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    HUMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION

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    HUMAN FACTORSIN

    AVIATION

    This book provides introduction to human factors, human performance and limitations and related topics required to the aviationmaintenance personnel.

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    CONTENTS1. Introduction to Human Factors

    Need to Address Human Factors

    SHEL Model

    Incidents and Accidents

    Statistics

    2. Safety Culture and Organisational Factors

    3. Human Error

    Error Models and Theories

    Types of Errors in Maintenance Tasks

    Violations

    Implications of Errors

    Avoiding and Managing Errors

    Complacency

    4. Human Performance & Limitations

    Vision

    Hearing

    Information-Processing

    Attention and Perception

    Situational Awareness

    Memory

    Claustrophobia and Physical Access

    Motivation

    Stress

    Sleep.

    Fatigue

    Alcohol. Medication, Drugs

    Physical Work

    Repetitive Tasks

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    5. Environment Peer Pressure

    Time Pressure and Deadlines

    Work load

    Noise and Fumes

    Illumination

    Climate and Temperature

    Motion and Vibration

    Complex Systems Hazards in the Workplace

    6. Procedures, Practices, Professionalism and Integrity

    Visual Inspection

    Work logging and recording

    Keeping up- to- date

    The Dirty Dozen

    Comparing Good and Bad Professionalism

    7. Communication

    Modes of Communications

    Communication Within and between Teams

    Communication Problems

    Processing of Information

    8. Teamwork

    Concept of Teamwork

    Management, Supervision and Leadership

    Characteristics of Team Leader

    9. Human Factors Programs

    Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA)

    MEDA Process

    10. Bibliography

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    GLOSSARY OF TERMS

    AAIB Air Accidents Investigation BranchANO Air Navigation OrderAWN Airworthiness NoticeBCAR British Civil Airworthiness RequirementsCAA Civil Aviation AuthorityCAP Civil Aviation PublicationCHIRP Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting ProgrammeCRM Crew Resource Management

    dB decibelsFAA Federal Aviation Administration.FOD Foreign Object DamageFODCOM Flight Operations Department CommunicationHFAMI Human Factors in Aviation Maintenance and Inspection ,HFCAG Human Factors Combined Action GroupHFRG Human Factors in Reliability Group

    HSE Health and Safety ExecutivelATA International Air Transport AssociationICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation.IMIS Integrated Maintenance Information SystemJAR Joint Aviation RequirementLAE Licensed Aircraft Engineerlm lumenlux lumens/m2

    MEDA Maintenance Engineering Decision AidMM Maintenance ManualMORS Mandatory Occurrence Report SchemeMRM Maintenance Resource ManagementNIHL Noise Induced Hearing lossNDI Non-Destructive InspectionNDT Non-Destructive TestingNTSB National Transportation Safety BoardOJT On-the-job Training

    REM Rapid Eye MovementSHEL Software, Hardware, Environment, liveware

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    SMM Shift Maintenance ManagerSMS Safety Management SystemTWA Time Weighted Average

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    Human Factors" refers to the study of human capabilities and limitations in the workplace. The aim of Human Factors is to optimizethe relationship between maintenance personnel and systems with a view to improving safety, efficiency and well being.

    "Ergonomics" is the study of human performance and its application to the design of technological systems. The goal of this studyis to enhance productivity, safety, convenience and quality of life.

    If Ergonomics is properly applied to system design, the overall system reliability can be increased, and the human error can beminimized.

    Both Human Factors and Ergonomics are primarily concerned with human performance and human behavior and for practicalpurpose, taken as referring to the same technology.

    Human Factors apply knowledge of human behavior and attributes to the design of products, equipment, machines and large scalesystems for human use.

    Human Factors apply knowledge of human behavior and attributes to the design of products, equipment, machines and large scalesystems for human use.

    Thus, "Human Factors" is a multidisciplinary subject which includes such attributes as:

    Human Physiology.

    Psychology (inducing perception, memory, social interaction, error etc.)

    Work Place Design

    Environmental Conditions

    Human-machine Interface

    Social Science

    Biology and Statistics etc.

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    Practically, some of the Human factors which affect-human performance are: Lack of Knowledge

    Distraction

    Fatigue

    Routine

    Lack of Resources

    Stress

    Communication

    Time Pressure and Personal Problems

    The above list is not exhaustive, but only representative.

    1.2 The SHEL ModelIt can be helpful to use a model to aid in the understanding of human factors. or as a framework around which human factors issuescan be structured. A model which is often used is the SHEL model, a name derived from the initial letters of its components:

    Software: maintenance procedures, maintenance manuals, checklist layout, etc

    Hardware: tools, test equipment, the physical structure of aircraft, design of, flight decks, positioning and operating sense of controlsand instruments, etc.

    Environment: physical environment such as conditions in the hangar, conditions on the line, etc. and work environment such aswork patterns, management structures, public perception of the industry, etc.

    Liveware: the person or people at the centre of the model, including maintenance engineers, supervisors, planners, managers, etc.

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    Figure 1: SHELL 'Model Developed by Professor Elwyn Edwards in 1972 then modified by Capt Frank Hawkins in 1975

    The man -- the "Liveware" -- can perform a wide range of activities. Despite the fact that modern aircraft are now designed to embody

    the latest self-test and diagnostic routines that modem computing power can provide, one aspect of aviation maintenance has notchanged: maintenance tasks are still being done by human beings.

    However, man has limitations. Since Liveware is at the centre of the model, all other aspects (Software, Hardware .and Environment)must be designed or adapted to assist his performance and respect his limitations. If these two aspects are ignored, the human - inthis case the maintenance engineer will not perform to the best of his abilities, may make errors, and may jeopardize safety.

    Due to modern design and manufacturing, aircraft are becoming more and more reliable. However it is not possible to re-design the

    human being: we have to accept the fact that the human being is intrinsically unreliable.

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    However, we can work around that unreliability by providing good training, procedures, tools, duplicate inspections, etc. We can alsoreduce the potential for error.

    S: misinterpretation of procedures, badly written manuals, poorly designed checklists. Untested or difficult to use computer software

    H: not enough tools. Inappropriate equipment, poor aircraft design for maintainability

    E: uncomfortable workplace, inadequate hangar space. Extreme temperatures, excessive noise, poor lighting.

    L: relationships with other people; shortage of manpower, lack of supervision, lack of support from managers .

    Another very popular model is the PEEP model given by British Airways. The model is shown below:

    Figure 2: The PEEP model

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    1.3 lncidents and Accidents Attributable to Human Factors (Examples):There have been-several "high profile" incidents and accidents which have involved maintenance human factors problems. Some ofthe major incidents and accidents are summarized below. These are:

    Accident to Boeing 737 - 200, (Aloha flight 243), Hawaii on 28 April 1988;

    Accident' to BAC 1-11, G-BJRT, (British Airways flight 5390), over Oxford shire on 10th June 1990.

    Incident involving Airbus A320, G-KMAM (Excalibur Airways) at London Gatwick Airport, on 26 August 1993.

    Incident involving Boeing 737-400 GOMM (British Midland) near Dave try, on 23 February 1995.

    Incident involvingA 320, Lufthansa on 20 March 2001.

    The accident involving Aloha flight 243 in April 1988 involved 18 feetof the upper cabin structure suddenly being ripped away in: flightdue to structural failure. The Boeing 737 involved in this accident had been examined, as required by US regulations by two of theengineering inspectors.

    Figure 3: Aloha accident

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    Most of the incidents that occurred due to maintenance errors were found to be characterized by the following: There were s1aff shortages

    Time pressures existed

    Most of the errors occurred at night

    Shift or task handovers were Involved

    They all involved supervisors doing long hands-on tasks

    There was an element of a "can-do" attitude

    Interruptions occurred

    There was some failure to use approved data or company procedures Manuals were confusing and

    There was inadequate pre-planning, equipment or spares.

    In all of the examples above, the accident or incident was preventable and could have been avoided ifanyone of a number of thingshad been done differently.

    In some cases, a number of individuals were involved and the outcome could have been modified if anyone of them had reacted orqueried a particular action. In each situation however, the individuals failed to recognize or react to signs of potential hazards did not

    react as expected of them or allowed themselves to be diverted from giving their attention to the task in hand, leaving themselvesopen to the likelihood of committing an error.

    As with many incidents and accidents, all the examples above involved a series of human factors problems which formed an errorchain. If any one of the finks in this "chain" had been broken by building in measures which may have prevented a problem at one ormore of these stages, these incidents may have been prevented.

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    Figure 4: The Error Chain1.4 Statistics

    In 1940 it was calculated that approximately 70'% of all aircraft accidents were attributable to man's performance, that is to sayhuman error, When the International Air Transport Association (lATA) reviewed the situation 35 years later, they found that therehad been no reduction in the human error component to accident statistics.

    A study was carried out in 1986, in the USA by sears looking at significant accident causes in 93 aircraft accidents. These were asfoIIows:

    If any one of the links in thisIf any one of the links in this chainchain had been broken by building in measures which may havehad been broken by building in measures which may haveprevented a problem at one or more of these stages, these incideprevented a problem at one or more of these stages, these incide nts may have been prevented.nts may have been prevented.

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    Contributory factors for-the accidents Percentage of accidentsPilot deviated from basic operational procedures 33Inadequate cross-check by second crew member 26

    Design faults 13Maintenance and inspection deficiencies 12

    Absence of approach guidance 10

    Captain ignored crew inputs 10

    Air traffic control failures or errors 9Improper crew response during abnormal conditions 9

    insufficient or incorrect weather information 8

    Runway hazards 7Air traffic control/crew communication deficiencies 6

    Improper decision to land 6

    As can be seen from the list, maintenance and inspection deficiencies are one of the major contributory factors to accidents.

    The UK CAA carried out a similar exercise in 1998 looking at causes of 621 global fatal accidents between 1980 and 1996. Again the

    area "maintenance or repair oversight IerrorIinadequate featured as one of the top 10 primary causal factors.

    It is clear from such studies that human factors problem in aircraft maintenance engineering area significant issue, warranting seriousconsideration.

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    Figure 5: Human causes versus machine causes for accidents

    From figure 5, it is seen that the machine causes for the aviation accident have come down presently due to advanced technologyand design in aircraft systems while the human causes for accidents have increased.

    Human error has the greatest potential to adversely affect Contemporary aviation safety. In 1993 the Boeing Airplane Companyanalyzed 220documented accidents and found the top three casual factors to be:

    Design defects (33/220)

    Flight crew not adhering to procedures (70/220}

    Maintenance and inspection errors (34/220)

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    The UK CAA published a list, in 1992, of the frequently recurring maintenance discrepancies, based on the Mandatory OccurrenceReports. The problems observed in the order of frequency of occurrence were: Incorrect installation of components

    fitting of wrong parts

    electrical wiring discrepancies (including cross-connections)

    loose objects (tools etc.) left in aircraft

    inadequate lubrication

    cowlings, access panels and fairings not secure

    landing gear ground lock pins not removed before flight

    The following figure 6 shows the percentage of accidents that took place in different phases of the flight. It is observed that theaccident rate is more during approach and landing phases.

    Figure 6: Percentage of accidents

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    Figure 7: In Flight Shut Down due to Maintenance Error

    An analysis by Boeing in 1993, conducted with - 122 documented occurrences (during 1989 -1991), involving Human Factors inducederrors with likely engineering relevance, is given below.

    Fastenings undone Iincomplete 22%Items left locked Ipins not removed 13%

    Caps loose or missing 11%Items left loose or disconnected 10%

    Items missing 10% -

    Tools 1 spares not removed 10%

    Lack of lubrication 07%

    Panels left off 03%

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    Statistics indicate that organizational or systemic errors within aircraft maintenance organizations are not limited to one organizationor one region. In many accidents analyzed, the behavior of the organizations and the individuals within the organizations before theoccurrences was similar.

    FOR EXAMPLE

    Maintenance inspection personnel failed to adhere to established methods and procedures.

    Those responsible for ensuring adherence to established procedures and methods failed to supervise not in "one-offs" butin. what were symptomatic of longer-term failures.

    High-level maintenance management failed to take positive action to require compliance with procedures as prescribed bytheir respective organizations.

    Maintenance work was performed by personnel who were not assigned to do the job but who, with good intentions, startedthe work on their own initiative and lack of proper and/or positive communication was evident extending the chain of errorwhich led to the accidents.

    One of the basic elements of the aviation system is the decision maker (high level management) who is responsible for setting goalsand for managing available resources to achieve and balance aviation's two distinct goals: safety and on-time cost effective

    transportation of passengers and cargo.

    Therefore it is not difficult to see why and where errors were committed.

    Inadequate pre-planning, equipment or spares

    Existence of time pressure

    At least one handover of work was involved

    Supervisors were doing hands on tasks

    There were staff shortages

    Occurrence of Interruptions during the task

    Manuals were confusing

    Failure to use approved data or procedures

    Almost all the features mentioned above are "organisational system" related.

    Safety culture is defined as the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavioror in layman's terms as "the way things are done in this company".

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    Companies often state that safety is their highest priority, but fail to live up to that maxim. Commercial pressure must not be allowedto outweigh safety even if it affects the bottom line. The ultimate goal of the safety culture is to eliminate accidents.

    The Board must be actively involved, or potentially it will be a drag on resources. The top managements drive and commitment mustbe unwavering. Its commitment to safety must be demonstrable.

    2.2 Styles of Safety CultureManagement is able to determine the style of safety culture of the organisation. Their actions not words have a significant effect onthat culture.

    Safety Coutures not only about the management's commitment to safety, it's also about the subsequent approach the staff takes tosafety in the workplace. Ideally management should seek to develop a Learning Culture, that is capable of supporting the Company'sbusiness principles and safety objectives.

    A good Culture should:

    Be supportive of the staff and management.

    Stimulate honest participation.

    Seek to learn from its mistakes and errors.

    Accept that mistakes will happen and encourage open reporting.

    Treat those involved in the errors justly.Consider the implications of management and their systems in all incidents.

    Studies into company cultures in many industries have identified that beneath the corporate culture; there can also be professionalsub-cultures within the organisation. This means that the approach taken to work by a group may differ to that which the companyimagines.

    One such professional sub-culture is the Maintenance Sub-Culture. There is no malice or ill intent in such sub-cultures, it just relatesto the beliefs and understanding of that group and affects the way they work. Maintenance Sub-Culture could be generalized asbeing:

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    Figure 8: Sometime error committed has little consequences and sometimes it has grave consequences.

    3.1 Error Models and TheoriesTo appreciate the types of error that it is possible to make, researchers have looked at human error ina number of ways andproposed various models and theories. These models attempt to capture the nature at the error and its characteristics. To illustratethis, the following models and theories will be briefly highlighted:

    Design - versus operator-induced errors;

    Variable versus constant errors; Reversible versus irreversible errors;

    Slips, lapses and mistakes

    Skill rule and knowledge-based behaviors and associated errors;

    The "Swiss Cheese Model"

    3.1.1 Design-Versus Operator-Induced ErrorsIn aviation emphasis is often placed upon the error(s) of the frontline operators that may include flight crew, air traffic controllers and

    aircraft maintenance engineers.

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    However errors may have been made before an aircraft ever leaves the ground by aircraft designers. This maymean that, even if .an

    aircraft is maintained and flown as it is designed to be, a flaw in its original design may lead to operational safety being compromised.

    Alternatively, flawed procedures put in place by airline maintenance organisation or airtrafficcontrol management may also lead tooperational problems.

    3.1.2 Variable versus Constant ErrorsIn his' book "Human Error", ProfessorJames Reason discusses two types of human error: variable and constant. The variableerrors are random in nature, whereas the constant errors follow some kind of consistent, systematic (yet erroneous) pattern.

    The implication is that constant errors may be predicted and therefore controlled, whereas variable errors: cannot be predicted andare much harder to deal with.

    If we know enough about the nature of the task, the environment it is performed in, the mechanisms governing performance, and thenature of the individual. We have a greater chance of predicting an error.

    Figure 9: Example of constant errors and variable errors

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    Target patterns of bullets shot by two Riflemen are shown above. Rifleman A's pattern exhibits variable error and Rifleman B's

    pattern exhibits larger constant error.

    However, it is rare to have enough information to permit accurate predictions; we can generally only predict along the lines of "re-assembly tasks are more likely to incur errors than dismantling tasks or "An engineer is more likely to make an error at 3 a.m. afterhaving worked 12 hours, than at10 a.m. after having worked only 2 hours".

    It is possible to refine these predictions with more information but there will always be random errors or elements which cannot bepredicted.

    3. 1.3 Reversible versus Irreversible ErrorsAnother way of categorizing errors is to determine whether they are reversible or irreversible. The former can be recovered from,whereas the latter typically cannot be.

    For example, if a pilot miscalculates the fuel he should carry, he may have to divert to a closer airfield, but if-he accidentally dumpshis fuel, he may not have many options upon him.

    A well designed system or procedure should mean that errors made by aircraft maintenance engineers are reversible. Thus, if an

    engineer installs a part incorrectly, it should be spotted 'and corrected before the aircraft is released back to service by supervisoryprocedures in place.

    3.1.4 Slips, Lapses and MistakesReason highlights the notion of "intention" when considering the nature of error, asking the questions:

    Were the actions directed by some prior intention?

    Did the actions proceed as planned?

    Did they achieve their desired end?

    The most well-known of these are slips, lapses and mistakes.

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    Figure 10: Error classification based on intention

    Slips typically occur at the task execution stage, lapses at the storage (memory) stage and mistakes at the planning stage.

    Slips can be thought of as actions not carried out as intended or planned, e.g. transposing digits when copying out numbers, ordisordering steps in procedure.

    Lapses are missed actions and omissions, i.e. when somebody has failed to do something due to lapses of memory and/or attentionor because they have forgotten something, e.g. forgetting to replace an engine cowling.

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    Errors at the knowledge-based performance level are related to incomplete or incorrect knowledge or interpreting the situation

    incorrectly. An example of this might be when an engineer attempts an unfamiliar repair task and assumes he can work it out. Oncehe has set out in this way, he is likely to take more notice of things that suggest he is succeeding in his repair, while ignoringevidence to the contrary (known as confirmation bias).

    3.1.6 The Swiss Cheese ModelIn his research, Professor James Reason has highlighted the concept of defences against human error within an organization, andhas coined the notion of defenses in depth.

    Examples of defences are duplicate inspections, pilot pre-flight functional checks, etc., which help prevent to trap human errors,reducing the likelihood of negative consequences. It is when these defenses are weakened and breached that human errors canresult in incidents or accidents.

    These defences have been portrayed diagrammatically, as several slices of Swiss Cheese (and hence the model is known asProfessor Reasons Swiss Cheese model)

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    Figure 11: Prof.James Reasons Swiss Cheese Model

    Some failures are latent, meaning that they have been made at some point in the past and lay dormant. This may be introduced atthe time an aircraft was designed or may be associated with a management decision.

    Errors made by front line personnel, such as aircraft maintenance engineers, are active failures. The more holes in a systemsdefences, the more likely it is that errors result in incidents or accidents, but it is only in certain circumstances, when all holes lineup, that these occur.

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    An example of an optimizing violation would be an engineer who has to go across the airfield and drives there faster than permitted.

    3.3.1 Reason's Study of Aviation Maintenance -EngineeringReason analysed the reports of 122 maintenance incidents occurring with in a major airline over a 3 year period. He identified themain causes as being:

    Omissions (56%)

    Incorrect installation (30%)

    Wrong parts (8%)

    Other (6%)

    It is likely that Reason's findings are representative for the aircraft maintenance industry as a whole. Omissions can occur for avariety of reason, such as forgetting, deviation from a procedure (accidental or deliberate), or due to distraction.

    The B737 double engine oil loss incident in which the HP rotor drive covers were not refitted is an example of omission.

    Incorrect installation is unsurprising, as there is usually only one way in which something can be taken a part but many possible waysin witch it can be reassembled.

    Reason illustrates this with a simple example of a bolt and several nuts asking the questions (Figure 12).

    Figure 12: Professor: James Reason's Nut and Bolt example

    (a) How many ways can this is disassembled?(The answer being 1) and:

    b) How 'many ways can it be reassembled?(The answer being about 40,000, excluding errors of omission).

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    3.4 Implications of Errors (i.e. Accidents)

    In the worst cases, human errors in aviation maintenance can and do cause aircraft accidents. However, as portrayed in figure 13,accidents are the observable manifestations of errors. Like an iceberg witch has most of its mass beneath the water line, the majorityof errors do not result in actual accidents.

    Figure 13: The Iceberg Model of Accidents

    Thankfully most errors made by aircraft maintenance engineers do not have catastrophic results. This does not mean that this mightnot be the result should they occur again.

    3.5 Avoiding and Managing ErrorsWhilst the aircraft maintenance engineering industry should always strive towards ensuring that errors do not occur in the first place,it will never be possible to eradicate them totally. Therefore all maintenance organisations should aim to manage errors.

    Error management has two components in its approach. They are

    Prevent; errors from occurring and

    Eliminate or mitigate the bad effects of errors

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    Professor James Reason refers to the two components of error management as:

    Error containment and. Error reduction,

    To prevent error from occurring, it is necessary to predict where they are most likely to occur and then to put in place preventativemeasures.

    Incident reporting schemes do this for the industry as a whole. Within a maintenance organisation, data on errors, incidents andaccidents should be captured with a Safety Management System (SMS), which should provide mechanisms for identifying potential

    weak spots and error-prone activities or situations. Output from this should guide local training, company procedures the introductionof new defenses, or the modification of existing defenses.

    Barriers are an easy way to block the route to error. But each barrier will have a flaw that is the Human Element, Some of thecommonly used barriers are:

    Recruitment of skilled labor

    Training

    Procedures

    Legislation:

    Inspection and Certification

    According to Professor James Reason, error management induces measure to: Minimise the error liability of the individual or the team Reduce the error vulnerability of particular tasks or task elements. Discover, assess and then eliminate error-producing (and violation -producing)factors within the workplace Diagnose organisational factors that create error-producing factors within the individual, the team the task orthe workplace. Enhance error detection

    Increase the error tolerance of the workplace or system Make latent conditions more visible to those who operate arid manage the system and. Improve the organizations intrinsic resistance to human fallibility

    It would be very difficult to list all means by which errors might be prevented or minimized in aircraft maintenance. In effect, the wholeof this book discusses mechanisms for this, from ensuring that individuals are fit and alert, to making sure that the hangar lighting isadequate.

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    One of the things likely to be most effective in preventing error is to make sure that engineers follow procedures. This can be effected

    by ensuring that the procedures are correct and usable, that the means of presentation of the information is user-friendly andappropriate to the task and context, that engineers are encouraged to follow procedures and not to cut corners.

    3.6 ComplacencyThrough out the industry worldwide, 20% of all accidents are caused by machine and 80% by human operatives. In attempting tounderstand the motives contributing to accident, and in particular to understand the chain of events preceding them, "complacency"has been found to be active ingredient in many incidents.

    Complacency is a self satisfied attitude and it can be defined as follows:"Unjustified self - satisfaction accompanied. By a law awareness of the need for action or involvement" Or a conscious orunconscious relaxation of one's usual standards in making decision and taking action"

    We canput like this. "The difference between ignorance and complacency?" is " I don't know and I don't care".

    Complacency is an attitude. and attitudes govern the probabilities of our responding to certain incidents in a given set ofcircumstances. Because of most of the repetitive nature of the aviation maintenance work, complacency is an ever-present danger.

    When a person becomes complacent, his stress level for the task decreases andconsequently does his performance. The majorcontributors of complacency in aviation industry are:

    RELIABLE AIRCRAFTToday's aircraft is so reliable that they can contribute to complacency.

    FAMILIAR CIRCUMSTANCESIt is not unusual that after having driven to the, Work place, an operative is often unable to recall passing someprominent landmark. This overly familiarsituation can, and does apply to maintenance too.

    EXPECTANCYOperatives will often see or hear what they expect to seeorhear, rather than what is actually occurring.

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    The major symptoms of complacency are:

    Accepting lower standards of performance. Erosion of desire to remain proficient Boredom and inattention: Satisfied with the status quo Increased feeling of well being and Neglecting personal safety items.

    The safety nets for the complacency are: Awareness of the situation Professional investment Physical fitness Planning ahead Initial and recurrent training Creating challenges for yourself and Facing the reality

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    Figure 14: The human eye.

    4.1.1 The CorneaThe cornea is a clear window at the very front of the eye. The cornea acts as a fixed focusing device. The focusing is achieved bythe shape of the cornea bending the incoming light rays. The cornea is responsible for between 70% and 80% of the total focusingability (refraction) of the eye.

    4.1.2 The Iris and PupilThe iris (the colored part of the eye) controls the amount of light that is allowed to enter the eye. It does this by varying the size of thepupil (the dark' area in the centre of the iris). The size of the pupil can be changed very rapidly to cater for changing light Levels. Theamount of light can be adjusted by a factor of 5:1.

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    Figure 15: Details of human eye

    4.1.3 The LensAfter passing through the pupil, the light passes through the lens. Its shape is changed by the muscles (ciliary muscles) surrounding

    it which results in the final focusing adjustment to place a sharp image onto the retina. The change of shape of the lens is calledaccommodation.

    In order to focus clearly on a near object, the lens is thickened. To focus on a distant point, the lens is flattened. The degree ofaccommodation can be affected by factors such as fatigue or the ageing process.

    4.1.4 The RetinaThe retina is located on the rear wall of the eyeball. It is made up of a complex layer or nerve cells connected to the optic nerve. Two

    types of light sensitive cells are found in the retina -- rods and cones.

    The central area of the retina is known as the fovea and the receptors in this area are all cones. It is here that the visual image istypically focused. Moving outwards, the cones become less dense and are progressively replaced by rods, so that in the periphery ofthe retina, there are only rods.

    At the point at which the optic nerve joins the back of the eye, a "blind spot" occurs. This is not evident when viewing things with botheyes (binocular vision), since it is not possible for the image of an object to fall on the blind spots of both eyes at the same time.

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    However, this protection can only be provided for a maximum of about 15 minutes, and does not provide protection against sudden

    impulse noise such as gunfire. It does explain why a person is temporarily "deafened'" for a few seconds after a sudden loud noise.

    The middle ear is usually with air which is refreshed by way of the Eustachian tube which connects this part of the ear with back ofthe nose and mouth. However, this tube can allow mucus to travel to the middle ear which can build up, interfering with normalhearing.

    Figure 16: The Human ear.4.2.3 Inner Ear

    Middle ear unlike the middle ear, the inner ear is filled with fluid. The last of the ossicles in the middle ear is connected to thecochlea. This contains a fine membrane (the basilar membrane) covered in hair like cells which are sensitive to movement in thefluid. Any vibrations they detect cause neural impulses to be transmitted to the brain via the auditory nerve.

    4.2.4. Performance and Limitations of the EarThe performance of the ear is associated with the range of sounds that can be heard both in terms of the pitch (frequency) and thevolume of the sound.

    Volume (or intensity) of sound is measured in decibels (dB). Table below shows intensity levels for various sounds and activities.

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    4.2.5 Impact of Noise on Performance

    Noise can have various negative effects in the workplace. It can: Be annoying (e.g. sudden sounds, constant loud sound, etc.); Interfere with verbal communication between individuals in the workplace; Cause accidents by masking warning signals or messages; Be fatiguing and affect concentration, decision malting, etc.; damage workers hearing (either temporarily or permanently)

    The amount of vibration detected in the cochlea depends on the volume and pitch of the original sound. The audible frequency rangethat a young person can hear, is typically between 20 and 20,000 cycles per second (or Hertz), with greatest sensitivity at about 3000Hz.

    Typical sound levels for various activities

    Intermittent and sudden noise are generally considered to be more disruptive' than continuous noise at the same level. In addition,high frequency noise generally has a more adverse affect on performance than lower frequency. Noise tends to increase errors andvariability, rather than directly affect rate.

    4.2.6 Hearing ImpairmentHearing loss can result from exposure to even relatively short duration noise. The degree of impairment is influenced mainly by theintensity of the noise. Such damage is known as Noise Induced Hearing Loss (NIHL).

    Activity Approximate Intensity level (Decibels)

    Rustling of leaves IWhisper 20Conversation at 2m 50Typewriter at 1 m 65

    Car at -50 Km/Hr - 70Lorry at 15m 75Power Mower at 2m 90Propeller aircraft at 300m 100Jet aircraft at 300m 110Standing near a propeller aircraft 120Threshold of pain 140Immediate hearing damage results 150

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    Cerebellum: Co-ordinates body movements byfine tuning the motor commands from the cerebrum. Using muscle tone and position

    of limbs, the cerebellum controls posture and balance.

    Figure 17: Major parts of Human Brain

    Brain Stem: Evolutionarily, the most primitive part of the brain it is directly responsible for sustaining the basic functions of life. Breathing Heartbeat Blood Pressure etc.

    The Thalamus and Hypothalamus lay below the cerebrum and connect it to the brain stem. The thalamus acts as a relay station, for

    incoming sensory signals to the cerebral cortex and for the outgoing motor signals, from it.

    The hypothalamus regulates many of the body's basic functions, such as eating, drinking, temperature regulation, sleep emotionalbehavior and sexual activity.

    The brain functions via complex neuronal, or nerve cell, circuits. Communication between neurons is both electrical and chemical.

    One neuron may communicate with thousands of other neurons, and many thousands of neurons are involved in even, the most

    simplest of behaviors.

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    Figure 18: Closer look into Human Brain Activities

    Areas of the brain have been mapped, each area being responsible for certain behavior and skills. Knowing, that certain areas of thebrain are responsible for certain functions has led a number of people to study the brain, to see if it is possible to predict habits andtrends in behaviour.

    Figure 19: Mapping of Human Brain Function

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    4.3.1 An Information Processing Model

    Information processing can be represented as a model. This captures the main elements of the process, from receipt of informationvia the senses, to outputs such as decision making and actions. One such model is shown in the figure 20.

    Figure 20: A Functional Model of Information Processing

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    Information processing is the process of receiving information through the senses, analysing it and making itmeaningful.

    Sometimes, what we perceive is distorted by passed experience or seeing Ihearing what we want to see Ihear. Sometimes ourbrain produces results that are ambiguous.

    The ability of the information processing system to perceive something (such as a picture, sentence, concept. etc.) even thoughsome of the data may be missing. The danger, however, is that people can fill in the gaps with information from their own store ofknowledge or experience, and this may lead to the wrong conclusion being drawn.

    There are many well-known visual 'illusions' which illustrate the limits of human perception.

    Figure 21: Linear Perspective

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    Figure 22: Colour Gradient

    Figure 23: Colour Gradient

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    Figure 24: Relative Size

    The concept of 'perspective' (how we perceive objects) is nothing new. In the 13th century, artists would paint to give depth and asense of distance in their paintings.

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    Figure 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31: Different Illusions

    Zollnur Illusion

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    Do you see some squares or rectangles? Really, this is nothing more than a bunch of lines going in every which direction, but the

    way our mind interprets these lines are totally different!! In the other diagram, there is a perfect square inside.

    Figure 32: Is it the word Liar or something else? Figure 33

    When you look at this you, probably see a triangle. There is not one there the way the circle parts are cut out, make us think is atriangle there even through there isnt any!

    Figure 34: The effect of expectation

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    When you first read this, what does it say? A Bird in The Bush?

    If you read this more carefully you will find that it says "A Bird in The The Bush!!!

    FINISHED FILES ARE THERESULT OF YEARS OF

    SCIENTIFIC STUDYCOMBINED WITHTHE EXPERIENCE

    OF YEARS...

    Figure 35: Count the number of Fs in the above passage.

    In aviation maintenance it is often necessary to consult documents with which the engineer can become very familiar. It ispossible that an engineer can scan a document and fail to notice that subtle changes have been made. He sees only whathe expects to see (expectation).

    As an illustration of how expectation, can affect our judgment, the same video of a car accident was shown to two groups of subjects.

    One group was told in advance that they were to be shown a video of a car crash: the other was told that the car had been involvedin a bump. Both groups were asked to judge the speed at which the vehicles had collided. The first group assessed the speed assignificantly higher than the second group. Expectation can also affect our memory of events. The study outlined above wasextended such that subjects were asked, a week later, whether they recalled seeing glass on the road after the collision. (There wasno glass). The group, who had been told that they would see a crash, recalled seeing glass; the other group recalled seeing no glass.

    4.3.2. Sensory Receptors and Sensory StoresPhysical stimuli are received via the sensory receptors (eyes. ears, etc.) and stored for a very brief period of time in sensory, stores(sensory memory). Visual information is stored for up to half a .second in iconic memory and sounds a re stored for slightly longer(up to 2 seconds) in echoic memory. This enables us to remember a sentence as a sentence rather than merely as an unconnectedstring of isolated words or a film as a film, rather than as a series of disjointed images.

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    4.5 Situational Awareness

    The process of attention, perception and Judgment should result in awareness of the current situation.

    Situation awareness has traditionally been used in the context of the flight deck to describe the pilot awareness of what isgoing on around him e.g. where he is geographically, his orientation in space what mode the aircraft is in, etc.

    In the aircraft maintenance engineering context, it refers to the perception of important elements, e.g. Seeing loose bolts or missing parts, hearing information passed verbally; the comprehension of their meaning e. g. why is it like this? Is this how it should be?

    Situation awareness is the synthesis of an accurate and op to-date mental model of ones environment and state, and the ability touse this to make predication of possible future states.

    As With decision making, feedback improves situation awareness by informing us of the accuracy of ourmental models and theirpredictive power.

    The ability to project system status backward to determine what events may have led to an observed system state, is also veryimportant in aircraft maintenance engineering, as it allows effective fault finding and diagnostic behavior.

    Situation awareness for the aircraft maintenance engineer can be summarized as: the status of the system the engineer is working on; the relationship between the reported detect and the intended rectification; the possible effect on this work on other systems; the effect of this work on that being done by others and the effect of their work on this work.

    4.6 MemoryMemory is, critical to our ability to act consistently and to lean new things. Without memory, we could not capture a "stream" of

    information reaching our senses, or draw on past experience and apply this knowledge when making decisions.

    Memory depends on three processes: registration -- the input of information into memory; storage - the retention of information: retrieval - the recovery of stored information.

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    Ulti t l if i fi d ki hi h b i h bi t ( h i t d i ) th h ld id

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    Ultimately, if an engineer finds working high up brings on phobic symptoms (such as severe anxiety and panic), they should avoidsuch situations for safety's sake. However, as with claustrophobia, support from team members can be helpful.

    Managers and supervisors should attempt to make the job as comfortable and secure as reasonably possible (e.g. providing kneepad rests, ensuring that staging does not wobble, providing ventilation in enclosed spaces, etc.) and allow for frequent breaks ifpracticable.

    4.8. MotivationMotivated behavior is goal directed, purposeful behavior and no human behavior occurs without some kind of motivationunderpinning it. Motivation reflects the difference between what a person can do and what he will do.

    Motivation can be thought of as a basic human drive that arouses, directs and sustains all human behavior. Motivation is usuallyconsidered to be apositive rather than a negative force in that it simulates one to achieve various things.

    However, just because someone is motivated, this does not mean to say that they are doing the right thing. For instance, manycriminals are also highly motivated: Motivation is so difficult to measure and predict.

    Some of the practical motivating factors are: opportunity for achievement opportunity for advancement recognition for good work increasing responsibility

    Some of the demotivating factors are: poor staff relations poor personnel policy poor salary

    poor job security I working conditions

    4.8.1. Maslow's Hierarchy of NeedsPossibly one of the most well-known theories which attempts to describe human motivation is Maslow's hierarchy of needs.Maslow considered that humans are driven by two different sets of motivational forces:

    those that ensure survival by satisfying basic physical and psychological needs; those that help us to realise our full potential in life known as self actualisation needs (fulfilling ambitions. etc.).

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    M l l i th h th ti l hi hi l t f th d ti t d t ti f Th th i th t th d

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    Maslow explains the hypothetical hierarchical nature of the needs we are motivated to satisfy. The theory is that the needslower down the hierarchy are more primitive or basic and must be satisfied before we can be motivated by the higher needs.

    Figure 36: Maslow's hierarchy of needs

    For instance, you will probably find it harder to concentrate on the information in this document if you are very hungry (as the lowerlevel physiogical need. to eat predominates over the higher level cognitive need to gain knowledge).

    There are always exceptions to this, such as the mountain climber who risks his life in the name of adventure. The higher up thehierarchy one goes, the more difficult it becomes to achieve the need. High level needs are often long-term goals that have, to beaccomplished in a series of steps.

    An aircraft maintenance engineer will fulfill lower level needs by earning money to buy food, pay for home and support a family. Theymay well be motivated by middle level needs in their work context (e.g. social groups at work, gaining status and recognition). It isnoteworthy that for shift workers, tiredness may bea more powerful motivator than a higher order need (such as personal satisfactionto get the job done in time or accurately).

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    Figure 37:Steps in Motivational Cycle.

    An interesting experiment on motivation was carried out in 1924 at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company inChicago. Here, the management altered various factors such as rest periods, lighting levels, working hours, etc. andeach time theydid so, performance improved, even when the apparent improvements were taken away!

    This suggested that it was not the improvements themselves which were causing the increased production rates, but rather the factthat the staff felt that management was taking notice of them and were concerned for their welfare. This phenomenon is known as theHawthorne effect.

    4.8.2 DemotivationHighly motivated people tend to show the following characteristics:

    high performance and results being consistently achieved; the energy, enthusiasm and determination to succeed; unstinting co-operation in overcoming problems; Willingness to accept responsibility. Willingness to accommodate change.

    STEP1: Need

    Need to complete a report in two weeks.STEP2: Buildup of Tension

    Worry that time will not run out;Doubts about abilities;Fear of failure;Set aside other needs

    STEP3: Focused activitiesResearch of the topic;Take notes;Prepare the outline;Write the report

    STEP4: Achievement of GoalTurn in completed report

    STEP5: Satisfaction and Tension ReductionFeel freedom to satisfy other needs

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    Stress can be felt when carrying out certain tasks that are particularly challenging or difficult. This stress can be increased by lack of

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    S ess ca be e e ca y g ou ce a as s a a e pa cu a y c a e g g o d cu s s ess ca be c eased by ac oguidance in this situation, or time pressures "to complete the task or job. This type of stress can be reduced by careful managementgood training, etc.

    Within the organisation, the social and managerial aspects of work can be stressful.

    4.9.4 Stress ManagementOnce we become aware of stress, we generally respond to it by using one of the two strategies defense or coping.

    Coping strategies involve dealing with the source of the stress rather than just the symptoms (e.g. delegating workload, prioritising

    tasks, sorting out the problem, etc.).

    Unfortunately, it is not always possible to deal with the problem if this is outside the control of the individual (such as during anemergency), but there are well published techniques for helping individuals to cope with Stress.

    Good stress management techniques include: Relaxation" techniques; Careful regulation of sleep and diet; A regime of regular physical exercise; Counseling: ranging from talking to a supportive friend or Colleague to seeking professional advice. .

    There is no magic formula to cure stress and anxiety merely common sense and practical advice.

    Defense strategies involve alleviation of the symptoms (taking medication, alcohol, etc.) or reducing the anxiety (e.g. denying yourself that there is a problem (denial), or blaming someone else).

    Coping is the process whereby the individual either adjusts to the perceived demands of the situation or changes the situation it self.

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    pMan, like all living creatures have to have sleep. Despite a great deal of research the purpose of sleep is not fully understood.

    Sleep can be resisted for a short time, but various parts of the brain ensure that sooner or later, sleep occurs. When it does, it ischaracterised by five stages of sleep:

    Stage 1: This is a transitional phase between waking and sleeping. The heart rate slows and muscles relax. It is easy towake someone up.

    Stage 2: This is a deeper level of sleep. But it is still fairly easy to wake someone.

    Stage 3: Sleep is even deeper and the sleeper is now quite unresponsive to external stimuli and so is difficult to wake.Heart rate, blood pressure and body temperature continue to drop.

    Stage 4: This is the deepest stage of sleep and it is very difficult to wake someone up. Rapid Eye Movement or REM sleep: Even though this stage is characterised by brain activity similar to a person who is

    awake, the person is even more difficult to be awoken than stage 4. It is therefore also known as paradoxical sleep.Muscles become. totally relaxed and the eyes rapidly dart back and forth, under the eyelids. It is thought that dreamingoccurs during REM sleep.

    Stages 1 to 4 are collectively known as non-REM (NREM) sleep. Stages 2-4 are categorised as slow-wave sleep and appear torelate to body restoration, whereas REM sleep seems to aid the strengthening and organisation of memories.

    Sleep deprivation experiments suggest that if a person is deprived of stage 1-4 sleep or REM sleep he will show rebound effects.This means that in Subsequent sleep, he will make up the deficit in that' particular type of sleep. This shows the importance of bothtype of sleep.

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    Figure 38: Typical cycle of REM and NREM sleep

    As can be seen from the above figure 40, sleep occurs in cycles. Typically, the first REM sleep will occur about 90 minutes after theonset of sleep, the cycle of stage 1 to 4 sleep and REM sleep repeats during the night about every 90 minutes. Most deep sleepoccurs earlier in the night and REM sleep becomes greater as the night goes on.

    Sleep is a natural state of reduced consciousness involving changes in body and brain physiology which is necessary to man torestore and replenish the body and brain.

    4.10.1 Circadian RhythmsApart from the alternation between wakefulness and sleep, men have other internal cycles, such as body temperature andhunger/eating. These are known as circadian rhythms as they are related to the length of the day.

    Although, circadian rhythms are controlled by the brain, they are influenced and synchronised by external (environmental) factorssuch as light.

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    Figure 39: The Circadian Rhythm for internal body temperature

    Figure 39 above, shows the circadian rhythm for body temperature. This pattern is very robust, meaning that even if the normalpattern of wakefulness and sleep is disrupted (by shift work for example), the temperature cycle remains unchanged.

    Hence, it can be seen that if you are awake at 4-6 o'clock in the morning, your body temperature is in a trough and it is at this timethat is hardest to stay awake. Research has shown that this drop in body temperature appears to be linked to a drop in alertness andperformance in man.

    Circadian rhythms are physiological and behavioral functions and processes in the body that have a regular cycle of approximatelya day (actually about 25 hours in man).

    An example of disrupting circadian rhythms would be taking a flight that crosses time zones. This will interfere with the normalsynchronization with the light and dark (day / night). This throws out the natural link between daylight and the bodys internal clock,causing jetlag, resulting in sleepiness during the day, etc. Eventually however, the circadian rhythm readjusts to the revisedenvironmental cues.

    The engineers performance at this low point will be improved if he is well rested, feeling well, highly motivated and well practiced inthe skills being used at that point.

    09:00 12:00 15:00 18:00 21:00 24:00 03:00 06:00 09:00

    Hour of the day

    Circadian rhythms are set by ourCircadian rhythms are set by ourBiological ClockBiological Clock..

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    5. ENVIRONMENT

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    5.1 The Social EnvironmentAircraft maintenance engineers work within a "system". As indicated in the following figure There are various factors within thissystem that impinge on the aircraft maintenance engineer, ranging from his knowledge, skills and abilities, the environment in whichhe works to the culture of the organisation for which he works.

    Figure 40: The maintenance system

    Even beyond the actual company he works for the regulatory requirements laid down for his trade clearly impact on his behavior. Allaspects of this system may contribute towards errors that, the engineer might make.

    The vast majority .of aircraft maintenance engineers work for a company, either directly, or as contract staff. It is important tounderstand how the organisation in which the engineer works might influence him. Every organisation or Company employing aircraftmaintenance engineers will have different "ways of doing things".

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    Figure 41: Different arousal levels and performances

    At low levels of arousal, our attentional mechanisms will not be particularly active and our performance capability will be low(complacency and boredom can result). At the other end of the curve, performance deteriorates when arousal becomes too high.

    To a certain extent this is because we are forced to shed tasks and focus on key information only (called narrowing of attention). Besttask performance occurs somewhere in the middle.

    In the work place arousal is mainly influenced by stimulation due to work tasks. However, surrounding environmental factors such as

    noise may also influence the level of arousal. Optimum arousal to best task performance.

    An individual aircraft maintenance engineers can usually identify what work he has to do quite easily. It is more difficult to assesshow that work translates into workload.

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    5.8 Climate and TemperatureHumans can work within quite a wide range of temperature and climatic conditions, but performance is adversely affected at

    extremes of these. Thus, as can be seen in Figure below, when it is too cold and / or wet or too hot and/or humid, performancedi i i h

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    , g , , pdiminishes.

    Figure 42: The relationship between climate and performance

    As has been noted throughout this document, aircraft maintenance engineers routinely work both within the hangar and outside.Clearly, exposure to the widest range of temperature and climate is likely to be encountered outdoors.

    Here, an engineer may have to work in direct summer sun, string winds, heavy rain high humidity, or in the depths of winter. Althoughhangars must exclude inclement weather, they can be cold and draughty, especially if the hangar doors have to remain open.

    Hangars used to house aircraft together with office accommodation should be such as to "ensure the working environment permitspersonnel to carry out work tasks in an effective manner. Temperatures should be maintained such that personnel can carry outrequired tasks without undue discomfort.Engineers cannot be expected to maintain the rigorous standards expected in their profession in all environmental conditions.

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    To be effective, warnings signs must:

    Clearly identify the hazard(s);

    Describe the danger (i.e. electric shock, radiation, etc); Inform employees what to do or not to do

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    Inform employees what to do or not to do.

    The sign must attract an engineer's attention, it must be visible and it must be understandable to the people it is aimed at.Additionally, in the maintenance industry, it must be durable enough to remain effective, often for years, in areas where dust and theelements can be present.

    Positive recommendations are more effective than negative ones. For example, the statement "Stay behind yellow line on floor" is

    better than "Do not come near this equipment Warning signs should contain a single word indicating the degree of risk associatedwith the hazard. DANGER denotes that the hazard is immediate and could cause grave, irreversible damage or injury. DANGERsigns use red, black and white.

    CAUTION indicates a hazard of lesser magnitude. The sign should also detail how to avoid or manage the risk. CAUTION signs aregenerally yellow and black.

    Careful handling of health and safety in the maintenance environment should serve to minimise risks. However, should health andsafety problems occur, all personnel should know as far as reasonably practical how to deal with emergency situations.

    Emergencies may include:

    An injury to oneself or to a colleague;

    A situation that is inherently dangerous, which has the potential to cause injury (such as the escape of a noxious substance,or a fire).

    Appropriate guidance and training should be provided by the maintenance organisation. The organisation should also provideprocedures and facilities for dealing with emergency situations and these must be adequately communicated to all personnel.

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    6.4 The Dirty DozenOne of the early MRM training programmes was developed by Gordon DuPont for Transport Canada. It introduced ''The Dirty

    Dozen", which are 12 areas of potential problems in human factors.

    A i f t h b d d f h f th h di i i f l f d ti " f t t "

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    A series of posters has been produced, one for each of these headings, giving a few examples of good practices or "safety nets"which ought to be adopted. These are summarised below.

    1. Lack of communication

    Use logbooks, worksheets, etc. to communicate and remove doubt.

    Discuss work to be done or what has been completed.

    Never assume anything.

    2. Complacency

    Train yourself to expect to find a fault.

    Never sign for anything you didn't do [or see done].

    3. Lack of knowledge

    Get training on type aircraft.

    Use up-to-date manuals.

    Ask a technical representative or someone who knows.

    4. Distraction

    Always finish the job or unfasten the connection, Mark the uncompleted work.

    Lock wire where possible.

    Double inspect by another or self.

    When you return to the job, always go back three steps.

    Use a detailed check sheet.

    5. Lack of teamwork

    Discuss what, who and how a job is to be done.

    Be sure that everyone understands and agrees.

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    6. Fatigue

    Be aware of the symptoms and look for them in yourself and others.

    Plan to avoid complex tasks at the bottom of your circadian rhythm. Sleep and exercise regularly.

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    Ask others to check your work.

    7. Lack of Resources

    Check suspect are as at the beginning of the inspection and AOG the required parts.

    Order and stock anticipated parts before they are required.

    Know all available parts sources and arrange for pooling or loaning.

    Maintain a standard and if in doubt ground the aircraft.

    8. Pressure

    Be sure the pressure isn't self-induced.

    Communicate your concerns.

    Ask for extra help.

    Just say 'No'.

    9. Lack of assertiveness

    If it's not critical, record it in the journey log book and only sign for what is serviceable.

    Refuse to compromise your standards.

    10. Stress

    Be aware of how stress can affect your work.

    Stop and look rationally at the problem.

    Determine a rational course of action and follow it.

    Take time off or at least have a short break.

    Discuss it with someone.

    Ask fellow workers to monitor your work.

    Exercise your body.

    11. Lack of awareness

    Think of what may occur in ~e event of an accident.

    Check to see if your work will conflict with an existing modification or repair.

    Ask others if they can see any problem with the work done.

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    12. Norms

    Always work as per the instructions of have the instruction changed.

    Be aware the "norms" don't make it right.

    6 5 Comparing Good and Bad Professionalism

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    6.5 Comparing Good and Bad Professionalism

    Good Bad

    Management, on discovering corner cutting toget work done, being prepared to ground anaircraft until appropriate checks have been

    made.

    Management condoning corner cutting to getwork done.

    Refusing to sign off tasks not seen. Signing off tasks not seen.

    Admitting to being fatigued and negotiating achange in tasking, to work on non critical tasksinstead.

    Turning up to work or accepting an additionalshift or overtime, when fatigued (even thoughthe motivation may be altruistic to help out.)

    Turning up to work fully rested.

    Using off duty time to do another job , or to take

    on domestic commitments which result in youbeing unduly fatigued when turning up to work

    Moderating alcohol intake the evening beforework

    Overindulgence in alcohol the night before anearly shift

    Reporting alternative (and possibly better)ways of doing tasks and getting them acceptedas official alternative procedures

    Use of black book

    Use of documentation, even for familiar tasks Reliance on memory for familiar tasks

    Planning work to allow adequate time andresources.

    Planning work without allowing enough time forit to be done properly.

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    7. COMMUNICATIONSGood communication is important in every industry. In aircraft maintenance engineering, it is vital. Communication, or more often a

    breakdown in communication, is often cited as a contributor to aviation incidents-and accidents.

    This chapter examines the various aspects of communication that affect the aircraft maintenance engineer

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    This chapter examines the various aspects of communication .that affect the aircraft maintenance engineer.

    Aircraft maintenance engineers often work as teams. Individuals within teams exchange information and need to receive instructions,guidance, etc.

    Moreover, one team will have to pass on tasks to another team at shift handover.

    An engineer needs a good understanding of the various processes of communication, as without this, it is impossible to appreciatehow communication can go wrong.

    7.1 Modes of CommunicationWe are communicating almost constantly, whether consciously or otherwise. An aircraft maintenance engineer might regularly

    communicate:

    Information;

    Ideas;

    Feelings; Attitudes and beliefs

    As the sender of a message, he will typically expect some kind of response from the person he is communicating with (therecipient), which could range from a simple acknowledgement that his message has been received (and hopefully understood), to aconsidered and detailed reply. The response constitutes feedback.

    Communication is defined in the Penguin Dictionary of Psychology as:

    "The transmission of something from one location to another. The 'thing' that is transmitted may be a message, a signal, ameaning, etc. In order to have communication both the transmitter and the receiver must share a common code, so that themeaning or information contained in the message may be interpreted without error".

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    As can be seen in the above definition, communication can be:

    Verbal/spoken - e.g. a single word, a phrase or sentence, a grunt;

    Written/textual - e.g. printed words and/or numbers on paper or on a screen, hand written 'notes; Non-verbal-

    Graphic e g pictures diagrams hand drawn sketches indications on a cockpit instrument;

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    Graphic - e.g. pictures, diagrams, hand drawn sketches, indications on a cockpit instrument; Symbolic - e.g. 'thumbs up', wave of the hand, nod of the head; Body language - e.g. facial expressions, touch such as a pat on the back, posture.

    Figure 43: The communication model

    7.1.1 Verbal and Written CommunicationGenerally speaking, verbal and written communication is purposeful. For a spoken or written message to be understood, the senderhas to make sure that the receiver:

    Is using the same channel of communication;

    Recognizes and understands his language;

    Is able to make sense of the message's meaning;

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    The channel of communication is the medium used to convey the message. For spoken communication, this might be face-to-face,or via the telephone. Written messages might be notes, memos, documents or e-mails.

    Aircraft maintenance engineers may communicate in any language. However, it is also vital that the message coding used by thesender is appreciated by the recipient so that he can decode the message accurately. This means that engineers must have a

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    pp y p g y gsimilar knowledge of technical language, jargon and acronyms.

    Assuming the channel and language used are compatible, to extract meaning, the engineer has to understand the content of themessage. This means that it has to be clear and unambiguous.

    The message must also be appropriate to the context of the workplace and preferably be compatible with the receiver's

    expectations. Where any ambiguity exists, the engineer must seek clarification.

    7.1.2 Non-verbal CommunicationNon-verbal communication can accompany verbal communication, such as a smile during a face-to-face chat. It can also occurindependently, for instance a colleague may pass on his ideas by using a sketch rather than the use of words. It can also be usedwhen verbal communication is impossible, such as a nod of the head in a noisy environment.

    Non-verbal communication is also the predominant manner by which systems communicate their status. For instance, most displays

    in the aircraft cockpit present their information graphically.

    Body language can be very subtle, but often quite powerful. For example, the message "No" accompanied by a smile will beinterpreted quite differently from the same word said whilst the sender scowls.

    Figure 44: The composition of non verbal communications

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    7.3 Communication ProblemsThere are two main ways in which communication can cause problems. These are lack of communication and poor

    communication. The former is characterised by the engineer who forgets to pass on pertinent information to a colleague. or when awritten message is mislaid.

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    The latter is typified by the engineer who does not make it clear what he needs to know and consequently receives inappropriateinformation, or a written report in barely legible handwriting. Both problems can lead to subsequent human error.

    Spoken messages provide considerable flexibility and informality to express work-related matters when necessary. The key to suchcommunication is to use words effectively and obtain feedback to make sure your message has been heard and understood.

    Communication also goes wrong when one of the parties involved makes some kind ofassumption. The sender of a message mayassume that the receiver understands the terms he has used.

    The receiver of a message may assume that the message means one thing when in fact he has misinterpreted it. Assumptions maybe based on context and expectations. Problems with assumptions can be minimised if messages a1e unambiguous and properfeedback is given.

    7.4 Dissemination of Information

    Both the individual engineer and the organisation in which he works have a shared responsibility to keep abreast of new information.Good dissemination of information within an organisation forms part of Anecdotal evidence describes a case where a certainmaintenance procedure was "proscribed" (i.e. prohibited) in a service bulletin.

    The technician reading this concluded that the procedure was "prescribed" (i.e. defined'. laid down) and proceeded to perform theforbidden action.

    There should normally be someone within the maintenance organisation with the responsibility for disseminating information.Supervisors can play an important role by ensuring that the engineers within their team have seen and understood any

    communicated information.

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    Working as part of a team has a number of potential benefits which include:

    Individuals can share resources (knowledge, tools, etc.);

    They can discuss problems and arrive at shared solutions; They can check each others work (either "officially" or "unofficially").

    T b d k hi f k h ki l l Thi i ibili k

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    Teams can be encouraged to take ownership of tasks at the working level. This gives a team greater responsibility over a packageof work, rather than having to keep referring to other management for authorisation, support or direction. However, groups left to theirown devices need proper leadership

    Healthy competition and rivalry between teams can create a strong team identity and encourage pride in the product of a team.Team identity also has the advantage that a group of engineers know one another's capabilities (and weaknesses).

    If work has to be handed over to another group or team. (E.g. shift handover), this can cause problems if it is not handled correctly. Ifone team of engineers consider that their diligence (i.e. taking the trouble to do something properly and carefully) is a waste of timebecause an incoming team's poor performance will detract from it, then it is likely that diligence will become more and more rare overtime.

    The Johari window classifies an individual's relating to others according to four quadrants (or windowpanes).

    Quadrant 1, the open quadrant

    Quadrant 2, the blind quadrant Quadrant 3, the hidden area

    Quadrant 4, the area of the unknown

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    Figure 45: Johari Window of individual's relations

    For teams to function cohesively and productively, team members need to have or build up certain interpersonal and social skills.These include communication, cooperation, co-ordination and mutual support.

    8.1.1 CommunicationCommunication is essential for exchanging work-related information within the team. For