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Transcript of Military-Strategic Information Section Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces Unclassified ||...
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 1
RECENT EVENTS IN LEBANON
IN L IGHT OF THE UN TRIBUNAL INDICTMENT
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Recent Events
Lebanon Background Lebanon Politics
Special Tribunal for Lebanon
Hizballah’s Threats
1/12: Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government
Government Formation Process
Map and Statistics
History of Main Events 1920-2010
Internal Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the Present
Social and Demographic Characteristics
Governmental Regime
Political Trends
Political Camps
External Actors
After Hariri’s Murder
The Judicial Process
Reactions to STL
Overview of Hizbullah
Hizbullah’s Military Aspects
A Threat to Lebanon
A Threat to Israel
A Threat to the Region
SUMMARY
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 3
SUMMARY• The fall of PM Saad Hariri’s government, and the growing tensions over the preliminary
indictments of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, have provoked fears of regional
destabilization and renewed sectarian violence in Lebanon.
• Hizbullah, strongly backed by a Syria and Iran striving to deepen their
influence in Lebanon, acts aggressively against state institutions and political
opponents to advance its interests, thus challenging Lebanon’s sovereignty and
independence.
• The present crisis highlights the increasing “Hizbullazation” of Lebanon. Hizbullah
continues to advance its goals, gain legitimacy and strengthen its political basis. For
the first time since “The Cedar Revolution” (2005), Syria and Hizbullah have
managed to attain political dominance.
• Hizbullah’s militaristic abilities and forces now largely surpass its 2006, pre-
Second Lebanon War levels. The international acceptance of this trend has rendered
Hizbullah confident of its power and its right to use it, despite its status as an illegal non-
state terrorist entity.
• A radical government led by Hizbullah will have a major effect on national
issues (government policy, “Defense Strategy”, internal security, UNIFIL’s mission,
STL), constituting strategic challenges, not only for Lebanon and Israel, but for the
entire region.
Focal P
oin
ts
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 4
RECENT EVENTS
Ministers Resign and Collapse of Hariri’s Government
On 12 January 2011, 11 Lebanese ministers withdrew from the National Unity
Government headed by Saad Hariri. The government immediately dissolved
due to the lack of support from the Lebanese Parliament.
Of those 11 ministers (including the Foreign Affairs,
Energy, Communications, Industry and Tourism
ministers), 10 are members of the “March 8”
political camp lead by Hizbullah. The other minister
is a presidential appointee who publicly identifies
with Hizbullah. This new crisis in the Lebanese political arena follows the failure between
Saad Hariri’s and Hizbullah’s coalitions to come to a comprise regarding
the outcome of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL, charged with investigating
the assassination of Rafik Hariri), despite mediation attempts by Syria and Saudi
Arabia to reach a deal concerning the reaction to the tribunal indictments.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 5
RECENT EVENTS
Government Formation Process
After the Hariri government has collapsed, the current administration is
considered temporary. The President (Michelle Suleiman) is required to
build a new government within 30 days by electing a (Sunni) Prime Minister
with the approval of Parliament.
In the past weeks, both the “March 8” and “March 14”
alliances have tried to convince external parties to support
them in their attempts to achieve a majority in the
Parliament (they need at least 65 of the 128 members).
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt’s support for the “March 8”
alliance could be decisive in promoting the formation of a
new government more closely related to Hizbullah.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 6
RECENT EVENTS
Government Formation Process
Due to these developments, Lebanon is currently trapped in a delicate
situation, giving rise to mutual accusations between the parties and
fears of renewed sectarian violence.
The events of the past few days, and the announcement
that Hizbollah has obtained a majority in the Parliament
to elect the Sunni millionaire Najib Miqati as the next
prime minister (as a consequence of Syrian moves),
demonstrate the plausibility of a government
established by Hizbollah.The “March 14” Alliance has expressed its refusal to participate in a Syrian-
Iranian “puppet” government. Employing martial rhetoric, proponents of
the Alliance called for a “Day of Anger” in protest. Christian leader Samir G’ag’a
declared that a pro-Hizbullah government could lead to a civil war and
“transform Lebanon into Gaza”.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 7
After Rafik Hariri’s Murder
Rafik Hariri, along with 22 other people, was killed on February 2005 by a truck
bomb. The murder initially led to the appointment of the UN International
Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), headed by Detlev Mehlis. The
Mehlis Report, presented on October 2005, implicated Lebanese, Syrian and
Iran intelligence officers.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
The present crisis climaxes over tensions
regarding the STL, which is expected to indict
members of Hizbullah and to determine
potential Syrian and Iranian culpability in
the Hariri’s political assassination.
Following the 1757 UN Security Council Resolution on May 2007, the
STL was finally created on March 2009 to procure a formal and binding
international sentence in the case. The mission headquarters are located
near the Hague and 49% of the project is financed by the Lebanese government.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 8
The Judicial ProcessThe draft indictments of the STL investigation were presented on Monday, 17
January 2011 but the details of the suspects and their charges remain
confidential.
However, various sources report that the STL will charge high-ranking Hizbullah,
Syrian and Iranian authorities with the crime of political assassination. This
judicial process represents a huge danger to Hizbullah’s – and its
supporters’ – status and legitimacy in Lebanon.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Following the decision of the prosecutor, Daniel
Bellemare, to publish the indictments, Judge Daniel
Fransen has 6-10 weeks to decide whether to confirm or
dismiss them. The names of the suspects will be
publicized if he decides that there is enough evidence to
proceed with a trial.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 9
Reactions to STLThe potential impact of the STL depends much more on how the different
relevant actors react to the report than the conclusion of the report itself.
Many Hizbullah officials have expressed their potential willingness to tolerate
a damning STL judgment should Hariri’s camp agree to make no concerted effort to
fulfill its sentence.
However, if the “March 14” camp is determined to fulfill the indictments or
possibly even declare support for the findings, Hizbullah might decide to re-ignite
hostilities and provoke bloodshed.
Hassan Nasrallah tried to quell the tensions, but also stated that Hizbollah
would not tolerate an arrest of any of its members. He also declared that
Hizbollah would deny support to the STL should it gain control of the
government.
SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 10
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 11
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Area: 10.452 km2
Width: 88 km (maximum)
32 km (minimum)
Population: 4.224.000
Population Density: 404/km2
Terrain: Plateau along the coast; mountainous in the center, east and north; valley in the far east.
GDP (estimate to 2010): $58.576 billion
GDP per capita: $14.988
Map and Statistics
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 12
LEBANON BACKGROUND
History of Main Events : 1920- 2010
1943
1975
1920
1978
1985
1989
1996
2000
2005
1993
1976
Founding of the “Great Lebanon”
entity
Lebanon achieves
Independence – “National
Pact”
Start of the
Lebanese Civil War
Syria enters Lebanon
End of the Lebanese Civil War,
“Taif Agreement
”
“Grapes of Wrath” Israeli
Operation against
Hizbullah
Hariri’s Murder,“Cedar
Revolution”, Syrian
withdrawal after UN
Resolution 1559
Israeli withdrawal from South
Lebanon
2009
National Unity Government
2006
Second Lebanon War
– UNIFIL
Mandate by UNSCR 1701 Resolution
1982
“Peace in the
Galilee” War,
creation of
Hizbullah
“Litani Operation”, Creation of UNIFIL by
425 Resolution
Israeli withdrawal to the “Security Border”
“Justice and Accountabili
ty”: First Israeli
operation against
Hizbullah
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 13
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
September 2004: Lebanon Constitutional Amendment – Backed
by Syria, its approval extended the office term of President Emile
Lahoud.
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
14 February 2005 – Rafik Hariri’s Murder – Former Prime Minister
Hariri killed by a car bomb in Beirut. Leaders of the March 14 Alliance
accused Syria and Hizbullah. In response, the March 8 Alliance, which
attributed responsibility for the murder to the USA and Israel, was
formed.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 14
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
26 April 2005 - Syrian Retirement after
UN 1559 Resolution – After the United
Nations called for an investigation, Syria
withdrew it troops from Lebanon. The
Lebanese political arena consolidated into
two political camps: the March 14 Alliance
and March 8 Alliance.
14 March 2005 – “Cedar Revolution” –
The murder of Hariri led to a series of
demonstrations, popularly named the “Cedar
Revolution”. Participants demanded the
withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon as
well as the establishment of an international
commission to investigate the murder.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 15
LEBANON BACKGROUND
July 2006 – Second Lebanon War - In response
to Hizbullah rocket fire and the wounding, killing
and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, the IDF entered
Hizbullah-controlled southern Lebanon. The war
resulted in UN Resolution 1701, which prompted a
ceasefire and established a renewed version of
UNIFIL to act as a deterrent to Hizbullah aggression.
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
May 2007 – Nahr al Bared conflict – Battles
between the Lebanon Internal Security Forces
(ISF) and militants of Fatah Al Islam (an Al-
Qaeda inspired group).
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 16
LEBANON BACKGROUND2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
May 2008 – Internal Strife – After Siniora’s
government attempted to prohibit a Hizbullah
communications network, the group responded with
violence. The struggle concluded with the “Doha
Agreement”, which ushered in Michel Suleiman as
president and sealed a commitment between the
coalitions to avoid a new civil war. June 2009 – Close victory of the “March 14 Alliance” in elections –
A national unity government was formed, directed by Saad Hariri and
including a Hizbullah veto (“National Silence Government”).
Lebanon Affairs: From the “2005 New Order” to the present
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 17
LEBANON BACKGROUND
Social and Demographic Characteristics
Lebanon’s population is a mixture of 18 ethnic-religious minorities, including
Muslim Shi’ites, Muslim Sunnis, Christian Maronites, Christian Greek Orthodox,
Druze and Greek Catholics. This country’s diversity is a consequence of its
history as a refuge for the region’s persecuted minorities.Druze
Shiites
Christians
Sunnis
The last official census was held in 1932,
when there was an established Christian
majority.
A recent non-official study by the
“Statistics Lebanon” firm shows that
Shiites constitute 28% of the total
population, Sunnis 28%, Maronites 21.5%,
Greek Orthodox 8%, Druze 5% and Greek
Catholics 4%.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 18
LEBANON POLITICS
Governmental Regime
President – Christian Maronite (Michel Suleiman)
Prime Minister – Muslim Sunni (Saad Hariri)
Parliament Chairman – Muslim Shiite (Nabih Berri)
Role Distribution in Government (before its fall):
Lebanon is technically governed as a parliamentary democracy. Due to its
complex demographic composition, Lebanon has a special governing system
known as “Confessionalism”, intended to ensure fair representation among its
diverse population.
This system functions in both the government and the parliament and was
implemented by the “1943 National Pact” and the “1989 Taif Agreement”.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
The 128 seats of the unicameral Parliament are equally divided between
Christians and Muslims, and proportionally between the minorities as well as
between the regions.
Unclassified || Slide 19
LEBANON POLITICS
Governmental Regime
Distribution in Parliament:
After Taif Before Taif Confession
27 20 Sunni
27 19 Shi’a
8 6 Druze
2 0 Alawite
64 45 Total Muslims
64 54 Total Christians + Muslims
After Taif Before Taif Confession
34 30 Maronite
14 11 Greek Ortodox
8 6 Greek Catholic
5 4 Armenian Ortodox
1 1 Armenian Catholic
1 1 Protestant
1 1 Other Christians
64 54 Total Christians
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 20
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Trends
Ethnic-Religious rivalry -
The main component of Lebanese politics affecting civil life, institutions
roles distribution, laws and policies. Parties tend to be armed or
connected to armed factions, so political issues tend to result in violent
confrontations.
External involvement –
Since the Civil War, Lebanon has been a battleground for regional actors to
settle their disputes. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Arab Emirates, the
USA and France are all historical stakeholders that have actively
influenced Lebanese politics by supporting parties and indirectly
dominating internal Lebanese affairs.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 21
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Trends
Hizbullah’s character as “a state within a state” –
Hizbullah’s civilian-military system, provided by Iran and Syria, enables it
to implement independent policies. Moreover, it gained the political “veto
power” by integrating into the former government.
The Palestinian issue –
A sensitive issue since the Civil War, the Palestinians maintain a
substantial presence in Lebanon as refugees. Most of them have a limited
legal status: they do not receive Lebanese citizenship or internal aid, and
are often manipulated to achieve terrorist goals, both local and
global.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 22
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
Religion and ethnic identification: Sunnis vs. Shiites vs.
Christians
Character of Lebanon: Secular vs. Islamist
Path of Politics: Moderation vs. “Resistance”
Regional affinity: Pro-Occidental / Pro-Saudi vs. Pro-
Syrian/Iran
Economic Methods
The elements that divide the camps
include:
The characteristics of the Lebanese political regime, “Confessionalism”, requires the
conforming of inter-ethnic political camps. This means combining different ethnic groups
and forming political alliances.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 23
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
Headed by Saad Hariri’s principle Sunni party (Movement of the Future) with Maronite and Druze allies, it was consolidated after the mass demonstrations of the “Cedar Revolution”.
Obtained parliamentary majority (71 of the 128 seats) in the June 2009 elections and formed a government after four months of negotiations.
Hariri is seconded by the Christian leaders Amin J’amil (Falanges chairman) and Samir G’ag’a (Kajal chairman).
“March 14” Camp
Since 2005, the Lebanon political arena has been divided into two main political
camps:
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 24
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
The main opposition coalition, it obtained 57 seats in the June 2009 elections and negotiated a national unity government with “veto power”.
It is conformed by the main Shiite parties Hizbullah (headed by Hassan Nasrallah) and Amal (headed by Nabih Berry), in cooperation with the Christian leader Michael Aoun and a number of Sunni, Christian and Druze leaders.
“March 8” Camp
The President: Michel Suleiman
The Druze leader: Walid Jumblatt
Non-aligned actors
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 25
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
PARLIAMENT ELECTION RESULTS 2009
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 26
LEBANON POLITICS
Political Camps
March 14 Al-liance, 60Ma
rch 8
Al-liance, 57
Progressive Socialist Party *, 11
SEATSPARTIES IN THE
COALITION
29Movement of the
Future (Mustaqbal)
15March 14
Independents
5 Lebanese Forces
5 Kataeb Party
2 Hunchak Party
1 Islamic Group
1 Ramgavar Party
1Democratic Left
Movement
1 National Liberal Party
SEATSPARTIES IN THE
COALITION
19Free Patriotic
Movement
13 Hizbullah
13 Amal Movement
4 Marada Movement
2Lebanese
Democratic Party
2
Armenian Revolutionary
Federation
2Syrian Social
Nationalist Party
2 Ba'ath Party
PARLIAMENT COALITIONS AFTER ELECTION RESULTS 2009
(*Note: The Progressive Socialist Party (Druzes) was firstly part of the 14 March Coalition, one month after the elections withdraw, but remain part of the Parliament majority)
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 27
LEBANON POLITICS
External Actors
The division between the Lebanese camps follows a familiar pattern in the
Middle East; they are divided into the “moderate camp” and the “radical camp”.
The chief external actors in Lebanese politics reflect this schism:
Syria – sees Lebanon as part of its area of influence,
primarily supports Shiites though also Sunni groups.
Recently returned to influential prominence in
Lebanon after international pressure forced its oust in
2005; is thus interested in maintaining stability.
Saudi Arabia – acts in support of the Sunnis to reinforce it position, especially
following Syria’s recent withdrawal. While it strongly supports Hariri, it also
wants stability.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 28
LEBANON POLITICS
External Actors
Iran – has a growing influence in the military arena
by providing financial support, intelligence, and
arms to Hizbullah, thus advancing Shiite interests
and fortifying the threat to Israel’s northern front.
Egypt, Arab Emirates – interested in protecting Sunni factions.
The Occident (mainly USA and France) – consider Lebanon a geo-strategic
asset in the region, and is interested in protecting the Christians minority
(Lebanon used to be a French colony). In addition, it works to support pro-
Occident Sunni parties.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 29
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Overview of Hizbullah
Following the rise of the Shiites in Lebanon in the 1960s-70s and the Islamic
Revolution in Iran in 1979, Hizbullah was established as a result of the 1982
Lebanon War, during which it was enforced by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Hizbullah’s main goal is to instigate an Islamic revolution in Lebanon by
imposing a government based on Shiite laws and to export this revolution to
different regions in the Middle East.
Hizbullah is a radical Shiite organization which
represents a major political and military force in the
region. The organization functions as a front-
line Iranian proxy, relying on both Iranian and
Syrian support.
With the death of Abbas Mussawi, in 1992, Hassan
Nasrallah was nominated as the new Secretary-
General. This marked a new era in Hizbullah
operations, combined with expanding political activity
as a party in the Lebanese Parliament.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Classified || Slide 30
HIZBULLAH THREATS
After the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, Hizbullah succeeded in
strengthening its status in the Lebanese “street”, progressively legitimizing itself
as a national resistance movement. This process was enforced by its entrance to
the government in July 2005. Once in a position of power, the organization slowly
consolidated its hold on the political situation, procuring a “veto” in 2008.
Hezbollah’s power stems from a number of sources:
Military PoliticalSocio-
Economic
Professional and well-trained army
Guerilla warfare techniques and civilian shields
Strategic force (UAV’s, missiles,
etc)
Terror component
Modus Vivendi with the government
Increased influence following
governmental recognition
“Blocking third” veto right
Operates primarily in Shiite regions
Ideological indoctrination
Largely backed by Iran
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 31
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Hezbullah’s modus operandi includes the use of
advanced conventional weapons with guerilla terrorist
techniques.
To this effect, it has amassed a massive arsenal
combined with advanced weapons, over 40,000
rockets, anti-tank and coastal missiles, IEDs, UAVs
and more.
This is backed by Scud and M600 rockets, which allow
Hezbollah to target the Israeli population from deep
within Lebanon strategic depth.
122mm Grad (25km / 15 mil)
240mm Fajr 3 (50km / 30 mil)
Fajr 5 (75km / 45 mil)
M-600 (300km / 185 mil)
Scud-D (600km / 375 mil)
THE IRANIAN-MADE ABABIL UAV
THE ZILZAL
220M ROCKET LAUNCHER
C802 COASTAL MISSILE
SAGGER ATGM MISSILES
Hizbullah’s Military Aspects
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Classified || Slide 32
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Following the Second Lebanon War in 2006 and despite UNSCR 1701, Hizbullah
began the process of repairing and increasing its capabilities. This occurred through
a number of venues:Training
Drills
Smuggling
Infrastructure
Personnel
Arsenal
Functioning as a front-line proxy of Iran in the region, Hizbullah continues to rely
on massive weapon transfers as a lifeline for its operations. The smuggling takes
place by air, land and sea, benefiting from pivotal Syrian support as well.
IRANIAN WEAPONS FOUND IN LEBANON
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Classified || Slide 33
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Despite the explicit prohibition of non-governmental weapons in southern
Lebanon (UNSCR 1701), many weapons are sent on to the region.
Iranian meddling in the region well exceeds weapon transfers. Iran continue to
play an active role in training members of Hezbullah, as well as providing
assistance for its political activity, which has already seen dividends.
"Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer…any arms or related material…all States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft“
(UNSCR 1747, Paragraph 5)
Iranian efforts are complemented by
massive economic support to Hezbullah.
The Iranian Quds organization alone
contributes between 100-200 million
dollars annually to Hezbullah.
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
34
Hizbullah’s military assets are deployed within populated areas throughout Lebanon, as part of its strategy, doctrine and preparation for war.
5,000 Activists
≈40,000 Rockets
Hizbullah’s Deployment
in Southern Lebanon
Command
Unit
Sector
Village
Each village military
compound contains dozens of activists and
hundreds of rockets
Concept of Operation
Massive long-range strike
Targeting mostly Israeli population centers
Territorial defense of the launching units
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
35
(Closed Military Zones)
2006 2010
CMZ Inhabited Environment
Khirbat Salim
14/17/09
Depot in town center containing 122mm rockets, 155mm rockets, mortars and more detonates
Tayr Falsi
12/10/09
Arms depot detonates. Weapons are removed and transferred to nearby village
Marwaheen
23/8/09
Local civilians forcibly eject Hizbullah operatives attempting to establish operations in town
Since Lebanon War, Hezbollah routinely deploys in the rural environment of southern Lebanon. This serves as its backbone for war-
time operations.
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 36
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Hizbullah possesses the most powerful military force in Lebanon,
thanks to Syrian and Iranian assistance. Its arsenal far outnumbers that of
the Lebanon National Army, and in some parts of the country constitutes the
de-facto martial authority.
Hizbullah continues to advance it goals, gain legitimacy and
strengthen its basis in Lebanon (and may even attain political
domination). It uses a dual strategy of accumulating power without seizing
control of the government while progressively weakening political rivals and
destabilizing the political system.
Hizbullah’s dual process of legitimization and destabilization in the
Lebanese political arena is expected to continue for the foreseeable future
(due to its demographic advantages), and could perpetuate ethnic tensions.
A Threat to Lebanon
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 37
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Since its creation, Hizbullah has posed a military threat to Israel’s
northern border, challenging Israel’s security interests in Lebanon and the
region.
During the past 30 years, Hizbullah has employed various means in its
attempt to terrorize the Israeli population, including attacks on Israeli
military bases, missiles fired at Israeli civilians, kidnapping soldiers, etc.
Hizbullah military potential is reserved as a future platform for Iran and Syria to
attack Israel. Iran established it and aided it with resources, logistics and
arms. For Syria, Hizbullah is useful in the fight against Israel and as a means
to advance its interests in the Lebanese internal political order.
A Threat to Israel
Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Unclassified || Slide 38
HIZBULLAH THREATS
Hizbullah envisions itself as an active regional player with the purpose
of creating an Islamic Shiite revolution in the Middle East.
Moreover, as an instrument of Iran Hizbullah believes that
moderate/pro-occident countries stand in opposition to their
plans in Lebanon. Hizbullah sees Lebanon as a potential military
platform from which to threaten said countries and thus accumulate
power for the radical camp.
A strong Hizbullah, in control of Lebanese politics and territory,
constitutes a destabilizing force in the region that threatens the
development of moderate trends in the Middle East.
A Threat to the Middle East