MisinformationDisorder:AssessingRussia’sSoftPowerPotential

IGORHARRISMAIRCAPSTONEDECEMBER2016

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AbstractIn2012,PresidentV.PutinaccusedwesternmediaofemployingmisinformationtodistortRussia’simageintheinternationalarena.Inamanifestoforhisthirdpresidency,Putinlabeledtheallegedmisinformationasafacetofwesternsoftpower.HedeclaredthatitwastimeforRussiatofightbackbyusingsimilartactics.Softpowerininternationalrelations,asadvancedbyHarvardProfessorJosephNye,istheabilityofastatetoshapepreferencesofotherstatesbymeansofappealandattraction.TheproblemisthattheKremlin’sapplieddefinitionofsoftpowerisreducedtoastrictamalgamationofgovernmentcraftedpublicdiplomacyandaheavydoseofUSSRstylepropaganda.Allothervariablesthatmakeacountryattractivetotheinternationalcommunityandincreasesoftpowerpotentialaresimplyomitted.TheintentofthispaperistoanalyzethesourcesofRussiansoftpowerandexaminehowtheKremlinutilizessoftpowertoinfluenceAmericanandWesternEuropeanpolicytowardRussiawhilesimultaneouslyincreasingpublicopinionofRussiainwesterndemocracies.

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ContentsAbstract.........................................................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

Intro...............................................................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

TheoreticalFramework...............................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

TheProblemwithPower.........................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

TheConceptofSoftPower......................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

CriticismsoftheConcept.........................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

SignificanceoftheConcept....................................................................................................................7

SP302015:EmpiricalMeasurementofSoftPower...................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

TraditionalApproachtoMeasuringPower............................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

OriginsofSoftPowerMeasurement.......................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

SP30Methodology...................................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

KeyBarrierstoEntry…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….10

SoftPowerAccordingtotheKremlin.....................................................................................................13

SoftPowerandtheUSSR.....................................................................................................................14

Putin’sInformationWar......................................................................................................................15

NewWaveofRussianSoftPower...........................................................................................................15

FarRightPoliticalCoalitions...................................................................Error!Bookmarknotdefined.

TheFrenchConnection....................................................................................................................................................16

WesternPR/LobbyingGroups...............................................................................................................18

PurchasingSpaceinWesternNewspapers............................................................................................20

ForeignLanguageNewsChannels.........................................................................................................21

Authoritarian/ConservativeAppeal……………………………………………………………………………………….23

Conclusions/Recommendations................................................................................................................24

Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………25

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IntroductionTheKremlinhasgonethroughconsiderableeconomicpains,inthelasttenyears,toimproveinternationalpublicopinionofRussiawithinleadingwesterndemocracies.ItseffortshavefocusedlargelyonfarrightpoliticiansandorganizationsthatareopposedtotheideaoftheEuropeanUnion,NATO,andpoliciesunfavorabletoRussia.Thediscussionthatfollowsseekstoexaminetheseeffortsindetail,provideatheoreticalframeworkinaccordancewithwhichtheseeffortsareexerted,identifytheshortcomingsoftheutilizedapproaches,andmakerecommendationsastohowtheycanbeimproved.

Thecentralconceptofthisanalysisisinfluenceandhowitiscreated/exerted.Theabilityofonestatetohaveinfluenceuponanotherisaquestionofpower.Whilehardpowercapabilityanditsinfluencehavebeenunderthemagnifyingglassfordecades(seeGerman,Heart,Treverson,Jones)1,softpowerappearstobemoreproblematicofaconcept;notonlyistherenowaytomeasuretheeffectsofsoftpower,themeasurementofsoftpowerpotentialitselflacksanagreeduponapproach.Lackofaunifiedapproach,orattemptsatcreatingsuchanapproach,reflectsgeneraldisinterestintheconceptinthefieldofinternationalrelations.

Dismissingacademiccritiquesofsoftpower,Iarguethatsoftpowerdoesdeserveattention,ifnotonlyforthefactthatthehardpowerapproachtopoliticshasprovendisastrousinrecentyears..First,IintroducetheconceptasoriginallydefinedbyJosephNye,reviewrecentattemptsatempiricalcalculationofsoftpower,andapplytheconcepttoPutin’sRussia.Itakeissuewiththemethodologyofexistingempiricalsoftpoweranalysisbecausethecategoriesevaluatedaretooexclusive,ambiguous,andplaguedwithaliberaldemocraticbias.

EvidenceexiststhatRussiahasactivelyintegratedsoftpowerintoitsforeignpolicy,thoughitsversionoftheconceptdoesnotverymuchadheretothedefinitionoriginallyprovidedbyNye.TheultimategoalofthispaperistoanalyzetheKremlin’sinterpretationanduseofsoftpowerandexaminehowitutilizesthisconcepttoinfluenceAmericanandWesternEuropeanpolicytowardRussiawhilesimultaneouslyincreasingpublicopinionofRussiawithinwesterndemocracies.TheKremlin’sinterpretationofsoftpower,Iargue,consistsofaconcentratedfocusonpublicdiplomacy/mediaadvocacyandexclusionofalmosteveryotheraspectoftheconceptadvancedbyNye.However,Russia’ssoftpoweroffensiveisnotlimitedtothepoliticalanddigitalarenas;MoscowalsoemitstraditionalreligiousandfamilyvaluesthatarefoundappealingbyconservativesintheWest.

1GregoryF.TrevertonandSethG.Jones,MeasuringNationalPower,SantaMonica,CA,RANDCorporation,2005CliffordGerman,“ATentativeEvaluationofWorldPower.”TheJournalofConflictResolution,vol.4,no.1,1960,pp.138–144.www.jstor.org/stable/172589.JefferyHeart,“Threeapproachestothemeasurementofpowerininternationalrelations”,InternationalOrganization,30(2),(1976)pp.289–305

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TheexistingstrategysuffersfromshortcomingsandpitfallsthatpreventRussiafromproperlycultivatingitssoftpowerpotential.TheseproblemsarelargelydomesticandgenerallyignoredbyPutin’sadministration.Inthefollowingdiscussion,Ihopetodemonstratewhyexactlythebarrierstosoftpowercultivationareneglectedandwhytheadministrationhasdonelittletochangethem.IconcludebymakingrecommendationsastowhatalterationsRussiashouldmaketoitsdefinitionofandapproachtosoftpowertoactuallyincreaseitsinfluenceabroad,and,ifinternationalpublicopinionofacountryisatallindicativeofitssoftpowerpotential,increaseitslargelynegativeimageintheinternationalarena.

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TheoreticalFrameworkTheProblemwithPowerThefoundationofrealismisrootedinthesuppositionthatnationalinterestisdefinedintermsofnationalpower,meaningthatstatesintheanarchicrealmsecuretheirnationalinterestsbymeansofpower.Aperpetualprobleminthefieldofinternationalrelationsisthatthenotionofpowerlacksaproperdefinition.Theconcepthasproventoocomplextofitanyconcisedefinition.Realistssufferfromthisproblem.KennethWaltzhasacknowledgedthattheproperdefinitionofpowerremainsacontroversialmatter.

Constructivistsaremoreconcernedwiththeconceptualanalysisofthequestion‘whatdoespowerdo?’Theyexaminethegenealogyofhowpowerhascometomeananddowhatitdoes.Despitetheirdifferenceinapproach,constructivistsarealsohard-pressedtofindadescriptivemeaningofpower.Regardlessofscholarlydisagreementsonprecisedelineation,theprincipleofpowerliesintheabilityofthosewhoholdittomakeothersbehaveinacertainway(state“A”gettingstate“B”todowhatstate“A”wantsbecauseState“A”holdsmorepower).Ininternationalrelations,powercaneitherbeexpressedthroughbruteforceorthroughtheabilitytoattract,persuade,orinsomewayinfluence,withanarrayofvariationsandpossibilitiesinbetweenthetwomethodologies.Thesubsequentdiscussionwillfocusstrictlyonthelattercategory.

Figure1:ThePowerSpectrum.Source:ValueofDissent.

TheConceptofSoftPowerIn1990,HarvardprofessorandlateradvisortotheClintonadministration,JosephNye,introducedanovelapproachtotheconceptofpower,aformofinfluencethathecalledsoftpower.Therewasnothingnewabouttheconcept,ithasbeenaroundforcenturies.FromLao-TzutoMachiavelli,historybooksarefilledwithexamplesofsoftpowerutilizationsasameansofachievingpoliticalgain.Nyewassimplythefirsttogiveitanameandembeditintoatheoreticalframework.

Wherehardpowercanforcetargetstatestodothingstheymaynotwanttootherwisedobythreatoruseofmilitaryforce,softpowercanattractorpersuadetargetstatesbymeansofculturalandideologicalinfluence,thusrenderingthreat/useofforceunnecessary.There

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isnoresistanceonbehalfofthetargetstatetosoftpowerbecausethetargetstatecanidentifywiththetransmittedgoalsandvalues.

Nyeproposesthatsoftpowerrestsonthreepillars;culture,politicalvalues,andforeignpolicy.Thefirst,culture,cantakeonseveraldifferentforms,includingsubcategoriesofhighandlowculture.Highculturereferstothefineartsandliterature,thingsthatappealtotheupperechelonsofsociety,whilemovies,music,andotherlikesofsucharelowcultureandappealtothegeneralmasses.Politicalvaluescanbetakentomeantheideasofsocietalgroupsandthedogmaticstructuresuponwhichtheyarebuilt.Foreignpolicyisthewayinwhichastatecarriesitselfinrelationtootherstatesandissuccessfulifitdisplaysahighdegreeofmoralauthorityandappearscredibleandjust.2Takingintoaccountthenatureofthesethreefactors,itisreasonabletoassumethattheinfluencewhichtheypurportedlybroadcasttakessometimetogrowtofruition.

CriticismsoftheConceptNye’sconcepthasoftenbeenmetwithharshcriticism.Ferguson,usingtheUnitedStatesasacasestudy,insiststhatitismilitarypowerandeconomiccapacitythatareentirelyresponsiblefortheUnitedStates’hegemonicstatus.Guns,people,money,andoilaretheprimemoversinglobalaffairs,notmoviesandCoca-Cola.3Matsudaarguesthatevenifastateisabletopenetrateanotherwithitsculturalprowess,politicalappeal,orconductintheinternationalarena,doesnotmeanthatthetargetstateisgoingtoacceptthosefactorsentirely.4Anotherproblemwiththeconceptofsoftpoweristheabsenceofanyuniformapproachtogaugeitseffectsoninternationaloutcomes.Atthistimeitisverydifficulttoknowwhenapplicationofsoftpowerhasoccurredandevenmoredifficulttoestablishwhetheritsapplicationhadbeensuccessful.Furthermore,softpowerisverydifficulttomeasureempirically.However,attemptsatmeasuringsoftpowerhavebeenmadeandwithsomedegreeofsuccess.TheSoftPower30Index(SP30fromhereon),aglobalrankingofsoftpower,isthemostrecentexample.Perhapsthegreatestconceptuallimitationofsoftpower,asclearlyevidencedintheSP30Index,isitsdemocratic/capitalistbias.Nyearguesthattherearetwoconditionsunderwhichattractionisgenerated;first,thestatemusthavepoliticalvaluesthatreflectuniversalvalues,andsecond,thestatemustconductforeignpoliciesbasedontheseuniversalvalues.Statesthatadheretobothfactorshavehighsoftpowerpotential,whereasstatesthatdonothavelowsoftpowerpotential.Throughoutmostofhiswork,Nyeinsiststhatliberaldemocraticvaluesarethemostattractive.AccordingtoNye’s

2JosephNye,“PublicDiplomacyandSoftPower”,inAnnalsofAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,vol.616,“PublicDiplomacyinaChangingWorld”,2008,pp.94-95.3NiallFerguson,“ThinkAgain:Power”,ForeignPolicy,Nov.2009,http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/4TakeshiMatsuda,SoftPoweranditsperils:USCulturalPolicyinEarlyPostwarJapanandPermanentDependency(US,StanfordUniversityPress:2007)pp.4-6.

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definition,countrieslikeChinaandRussiawillnotbeabletogeneratesoftpowerpotentialunlesstheyadoptliberalpracticesmodeledintheimageoftheWest.SignificanceoftheConceptThoughitseffectscannotalwaysbegaugedanditisnotanidealcandidateforempiricalobservation,theconceptofsoftpowerwarrantsattentionforitsemphasisonculturalprowessasameansofachievinggoalsratherthanbruteforceorevendiplomaticcoercion.Softpowerdeservesattentionbecauseitoffersanalternativetoviolenceandtensionintheglobalcommunity.Perhapstheproblemisthattoomanyinthefieldsofpoliticalscienceandinternationalrelationshaveshunnedawayfromtheconcept,thusbarringitfromthedueprocessthatmayotherwiseyieldsomeunexpectedresults.

Attheveryleast,Nye’sconceptdeservesadequateattentionbecausetheotherapproachestopower,internationally,haveresultedinlessthandesirableconsequences.Employmentofforcetosolveproblems(Afghanistan,Iraq,&Libya)hasproventobeabsolutelydisastrousforbothusersandtarget.Theconceptofsoftpower,thoughstillinitsinfancystages,offersatleastsomeglimmerofhopeforpeacefulresolutiontodangerousconflict.Inregardstoitsstrongpropagationofliberaldemocraticvalues,theframeworkthatisusedtomeasureit(seebelow)couldbemodifiedtoencompassstatesotherthanwesterndemocracies.

SP302015:EmpiricalMeasurementofSoftPowerTraditionalApproachestoMeasuringPowerHistorically,softpowerhasnotreceivedverymuchattentionfromthoseinthebusinessofcalculatingpower.Modelsdesignedtotestpowerfocusedspecificallyonhardpowercapabilities.TheydidencompasssomecategoriesthatNyewouldrefertoassourcesofsoftpower,forexample,economicsordomesticsocio-politicalfactors,butmainlyemphasizedvariableslikeweaponcapabilities,militarysize,andenergy.E.CliffordGermanarguedthatnationalpowercouldbecalculatedwiththeformulaN*(L+P+I+M),inwhichNisnuclearcapability,Lisland,Pispopulation,Iistheindustrialbase,andMismilitary.5JefferyHartthenattemptedtodefinethegeneralapproachestomeasuringpower,breakinghisdefinitioninto3approaches:1)controlovereventsandoutcomes,2)controloverresources,and3)controloveractors.6Hart’sapproachandsubsequenteffortsinmeasuringpowerhavenotbeenexclusivelylimitedtohardpower.Forexample,ComprehensiveNationalPower(CNP)measuresbothhardandsoftpower,takingintoaccountnaturalresources,population,economic

5German,“ATentativeEvaluationofWorldPower.”6Heart,“Threeapproachestothemeasurementofpowerininternationalrelations”

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performance,technology,politics,militarypower,culture,andeducation.7Howeverthismodelischallengedbyothersimilarindexesandthelackofcommonstandardhaspreventedeffortslikeincreasingthenumberoffactorsmeasuredorfurthercomplicatingthemeasurementsfromimprovingtheaccuracyofthiscalculation.8TheCompositeIndexofNationalCapability(CINC)focusesstrictlyonhardpowerandiscomprisedof6components:militarypersonnel,militaryexpenditures,ironandsteelproduction,primaryenergyconsumption,totalpopulation,andurbanpopulation.9

Figure2:BreakdownofPower.Source:VoiceofDissent

SP30MethodologyIfG-Monoclewasthefirstattempttoexclusivelymeasuresoftpowerinquantitativeterms.Itsucceededtoanunprecedentedextentinidentifyingandcategorizingvarioussourcesofsoftpowerthatdetermineacountry’spotentialabilitytoconvertsoftpowerintoforeignpolicyinfluence.Thesignificanceofthestudywasthatitcombinedobjectivemetricwithsubjectivedata.PriortotheIfG-Monocleattemptatmeasuringsoftpower,publicopinionpollswerethestandardgotoinsupportofsoftpowerpotential.However,publicopinionpollsonlycaptureperceptionandcannotprovideobjectiveassessmentofresources,realities,andactionsthatconstitutesoftpower.10SP30buildsonNye’spillarsofsoftpoweraswellastheIfG-Monoclesoftpowerindex.Itdiffersinthatittakesintoaccountthedigitaldiplomacycomponent,thatis,internetandinternetrelatedactivity,andtakesamoredetailedapproachtonormalizingandcomputingthedata.Thefinal(softpower)scoreisconsideredasfollows:combinedscoresofthe

7MichaelPillsbury,“ChinaDebatestheFutureSecurityEnvironment,”NationalDefenseUniversityPress,(January2000),https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/pills2/index.html8“TheRiseofChinaandItsPowerStatus,”ChinesJournalofInternationalPolitics,2006.9http://www.correlatesofwar.org/10JonathanMcClory“TheNewPersuaders:AnInternationalRankingofSoftPower,”InstituteforGovernment,2010.

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objectivesub-indices(government,culture,engagement,education,economics,anddigitaldiplomacy)andcombinedweightedscoresofthesubjectivepollingcategories(cuisine,technologicalproducts,friendliness,culture(notquantifiable),luxurygoods,foreignpolicy,andlivability)areaddedresultingina70-30objective-subjectiveindex.GovernmentFirst,thestudytakesintoaccountastate’sgovernmentbyassessingitspublicinstitutions,politicalvalues,andmajorpublicpolicyoutcomesandmeasuringindividualfreedoms,humandevelopment,societalviolence,andgovernmenteffectiveness.CultureThiscategoryisintendedtoshowtheattractivenessofacountry’scultureandmeasuresthetotalnumberofinternationaltourists,averagesumofmoneyspentpertourist,numberoffilmsappearingininternationalfilmfestivals,languageindexscore,annualmuseumattendance,andcreativegoodsexports.EnterpriseThiscategoryfocusesontheattractivenessofthecountry’sinternalmarketbytakingintoaccountfactorssuchasglobalpatentsfilled,WEFcompetitivenessscore,FDIasapercentageofGDP,globalinnovationindexscore,WorldBankDoingBusinessscore,andTransparencyInternational’scorruptionindexscore.EducationTheabilityofacountrytoattractinternationalstudentsisavitaltoolofpublicdiplomacyandastrongindicatorofacountry’ssoftpowerpotential.Educationismeasuredbythenumberofinternationalstudentsstudyinginthecountry,relevantuniversities,andacademicoutputofhighereducationinstitutions.

EngagementTheeconomicssub-indexcapturestherelativeattractivenessofacountry’seconomicmodelintermsofitscompetitiveness,capacityforinnovation,andabilitytofosterenterpriseandcommerce.Innovative/competitivemarketsareattractivetoforeigninvestorsandthusconstituteavitalinstrumentofsoftpowerprojection.Thestudyacknowledgesthateconomicscanbeattributedtohardpowerandexplicitlystatesthatthegoalhereisnottomeasureeconomicoutput,butrathertoassessvalue,quality,andoutcomesincludinginnovation,entrepreneurship,andcompetiveness.DigitalDiplomacyEveryothercategoryanalyzedinthestudyhasbeenchangedorinsomewayeffectedbytechnology,foreignpolicyincluded.Digitaldiplomacyfallsunderthetechnologyumbrella,andplaysanimportantroleincalculationofsoftpowerpotential.Theanalysiscapturestheextenttowhichcountrieshaveembracedtechnologyintwocategories:connectivitytothedigitalworldanduseofdigitaldiplomacy.1111"TheSoftPower30-AGlobalRankingofSoftPower"(PDF).Portland.July2015

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Figure3.Countrieswithhighestsoftpowerpotential,calculatedbasedontheframework

outlinedabove.Russiaisnotonthelist.Source:SP30Index.

Russia’sKeyBarrierstoEntrytoSP30DespitetheeffortsMoscowhasinvestedintoimprovingitsimageintheinternationalsphere,especiallyinwesterndemocracies,ithasbeenunabletosecureapositiononthe

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

1UnitedKingdom2Germany

3UnitedStates4France5Canada

6Australia7Switzerland

8Japan9Sweden

10Netherlands11Denmark

12Italy13Austria14Spain

15Finland16NewZealand

17Belgium18Norway19Ireland

20Korea,Rep.21Singapore22Portugal

23Brazil24Poland25Greece26Israel

27CzechRepublic28Turkey29Mexico30China

SogPowerPotenhal(%)

CountrieswithTopSogPowerPotenhal

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SP30Index.TheexclusionmaylikelybeattributedtoRussia’shostilitiesinUkraine,thesanctionsthatensued,andaseeminginabilitytoworkwiththeWestinsolvingtheSyriacrisiswhichinturnyieldedlowerrankingsineducation(numberofinternationalstudentsdecreased),engagement(numberofinternationalinvestorsdecreased),culture(numberoftouristsdecreased),andenterprise(onaccountofRussia’swidespreadanddeeplypenetratingcorruption).

Figure4:CorruptionIndex2006-15,Russiahasthepoorestscoreoverthecourseof10years,itappearstobemorecorruptthanTurkey,Mexico,andChina,thelastthreepositionsonthe

SP30Index.Source:TransparencyInternational.

AnotherfactorstandinginthewayofRussia’sinclusionintoSP30isitsstrictcensorship.Television,Russia’sprimarysourceofinformation,isamediumalmostentirelymonopolizedbythegovernment.Non-governmentaffiliatedstationshavelittleroomtonavigateinthespectrumofpublictelevision,constantlyunderthreatofbeinglabeledforeignagentsandimpositionofunreasonabletaxesthatcomewithsuchlabels.Theinternet,notaspervasiveastelevision,radio,ortalkingtoothers,butnonethelessaconsiderablesourceofinformationforRussia,isalsoheavilycensored.

Inadditiontorampantcorruptionandcensorship,otherinternalfactorsthatblockRussia’ssoftpowercultivationcapacityincludehighhomiciderates,unemployment,lowacademicoutput,homelessness,socialinequality,andinstability.Toappearattractiveabroadandinfluenceinternationalactorswithoutmucheffort,asproposesthetraditionaldefinitionofsoftpower,acountryneedstoprovideconditionsinwhichcitizenscanprosper,thrive,and

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Russia UK UnitedStates Germany Turkey Mexico China

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create.Russiasuffersfromamultitudeofproblemsthatpreventitscitizenryfromprosperingandcreating.SeePolitovskaya,Nemtsov,Dashiwa,andMilovforindepthanalysisofRussia’sdomesticproblems.12

Figure5TelevisionisRussia'sprimarySourceofInformation.Source:WorldValuesSurvey

Figure6:Russia'sinternetiscensored.Source:FreedomHouse

12SeeAnnaPolitovskaya,Putin’sRussia,KarrenDashiwa,Putin’sKleptocracy,BorisNemtsovandVladimirMilov,“Putin:What10YearsofPutinHaveBrought.”

7% 3%

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PrimarySourcesofInformahoninRussia

DailyNewspaper PrintetMagazines TVNews

Radio Internet Talkingtoothers

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DespiteRussia’sobviousdomesticproblems,worthconsideringisthefactthattheSP30Index,notunliketheexplanationofsoftpowerprovidedbyJosephNye,suffersfromalackofobjectivity.FactorsincludedintheSP30Indexarebiasedinfavorofwesterndemocracies/capitaliststates,thiscanbeinferredfromthefactthatsub-indiceslikeindividualfreedomsandafocusontheattractivenessofacountry’sinternalmarketareusedascriteriatomeasureastate’ssoftpower.AcountryofRussia’scaliber,clearlynotdemocraticandnotknownforpromotionofindividualfreedoms,isinherentlyrestrictedfromenteringtheSP30.

SoftPowerAccordingtotheKremlinPerhapsRussiansoftpowercapacityshouldbemeasuredaccordingtoadifferentscaleanddefinition.Afterall,shapingthepreferencesofothers,whichistheultimategoalofsoftpower,canbedoneinavarietyofways,itdoesnotnecessarilyneedtobeattraction.Abilitytopersuadeandinfluencecanalsohaveanimpactonshapingthepreferencesofothers,itissimplyadifferentmeanstoachievingsimilarends.

Historically,RussiahasalwaysprideditselfonbeingdifferentfromtheWest.Russiahastakenitsownpathtomodernity,politics,religion,culture,etc.ThecaseofRussiansoftpowerisnodifferent.Insteadofcombatinginternalproblemsinordertoincreasesoftpowerpotential,Putin’sadministrationhasfocuseditseffortsonpublicdiplomacyaimedattheWest.Theyhavedonesofortworeasons;firsttoincreaseRussia’simageinwesterndemocraciesandsecondtoinfluenceforeignpolicyofthosedemocraciestowardRussia.

ThefollowingsectionsarededicatedtotheexplorationoftheKremlin’sinterpretationofsoftpoweranditssubsequentemploymentintheglobalsphere.Specifically,Iaimto1)examineUSSR’ssoftpowerpotentialasopposedtothatofmoderndayRussia2)determinePutin’sdefinitionofsoftpower,3)highlighttechniquesemployedbyPutin’sadministrationinexercisingthesoftpoweroffensiveabroad,and4)makerecommendationsastohowRussia’ssoftpowerpotentialassessmentcanbeimproved.

SoftPowerandtheUSSRVanHerpenarguesthatuntilrecently,theKremlinhasnotpaidverymuchattentiontotheconceptofsoftpower.Nye’scornerstoneworkonthesubjectofsoftpower-BoundtoLead-isyettobetranslatedintoRussian,anduntil2000,theconceptwasnotreferencedanywhereintheEastViewUniversalDatabase,thelargestrepositoryofjournalsandnewspapersavailableintheRussianlanguage.

Russia’sevidentlackofconcernforsoftpowerdoesnotimplythatRussiahashadnoexperiencewithit.Onthecontrary,theSovietUnionwasapowerhouseofsoftpowerdissemination.Nyeexplainsthatthedynamicforceofsoftpowerisattraction.DespitethenegativepositionitoccupiesinthecollectiveandindividualmemoriesoftheWest,the

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SovietUnionappealedtoandattractedmanyintheinternationalcommunity.EventhoseintheWestcannotdenythefactthattheSovietUnionhadsomedistinctiveadvantages.

“TheSovietUnionofferedanalternativetothebourgeoiscivilizationandquiteanumberofpeoplewouldlongviewitasarisingidealsociety,forwhichtheywerereadytosacrificetheirlives.”13SovietwomenhadmoreopportunitiesinemploymentandpoliticsthendidthoseintheWest.Thegovernmentactivelysponsoredartisticandculturalpursuits;filmsoftheSovietUnionreceivedhighpraisebytheinternationalcommunity.Thestatelikewisepromotedadvancementsinscience,technology,andspaceexploration;launchingYuriGagarinintothecosmicrealmssetanaspirationalinternationalmark.Educationwasfreeandofaconsiderablequality.TheSovietUnionidentifiedwithpopulardecolonizationmovementsinthirdworldcountriesandinvestedheavilyintoforeignaid.

Yetthewellofsoftpowerbegantodryupandattheendofthesixtiesplungedintoasteadydecline.Thebeginningofthedeclinewasmarkedin1968,byanuprisingbywhatwasthenCzechoslovakia.AlexanderDubchek,aSlovakpolitician,attemptedtoblenddemocracyandsocialism,easingcentralplanning,censorship,andsecretpoliceactivity.NotlongafterDubchekpulledhisdemocraticstunt,SovietUnionsoldiersoccupiedCzechoslovakiaandputanendtotheproposedreforms,crushingthedreamsandshatteringtheillusionsofthosewhobelievedinthecommunismideal.Ashistoryprogressedthroughtheseventiesandintotheeighties,advancementsonnearlyallaforementionedfrontshalted,andtheSovietsystemstagnatedundertheweightofitsshortcomingsuntil1990,whenitfinallycollapsed.

TheSovietUnionhadanideologythatresonatedwiththethirdworldstruggleandtheworkingclassoftheWest,asortofmoralinfluenceforthosewhodidnotexperienceSovietcommunismfromwithin.ItappealedtoEuropeans,particularlythoseinFrance,whofoughtagainsttheNazisintheSecondWorldWar.ItappealedtothecountriesofAfricabecauseitheldthepromiseofdecolonization.ItappealedtoLatinAmericaaswell,namelyCuba,whosecommoditiestheSovietUnionpurchasedatunreasonablyhighprices.TheRussiaoftodayresembleslittleoftheSovietUnionintermsofideologyandappeal.14

Putin’sInfoWarTheprevailingnotioninRussiahasbeenthattheWest,especiallytheUnitedStates,isactivelyconductingapropagandacampaignagainstitforthepurposesofitscontainment.EvidenceusedbytheRussianelitestojustifythissuppositioncomesinformoflargelynegativeinternationalpublicopinionofRussia.ToanyonefamiliarwithRussianpoliticalhistory,itshouldcomeasnosurprisethatPutindoesnotseetheRussia’snegativeimageintheworldasaresultofimmanentflawsoftheRussianpoliticalsystem,butinsteadblameswesterngovernmentsfordistortingglobalperceptionsofRussiabypresentingtheworldwithinaccurateandmisconstruedinformationaboutthecountry.13AlexanderLukin,“TheWestandPost-SovietRussia,”RussiainGlobalAffairs.http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_1188614JosephS.NyeJr.,TheFutureofPower(NewYork:PublicAffairs,2011),168-169.

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Inamanifestoforhisthirdpresidency,publishedintheMoskovskieNovostiin2012,Putinaddressestheconceptofsoftpower,“…acomplexofinstrumentsandmethodstoachieveforeignpolicyobjectiveswithouttheuseofweapons,whichincludetheuseofinformationandothermeans.”15Hegoesontosaythatcertainentitiesskilledintheartofsoftpower,namelyforeignagentsdisguisedasNGOsoperatingwithinRussia,havemisusedtheconceptfornefariousendsforfartoolong,andthatitistimeforRussiatodevelop“itsownsoftpowerarsenalinordertoprevailinthiszero-sumpowergame.”16Information,declaredPutin,willbetheprimaryweaponinthisnewstruggle.

Aparallelcanbedrawn,thoughnotentirelysymmetrical,betweenthestagnatingUSSRofthe1980sandtheEuropeanUnionof2016.TheideaoftheEuropeanUnionislosingpopularityamongmanyEuropeannations,thisisconfirmedbythefactthatthepoliticalfarrightisontheriseallthroughouttheregion.Inthelate1980s,fewwithintheSovietUnionreallybelievedintheideaofcommunism.TheinternaldisintegrationwasenhancedbycreepingwesternizationthatsnuckunderneaththeironcurtaininformofAmericanclothingcigarettes,music,film,etc.

AnargumentcanbemadethatRussiaiscurrentlytryingtoexertasimilartypeofinfluenceontheEuropeanUnion.However,Russiaisnotdoingsobyproducingpopulartechnologicalartifacts,worldrenownedfilmandmusic,ormarketingitspoliticalvalues.RussiaistryingtoinfluencetheWestbydirectingitsinformationaloffensive,definedbytheKremlinassoftpower,againsttheconceptoftheEUandreinforcingconditionsinwhichrightwingmovementscangrow.Thus,RussiahopestospeedupthedisintegrationoftheEuropeancommunity.

NewWaveofSoftPowerEmployedbyPutin’sAdministrationThoughtheconceptofsoftpowerwasnotofficiallychristenedinRussiauntilPutin’s2012MoskovskieNovistyarticle,thecreationofinstitutionsandfirmsaimedatpromotingRussianviewsandimprovingthelargelynegativeinternationalperceptionofRussiastartedsomewherearoundthebeginningofPutin’ssecondpresidencyinthemid-2000s.AsRussia’sbehaviorintheinternationalarenabecamemorealarmingtowesterndemocracies,theKremlin’ssoftpoweroffensiveintensified.

FarRightPoliticalCoalitions

Russiahasdeployedanarrayoffinancialmeanstoinfluencewesternpolicyandthishasincludedextendingdonationsandprovidingfeesforservicesorloansto(rightwing)politicians.Thoughthispracticehasbeenverydifficulttomonitor,itisinfactahighlycontroversialtopicinFranceandpresumablyUKandGermanyaswell.Itcomesasno

15VladimirPutin,“RossiyaImenyayshchiysyamir”(RussiaandtheChangingWorld),MoskovskieNovosti(February,2012).1616Putin,“RossiyaImenyayshchiysyamir”

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surprisethatrecipientsofthismoneyarepoliticiansopposedtoNATOandtheEuropeanUnion,“twoinstitutionsdefendingthevaluesofacertainEuropeanandtrans-AtlanticorderthattheKremlinseesasopposedtoitsinterests.”17Someoftheseloanshavebeenchanneledthroughwestern-basedbutRussian-affiliatedbanks.RecipientsoftheseloanshavealsobeenwelcomedinRussiatogivepaidtalkswheretheydefendsecuritypoliciesmoreinlinewithRussia’sthanwiththeirowngovernments.18Payingforwesternsupportdoesnotexactlycoincidewiththetraditionaldefinitionofsoftpower.Moreoften,thesupportiscostlessandvoluntarybytheweakerside.However,Russia’slackofadherencetothetraditionaldefinitionshouldatthispointbewellnoted.Certainly,theKremlinunderstandsthelimitationsofitssoftpowerinthetraditionalsense;PutiniscleverenoughtounderstandthatpeopleintheWestarenotjustgoingtogoalongwithMoscow’sagenda.Instead,Putin’sadministrationattemptstoexploitthefear,uncertainty,andpopulismevolvingincountriesoftheEuropeanUnionbysupportingactorswhohaveralliedtheircampaignsaroundthoseveryfactors.ThecoalitionofpartiesworkingwiththeKremlinanddirectlyorindirectlyreceivingmoneyfromitisnotstrictlylimitedtofarrightorganizations/movements;regionalseparatistmovementsareonMoscow’spayrollaswell.Ideologyisnotthecommongroundhere.Rather,theseeminglyunlikelycooperationisdrivenbyoppositiontoEurope’scurrentforeignandsecuritypolicies,especiallyastheypertaintoNATO,theEuropeanUnion,RussiaandUkraine.“Intheirzerosumworldview,anythingthatweakensNATOortheEuropeanUnionorgovernmentsthatsupporttheseinstitutionsprovidesanadvantagetoRussia.”19TheFrenchConnectionTheFrenchNationalFront,undertheleadershipofMarineLePen,received9millionEuroforthe2014electioncampaignfromaRussian-Czechbank.LePenstatedthatthepoliticalorganizationwasforcedtoseekforeignfinancialaidonaccountofthefactthatFrenchbankshaverefusedtoextendhercredit.ThebankthroughwhichthecreditlinewasestablishedbelongstoGenadiyTimichensko,abusinessmanwhoiscurrentlyontheU.S.andEUsanctionslist.LePeninsiststhatthereisnothingillegalnorunorthodoxaboutthesetypesofmonetarytransactionsanddeniesthattheextensionofcreditisanactoflobbyismonbehalfofRussia.Asfarasthepartyisconcerned,thereisnolinkbetweenthecreditingbankandPutin.Furthermore,NationalFrontrepresentativesinsistthatthecreditwillberepaidinfull.20

17RichardBenyon,“Corruption-SecurityNexus,”NATOReport2016,NATOPA.18RichardBenyon,“Corruption-SecurityNexus,”NATOReport2016,NATOPA.19RichardBenyon,“Corruption-SecurityNexus,”NATOReport2016,NATOPA.20“FrenchUltra-RightReceives9millionEurofromRussia”BBCNews,2014.http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2014/11/141124_ru_s_russia_front_national_loan_france

17

PoliticalscientistStanislavBelkovskidisagrees,claimingthattheFrenchNationalFrontisnotacommercialorganizationandwillnotbegeneratingthetypeofrevenueneededtopaybacktheloan.HebelievesthatthebankdoeshaveanaffiliationwithMoscow,andeventhoughthereisnowaytolegallyproveit,theKremlinhadsanctionedthecreditextension.HearguesthatthisisaformofendorsementonbehalfofMoscowofideaspropagatedbytheNationalFront,aEuroscepticnationalistpartythathasopposedtheEUsinceitstreatybecamelawin1993.21FrenchmagazineNouvelObervateurhasonmultipleoccasionsexploredthelinkbetweentheNationalFrontandtheKremlin,suggestingthatLePenisaregularatfunctionsheldintheRussianembassyinParis.22LeadersoftheFrenchNationalFronthaveshownsupportforPutinandhisbehaviorintheinternationalarena,includingtheannexationofCrimea.LePeninsistedthattheresultsofthereferendumonthestatusofCrimeawereimpossibletodispute,whileherfatherJean-MariLePen,founderoftheNationalFrontinFrance,claimedthat“CrimeawasalwaysapartoftheRussianEmpire.”BelkovskiconcludesthatthegenerousloantoLePen’spartyisarewardforpromotingpro-RussianinterestsinFranceandopposingthemembershipintheEuropeanUnion.23Inearly2016,thepartyofficiallyconfirmedthatitwouldbeseekingattheveryminimum27millionEuroforthe2017presidentialandparliamentarycampaigns.ThepartyishopingtoonceagainreceivehelpfromRussia.24In2015,MarineLePensuccessfullyoversawthecreationoftheEuroscepticfarrightfactionintheEuropeanParliamentcalledEuropeofNationsandFreedom(ENF).Membersofthisgrouprelentlesslypushpro-RussianagendaandsupportinterestsoftheKremlin,meanwhiledenyinganyaffiliationofinterestbetweentheirrespectiveorganizationsandMoscow.EMFisatthistimeonly5percentoftheMEP(751),butalreadyitgatheredmorethan25members,thussuccessfullysecuringpreviouslyunavailablerightsandpowers,aswellasasignificantbudget.25ItisverypossiblethatRussia’spopularityisincreasingallacrosstheEuropeanpoliticalrightevenwithoutfundingfromMoscow.Putin’sleadershipskillsandRussia’sdefyingbehaviorareviewedasattractivebyfringepartiesdisillusionedwiththeproEU,propoliticalcorrect,liberalisttendenciesoftheWesttoday.Andnotonlytheright;leftistpartiessuchasSyrizainGreece,alsohaveleaningstowardRussia.TheyopposetheexpansionofeconomicsanctionsagainstRussiaandwhilebelievingthatremainingin

21SashaPolakow-Suransky,“TheruthlesslyeffectiverebrandingofEurope’snewfarright,”TheGuardian,(November2016).https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/01/the-ruthlessly-effective-rebranding-of-europes-new-far-right22“FrenchUltra-Right…”BBCNews23“FrenchUltra-Right…”BBCNews24YuriSafronov,“DoRussiansReallyWanttheNationalFront?”NovayaGazeta,(February2016),https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/02/17/67485-hotyat-li-russkie-natsfront25“Europe’sNewPro-PutinCoalition:ThePartiesofNo,”InstituteofModernRussia,(August2015),http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/world/2368-europes-new-pro-putin-coalition-the-parties-of-no

18

NATOisinGreece’sbestinterest,haveexpressedfrustrationwiththeorganization.Anotherleftwingpro-RussianpartyisSpain’sPodemos.26AstensionswithintheEuropeanUniongrow,agentsinterestedinpreservingtheEuropeancommunityaredesperatelylookingtoexposewhattheyseeasRussia’snefariousinvolvement.However,nothingoutsidetheparametersoflegalityhasyetbeendiscovered.“TheRussiancampaignexistsinagreyarea,operatingcovertly-andoftenlegally-toavoidpoliticalblowback,butwiththeclearaimofweakeningwesternwilltofight,maturingdoubtsoverNATO,theEU,Tridentandeconomicsanctions.”27WesternPR/LobbyingGroupsAnotherexampleoftheKremlin’ssoftpoweroffensiveisthehiringofwesternPRandlobbyingfirmstoinfluencewesterndecisionmakersandimproveRussia’simageabroad.VanHerpenreferstothispracticeas“reputationlaundering.”28Non-governmentalorganizationssuchaschurches,businessgroups,andlobbyingfirmscanhaveasignificantinfluenceinshapingnationalpolicies.Thelobbyinggroupsareofparticularinfluence,becausetheyemployformerpoliticianswhohavedirectlinkstothepoliticalestablishment.By2007,“Moscowha[d]alreadyenlistedextremelyinfluentiallobbyists[…]includingformerU.S.SecretariesofStateHenryKissingerandJamesBaker,whohasworkedasaconsultantforGazpromandRussia’spipelinemonopolyTransneft.”29

In2006,RussiahadyetanotherdisagreementwithUkraine(historically,thishasbeenareoccurringphenomenon)andasaresultcutoffitsgassupply.Inthesameyear,Moscowbannedgaypridemarchesandsubjectedhomosexualstorepeatattacksbyangrynationalists.Todealwiththebadinternationalreputation,PutinhiredaNewYork-basedfirmcalledKetchumforatotalof$2milliondollars.Thefirmthrewtogethersomepodcasts,invitedsomewesternjournaliststoSt.Petersburg,andproclaimedthatithadsuccessfullyshowedRussia’sdemocraticnaturetotheWest.30GallupdatasuggeststhattheoverallpositiveopinionofRussiaintheU.S.actuallydecreasedfrom2006to2007,buttheKremlinappearedtobesatisfiedanyway.In2007,RussiarenewedthecontractwithKetchumandsoonafterPutinwasnamedbyTimeMagazineas“PersonoftheYear.”Between2006and2009,Ketchumanditsaffiliate,theWashingtonGroup,werepaidsomewherearound$14millionfortheirservices.26“IntheKremlin’sPocket,”TheEconomist,(February2016),http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21643222-who-backs-putin-and-why-kremlins-pocket?fsrc=scn/fb/te/pe/ed/inthekrlemlinspocket27PeterFoster,“RussiaaccusedofClandestineFundingofEuropeanPartiesasU.S.ConductsMajorReviewofVladimirPutin’sStrategy,”TheTelegraph,(January2016),http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/12103602/America-to-investigate-Russian-meddling-in-EU.html28MarcelVanHerpen,Putin’sPropagandaMachine(Rowman&Littlefield,2016)29GregoryFeifer,“WhytheRussiaSpyStoryReallyMatters,”RadioFreeEuropeRadioLiberty,(July2010),http://www.rferl.org/a/Why_The_Russia_Spy_Story_Really_Matters/2095515.html30JamesKirchick,“PravdaonthePotomac,”NewRepublic(February18,2009).

19

Figure2:U.S.PublicOpinionofRussiacontinuedtodeclineafterKetchum’sserviceswere

retained.31

Inadditiontohiringinternationallobbyingfirms,theKremlinhasorganizedinternationalforumsatwhichexpertsinthefieldsofpoliticalscience,internationalrelations,andspecificallyRussiacanmeetwithRussiancounterpartsandenjoyunabridgeddialogue.OnesuchforumistheValdaiDiscussionClub.Thefirstmeetingwasorganizedin2004andservedthreeprimaryobjectives:itcreatedanillusionofopennessandfreespeech,allowedRussianelitestonetworkwithwesternintellectuals,andatthesametimeservedasatestinggroundforKremlin’sfutureforeignpolicyadvancements.IntellectualswereencouragedtocriticizePutin’sadministrationandprovidefeedbackastohowitcouldperformbetter.Theywerealsoencouragedtoaskdaringquestion.32

OnetheoryisthatPutintestedthegroundstoseejusthowfarhecouldpushtheWest,basedonquestionsandresponsesprovidedbytheunsuspectingguests.AnotheristhattheValdaisessionallowedforthepossibilitytofinetunetheKremlin’sdevelopinginformationoffensive.Inbothcases,PutinandhisentouragehadsuccessfullyestablishedconnectionswithrepresentativesfromEuropeandtheUnitedStates.ThoughmanyinternationalobserversfelttheconferencewasdistastefulandwroteitoffasablatantpropagandaattemptbytheKremlin,participantslefttheconferencefeelinglikeabreakthroughinworldpracticehadbeenmade.33Sincethen,ValdaiClubhasbecomeanannual,sometimesevenmonthly,eventthatincludesparticipantsnotonlyfromprestigiouswesterninstitutionssuchasHarvard,Georgetown,UniversityCollegeLondon,andtheLondonSchoolofEconomics,butfromallovertheworld.Someothernotableacademic

31http://www.gallup.com/poll/1642/russia.aspx32VanHerpen33TimWall,“Putin’sDeGaulleMoment,”TheMoscowNews(November14,2011)http://www.russialist.org/archives/russia-putin-degaulle-moment-756.php

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establishmentsrepresentedatValdaiincludeCairoUniversity,TelAvivUniversity,andtheUniversityofTehran.

PurchasingSpaceinWesternNewspapersAnothersoftpoweroffensivewasinitiatedin2007when“RussiabeyondtheHeadlines”firstmadeitsentranceintotheglobalmediafront.ItconsistsofeightpagenewspapersupplementsbyTheRussianPaperandiscalledRussianWorld.Thesupplementappearsonceamonthinanumberofinfluentialwesternpapers,includingTheNewYorkTimesandTheWashingtonPostintheUnitedStates,TheTelegraminEngland,LeFigaroinFrance,ElPaisinSpain,RepubblicainItaly,andSuddeutscheZeitunginGermany.Thesupplementsarecharacterizedbyalayoutthatisverymuchsimilartotheactualpaperandafocusonawidearrayofthemesuntaintedbypro-Russianpropaganda.Inmanyinstances,theKremlinisactuallycriticized.34

TheintentoftheRussianWorldpublicationistoconvincetheaudiencetheyarereadingawesternpaper.Thisisdonefortworeasons:first“todiminish[theaudience’s]cognitivedissonancebyadaptingthecontentsandthestyleofthearticlestofittheir‘critical’westernmind”,andthentoindirectlychannelinformationtothebroaderpublicviatheindividualswhotakethetimetoreadtheeightpagesegment.ThearticlescriticaloftheKremlin,forexample,createtheideathatRussiaisaliberalsocietywherecensureofthegovernmentisaperfectlyacceptablepractice,anideathatsitswellinthemindsofwesternreaders.35

ThemostblatantintrusionintotheU.S.newspaperscenemayhavecomeonSeptember11,2013.Americanaudiencesmayrecallanop-edpennedbyVladimirPutininTheNewYorkTimesthatridiculedtheUnitedStatesforinterveninginvariousconflictsaroundtheglobeandurgedtheObamaadministrationtoabstainfrominvolvementinSyria.Putin,emergingasthevoiceofpeaceandreason,outlinedthedisastrousconsequencesthatwouldensueinthewakeofAmericaninvolvementinSyria.36AccordingtoTheGuardian,thecontentwasbroughttoTheNewYorkTimesbynoneotherthanKetchum,thePRgrouprecruitedbyPutin.

Putin’sstuntinTheNewYorkTimesfallsmoreinlinewithNye’sdefinitionofsoftpowerthanpayingoffEuropeannationalists.Inthiscase,thediplomatsarebypassedentirelyandthemessageisaimeddirectlyattheAmericanpublic.Thisisdonewiththeintentofconnectingwiththosereaderswhowanttoavoidinvolvementinquestionablemilitaryactivities,whichintherecentpasthavecosttheAmericanpublicdearly.EvenpeoplewhodonotmuchcareforPutinorRussiamayfindthismessageintunewiththeirbeliefs.At34VanHerpen35VanHerpen36VladimirPutin,“APleaforCautionfromRussia,”TheNewYorkTimes,(September,2013),http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.

21

theveryleast,itleavesasubconsciousimprintofthenotionthatonsomelevel,AmericansandRussiansarenotsodifferent.

ForeignLanguageNewsChannelsPrimeexamplesofRussia’sinstitutionalizationofsoftpowerarethebroadcastedEnglishlanguagenewssourcesprovidingexpertdiscussiononmatterspertinentintheWest.TheseincludeRussiaToday(RT),SputnikNews,andRia-Novosty.ThegoalofthesenewsoutletsistoimproveRussia’simageabroadandtostressRussia’spositivepointsandmodernizationefforts.Atthesametime,thenetworksreportonthenegativesideoftheWest,coveringtopicssuchhomelessness,unemployment,andhumanrightsviolations.

ThemostpopularofthesechannelsisbyfarRussiaToday(RT).ItoffersprograminginmultiplelanguagesincludingEnglish,Spanish,Arabic,andHindu.RTenjoysoneofthelargestaudiencebasesofanyglobalnewsbroadcasteranditsYouTubechannelwasthefirstinhistorytoreceiveoverabillionhits.AsofDecember20,2016,RThasover4billionhits.37ThechannelmarketsitselfasanalternativetoAlJazeeraandViceNewsandmaintainsanedgyprofilewithprovocativetaglineslike“questionmore”and“questioneverything.”Ithasanannualbudgetofover$300million.38

JuliaIoffe,writingfortheColumbianJournalismReview,arguesthatthechannel“wasconceivedasasoft-powertooltoimproveRussia’simageabroad,tocountertheanti-RussianbiastheKremlinsawinthewesternmedia.”Russia,shecontinues“…isstilldesperatelytryingtofendoffstereotypesofitself-theendemiccorruption,thewhimsicalautocracyofthestate-thathavekeptmuchforeigncapital,andmanyRussianémigrés,fromreturning.”39

WashingtonPostinsiststhat“RTisimplementingasophisticatedYouTubeprogramthattargetsspecificmessagesatwell-definedaudiences.”40Analysisof2,695videosduringaonemonthperiodin2015revealedthat75%ofRTAmericavideosand81%ofviewswereU.S.centered,whileinEurope(RTFranceandRTGermany),Ukrainecoverageandanti-EUprogramingdominatedthestream.AnalysissuggestedthattheAmericanandUKchannelswerelesspopularthanthoseinEurope,leadingtheauthorstoconcludethatthenetworkhadgivenuptargetingthoseaudiencesspecifically,butnottheinternationalEnglishlanguageaudience.41Thestudyisfartoosmalltoleadtoanydefinitiveconclusions,butitdoesrevealthatthemessagesRTissendingareregionspecific.

37Rt.com38RobertOrttung,ElizabethNelson,AnthonyLivshen,“HowRussiaTodayisusingYouTube,”TheWashingtonPost,(March23,2015),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/23/how-russia-today-is-using-youtube/?utm_term=.fad45a1e4b6239JuliaIoffe,“WhatisRussiaToday?”ColumbiaJournalismReview,(October2010),http://www.cjr.org/feature/what_is_russia_today.php?page=all40Orttung,Nelson,Livshen,“HowRussiaTodayisusingYouTube”41Orttung,Nelson,Livshen,“HowRussiaTodayisusingYouTube”

22

Figure7:YouTubeChannelSubscribers.Source:YouTube.

IfthereremainsanydoubtastowhoownsRT,Putinhimselfclearsupanyambiguity.Inaninterviewwiththenetwork,Putinconfessesthatin2005,heenvisionedacompetentinformationoutletthatwouldnotonlyprovideunbiasedcoverageofeventsinRussiaandintheworld,but“trytobreaktheAnglo-Saxonmonopolyontheglobalinformationstreams.”42HeclaimsintheinterviewthatthechannelwasneverintendedtobeamouthpiecefortheRussiangovernment,butconsideringthefactthatitisfundedbyMoscowcannothelpbutreflecttosomedegreeitsofficialposition.43

SputnikNewsisanother,lesspopular,Kremlinownedinternationalnewsoutlet.Theoutletfocusesonglobalpoliticsandeconomicsandgenerallycaterstonon-Russianaudiences.Sputnik’snewswireserviceruns24/7,operatesinover30languagesandhasregionaleditorialofficesinWashington,Cairo,Beijing,London,andEdinburgh.44LikeRTandRia-Novosti,anotherKremlinsponsoredcounterpartservingasimilarpurpose,SputnikNewshasbeenaccusedoffabrication,disinformation,andbias.

WellrespectedandoutspokenRussianjournalist,filmdirector,andpolitician,AlexanderNevrozov,dismissesRT,Sputnik,andotherRussiansourcesofmassinformationaimedat42MaxFisher,“InCaseYouWeren’tClearonRussiaToday’sRelationshipwithMoscow,PutinClearsitUp,”TheWashingtonPost,(July2013),https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/06/13/in-case-you-werent-clear-on-russia-todays-relationship-to-moscow-putin-clears-it-up/43Fisher44Sputniknews.com

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spreadingKremlinpropagandaabroadasjournalisticallyinadmissibletrash.InaNovember2016interviewforRadioStationExoMoskvi(EchoofMoscow),Nevrozovdiscussespropaganda,classifyingitintocategoriesofsuccessfulandunsuccessful.TheSMIsMoscowutilizestopushitsagendaabroad,accordingtoNevrozov,undoubtedlyfallinthelattercategory.HereferstoRT,Sputnik,andtheRussianWorldnewspapersupplementsasblatantexamplesofunskillful,amateurpropagandaofthepoorestandmostindigestiblequality.45Authoritarian/ConservativeAppealAbundantevidencesuggeststhatRussiaistryingtoincreaseitssoftpowergloballybybuyingorcreatinginternationalnewsoutlets,keepingwesternnationalistsontheirpayroll,andengaginginallmannersofnon-traditionalsoftpowercultivation.YetRussia’sutilizationofsoftpowerstretchesbeyondtheobviousefforts.TheKremlinhasanappealthatresonateswithauthoritarianleadersandconservativepublicsworld-wide;theseareimportantfactorsthatfutureresearchonRussiansoftpowermustabsolutelyaddress.

Putinisastrong,authoritativefigurewhodoesashepleases,utterlydisregardingtherulesandstandardsoftheinternationalcommunity.ItisnotdifficulttoseewhyleaderslikeBasharal-AssadandRodrigoDuterteseekPutin’spatronageandgravitateclosertoRussia.However,itishardertoexplainwhyordinarycitizens,evenincountriessuchastheUnitedStates,mightidentifywithRussia.Nyearguedthatliberaldemocraticvaluesaretheprimarydrivingfactorsintheabilitytoattract.Yethisemphasisontheliberal/democraticaspectsservesasagreatobstructiontoevaluatingattractionofnon-democraticstates.

PutinhasbeenverycriticalofLGBTrights;inRussiaLGBTrightsdonotexist.Hehasmadehimselfouttobeastrongproponentofthetraditionalfamilysystemandhas,withthehelpoftheRussianlawmakingapparatus,successfullybannedanythingthatisevenmildlyinterpretedashomosexual.WesternmediadenouncedPutinforsuchactions,butmanyintheWest,betheyconservative,religious,orotherwiseprejudicedagainstnon-traditionalvalues,applaudedPutin’sdecision.Thisparticularpieceoflegislationdemonstratesthatsoftpowerdoesnothavetostemfromliberalbeliefsandcanverywellbeproducedbyconservativevalues.

ConclusionsandRecommendationsIfRussiaistobejudgedinaccordancewiththeSP30Index,itwillalwaysfail,becausetheindexisbiasedanddoesnotcapture“non-western”formsofsoftpower.YetRussiaisstillsoughtoutbycountrieslikeVenezuela,Vietnam,andSyria,thereforeitdoeshavesomeattraction.HereitisimportanttolookatthehistoryofthesestatesasitpertainstotheSovietUnion.Itisalsoimportanttolookatthepoliticalsystemsinthosestatesandthe45AlexanderNevrozov,PersonallyYours,(November2016),http://echo.msk.ru/programs/personalnovash/1878800-echo/

24

valuesofthepeoplethatresidewithinthem.IntheeyesoftheWestandthecorrespondingSP30Index,Russiadoesnotholdverymuchsoftpowerpotential,butifpublicopinionisanyindicatorofsoftpowerinfluence,thenRussiaisquiteabitmoreaffluentinChina,Vietnam,andother“lessdemocratic”states.Amoreencompassingempiricalstudyofsoftpowershouldtakeintoaccounthistorybetweenthecomparedstates,language,religion,andvalues.

Russiacanincreaseitssoftpowerpotentialaccordingtothetraditional,westerndefinition,butitwillhavetoconcentrateitseffortsoninternalissueslikecorruption,unemployment,andgeneralstagnationofRussianculture.Atthepresent,majorityoftheRussianpopulationralliesbehindPutin,andthatsupportiscrucialtohispower.However,ifthesituationathomecontinuestoworsen,supportforPutinwilllikelydecline,andthatmeanshisdomesticlegitimacywilldecline.Iflegitimacycomesintoquestion,PutinandhiscircleofMedvedevsmayfindthemselvesinapositionwhereinternationalinfluenceisentirelyoutsidetherealmofpossibility.

TheeffectsofthesoftpoweroffensivelaunchedbyPutinatthedawnofhisthirdpresidencyremaintobeseen.Itseemsthathiseffortshavebeenopportunistinnature,exploitingtheweaknessoftheEuropeanUnionandpoliticalinstabilityelsewhereintheWest,andsofartheyhavebeenrathersuccessful.WiththetriumphofTrumpinthe2016UnitedStatesPresidentialElectionsandMarineLePen’sincreasingpopularityinFrance,itseemsthattheseedsoffrustrationexploitedbythepoliticalrightarebeginningtocometofruition.

Russiawantsthepoliticalrighttoberepresentedinthegovernmentsofwesterndemocracies,sothattheywouldpushpro-Russian,anti-EU/anti-NATOforeignpolicy,likeliftingsanctionsagainstRussia.Anotherreasonforthesupportistodestabilizesocietyandpoliticalstructuresinthecountriesinquestion.However,alloftheseeffortswillprovemeaninglessifRussiaisunabletotakeadvantageofthemonaccountofadeterioratingdomesticsituation.AttentiontoproblemsathomewillnotonlyallowRussiatoharnesssoftpowerpotentialaccordingtowesternstandards,butbecomeaconsiderableplayerintheinternationalarena,onethatwillnotneedtoresorttopropagandatacticsaloneinordertoproveitslegitimacyandimportancetotheWest.

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