Metatech-Report on Severe Space Weather-January 11, 2009

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PRESS RELEASE

An Overview of the National Academy of Sciences Report on Severe SpaceWeather and the Vulnerability of US Electric Power Grid

Metatech CorporationJanuary 11, 2009

Early this week the National Academy of Sciences released the report Severe Space WeatherEventsUnderstanding Societal and Economic Impacts Workshop Report. This report in particularhas noted the vulnerability of the electric power grid to severe geomagnetic storms (created by solaractivity) and that severe geomagnetic storms pose a risk for long term outages to major portions of theNorth American power grid. While a severe storm is a low-frequency occurrence event, it has thepotential for long duration catastrophic impacts to the power grid and its affected users. The impactscould persist for multiple years with potential for significant societal impacts and with economic costs thatcould be measurable in the several Trillion Dollars per year range.

These report assessments largely stem from input to the panel provided by Metatech Corporation and are

indeed more fully discussed on pages 77-79 of the report and also in the report summary andappendices. Metatechs analysis was carried out for investigations under the auspices of the EMPCommission (established by Congress under the provisions of the Floyd D. Spence DefenseAuthorization Act of 2001, Public Law 106-398, Title XIV) and also for FEMA under Executive Order13407 to examine the potential impacts on the U.S. electric power grid for severe geomagnetic stormevents. We have also provided testimony to Congress (before the U.S. House Subcommittee onEnvironment, Technology, and Standards and the Subcommittee Hearing on What is Space Weatherand Who Should Forecast It? on October 30, 2003). Similar assessments for other important worldpower grids, including those in England, Norway, Sweden, Japan and portions of Canada have also beenperformed by Metatech.

What are the Risks and Frequency of Severe Geomagnetic Storms?Significant power grid impacts in present day networks have been observed at relatively low levels of

geomagnetic field disturbance intensity. For example the Quebec grid blackout during the March 13-14,1989 storm occurred at a peak intensity derivative of 480 nT/min and permanent damage to large powertransformers have occurred at even lower levels. An analysis conducted by Metatech of bothcontemporary and historic storm data and records indicates that dBh/dt impulsive disturbances largerthan 2000 nT/min have been observed on at least three occasions since 1972 at latitudes of concern forpower grid infrastructures in the U.S. In extreme scenarios (estimated to be ~1 in 100 years), availabledata suggest that disturbance levels as high as 5000 nT/min may have occurred during the greatgeomagnetic storm of May 1921, an intensity ~10 times larger than the disturbance levels associated withthe major impacts observed on North American power grids in March 1989.

Why is a blackout from a Severe Geomagnetic Storm different from other power blackouts (suchas August 2003)?The August 2003 Blackout affected a large area of the Eastern U.S. Most power was restored within 24-

36 hours. From our analysis, both the size of the blackout and the recovery from the blackout due to alarge geomagnetic storm would be unprecedented in size (Figure 1a) and duration. This extendedrecovery would be due to permanent damage to key power grid components (especially Extra HighVoltage [EHV] transformers) caused by the unique nature of the electromagnetic disturbance. Fullrecovery could plausibly extend into years in many parts of the impacted regions. The most troublingaspect is the possibility of an extremely slow pace of restoration from such a large power outage and theinterdependencies that could cripple other infrastructures such as water, transportation, andcommunications due to the prolonged loss of the electric power grid supply. In the impacted areas thiswould lead to the loss of potable water distribution within several hours, the loss of perishable foods and

Metatech Corporation 358 S. Fairview Ave., Suite E Goleta, California (805) 683-5681Registered Mail: P.O. Box 1450 Goleta, California 93116


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medications in about 12-24 hours, and the immediate (or eventual) loss of heating/AC, sewage, phones,transportation, fuel re-supply, etc.

What is the assessment of permanent damage to the power grid, and why would it take so long torecover?In recent analyses that have been conducted, it is estimated that over 300 large EHV transformers wouldbe exposed to sufficiently high levels of geomagnetically induced current (GIC) to place these units At-Risk of failure or permanent damage requiring replacement. Figure 1b provides an estimate of PercentLoss of EHV transformation capacity by state for a 4800 nT/min geomagnetic storm threat environment.Such large-scale damage would likely lead to prolonged restoration and long term chronic shortages of

electric energy supply capability to the impacted regions. In areas with a high degree of loss, restorationof any grid capacity may be very difficult until replacement transformers can be obtained and installed.

Figure1a Figure1b

Figure1. (1a)4800nT/mingeomagneticfielddisturbanceat50ogeomagneticlatitudescenario. TheregionsoutlinedaresusceptibletosystemcollapseduetotheffectsoftheGICdisturbance,andtheregionimpactedwouldbeofunprecedentedscale(populationsinexcessof130million).

(1b)A map showing theAtRisk EHV Transformer Capacity by statefor this disturbance scenario; regions with highpercentages could experience long duratio

outagesthatcouldextendmultipleyears.

The current world market conditions for the purchase of new EHV transformers are a major concern forany power system operator that would need to acquire a new transformer under emergency conditions. Inorder to support work recently done on Executive Order 13407 for FEMA assessing the vulnerability ofthe U.S. Grid due to large geomagnetic storms, Metatech commissioned a study of the supply capabilityof the current world manufacturing capability for EHV transformers. A number of items of concern can benoted from this study.

Manufacturing capability in the world for EHV-class transformers continues to be limited relativeto present market demand for these devices. Further, manufacturers would be unable to rapidlysupply the large number of replacement transformers needed should the U.S. or other powergrids suffer a major catastrophic loss of EHV Transformers.

Manufacturers presently have a backlog of nearly 3 years for all EHV transformers (230 kV and

above). The earliest delivery time presently quoted for a new order is early 2011. Only one plant exists in the U.S. capable of manufacturing a transformer up to 345 kV. No

manufacturing capability exists in the U.S. at present for 500 kV and 765 kV transformers, whichrepresent the largest group of At-Risk transformers in the U.S.

Is this a Growing Problem of Power Grid Vulnerability to Geomagnetic Storms?Trends have been in place for several decades that have acted to unknowingly escalate the risks fromspace weather to this critical infrastructure. As the size and complexity of the power grid has grownnearly tenfold over the past 50 years, it has in essence become a larger and more efficient antenna that



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couples to disturbances in the Earths magnetic field during a storm. Electric energy supply continues togrow and is the largest segment of energy usage in the U.S. economy accounting for nearly 40% of allenergy consumed (in contrast, petroleum accounts for only 22% of current U.S. energy consumption).

Unlike other more familiar threats such as seismic events or high winds where rigid infrastructure designcodes have been developed and are closely followed, no formal design codes exist that counter thepotential impacts of geomagnetic storms exists.

Are there any ways at present to prevent power grid blackouts?Present operational procedures utilized by U.S. power grid operators largely stem from experiences inrecent storms including the March 1989 storm. However, these present U.S. Grid OperationalProcedures are based largely on limited experience, generally do not reduce GIC flows and are unlikelyto be adequate for historically large disturbance events.

Given the potentially enormous implications of power system threats due to severe space weather, it isimportant to develop effective means to prevent a catastrophic failure of this infrastructure. The mostimportant means to reduce risk is to reduce the coupling mechanism from the disturbance environment tothe electric power grid. This coupling causes the flow of a Geomagnetically-Induced Current (GIC) that isthe root cause of all power grid problems. Preliminary work undertaken for the EMP Commissionindicates remedial measures to reduce GIC levels are needed and are cost-effective. The installation of

supplemental transformer neutral ground resistors to reduce GIC flows is relatively inexpensive, has lowengineering trade-offs, and can produce 60-70% reductions of GIC levels for storms of all sizes. TheEMP Commission has estimated the cost of this hardening in the existing U.S. power grid infrastructure tobe on the order of $150 million.

New economic stimulus measures may be undertaken soon to boost the production of renewable electricenergy, particularly wind generation, which has the greatest potential for being produced in theMidwestern U.S. While the development details are still very preliminary, most large developments wouldrequire the construction of an extensive new network of 765 kV transmission lines to deliver this energy tomajor metropolitan areas in the Eastern and Western U.S. This could result in a seven-fold increase ofthe existing U.S. 765 kV transmission network infrastructure should it be developed, and it would greatlyescalate the vulnerability of the U.S. to geomagnetic storms, as higher voltage transformers are morevulnerable to geomagnetic storms.

Since effective measures to reduce GIC levels can be provided at relatively low-cost, they should beconsidered in association with any infrastructure development stimulus plans and incorporated into theexisting infrastructure as well.

Contact Information:

Mr. John Kappenman, [email protected]. William Radasky, [email protected] Information, [email protected] Contact in Goleta, California, +1-805-683-5681

For copies of storm animations, prior Congressional Testimony and other general information

visit our website at:

Metatech Space Weather Advisory Page - http://www.metatech-aps.com/Advisories.html

The National Academy of Sciences Report can be downloaded in pdf form at:http://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.html

http://[email protected]/http://[email protected]/mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]:[email protected]://www.metatech-aps.com/Advisories.htmlhttp://www.metatech-aps.com/Advisories.htmlhttp://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.htmlhttp://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.htmlhttp://www.nap.edu/catalog/12507.htmlhttp://www.metatech-aps.com/Advisories.htmlmailto:[email protected]:[email protected]://[email protected]/

Metatech-Report on Severe Space Weather-January 11, 2009

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