented voters in the upper chamber,

and the Gini index for each upper chamber

10% 20% 30% 50% Gini index of inequality

EU-25

(Unanimity)

50.6 68.2 78.1 86.3 0.58

USA 39.7 55.0 67.7 83.8 0.49

Switzerland 38.4 53.2 64.7 80.6 0.46

Venezuela 31.6 47.2 60.0 77.5 0.40

Australia 28.7 47.8 58.7 74.0 0.36

Canada 33.4 46.3 55.6 71.3 0.34

Germany 24.0 41.7 54.3 72.6 0.32

EU-25

(QMV)

23.6 40.0 51.5 69.0 0.28

India 15.4 26.9 37.4 56.8 0.10

Austria 11.9 22.5 32.8 52.9 0.05

Belgium 10.8 20.9 31.0 50.9 0.01

Source: Lijphart (1999, 208) plus author’s calculations for the EU. Population data for EU member states

come from CIA (2006). The Gini index for the EU was calculated using the computational formula for

grouped data reported in Buchan (2002, 2). Lijphart’s source of data was the Stepan-Swenden Federal

Data Bank, All Souls College, Oxford University.

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what seems clear is that the incongruence between the Council and the EPreinforces the Council’s relative power. In light of the chosen indicators, theone factor that clearly works to enhance the power of the EP is its democraticlegitimacy as a directly elected body. Hence, the territorial channel ofrepresentation is strong in the EU’s system of representation.

The Comparative Importance of Interest-based Representation

It is often noted that an impressively large number of interest organizationsis present in Brussels (see, for example, Wessels 1999, 106). But, the sheernumber of interest organizations present at the centre of a political system,cannot be taken as evidence of their capacity to influence policy (cf. Potters& Sloof 1996, 423). As noted by Potters & Sloof, the number of participantsin collective action is an ambiguous indicator of associational power. Addingmore participants to a group has the double effect of strengthening it byincreasing its resources and weakening it by worsening the problem of freeriding. Potters & Sloof (ibid., 423) concluded that, “[t]here does not seem tobe any systematic [empirical] evidence that one of the effects is stronger ingeneral”. An alternative method, proposed by Lijphart (1999), is to use thelevel of corporatism in a political system as a proxy for the general importanceof organized interests in policy making. However, the composite measure that

Table 2. Bicameralism in national political systems and in the EU

Cameral structure Political system Index of bicameralism

Strong bicameralism:

symmetrical and incongruent

chambers

Australia, Colombia, European

Union, Germany, Switzerland,

USA

4

Medium-strength

bicameralism: symmetrical and

congruent chambers

Belgium, Italy, Japan,

Netherlands

3

Medium-strength

bicameralism: asymmetric and

incongruent chambers

Canada, France, India, Spain,

Venezuela

3

Weak bicameralism:

asymmetrical and congruent

chambers

Austria, Bahamas, Barbados,

Ireland, Jamaica, Trinidad and

Tobago

2

Unicameralism Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland,

Greece, Israel, Luxembourg,

Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand,

Papua New Guinea, Portugal

1

Source: Lijphart (1999, 212) plus data for the EU. Note: Botswana and the UK are intermediate cases,

classified as ‘between medium-strength and weak bicameralism, with a corresponding index of

bicameralism of 2.5. So is Norway, which is classified as a ‘one and a half chamber’ system, and judged

to have an index of bicameralism of 1.5. See Lijphart (1999, 213) for motivations.

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Lijphart used to this end has been criticized as “an unabashedly atheoreticalaggregation of twelve previous measures” (Kenworthy 2003, 17).

By contrast, the theoretical target here will be specified precisely as thedegree of concertation at the central level of the political system. This will betaken to be an approximation of the general influence of the interest-basedchannel on policy making. Hugh Compston (2002, 1) defined concertationas “the making of public policy by means of national-level, intersectoralnegotiations leading to agreements — as opposed to non-binding discussions— between government representatives and representatives of peak employerand/or trade union confederations about the formation of government poli-cies”. In the 1970s, many West European states had developed lastingarrangements for concertation in which interest organizations — typicallytrade unions and employer organizations — held ‘quasi-public status’ andtook permanent part in public policy making (see, for example, Molina &Rhodes 2002, 305). Today, union and employer influence remains institu-tionalized in countries that follow a neo-corporatist trajectory, while beingconfined to non-institutionalized forms of political participation (for exam-ple, lobbying) in other countries that follow a pluralist path (Traxler et al.2001).12 The practice of concertation has also spread to other policy sectors(for example education, health care and environmental policy), therebyinvolving new types of organized interests (Molina & Rhodes 2002, 309).

In order for interest organizations to gain the important formal role inpolicy making that concertation implies, they have to mobilize enough powerto access political arenas. Traxler et al. (2001, 76) have developed an empir-ical measure of this capacity, which they term ‘associational power’. Theirdata cover union and employer peak organizations in twenty OECDcountries.13 Table 3 compares the EU to the twenty national systems studiedby Traxler et al. (2001), with regard to the associational power of peak-levelbusiness and labour organizations. Clearly, European-level peak organiza-tions are excluded from several policy areas and activities where the vastmajority of national peaks can count on involvement. Most notably, theEuropean-level peak organizations do not take part in any implementationof European agreements — a task left to affiliate organizations and/orgovernments at the national level. It should be remembered, however, thatthe European-level employer organizations and unions have the unique rightto collectively propose law. Among the Union’s member states, Belgium isthe only country where such extensive and independent legislative powersare granted to the social partners (Dølvik & Visser 2001, 30).

Compared with their national counterparts, then, organized interests at theEuropean level do not seem exceptionally powerful in terms of their capacityto act collectively to influence policy. Still, representatives of organized inter-ests do play an institutionalized role in at least one important portion of EUpolicy making. This alone should be reason enough to question the argumentmade by Streeck & Schmitter (1991, 156ff.) that the EU will remain an allthrough pluralist system. In broader comparative light, the EU may well finditself at an intermediate position, between corporatist and pluralist extremes(cf. Falkner 1998). However, the conclusions here are based on the extent to

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which union and employer peak organizations participate in policy makingand this calls for caution in interpreting the results. Employer and unionorganizations cannot be regarded as typical organizations in a typicalsector.14 Still, there are some advantages in focusing on these two groups.

Table 3. Associational power: the main policy-related activities of the largest peak

organizations at the national and European levels, respectively

National systems European Union

Activities

Union

peaksa (%)

Employer

peaksa (%)

Union

peaksb

Employer

peaksb

General activities

Influence central government or

parliamentary bodies with regard to

labor-market issues

90 94 Yes Yes

Represent members’ labour market

interests in central corporatist institutions

77 99 Yes Yes

Specialized activities

Participate in the formulation of:Industrial policy programmes 74 78 No No

Regional development programmes 70 67 No No

Public occupational programmes

(including apprenticeship) and active

labour-market policy

75 100 Yes Yes

Research and development programmes 54 44 No No

Quality control programmes and/or

standardization of products

— 44 — No

Implement or participate in implementation of:Industrial policy programmes 44 44 No No

Regional development programmes 41 40 No No

Public occupational programmes

(including apprenticeship) and active

labour-market policy

60 72 No No

Research and development programmes 35 28 No No

Quality control programmes and/or

standardization of products

— 33 — No

aPercentage of the largest national peak organizations performing each function in twenty OECD

countries 1991–1996. Source: Traxler et al. (2001, 76).bWhether the main union and employer peak organizations at the European level (ETUC,

BUSINESSEUROPE, CEEP and UEAPME) perform each function. Sources: Branch & Greenwood

(2001); Compston (2001); Dølvik & Visser (2001); Falkner (2003, 259–271) and Obradovic (2001).

Regarding standardization, formal non-participation was also confirmed through personal conversations

with two experts, Charlotte Nyberg, Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, and Sven Bergström, The

Swedish Trade Union Confederation. See also, the Amsterdam Treaty, articles 137–139, regarding the

legal basis of the European level social partnership procedure.

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First, they are present and relatively well organized in all modern democra-cies and at the European level. This ensures that a wide comparison betweenpolitical systems can be made. Secondly, within the mentioned category ofcountries, one would be hard pressed to find a political system that has insti-tutionalized the participation of other organized interests in policy making,while excluding employers and unions. This point guarantees some amountof measurement validity by reducing the risk of missing important instancesof concertation.

Does the EU’s Legitimacy Hinge on its System of Representation?

With these results at hand, does there seem to be a connection between theEU’s particular mix of representational channels and its legitimacy as apolitical regime? Legitimacy is a concept with several meanings, but itscentrality to political philosophers stems from the idea that it is the definingquality of rightful political authority (cf. Beetham & Lord, 1998, 1). For thepurposes of this paper, it is useful to make a distinction between formal andsocial legitimacy (cf. Weiler 1991, 2468; Karlsson 2001, 107, 259).15 Apolitical regime acquires formal legitimacy by meeting one or several abso-lute criteria “through which it can be rationally argued that collectivizeddecisions must be accepted by those who have not participated in them, or,while participating, have not had their preferences satisfied” (Bartolini2005, 166). What these criteria should be has been the subject of widedebates in most Western societies, especially in times of severe political crisis(Beetham & Lord 1998, 1). Social legitimacy, in contrast, is not a matter ofprinciples, but of actual public support. In order to be socially legitimate, aregime must enjoy widespread acceptance by those who are subject to it(Karlsson 2001, 108). Arguably, the formal and social dimensions of legiti-macy are complementary in modern democracies;16 the exercise of politicalauthority should be subject to and constrained by both fundamental demo-cratic principles and important changes in public opinion (cf. Beetham &Lord 1998, 3; Karlsson 2001, 107).17

From the viewpoint of formal legitimacy, the key difference between thethree channels of representation discussed above, lies in the way that prefer-ences are aggregated within them (Bartolini 2005, 250; see also Rokkan1975, 217). In modern democracies, the electoral channel is the key structureof representation, since elections aggregate preferences according to thefundamental democratic rule of ‘one person-one vote’. On this basis, elec-tions are expected to uphold the principle of political equality among citizens,and ensure that political leaders stay responsive to the interests of the generalpublic. As noted by Bingham Powell (2000, 3), “elections are instruments ofdemocracy to the degree that they give the people influence over policymaking”.18 The territorial channel aggregates preferences in a different way,which promotes the idea of equity between territories; ‘one state — one vote’.In a stylized version of this process, preferences are first aggregated withineach territory, where the political leadership receives mandates through regu-lar democratic procedures. In a second step, and based on these mandates,

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territorial representatives negotiate amongst each other and make bindingdecisions by unanimity rule. This two-step process is generally regarded aslegitimate, since the principle of equity between territories allows for indirectdemocratic responsibility. No territory can be overruled and voters in eachterritory can hold their own leaders fully responsible (cf. Moravcsik 1993).As regards the interest-based channel of representation, no simple aggrega-tion formula can be reported, for, in the words of Stein Rokkan (1975, 217),“[a]t the corporate level there is no equality: there may be provisions forparity in the organization of arenas of bargaining but what counts in the deal-ings among corporate groups is the capacity to mobilize, to control and, quiteparticularly, to withdraw resources of direct importance for the maintenanceof the territorial political system”. Still, the argument must be made thatinterest-based representation contributes to the formal legitimacy of a polit-ical regime. Organized interests aggregate individual preferences to formcollective demands, and so they are an essential source of structured infor-mation for the elected leadership (cf. Rokkan 1999, 261–262; Wessels 1999,106–107).19 The flip side of this resource is well known. The informationprovided by organized interests is based on their own interests; and theseinterests may diverge from those of society at large (see, for example, Olson1965, 127–128). So, while the interest-based channel of representationprovides valuable support to both other forms of representation, it mustremain a complementary, rather than independent source of legitimacy.

In sum, the electoral channel is the fundamental formal legitimizingcomponent in a system of representation, to the extent that representativesmake collective decisions by majority rule. When decisions are taken underunanimity rule, the territorial channel stands out as equally justifiable, in sofar as it fulfills the criterion of indirect political responsibility. The interest-based channel, in contrast, works as a complementary source of informationfor the political leadership and should not be regarded as an independentsource of legitimacy from a formal point of view. Extending these points tothe EU, the conclusion arises that it is a political regime in breach with thedemocratic norm that collective decisions by majority rule requires electorallegitimation. The reason is that majority voting is commonly practised in theCouncil of Ministers, although the members of this body collectively lackdirect electoral legitimacy (cf. Gustavsson 2003, 184ff; see also Beetham &Lord 1998, 13–16; Bartolini 2005, 167). From a formal point of view,therefore, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit.

Turning to the question of the EU’s social legitimacy; is the EU’s currentlack of public support related to the balance it strikes between different chan-nels of representation? It is useful to approach this question through adistinction between the input and output side of the policy process: Does theEU’s social legitimacy depend on its system of representation (input struc-tures) or rather directly on the political results (outputs) that the EU producesas a political regime (cf. Scharpf 1997, 19)? Empirically, there is someevidence that the EU is legitimized by its outputs rather than by its inputstructures. In general, public support for the EU rose until the beginning ofthe 1990s and declined thereafter (Marsh 1999, 105–106). Based on the

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European Representation Study and the 1994 Eurobarometer, Pippa Norris(1999, 88) found that “overall policy performance lies at the heart of dissat-isfaction with EU democracy”. Peoples’ perceptions of whether their countryhad benefited from EU membership explained the bulk of variation insupport for EU decision-making processes at the country level (ibid., 83–87).20 Michael Marsh expanded on these results, asking what, in turn, couldexplain peoples’ perceptions of whether their country had benefited from EUmembership. He found “strong and relatively enduring” national differencesin satisfaction that could be explained by objective economic factors — mostparticularly by the dynamics of unemployment in each country (Marsh 1999,106).21 A review of the current state of knowledge in this field partlyconfirms early impressions. Liesbeth Hooghe & Gary Marks (2005) summa-rized evidence from eleven influential explanatory studies and found thatthree types of strong and robust factors explain public support for the EU.Two of these are mutually reinforcing; exclusive national identities interactwith national elite divisions on European integration. Together, these werediscovered to be the most important sources of Euroscepticism (ibid., 426,436). Secondly, economic facts and expectations — personal and in relationto one’s country — proved to bear directly on public support for the EU.Positive economic circumstances of each kind were related to positive feel-ings toward the EU (Hooghe & Marks 2005, 431).22

Taken together, the empirical findings seem to indicate that the territorialchannel of representation could play an important role in upholding the EU’ssocial legitimacy. The nation-state appears to remain an important frame ofreference for positive as well as negative public judgements of the EU (cf.Hooghe & Marks 2005, 430).23 As noted by Michel Marsh (1999, 92),“[n]ational units serve as one channel of representation in the Europeanpolitical system … and to the extent that variations in support arebetween countries rather than within them, this channel is particularlyappropriate”.

Conclusions

In representative systems that aspire to be democratic, it is the task of variouscategories of political representatives to solve the classical paradox ofmaking the citizens ‘present’ in the policy process, in spite of the fact thatthey do not take part in it directly. The European Union’s system of repre-sentation is not as unique as it seems at first glance. It is composed of thesame main channels — electoral, territorial and interest-based — thatconnect citizens with political leaders in national political systems. Based onthe trade-off that the EU makes between electoral and territorial representa-tion, it should be classified as a strongly bicameral system. Like many federalstates, the EU attributes great importance to conflicts of interest that arestructured along territorial lines. Moreover, comparative data on the associa-tive power of union and employer peak organizations can be used as a proxyfor the general importance of interest-based representation in politicalsystems. When national systems are used as a yardstick, organized interests

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at the European level seem to have an intermediate, rather than exceptional,collective capacity to influence policy. In sum, the trade-off that the EUmakes between its main channels for political representation is fullycomparable with those in national political systems.

Connecting these empirical results to current research on the EU’s legiti-macy, a tentative conclusion can be made regarding the connection betweenthe EU’s particular mix of representational channels and its legitimacy as apolitical regime. A key to a more legitimate EU seems to lie in a continuedco-existence of electoral and territorial representation, rather than in a pushtoward electoral politics alone. Two complementary observations supportthis proposition. On the one hand, the EU’s formal legitimacy turns on therequirement that directly elected representatives should have the final wordwhen European-wide decisions are made by majority rule. On the other, itseems that the EU’s social legitimacy hinges on the existence of territorialrepresentation at the European level, since the nation-state is an importantframe of reference for citizens as they evaluate EU policy. To conclude,finding ways to strike the proper balance between channels of representationat the European level stands out as a future challenge to researchers andpolitical actors. The argument here suggests that the delicate issue of tradingoff formal and social legitimacy should be at the centre of this debate.

Acknowledgement

The author would like to thank Ron Holzhacker for organizing the ERC-CONNEX and for commenting on several versions of this article. TobiasAuberger, Caspar van den Berg, Patrick Bijsmans, Tannelie Blom, LaszloBruszt, Gary Marks, Frans van Waarden, Marten Vink and other partici-pants in the ERC-CONNEX gave helpful comments on earlier drafts andideas. Thanks also to Hanna Bäck, Sverker Gustavsson Christer Karlsson,Björn Lindberg, Kalle Lindgren, Arne Mårtensson, Thomas Persson, TorstenSvensson and Kåre Vernby and one anonymous reviewer for usefulcomments, and the Borbos E. Hansson foundation and the Swedish Networkfor European Studies in Political Science for financial support.

Notes

1. Bartolini (2005) discussed the relationship between the three channels of representation at the

national and European levels thoroughly, but did not make a structured comparison across a specific

set of political systems.

2. The concept of ‘competition over inputs’ was adopted from Simon Hix (1998, 38).

3. In Easton’s conceptualization, the major properties of a (political) system are the following. A system

is identifiable and this is in two main ways. First, in terms of its boundaries “dividing it from its setting”

(1967, 385) and, second, in terms of the units that make the system up. Moreover, a system needs

inputs to keep going and produces outputs that are different from those inputs. Within the system

there is some amount of differentiation, meaning that there is some “division of labor” between its

units that “provides a structure within which action takes place” (ibid., 386). If all activities taking

place within the system entailed differentiation, however, the system would be likely to fall apart. So,

systems must also provide some mechanisms of integration, “whereby its members are … induced to

cooperate in some minimal degree” (ibid., 387) and keep producing the system’s outputs.

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4. These are Easton’s words in favour of studying political systems as wholes, making the relation

between its components visible and part of the analysis.

5. Here, Arend Lijphart’s (1999) extensive study of democratic institutions in thirty-six countries has

been a very efficient starting point in the search for comparative indicators, although some of my

final choices diverge from his.

6. In the following, ‘the Council’ will denote the Council of Ministers.

7. Tsebelis & Money (1997) thoroughly reviewed the contemporary debate on relative house power,

and its connections with historical arguments regarding bicameralism. Lijpart (1999) described

contemporary empirical regularities based on existing research and classified democracies along a

scale that ranges from unicameralism to strong bicameralism.

8. In the following, I draw on Lijphart’s enumeration and description of these three factors (1999,

205–207) and some further explanations in Tsebelis & Money (1997, 44f).

9. Cf. Tsebelis & Money (1997) who based their conclusions on game-theoretic models, corroborated

with extensive data on France only, and a number of other brief case studies. The results are highly

interesting, but in their present form not a sufficient basis for a broad comparative study.

10. Moravcsik (2002, 612) argued that the Council is the most important source of democratic account-

ability at the European level and underlined that member state governments are democratically

elected at the national level. In contrast, Hix (2004) argued that direct elections to the EP are the

main basis for the EU’s legitimacy and that this mechanism should be reinforced in a number of ways.

11. According to Stepan (1999, 31), one implication of this is that one vote in Wyoming — with 453,588

inhabitants — is worth 66 votes in California — with 29,760,021 inhabitants. (The calculation was

made in 1990.)

12. Traxler et al. (2001) found that modern democracies cluster around these two alternatives. They

used the terms ‘lean corporatism’ and ‘neo-liberalism’, claiming that the recent developments call for

new ideal-types (see, especially, chapter 20).

13. This measure is selected on the basis of Kenworthy’s (2003) survey. The survey covers 42 existing

quantitative indicators of corporatism and comes to the conclusion that they diverge by targeting

four different types of phenomena: (1) interest group organization; (2) wage setting arrangements;

(3) interest group participation in policy making; (4) political-economic consensus. The type of

indicator most amenable to the aims here is the one that focuses ‘interest group participation in

policy making’. Among the indicators in this category, the best appears to be the one by Traxler et al.(2001), since their study is the only one that includes organized business, rather than focusing on

labour alone.

14. An interesting question for future comparative research would be to extend the data on associational

power to cover several other sectors (e.g. agricultural policy and environmental policy). Such data

would allow more solid conclusions about the importance of interest-based representation in various

political systems, including the EU. As noted by Alan Cawson (1986, 39), pluralism and corporatism

are processes that tend to co-exist in societies. In a given political system, “one can speak of a

corporate and a competitive sphere of politics”. Against this background, it is somewhat dubious to

generalize across political sectors that have not been investigated using comparable measures.

15. I make use of the distinction between formal and social legitimacy introduced by Weiler (1991), but

subsequently use definitions of these concepts that diverge from the ones he proposed.

16. It should be noted that these two dimensions of legitimacy correspond directly to the “two main

methods for assessing the democratic legitimacy of a political system” that were discussed in the

introduction to this Special Issue.

17. Beetham & Lord (1998) conceptualized legitimacy in terms of three criteria, of which two are formal

(‘legality’ and ‘normative justifiability’) and one social (‘legitimation’). They argued that these crite-

ria are complementary, rather than alternative.

18. Cf. Hanna Pitkin (1972, 234) who noted that “Our concern with elections and electoral machinery,

and particularly with whether elections are free and genuine, results from our conviction that such

machinery is necessary to ensure systematic responsiveness”.

19. With specific reference to the EU, Wessels (1999, 106)argued that interest representation, as a

complementary means of preference aggregation, is acutely needed in large political systems, where

“[l]arger numbers include a larger variety of interests and a higher complexity of problems”.

20. The model tested by Norris included the following rival explanatory factors: the social characteristics

of the respondents, the length of their countries’ membership in the EU, the attitudes of national

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opinion leaders’ toward the EU and partisanship. These factors turned out to have much less explan-

atory power (Norris 1999, 83–87).

21. Cf. Matthew Gabel (1998, 351–352) who tested five rival theories aiming to explain variations in

public support for the EU at the individual level. Here, too, material benefits and losses (‘the

utilitarian model’) turned out to provide the most robust explanation.

22. It should be noted that economic factors turned out to explain more of the difference in public

support between countries, while identity factors explain more of the differences between parties as

well as between individuals.

23. Hooghe & Marks (2005, 430) found that the country level accounts for 14.3 per cent of the variation

in public opinion on the EU.

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