Mind Volume Lxxi Issue 282 1962 [Doi 10.1093%2fmind%2flxxi.282.197] Sprigge, Timothy --...

IV.—INTERNAL AND EXTERNALPROPERTIES

BY TIMOTHY SPRIGGE

ABB there internal properties of things? By a thing I meananything of a sort such that it is true that something of that sortexists, leaving it open whether all things are what would ordinarilybe called particulars. By an internal property of a thing, I meana property of a thing such that the thing could not but have it.

The whole question has been discussed more often with regardto relational properties. What I say is intended throughoutto apply as much to relational properties as to non-relationalproperties. My discussion of this topic represents, for the mostpart, my reactions to the ideas of Mr. John Watling, that keenopponent of internal properties.

The question thus framed is far from definite in meaning.Let us consider two things which might be meant by the asser-

tion that things have internal properties. Firstly, it might bemeant that some propositions of the form ' Fa ' are necessarilytrue. Secondly, it might be meant that some propositions of theform ' Fa ' are entailed by corresponding propositions of theform ' a exists '. The second I shall dismiss on the grounds thatit is nonsensical to talk of propositions of the form ' a exists '.

The first view is, in my opinion, false. But at the moment Iam less concerned to establish its falsehood than to consider theappropriate way to state its falsehood.

The ordinary way of expressing the contradictory view is tosay that all propositions of the form' Fa ' are synthetic, and there-fore contingent, but certain associations of the words " synthetic "and " contingent"—whether they are of their connotations ornot is doubtful—give to the view a paradoxical air which I shallbriefly point out. ' Charlie Chaplin has at some stage in his lifebeen a human being ' is a proposition of the form in question. Soon this view it is synthetic. Now the contradictories of syntheticpropositions are generally supposed to be conceivable. Yet thecontradictory of this proposition is not conceivable. This is aparadox of the view that there are no internal properties in thesense in question. This is the first of my two topics.

The other topic is this:—although it is impossible to distin-guish the internal properties of a thing from its external properties,understanding " internal " as above, and " external" as non-internal, yet the attempt to do so stems from awareness of some

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distinction which there really is to be made. For there is somesense of could, in which there are some properties of a thing whichit could not be without, and other properties of it which it couldbe without. If we use the word " internal " for the first kind ofproperty, and the word " external" for the second kind of pro-perty, then there are internal and external properties. ThusCharlie Chaplin simply could not have been without the propertyof at some time in his life being a human being, but he could havebeen without the property of having at least four wives. I donot think that in the sense which I thus allow to the internal-external distinction, all properties are either on one side or theother, but certainly some are more internal and others moreexternal. I shall make some attempt to analyse this distinction,and this will be my second topic, but until expressly stated, Ishall be using the terms " internal" and " external" in the sensefirst mentioned. I thus bring together my two main topics,because I may approach the matter somewhat obliquely in whatfollows.

We may divide propositions into two classes—those whichare about things and those which are not. Let us call the formerparticular propositions and the latter universal propositions.This however is only a convenience—I do not imply that allentities are particulars.

A criterion, of a sort, for distinguishing between particular anduniversal propositions is that the former require in sentenceswhich are to express them, at least one word standing for a thing,whereas the latter do not. The proposition expressed by thesentence " T. S. Eliot is a poet" is a particular proposition.Such a proposition does not, however, have to be expressed by asentence containing what is ordinarily called a proper name.The same proposition might be expressed either by the symbols" T. S. Eliot is a poet" or the symbols " The author of The SacredWood is a poet".

In this paper I adopt the following notation. The occurrenceof an expression between double inverted commas shows that thereference is to symbols or a sentence. The occurrence of anexpression between single inverted commas shows that thereference is to a concept or a proposition.

Propositions about particulars require for their expression in asentence use of a word referring to a particular. But this is notto say that all such sentences express particular propositions. Auniversal proposition may—it seems—be translated into a sen-tence including a word standing for a particular. For example," All men are mortal" may be translated into " All men in




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London and all men not in London are mortal ". If thiB lattersentence expresses the same proposition as the former, then auniversal proposition may be, but does not have to be, expressedin a sentence which includes a word referring to a particular.But a particular proposition, such for instance, as " All men inLondon are mortal " may not be expressed except by a sentenceincluding a referring expression.

It might, however, be doubted whether " All men are mortal"and " All men in London and all men not in London are mortal"do express the same proposition. The ground of this doubtwould be that to believe the former does not, while to believethe latter apparently does, require some sort of acquaintancewith London. In that case, presumably, the proposition ex-pressed by the hitter sentence would be a particular proposition.But it seems that the two propositions would be logically equiva-lent, in which case a universal and a particular proposition couldbe logically equivalent, which is paradoxical. For the present,then, I take it that there is but one proposition, and that auniversal one.

Universal propositions divide into the synthetic and theanalytic. ' There are no men over the age of one hundred andtwenty ' is synthetic, and ' There are no men who are not mam-mals ' is analytic. To believe a universal proposition of eitherkind is to be disposed to pass from believing particular proposi-tions of one sort about any set of particulars to believing particularpropositions of another sort about the same set of particulars, atleast that is my pious hope.

Our first main question is whether propositions about particu-lars may likewise be divided into the synthetic and the analytic,for it is only if such a distinction is possible that the distinctionbetween internal and external properties is possible. The inter-nalist—as I shall call the believer in internal properties—musthold that either there are analytic propositions ascribing proper-ties to particulars, or that there are propositions ascribingproperties to particulars entailed by propositions ascribingexistence to these particulars.

I shall dismiss the second alternative briefly, while admittingthat my dismissal of it begs the question to some extent. For Ishall boldly assert that an existential proposition cannot be aparticular proposition. That it exists, is not a thing one can sayabout a particular. The premise of Moore's argument, that onecan meaningfully say of a particular that it exists because one canclearly meaningfully say of a particular that it might not haveexisted, is false. One cannot say of a particular that it might not




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have existed. One thinks one can say this, because it appears tobe the contradictory of a proposition to the effect that the thingnecessarily exists, which one is anxious to contradict. But onceone sees that the words " this necessarily exists " express nointelligible proposition, the wish to contradict it by saying " thismight not have existed " also disappears. If it is accepted then,that an existential proposition is never about a particular, onemust admit that an existential proposition cannot entail a proposi-tion about a particular. From the proposition that there issomething of a certain sort, or that something is of a certain sort,one cannot deduce any proposition about any particular thing.From a negative existential proposition or universal proposition,however, one can deduce a proposition about a particular thing,but this is beside the point. Thus, if the internalist is maintainingthat some proposition ascribing a predicate to a particularfollows from an existential proposition, his case is lost, and thereare seen to be no internal properties. The only remainingpossible form of internalism is that which maintains that somepropositions ascribing predicates to particulars are analytic.

If we could establish that there are no analytic propositionsabout particulars, then the internalist view would be refuted.

Most of my argument will be directed to showing that proposi-tions such as ' The author of The Sacred Wood wrote or otherwisethought up The Sacred Wood ' or' This river bed has at some stagehad water in i t ' are either not about particulars or are not analytic.But there is apparently one special class of propositions aboutparticulars to which it is difficult to deny analyticity. I shallconsider this class first, in order to get them out of the way.

Consider the proposition about a certain table ' this is not-round-and-square'. It does seem that here we have an analyticproposition about a particular. If we can call not-round-and-square a property of the table, then it seems that it is an internalproperty of it, it would be self-contradictory to deny it of thetable. In which case it is established that the table has at leastone internal property, which shows that there are internalproperties.

Yet this is surely not the sort of thing which anyone who talksof internal properties has in mind. For properties like thisbelong to everything.

Let us deal with the point thus. Let us say that there can beno predicate, and therefore no property, F such that ' (x) (Fx)' isanalytic. Then we may deny that there are any internal proper-ties while leaving it open whether there may not be analyticpropositions of .the form ' This ia such and such ' where ' this '




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refers to a particular. But in such propositions' is such and such'is not a genuine predicate.

We may then divide particular propositions into predicativeand pseudo-predicative ones. The mark of a pseudo-predicate isthat necessarily it applies to everything, or, if a relation, that itrelates everything. We may also call pseudo-predicates thosewhich, necessarily, apply.to nothing.

I take it that in denying that any predicative proposition isanalytic, I am denying that there are internal properties.

But after all are not some of these propositions analytic? Is itnot analytic that the author of Waverley wrote Waverley—using" write " in a way sufficiently sophisticated to rebut Moore'snaivety?

Now ' The author of Waverley wrote Waverley ' might expressan analytic proposition. It might express the proposition thatif anything is the only author of Waverley, then that thing is anauthor of Waverley. To believe this proposition is to be disposedto pass from any predicative proposition of the form ' x is theauthor of Waverley' to a certain predicative proposition of theform ' x is an author of Waverley'. That is, it is to be ready toclassify anything one has classified as the only author of Waverleyas an author of Waverley. It would be an analytic propositionbecause the success of the disposition in which believing it consistscomes about in a manner different from that in which, for example,the success of a disposition to pass from any proposition of theform ' x is called Thomas Stearns Eliot' to a certain propositionof the form ' x wrote The Sacred Wood ' comes about.

But " The author of Waverley wrote Waverley " might be usedto say the same thing as is said by " Scott wrote Waverley " andthis thing is clearly no analytic proposition. So it seems that ifwe interpret the sentence " The author of Waverley wroteWaverley " as about a certain particular (i.e. the particular whowrote Waverley and is known as Scott) then it is not analytic.That is, if it is used to give a description of a certain thing it isnot analytic.

This point may be rammed home by saying that, after all,the author of Waverley, that is, Scott, might easily not havewritten Waverley, and therefore it is a contingent fact that—andtherefore a synthetic proposition that—he did write Waverley.

But to ram home the point in this way is to raise the paradoxupon which I remarked at the beginning. For it invites one toconsider whether Scott could have been the very same person,and not have written Waverley, which, on consideration, one mustgrant he could have been. In this way one is invited to consider




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any proposition about Scott which one might be tempted toanalytic, and to reject its claim to analytdcity on the ground thatone can imagine what it would be like for Scott not to have hadthe property predicated of him in the proposition; and one isforced in each case to think that indeed he could have beenwithout these properties. Scott could have been born of dif-ferent parents, have been famous as a composer rather than as anauthor, have lived in a different country. But could Scott havebeen a pig? When we answer that he could not have been a pig,that is, not throughout his whole life have been a pig—for thequestion whether he might have been at some stage transformedinto one by magic like the sailors of Odysseus is another question—we are surely making a logical rather than a factual claim.Or again, consider a very full description of St. Paul and a veryfull description of Scott. Surely it is not even logically possiblethat the descriptions might have applied differently, that whichin fact applies to Paul applying to Scott and vice versa.

This whole approach is wrong. For it presupposes a distinc-tion between predicates which necessarily apply and those whichapply only contingently, between internal and external properties.It attacks the idea that things have internal properties, not atroot by a criticism of the concept of an internal property, but byshowing that supposed internal properties do not necessarilyqualify their subjects.

On the one hand there are those who say that it is always asynthetic proposition that a thing has certain properties. On theother hand there are those who say that for a thing to be at all,it must have certain properties. If there were not a thing exem-plifying these properties that thing would not be at all. Theformer regard the latter as superstitious because they think thatthey cling to some notion of each object having an essence. Thelatter regard the former as superstitious because they think thatthey have some idea of a bare particular which is only contin-gently connected with certain properties, although it could aswell have existed with any others instead.

The argument may proceed this way. The anti-essentialistchallenges the internalist to find any properties which, say, theQueen must have had. The internalist suggests, perhaps, thatthe Queen must have the property of at some stage in her lifebeing Sovereign. The other suggests that it is only a contingentfact that the Queen did not die at birth, and therefore only acontingent fact that, and so a synthetio proposition that, theQueen has the property at some stage in her life being Sovereign.The internalist then says that the Queen must have been born of




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Royal Blood. The anti-essentialist says that there would be nocontradiction in a news bulletin asserting that it had been estab-lished that the Queen was not in fact the child of her supposedparents, but had been secretly adopted by them, and thereforethe proposition that she is of Royal Blood is synthetic.

In this way the anti-internalist parries the argument of theinternalist by suggesting with regard to each proposed internalproperty of the particular in question, that we can quite wellimagine that very same particular without the property in ques-tion.

For a time he is winning. Yet there comes a time when hisclaims appear a trifle too far fetched. The internalist suggeststhat we cannot imagine that particular we call the Queen havingthe property of at no stage in her existence being human. If theanti-internalist admits this, admits that it is logically inconceivablethat the Queen should have had the property of, say, always beinga swan, then he admits that she has at least one internal property.If on the other hand he says that it is only a contingent fact thatthe Queen has ever been human, he says what it is hard to accept.Can we really consider it as conceivable that she should neverhave been human?

Here then the internalist is winning. But it is not an al-together happy victory, for the properties which he may win forthe Queen as internal to her are of a somewhat unspecinc nature.The properties which can be won for her as internal are hardlysuch as distinguish her from her courtiers.

The internalist can make a rather better case for a somewhatdifferent sort of particular. But it should not be thought thatthe difficulties he had in ascribing individuating internal proper-ties to the Queen arise from special problems connected withthe criteria of personal identity. Usually it is as difficult tofind specific internal properties for individual physical objects.

Consider now a particular experience. At a certain specifictime a certain person A has a certain particular experience E.It is an unpleasant gustatory sensation caused by having got somesoap into the mouth, in the course of shampooing his hair. A canto some extent describe his experience, and in so doing he isclearly describing a particular. It was a nasty bitter taste, orperhaps rather the consciousness of a nasty bitter taste. Nowthe anti-internalist would say that that very same particularmight logically have been a sweet taste, rather than a bittertaste. But the internalist would surely speak reasonably if hesaid that to suppose this, is to suppose that the particular inquestion might never have occurred at all, but some other




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particular have occurred instead. That particular taste could notconceivably have been a sweet taste—its bitterness was a propertyinternal to it.

In order to deny internal properties the anti-internalist findshimself forced into quite unplausible contentions, such as that thatvery same taste might have been sweet and not bitter. Also hehas to make even odder claims such as that it is only a contingentfact, and therefore a synthetic proposition that, Napoleon was ahuman being and not a boat. All this he seems forced into, whenhe wishes to deny that any particular thing necessarily has someof the properties which it has.

He is making a valid logical point, but somehow his wholeapproach is wrong. For it tacitly accepts a distinction betweenpredicates which necessarily apply and those which apply onlycontingently, internal and external properties, and attacks theidea that things have internal properties, not at root by a criticismof the concept of an internal property, but rather by attemptedimpeachment of any proposed internal property, as lacking thecredentials, that is as not being a property which the particularnecessarily has.

If by an internal property of a particular is meant a propertysuch that the proposition that the particular exemplifies it isanalytic, then there are no internal properties. But this hasnothing to do with any indefiniteness in our concept of the par-ticular in question, but rests upon the nature of predication.

If one considers the sentences which express propositions thepoint becomes almost grammatical. In sentences expressing par-ticular propositions where the subject word is a name, the subjectword has no connotation. Therefore no predicate word can havea connotation which is incompatible with the connotation of thesubject word. But a subject-predicate sentence could onlyexpress a necessary proposition if the connotation of the subjectword were incompatible with the connotation of the negation ofthe predicate word. Since this cannot be the case where thesentence expresses a particular proposition, no sentence canexpress a proposition ascribing properties to a particular whichproposition is necessary. From this one may conclude that thereare no such propositions and hence that particulars do not haveinternal properties. Of course, this rests upon the questionableview that there may be naming words without connotation—andthis indeed is basically the point at issue. Our discussion mayat least remove certain reasons for refusing to accept that theremay be such names, for it may show that it does not have theparadoxical consequence that anything might have had any




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properties whatever, at least that it does not have this conse-quence in a form which is paradoxical.

To express a proposition about a particular is to describe orevaluate something. We will consider only descriptive proposi-tions for the present. Such propositions merely classify the thingas of one sort or another. It is quite inappropriate to seek forsome properties which the thing must have to be what it is. Butone does not quite Kke admitting this, because it seems to draw adivision between substance and properties, and to suggest thatthe connection between them is somehow fortuitous, and that thesubstance could just as well have quite different properties.

But it seems that one must identify a thing by some descrip-tion, and having been thus identified as answering to that des-cription, is it not in effect denned as the thing having thoseproperties, which properties therefore it necessarily has?

One may remove these doubts, I hope, by considering aconversation such as follows. It is not a very ordinary conver-sation, but it is quite intelligible. A : I am going to describe acertain thing to you. B : What thing? A : You will recogniseit as the description proceeds. It is domed. It is made mainlyof stone. It is partly hollow. It is in the heart of a great city.It houses many famous paintings. B : You're talking of theNational Gallery. A : I will continue. Entrance to it is free.In front of it is a square containing a tall column on which standsthe statue of a famous sailor who is looking out upon the capitalcity of his country.

Now in enunciating these properties A was describing acertain object. A had to give a certain amount of the descrip-tion before B cottoned on to what he was saying. But the proper-ties of the National Gallery, the mention of which in A's descrip-tion enabled B to identify it, are not properties of the NationalGallery in any logically different way from those mentioned afterB had managed to identify the object. If one sets out to describean object one cannot distinguish between properties which areessential to it and those which are not. It simply is a thing of acertain sort, and that is that.

But people find it difficult to see how the object can so to speakget into the proposition except as an object, or the object, answer-ing to a certain description. A serious attempt to deal with thispoint would require an analysis of the concept of a proposition.But some light on the nature of a predicative proposition may bethrown by consideration of a simple situation in which one isformulated.

Someone notes a passing object and says ' That is a starling '.




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Here the speaker nearly uses the object as its own name. If hecaught the bird he might almost hold it up and say ' is astarling'. When one Bays that a passing object is a starling, one'sbelief that it is a starling is a way of treating a certain actualobject. One k classifying it, the very object iteelf, that is,roughly, one is behaving towards it in a manner such as one doestowards certain other, but not all other, thingB which one comesacross. To hold a belief of this sort is quite different from holdinga universal belief, for in thiB case one's belief is a way of treatingan actual thing, and one can only believe a proposition about thatthing by treating it itself in a certain way. But a universal beliefis a second order disposition, a disposition to pass from one'streatings of things in one way to treatings of them in another way,and this second order disposition can exist—in the manner ofdispositions—without ever being activated by any treating of anactual object. Thus actual objects figure in particular proposi-tions, which are the internal accusatives of beliefs, as they do notin universal propositions.

This account does all very well for the belief in particularpropositions where the particular in question is sensibly presentto the believer, and may itself be classified in some way or other.Then we may perhaps consider a belief about the particular asbeing a certain treating of that particular. But what aboutbelief in propositions about particulars which are remote in spaceand time?

Bertrand Kussell at times held that we could only believepropositions about particulars which were sensibly present, andwe would get out of our difficulty if we followed him here. Butthis would be to give up—as he did—treating " Julius Caesar " asa word used by us to name a particular, and I do not think wewould be right to do this.

Rather, I would say that in believing propositions aboutJulius Caesar we are still reacting to him, to the man himself,in some way, and treating him, when for instance we believehim to have been a dictator, in a way such as we treat some otherbut not all other objects. It is something of the same kind as ourclassification of a passing object as a starling, and as such basicallydifferent from believing a universal proposition.

However this may be, to describe an object cannot be toformulate an analytic proposition. One may gather fromsomeone's description what object it is of which he is talking.But there is only one way of describing an object—that is sayingwhat sort of thing it is, and one cannot distinguish some suchsayings as analytic.




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Yet to say that a proposition descriptive of a particular issynthetic is liable to mislead. To say that it is synthetic suggeststhe thought that logically it might have been otherwise. Forinstance consider the proposition ' it is a building'—where ' i t 'refers to the National Gallery.

If we say that this proposition is synthetic it suggests that it islogically possible, that is conceivable, that the National Galleryshould not have been a building. Then we worry ourselves asto what it would have been like for the National Gallery not tohave been a building. For if it is a synthetic proposition thatit is a building, it must be logically possible that it should not havebeen a building, and if it is a synthetic, though false proposition,that it is not a building, we should be able to imagine what itwould have been like for it to be true.

Here we have the source, I think, of some of the worry that theconcept of a substance produces. For if it is a synthetic proposi-tion with regard to any substance, or particular, that it has anyproperty, it seems that it could have been the very same substancewhile having quite different properties. This makes trans-substantiation possible—though this is actually the reverse, achange of substance without change of properties—but leavesthe substance as an unknown something.

If every proposition has to be synthetic or analytic then it isbetter to call the description of a particular, that is a predicativeproposition, synthetic. But to call predicative propositionssynthetic is misleading, in that it suggests the thought that onecould imagine what it would be like for them to be false.

Here is a certain thing, let me try to classify it. That is thespirit in which a description is properly made. It just is a thingof a certain sort which sort the description—the assertion of thepredicative proposition—attempts to specify. To ask whether aworld is conceivable in which this very thing was quite otherwiseis bewildering.

Certain descriptions apply to the thing. Once one has noticedthat they apply, one does not always know what to make of thequestion—must they have applied?

Thus it would be in some ways more suitable to say that theanalytic-synthetic distinction does not apply to predicativepropositions than to say that they are synthetic. They cannotproperly be called analytic. On the other hand one cannot—in many cases—properly ask what it would be like for them tobe false. If, therefore, we do call them synthetic, it should onlybe as a way of contradicting the claim that any of them areanalytic.




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But despite the fact that descriptions of a thing cannot bedivided into expressions of analytic, and expressions of syntheticpropositions, yet there is a sense in which propositions of theform ' Fa ' may either ascribe to a thing a property such as itcould have been without or may ascribe to a thing a propertysuch as it could not have been without. For instance, this chairhas both the property of being a chair, and the property of beingin this room between 3 and 4 this afternoon, but whereas one wouldwant to say that it could easily not have been in this room atthe time in question, it could not have failed to be a chair.Similarly Macmillan could easily not have been Prime Ministerin 1959, but it is not easy to see that he could have failed to be aman, and perhaps not easy to see that he could have failed to beBritish. What account can we make of this sort of distinction—adistinction at which those who distinguish between internal andexternal properties have perhaps been aiming? For what theyhave been suggesting is that while it is rubbish to suggest thatMacmillan might not have been human, it is not rubbish to suggesthe might not have been Prime Minister.

Someone might ask whether the Nelson Column could bepainted gold and retain its brightness. This is a question theanswer to which would depend upon how London's atmosphereaffects gold paint. That is to say, among the predicates whichmay apply to a thing are many such as ' would soon look dirty ifpainted gold ', ' would burst if pricked ', ' would hit you if yousaid that', ' would die if injected with such and such '. Manyquestions of the form ' could this thing be different from what itis? ' may be answered by drawing attention to the predicatesof this sort which apply to it. The question—' could Scott havewritten music instead of novels ?' would be answered if we coulddecide that certain predicates applied or did not apply to him,e.g. ' would have written beautiful music if he had been given atraining in harmony ', ' would not have written his novels if hehad had more money'. In short, there are all sorts of truthsabout particulars of the general character ' x would under suchand such circumstances not have had such and such propertieswhich x now has', or ' there are no circumstances under which xwould have had such and such a property '. So we may make adistinction between properties which a thing would have underany circumstances and those which it would not have had grantedcertain other circumstances.

But to ask whether a thing could have been quite differentfrom what it is, whether Scott could actually have had all theproperties of Handel, is on a different level. The questions we




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have just been asking are all to some degree requests for furtherdescriptions of Scott. But the present question is not one thatcalls for any investigation of Scott, and it is difficult to acceptthat a question which calls for no investigation of Scott, to whichnothing about Scott is relevant, is really about Scott.

What I want to understand is why, while we can accept theidea that Scott might have written music rather than novels, wecannot accept the idea that he might have had all Handel'sproperties, and Handel have had all Scott's.

But our question does not have to be asked about persons.Some philosophers have thought that this sort of problem wasespecially perplexing about persons, but the perplexity withwhich I am at present concerned should be provoked equally bymeditations upon pots and pans, ideas and feelings.

Describing a particular is classifying it, saying that it is ofone sort rather than another. Now in some cases to say of aparticular that it might have been different from what it is, sayingthat it might have had a property F, which is incompatible withG, a property which it has, is one way of classifying it. That is,to say it might not have had property G, or more specifically,would under specified conditions have had property F, isin some cases to tell one something true about how the objectactually is.

Suppose someone says of a certain lawyer, on the basis ofhearing him sing at home, that he might have been a great operasinger. This is to classify him in a certain way just as to saythat he is a very bad lawyer is to classify him in another. Sup-pose one says of him that he might never have been a lawyer.This is somewhat vague, and one would probably requireelucidation of it if it were ever said. A very general interpreta-tion of it would be that at an earlier stage in his life there was muchto suggest that he would not become a lawyer but somethingquite different. It might, however, be a prelude to some verydetailed story concerning how his becoming a lawyer was a resultof some quite unexpected circumstances.

To say that Scott might have composed music rather thanwritten novels, might be to make a variety of claims. It mightbe to say that he belonged to a class of men who may becomeeither very good composers or very good novelists, and thatwhich they become depends upon external circumstances.

My general point is this: to say that something might havehad a property F, which is incompatible with a property G whichit does have, may be a way of saying something quite true aboutthe sort of thing it is. But there are many cases when to aay

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such a thing is not to say anything true about the sort of object itis. Sometimes indeed philosophers may say that a thing mighthave had such a property F as a way of saying that the proposi-tion that it has property not-F is not analytic. But this—as wehave seen—is a misleading way of making the point.

But we wished to distinguish between internal and externalproperties. I suggest that a property is internal to a particularto the extent that no information about that particular is con-veyed by one who says that it might have lacked that property.I think that the distinction between internal and externalproperties is not exact. Now it seems that to say that Napoleonnight not have been human, and perhaps that he might not havebeen Corsican, is to convey no information about him But tosay that he might have won the battle of Waterloo might wellbe said in a context in which it conveys information. To saythat Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon might reallyconvey information about the sort of man he was, it might tellus that there were many motives in him working against hiscrossing the Rubicon. But to say that he might have beenJapanese does not seem to tell us anything about him. Butperhaps it might be to say that many of his qualities were com-patible with being Japanese. Anyway one has in each individualcase to find out what is being said. The central point is thatsuggestions that a thing might have been otherwise are intelligiblein so far, and only in so far, as they are attempts to classify theobject as it is, or to say what would happen to it under specifiablecircumstances.

I propose the following definition. Let F be any property of athing a. Then F is an external property of a if somethinginteresting and true may be said of the form ' if such and suchthen not-Fa'. Otherwise F is an internal property. But asfrom different points of view different things are interesting, sofrom different points of view different properties are internaland external.

The question has so far only been considered with reference tothose things which are commonly called particulars. Are thereany other things, for instance universals, and supposing there are,does what has been said apply to them also?

Suppose there is such a thing as the colour Blue. One mayraise the question whether it can be denied that the proposition' Blue is a colour' is both about a thing, Blue, and logicallynecessary. In this case there would be internal properties inthe first sense, the sense in which I have denied that there are,though indeed only internal properties of non-particulars.




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To avoid this, it might be argued that ' Blue is a colour ' is auniversal proposition to the effect that (x) (x has the property ofbeing the universal Blue D x has the property of being a colour).This is analytic, but it is not about Blue. But if there is somethingwhich is the colour Blue, why cannot one talk directly about it?If one is not going to do so, one may as well forthwith equate theabove proposition with ' (x) (x is blue D x is coloured)'.

Consider now a conversation like that I imagined earlier.A. I am going to describe a eertain thing to you.B. What thing?A. You will recognise it as I proceed. It is eternal. It is non-

spatial. It is very beautiful. It is a colour. It is more likeblack than red. It is often exemplified by the sky.

At some stage B will recognise what A is describing, namelyBlue. Or perhaps if he is a nominalist he will say that he doesn'tthink A has succeeded in describing anything. But presumingfor the moment that A is describing something, his propositionsare not analytic, even if he ends up by saying ' It is the propertyBlue '. The interest of this example is that it brings out force-fully the manner in which propositions about particulars aresynthetic. It shows that the syntheticness of predicativepropositions is nothing to do with the nature of the entities ofwhich they are descriptive, nor anything to do with the separa-bility in thought of a thing from its properties. Here it is auniversal, rather than a particular, that is in question, and ifpropositions about universals may be regarded as synthetic, howmuch more may propositions about particulars be! The pointis that although propositions about particulars such as theNational Gallery or universals such as Blue are not analytic, andtherefore perhaps to be called synthetic, it does not follow fromtheir being synthetic that we may reasonably ask what it wouldbe like for them to be false. It does not mean that we can imaginethe National Gallery not being a gallery, or Blue not being a colour.They are what they are—and the question Could they be different?can only be answered by considering the applicability to them ofcertain other predicates of the type ' would have been F,

* ? ' • .Yet it seems that if one does accept that ' Blue is a colour ' is of

the form ' Fa' , and is not the same as either of the universalpropositions above, one is landed with a thing having internalproperties in the objectionable sense. For surely it is logicallynecessary that Blue is a colour?

I would dispute this. If in the sentence " Blue is a colour "," Blue " really is used to refer to something, namely the colour




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212 T. SPRIGGE : INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROPERTIES

Blue, then the proposition expressed is not analytic. The factthat it would not be analytic throws some light on the questionof internal properties in the objectionable sense. For if anythinghad internal properties in that sense one might think it would beBlue. And this shows that the denial that a thing has internalproperties need not be linked with any claim that in the case ofeach of its properties it could be conceived or imagined without it.

The reason for saying that ' Blue is a colour ' is, if it is actuallyabout Blue, not analytic, is that if it is actually about Blue it is adescription, and a description of something cannot be the expres-sion of an analytic proposition.




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Mind Volume Lxxi Issue 282 1962 [Doi 10.1093%2fmind%2flxxi.282.197] Sprigge, Timothy --...

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Transcript of Mind Volume Lxxi Issue 282 1962 [Doi 10.1093%2fmind%2flxxi.282.197] Sprigge, Timothy --...