MH370 2ACs



MH370 2ACs

Transcript of MH370 2ACs

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2AC Frontlines – Starter Pack Aff

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A-to “T – Exploration”

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There are many Neg T violations on the word “exploration” – this frontline answers the 1NC exploration violation from the opening packet.

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2AC v. “Exploration”

( ) We meet – their Ocean Policy Committee ev is mostly spin. Many parts of searching for the plane aren’t under the investigator's control – including weather, currents, unknown parts of the ocean.

( ) We meet the Ban card as well – we’re not purely a targeted search. We’re exploring unknown aspects of the Indian Ocean.

( ) Counter-interpretation – “Exploration” includes some intentional targets.

Mineart ‘2Gary M. Mineart and Fred C. Klein, Mitretek Systems, “A Data Management Strategy for the Ocean Exploration Program”,

The Frontier Report defines ocean exploration as “discovery through disciplined diverse observations and recording of the findings” [2]. The U.S. Navy, a partner in the President’s Panel process, has refined its definition as the systematic examination of the oceans for the purposes of discovery; cataloging and documenting what one finds; boldly going where no one

has gone before; and providing an initial knowledge base for hypothesis-based science and for exploitation [3]. This definition recognizes that true ocean exploration is planned and executed to achieve discoveries as an intentional process rather than relying on serendipitous discoveries that sporadically emerge from typical oceanographic research programs. This definition also emphasizes the recording of results to facilitate the sharing of each new baseline level of knowledge across a broad, multidisciplinary user community.

( ) Neg leaves us with indefensible Affs. Raw exploration – just for the sake of knowledge – is thin on advantages and massively links to politics and spending. Allowing some targeted goal is important for allowing the Aff to win.

( ) Poor education – almost no one in Congress would expect a bill without any goal to pass. Teaches us poor policymaking skills.

( ) Overlimits – all affs could be spun as “having a hidden goal”. Limits out every Aff and we’d never win.

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( ) No neg ground loss – we ran a whole advantage about topographic knowledge and there’s no disad they’ve lost because we specified the 370 search area.

( ) Reasonability before competing interpretations – any other stance causes a race to the bottom that hurts topic-specific education.

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A-to “T – Non-Military”

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Notes to students

First – this is by far the deepest of the three sets of Aff T answers. This is because I think this violation will get a lot of play this season.

Second – the card under the header “Must-read 1AR versus Non-Military T” is one of the stronger Aff T cards on the topic.

I did not include it in the frontline for reasons that I can explain upon request – but I could easily see an Aff choosing to do so.

… I also think the some Negs are going to claim that the *2AC* Zedalis ’79 ev spins Neg (I don’t share this assessment, but I think it might emerge). The 1AR “must-read” card from Zedalis ’79 is useful because – in addition to helping the Aff for the reasons cited in the tag of the card – it also should put spin games about what the author “really thinks” to bed.

Third – the first T answer on this frontline is tricky. I could see creating interesting discussions in lab. It applies differently based upon how the plan is worded.

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2AC Frontline

( ) We meet – plan commits to a “non-military” search. If they win we can’t be “dual-use” assets – that solely re-defines the plan and commits us to different tech.

( ) Counter-interpretation and challenge – make Negs explain factual existence of “non-military” ops that are carried out with military assets.

Gvosdev ‘10Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College. He is currently a senior editor at The National Interest. – internally quoting Derek Reveron, who is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College – “The Defense Exports” – The National Interest – October 10, 2010 –

Derek Reveron’s concept of “exporting security” (discussed in detail in a book of the same name just released by Georgetown University Press) could provide a way forward out of this impasse. Although the public’s attention is drawn to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of what the U.S. military is doing today is strengthening the capacities of partners—strengthening their abilities to exercise effective control over their territories and coastlines and to be in a position to repel outside threats. The United States has security-assistance programs with 149 other nations. Some of it is active, kinetic support in combating insurgents, terrorist groups or drug cartels, as in Yemen and Colombia. Some of it is developing partnership and training programs to enhance the ability of nations to deploy peacekeeping forces or coast guards. It can encompass the gamut from humanitarian relief operations to creating defensive alliances. The net result of all of these efforts is to “develop enduring relations” with other states that gives the United States access to a global network of bases and platforms, but also “strengthens key partners and reduces both the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generates”—and in so doing, can also reduce the burden on the United States to have to act as a global sheriff. Reveron’s approach avoids the “stocking up” approach to military procurement, because the emphasis would be on finding ways to deploy and use assets, rather than warehousing systems “in case of

emergency.” For instance, in the maritime realm, the carriers, amphibious vessels and destroyers that were designed to contain the Soviet navy and protect sea lines of communication (and which might be used in a similar role vis-à-vis China in the future) are now being used “to conduct activities ashore to improve human security.” The 2010 response to the Haiti earthquake saw an aircraft carrier and sixteen other warships deployed to provide humanitarian relief and rescue services; such “nonmilitary” missions , in turn, help to

reduce the factors which can produce security threats to the United States and reinforce American ties with other states.

Reveron quotes a navy official who notes that using “war” assets for non-military missions such as

training and humanitarian relief means “We can show up, provide training, provide resources, and then leave very little footprint behind.” An “exporting security” approach guides future procurement decisions towards “multiuse” platforms that can combine conventional and non-conventional missions.

( ) We don’t de-limit – we have literature proving we’re non-military and we don’t bleed to combat ops.

( ) Neg overlmits. Makes exploring the unknown impossible. Also limits-out sonar or cameras because they’re “dual-use”.

Hollins ‘99Ernest Hollings – Democratic Senator from South Carolina – STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS. Part of this card is part of the Ocean Act legislation that Mr. Hollins CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: May 5, 1999 --

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Nowhere is the need for U.S. leadership more evident than in the area of ocean exploration . Today , we still have explored only a

tiny fraction of the sea , but with the use of new technologies what we have found is truly incredible.

For example, hydrothermal vents, hot water geysers on the deep ocean floor, were discovered just 20 years ago by oceanographers trying to understand the formation of the earth's crust. Now this discovery had led to the identification of nearly 300 new types of marine animals with untold pharmaceutical and biomedical potential. In recent years, scientists from 19 nations have joined in an international partnership, headed by Admiral Watkins, to explore the history and structure of the Earth beneath the oceans basins. Their ship, the Resolution, is the world's largest scientific research vessel and can drill in water depths of up 8,200 meters. Over the past 12 years, it has recovered more than 115 miles of core samples through the world oceans. Recently ship scientists worked off the coast of South Carolina collecting new evidence of a large meteor that struck the Earth 65 million years ago, and is thought to have triggered climate change that may be linked to the disappearance of the dinosaurs. Many of our marine research efforts could have profound impacts on our economic wellbeing. For example, research on coastal ocean currents and other processes that affect shoreline erosion is critical to effective management of the shoreline. Oceanographers are working with federal, state, and local managers to use this new understanding in protecting beachfront property and the lives of those who reside and work in coastal

communities. Development of underwater cameras and sonar , begun in the 1940s for the U.S. Navy , has led to major

strides not only for military uses, but for marine archaeologists and scientists exploring unknown stretches of

sea floor. Consumers have benefited from the technology now used in video cameras . Sonar has broad applications in both the military and commercial sector. Finally, marine biotechnology research is thought to be one of the greatest remaining technological and industrial frontiers. Among the opportunities which it may offer are to: restore and protect marine ecosystems; monitor human health and treat disease; increase food supplies through aquaculture; enhance seafood safety and quality; provide new types and sources of industrial materials and processes; and understand biological and geochemical processes in the world ocean. In addition to the economic opportunities offered by our marine research investment, traditional marine activities play an important role in our national economic outlook. Ninety-five percent of our international trade is shipped on the ocean. In 1996, commercial fishermen in the United States landed almost 10 billion pounds of fish with a value of $3.5 billion. Their fishing-related activities contributed over $42 billion to the U.S. economy. During the same period, marine anglers contributed another $20 billion. Travel and tourism also contribute over $700 billion to our economy, much of which is generated in coastal areas. With a sound national ocean and coastal policy and effective marine resource management, these numbers have nowhere to go but up. With respect to public safety, it is particularly important to develop ocean and coastal priorities that reflect the changes we have seen in recent years. Before World War II, most of the U.S. shoreline was sparsely populated. There were long, wild stretches of coast, dotted with an occasional port city, fishing village, or sleepy resort. Most barrier islands had few residents or were uninhabited. After the war, people began pouring in, and coastal development began a period of explosive growth. In my state of South Carolina, our beaches attract millions of visitors every year, and more and more people are choosing to move to the coast-making the coastal counties the fastest growing ones in the state. Seventeen of the twenty fastest growing states in the nation are coastal stateswhich compounds the situation that the most densely populated regions already border the ocean. With population growth comes the demand for highways, shopping centers, schools, and sewers that permanently alter the landscape. If people are to continue to live and work on the coast, we must do a better job of planning how we impact the very regions in which we all want to live. There is no better example of how our ocean and coastal policies affect public safety, than to look at the effects of hurricanes. Throughout the 1920s, hurricanes killed 2,122 Americans while causing about $1.8 billion in property damages. By contrast, in the first five years of the 1990s, hurricanes killed 111 Americans, and resulted in damages of about $35 billion. While we have made notable advances in early warning and evacuation systems to protect human lives, the risk of property loss continues to escalate and coastal inhabitants are more vulnerable to major storms than they ever have been. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo came ashore in South Carolina, leaving more than $6 billion in damages. Of that total from Hugo, the federal government paid out more than $2.8 billion in disaster assistance and more than $400 million from the National Flood Insurance Program. The payments from private insurance companies were equally staggering. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida and slammed into low lying areas of Louisiana, forever changing the lives of more than a quarter of a million people and causing an estimated $25 to $30 billion dollars in damage. Hurricanes demonstrate that the human desire to live near the ocean and along the coast comes with both a responsibility and a cost. The oceans are part of our culture, part of our heritage, part of our economy, and part of our future. Those who doubt the need for this legislation need only pick up a newspaper and they will be face to face with pressing ocean and coastal issues. And while our coastal waters are governed by the United States or all of us, beyond our waters progress relies primarily on international cooperation. There are no boundaries at sea, no national borders with fences and checkpoints. Deciding how to manage all these problems and use the seas is one of the most complicated tasks we can tackle. Therefore, we need to be smart about ocean policy-we need the best minds to come together and take a look at what the real challenges are. It is not enough to sit back and assume the role of caretakers. We must be proactive and develop a plan for the future. The United Nations declared 1998 to the be the Year of the Ocean in part to encourage governments and the pubic to pay adequate attention to the need to protect the marine environment and to ensure a healthy ocean. This is an unprecedented opportunity to follow up the Year of the Ocean activities by celebrating and enhancing what has been accomplished in understanding and managing our oceans. The Stratton Commission stated in 1969: "How fully and wisely the United States uses the sea in the decades ahead will affect profoundly its security, its economy, its ability to meet increasing demands for food and raw materials, its position and influence in the world community, and the quality of the environment in which its people live." Those words are as true today as they were 30 years ago. Mr. President, it is time to look towards the next 30 years. This bill offers us the vision and understanding needed to establish sound ocean and coastal policies for the 21st century, and I thank the cosponsors of the legislation for joining with me in recognizing it significance. We look forward to working together in the bipartisan spirit of the Stratton Commission to enact legislation that ensures the development of an integrated national ocean and coastal policy well into the next millennium. I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [pS4794] S959 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the "Oceans Act of 1999". SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS; PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. (a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings: (1) Covering more than two-thirds of the Earth's surface, the oceans and Great Lakes play a critical role in the global water cycle and in regulating climate, sustain a large part of Earth's biodiversity, provide an important source of food and a wealth of other natural products, act as a frontier to scientific exploration, are critical to national security, and provide a vital means of transportation. The coasts, transition between land and open ocean, are regions of remarkable high biological productivity, contribute more than 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, and are of considerable importance for recreation, waste disposal, and mineral exploration. (2) Ocean and coastal resources are susceptible to change as a direct and indirect result of human activities, and such changes can significantly impact the ability of the oceans and Great Lakes to provide the benefits upon which the Nation depends. Changes in ocean and coastal processes could affect global patterns, marine productivity and bio-diversity, environmental quality, national security, economic competitiveness, availability of energy, vulnerability to natural hazards, and transportation safety and efficiency. (3) Ocean and coastal resources are not infinite, and human pressure on them is increasing. One half of the Nation's population lives within 50 miles of the coast, ocean and coastal resources once considered inexhaustible are not threatened with depletion, and if population trends continue as expected, pressure on and conflicting demands for ocean and coastal resources will increase further as will vulnerability to coastal hazards. (4) Marine transportation is key to United States participation in the global economy and to the wide range of activities carried out in ocean and coastal regions. Inland waterway and ports are the link between marine activities in ocean and coastal regions and the supporting transportation infrastructure ashore. International trade is expected to triple by 2020. The increase has the potential to outgrow (A) the capabilities of the marine transportation system to ensure safety; and (B) the existing capacity of ports and waterways. (5) Marine technologies hold tremendous promise for expanding the range and increasing the utility of products from the oceans and Great Lakes, improving the stewardship of ocean and coastal resources, and contributing to business and manufacturing innovations

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and the creation of new jobs. (6) Research has uncovered the link between oceanic and atmospheric processes and improved understanding of world climate

patterns and forecasts. Important new advances, including availability of military tech nology have made feasible the

exploration of large areas of the ocean which were inaccessible several years ago. In designating 1998 as "The Year

of the Ocean", the United Nations high-lighted the value of increasing our knowledge of the oceans.

( ) That contextualizes to our Aff. Civilian tech CAN’T reach 20,000 feet – that’s our Austin and Malaysia Kini ev. Neg forces the Aff to explore known areas.

( ) Means no Aff would be topical – exploration must search new places.

NOAA 2K National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “A New Era of Ocean Exploration”, 8-22, is Ocean Exploration? National Geographic Society: one explores to obtain information about areas that are

largely or completely unknown

( ) Poor grammar and contrived-limit. “Non-military” modifies THE EXPLORATION ACTIVITY – not tools used for it. Military equipment can be used on non-military missions.

Zedalis ‘79Rex J. Zedalis – Research Associate, International and Comparative Law Department, George Washington University (1978-1979). Member of the California Bar and the American Society of International Law – “"PEACEFUL PURPOSES" AND OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING AND THE PROPOSED MILITARY REGIME FOR THE HIGH SEAS” – Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 2 – available via:

Perhaps the most conspicuous addition made by Part VII of the RCNT to the legal regime established by the 1958 Convention is the reservation of the high seas to use for

"peaceful purposes." Article 88 of the RCNT69 states that the "[h]igh seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes . " Though reservations of transnational spatial areas for "peaceful purposes" is by no means a novel conception in international law,70 the ambiguity of the "peaceful purposes" provision has generated continuing debate as to the nature of the normative

prescription it declares. Some suggest that the term "peaceful purposes" permits all nonaggressive uses , even though they may be of a military nature. Others insist that only non-military uses are consonant with the

provision.71 In the context of the instant draft convention, if only non-military uses are permitted,

then the high seas may not be employed for any activity of a military nature, including the navigation of warships.12 On the other hand, if "peaceful purposes" simply prescribes a nonaggressive standard, then the

high seas may legally be use d for a whole host of activities of a military nature as long as none of the activities are aggressive. When the "peaceful purposes" provision of article 88 of the RCNT is construed in the context of the whole draft convention so as to effectuate the general

intention of the architects as evidenced by the preceding and subsequent provisions,73 the inescapable conclusion is that it establishes a nonaggressive normative standard. One of the enumerated freedoms of the high seas guaranteed to all states is the freedom of navigation. This freedom is not restricted and in fact the RCNT contemplates navigation by military as well as

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civilian vessels.74 Such use, however, would be clearly inconsistent with a non-military standard. 75 Military use of the high seas is a well

established customary utilization recognized by the general principles of international law and incorporated in article 87 of the RCNT by virtue of the words "inter alia" prefacing the litany of express freedoms. To suggest that the "peaceful purposes" provision establishes a non-military standard is inconsistent with the language contemplating military navigation as well as that incorporating more extensive military uses. In light of the minimal interference

caused to inclusive uses of ocean space by highly valued exclusive military uses, such a result seems desirable. Continues to footnote. This is the first paragraph of an especially-long footnote: 75. The opposite, however,

has been argued in relation to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. See Finch, Outer Space for ''Peaceful Purposes," 54 A.B.A.J. 365 (1968). Many commentators feel that the Outer Space Treaty language permitting the use of military personnel and equipment on the moon and other celestial bodies requires that "peaceful purposes" be defined to prescribe a non-aggressive standard. In light of the fact that most if not all celestial exploration is undertaken by military personnel utilizing military equipment, it can be cogently argued that the drafters included such language so as to avert suggestions that a non-military definition of the "peaceful purposes" clause precluded military

personnel from exploring outer space. Thus, it is very possible to have a non -military normative standard for outer space, yet in recognition of the realities, permit military personnel to explore space. After all,

military equipment can be used for activities of a non-military nature .

(Notes to students: This is a little complicated…. First, the “RCNT” – as mentioned in this evidence – means the “Revised Composite Negotiating Text” produced at the eighth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea… In 1958, the UN Law of the Sea added a “peaceful purpose” provision – which means ships on the high seas were to be acting “peacefully”. A debate broke out as to what “peaceful purpose” meant. Some argue that “peaceful purpose” means “yes, can be military, but non-aggressive”. Thus, a defensive security mission or an act of military self-defense would be “non-aggressive”. Others argued that “non-military” means “no military application”. The Aff is arguing – with this ev – that they don’t de-limit because they set a bright line that doesn’t bleed to navigating “defensive” battleships on the high waters. That, according to the Aff, is distinct from military equipment on a non-military ship. The author concludes BOTH that “peaceful purpose” was intended to be “non-aggressive” AND that if the standard were “non-military” it would exclude military vessels. Both are consistent with the Aff claim because the Aff should argue they are military equipment but not a military mission. Someone may claim that this author concludes that the “non-military” standard differs for the oceans – and this means the Aff “can’t touch the military whatsoever”. This is not what the author says. Rather, the author says that if – for the ocean – the standard was BOTH “yes some military” and also the vague “peaceful purpose” standard that would NOT mean the same thing in means in the Outer Space Convention. In the Outer Space Convention, that means “military is discouraged but allowed out of necessity”. In the Law of Sea it means “yes, some military” but that “peaceful purpose” would limit to not just “necessity” but also “non-aggressive” actions like a defensive mission or self-defense on the high seas…. That is indeed a little complicated. Let me know if you have questions.)

( ) Contrived limits outweighs all. If they can re-spin phrases in the topic for the sake of “limits”, they’ll always limit-out the Aff. We’d never win if grammar is second to limits.

( ) No ground loss

--- we didn’t spike-out “non-military” disads.

--- huge Aff that’s stepped in current events literature. They’ve got plenty to say.

--- we haven’t run hard power advantages – which would be the upside to abusing “non-military”.

( ) Reasonability before competing interpretations – any other stance causes a race to the bottom that hurts topic-specific education.

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*** Must-read 1AR versus Non-Military T

( ) Lack of bright line means err Aff. If not, then no workable cases. Also proves “military characteristics” is a bad standard.

Zedalis ‘79Rex J. Zedalis – Research Associate, International and Comparative Law Department, George Washington University (1978-1979). Member of the California Bar and the American Society of International Law – “"PEACEFUL PURPOSES" AND OTHER RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING AND THE PROPOSED MILITARY REGIME FOR THE HIGH SEAS” – Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7 [1979], Iss. 1, Art. 2 – available via:

The requirement in article 143(1) that marine scientific research be carried out "exclusively for peaceful purposes" does not appear to proscribe all scientific research of a military nature. This conclusion is derived from the consistency of such a construction with the interpretation of "peaceful purposes" as used elsewhere in the RCNT (articles 88 and 141), the absence of a provision explicitly prohibiting such traditional activity, and the fact that reading "peaceful purposes" as prohibiting scientific research of a military nature would produce the anomalous result of having one provision (article 143(1)) proscribe relatively innocuous research activity while provisions found elsewhere in Part XI (articles 136, 140(1), and 141) permit other extensive military uses consistent with principles of international law. Nor does it appear that the requirement that such activity be carried out for the "benefit of mankind as a whole" significantly affects the interpretation concerning the impact of article 143(1) on scientific research of a military nature. Though admittedly some may argue that no military activity can

benefit mankind as a whole, it seems that scientific research is distinct from what is typically viewed as military activity. Specifically, while traditional military activity can benefit either the acting nation alone or the acting nation plus all others, except those against which it

is directed, recent history has demonstrated that almost all scientific activity, albeit military in nature, produces some useful

non-military applications. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish most

military from most non-military scientific research. Certainly such an attempt could not turn upon

the character of those conducting the activity, particularly since military scientists are generally in

the forefront of scientific activities in transnational spatial areas. And, finally, as mentioned in relation to the requirement that marine

scientific research be carried out exclusively for "peaceful purposes," construing any provision in article 143(1) as proscribing military research produces

the anomalous result of outlawing innocuous activities while provisions elsewhere in Part XI permit other extensive military uses of the Area.

(Note: the word “proscribing” means “to forbid, especially by law”.)

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Extension – Aff is officially “Non-Military”

( ) Search-and-rescue are officially “non-military” ops.

Tilley ‘13John A. Tilley, Associate Professor, Department of History, East Carolina University. Before joining the faculty at East Carolina University, Tilley was an assistant curator at the Mariners' Museum in Newport News, Virginia. His publications include The British Navy and the American Revolution (1987). His articles have appeared in The Nautical Research Journal and Model Shipwright. Tilley teaches courses in military history. “History of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary” Published at RATLINES: UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AUXILIARY UNOFFICIAL NEWSLETTER – May 7, 2013 -

The third cornerstone is "Operations." The Auxiliary assists the Coast Guard in several of its non-military

functions , including search-and-rescue (SAR), safety, regatta, and harbor patrols, and checking aids to navigation (ATON).

( ) Search-and-rescue is non-military. Prefer ev that assumes maritime activities and the region at hand.

WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM ‘12(Internally quoting US Naval Admiral Gary Roughead – The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is a forum for naval professionals, which aims to increase naval cooperation in the Western Pacific by providing a venue for discussions on professional issues, generating a flow of information and opinion, leading to common understanding and potential agreements. There are currently 20 full members, including the United States, Australia, and Malaysia. 13th WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM, KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, 25 – 26 SEPTEMBER 2012 –

The Chair also reiterated the response made by Admiral Roughead (US Navy) at the 12th Symposium to the concept of

“Harmonious Ocean” pledged by Rear Admiral Xu Weibing (PLA Navy) that this forum should continue in openness and engage in

practical cooperation that will make the activities of the WPNS more expansive in its outlook and more inclusive in sharing its common views of the strategic maritime security position, with a particular emphasis on its vision for the future. The Chair reflected that when Malaysia

hosted the 4th Symposium in 1994, some of the topics discussed include the non-military security issues such as approach in

managing maritime security, search and rescue and prevention of sea pollution. However, he said that the challenge today was the management of naval issues as they are becoming more complex, complicated, multifaceted and intertwined. He added that these have to be dealt with in a holistic manner and could be attended in a collaborative effort among the regional states as envisaged through the theme of the Symposium, “Enhancing Interoperability and Professional Cooperation."

( ) Search-and-rescue is non-military. Prefer ev that assumes maritime activities and the region of the MH370 search.

Kaneda ‘4Hideaki Kaneda, a former Vice Admiral of Japan's Defense Forces, is Director of the Okazaki Institute. CSIS Conference and Publications. Maritime Security in East Asia – “Regional Assessment of Northeast Asia: Pursuing a Maritime Security Coalition in the Asia-Pacific Region”. A paper prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies – American-Pacific Sealanes Security Institute conference on Maritime Security in Asia. January 18-20, 2004,

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At the beginning of the 21st Century, seven specific instability factors affect security in the Asia-Pacific region. The first factor is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from Northeast Asia to other regions. The second factor is international terrorism, which has become especially apparent after the 9.11 terrorist attacks. Terrorism is gathering strength through alliances in and out of the Asia-Pacific region, and increasingly targeting countries with weaker governments. The third factor is the rapid build-up of Chinese military power, mainly naval and air power, which could potentially tip the balance of regional military power. The fourth factor is the military confrontational structure that originated in the cold war and still remains on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. These bring instability, uncertainty and lack of clarity to the regional situation. The fifth factor is the historical issue of territorial, religious and ethnic disputes and confrontations. In particular, disputes over the possession of islands are likely to significantly affect the stability of the whole region while obstructing maritime security. The sixth factor is the confrontational structures surrounding oceanic interests, which are closely related to the disputes over island possession. The seventh factor is the increase in internationalized and organized criminal activities such as piracy, drug trafficking and slave trading, and illegal activities such as over-fishing, unsanctioned ocean resource surveying and environmental destruction in Asia-Pacific waters. 2. Pursuing a Regional Maritime Security Coalition (1) Maritime Safety and Security as a Common Key Phrase for Regional Security Surveying the above instability factors, “maritime safety and security” stands out as a common key

phrase highlighting the vital issues for regional security. Maritime safety and security can be divided into three categories. The first is emergency maritime security, which indicates purely maritime military issues of war, including the defense of

territory and SLOC protection. The second is peacetime maritime safety , which indicates non-military maritime issues such as international terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, search and rescue, humanitarian and navigational operations. The third is various maritime activities that can include fishing, preserving maritime resources and environmental issues.

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Extension – Neg overlimits

( ) Their interpretation eliminates ALL search and rescue Aff – those inevitably use some military assets.

Thayer ‘14Carl Thayer is Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales. He is a Southeast Asia regional specialist who taught at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Australian Command and Staff College, and Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College. “Flight MH370 Shows Limits of ASEAN’s Maritime Cooperation” – The Diplomat – March 18th –

It should be noted that the focus of ASEAN SAR planning is mainly on ships in distress at sea. For example, the chairman’s statement issued after the twenty-third ASEAN Summit in Brunei in October last year declared that ASEAN leaders looked forward “to developing the ideas of establishing hotlines of communication to further enhance trust, confidence and to respond to emergency situations at sea and cooperate in the area of search and rescue for vessels in distress at sea…” The ASEAN Maritime Forum, which was founded in 2010, has held four meetings.

None of these meetings has explicitly addressed SAR missions, capacity building or practical exercises. As the MH 370 incident revealed, military assets are invariably committed to SAR missions, especially in their initial phase. ASEAN Defense Ministers, however, have not made SAR a priority. For example, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), established in 2006, began to conduct tabletop exercises in 2011, but they have not included SAR.

(Note: “SAR” stands for “search and rescue”)

( ) That overlimits – think about what it means to not allow the Aff to “search” on an ocean exploration topic. It makes the topic nonsense.

( ) No topical Aff under their interpretation – Can’t explore the unknown without military or dual-use tech.

Nystuen ‘98John D. Nystuen is Professor Emeritus, Geography and Urban Planning, University of Michigan. “Book Review: The Universe Below by William J. Broad” – Solstice – Summer –

In one of the continuing ironies of our age, the military pioneered the technology that opened the oceans to

exploration. They made the deep sea a battlefield in the Cold War. The military were not interested in exploration. Their interest was in being able to

operate in deep water to support submarine warfare and undersea espionage. The United States developed a technological advantage over the Soviet Union by investing huge resources toward these purposes. Mr. Broad describes several defining events that shaped this effort. For example, in April, 1963, the USS Thresher,

the most advanced attack submarine of its day, inexplicably sank, its 129 men lost in water more than a mile and a half deep. The Navy had no way to reach the ship to salvage sensitive equipment or to investigate the mystery of why she was lost. The tragedy led to much greater expenditure on the development of deep submersible craft ostensibly to make possible deep sea rescue operations but also to expand the possibilities for undersea espionage through use of search and salvage capacities

to be used to obtain intelligence from sunken Soviet ships, especially nuclear equipment and devices from submarines lost at sea. Mr. Broad is a Pulitzer prize winning science writer for the New York Times. His investigative powers are evident in this book as he details the political and policy debate that took place in Washington to direct resources into the Navy’s deep submersible operations. Most of the effort was to support espionage which was in line with the tendency of

the United States to depend upon technological means for conducting espionage instead of relying on spies and secret agents. After the end of the Cold War much of this military technology was declassified and is now being used in civilian efforts at

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exploration. Russian equipment is also available for hire and lease as the Soviet Union had also developed deep submersible capabilities during the Cold War.

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Extension – No bright line

The Neg can’t draw a bright line on military vs. non-military tech. Means they limit out *everything*

Britt ‘93(et al; Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin – Chairperson for the UN Study on Charting the Potential Uses ofResources Allocated to Military Activities for Civilian Endeavours to Protect the Environment. Britt also works for the Swedish Disarmament Commission – “Potential Uses ofMilitary-Related Resources furProtection of the Environment” – Office for Disarmament Affairs: Report of the Secretary-General –

Of all the military-related resources, technologies qualify most for environmental use and most technology is inherently dual-

purpose .. In many cases, the environmental applications may not differ fundamentally from the military, except where the latter is more

complex and costly. Many systems have been developed in parallel, or if developed for military purposes, have resulted in spin-off to the non-military sector. In the market economies, manufacturers and R&D organizations may supply both sectors and defence laboratories and agencies often have a major commitment to non-military work, and vice versa. The result of having some of the costs of R&D, and production, for technology with civilian application underwritten by military budgets is sometimes seen as

beneficial by the industrial sector. Although the present study addresses military-related resources, it is not always feasible to

differentiate between the military and non-military, especially with respect to technology. Obviously the

reverse applies, and it can be argued that the civilian sector leads in many areas.

Navies can and do carry out “non-military operations” Sakhuja ‘11Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Director (Research), Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi. He is also Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore since 2006. He is a former Indian Navy officer. Dr Sakhuja received his Ph D from the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. – Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic Transactions China, India and Southeast Asia. p. 199

Since the 1990s, India has been nurturing an ascendant operation maritime profile. It has established bilateral engagements with the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, Japan and several countries in the Southeast Asian region. Codenamed Malabar, the Indo-U.S. naval exercises were conceptualized in 1992 to mark the beginning of a new relationship between India and the United States," and fourteen such naval exercises have taken place in the past. In the beginning these exercises were rudimentary and these have progressively improved in content and complexity with participation by several

complex platforms such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and long-range maritime patrol aircraft." The exercises paved the way for greater understanding between the naval forces and helped to develop a broad framework for operating together in support of non-military operations such as anti-piracy , safety of sea lanes , and antidrug and gunrunning patrols. The 1998 Indian nuclear tests abruptly ended cooperation between the two navies, but bilateral exercises were resumed and the cooperation got a boost with the Indian Navy dispatching a naval helicopter to USS Hewitt to carry out the medical evacuation of a U.S. navy sailor.

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Extension – C-interp/we don’t de-limit

( ) Armed Forces can do non-military ops – like the plan. We don’t de-limit to combat or security missions.

Huntington ‘93Samuel P. Huntington is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Dr. Huntington is the author or editor of over a dozen books and ninety scholarly articles. He has studied, taught, and written widely in three principal areas: military politics, strategy, and civil-military relations; American and comparative politics: and. political development and the politics of less developed countries. From the chapter “Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military” – from the book: Non-Combat Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by James R. Graham – p. 6-11

This past year after the hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii many people hailed the superb contribution the military made to disaster relief as evidence of a "new role" for the U.S. armed forces. Nothing could be more off the target The U.S. military have regularly provided such relief in the past. As the official U.S. military history puts it, during the 1920s and 1930s, "the most conspicuous employment of the Army within the United States... was in a variety of tasks that only the Army had the resources and organization to tackle quickly. In floods and blizzards and hurricanes it was the Army that was first on the spot with cots, blankets, and food."2

That has been the case throughout our history. It is hard to conceive of any non-military role for the U.S. military that does not have some precedent in U.S. history. Non-military functions of the armed forces are as American as apple pie. Throughout our history also, however, these non- military uses of the armed forces have never served as the justification for the maintenance of armed services. The overall size, composition, organization, recruitment, equipment, and training of the armed forces have been justified by the needs of

national security and the military missions, the combat missions , which the armed forces may have to perform. In this new fifth phase of American

international relations, the security and military functions of the armed forces remain as important as ever. They are the reasons why we will and should continue to have military forces in the

coming years. How can these military missions be defined? There are, I think, at least three such missions. First , for the first time in sixty years, no

major power, no peer rival, poses a security challenge to the United States. It is obviously in our interests to maintain this

situation , a goal which has been affirmed by both Presidents Reagan and Bush and in the initial version of the Defense Guidance issued in the winter of 1992. We now need the

military policy and forces not to contain and deter an existing threat as we did during the Cold War but rather to prevent the emergence of a new threat. To accomplish this goal, we must

maintain substantial invulnerable nuclear retaliatory forces plus military deployments in Europe and Asia for reassurance and to preclude rearmament by

Germany or Japan. We must also maintain U.S. technological superiority and U.S. maritime superiority, and provide the base for the rapid and effective creation of a new enhanced military

capability if a major power threat should begin to emerge. Second, regional powers do pose significant threats to American interests in Southwest Asia and East Asia, and we must

have the capability to deal with those threats as we did in the Gulf War. To deter or defeat regional aggression the United States will need light and heavy ground

forces, tactical aviation, naval and marine forces designed to fight from the sea against land targets, and the sea and air lift to deploy ground forces rapidly to the scene of combat Ideally the U.S. should be able to fight the equivalent of another Gulf War. The Bush Administration's Base Force and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Option C both purportedly would provide this capability. Whether five years from now American forces will in fact be able to fight another Gulf War against an Iraq-like enemy remains to be seen. Our decisive victory in the Gulf War, however, makes it unlikely that we will be able to repeat that victory in the future. Any major regional aggressor in the future is likely to have and to use nuclear weapons. This point is reflected in the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he drew from the Gulf War. He replied: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."3 The most likely aggressors of the future—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and others—are intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Until they do have these weapons, the probability of stability in their regions is reasonably high. Once they do have these weapons, the likelihood they will use them will be high. In all likelihood the first sure knowledge the world will have that they possess a usable nuclear weapon will be the explosion of that weapon on the territory of a neighbor. That act would be coupled with a massive conventional offensive designed to produce the quick occupation of Seoul, the Saudi oil fields, or whatever other target the aggressor had in mind. This is the most serious type of regional threat the U.S. may have to confront, and it may well also be one of the most probable. Coping with such aggression will place new demands, and what in the context of this conference we might call non-traditional, demands on U.S. military forces. They will have to fight an enemy who has a small number of nuclear weapons and little or no inhibitions about using them. To deter this first use by a rogue state, the United States will have to threaten massive, including possible nuclear, retaliation against such a state. The central function of the Strategic Command in the coming years will be maintenance of nuclear peace in the

Third World. Third, the U.S. military may also have to intervene quickly and effectively in countries important to the U.S. in order to support a friendly government, restore a friendly government that has been overthrown, overthrow a hostile regime, protect American lives and property, rescue hostages, eliminate terrorists, destroy

drag mafias, and engage in other actions which normally fall under the heading of " low intensity conflict". Whether or not a state is aggressive or pacific,

reasonably decent or totally threatening, depends overwhelmingly on the nature of its government. President Clinton has very appropriately said that the promotion of democracy should be a central, perhaps the central, theme of American foreign policy. In areas critical to its security, the U.S. has to be prepared to defend governments that are friendly and democratic and to overthrow governments that are unfriendly and undemocratic. This requirement also emphasizes a new role for American military forces: the targeting of dictatorial governments and their leaders. In the Gulf War the U.S. military degraded by more than fifty percent the capability of the Iraqi forces. The U.S. military also substantially brought Iraqi society to a standstill. The U.S. military, however, proved incapable of eliminating the true villain of the piece: the Iraqi government. The elimination of Saddam Hussein was a U.S. objective, although not one endorsed by the United Nations, and we failed to achieve that objective. During the past decade, indeed, we have tried to eliminate three hostile dictators: Khadaffi, Noriega, and Saddam Hussein. We only succeeded with Noriega, and it took us some while and we suffered some embarrassment in doing that, although it involved a minuscule country with respect to which our intelligence had to be better than almost any other place in the world. Targeting and incapacitating dictatorial governments will be an important mission for the U.S. military in the coming years, and it is one with

respect to which our capabilities are now sadly deficient These are some of the military missions of the United States armed forces in the

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post-Cold War world. What then are appropriate non-military or civilian uses to which the armed forces may be put in this world? As I have indicated,

historically the non-combat activities have been multiple and diverse. There is no reason why they should not be so in the future. First, these uses of the armed forces could

well include those domestic functions in American society highlighted by Senator Nunn and included in the Defense Authorization Act. Second, these uses obviously should

include humanitarian relief at home and abroad where such activity is welcomed by the local government.

( ) Our interpretation won’t “de-limit”. We allow military assets for humanitarian task only if they’re necessary to complete a task. Perry ‘8(et al; Dr. Charles M. Perry – Vice President & Director of Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy AnalysisThe U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process: How It Works and How It Could Work BetterCharles M. Perry – May –

Traditionally, if it is determined that military assets are indeed necessary to respond to a disaster, OFDA will submit a formal request for military assistance to the State Department’s Executive Secretariat, which will in turn forward the request to the Executive Secretariat of DoD. Following an intensive intra-DoD review process, the secretary of defense or deputy secretary may order the deployment of military assets to the disaster zone in support of OFDA efforts, signing what is called a “third party waiver” to

allow U.S. military goods and services to be used in a non-military operation to assist a “third party.” On the basis of such a waiver, over fifteen thousand U.S. soldiers and sailors were deployed as part of the 2004 tsunami response to work alongside

OFDA in the affected regions. More specifically, the U.S. military provided twenty-six ships, eighty-two planes, and fifty-one

helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5 million tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and other disaster relief agencies to move much-needed aid to inaccessible areas affected by the tsunami (OFDA 2005, 17). But DoD assistance may be as limited (if nonetheless crucial) as the dispatch of a single C-130 to deliver supplies to a disaster zone, or the diversion of a nearby ship to assist in the evacuation of people at risk or injured. In theory, the criterion for both levels of response is that no commercial alternative exists or is readily available. However, despite the formal process for requesting military assistance, local U.S. ambassadors and country officers in the relevant regional bureau at the State Department have often requested DoD assistance directly, leaving USAID and OFDA out of the loop. Moreover, some officials at State are neither familiar with disaster management issues and procedures nor even aware of USAID’s and OFDA’s role as the LFA for foreign HA/DR activities. For instance, in response to flash floods in the Horn of Africa in 2006, State issued a request for DoD assistance. When personnel from DoD spoke with the relevant regional bureau at State, they found that staff at the bureau were unaware of OFDA’s role or that USAID was in fact the LFA, and needed to provide the justification for DoD assistance. Still worse, DoD actually had to give bureau officials the contact information for the proper USAID/OFDA representatives (interview 2007a). Examples such as this illustrate the conundrum facing DoD: How does the military (meant primarily as a resource of last resort) respond to requests for assistance when State Department officials may not yet have properly coordinated with USAID/OFDA to fully assess the availability of civilian options, including cheaper, commercial alternatives? In an effort to avoid such situations in the future, USAID, DoD, and State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State/PM) are drafting new HA/DR guidelines to clarify how State should respond to and handle overseas disasters, and to improve the State-DoD assistance request process.

OFDA, of course, is generally quite willing to request the mobilization of military assets for overseas relief missions, and to give DoD relatively wide latitude to work directly with its counterpart in the affected nation. This is especially true when

that nation lies within a region of strategic interest, as was the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan

earthquake, the 2006 Philippine mudslide, and the 2007 Bangladesh cyclone. That said, increased calls for DoD involvement in HA/DR missions have pushed the military to operate less as an instrument of last resort in support

of civilian relief agencies and more as a regular contributor, intimately involved in a broad range of humanitarian work. Increasingly, U.S. forces are on the ground, working alongside host nation officials and military personnel to eliminate sources of instability and improve livelihoods through various development and capacity-building projects. In the Horn of Africa, for example, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 to promote regional stability and protect coalition interests through disaster relief, humanitarian support, medical and dental assistance, and construction and water development projects. CJTF-HOA also provides military-to-military training in counterterrorism and in border and maritime security. In 2008, the U.S. government will establish a new unified combatant command responsible for Africa known as Africa Command (or AFRICOM) to expand CJTF-HOA civil affairs efforts and similar projects elsewhere on the continent. For their part, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and PACOM already run similar programs in their respective areas of responsibility (or AORs), such as Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) in Central America and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).

(Note: The acronym “OFDA” stands for the US’s “Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance”. “HADR” stands for “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief”)

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A-to Specific Neg cards

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A-to Neg’s Brown card

( ) Reject the Brown ev:

--- No intent to universally define – author defines for the purposes of her personal thesis on Burmese Militia Groups.

--- Defines “roles” – as in occupations – within the military. Doesn’t exclude equipment.

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A-to Wuerzner

( ) Wuerzner ev only proves there’s no clear bright line for a “military asset”. It doesn’t prove you should err neg.

( ) The invert the error – this ev just proves no aff’s topical because nothing is “non-military”.

( ) Wuerzner makes no sense in context of the aff – searching for the plan doesn’t fulfill the two standards in the card – militarily effective AND definite

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A-to Bunyan

( ) we meet it – we’re civilian. Assets don’t change missions.

( ) doesn’t apply – assumes the EU’s rapid-reaction paramilitary police force

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A-to Oxford 14

( ) we meet it – we’re civilian. Assets don’t change missions.

( ) Says “not characteristic” of the military. We meet – we’re an atypical use of military assets.

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A-to Vocabulary 14

( ) massively de-limits – uses the word “associated”. Rules out camera and sonar.

( ) we meet it – the EXPLORATION, not the tech, is not conceptually ASSOCIATED with combat.

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A-to Resnick

( ) Dismiss the Resnick ev:

--- it’s defining engagement and exploration or assets.

--- we meet it – we think we’re facially the “means”. Our objective is “non-military”.

--- the neg links harder to “subjective and blurry”. They have to contrive a false distinction about assets.

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A-to Webster’s ‘14

( ) We meet the 3rd definition on the same page – we’re not the “usual characteristics” of the military.

( ) we meet – this just begs the question of our exploration v. asset distinction

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A-to Benkèo

( ) Zedalis on-point answers Benkèo. It speaks to the “non-aggressive” vs. “non-military” distinction and proves that plan’s exploration is non-miltiary and not just “non-aggressive”.

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A-to T – Southern Ocean

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2AC Frontline

( ) Counter-definition – Southern Ocean is an ocean.

NOAA ‘14(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – “There is only one global ocean” – Last Revised January 23, 2014 –

While there is only one global ocean, the vast body of water that covers 71 percent of the Earth is geographically divided into distinct named

regions. The boundaries between these regions have evolved over time for a variety of historical, cultural,

geographical, and scientific reasons. Historically, there are four named oceans: the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic.

However, most countries—including the U nited S tates —now recognize the Southern (Antarctic) as the fifth ocean. The Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian are known as the three major oceans. The Southern Ocean is the 'newest' named ocean. It is recognized by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as the body of water extending from the coast of Antarctica to the line of latitude at 60 degrees South. The boundaries of this ocean were proposed to the International Hydrographic Organization in 2000. However, not all countries agree on the proposed boundaries, so this has yet to be ratified by members of the IHO. The U.S. is a member of the IHO, represented by the NOS Office of Coast Survey.

( ) No bright line or precision – even National Geographic is torn on the question.

Holland ‘11ELIZABETHE HOLLAND – Reporter for the St Louis Post Dispatch. She is internally quoting members of the American Meteorological Society and Ann Kelly, who teaches graduate level courses on oceanography for high school teachers. “Southern Ocean debate buoys teachers' role in classroom” – St Louis Post Dispatch – January 05, 2011 –

"It's the newest ocean," said Ann Kelly, a teacher at Bishop DuBourg High School who, as a member of the American

Meteorological Society, oversees a graduate-level course on oceanography for teachers. Kelly said most of the teachers who take the courses come into class having never heard of the Southern Ocean. "Most people are like, 'Oh, I didn't know they called it that,'" she said. What the International Hydrographic Organization defines as the Southern Ocean completely surrounds Antarctica and extends upward to 60 degrees south latitude in an area where the cold waters of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current — an ocean current that flows from west to east around Antarctica — meet the warmer waters of the north. While debate continues over whether the Earth has four or five oceans, promoters of the latter say the Southern Ocean is the fourth-largest of the five (smaller than the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian, but larger

than the Arctic). "Oceanographers and meteorologists do consider it important and do consider it an ocean," Kelly said. But other experts don't even agree that it officially exists. It's a dispute that shows not only how teachers can be thrust into

academic disagreements, but how those scientific debates can take time to trickle down to classrooms. Not official Among the detractors of a formal designation is the National Geographic Society, which doesn't officially recognize the Southern Ocean. But the respected body hasn't exactly closed the books on the concept either. Cindy Aitken,

a spokeswoman for the organization, said the newest edition of the National Geographic Atlas of the World says: "The

Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans merge into icy water around Antarctica. Some define this as an ocean, calling it the Antarctic Ocean, Austral Ocean or Southern Ocean. While most accept four oceans, including the Arctic, there is no international agreement on the name

or extent of a fifth ocean. "In general, National Geographic recognizes the Southern Ocean as a scientific term and not a oceanographic feature.

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( ) We meet – plan still searches a body of water – if you’d rather call that body of water the “Southern Indian Ocean” or the “Southern Pacific Ocean”, it’s still an ocean. We aren’t searching the Hudson Bay or the Great Lakes.

( ) Antarctic Affs still exist under their interpretation – they’d just be run an “Southern Indian Ocean” or “Southern Pacific”.

( ) Neg’s Expertise arg is wrong – our NOAA cards cites experts from around the world that do recognize the Southern Ocean. National Geographic are outliers and aren’t better qualified.

( ) they overlimit – the arbitrarily say we can’t explore a body of water that every country on Earth recognizes as an ocean. Under their standard, any internet weirdo that said “the Pacific Ocean” wasn’t an Ocean” would get equal footing. Creates a poor model for real world education.

( ) No ground loss – we didn’t run an Antarctic advantage. And, all of the same Neg links apply regardless of the name of the body of water.

( ) Reasonability before competing interpretations – any other stance causes a race to the bottom that hurts topic-specific education.

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A-to China Cplan

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2AC Frontline

( ) Perm – do both

( ) At best, they can only solve Advantage One. They don’t boost US soft power or effect the US Pivot towards Asia.

( ) Only US tech can solve – that’s our 1AC ev from Lamothe, Austin, and Malaysia Kini.

( ) International Fiat is bad – we have to prep for over 190 countries; it’s not reciprocal – we get one actor, so should they; creates non-Real world model – as no one person controls the levers of power in two countries.

( ) Chinese search and mapping won’t solve – technical problems.

NDTV ‘14This is originally an Agence France-Presse Report – New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV) is an Indian commercial broadcasting television network – “Chinese Ship in Latest Glitch in MH370 Search Mission” May 31, 2014 –

A Chinese ship mapping the ocean floor ahead of an intensive underwater search for missing Flight MH370 was returning to port today due to a technical problem , officials said. The massive Indian Ocean search for the Malaysia Airlines

plane, which disappeared on March 8 carrying 239 people including five Indians, has so far failed to find any sign of the Boeing 777. The Chinese survey ship, Zhu Kezhen, was conducting a bathymetric survey - or mapping of the ocean floor - to help experts determine how to carry out the next stage of the search on the previously unmapped ocean seabed. "Zhu Kezhen suffered a defect to its multibeam echosounder and is coming into port to conduct the necessary repairs," Australia's Joint Agency Coordination Centre said in a statement.

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Extensions – China won’t find it, US key

( ) China won’t find it – plan is key.

Ho ‘14Benjamin Ho is an Associate Research Fellow in the Multilateralism and Regionalism Program in the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. His research interests include the study of multilateral institutions in the Asia-Pacific region, US-China political relations, and national security issues. Benjamin a Masters degree in International Relations from NTU. “MH370: Limits of China’s Soft Power” – RSIS COMMENTARIES, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies – This piece was also carried by the New Straits Times – March 31st –

Despite China’s growing regional influence, it would seem that at the end of the day, Western involvement and assistance is needed, especially when it comes to the use of technology in complex search missions. According to the Straits Times’ China specialist Ching Cheong, what the MH370 incident revealed about China’s power status in the region is not encouraging as countries were reluctant to share information with it. Given Malaysia’s influential position in ASEAN, it is likely that the Malaysian approach – looking to the West, instead of China – is representative of an overall ambivalence of the ASEAN community when it comes to working with China, especially when it concerns sharing of technical information that could possibly impinge on national security and intelligence-gathering capabilities. The fact that China does not enjoy the trust of its neighbours also raises the question to what extent its

global aspirations are viewed favourably by the rest of the region. In the case of MH370, China has contributed considerable assets in searching for the aircraft. Yet none of these assets possess the technological sophistication needed to undertake a mission as difficult as the current search for the missing airliner - a sign that China’s much- vaunted military modernisation programme still has some way to go before it matches that of its Western counterparts. Unless Beijing is concealing its true capabilities – something unimaginable in such circumstances - regional countries would still turn to the West, if not always, for

leadership, at least for its technical competence and know-how, even on territory that China claims.

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2AC Spending

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1AR extensions for most of these arguments are available in the spending core.

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2AC Frontline

( ) Their Moore ev says the economy withstood over one-trillion in spending during Obama’s first term. Disad is empirically false.

( ) Plan’s under 1.5 million – not even .01% of current debtTime ‘13“Navy Goes to Great Depths to Determine Cause of Air Force Crash” By Mark Thompson-Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for Time, 1/10/13,

Getting to the downed craft was no small undertaking. According to the company: In early August 2012, at the direction of the Naval Sea Systems Command’s Director of Ocean Engineering, Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV), Phoenix mobilized the

Navy’s ORION deepwater side scan sonar system, the CURV 21 remotely operated vehicle (ROV), and the Navy’s motion compensated, 30,000 pound Fly-Away Deep Ocean Salvage System (FADOSS). All equipment was transported over land from Phoenix’s facility in Largo, Maryland to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. From there, military transport aircraft moved the equipment to Hawaii, where the gear was loaded aboard USNS Navajo (T-ATF 169). After a 10-day transit to the crash site, underwater search operations commenced using the Navy’s 20,000 fsw [feet of seawater] depth search system, ORION. After searching the initial planned search area spanning a 2 x 4 nautical mile (nm) area, search operations shifted to another high-probability area and the suspected F-16 debris field was quickly identified. Next, Phoenix personnel deployed the CURV 21 deepwater ROV system and conducted a detailed video survey of the area in which several high priority items,

including the Flight Data Recorder and engine, were identified. Over the next 10 days, the Phoenix team piloted the CURV 21 ROV through 12 dives and recovered all critical items desired by the embarked accident investigating board. Phoenix spokesman Peter LeHardy says his company has a Navy contract for such work as deep as 20,000 feet. It does the work with Navy gear it maintains and operates. “Recovering the F-16 was well within

our capabilities,” he adds. “Our deepest effort to date was a recovery of a subsea sensor back in 2010, at a depth of 18,558 feet.” The Navy said the operation cost it $1.4 million.

( ) Not unique – Econ low now. Prefer future predictive ev.

Kohl 5/27{David, professor emeritus in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics (Virginia Tech), two-time recipient of the American Agricultural Economics Association’s Outstanding Teaching Award, “Economic Indicators and Confusing Signals,” Corn and Soybean Digest: Road Warrior, 2014,}

The U.S. economy is showing mixed signals . The lead economic index (LEI) which foretells the future of the economy has been

increasing in recent months, most recently up 0.4%, which is bullish for the economy. Sixty percent of the factors that make up the LEI are exhibiting positive signs. The purchasing manager index (PMI) also illustrates a positive growth oriented economy for the next few months. The readings have consistently been above 50, a metric that suggests an expanding economy. Another positive sign is 78.6% factory capacity utilization. For comparison, at the height of the great economic recession of 2009, this figure dropped to 68%, the lowest ever recorded.

Confusing Signals Despite the forward-looking good news, housing, which is a pivotal part of the economy,

is still struggling. With one in seven jobs in America tied to housing, this engine of the economy is improving at a modest pace. Ideally, housing starts range between 1.1 million and 1.5 million annually. In recent months, this metric has been in the 900,000 range, and it increased to 1.072 million in April. Reasons for the struggle include higher mortgage rates, students with over $1 trillion of student loan debt collectively, increased regulation of mortgage lenders, the desire to rent rather than own a home, and affordability of housing with flattening or reduced wage scales.

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Another area of the economy that is struggling is unemployment. While the rate has declined to 6.3%,

the U-6 unemployment rate which includes the long-term unemployed, discouraged workers and people mismatched in the workforce is at 12.3%. While many jobs are available, the particular skill sets needed may not be available, creating

a gap. This is particularly true in the agriculture industry with more use of technology and innovation, which requires a highly skilled

agricultural workforce. Oil prices remain stubbornly high impacting consumer purchases. Copper prices, a

bellwether of world economic growth and inflation, have declined by approximately 25% year-over-year. Yes, first quarter

gross domestic product (GDP) growth was a paltry 0.1%. Everyone he is blaming the winter weather, but there may be other factors involved. Further tracking of economic indicators in the summer and fall may provide a clear path, but for now the economy is muddling along!

( ) Deficit spending good – also proves Neg link is epistemologically biased.Krugman ‘13“Dwindling Deficit Disorder” PAUL KRUGMAN- NY Times, PHD at MIT, Nobel Prize winner, best economist everrrrrr, March 10, 2013,

For three years and more, policy debate in Washington has been dominated by warnings about the dangers of budget deficits. A

few lonely economists have tried from the beginning to point out that this fixation is all wrong, that deficit spending is actually appropriate in a depressed economy. But even though the deficit scolds have been wrong about everything so far — where are the soaring interest rates we were promised? — protests that we are having the wrong conversation have consistently fallen on

deaf ears. What’s really remarkable at this point, however, is the persistence of the deficit fixation in the face of rapidly changing facts. People still talk as if the deficit were exploding, as if the United States budget were on an unsustainable

path; in fact, the deficit is falling more rapidly than it has for generations, it is already down to sustainable levels, and it is too small given the state of the economy. Start with the raw numbers. America’s budget deficit soared after the 2008 financial crisis and the recession that went with it, as revenue plunged and spending on unemployment benefits and other safety-net programs rose. And this rise in the deficit was a good thing ! Federal spending helped sustain the economy at a time when the

private sector was in panicked retreat ; arguably, the stabilizing role of a large government was the

main reason the Great Recession didn’t turn into a full replay of the Great

Depression. But after peaking in 2009 at $1.4 trillion, the deficit began coming down. The Congressional Budget Office expects

the deficit for fiscal 2013 (which began in October and is almost half over) to be $845 billion. That may still sound like a big number, but given the state of the economy it really isn’t. Bear in mind that the budget doesn’t have to be balanced to put us on a fiscally sustainable path; all we need is a deficit small enough that debt grows more slowly than the economy. To take the classic example, America never did pay off the debt from World War II — in fact, our debt doubled in the 30

years that followed the war. But debt as a percentage of G.D.P. fell by three-quarters over the same period. Right now, a sustainable deficit would be around $460 billion. The actual deficit is bigger than that. But according to new

estimates by the budget office, half of our current deficit reflects the effects of a still-depressed economy. The “cyclically adjusted” deficit — what the deficit would be if we were near full employment — is only about $423 billion, which puts it in the

sustainable range ; next year the budget office expects that number to fall to just $172 billion. And that’s why

budget office projections show the nation’s debt position more or less stable over the next decade. So we do not, repeat do not , face any kind of

deficit crisis either now or for years to come . There are, of course, longer-term fiscal issues: rising health costs and an aging population will put the

budget under growing pressure over the course of the 2020s. But I have yet to see any coherent explanation of why these longer-run concerns should determine budget policy right now. And

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as I said, given the needs of the economy, the deficit is currently too small. Put it this way: Smart fiscal policy involves having the government spend when the private sector won’t, supporting the economy when it is weak and reducing debt only when it is strong. Yet the cyclically adjusted deficit as a share of G.D.P. is currently about what it was in 2006, at the height of the housing boom — and it is headed down. Yes, we’ll want to reduce deficits once the economy recovers , and there are gratifying signs that a solid recovery is finally under

way. But unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, is still unacceptably high. “The boom,

not the slump, is the time for austerity,” John Maynard Keynes declared many years ago. He was right — all you have

to do is look at Europe to see the disastrous effects of austerity on weak economies. And this is still nothing like a

boom. Now, I’m aware that the facts about our dwindling deficit are unwelcome in many quarters. Fiscal fearmongering is a major industry

inside the Beltway, especially among those looking for excuses to do what they really want, namely dismantle Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security. People whose careers are heavily invested in the

deficit-scold industry don’t want to let evidence undermine their scare

tactics ; as the deficit dwindles, we’re sure to encounter a blizzard of bogus numbers purporting to

show that we’re still in some kind of fiscal crisis. But we aren’t . The deficit is indeed dwindling, and the case for making the deficit a central policy concern, which was never very strong given low borrowing costs and high unemployment , has now completely vanished.

( ) US Economy is resilient

Perez ‘13{Tom, US Secretary of Labor, former law professor (Maryland), M.A. Public Policy (Harvard), Ph.D. in Law (Harvard), “The Resilience of the American Economy,” US Department of Labor, 11/8,}

The American economy is resilient . October’s jobs report demonstrates continued steady growth ,

with the addition of 212,000 total private sector jobs in October. The unemployment rate, which fell in September to a nearly-five

year low of 7.2 percent, remains essentially unchanged at 7.3 percent, while American manufacturers added

19,000 jobs in the month of October. But while American businesses continue to add jobs — 7.8 million over the last 44

months of private sector job growth — they do so in spite of Congress , not because of it. October’s job growth was undoubtedly restrained by the brinksmanship and uncertainty created by the federal government shutdown and the near-default on the nation’s debt. The American economy is resilient, but it is not immune to manufactured crises. We see signs that suggest the shutdown had a discouraging effect on America’s continued recovery. We remain concerned about the drop in the labor force participation rate, and American workers on

temporary layoffs rose by nearly 448,000, the largest monthly increase in the history of that series of data. The American people deserve leadership that focuses on growing the economy — not holding it hostage. Let’s keep our eye on the ball by passing immigration reform, which has bipartisan support and would inject a trillion dollars into the economy, and investing in infrastructure upgrades that would create thousands of middle class jobs right now. Instead of erecting political roadblocks, let’s work together to pave bipartisan roads

to full recovery. Today’s employment numbers are a reminder that while the economy continues to grow

and create new jobs , it remains on uncertain footing. Too many Americans still find the rungs on the ladder of

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opportunity beyond their reach. We need to move forward with common-sense proposals that will create jobs, strengthen the middle class, reduce our deficit and expand opportunity for American families. The president and I stand ready to work with Congress to do just that.

( ) Economic decline won’t cause war---best and most recent data confirms

Drezner ‘12 (Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” http://www.globaleconomicgove

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greaterinternal

repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict , there were genuine concerns

that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea,

and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests

otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion

they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in

20 07. ”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have

military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm thatthe Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict ; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been

reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is

“contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis , the proper comparison is with Great Depression . And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart

and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

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1AR Extensions (Tyler’s Speech)


Then on the overview, they say that they win on magnitude because they get to extinction, but food insecurity also leads to nuke war, which will cause extinction. Countries become desperate for supplies and people don't think straight. They are more willing to take drastic measures, which will lead to disaster.

Hungry African 2017Wow im hungry, im gonna start a nuclear war. This happens much more than people think. This is definitely going to lead to extinction.

also ignoring food insecurity is immoral. Food insecurity leads to much worse forms of structural violence like rape and stealing and more starving. You have a moral obligation to try to help these people because they are actually going to be hurting instead of some super unprobable nuclear war scenario.

We have the more probable impact because this stuff is real

We also have a faster timeframe because overfishing is happening now and overfishing spirals

2ac 2 plan is under 1.5 millionExtend 2ac #2, Time ‘13 Plan only costs 1.4 million because they have used the drone for similar reasons before and it only cost 1.4mill. This means it doesn't trigger the link, there is no link.

TS: They say our card talks about a completely different dive and that ours would require a top. scan but it still uses the same drone and the previous dive could have used a top scan as well.

They say their Yan ‘14 Card should be preferred because it actually uses real estimates of countries involved. The card talks about Malaysia, China, and Australia debating next steps to find MH370, the problem with this card is that we are debating US subs, these subs are owned by

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the US. The other countries the card focuses on don’t have a lot of say in how the US spends it money.

They say their card actually uses real estimates unlike the Aff but our estimates come from the US navy, the actual pilates and owners of the sub, also one dive is all thats needed to get a good estimate of future costs as top. scan costs just need to be added.

2ac 3 non unique econ low nowExtend 2AC #3, Khol 5/27 sais: Econ low now because the economy is struggling. This means if the economy is low now, There will be no war.

They say-Economy is booming Kruger 6/61. Unemployment is at %12.3 because  the economy is muddling along .2. Oil, housing, and other prices are high because the economy is struggling and no one has any

money.3. GDP is at 0.1% because there is no money to increase product.

2ac 4 deficit spending goodExtend 2ac #4, Krugman ‘13 says deficit spending good because it is necessary for a depressing economy to have deficit spending. This means internal link turn.They say that fiscal austerity is key to econ growth.

1. Krugman’13 says that our economy is depressing and it is appropriate that deficit spending should be implemented. Deficit spending good because no negative effects,

2. It’s correlation vs causation they both may be happening at the same time, but the econ is not getting better because of fiscal austerity.

3. Then they say that they control uniqueness because the econ is good and there is relatively little spending, but one is not caused by the other. If anything, this economic recovery is a result of the large amounts of spending that happened during obama’s first term. Things don't affect each other immediately, these things take time. And there hasn't been fiscal austerity until very recently, so it cant have made this econ recovery session.

2ac 5 US econ resilientExtend Perez ‘13,  They say econ. fragile but Perez ‘13 says the  They do so in spite of Congress, , not because of it. October’s job growth was undoubtedly restrained by the brinksmanship and uncertainty created by the federal government shutdown and the near-default

2ac 6 econ decline doesn’t cause warExtend 2AC #6 Drezner 8/12 Says Econ. decline won’t cause war because great depression didn’t cause war and we a society has changed to not allow large scale war. They say Economy is regressing to 1914 levels therefore war will ensue but there is no surge in nationalism which defined WW1.

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They say perception James ‘13  causes instability but Drezner ‘12 says that there is no surge in bad perception because the Interstate violence has declined.They say economic collapse will cause global instability but the authors Harris and Burrows wrote this in

2009 while my card is 2012 while many things have changed in 3 years.

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2AC vs. Politics Disad – NSA Reform

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Since the Neg can run many modules – I did not put impact answers in this frontline. Aff should place those in the 2AC based on the choice of 1NC module.

Also, there are backlines to everything – some are in the NSA Core file and others are in the “politics internal links” core.

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( ) Not unique – Senate will modify bill nowHattem, 5/24 Julian, Reporter @ The Hill covering tech policy, 5/24/14,

NSA reform to be ‘fight of the summer’ Civil libertarians who say the House didn’t go far enough to reform the National

Security Agency are mounting a renewed effort in the Senate to shift momentum in their direction. After compromises in the House bill, the NSA’s critics are buckling down for a months-long fight in the Senate that they hope will lead to an end to government snooping on Americans. “This is going to be the fight of the summer,” vowed Gabe Rottman, legislative counsel with the American Civil Liberties Union. If advocates are able to change the House bill’s language to prohibit NSA agents from collecting large quantities of data, “then that’s a win,” he added. “The bill still is not ideal even with those changes, but that would be an improvement,” Rottman said. The USA Freedom Act was introduced in both the House and Senate last autumn, after Edward Snowden’s revelations about the NSA’s operations captured headlines around the globe. Privacy advocates like the ACLU rallied around the bill as the way to rein in the spy agency and more than 150 lawmakers signed on as cosponsors in the House. In recent weeks, though, advocates worried that it was being progressively watered down. First, leaders on the House Judiciary Committee made changes in order to gain support from a broader cross-section of the chamber. Then, after it sailed

through both the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, additional changes were made behind closed doors that caused many

privacy groups and tech companies such as Microsoft and Apple to drop their support. When it passed the House 303-121 last week, fully half of the bill’s original cosponsors voted against it. “We were of course very disappointed at the weakening of the bill,” said Robyn Greene, policy counsel at the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute. “Right now we really are turning our attention to the Senate to make sure that doesn’t happen again.” Instead of entirely blocking the government’s ability to collect bulk amounts of data, critics said that the new bill could theoretically allow federal agents to gather information about an entire area code or region of the

country. One factor working in the reformers’ favor is the strong support of Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). Unlike House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), who only came to support the bill after negotiations to produce a

manager’s amendment, Leahy was the lead Senate sponsor of the USA Freedom Act. The fact that Leahy controls the committee gavel means he should be able to guide the bill through when it comes up for discussion next month, advocates said. “The fact that he is the chairman and it’s his bill and this is an issue that he has been passionate about for many years” is comforting, Greene said. “I think this is something he really wants to see get done. He wants to see it get done right. And he wants to see that Americans are confident that their privacy is being adequately

protected,” she added. Moments after the House passed its bill, Leahy issued a statement praising the action but said he was “disappointed” that some “meaningful reforms” were not included. Other surveillance critics such

as Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) expressed similar dissatisfaction with the House effort. Their sentiments should be buoyed by the swift outrage from

civil liberties advocates on both sides of the aisle , reformers hoped.

( ) Regardless of details – passage of some NSA reform bill is inevitable

Jakes, 14 (Lara, senior national security and diplomatic affairs writer for AP, former foreign correspondent and chief of bureau in Baghdad, Bloomberg Business News, 1/18, fuels reform on some but not all NSA spying President Barack Obama's orders to change some U.S. surveillance practices put the burden on Congress to deal with a national security controversy that has alarmed Americans and outraged foreign allies. Yet he avoided major action on the practice of sweeping up billions of phone, email and text messages from across the globe. In a speech at the Justice Department

on Friday, Obama said he was placing new limits on the way intelligence officials access phone records from hundreds of millions of Americans — and was moving toward eventually stripping the massive data collection from the government's hands.

His promises to end government storage of its collection of data on Americans' telephone calls — and require judicial review to examine

the data — were met with skepticism from privacy advocates and some lawmakers. But Obama has made it nearly impossible for reluctant leaders in Congress to avoid making some changes in the U.S. phone

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surveillance they have supported for years. Obama admitted that he has been torn between how to protect privacy rights and how to protect the U.S. from terror attacks — what officials have called the main purpose of the spy programs. "The challenge is getting the details right, and that is not simple," he said. His speech had been anticipated since former National Security Agency analyst Edward Snowden made off with an estimated 1.7 million documents related to surveillance and other NSA operations and gave them to several journalists around the world. The revelations in the documents touched off a public debate about whether Americans wanted to give up some privacy in exchange for intelligence-gathering on terror suspects. The president said his proposals "should give the American people greater confidence that their rights are being protected, even as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain the tools they need to keep us safe." Obama acknowledged more needs to be done, but he largely left it to Congress to work out the details. The NSA says it does not listen in on the phone calls or read the Internet messages without specific court orders on a case-by-case basis. But intelligence officials do collect specific information about the calls and messages, such as how long they lasted, to try to track communications of suspected terrorists.

Plans to end the sweep of phone records have been building momentum in Congress among both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.

( ) Not-unique – Attention on Obama scandals crushes his political capital now.

Stevens ‘14Internally quoting – Rhodes Cook, a political analyst, contributor to Politico, and publisher of the bimonthly political newsletter “The Rhodes Cook Letter.” Matt Stevens is an Editorial writer for Republican-American. He holds a B.A. in political science and an M.A. in print journalism and public affairs. ‘Will Obama ever be popular again?’ – Republican American – June 9th, 2014 –

Mr. Cook pinned the president’s popularity woes on lingering economic problems, distaste for the Patient Protection and

Affordable Care Act, and the scandals that have dogged the Obama administration. He declared it is not impossible,

but unlikely Mr. Obama will be able to stage a comeback. Read about it all here. I think Mr. Cook’s intuition is right on the

money. If something happens to erode confidence in a president early in his second term, the lame-duck nature of Round 2 makes it difficult to climb out of the hole. In Mr. Obama’s case, not long after he was re-elected in 2012,

many Americans came to see his administration as an incompetent group of political tricksters, because of the aforementioned debacles. Given that the resulting approval-ratings slump hasn’t reversed itself, it seems this narrative is set in stone.

Since Mr. Obama’s political capital diminishes by the day , it seems there is little he can do to change – no pun intended –

things. Indeed, his second-term situation is analogous to that of his predecessor, George W. Bush.

( ) Turn – Plan Resurrects the 370 story. That successfully distracts media focus on Obama’s scandals.

TYT’ 14TYT Network, “The Young Turks” Network, is a Multi-Channel Network of online video talk shows, consisting mostly of TYT owned-and-operated shows and a select group of outside partners. The network generates over 68 million views per month. “MH370 Obama Connection Found (By Fox News)” – March 25th, 2014 –

Now Bill O’Reilly is sounding desperate. How many times now since the start of the Malaysia Airlines story has he devoted a segment to hammering the media — mainly CNN — for obsessing over the missing jetliner? We’re starting to lose count. In any case, O’Reilly’s answer to CNN’s wall-to-wall reporting on the story is wall-to-wall whining about

its coverage of the story. Backed up by a nice helping of sanctimony, that is: In last night’s sermon, O’Reilly slighted the networks for steering clear of Benghazi, Libya, and the IRS in favor of the more neutral MH370 .

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( ) No link – plan wouldn’t cost political capital in the Senate. Senate is majority Democrats – but their link assumes fiscal conservatives who don’t want to spend big bucks on the plan.

( ) Political capital doesn’t exist and isn’t key to their DA. Winners Win is more true.Michael Hirsch, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also Newsweek’s Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for, “The World from Washington.” Earlier on, he was Newsweek’s foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror. He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994.

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In

response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how much “pol itical cap ital ” Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing

on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone had talked seriously

about Obama having enough political capital to oversee passage of both immigration reform and gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second term—even after winning the

election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)—this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundit’s license. (It doesn’t exist, but it ought to.) In his first term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years.

Obama didn’t dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic “third rail” that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the president’s health

care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obama’s personal prestige or popularity—variously put in terms of a “mandate” or “pol itical cap ital ”—chances are fair that both will now happen . What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasn’t the

election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the

national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: “Be bold.” As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. It’s impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make

anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didn’t a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senate’s so-called

Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would

“self-deport.” But this turnaround has very little to do with Obama’s personal influence—his political mandate, as it were. It has almost entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. That’s 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, the breakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a

speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come out of the Republican Party’s recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party

may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. It’s got nothing to do with Obama’s political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of

political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.” The real problem is that the idea of pol itical cap ita l—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong . “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of

political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It

conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way

unforeseen events can suddenly change everything . Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real

investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just don’t know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, “Winning wins.” In theory, and in practice,

depending on Obama’s handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he could still deliver on a lot of his second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the

huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that pol itical cap ital is , at best, an empty concept , and

that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. “It can refer to a very abstract thing, like

a president’s popularity, but there’s no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless,” says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on

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one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of cap ital . “The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdom is that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors” Ornstein says. “If they think he’s going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. It’s a bandwagon effect.”¶ ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ¶ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because he’s aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&M’s Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnson’s landslide

victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwater’s ineptitude as a candidate) was President Johnson’s masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late 1963. Don’t focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers’ support for a tax cut and appropriations bills the president needed. “One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtn’t to expend it on this,” Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, “Well, what the hell’s the presidency for?” Johnson didn’t worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentum he possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro records. “Momentum is not a mysterious mistress,” LBJ said. “It is a controllable fact of political life.” Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.) And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claim of political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly demonstrated that he didn’t fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, “I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. That’s my style.” The 43rd president threw all of his political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didn’t have enough political capital. Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bush’s margin over John Kerry was thin—helped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romney’s gaffe-filled failure this time—but that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most people’s eyes. Voters didn’t trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bush’s term, the stock-market collapse bore out the public’s skepticism. Privatization just didn’t have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-followed political blogger, “was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. It’s like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I don’t think Obama’s going to make that mistake.… Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didn’t understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Party’s concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at

Newtown.” Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, “but because Republicans are beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea ,” as the party suffers in the polls.¶ THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER¶

Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well-worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didn’t realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention, with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010—haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pockets—government-imposed health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titanic fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the country’s mood. Unlike Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reform was that it distracted the government’s attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didn’t really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reform legislation with loopholes. Health care was sucking all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielberg’s hit movie Lincoln. Daniel Day-Lewis’s Abraham Lincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move people’s hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of the tide in the Civil War. But it’s clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroom horse-trading. “The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can give out to people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did,” says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDR’s plan to expand the Supreme Court by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term. Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didn’t fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obama’s second-term agenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win,

and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the country’s mood will support—such as, perhaps, immigration reform and gun control—there is no reason to think he can’t win far more victories than any of the careful calculators of pol itical cap ital now believe is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid today’s atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If he can get some early wins —as he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increase—that will create momentum , and one win may well lead to others. “Winning wins.” Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political-capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he

fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a “post-partisan” president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-term restructuring plan that would “lay the groundwork for long-term economic growth.” The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly was—a giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measure—he might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet socialist. After that, Obama’s public posturing provoked automatic opposition from the GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any plan—from deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reform—Republicans were virtually guaranteed to come out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOP’s newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaim immigration reform as their own issue, and he was willing to let them have some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans don’t have to listen to what I say anymore. And don’t worry about who’s got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where I’m saying this: in a state you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no choice but to move. It’s your choice.

( ) Not intrinsic – a logical policy maker could do both the plan and reform the NSA in the manner the neg describes.

( ) PC not real- it’s a myth- vote based on ideology

Moraes ‘13Frank Moraes is a freelance writer with broad interests. He is educated as a scientist with a PhD in Atmospheric Physics. He has worked in climate science, remote sensing, and throughout the computer industry. And he has taught physics. 1-8-2013

Yesterday, Jonathan Chait metaphorically scratched his head: "Nominating Hagel Most Un-Obama Thing Ever." He can't understand this nomination given that (1) Hagel will be a hard sell and (2) Obama doesn't much listen to his advisers anyway. It is interesting speculation, but I wouldn't have even thought about it had he not

written, "Why waste political capital picking a fight that isn't essential to any policy goals?"¶ This brought to mind something

that has been on my mind for a while, as in posts like "Bipartisan Consensus Can Bite Me." I'm afraid that just like Santa Claus and most conceptions

of God, " Political Capital" is a myth . I think it is just an idea that Villagers find comforting. It is a neat

narrative in which one can straightjacket a political fight. Otherwise, it is just bullshit .¶ Let's go back to late 2004, after Bush Jr was re-

elected. He said, "I earned capital in the political campaign and I intend to spend it." What was this thing that Bush intended

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to spend? It is usually said that political capital is some kind of mandate from the masses. But that is clearly not what Bush meant. He got a mandate to fuck the poor and kill the gays. But he used his political capital to privatize Social Security. One could say that this proves the point, but does anyone really think if Bush had decided to use his political capital destroying food stamps and Medicaid that he would have succeeded any better? The truth was that Bush's political capital didn't

exist.¶ Let's look at more recent events: the Fiscal Cliff. Obama didn't win that fight because the people who voted for him

demanded it. He won it because everyone knew that in the new year he would still be pres ident . Tax rates were going up.

Boehner took the Fiscal Cliff deal because it was the best deal that he felt he could get. He didn't fold because of some magi c p olitical c apital that Obama could wave over him.¶ There is no doubt that public opinion does affect how

politicians act. Even politicians in small safe districts have to worry that larger political trends may end up making them look stupid, out of touch, or just cruel. But

beyond that, they really don't care. If they did, then everyone in the House would now be a Democrat: after all, Obama won a mandate and the

associated p olitical c apital . But they don't, because presidential elections have consequences -- for who's in the White House. They don't have much consequence for the representative from the Third District of California.

*** Note: insert impact answers as needed

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Extensions – Distractions Link Turn

370 traps the new cycle – distracts from Obama’s setbacks.

Finkelstein ‘14Mark Finkelstein is a NewsBusters Senior Contributor. “Morning Joe Goes All-In MH370: Better Than Broadcasting Obama's Bungles” – NewsBusters – March 20, 2014

You're MSNBC. That hurts I know, but work with me. So, what would you like to feature: President Obama getting Putinized? Syria flouting the WMD agreement? Iran's inexorable march toward nukes? The ongoing Obamacare debacle?

Not so much. Say: why not make like CNN and go all in on MH-370? Which is precisely what Morning Joe did today. The first 103 minutes were devoted exclusively to the story of the missing plane, as an endless series of experts and panelists speculated to no particular avail. Rare that we agree with Madeline Albright. But long into the second hour, during—finally—a Ukraine segment, Albright said "I know we're all focused on the airplane," but suggesting that Ukraine is by far the more critical issue. Mika Brzezinski reacted defensively. View the video after the jump. As soon as the Ukraine segment was over, it was back to MH370. As a small-plane pilot, I'm normally fascinated by aviation stories in the news. But at this point, the endless jabber and surmise have turned me off to MH-370. Have NB readers reached the saturation point too, at least until there's some hard news? MADELINE ALBRIGHT: We worked in the '90s to try to get Russia to be a part of the system. We did everything we possibly could. And I think that they now are in a process of isolating themselves. It is

dangerous. This is a game changer. And I think -- I know we're all focused on the airplane . But the bottom line is, this

has really, truly long-term implications and we all need to focus on how to deal with Ukraine, how to deal with US-European relations, try to get our economic treaties -- trade treaties done. And then focus on our relations with Russia. Turning point, I'm very glad thATe "Time" has it on the cover, and I'm very glad to have been a part of this discussion.

Public still has huge appetite for the 370 story – it will trap headlines.

IBT ‘14Athena Yenko – reporter working for International Business Times – internally quoting CNN Worldwide President Jeff Zucker – “MH370: CNN’s ‘Obsession’ with MH370 Coverage Explained” – May 12, 2014

Apparently, it seemed that King was wrong as CNN Worldwide President Jeff Zucker said that it was the audience who led CNN to how it is handling its reporting of MH370. Speaking with Mashable, Zucker explained that data retrieved from three different analytics systems that CNN used, plus record of overnight TV ratings, led the network to dwell on MH370 the way it did - intense. The data that the system tracked showed that the missing plane's story sprang branches. The network then decided give a longer air time for MH370 coverage. "Clearly, the audience has spoken and said that what CNN did was correct," Zucker said. "I think that if people want to be critical of CNN for over-

covering a story, that's totally fine with us." According to chart presented by Mashable, CNN's ratings were lower in 2013 until

the network reported on MH 370. The significant boost in its 2014 ratings in March was attributed the news surrounding the missing Malaysian plane. "We're looking at consumption patterns and trends across the web, mobile, social and video, and then on third-party sites, looking at that and making decisions about how we program for all platforms. You're seeing that start to come online and start to bear fruit with something like the Malaysian airline story," KC Estenson, general manager of CNN Digital, explained.

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Media will get sucked-back into news about 370.

Willies ‘14Egberto Willies is an author, blogger, political activist and Executive Committee member of Move to Amend – “Bill Maher equates America's Malaysia flight MH370 obsession to our political dysfunction” – Daily Kos – May 03, 2014 –

Comedy and satire have the uncanny ability to tell stories in a nonthreatening manner. Done correctly they can be heard palatably. Bill Maher takes America’s obsession with Malaysia Flight MH370 as a proxy for many of America’s dysfunctions. Many will only see the humor in the piece. Subsequently the observed absurdities in the piece of what we do politically and otherwise are bound to self-reveal. That is why both Jon

Stewart and Bill Maher are so effective. Maher illustrates how America’s obsession with Malaysia is ill-placed given the reality of flight travel. He notes that Americans are uninterested in knowing much about genetically modified foods, the content of impactful legislation, the extent of polluters’ misbehavior, and many other issues. These issues have much more impact

on their daily lives. Yet these issues get very little scrutiny from the media. Granted, there are reasons for a continuous effort to find MH370. We should want to know if there is some flaw in the plane that could affect the entire fleet.

However, given that these planes have been flying for years, empirically one can assume they are safe in the aggregate. Ultimately

Maher gets to the core of the American psychology . We have the need for complete closure. Is that a

mental disorder, intrinsically human, or the need to be all-knowing? It is likely all of the above. The side effects are palpable as Maher clearly states.

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Extensions – Scandals = draining Obama’s PC now

( ) Media distraction needed – Obama’s agenda currently dogged by negative stories.

Oliphant ‘14James Oliphant – White House Correspondent for National Journal. Before joining National Journal, he was a correspondent covering the 2012 presidential campaign for the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, and also worked as a congressional and legal affairs reporter for those newspapers. He is a former editor-in-chief of Legal Times in Washington. “How Does a Paralyzed President Move the Needle?” – National Journal – June 12 –

This was supposed to be a summer in which President Obama's political operation could work on fine-tuning its midterm message and making

the Democrats' case to voters. But as congressional races have started to heat up, the White House has consistently found itself distracted and paralyzed by A Series of Unfortunate Events. Take this week. The administration rolled out a student-loan initiative intended to provide relief to overburdened graduates while, ideally, also motivating some of them to come to

the polls in the fall to support Democrats. But White House aides instead found themselves still fending off questions about the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner swap, a hoped-for feel-good moment that went bad in a hurry. Later in the week, a speech on college affordability was overshadowed by bad news from Iraq, as events there swiftly seized the spotlight. Moreover, the two most-talked

about people of the week were Eric Cantor and Hillary Clinton, not the president of the United States. The rocky week came right on the heels of a Veterans Administration scandal caught the White House flat-footed and amid a crisis in Ukraine that shows no sign of abating despite the administration's best diplomatic efforts. To make matters worse, the steady economic progress that many had anticipated this year has come only in dribs and drabs. And the president's approval rating remains mired in the low 40s, unlikely to rebound

soon. All of it has made crafting any sort of coherent stay-the-course message a challenge, to put it mildly. Questions remain, too, about whether this White House is more committed to the president's liberal legacy than to backstopping endangered Democrats. The Environmental Protection Agency's new power-plant regulations, for example, couldn't have landed at a worse time for Sen. Mary Landrieu in Louisiana or Senate aspirant Alison Lundergan Grimes in Kentucky—two embattled Democratic candidates in fossil-fuel states. Nor has the administration shown any inclination to approve the Keystone XL pipeline any time soon, a move that would help them and other candidates in similar straits.

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2AC v. K – Military Cloak

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2AC frontline

( ) Logic disproves their whole K – if the US is so power-hungry, make them explain why the US pulled-out of the search. The plan is the same commitment, but just with better tech. All of their impacts should have happened in March & April when the US was searching.

( ) Perm – do plan and reject imperial rationale. Humanitarian help can be advanced without propping up violent imperialism.

GROVOGUI ‘13Professor Siba N. GROVOGUI, Department of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University – “The Missing Human Intervention, Human Security, and Empire” – Jun 6, 2013 -

I hasten to clarify that what is at stake here is not humanitarianism as a ‘universal’ property but the propriety of the associated practices. To me, it is indeed possible to envisage humanitarianism devoid of imperial rationality, one that matches in its rationality a

certain universal instrumentality: the need to assist others in need. From this perspective, humanitarianism is intended to provide solidarity, security, and the instruments of life when the latter seem in doubt. However, humanitarianism today is the fulfillment of an imperial design in which rebellious and faltering postcolonial entities are reconstituted as a reincarnation of the mythical Babylon and thus in need of law and a re-insertion into a new metaphorical Jerusalem. It is in this context that one may legitimately ask in the context of real interventions questions about the meaning and subject of solidarity; the extent and purpose of security; all the domains of the allowable human activity. This is to say that

concern about the instrumentalism or institutional relevancy of humanitarianism must be distinguished from ones attendant to

the instrumentalization of this very instrumentality in the context of actual interventions.

( ) Policy Framework first – best teaches pragmatic change. And avoids regress – endless items become the nexus question – discourages clash with the other 99% of the Aff.

( ) Perm – do plan and all non-competitive parts of the Alt.

( ) K is too sweeping. Humanitarian efforts like the plan can empower and the Alt is nihilism.

Moore 2KDavid Moore teaches Economic History and Development Studies at the University of Natal in Durban. Economic History and Development Studies – University of Natal at Durban – Working Paper No. 24: “Humanitarian agendas, state reconstruction and democratisation processes in war-torn societies”. The card is edited for abelist langauge –

But in the past few years, the discourse has become stronger: the humanitarian international cannot do the right thing. The criticism comes close to asserting that reliance on private NGOs, the aid agencies of bloated western states, and venal African élites to assist recovery from natural or political disasters is destructive from the moment of

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conception. It claims that any activities from the well-meaning outside world leads to corruption at best, and

prolongation of war or disaster at worst. The HIs assist warlords through political, economic, and de facto diplomatic recognition by negotiating with them for passage through insurgent controlled areas, or for access to airfields for the landing of food-bearing planes. The food in the planes is usually the wrong type, it ends up making profit for the merchants who steal it or bribe aid officials to buy it, its cheap availability discourages small commodity producers from planting their seeds for the next harvest – and it benefits highly subsidised western agribusiness. The communities surrounding refugee camps are changed irreparably.82 Some members of the HI (if one includes the evangelists in Mozambique who befriended Renamo in Mozambique) even sell arms to the insurgents they think are on the right side of heavenly justice.83 All of these narratives fit seamlessly into a discourse of discontent: a discourse that says attempts to do good inevitably go wrong.

This world-view fits in with leftist cynicism asserting that nothing but a working class revolution (or perhaps the

perfect vanguard of a peasant-worker alliance) can set things right and all else serves capital or chaos. It tallies with realist non-interventionism on the conservative side and with the state-centric right in the discipline and practice of international relations (this ideology lets venal élites do

what they want). It fits with laissez-faire economists, Ayn Randesque libertarians , and even small-liberal advocates of good-governance who

counsel the long road to institutional renewal and governmental capacity before trying anything else like popular renewal from below or dependency inducing and

corruption causing welfare from above. It is close to what Albert Hirschman has called the rhetoric of reaction : the three horsemen of perversity,

futility and jeopardy mean that paralysis (constant inaction) is the best answer.84 It is such a counsel of despair that one can almost foresee the response to Peter Singer’s suggestion that Americans earning more than a basic-needs income of $US30,000 should give the rest away:85 “it would cause more harm than good – leading to corruption, dependency, aid to warlords, inappropriate food etc.” Similar arguments would be made about a Tobin tax.

The perverse logic of his argument leads de Waal to swing from modesty to grandiosity in his advocacy of changes to the humanitarian aid regime. His humble measures are negative: he advises the HI not to obscure power relations, not to seek the media limelight, and not to claim long-term solutions in situations of relief (de Waal condemns statements about “justice” and “long-term development” being served up by humanitarian actors86). These measures seem

to be Band-Aids stuck on to his relentless register of despair. Yet in spite of writing a whole book on humanitarianism as a “mode of power” the

reader is warned (rightly) that the HI has much less influence than “arms manufacturers, civil servants in donor treasuries and a host of others”87 – but not specifically the IFIs! On the more visionary scale, he ranges from suggesting choosing the “committed” political group of one’s choice88 to advocating the appointment of an ombudsperson89 or international auditor or commissioner.90 Between the utopian and the banal, he adds a “third way” of better public service techniques akin to the discourse of “good governance,” and more reliance on African NGOs. Finally, de Waal appears to advance the cause of something that might

be called the “political international” which would “tell the truth:” both about the reality of politics and the limited HI role.91 Such advice ignores the

reality that while the humanitarian “mode of power” operates very state-like institutions are in being formed. They can become instruments of “democratisation.” It is to one case study of such a process of “governmentalisation” that this paper now turns.

( ) Zero link to their military humanism arg. Their GROVOGUI ev is about abusing humanitarianism to “kill-to-save” – like Iraq or Afghanistan. The Aff isn’t close to that – and the presumption is that the passengers aren’t alive, rendering “kill-to-save illogical”.

( ) We impact turn their K. The Neg’s Seed, Kirk & Fukushima cards simply posit the soft power and the pivot are bad – our advantages prove they are all.

( ) Particularity first – Best studies prove China’s a risk in this specific context.

Ratner ‘14(et al; Dr. Ely Ratner Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security – “Roiling the Waters” – Foreign Policy – Jan-Feb – officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle. Perhaps that's why Biden invoked his father's advice in warning on the eve of his Beijing visit that "the only conflict that is worse than one that is intended is

one that is unintended." But an overemphasis on stability can be dangerous. While preventing inadvertent war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal, it is just as important to discourage China from believing that it can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle international disagreements without triggering a serious response. Making the risk of escalation too low will at some point start running counter to U.S. interests. Why? Because China is taking advantage of Washington's risk aversion by rocking the boat, seeing what it can extract in the process, and letting the United States worry about righting it. Beijing's playbook of tailored coercion relies in part on China's confidence that it can weather ephemeral international outrage while Washington takes responsibility for ensuring the situation

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doesn't get out of control. This means that reducing the likelihood of escalation through high-level strategic

dialogues and military-to-military hotlines, however important, is in and of itself insufficient to curb Chinese

assertiveness. History has demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense of deterrence. The Cuban missile crisis, the modern world's closest brush with the apocalypse, was precipitated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's perception that the United States, especially President John F. Kennedy, was overly concerned about stability and cooling tensions between the superpowers. Khrushchev's sense that America could be pushed was formed by Kennedy's cautious reactions to assertive Soviet moves toward Berlin, as well as Khrushchev's measure of Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna superpower summit as "weak" and accommodating. Over the following year and a half, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union sought to exploit what they perceived to be shaky American resolve, pressing in Berlin, where East Germany built a wall closing off the free part of the city, and secretly deploying nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Only through a demonstrated willingness on the part of Kennedy to go to the nuclear brink -- with U.S. nuclear forces on high alert and U.S. naval forces prepared to forcibly halt Soviet ships attempting to run the blockade (accompanied by a U.S. concession on missile deployments in Turkey) -- was the United States able to get Moscow to back down. Needless to say, restraint and a willingness to negotiate were elemental to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but only in the context of a major mobilization of U.S. forces against Cuba, the elevation of the U.S. alert level to Defcon 2 (one step short of nuclear war), and chilling threats designed to convince the Soviets that conciliation was the only viable move. OF COURSE, CHINA IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION. And 2014 is not 1962. The point is simply that a country with the power of the USSR or China, unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the United States, could

well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even under the shadow of nuclear weapons. As historian Francis Gavin has argued, the

whole history of the Cold War shows that countries like China -- and, at times, the U nited S tates -- can

bluff, coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave it with the impression that these approaches work. Just as the United States would have been far better off if Kennedy, at the Vienna summit, had squelched Khrushchev's doubts about his resolve to defend Berlin, it will be far better if the leadership in Beijing has the clear sense that the United States will meet each challenge to its and its allies' interests resolutely. Taking a cue from history,

the U nited S tates needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing's calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China. This does not mean abandoning engagement or trying to contain China, let alone fomenting conflict. But it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems to think. China must understand that attempts to roil the waters could result in precisely the kinds of costs and conflicts it seeks to avoid. To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that actually elevate the risks -- political, economic, or otherwise -- to Beijing of acting assertively. On the high seas, the focal point for the region's territorial disputes, China has bullied its neighbors by relying on non-military vessels. China is using its rapidly expanding coast guard to assert its expansive sovereignty claims by harassing non-Chinese fishermen, oil companies, and military vessels that pass through contested waters in the East and South China seas. This

has the benefit of exploiting China's dominant numerical advantage while keeping the U.S. Navy on the sidelines. Washington should

blur the false distinction between non-military and military ships by stating that it will respond to physical coercion and the use of force as deemed appropriate -- regardless of whether the perpetrator is a white- or gray-hulled ship. Exercises that practice U.S. naval operations against aggressive non-military vessels would be a good place to start. So would calling upon China to end its illegal occupation of the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, while contesting Chinese administration there by sending the U.S. Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation. The Chinese PLA Navy, for its part, hasn't been shy to test the waters. In early December, the U.S. Pacific Fleet revealed that the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens, while shadowing China's new aircraft carrier on a routine mission in international seas, was forced to take evasive action when a PLA Navy warship attached to the carrier group approached on a collision course, literally forcing the cruiser into a game of chicken. "The Chinese knew what they were doing," a military official told CNN. Beyond the sea, the United States must demonstrate a willingness to push back militarily when China attempts to coerce America's allies and partners. To do this, the U.S. military needs capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that also offer plausible, concrete options for responding to Chinese attempts to exploit America's perceived aversion to instability. Leaders throughout Asia

will be watching. Too much caution, especially if China is clearly the initiator, may be read as U.S. weakness, thereby perpetuating rather than diminishing China's incentives toward adventurism.

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Optional Args to consider adding to 2AC

( ) Who is Tony Seed ?... He has no real quals and lacks the background to explain the rationale behind the search.

***this one makes sense if they say “China Threat, Representation K” ***

( ) Reps K bad – assumes Representational Determinism. Prefer the particularized and surrounding context of HOW our reps were deployed.

Shim ‘14(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times,, Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines

and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the

important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b ; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle

(2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action.

The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become

part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However,

particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance,

proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN

effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no

causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I),

for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images , which dominates political and

public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

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( ) Imperial K backfires on OWN goals.

Hoare ‘6Marko Attila Hoare is a Research Fellow at the Faculty of History, University of Cambridge. This is a review of the book Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of its Enemies by Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Atlantic – Dissent – Summer 2006 –

‘The perfect is the enemy of the good’ – this is a proverb that applies to the seductive but bankrupt ideology of ‘anti-

imperialism,’ which presents itself as opposition to the most powerful form of oppression but which in practice is something much less positive , indeed negative and reactionary . In simplest terms, ‘imperialism’ can be defined as a state’s pursuit of empire or the expansion of its power, through acquiring territory from, or power over, other states or peoples. No reasonable person would not oppose this, but ‘anti-imperialism’ today means something other than opposition to imperialism. ‘Imperialism,’ in the eyes of the average ‘antiimperialist,’ is coterminous with ‘the West,’ i.e. with the US and its West European and Israeli allies. As such, it is used to refer to the bloc of states that dominates the world today, and there is undoubtedly something emotionally appealing to the individual ‘radical’ in apparently fighting that which is all-powerful. As an eighteen-year old Trotskyist and ‘anti-imperialist’ at the time of the 1991 Gulf War, I can testify to the empowering sense of self-righteousness I felt as I demonstrated against the US and its allies, in the course of which my views became increasingly extreme: I fervently believed that the US-led intervention was by far a greater evil than Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait; that it would be a blessing for humanity if the US and its allies were defeated; that such a defeat would trigger revolutionary outbreaks across the Middle East and even in the West. Such were the views of a teenage zealot with no knowledge of the Middle Eastern peoples or appreciation of their interests. I debated at the time with Kanan Makiya, the great Iraqi dissident, who shocked me by saying that it was in Iraq’s interests to be liberated by the US. Makiya derived his views from his great knowledge of Middle Eastern politics and his love for the Iraqi people; I derived mine from abstract principles. It was only when my own mother’s country, Yugoslavia, was torn apart by local fascists that I gradually came to realise that Makiya had been right, and to comprehend the political and moral bankruptcy of ‘anti-imperialism.’ It is very easy to be ideologically purist when it is someone else’s country that is at stake; much more difficult when it is ones own, and one’s own people are being slaughtered. For the rest of this article, for the sake of style, we shall drop the quote marks around the term ‘anti-imperialism.’ Yet, as Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit show in their fascinating, insightful and elegantly written introduction to the philosophy of antiWesternism, the term tends not to mean opposition to ‘imperialism,’ but something at once darker and fundamental to modern political thought. What follows should not be taken as an attack on the small minority of decent, sincere anti-imperialists who genuinely oppose oppression and injustice on an

internationalist basis – today anti-imperialists of this kind are very much the exception rather than the rule. Before examining the theoretical meaning of anti-imperialism, it is worth listing at least twelve practical reasons why the phenomenon, in its left-wing manifestation to which I

once subscribed, is a negative one: 1) Anti-imperial ism is impotent . The left -wing radicals who describe themselves as anti-imperialists,

and who engage in the unending, indiscriminate demonisation and denunciation of the US and its allies, have no idea about how to ‘defeat imperialism,’ nor any means to bring it about. The high-point of the Western left’s anti-imperialism was probably the US defeat in the Vietnam war – brought about in part by the anti-war demonstrations in the West, it is true, but also by a set of fortuitous circumstances: the largeness of Vietnam as a country (with one quarter the population of the US); the skill and dedication of the North Vietnamese / Vietcong resistance; and the support given by the Soviets and Chinese to the latter. Take away such circumstances and anti-

imperialism is a broken reed. Thirty years after its defeat in Vietnam, the US and liberal Western capitalism are stronger than ever. Even the million-strong monster demonstration in London against the Iraq war failed to prevent British participation. Anti-imperialism gives moral

satisfaction to the anti-imperialist, but does not actually weaken or halt ‘imperialism’ in any way . 2) Anti-imperialism has no positive content. The socialists who opposed World War I, and the left-wing radicals who demonstrated against the Vietnam War, did so in the belief that they were fighting for a better society – one that the Bolshevik Revolution and the Communist victory in Vietnam seemed to them to be heralding. Now that Communism has been discredited and there is no alternative to the Western liberal-capitalist model on the horizon, the current generation of anti-imperialists continue to demonstrate against Western intervention and the liberal-capitalist system, but without

offering anything in return: the idealists have been transformed in to nihilists ; their victory promises not a better, more just and egalitarian world, but the triumph of genocide in the Balkans and fundamentalism in the Middle East, in return for a minor setback to our own democratically elected leaders. 3) Anti-imperialism is redundant. It is perfectly possible to oppose acts of Western military intervention that one considers wrong, without subscribing to an antiimperialist ideology. Rightly or wrongly, large segments of the Western elites opposed intervention in World Wars I and II and in the Vietnam War. Opposition to the US intervention in Iraq united the British Conservative politicians Malcolm Rifkind, Douglas Hogg and Douglas Hurd; the presidents of Russia and France; the currently ruling Spanish Socialists; and the Pope – yet none of these is lumbered with an anti-imperialist ideology. Nor does support for one act of Western intervention imply support for them all: Clare Short supported intervention in Kosovo but opposed it in Iraq; Boris Johnson opposed it in Kosovo and supported it in Iraq; each justified their stance with reasoned arguments. Anti-imperialism merely confuses the debate over the rightness or

wrongness of a given act of intervention, b y loading it with ideological baggage . 4) Anti-imperialism is based on a faulty theoretical model that owes more to Christian modes of thinking than to Marxism or socialism. The popularity of the term originally derived from Lenin’s concept of imperialism as the ‘highest stage of capitalism,’ whereby the cartelisation of capitalism at the national level stifled domestic competition and resulted in heightened conflict between the advanced capitalist countries, in which the export of capital to third-world countries was eventually backed up by military invasion and colonisation. Right or wrong, this was at least a sober theoretical model, but it is one that has been jettisoned by contemporary ‘anti-imperialists’ in favour of a model derived from the Christian concept of Satan, or the all-powerful force for

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evil. In place of Lenin’s concept of rival imperialist powers engaged in an unending struggle with one another for control of the world’s riches, they understand ‘imperialism’ to mean a homogenous bloc possessed of a single evil will. Often this is equated with Washington, with the assumption that Britain, Israel and other close US allies are mere minions of the US. This fails to take into account the fact that even in the US alone, the political and economic elite is divided between different, often mutually hostile, institutions and interest blocs, no one of which

alone represents the ‘US’ or ‘imperialism . ’ Over intervention in the former Yugoslavia, the US establishment was bitterly divided. Yet the

antiimperialists imagine all these competing, contradictory interests to be a seamless, dark unity. Consequently: 5) Anti-imperialism

writes off the struggle within the ruling elite. Anti-imperialists necessarily see all mainstream politicians as

representative of a single bourgeois or imperialist interest, and are therefore unwilling to accept that some factions within the ruling

elite may be pursuing more progressive policies than others . Again, this tendency has its roots in a Protestant obsession with inner purity of belief , over and above the concrete results of actions, so that the ‘hypocrisy’ of ‘bourgeois’ politicians is more important to the anti-imperialists than whether or not their policies bring objective benefits. The fact that liberal,

conservative or social democratic politicians in the US, Britain or elsewhere may be genuinely sympathetic to oppressed nationalities such as the Iraqi Kurds or the Kosovo Albanians, and may be pushing for policies that would benefit them, in opposition to other Western politicians who would prefer to ally themselves with the Saddams and the Milošević’s, is of no interest to the anti-imperialists , who will not throw their weight behind the progressives in these debates.

Yet it is precisely in this arena that the most important political questions of the day

are being decided.

( ) No, not ethics impacts – consequences should be first.

Issac, ‘2 (Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold

Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility . The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends . Abjuring violence or

refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it

is often a form of complicity in injustice . This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and

(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather tha n the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may

engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and

historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits THIS judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It

promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

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Extensions – Neg = too sweeping

( ) Too sweeping to say all military humanitarianism drive a violent agenda.

Bagayoko ‘8Niagale Bagayoko is a political scientist who has done research on security sector reform in francophone African countries and led field research in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal. She has also studied interagency and multilateral processes in post-conflict environments as well as sub-regional security mechanisms in West Africa (ECOWAS). She has carried out extensive research on the impact of Western security policies (France, United States, European Union) on African conflict-management mechanisms. “State, non-state and multilateral logics of action in post-conflict environments” – Working Paper series - Global Consortium on Security Transformation – #6 – December –

Critical voices in the NGO and academic worlds increasingly argue that there is a danger that northern security priorities might ‘securitize’ the humanitarian and development agendas, particularly in post-conflict

environments. While these dangers are real, nevertheless one should not stereotype all international actors as

“northern” or as promoting northern security (e.g. anti-terrorist) agendas . Rather than caricaturizing all the international

actors that intervene in post-conflict situations with the global label of “Northener”, it is instead more fruitful to view such actors as diverse players with conflicting interests that operate according to different policy logics. Indeed, post-conflict environments involve an ever increasing range of international actors. The first category of actors includes agents deployed by northern states, while the second category constitutes the agents deployed by multilateral organizations. A third set of

international stakeholders include non-states actors, such as NGOs, private companies and media organizations. These various actors are driven by very differing normative agendas. While they engage in the same fields of study and reform, their logics of action refer to standards, norms or procedures that are often hardly compatible one with each other.

( ) No hidden agenda – No ev proves liberal humanitarian efforts are designed for imperial conquest.

Chandler ‘10(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster – Review of International Studies – Vol. 36 (2011), Special Issue: Evaluating Global Orders, pp.137-155. Available at:

In the critiques of the liberal peace, this growing consensus on the problematic nature of liberalism appears to cross the political

and policy spectrum. The fundamental and shared claim of the critics is that the lack of success of external interventions, designed not only to halt conflict but to help reconstruct the peace, is down to the liberalism of the interveners. If only they were not, in various ways, so liberal, then it is alleged external intervention or assistance may potentially be much less problematic. It can appear that the main academic and political matter of dispute is whether the liberal peace discourse is amenable to policy change. Here the divide seems to roughly approximate to the division highlighted above, in terms of the heuristic categories of ‘power-’ and ‘ideas-based’ liberal peace critics. The more radical, ‘power-based’, critics, with a more economically deterministic approach to the structural dynamics or the needs of ‘neo-liberalism’ are less likely to be optimistic of reform. On the ‘ideas-based’ side, those critics of liberal peace frameworks who tend to be more engaged in policy related work are more optimistic with regard to a shift away from the policy emphasis of liberal peace. In a recent article, Endre Begby and Peter Burgess argue that the majority of the critics of the liberal peace seem to share two key assumptions about external intervention: firstly, that external Western intervention (of some kind) is necessary, and secondly, that the goal of this intervention should be the liberal one of human freedom and flourishing.33 They state that, in which case, the problem is not so much with the aspirations or goals of ‘liberal peace’ but with the practices of intervention itself. They have a valid point regarding the limited nature of much of this ‘critical’ discourse, but do not reflect adequately on the diminished content of the ‘liberalism’ of the policy

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interventions themselves nor the ‘liberal’ aspirations of those who advocate for the reform of practices of external intervention. It seems that the common ground in the broad and disparate critiques of the liberal peace, is not the critique of the external practices of intervention as much as the classical assumptions of liberalism itself. The critique of liberalism as a set of assumptions and practices seems to be driving the approach to the study of post-Cold War interventions in ways which have tended to produce a fairly one-sided framework of analysis in which the concept of liberalism is ill-equipped to bear the analytical weight placed upon it and appears increasingly emptied of theoretical or empirical content. Liberalism appears to be used promiscuously to explain a broad range of often contradictory policy perspectives and practices across very differing circumstances and with very differing outcomes. In this sense, it appears that liberalism operates as a ‘field of adversity’34 through which a coherent narrative of post-Cold War intervention has been articulated both by critical and policy orientated theorists. The promiscuous use of liberalism to explain very different policy approaches is, of course, facilitated by the ambiguous nature of the concept itself. It is this ambiguity which enables liberalism to be critiqued from opposing directions, sometimes by the same author at the same time. Good examples of this are Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk who criticise ‘liberal’ peacebuilding for being both too laissez-faire and too interventionist in its approach to the regulation and management of conflict. In the peacebuilding literature today, the experience of the early and mid-1990s and the ‘quick exit’ policies of the ‘first generation’ peacebuilding operations in Nambia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia and Guatemala has been repackaged as evidence that Western interveners had too much faith in the liberal subject.35 Similarly, the ad hoc responses to the problems of the early 1990s in the development of ‘second generation’ peacebuilding with protectorate powers in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, has been criticised as liberal hubris, on the assumption that international overlords could bring democracy, development and security to others. It seems that, rather than adding clarity, the critique of the ‘liberalism’ of intervention tells us very little. The mechanism through which these liberal framings have been facilitated and critiqued is that of the discursive centring of the non-liberal Other; on whose behalf the policy critics assert the need for different policy practices. In this way, the policy critics of past policy approaches evade a direct critique of liberal assumptions about equality, autonomy, and transformative capacity, instead, arguing that the non-liberal Other (in various ways) invalidates, challenges or resists (passively as well as actively) policy practices which may otherwise have been less problematic. Rather than a critique of liberalism for its inability to overcome social, economic and cultural inequalities, both the policy, ‘ideas-based’, critique of the liberal peace and the more radical, ‘power-based’, critiques argue that social, economic and cultural inequalities and differences have to be central to policy practices and invalidate universalising liberal attempts to reconstruct and rebuild post-conflict societies. In this context – in which the dichotomy between a liberal policymaking sphere and a non-liberal sphere of policy intervention comes to the fore – there is an inevitable tendency towards a consensual framing of the problematic of

statebuilding or peacebuilding intervention as a problem of the relationship between the liberal West and the non-liberal Other. The rock on which the liberal peace expectations are held to crash is that of the non-liberal Other. The non-liberal

Other increasingly becomes portrayed as the barrier to Western liberal aspirations of social peace and progress;

either as it lacks the institutional, social, economic and cultural capacities that are alleged to be necessary to overcome the problems

of liberal peace or as a subaltern or resisting subject, for whom liberal peacebuilding frameworks threaten their

economic or social existence or fundamental values or identities. The ‘critique’ becomes apology in that this discursive

focus upon the non-Western or non-liberal Other is often held to explain the lack of policy success and, through this, suggest

that democracy or development are somehow not ‘appropriate’ aspirations or that expectations need to be substantially

lowered or changed to account for difference. It would appear that the assumptions held to be driving liberal peace approaches are very much in the eye of their critical beholders. The most obvious empirical

difficulty is that international policy regarding intervention and statebuilding seems to have little transformative aspiration: far from assumptions of liberal universalism , it would appear that, with the failure of post-colonial development, especially from the 1970s onwards, international policymakers have developed historically

low expectations about what can be achieved through external intervention and assistance. The lack of transformative belief is highlighted by one of the key concerns of the policy critics of the liberal peace – the focus on capacity-building state institutions and intervening to construct ‘civil’ societies. The focus on institutional solutions (at both the formal and informal levels) to the problems of conflict and transition is indicative of the narrowing down of aspirations from transforming society to merely regulating or managing it – often

understood critically as the ‘securitising’ of policymaking. This is a long way from the promise of liberal transformation and the discourse of ‘liberating’ societies economically and politically. In fact, it is the consensus of opinion on the dangers of democracy, which has informed the focus on human rights and good governance. For the policy and radical critics of liberal peace, liberal rights frameworks are often considered problematic in terms of the dangers of exclusion and extremism. Today’s ‘illiberal’ peace approaches do not argue for the export of democracy – the freeing up of the political sphere on the basis of support for popular autonomy. The language of illiberal institutionalist approaches is that of democratisation: the problematisation of the liberal subject, held to be incapable of moral, rational choices at the ballot box, unless tutored by international experts concerned to promote civil society and pluralist values. In these frameworks, the holding of elections serves as an examination of the population and the behaviour of electoral candidates, rather than as a process for the judgement or construction of policy (which it is assumed needs external or international frameworks for its production).The focus on institutionalism does not stem from a critique of liberal peace programmes; institutionalist approaches developed from the 1970s onwards and were rapidly mainstreamed with the end of the Cold War.36 From 1989 onwards, Western governments and donors have stressed that policy interventions cannot just rely on promoting the freedoms of the market and democracy, but need to put institutional reform and ‘good governance’ at the core.37 Even in relation to Central and Eastern Europe it was regularly stressed that the people and elected representatives were not ready for freedom and that it would take a number of generations before it could be said that democracy was ‘consolidated’.38 The transitology literature was based on the critique of liberal assumptions – this was why a transitional period was necessary. Transition implied

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that markets and democracy could not work without external institutional intervention to prevent instability. While markets needed to be carefully managed through government policymaking it was held that civil society was necessary to ensure that the population learnt civic values to make democracy viable.39 It was through the engagement with ‘transition’ and the problematic negotiation of EU enlargement that the discursive framework of liberal institutionalism – where human rights, the ‘rule of law’, civil society, and anti-corruption are privileged over democracy – was programmatically cohered. It was also through the discussion of ‘transition’ that the concept of sovereign autonomy was increasingly problematised, initially in relation to the protections for minority rights and then increasingly expanded to cover other areas of domestic policymaking. 40 It would appear that the key concepts and values of the ‘liberal peace’ held to have been promoted with vigour with the ‘victory of liberalism’ at the end of the Cold War were never as dominant a framing as their radical and policy critics have claimed.41

Rather than attempting to transform non-Western societies into the liberal se lf-image of the West, it would appear that external interveners have had much more status quo aspirations, concerned with

regulatory stability and regional and domestic security, rather than transformation. Rather than imposing or ‘exporting’ alleged liberal Western models , international policy making has revolved around the promotion of regulatory and administrative measures which suggest the problems are not the lack of markets or democracy but rather the culture of society or the mechanisms of governance. Rather than promoting democracy and liberal freedoms, the discussion has been how to keep the lid on or to manage the ‘complexity’ of non-Western societies, usually perceived in terms of fixed ethnic

and regional divisions. The solution to the complexity of the non-liberal state and society has been the internationalisation of the mechanisms of governance, removing substantive autonomy rather than promoting it. While it is true that the reconstruction or rebuilding of states is at the

centre of external projects of intervention, it would be wrong to see the project of statebuilding as one which aimed at the construction of a liberal international order.42 This is not just because external statebuilding would be understood as a contradiction in liberal terms but, more importantly, because the states being constructed in these projects of post-conflict and failed state

intervention are not liberal states in the sense of having self-determination and political autonomy. The state at the centre of statebuilding is not the ‘Westphalian state’ of classical International Relations (IR) theorising. Under the internationalised regulatory mechanisms of intervention and statebuilding the state is increasingly reduced to an administrative level, in which sovereignty no longer marks a clear boundary line between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’.43 Whether we consider European Union (EU) statebuilding, explicitly based on a sharing of sovereignty, or consider other statebuilding interventions, such as those by the international financial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that the state is central as a mechanism for external coordination and regulation rather than as a self-standing actor in so-called ‘Westphalian’ terms.44

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Extensions – Aggression toward china good

( ) The Alt can’t solve – underplaying Chinese aggression makes solutions impossible.

Friedman ‘14Edward Friedman is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has worked in rural China, co-authoring Chinese Village, Socialist State (Yale University Press, 1993) and Revolution, Resistance, and Reform in Village China (Yale University Press, 2007) and serving as the major editor condensing and re-organizing Yang Jisheng’s great study of the Leap era famine Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2012) for an English-reading public. ‘Time to Escalate ? Should the U.S. Make China Uncomfortable?” – China File – Jan 21st – please note that the top portion of this card is from the editors as they pose a question to Friedman.

How should the U nited S tates respond to China’s new level of assertiveness in the Asia Pacific? In the past few months as Beijing has stepped up territorial claims around China’s maritime borders—and in the skies above them—the Obama administration has moved to soothe tensions, cool tempers and slow momentum toward potential conflict. In the January/February issue of

Foreign Policy, Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner of the Center for a New American Security argue that when the U.S. plays peacemaker it encourages China to raise the stakes, pursuing ever greater levels of adventurism with the confidence that Washington will step in and make sure things don’t get truly out of hand. “China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion by rocking the boat,” they write, “seeing what it can extract in the process and letting the United States worry about righting it.”

Instead, they conclude, the U.S. ought to pursue a military and diplomatic strategy that includes lowering its tolerance of

provocations at sea, deepening military ties with Japan, and building stronger alliances with other countries in the region “to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing’s calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China.” We

asked ChinaFile Contributors to respond. —The Editors Responses (by Edward Friedman): Colby and Ratner perform an invaluable service by detailing how C.C.P. government foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region is dangerously expansionist and a threat to China’s neighbors. Ruling groups in Beijing imagine China’s security as requiring a great expansion of

Chinese power. Our two authors are absolutely correct that analysts who will not confront this reality are hiding the seriousness of the challenge.

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A-to Pan K and China Threat K

( ) The Pan K doesn’t liberate and reifies conventional IR – they’ve bought-into the system by identifying us as the “bad ones”

Callahan ‘5William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714 doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Indeed, analysts increasingly criticise the political consequences of an Euro-American mode of representing China as a threat; 10 since Chinese security discourse is rarely analysed it is now necessary to explore the political consequences of China’s modes of self-representation and how ‘China threat theory’ is produced in the PRC. Indeed, this example will add to the critical examination of two of the main research themes of security studies: strategic culture and threat perception. To put it another way, the emergence of China is not simply an issue of international diplomacy and national security. It has important intertextual overlaps with other discourses that frame questions about China and the world, such as the dynamic between domestic and international politics, economics and politics, dangers and opportunities – as they produce Western and Chinese identity. A recent article in the popular Chinese news magazine, Liaowang, explains how China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is intimately linked with ‘China threat’ in an overlap of domestic and international politics:11 The world knows about the achievements of China’s reform and opening. But since the beginning of the 1990s, ‘China threat theory’ has been churned out from some corners of the world . . . to smear China’s image and to contain China’s rise. With the appearance of ‘peaceful rise theory’ international opinion suddenly realises the weaknesses of ‘China threat theory’. . . . Peaceful rise is the formula that sums up the essence of domestic policy and foreign relations in reform China. Indeed, the articles in this Forum likewise speak of dangers when they discuss China’s opportunities. This suggests that as in the popular Chinese phrase ‘weijicrisis’, danger (wei) and opportunity (ji) are not separate, but are intimately linked. To understand the opportunities of China, it is necessary to see how the mirror-image of peaceful rise – the China threat –

shapes the image of rising China not just abroad, but within China itself. Many writers take the meaning of ‘China threat’ as

self-evident, and then proceed to either agree or disagree with it. This introduction will examine the production of ‘China threat theory’ in order to provide a critical background for the discussion of China’s place in the world examined in the remaining articles. First, it will examine Western warnings of a China threat, and Chinese responses to them. Some commentators frame this as a geopolitical debate in Sino-US public diplomacy, and warn that it risks spinning out of control in a security dilemma. While I do not disagree with this concern, the essay will show that because the Chinese reaction is much stronger than the American action, something else is going on. The main purpose for these Chinese language texts is not to correct foreign misunderstandings; the key audience for ‘China threat theory’ is domestic, for identity construction in the PRC. I will argue that Chinese texts gather together a diverse and contradictory set of criticisms of the PRC and use ‘China threat theory’ discourse to collectively label them as foreign. By then refuting the ‘China threat theory’ criticisms as fallacies spread by ill-intentioned foreigners, the texts assert ‘peaceful rise’ as the proper way to understand China’s emergence on the world stage. Thus in a curious way, the negative images of the PRC that are continually circulated in Chinese texts serve to construct Chinese

identity through a logic of estrangement that separates the domestic self from the foreign other. Although Chinese discussions of ‘China threat theory’ are successful in generating national feeling within China, the discourse actually tends to reproduce China as a threatening power abroad because refutations of ‘China threat theory’ end up generating a new set of foreign threats . Hence rather than engaging in critical security studies to question the international order, these refutations of ‘China threat theory’ actually buttress the existing geopolitical framework of international relations. In the conclusion, I argue that we need to question how Realism has colonised the ‘rise of China’ debate by deliberately using theory to open up critical space for the issues discussed in this Forum’s consideration of China’s rise. 8 Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’, p. 6.9 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revisededn. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 5.

10 See Johnston, ‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’; Emma Broomfield, ‘Perceptions of Danger: The

China Threat Theory’, Journal of Contemporary China, 12:35 (2003), pp. 265–84; Chengxin Pan,‘The ‘‘China Threat’’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics’, Alternatives, 29:3 (2004), pp. 305–31.11 Ling Dequan, ‘‘‘Heping jueqi’’ gangju muzhang’ [Explaining ‘Peaceful rise’], Liaowang,5 (2 February 2004), p. 6.

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( ) Our argument is not that China is a threat – it’s that we should avoid either simplistic, reifying extreme. The 1AC instead points to context.

Callahan ‘5William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714 doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the

image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. It would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce ‘China threat theory’ as the misguided product of

the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because depending on circumstances anything – from rising powers to civilian aircraft – can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful

rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of threat . Indeed, ‘China threat’ has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among

many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the

West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the threat/opportunity dynamic . This essay has examined how ‘China threat theory’ is enthusiastically reproduced and circulated beyond the Beltway in Chinese texts to show how Chinese elites engage in their own threat interpretations and national identity productions. Thus it

underlines how ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ are not diametrically opposed as sites of total truth or falsity ; threat and opportunity are intimately related as complementary opposites that entail each other.

( ) The K of “China threats” reifies – by identifying the flaws in US posture and painting China as victimized, the IR system replicates itself

Callahan ‘5William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714 doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Hence by turning China threat into a theory, the discourse moves from merely responding to criticism in a negative way, actively producing positive meaning. Rather than simply ‘putting an end to ‘‘China threat theory’’ ’ as the first article on the topic advised in 1992,37 the discourse continually reproduces and circulates this set of

images of a peacefully rising China that is the victim of criticism that only comes from abroad. Although Taiwan is a site of much discussion of a ‘China threat’, Taiwanese people are rarely criticised in the mainland’s ‘China threat theory’ texts. This underlines how the category ‘China threat theory’ is used to sort out the domestic from the foreign: Taiwanese are seen by Beijing as Chinese compatriots. Because Beijing frames ‘China threat theory’ as a ‘foreign fallacy’ and Cross-Straits relations as an issue of domestic politics, the large and vociferous cache of ‘China threat’ texts from Taiwan are erased by ‘China threat theory’ discourse. Although Chinese premier Zhu Rongji sought to change the subject from China threat to China opportunity, many ‘China threat theory’ articles engage in a proliferation of foreign threats. As a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA reasons: ‘If we follow the logic of ‘‘China threat theory’’, who benefits from it, and who thus can be a threat to other countries’ security?’38 The common response to China threat theory thus is that America is the real threat.39 Yet it is not just the sole superpower that is seen as a threat. ‘China threat theory’ articles also generate a ‘Japan threat theory’ and an ‘India threat theory’. Many articles tell us that real reason for Japanese scholars, politicians and officials warning of a potential China threat is to justify rearming Japan and reviving the imperial Japanese militarism of the early 20th century.40 This concern provided the back-story that motivated the mass anti-Japanese demonstrations that rocked China in April 2005. As Shih concludes about Sino-Japanese diplomacy more generally, ‘the perception of a threatening Japan serves to differentiate China from Japan and consolidate an otherwise shaky national identity in China’.41 Likewise, when India’s leaders stated that their reason for becoming a nuclear power in 1998 was not the threat from Pakistan so much as the threat from China, a Chinese response was to create an ‘India threat theory’. An anonymous author concludes that if India continues to be unfriendly, the PRC will have to contain India. This policy would encircle India with a network of hostile alliances and foment Islamic fundamentalism in Kashmir and beyond.42 The message is clear; if a country rejects China’s ‘peaceful overtures’, then China will fight diplomatically, militarily, and rhetorically, including spreading an ‘India threat theory’ in South Asia and beyond. Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War

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thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to

the PRC after 1960. Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat , a

Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are

increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43

( ) The K of “China Threats” creates new boundaries that reify systems of domination

Callahan ‘5William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714 doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: ‘There is a consensus within mainland academic

circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: ‘‘Madness’’ ’.47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a ‘China

threat theory syndrome’.48 This brings us back to Foucault’s logic of ‘rationality’ being constructed through the exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as ‘madness’ . The rationality of the rise of China depends upon distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Lik e Joseph Nye’s concern that warnings of a China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say .

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( ) The K of “China Threat” reifies identity. This also proves their attempt to paint this as a larger indict on US policy is part of a process of ID construction.

Callahan ‘5William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701–714 doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Using a database that gives access to articles in a broad range of Chinese academic and professional journals, this introduction has examined China’s slippery relation to the world through the logic of how ‘China threat’ emerged as a theory in the PRC. Rather than referring to a clear set

of data or policies, the essay has shown how ‘China threat theory’ serves to discursively unify a diverse and

contradictory set of texts that are judged to be anti-China, regardless of whether they posit a rising China,

an insignificant China, or a collapsing China. Refuting these texts is not just an attack on the pessimists in the US , Japan, India, and Southeast Asia, but is an active performance of identity in China as specifically national (rather than local, class, ethnic, or gendered). Rather than suggest that commentators change from ‘China threat’ to ‘China opportunity’, I have argued that neither China threat nor China opportunity is autonomous or coherent. Like in the oft-quoted Chinese phrase for crisis, weiji, threat and opportunity construct each other in the events (that is, crises) of domestic and international politics. Most of the Chinese articles that assert a China threat theory are actually direct responses to events: the sale of fighter jets to Taiwan (1992), the publication of alarmist books and articles in the US (1997, 2000), Japan’s National Defence White Papers (2000, 2001, 2004), critical official US reports (2002, 2004), and so on.

By transforming ‘China threat’ from a response to these specific events into a general theory , I argued

that Chinese texts are engaged in a discussion of how to understand China through a negative logic of estrangement. There are many ways to construct national identity. Praising the economic development of

reform China and peaceful civilisation of Chinese tradition is one way. Refuting foreign criticisms through ‘China threat theory’ is another. The large quantity and sharp quality of ‘China threat theory’ discourse suggests that denouncing critics as

‘foreign’ in this way is an important means of asserting the image of China as a peaceful rising power. Rather than the main target of the Chinese articles being world opinion for international politics, the main audience for the ‘China threat theory’ articles is domestic, for identity politics in China. This negative discourse mirrors the glories of China, and serves to differentiate and estrange China as a

unique entity in an increasingly globalised world.

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Extensions – Representational Determinism

( ) Reps don’t shape policy – determinism wrong

Richardson ‘8Alexia -- “Traces of terror : photography and memory of political violence in Argentina and Peru” –as part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times,, Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. This was the her Dissertation to gain her PhD in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures University of Durham. While pursuing her PhD at Durham University, Alexia Richardson gained much traction on the international conference scene – presenting a paper titled 'Ni un paso atrás: Resistance and Emotion in Images of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo' at the ‘Public Displays of Affection’ conference at the University of Rochester, New York. Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: the ubiquitous nature of photographic images, their pervasive influence may be hard to pin down. In a sceptical analysis, David Perlmutter (1998) questions the logic of 'visual determinism', which argues for the role of images in policy decisions - the so-called 'CNN effect' which draws elected officials to the television set as they evaluate their ever-changing position in the public eye. According to Perlmutter, icons are selected and confirmed by a small section of society he calls 'discourse elites' - politicians, academics, and workers in the media. Because such privileged professionals work daily with images, control them, study them in broadsheet newspapers and believe in their effects, they tend to assume that the general public does likewise, often overestimating the familiarity of even the most famous images to the untrained or uninterested viewer. Choosing specific examples including Adams' image of General Loan in Tet and other'icons of

outrage', he argues that the measurable effect of visual images is small and they do not usually overturn

policy , although, by contrast, some examples of decisions influenced by images are given in Taylor (1998: 136). So, while many blamed photographs like those made by Adams

for influencing public opinion in the United States against the war in Vietnam , Perlmutter argues for the reverse: that because public opinion was already turning against the war, it seized on the image of

Loan as a confirmation of its new values. Perlmutter's warn ing against an exaggerated or naive trust in the power of the image is important, and he is correct in stating that an objective measurement of the influence of images on

policy decisions is hard to find . Nevertheless, his analysis does not preclude a more general awareness of certain regularly circulated photographs in society, and influence may also have

more general effects than government policy decisions. Accordingly, Hariman and Lucaites (2001: 19) believe that, 'visual practices have long been important yet undervalued constituents of democratic culture precisely because they are media for emotional representation that lead to performative identification rather than rational deliberation'. I would concur that the value accorded to written documents and the official archive of materials is often denied the photographic image which, nevertheless, is so regularly witnessed that its pull on the emotions should not be dismissed. 5

( ) Determinism unproven. Reps aren’t presumptively malignant and don’t shape reality.

Frosh ‘11Professor Paul Frosh, Distinguished Scholar at the Rothberg International School Department of Communication and Journalism, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Framing Pictures, Picturing Frames: Visual Metaphors in Political Communications Research Journal of Communication Inquiry published online 20 June 2011 DOI: 10.1177/0196859911410242

Probably the best known example of how accounts of power relations in visual media have come to structure conceptual thought is the case of “iconoclasm”: the long history of suspicion in Western thought that images are uniquely, and in general malignly, powerful.5 Plato’s parable of

the cave, with which this article began, is a case in point: cave dwellers mistake the images for reality. Scholars such as David Freedberg (1991) and W. J. T. Mitchell (1986, 1994)

have excavated influential traditions of thought predisposed against the power of images, while contemporary

discussions include Finnegan and Kang’s (2004) analysis of iconoclasm in political theory, especially the conceptualization of the public sphere.6 Of course, iconoclasm extends beyond

scholarly discourse: as Domke et al. (2002) point out, belief in the malign independent power of visual images, which they call

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“visual determinism,” is regularly voiced by political office holders and commentators , despite the relative paucity of

evidence for such power. 7

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Representational Determinism and War Reps

( ) Our determinism thesis applies to war reps. Their thesis is Nixonism.

Albanese ‘8The author currently a practicing attorney in New York State – and now holds BA from the University of Rhode Island, and a JD from University of Maine School of Law. The author wrote this paper as an Honors undergrad and it was selected for the Digital Commons Project of the Film and Media Studies Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Photography Commons Jeffrey, "Opening the Aperture: Examining Images of War in the Press" (2008). Senior Honors Projects. Paper 110.

Did visual images of war really contribute so much to America’s failure in Vietnam? Does television really have a “pacifist[ic] bias” (Hallin, 1994: 45)? Does television

coverage of war inherently “demoraliz[e] the home front” as Richard Nixon and countless other policymakers assert (Nixon, 1978 as quoted in

Hallin, 1986: 3)? The assumptions that form the foundation of what Perlmutter terms “visual determinism ” are not without their

criticisms. I will link, from Perlmutter’s list, the fourth and fifth assumptions (that the meaning of an image and the emotional responses it elicits are unambiguous) with Hoskins’ first

(the “singularity of ‘the’ audience”). Visual determinism seems less convincing when these assumptions are considered in the context of framing. According to Robert Entman, “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (Entman, 1993 as quoted in Perlmutter 1998: 7). Despite their high-

definition, the meaning of the information contained in pictures is not “fixed” or “unambiguous.” As Perlmutter notes, “visual images are chronologically and spatially limited

anecdotes about specific incidents ” (Perlmutter 1998: 17) and “facts or quotes chosen for commentary… are frames meant to affect [their] meaning”

(Perlmutter 1998: 39). Pictures need to be contextualized by the press or other political elites in order to have meaning. Similarly,

“identical pictures can serve contradictory purposes” (Perlmutter 1998: 23). Consider AP photographer Eddie Adam’s iconic photograph (see fig. 1) of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, leader of South Vietnam’s police and intelligence units, summarily executing an NLF prisoner on the streets of Saigon during the Tet Offensive. To some, the villain in the photograph is the NLF soldier—an agent of the enemy who killed Americans. To others, the villain is General Loan, a man the U.S. supported and, it seemed, may have committed a war crime. In a 1988 issue of the comic book The ’Nam, the photograph is re-created and it is the photojournalist himself who is the villain for putting the scene on the “[f]ront page of every newspaper in the states.” As Franklin notes, “[t]he logic of this comic-book militarism is inescapable: photographers must be allowed to image for the public only what the military deems suitable” (Franklin 1994: 40). This relates to Hoskins’ critique of the concept of a mass audience (Hoskins 2005: 15). Just as different frames can construct different meanings for identical pictures, the different experiences of audiences may result in identically framed pictures having different meanings. As Hallin notes, “[o]ne of the traditional findings of research on the effects of mass communication, for instance, is that because of selective perception, the media will often tend merely to reinforce people’s existing attitudes” (Hallin 1986: 107). A photographic image does not have a meaning, but rather

meanings. There is not a mass audience, but rather audiences. The existence of a diversity of meanings and audiences results in a diversity of emotional impacts and responses an image has the potential to provoke. Media

coverage of war does not occur in a vacuum. It must be situated historically when analyzing its impact on public opinion and

governmental policy . However, as Hallin has noted, this has not deterred many people from believing that there was a causal relationship between Vietnam’s status as the

first “televised war” and Vietnam being (in 1986, at least) “the country’s most divisive and least successful war” (1986: 105). As noted above, the conventional wisdom among policymakers and members of the military has been that it was television coverage of the Vietnam War that was “the principal cause of what they see as a national failure of will,” a failure which led to military defeat (Hallin 1986: 105).

( ) War Reps create ethical responses in the wake of violence.

Albanese ‘8The author currently a practicing attorney in New York State – and now holds BA from the University of Rhode Island, and a JD from University of Maine School of Law. The author wrote this paper as an Honors undergrad and it was selected for the Digital Commons Project of the Film and Media Studies Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, and the Photography Commons Jeffrey, "Opening the Aperture: Examining Images of War in the Press" (2008). Senior Honors Projects. Paper 110.

Images of dead or wounded soldiers or civilians provide important evidentiary information about the human costs of war .

They also may provide information that is required for ethical behavior. British archaeologist Timothy Taylor has established the

concept of “visceral insulation,” an inevitable consequence of social stratification and specialization: This phrase describes the way in which the necessary specialization of the modern world screens or insulates people from ‘visceral’ things…Visceral insulation is a recoil from corporeality, as if we feel that, by coming too close to what is bodily, our inevitable mortality will somehow

make itself too painfully known (2002: 277). Control over the imagery of war through press restrictions and the dissemination of bomb-scope

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footage by the Department of Defense are devices that viscerally insulate the American public, create the appearance of a war from which the human body is

absent, and make it easier for citizens to accept war. In March of 2008, the Pew Research Center released the results of polling that found that only 28% of Americans were aware of how many Americans had been killed in Iraq (Pew Research Center 2008). Perhaps a lack of

publicly available images depicting dead or wounded soldiers has contributed to this lack of knowledge about the human costs of war. Perhaps, as

Taylor suggests, knowledge of death as an inevitability is the “best spur to ethical behavior,” because “[d]eath signals the end point beyond which our reputations become irrevocable” (2002: 287).