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Memorandum for the RecordEvent: Interview of Ambassador Bob JordanType of Event: Witness InterviewDate: ]/14/04Date memo prepared: 1/15/04Special Access Issues: NonePrepared by: Serena Wille and Niki GrandrimoTeam Number: 4, 1 (respectively)Location: 9- I 1 CommissionClassification: SFjCRE~I ' ;CSII I ICSJNFParticipants: Jordan, Wille, Grandrimo, and Dan Byman (Team 3, for first hour ofinterview)

On January 14 , 2004 , we interviewed Ambassador Jordan for approximately 1hour and 40 minutes at the K Street office. This memorandum provides a summary ofwhat we consider the most important points covered in the interview, but is not averbatim account. he memorandum is organized by subject and does not necessarilyfollow the order of t h e ' interview. All information in this memorandum was provided byJordan during the interview unless explicitly stated or indicated otherwise.

Jordan received a B.A. in political science from Duke University in 1967. Hespent four years in the Navy working with the Naval Security Group. He then receivedhis M.A. in government (with an international relations focus) from the University ofMaryland. [Ed. Note: lordan received a from the University of Oklahoma.] Hespent 30 years as a lawyer, most of which were with Baker Botts LLP in Dallas, Texas.In October 200], Jordan began the US ambassador to Saudi Arabia. He spent twoyears in this position and, in October 2003, returned to work in the private sector in theU.S.

Before arriving in Saudi Arabia in October 200 I, Jordan met with the President. and discussed the US-Saudi relationship.

Jordan also received extensivebriefings from the CIA and academics; one of the topics was the general threat ofterrorism. In his country-specific preparation, there was little detail about terrorist threatsor AQ. There was no suggestion that the Saudi government sponsored or facilitatedterrorism. did not appear that the MEPP was raised in the briefings as that was thespecific question we presented to lordan to which he did not respond.]

Post 9/11, there were issues that divided the royal family and these strained theUS-Saudi relationship. First, there were those in the family who were conciliatory uponthe attacks (like the Crown Prince); those who thou ht the attacks were theresult of a Jewish plo nd those who believed theSaudi h ija ck ers were eviants an cnrruna s rat er an representatives of a fundamental

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shift in societ The Saudi business community wasequally divide e roya a rm y was a so Ivided over whether the US Arab-Israelipolicy was a cause of the attacks. The USG was able to change this view to some extentby briefing Saudi government officials about the hijackers. In private the Saudi officialsstopped making these claims, although some individuals continued with this rhetoric inpublic. As an aside, Jordan noted that the Saudis vieYved everything through the prism ofthe Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan said tha~ ~learly understood the involvementof the Saudis in the 9 /11 attacks and was not In denIal, like some of his relatives. Hequickly moved into gear and was very helpful to the US.

Immediately after 9 1 1 1 the US-Saudi relationship became.s t ra ined for otherreasons as well. There was a great deal of negative US press after attacks and theSaudis could not understand why President Bush did not defend them.vJordan said hethought the President was more supportive of the US-Saudi relationship 'th~n given creditfor. The mood in Congress was also anti-Saudi, which made Jordan's workmoredifficult. There was a constant stream of negative vibrations, including the Rand report,comments by Richard Perle, etc. Jordan says there were also leaks from Treasury-andDefense. The CFR feport came out in 2002 and was quite negative. The relationshi ,hitan all time low in s riil 2002 when Israel entered Jenin and Nablus

The Saudisthought the negativity was driven by Israeli sympathizers in the USG. Later there wereother leaks from Treasury that were counterproductive and self-serving. Jordan creditedthese to O F A C andl Ialthough .. thatl Icoulduse colorful language too. ...._-...........

By contrast, Jordan received report hatthey were receiving "unprecedented cooperat ionimprovement was in the level of information-sharing.

..... ~..,.....,.. ..........__ ~~~at one point to t e au IS t at t ey a to e moreproactive 10 t er r tnvest iga t tons . The lack of Saudi initiative was especially frustratingfor the first 6-8 months after Jordan said it was not until the May 12 bombings thatthe Saudis became more proactive.

Jordan did not believe the Saudis were trying to hinder USG law enforcementefforts. The Saudi culture dictated that they should only share final reports (rather thaninterim information or draft reports) with the USO. Jordan said the usa tried to breakthis culture, and he thinks the were successful in recent instances. There were alsoca acit issues.

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For the US to influence Saudi government behavior, Jordan said there are severallevers. First, US and Saudi interests need to converge and the US must capitalize on thisconvergence. took the May bombings for the Saudis to emotionally committedto stopping Al Qaida. Previously, there was only an intellectual commitment. TheSaudis are also very image conscious and were hurt by the negative US press afterJordan told the Saudis that the best way to improve their image was to cooperate fullywith the US on counterterrorism, engage in open dialogue with dissidents, grant rights towomen, etc. The Saudis want to be part of the respected Arab community and to be seenas the moderates they believe they are. They have started to engage in outreach bysending Saudi businessmen to the US heartland. A final means of leverage is admissionto the The Saudis are anxious to be admitted and Jordan says he worked hard toget the Administration to support their bid, which it did eventually. He also pushed theSaudis to reform their economy to meet standards; the could provide theSaudis cover to make necessary changes.

On the US-Saudi relationship today Jordan referred us to two cables he sent at theend of his tenure in which he assessed the relationship in a systematic way. Jordan saidhis cables pointed optfJhat the usa had no policy on the US-Saudi relationship. Seniorusa officials would travel.to the re ion and make re uests of the Saudis but no oneaddressed the relationshi ..itself.

When asked about Aufhauser's statement that Saudi Arabia is the "epicenter"terrorist finance, Jordan said that is like saying Miami is the epicenter of the drug trade.He said that terrorist financing activities may be going on but it does not mean that theSaudis are condoning them or turning a blind eye. However, he admitted that there isculpability. Clearly a number of wealthy people contribute to extremist organizations,some of which undoubtedly have terrorist ties. The greater source of funds, according toJordan, is NGOs, which are funded by Saudi individuals and the Saudi government,These have recklessly poor controls, with a vast majority of the funds being donated incash without any accounting. The transfers to branch offices and then to the: finalreci ients occur com letel below he rada ere

Early in 2002 OFAC made an effort to develop ackages of ey.{dence andations" a ainst entities and individuals e Saudi government would

repeatedly say, give us the evidence and we will take action. Jordan saidthat therequisite evidence was not made available, which made it diffic~rtt to enlist Saud]cooperation. Jordan was told the USG had the necessary evidence -,:Jordanagreed thatth e Saudis could h ave been m ore p roa ctive and could have gathered . in format ion

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themselves. In fact, Jordan believes the Saudis were doing more in this regard then theylet us know. It was a tit-for-tat situation: we didn't share intelligence, so they didn'tshare intelligence. Then there were leaks from Treasury [Ed. note: about the lack ofSaudi cooperation and Saudi government complicity], which mystified the Saudis who

IS Interagency Issueimproved over time but made the Saudis wonder how competent we were. It gave theman excuse to resist complying with our requests.

Jordan did not give much credence to the claim that many senior princes wereinvolved in terrorist financin2.1

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The Riyadh bombings had a positive impact o n the Saudi government'scounterterrorist efforts in general. Terrorist financing, however, is a "harder nut tocrack." The Saudi government removed the collection boxes from the mosques, whichwas viewed as a cataclysmic event in Saudi A r a b i a . Jordan said that it also cut offfunding to foreign operations of Saudi charities and was focusing on a more domesticagenda. In Jordan's view, progress was already being made and the Riyadh bombingaccelerated the process. In facq 'suggested the joint terrorist financing workinggroup and the USG was initially dilatory in responding. Now that it is up and runningJordan believes it is going well. In response to one draft USG comment from fall 2002stating that Saudi cooperation on terrorist financing was "sporadic and inconsistent," hesaid he was not aware of any USG conclusion to this effect. Jordan made it clear that hefaulted the Saudis for their execution rather than their efforts. He is not trying to defendSaudi Arabia; they certainly could have donemore and could still be doing more.However, other allies such as Germany have been equally reticent in their cooperation .

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When asked why al Qaida was composed primarily of Saudis, Jordan said that theprevious generation .of Saudis was flushed with oil wealth. As a result, the' educationsystem focused prinlaply .o~ philosophy and religion, not basic academics. Thus, theentire education structureproduced people with no skill for obtaining gainfulemployment. When th e Saudi oil-based economy began to fail, these undereducatedpeople's lofty expectations began to crumble and they were left with a sense ofdisillusionment. [U]

Jordan stated that the goal of young Saudi men is to attain a wife, job, car, and ahouse, and the latter three are necessary to obtain the first. With the segregation of thesexes, the lack of an outlet for personal crises, and the breakdown of the family structure,the young men tum to the mosques for solace. There, they are "bombarded" with adogma of intolerance, hatred, and anti-Semitism, and notions that depraved Westernersare defiling their pure Kingdom. This hatred gets projected onto others because they aretaught that their problems. are not their fault. Jordan stated that culturally, the Saudipsyche does not have the same notion of "individual's capacity to overcome" as some. other cultures. As a result, these young men are prey for radical Imams or teachers whoteach that this life is only a way station to eternity. They believe that they are tools ofAllah and ready to leave this world at his will. [U]

While he was at post, Jordan asked that a study of the curriculum taught in Saudischools be conducted. He discovered that school books were full of anti-Semitism, anti-Western, and radicaJ material. For example, a math problem would read, "There are fivemujahidin. Three go to jihad. How many are left?" Jordan pressed the SaudiG overnm ent for curricu lum reform , wh ich the Saudis now cla im to have done. L ikewise,

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the Saudis claim that they have caused reform within mosques, forcing extremist Imamsto moderate their sermons. Jordan said that he routinely asked for translations of thesermons presented in major mosques. He said that in one instance, the sermon itselfpreached tolerance but closed with "destroy the Jews and infidels." Jordan demandedthat the Saudi Government do more. [U]

When asked whether the Saudi Government views itself as a target of al Qaida,Jordan said that since the May) 2, 2003 bombings in Riyadh, the Saudi Governmentbelieves that it is more threatened by al Qaida than the US. This is also evidenced by theassassination attempts on Saudi Government officials and the November 9,2003bombing in Riyadh of a Muslim residential compound. As a result, Crown PrinceAbdullah has made it clear that anyone who aids, comforts, or rationalizes the acts ofterrorists will be dealt with harshly. [U]Jordan believes that the increase in the number of attacks in Saudi Arabia is adirect result of increased enforcement by the Saudi Government. In addition, he believes

that al Qaida is goinp ~fter soft targets and targets of opportunity because it is unable toconduct a cataclysnficattack. He commented that the al Qaida lieutenants in SaudiArabia are a "new generation" that believe they can bring down the Saudi Government.