MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy ...

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MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010
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Transcript of MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy ...

Page 1: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE

3/29/2010

Page 2: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy Rule of Law Guarantees during non-election times Elections Democratic Culture Institutionalization

Page 3: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Methods of Ensuring Civilian Control Control of the allocation of leadership positions

The ability of the executive to remove high-ranking military personnel from their positions

Control over the setting of defense priorities and related policies The limitation of military advisors

Control and/or effective oversight over intelligence and espionage functions

Civilian Government Effectiveness and Credibility Control over the political process and effective

policy Economic stability Social tranquility Lack of corruption and fear

Page 4: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Methods of Avoiding Civilian Control The ideal of the military as “guardian of the

homeland” Loyalty: the continuing loyalty of soldiers to

the military before the state, and of the military to its own institutions before those of the state/society

Holdovers from non-democratic or transition-era laws: incomplete reorganization of power leads to the persistence of military prerogatives

Accommodation by Omission: certain topics are neither addressed by law nor in ongoing political negotiations

Page 5: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Methods of Avoiding Civilian Control Mediation: where civilian institutions are

unable to effectively represent various citizen groups and their competing demands, the military may take a role in doing so

Social Control: paramilitary groups and militarized police forces strengthen the role of the military in domestic control

Alliance with elites: the exchange of favors with civilian (economic and political) elites helps the military to retain influence

Page 6: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Police v. Military

Military: the capabilities of a nation pertaining to preparation and war-making capabilities As the guarantor of security – of national

existence – the military may operate outside of “politics as usual,” even within the confines of its own territory

The military is not the appropriate tool for the everyday provision of safety and order

Police: “civil force for maintaining order, preventing and detecting crime, and enforcing laws” (dictionary.com) The police are not concerned with threats to

national existence so much as the everyday maintenance of order

As an organization for civil administration, the police obey normal legal procedures

Page 7: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Chile: How We Got Here

Colonial Legacy: The Chilean judicial system as a remnant of Spanish colonization

Undermining the Inquisitorial System: the Allende Administration

The Fall and Rise of the Rule of Law: the Pinochet Regime 1973 state of siege 1980 Constitution

Page 8: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Chile: How We Got Here

Democratic Reforms Procedural reforms

Public trials Oral hearings Public prosecutors and defenders Recognition of victims' rights

Constitutional reforms Reduces the Presidential term to four years from

six Revokes the role of the armed services as

guarantor of national security Elimination of irremovability of military

commanders in chief Elimination of designated senators Weakens the National Security Council

Page 9: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Is the Military A Threat to Chilean Democracy? Control of the allocation of leadership

positions Constitutional reforms eliminate the irremovability

of military commanders in chief Constitutional reforms eliminate designated

senators Control over the setting of defense priorities

and related policies Territorial disputes with Peru and Bolivia Peacekeeping deployments in Haiti,

India/Pakistan, and the Middle East Force Modernization: Professionalization,

Cooperation between the branches of the services, Equipment acquisition

Page 10: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Is the Military A Threat to Chilean Democracy? Civilian Government Effectiveness and

Credibility Confidence in the police:

Latin America: 37% (2005) Chile: 64% (2005)

Confidence in the military: Latin America: 42% (2005) Chile: 49% (2005)

Satisfaction with Democracy Latin America: 31% (2005) Chile: 43%(2005)

Informe Latinobarometro

Page 11: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Is the Military A Threat to Chilean Democracy? The ideal of the military as “guardian of the

homeland” Constitutional reforms revoke the role of the

armed services as guarantor of national security The continuing loyalty of soldiers Holdovers from non-democratic or transition-era

laws Supreme Court expressly declared torture to be a

crime against humanity AND the amnesty decreed by the military government in 1978 is inapplicable to war crimes or crimes against humanity

The military justice system investigates all cases of alleged police abuse.

Page 12: MILITARY AND POLICE REFORM IN CHILE 3/29/2010. Civilian Control Over the Military and Democracy  Rule of Law  Guarantees during non-election times

Is the Military A Threat to Chilean Democracy? Accommodation by Omission

Consensus has emerged over the last decade that institutional violence has ceased to be a problem despite “individual lapses”

Because of high public approval ratings of the police, there is little political debate over the way they should function

Social Control During the political transition there was an

increased sense of insecurity and thus security was a major concern of the transitional government but the security agenda turned to focus on street crime

The use of the military to respond to natural disasters, including the recent earthquake