The Fletcher School Online Journal for issues related to Southwest Asia and Islamic Civilization Fall 2004, Article 4 TheRoleofIslaminMalaysianPoliticalPracticeEricaMiller

Thehistorical,ethnic,religious,cultural,andpolitical realities that fuse to inform the state ofaffairs in modern Malaysia make the country afascinating study in contrasts. Malaysia can besimultaneously characterized as democratic andauthoritarian,Asian and Islamic, developed andunderdeveloped,andstableandtenuous.Withapopulation that is 60 percent Muslim, however,Islam is the factor that most critically impactsMalaysian politics.1 Examining Malaysiangovernmentandaffairsof state, itbecomes clearthat Islamic symbols and concepts permeate avariety of aspects of political life, from itshistorical and structural foundations, to itscontinuingpoliticaldiscourseandpractices.Withthe goal of better understanding Islams role inMalaysian political life, this essay will describethe historical evolution and circumstances thatgave Islam its preeminent status in Malaysianpolitics,andanalyzethesymbolicandsubstantivemanifestations of Islam in this context. Thisdescription and analysis will make evident thatthereligionplaysavitalroleinthepoliticsofthetwoprimaryMalayMuslimpoliticalparties, butthatthisroleislargelysymbolic,duetothehighlypluralisticnatureofMalaysiansociety.

By Way of Background: the Malay-Muslim Connection

In analyzing Islam in Malaysian politicstoday, it is helpful to provide some historicalbackground. Although there isdisagreement asto the exact date of Islams appearance in theregion, scholars typically connect it to the first

travels byMuslimArab sailors to the islands ofSoutheastAsia around the 8th century. Islam isbelieved to then have been brought to the portcity of Malacca on the west coast of the MalayPeninsulabyMuslimTamilIndiantradersaroundthe 14th century.2 These Indian bearers of IslamwereSunniMuslimswhoweregreatlyinfluencedby Sufi mysticism. Subsequently, the fusion ofSunni and Sufi practices combined withindigenous Malay beliefs and customssuch asanimismallowing for theevolutionofauniqueform of Islam still practiced inMalaysia today.3As authorFredR.vonderMehdenwrites,untilrecent years, extreme regional theologicalinfluenceshavebeenlesssignificantinMalaysianIslam,givingitacertainparochialism.4

After its introduction, the influenceof Islamgrew. It became engrained in the politicaldominion of Malacca in 1445, when a coupresulted inthe installmentofaMuslimrulerandthe beginning of the Malacca Sultanate. TheSultanates Islamic legacy to Malaysia waslonglasting, and its espousal and promotion ofIslammarksthestartofthepoliticalentrenchmentof Islam in Malaysian political life. As amechanism for increasing its allies and support,theSultanate encouraged the rapidandpeacefulconversion of its subjects and otherMalay royalfamilies to Islam.5 When the antiMuslimPortuguese conquered Malacca in 1511, theSultanate was forced move to Johor on thesouthern tip of theMalay Peninsula, promptingthe further spread of Islam. The Dutch lateroustedthePortuguesefromMalaccain1641.6

Al Nakhlah The Fletcher School Tufts University 160 Packard Avenue Medford, MA 02155-7082 USA Tel: +1.617.627.3700

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Islam became even more integral toindigenousaffairsofstatewith thearrivalof theBritish. TheEnglishEastIndiaCompanyarrivedon the islandofPenang innorthwestpeninsularMalaysia in 1786, and over the next 100 yearsexpanded its sphere of influence throughout thepeninsulaasameansofcounteringDutchpower.7In 1874, the British signed the PangkorEngagement with the Muslim Sultan of Perak,which allowed for the presence of a Britishresidentintheroyalcourt,andthefurtheringofBritish influence. This resident advisor couldadviseonallmattersexceptthoseinvolvingIslamand Malay customs, which would remain the

exclusive domain of theSultan. Eventually therewereBritishresidentsinallMalay Sultanates.8 Inimplementing this system,the British fostered thegrowthof aMalayMuslimpolitical elite. As Britishinfluencespread,Islamwasone of the only areas overwhich the Sultans had anypractical control, and theythus sought to retain anddevelop this domain ofinfluence. Many of thedescendants of these sameSultans became theMalayMuslim political elitefollowing independence.The British furthermore

createdschoolsofcolonialadministration,whosegraduateswould oneday also contribute to thiseliteclass.9

Once the British began to liquidate theircolonial empire at the turn of the 20th century,theyenvisionedforMalaya,asitwasthenknown,a system of parliamentary democracy, governedjointly by a Malay Union, and comprised ofrepresentatives from each of the major ethnicgroups: theMuslimMalaymajority, theChinese,and the Indians. The Britishwished thereby todecrease the power of the Sultans and allownonMalay minorities the rights of citizenship.Instead, this move prompted an abrupt Malay

backlash that marks the inception of modernMalay nationalism and Muslim politics.10 Thisbacklashcanbetracedinparttostrongfeelingsofeconomic insecurity amongMalayMuslimswithrespect to the Chinese and Indian worker andentrepreneurial populations, as well as to thebelief that Malays, as Bumiputras (sons of thesoil), should be provided certain safeguardsandspecialprivileges.11

The emergence of Muslim politics inMalaysia is therefore tied to the issue ofMalaynationalism that arose at this time, and to thedeep and indelible connection between Malayidentity and Islam. Indeed, Islam, along withBahasa Malayu (the Malay language), has beencalled the chief component of Malay identity.12TheMalaynationalistmovementserved tomoveIslamic issues to a central role in Malaysianpolitical life and in 1946 produced a powerful,organizedpoliticalforcethatremainsakeyplayerin currentMalaysianpolitics: theUnitedMalaysNationalOrganization(UMNO).13

The emergence of Muslim politics in

Malaysia is therefore tied to the issue of

Malay nationalism and to the deep and indelible connection

between Malay identity and Islam. Indeed, Islam, along with

Bahasa Malayu (the Malay language), has been called the chief component of Malay

identity.

The Malay elite that led the UMNOsuccessfully challenged the illfated Britishsupported Malay Union. This resulted in thedecisionof theBritish toestablish theFederationof Malaya in 1948, the Constitution of which because it was drawn up exclusively by theUMNO, the Sultans, and the British fullyprotected the special rightsofMalays.14 Despiteinterethnictensions,theUMNOandtheMalayanChinese Association (MCA) then forged atemporaryalliancein1952asaquidproquowhichensured victory for both parties. This Alliancewasmade permanent in 1953, and expanded toinclude the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) in1954,butremainedinthecontroloftheUMNO.15Inexpectationofnational independence, the firstnational elections were held in 1955 with theAlliancewinning51of52seats.16

Following the elections, the leadership ofeach Alliance party negotiated for fourmonthsover the creationofanational constitution. Theresult was a compromise known as the ethnicbargain, that enshrined Islam as the nationalreligion,inreturnforguaranteesfortherightsofothergroupsinMalaysia.ThebargainismanifestinArticle3(1),whichstipulatesthatIslam isthe

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religionoftheFederation;butotherreligionsmaybepracticedinpeaceandharmonyinanypartoftheFederation. In turn,Articles8 (1)and8(2)reassure the nonMalay communities that [a]llpersons are equalbefore the law and entitled totheequalprotectionofthelaw;andthatthereshallbenodiscriminationagainstcitizenson thegroundonlyofreligion,race,descent,orplaceofbirth.17 The Constitution provides citizenshipand naturalization rights for nonMalays, butArticle 12 (2) also makes it lawful for theFederationoraState toestablishormaintain . . .Islamic institutions or provide or assist inproviding instruction inthereligionofIslamandincur such expenditure asmay be necessary forthepurpose.18Finally,therearestaterunsyariah(theMalay for sharia,or Islamic law) courts thatenforce personal and family laws for Muslimsonly.19

Experts on Malaysia have argued that theestablishmentofIslamastheofficialstatereligionwas not intended to produce a theocracy, butrather was included at the insistence of theUMNO as a means of symbolically giving theConstitution the external features of an Islamicstate.20 Thus, theConstitution furtherbuiltuponthe centuriesold tradition of fusing Islam withthe state. However, the constitutional framersalsoclearlywentbeyondthesymbolictoconsiderthe temporalconcernsofmodernpolitical life,asisevidencedbytheConstitutionssubstantiveandconcrete language addressing important nonMalayconcerns.

Post-Independence Political Practice in Malaysia

Since Malaysia gained independence fromtheBritish in1957, ithasheldperiodicstateandnationalelections,asrequiredbytheConstitution.In theory, these have been open to all politicalparties. In practice, the MalayMuslim UMNOhasgainedthelargestshareofthepopularvoteinevery federal election since independence,.Furthermore, theUMNO alliance ofMalays andthemajorChineseand Indianparties,aswellas11smallerorregionalparties(theBarisanNasional,or BN), has always obtained the two thirds

majorityoftheParlimen(Parliament)necessarytochange the Constitution if it so desired.21However, such changeswouldnot be automaticin spite of this technical majorityit is vital torecognize,thatMalaysianpoliticsdonotoccurinan Islamic vacuum, absent any otherconsiderations or influences. Despite theunparalleledhegemonyof theUMNO in theBNandoftheBNinMalaysianpolitics,thepowerofthese groups is nonetheless checked by themultipleethnicandreligiousgroupsandinterestsrepresentedwithin theBN. Islamicsymbolsandissues do indeed play an important role inMalaysian politics, but they remain subordinateto,andlinkedwith,thebroaderroleofpoliticsinahighlypluralisticsocietywhereMalays,whoarepredominantly Muslim, comprise 58 percent ofthe total population; theChinese24percent;andtheIndians, 8 percent.22Indeed, UMNOs politicalsuccesscanbeattributedinpart to its recognition andacceptance of these ethnicconsiderations, and to itssuccessful pursuit ofconsociational democracy,evenifbydefault.23

UMNOs principalrival for support of theMalayMuslim population,the Parti Islam se Malaysia (Islamic Party ofMalaysia)orPAS,tooklongertounderstandandreact to the practical demands of a pluralisticsociety. While theUMNOcanbestbedescribedas espousing a secularist Islamic idealclassification,or, thebelief that it ispossible toseparate the religious and political spheres oflife, PAS can be characterized as a hybrid ofmodernist and fundamentalist idealclassifications. Itismodernistinthesensethatitaccepts a compromise between a traditionalIslamic and a modern Western nationstatemodel.Itisfundamentalistinthatitespousesagovernment that seeks a return to the Sunnah(customs of the Prophet) and is rejects Westernpoliticalmodels.24

Islamic symbols and issues do indeed play an important role in

Malaysian politics, but they remain

subordinate to, and linked with, the broader

role of politics in a highly pluralistic

society

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PASwascreatedin1951todirectlychallengeUMNOs secular stance, in favor of elevatingIslamspurelysymbolicstatusintheConstitutionto a more substantive and operational level.25StrongemphasiswasalsoplacedinthewordsofPAS third leader,Dr.BurhanuddinalHemionthe fusion of Malay nationalism with Islamicambitions. ThepartyaccusedUMNOofsellingoutMalayintereststotheChineseandIndiansinexchange forelectoral success,andadvocatedanincremental approach toward its ultimateobjective of Islamic governance, achievedwithin

the established democraticframework of Malaysia. 26PAS first electoral victoryinthe1959electionsgaveitcontrol of the largelytraditional, conservativeMalay states of KelantanandTerengganuintheeast,and of 13 nationalparliamentary seats. The1969 elections yieldedsimilar results, and PASwon almost half of theMalayMuslimvote. Theseelections marks thebeginning of real rivalrybetweenUMNOandPAS.27

The emergence ofIslamic revivalism in theearly 1970smarks the startofthemostcriticalepochofIslams influence inMalaysian postindependence political

practice. Revivalism in Malaysia was notmonolithic, but a multifaceted movement withmany causes, internal and external. ScholarMohamad Abu Bakar attributes an internal reeducationabouttheholisticnatureofIslamastheprimarycauseofMalaysianrevivalism.28Thisreeducation created a greater awareness andunderstanding of Islam among MalayMuslimsandaheightened feeling thatasaddin,orawayof life, Islamneeded agreater role in thepublicsphere.29 While the primary forces behindrevivalismwere internal toMalaysia, therewere

externalfactorsthatalsoplayedapart,including:the spread of Islamic literature, the influence offoreign fundamentalist movements andinternational Islamic organizations, the return ofMalayMuslim students from study abroad, andthe struggles of coreligionists in the 1973ArabIsraeliWarandintheIranianRevolution.30 Newtechnologies aided the spread of these trendsduring this time frame. The popular andwellrespected leaderoftheMuslimYouthMovementof Malaysia (ABIM), Anwar Ibrahim, was thelinchpin ofMalaysian Islamic revivalism, whichhasbeen characterized as abalancebetween thereturntoandstrictadherencetoIslamamongthefaithful, and by an emphasis on education,modern technological skills, and economicprogress.31

The rivalry between UMNO and PAS has

prompted a competition to win the

hearts and minds of the Malay-Muslim

electorate, while also trying to appealor at least not completely alienatethe non-Muslim voters of

Malaysia. Both parties have invoked Islamic symbols and pursued substantive policies pertaining to Islam in

an attempt to win public support.

As a result of the emergence of Islamicrevivalism in Malaysia and the wider Muslimworld, aswell as in response toPAS continuedelectoral successes,UMNObegana trendauthorSyedAhmadHussein terms the IslamizationofUMNO.32 When controversial UMNO PrimeMinister,Mohamad binMahathir, took office in1981 tobeginwhatbecame a 22year reignoverMalaysian political life, he pursued a variety ofpolicies, and is credited with modernizing theMalaysian economy to the point that it becameknown as one of the Asian Tiger cubs. Hisinitial focus, however,was to defeat the radicalPAS challenge. To this end, he more readilyembraced Islamic themes and projects, andbecame more accommodating to Islam andpursued various Islamic policies. As UMNOIslamized, PAS further radicalized in order todistinguish itspolicies from thatof its rival; thismove provoked electoraldefeats throughout the1980sandPAS thereforeultimatelyreturned toamore moderate approach.33 As Mahathirsapproach to governance became moreauthoritarian, PAS shifted its focus from Islam,per se, toward thepromotion ofdemocracy andtransparency within a framework of Islam.UNMO itself, meanwhile, grew progressivelymarked by scandal and undemocratic practices.However, theresignationofMahathir inOctober2003 and the accession to Prime Minister ofAbdullah Ahmad Badawi, a man with

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outstanding Islamicandpolitical credentials,hasreinvigoratedtheailingparty.

Islamic Symbol and Substance in Post-Independence Political Practice in Malaysia

The rivalry between UMNO and PAS hasprompted a competition to win the hearts andmindsoftheMalayMuslimelectorate,whilealsotrying to appeal toor at least not completelyalienatethe nonMuslim voters of Malaysia.Both parties have invoked Islamic symbols andpursued substantive policies pertaining to Islamin an attempt to win public support. Purelysymbolic gestures include rhetoric, statements,andmovesof supportordisapproval for certainpolicies,whilesubstantivemeasuresincludelegalactions thatchangeorattempt tochangestateornational law, as well as establish permanent ormore substantial programs and policies. It isdifficult to completely separate each of thestatements, actions, and laws that will bedescribed below into the clear categories ofsymbol and substance, but the distinctionpresents a useful framework through which toview the broader connection between Islam andpoliticalpracticeinmodernMalaysia.34

Symbol Over the decades, both UMNO and PAS

have engaged in highly symbolic rhetoric andactions designed to appeal to the religioussentiments of Islamic voters for the purposes ofpolitical gain. PAS has, among other incidents,been recorded as callingUMNO leadership kafir(unbelieverorinfidel)andhasequatedsupportofUMNO as tantamount to apostasy.35 Duringthe 1990s, the modernistfundamentalist partyalso distributed a poster calling on PASsupporterstowage jihadandmartyrdomagainstthe UMNO and the BN alliance.36 Moreover,there is documented evidence that PASpredecessorPMIPemployedwhatcouldbecalledscaretacticsduringthe1959and1964elections,for example forcing ruralvoters to swearon theQuranthattheywouldvoteforPMIPcandidates,or handing out guides for Muslim voters thatreferencedtheQuranandHadith.37Inallfairness,as PAS has gained more practical political

experience, it has softened its rhetoric and nowoften notes its commitment to democracy andtransparency, thus subtly criticizing UMNOstrend toward authoritarianism under Mahathir.As PAS message has evolved, it has alsoexpressed its certainty that the tenets andpractices of Islam are fundamentally compatiblewithdemocracy.38ThisevolutionisevidencedbyPASelectionslogansduringdifferentperiods; in1986,PASelectionsloganwastheforcefulPAS:PartyofAllah,whichsoftenedtoProgresswithIslamduringthe1990and1995campaigns.39

Foritspart,UMNOhasassociatedrivalPASwithIslamicextremismandterrorismasameansof frightening voters. This trend has beenespecially pronounced since the September 11attacks,whenUMNO linkedPAS to theTalibanregimeinAfghanistanandotherIslamicextremistmovements, such as Kumpulan Militan Malaysiaand JemaahIslamiyah. Analyst JosephLiownotesthatUMNO justifies these verbal attacks on thegrounds that PAS has been slow to condemnterroristsandextremists in thepast,andbecauseseveral members have voiced support forPalestiniansuicidebombers.40

Morepositively,oneUMNOaction thathada strong symbolic impact was its invitation toIslamic revivalist leader Anwar Ibrahim to jointhe Mahathir administration in 1981, a periodmarked by high Islamic sentiment in Malaysia.Scholar SyedAhmadHussein suggests that thismovealsodescribedastheAnwarfactor,duetoAnwars popularity and capacity for politicalmobilizationservedtoreinforcethepartysnewcommitment to Islam.41 When Mahathir laterdismissed Anwar in 1999 on charges of sexualmisconduct, theAnwar factor and its associatedsymbolismworkedagainsttheUMNO,leadingtoa public outcry over Anwars mistreatment inprison.42 At around the same time thatUMNOcooptedAnwar, italso considered changing theM in itsacronym tostand forMuslimratherthan Malay, but later decided against thechange.43

Furthermore,during its nearly fivedecadesin office, UMNO has had the opportunity topursuemanyfeelgoodIslamicinitiatives,suchas sponsoring Quran reading contests, building

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new mosques, scheduling Islamic programmingonTV, andproviding subsidies to civil servantswhoperformthehaj.44Initiativessuchasthesearegenerally politically safe in a highly pluralisticsocietylikeMalaysia,astheydonothaveagreatimpact on nonMuslim sectors of society, but atthesametimearepoliticallyadvantageousinthatthey do appeal to citizens who are Muslim.UnderMahathir,UMNOalsobegantoencouragetheuseof Islamicgreetings and salutations, andmany government speeches now start with theArabicgreeting,asalamalaikum(peacebeuponyou).

PAShasalsopursuedfeelgoodinitiativesinstates where it has held political control, mostnotably in its stronghold state ofKelantan. Forexample,inKelantansstatecapitalofKotaBahru,Nik Abdul Aziz Nik Mat, Menteri Basar (ChiefExecutive of the State government) of Kelantansince 1990 and a Tok Guru (traditional leader),givesakuliyyah(lecture)inthestreeteveryFridaymorningthattypicallyhasareligiousandpoliticalmessage.Thesewellknownkuliyyaharerecordedin books and on audio and video tapes and arethen distributed throughout Malaysia.45 Theyhave served at once to spread the PAS religiopolitical message and to increase politicalvisibility,whilealsobuildingastrongsentimentalconnection between the PAS leader and thepeopleofKelantan. Symbolic initiatives suchasthesehaveactuallyallowedPAStobuildpoliticalpowerandinfluencedespitethesubstantialfiscalandadministrativerestraintsimposeduponPAScontrolled states by the UMNOled centralgovernment.

Substance PASandUMNOhavealsoundertakenmore

substantiveIslamicstatementsandpoliciesintheyears since independence, although these arefewer in number than the largely symbolicgesturesdescribedabove. During the1970sand1980s, UMNO national leadership establishedseveral permanent bodies to promote Islam andIslamic education, including an IslamicResearchCenter and an International Islamic University.UMNO also elevated the National Council of

IslamicAffairs to apermanent statuswithin thePrimeMinistersoffice.

More significantly, Mahathir introducedIslamic banking, securities, and insurance lawsand amended the constitution to increase thepower of Islamic legal authorities.46 DonaldHorwitzdescribesthetrend:

Nowhere . . . in Asia has theIslamization of law preceded moremethodologically than in Malaysiawhere, in the spanofadecade,dozensof new statutes and judicial decisionshave clarified, expanded, andreformulated the law applicable toMuslims...whathasbeenattemptedisthe creation of two parallel, relativelyautonomous systems, one secular andoneIslamic.47These changes are indeed revolutionary,

howevertheyareadministeredbyeachstateandare still applicable only to the Muslims ofMalaysia,inaccordancewiththe9thSchedule,ListII,Paragraph1oftheMalaysianConstitution.48

BecausePAShasmaintainedpoliticalcontrolover several states on the eastern side of theMalaypeninsula, ithasalsohad theopportunitytopursuesomemoresubstantiveIslamicpolicies.The clearest example of this is its 1992introduction of hudud legislationwhich theUMNO has been hesitant to pursuein itsstrongholdstateofKelantan. Hudud isaportionof the syariah comprising a set of laws andpunishments for offenses such as adultery,stealing, consumption of alcohol, and apostasy.Hussein suggests thatPAS introduced thehududlegislation knowing that it would not beenforceable without amendments to the federalConstitution,whichwould be nearly impossiblesince it requires a two thirds majority inparliament. PAS itself has noted that the hududrequiresstrictrulesofevidenceandstatedthat itwould not be enforced until society had fullyunderstood its requirements.49 Each time hududhas been introduced, it has been subsequentlywithdrawn on technical grounds.50 The PAScontrolledstatelegislatureinTerengganuactually

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passed hudud legislation, but its implementationwas impossible because of the statessubordinationtothefederalConstitution.51

Amore recent example of substantive PASaction is its Islamic State Blueprint document,whichwasofficiallypresentedinNovember2003,but failed to be subsequently released to thepublicfollowingcriticismfrombothMuslimsandnonMuslims.52 Despite the substantial mediahypesurrounding the termsof theBlueprint, thepresident of PAS repeatedly emphasized at itsofficial release that PASs concept of an IslamicstatewouldupholdallofthecurrentprinciplesoftheMalaysianConstitution,includingfreedomofreligion, statusquoof the court system, and thedemocratic rightsofeachcitizen.53 BecausePASnever publicly released the full text of theBlueprint, it is impossible to know the truecontentsof thedocumentand toverify the truthofitsclaims.Despiteitsfailuretobereleased,thisaction is considered substantive because theBlueprint was several years in the making andwasintendedtoserveasthepartysstrategicplan.

Conclusion Islamhasbeen intimately tied toMalaysian

governmentaffairsandpoliticallifesincethetimeoftheMalaccaSultanateinthe15thcentury,butitsmodernrootscanbe traced to thestartofBritishdecolonization, which produced the Malaynationalistmovementand thebirthofMalaysianIslamic politics. Islam, as one of the keycharacteristics of Malay identity, has served asboth a mobilizing and polarizing force inMalaysian politics since independence in 1957.Thesymbolicandsubstantiveexamplesdescribedinthispaperfurtherunderscorethisfact.

The twoprimaryMalayMuslimparties, themoresecularUMNOandthemorereligiousPAS,have vied for dominance of the MalayMuslimvote,whilesimultaneouslystrivingnottoalienatenonMalayMuslims or infringe upon theirConstitutionallyguaranteed rights. Theprimarymechanism for achieving this balance has beenthe deliberate, creative, and continuing use ofIslamic symbolism and substance . However,symbolicstatementsandactspursuedbyUMNOand PAS greatly outnumber the amount of

substantive actions, as is demonstrated by theprevious examples, and further borne out byother recorded incidents of Islamicinfluencedpolitical acts. Moreover, of those substantiveactions that have been pursued, a large numberhavehadlittleornoimpactonsociety,aspoliticalleaders have been unwilling or unable toeffectivelyimplementtheseinitiatives.

The underlying reason for the politicalemphasis on symbolic actions and gestures oversubstantive ones can be traced to the pluralisticnature of Malaysian society, which informs thenatureof theConstitutionand thepoliticalpartycoalition structure in parliament. In a highlypluralisticsociety likeMalaysia,where Islamhasplayedanimportantroleinthestatesinceitsinception,symbolism has been animportant mechanism forexpressingMuslim identitywithout substantiallyinfringing upon the rightsofminoritygroups.ScholarHussein notes thatMalaysian political partiesare keenly aware of thevalue of the politics ofsymbolicaction,andhaveusedittotheiradvantage.54Indeed, the skillfulemployment of Islamicsymbolism has helped theUMNO maintain politicalcontrol,buthasalsoallowedPAStogainpoliticalground. In1979,PrimeMinisterHusseinOnnofUMNO said, you wonder why we spend somuch [money]on Islam . . . [ifwedonot]PartiIslam [PAS] will get at us.55 Likewise, PASwould define the [UMNO] governmentsIslamizationascosmetics,longonsymbolismbutshort on substance.56 In other words, bothpartiesrecognizeandexploitthepowerofsymbolfor political gain. It isafter allthe fight forheartsandminds,andsubsequentlyvotes,thatisthe ultimate political objective of every politicalpartyinademocracy,andinthisregard,Malaysiaisnotanexceptiontotherule.

In a highly pluralistic society like Malaysia,

where Islam has played an important role in the

state since its inception, symbolism has been an important

mechanism for expressing Muslim

identity without substantially infringing

upon the rights of minority groups.

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The views and opinions expressed in articles arestrictly the authors own, and do not necessarilyrepresent those of Al Nakhlah, its Advisory and

EditorialBoards, or theProgram for SouthwestAsiaand Islamic Civilization (SWAIC) at The FletcherSchool.

1DanMurphy,AFightfortheHeartsandMindsofMalaysia,ChristianScienceMonitor,October30,

2002,http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1030/p08s01wosc.htm.CentralIntelligenceAgency,Malaysia,TheWorldFactbook,2004,http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/my.html.

2RobertDayMcAmis,MalayMuslims:TheHistoryandtheChallengesofResurgenceIslaminSoutheastAsia(GrandRapids:Eerdmans,2002),1016.

3MohamadTalibOsman,IslamizationoftheMalays:ATransformationofCulture,inReadingsonIslaminSoutheastAsia,AhmadIbrahim,SharonSiddique,andYasminHussein,eds.,(Singapore:ISEAS,1985),44.McAmis,50

4FredR.vonderMehden,MalaysiaandIndonesia,inThePoliticsofIslamicRevivalism,ShireenT.Hunter,ed.,(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1988),247.

5R.S.MilneandDianeK.Mauzy,Malaysia:Tradition,Modernity,andIslam(Boulder:Westview,1986),11.6Ibid.,12.7Ibid.,13.8McAmis,38;Milne,1516.9SyedAhmadHussein,MuslimPoliticsandtheDiscourseonDemocracy,inDemocracyinMalaysia:

DiscoursesandPractices,FrancisLohKokWahandKhooBooTeik,eds.(Richmond,UK:Curzon,2002),81.

10Ibid.,8182.11Ibid.,81;K.J.Ratnam,ReligionandPoliticsinMalaya,ReadingsonIslaminSoutheastAsia,Ahmad

Ibrahim,SharonSiddique,YasminHussain,eds.(Singapore:ISEAS,1985),143.12Ratnam,143.13Hussein,8182.14Milne,23.15Milne,27.16Milne,28.17ConstitutionofMalaysia,http://www.helplinelaw.com/law/constitution/malaysia/malaysia01.php.18Ibid.19ConstitutionofMalaysia,Schedule,

http://www.helplinelaw.com/law/constitution/malaysia/malaysia15.php.20Ratnam,143144.21CentralIntelligenceAgency,Malaysia,TheWorldFactbook,2004,

http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/my.html.DanielKingsbury,Malaysia:InclusionandExclusion,SouthEastAsia:APoliticalProfile(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),274.

22CentralIntelligenceAgency,Malaysia,TheWorldFactbook,2004,http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/my.html.Note:Otherethnicgroupscomprise10percentofthetotalpopulation.

23ArendLijphartdefinesconsociationaldemocracyasgovernmentbyelitecarteldesignedtoturnademocracywithafragmentedpoliticalcultureintoastabledemocracy.ArendLijphart,ConsociationalDemocracy,inWorldPolitics,21,no.2,1969.

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24IslamandPoliticalValuesinSaudiArabia,EgyptandSyria.MiddleEastJournal33,no.1(Winter

1979),119.(ReferredtoinSharonSiddique,ConceptualizingcontemporaryIslam:ReligionorIdeology?inReadingsonIslaminSoutheastAsia,AhmadIbrahim,SharonSiddique,andYasminHussein,eds.(Singapore:ISEAS,1985),341.

25Ratnam,144.TheoriginalnameofthepartywasthePanMalayanIslamicPartyorPMIP;thenamewaschangedtoPASin1973.

26Hussein,85.27Ibid.,85.28MohamadAbuBakar,ExternalInfluencesonContemporaryIslamicResurgenceinMalaysia,

ContemporarySoutheastAsia13no.2(September1991),220.29Liow,Reconstructing,230AbuBakar,220228.31McAmis,81.32Ibid.,86.33SyedAhmadHussein,MuslimPoliticsandtheDiscourseonDemocracy,inDemocracyinMalaysia:

DiscoursesandPractices,FrancisLohKokWahandKhooBooTeik,eds.(Richmond,UK:Curzon,2002),74107.

34Clearly,becausePASleadershiphasnothadthedepthofpoliticalexperienceatthemostseniorlevelsthatUMNOhashadoverthedecades,theyhavenotbeeninapositiontoenactsubstantiveIslamicpolicies,butthereareseveralmoresubstantialactionsandstatementstakenbyPASthatcanbeanalyzedforthispurpose.

35Ratnam,146.36Hussein,9192.37Ratnam,146147.38Hussein,96;DatoSeriTuanGuruHadiAwang,President,PASPartyMalaysia.FullTextSpeech.

TheLaunchingoftheDocumentonIslamicState.November12,2003.www.freeanwar.net/July2003/facnews121103b.htm.

39Hussein,93.40JosephLiow,OutlookforMalaysias11thGeneralElection,InstituteofDefenceandStrategicStudies,

Singapore,March2004.41Hussein,88.42JosephLiow,OutlookforMalaysias11thGeneralElection.43Hussein,87.44Ibid.,74107.45Khoo,Searching,18.46Hussein,88.47DonaldHorwitz,TheQuranandCommonLaw:IslamicReformandtheTheoryofLegalChangePr.

I,AmericanJournalofComparativeLaw42no.2(Spring1994),236.48ConstitutionofMalaysia,Schedule.49Hussein,95,97.50Liow,Deconstructing,4.51Ibid.,14.52DatoSeriTuanGuruHadiAwang,President,PASPartyMalaysia.FullTextSpeech.TheLaunching

oftheDocumentonIslamicState.November12,2003.www.freeanwar.net/July2003/facnews121103b.htm.LimKitSiang,ThePASDecisiontonotMakePublicitsIslamStateBlueprintismostDisappointing,September17,2003,http://www.malaysia.net/dap/lks2617.htm.

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53DatoSeriTuanGuruHadiAwang,President,PASPartyMalaysia.FullTextSpeech.TheLaunching

oftheDocumentonIslamicState.54Hussein,88.55Ibid.,86.56Ibid.,94.

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