Mid-Term ExamMid-Term Exam

Thursday, Feb. 16Thursday, Feb. 16thth (in class) (in class) three sections (concise, brief written answers)three sections (concise, brief written answers)

– Part 1 Lectures – Bureaucracy and DemocracyPart 1 Lectures – Bureaucracy and Democracy one answer from choice of two questionsone answer from choice of two questions

– Part 2 Lectures – The Political-Bureaucratic InterfacePart 2 Lectures – The Political-Bureaucratic Interface one answer from choice of two questionsone answer from choice of two questions

– Part 3 Lectures – How the Bureaucracy Actually WorksPart 3 Lectures – How the Bureaucracy Actually Works one answer from choice of two questionsone answer from choice of two questions

Savoie and Gomery – Breaking the Savoie and Gomery – Breaking the Bargain...Bargain...

Savoie would support Martin govt’s approachSavoie would support Martin govt’s approach– Team 3, Team 4, Team 7 (yes)Team 3, Team 4, Team 7 (yes)– Team 2, Team 5, Team 6 (split)Team 2, Team 5, Team 6 (split)– Team 1 (mixed)Team 1 (mixed)– no...no teams!no...no teams!

Savoie would support Gomery, Vol.1 Fact-FindingSavoie would support Gomery, Vol.1 Fact-Finding– Team 1, Team 3 (yes)Team 1, Team 3 (yes)– Team 2, Team 5 (split)Team 2, Team 5 (split)– Team 7 (mixed)Team 7 (mixed)– Team 4, Team 6 (no)Team 4, Team 6 (no)

““Essence of Decision”Essence of Decision”Explaining the Cuban Missile CrisisExplaining the Cuban Missile Crisis

February 14February 14thth, 2006, 2006

Rational-Unitary Actor ApproachRational-Unitary Actor Approach

Cuban Missile Crisis as “Hard Case”Cuban Missile Crisis as “Hard Case” Rational-Unitary ActorRational-Unitary Actor

– identifies interestsidentifies interests– considers optionsconsiders options

Do NothingDo Nothing Diplomatic Pressure on KhruschevDiplomatic Pressure on Khruschev Secret Approach to CastroSecret Approach to Castro InvasionInvasion Air StrikeAir Strike BlockadeBlockade

– chooses optimal optionchooses optimal option

Organizational OutputsOrganizational Outputs

Date of Discovery -- October 14Date of Discovery -- October 14 thth

Organizational OutputsOrganizational Outputs

Date of Discovery -- October 14Date of Discovery -- October 14 thth

– SOPs explain why not earlier or laterSOPs explain why not earlier or later USIB – “September estimate”USIB – “September estimate”

– CIA SOP re: transmission timeCIA SOP re: transmission time

– SOP re: processing intelligence informationSOP re: processing intelligence information

– U-2 flight directive issued on Oct.4U-2 flight directive issued on Oct.4

Organizational OutputsOrganizational Outputs

Range of OptionsRange of Options– preferred option was airstrikepreferred option was airstrike

surgical airstrike not optionsurgical airstrike not option– MRBM classified as “mobile”MRBM classified as “mobile”

• Tactical Air Forces could only guarantee 90% Tactical Air Forces could only guarantee 90% effectivenesseffectiveness

– MRBM reclassified as “moveable” only after first week MRBM reclassified as “moveable” only after first week (e.g. October 20/21)(e.g. October 20/21)

The Bureaucratic Politics ModelThe Bureaucratic Politics Model

Date of DiscoveryDate of Discovery 10 day delay before October 1410 day delay before October 14thth U-2 flight U-2 flight

– Air Force vs. CIAAir Force vs. CIA

• failed Air Force mission on Oct.9failed Air Force mission on Oct.9

• co-operative mission – Oct. 14co-operative mission – Oct. 14

The Bureaucratic Politics ModelThe Bureaucratic Politics Model

Range of OptionsRange of Options the Presidentthe President

– RFKRFK

the Armed Forcesthe Armed Forces– Air ForceAir Force

– NavyNavy

the Secretary of Defensethe Secretary of Defense

The Bureaucratic Politics ModelThe Bureaucratic Politics Model

the Outcomethe Outcome blockade -- not the first choice of any one of the relevant blockade -- not the first choice of any one of the relevant

actorsactors– Implementation of blockadeImplementation of blockade

Navy vs. Presidential preferences for blockadeNavy vs. Presidential preferences for blockade– based on Navy SOPsbased on Navy SOPs– inititial public account that President preferences prevailedinititial public account that President preferences prevailed– reality – blockade operated from Navy-specified distancereality – blockade operated from Navy-specified distance

• result – one (possibly several) Soviet ships passed through result – one (possibly several) Soviet ships passed through blockade after it was operationalblockade after it was operational

crisis peak (October 27)crisis peak (October 27)– U-2 shot down over CubaU-2 shot down over Cuba

• US Air Force neglects to enforce Presidential order banning US Air Force neglects to enforce Presidential order banning any further overflightsany further overflights

The Denouement...The Denouement...

blockade effective on October 22 (through blockade effective on October 22 (through November 20)November 20)

Kruschev response (Oct. 26, Oct.27)Kruschev response (Oct. 26, Oct.27)– demand the US agree not to invade Cubademand the US agree not to invade Cuba

accepted publicly by JFKaccepted publicly by JFK

– demand that Jupiter missiles removed from demand that Jupiter missiles removed from TurkeyTurkey

accepted secretly by RFKaccepted secretly by RFK

Three Conceptual Lenses and the Three Conceptual Lenses and the Cuban Missile CrisisCuban Missile Crisisapplying the lenses to the Soviet applying the lenses to the Soviet

governmentgovernment– was the USSR acting as a rational-unitary was the USSR acting as a rational-unitary

actor?actor?– organizational structure modelorganizational structure model

the Arkhipov incident – Russian naval SOPsthe Arkhipov incident – Russian naval SOPs

– bureaucratic politics modelbureaucratic politics model