toon's bunkers can be seen to the right.

was attached to the 1st Light Armored In-fantry Battalion, designated Task ForceShepherd. It had 19 General DynamicsLAV-25 light armored vehicles dividedinto two platoons and a company head-quarters element.* Each LAV-25 wasarmed with an M242 Bushmaster 25mmcannon and carried a four-man infantryfire team. A section of seven General Dy-namics LAy-AT light armored vehiclesfrom 1st Light Armored Infantry Battal-ion's Headquarters Company was at-tached to Pollard's company. EachLAy-AT was equipped with an Emerson901A1 TOW 2 [Tube launched, opticallytracked, wire command link guided] anti-tank guided missile launcher, a thermalimaging system, and was manned by acrew of four. They were the company'sprimary antitank asset.69

At 1200, Company D was ordered tomove to Observation Post 4 and act as a

*Standard light armored infantry company organi-zation was three platoons and a headquarters ele-ment, but Company D had only four assignedofficers. To compensate for the lack of officers, Cap-tain Pollard organized the company into two pla-toons and trained the company to operate as twoelements.

screen for the evening. Captain Pollardconducted a reconnaissance and estab-lished his company and its attached LAy-

Ma) Jeffery A. Powers (left), operations of-ficer of 1st Light Armored Infantry Battal-ion (Task Force Shepherd) and Capt RogerL. Pollard (right), commander of CompanyD, 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion(Task Force Shepherd) examine the after-math of the battle at Observation Post 4 onthe morning of 30 January 1991.

Photo courtesy of Col Jeffrey A. Powers

AT section northwest of Observation Post4 at around 1500. He created his fire plan,used a global positioning satellite deviceto precisely note his unit's location, andmet with Lieutenant Ross. The liaisonwith Lieutenant Ross would prove to beincomplete, as Captain Pollard did notknow that 2d Platoon had its own vehi-cles. This oversight would lead to misun-derstandings during the engagement.7°

The first serious ground combat in theBattle of al-Khaf5i occurred at Observa-tion Post 4. The 6th Armored Brigade ofthe 3d Armored Division was assigned tostrike through the gap in the berm, draw-ing attention away from the movement ofthe 5th Mechanized Division to the east.As General Salah Aboud later recalled:"The 6th Armored Brigade was ordered tomove forward from the heights above theal-Zabr [Observation Post 4] and theycrossed the line at the eight o'dock atnight. And at nine o'clock and thirty min-utes they encountered enemy resistanceat al-Zabr, in Saudi Arabia."7'

The Battle of al-Khaf)i 15

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

Ma) Keith R. Kelly, Executive Officer, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, and SSgt Gregory L. Gillispie, Platoon Sergeant, 2d Platoon, Com-panyA, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, pose at the southern end of their position on the berm at Observation Post 4. One of the pla-

At 2000, Lieutenant Ross heard theclank of treads, then observed Iraqi ar-mored vehicles advancing through hisnight-vision device; it was a sizeable force.He attempted to contact his outlyingteams as well as Company D and the re-connaissance battalion headquarters byradio but got no response. Since contactearlier was no problem, there was a strongpresumption that the reconnaissance pla-toon's radios were being jammed. Usingrunners, Lieutenant Ross alerted his pla-toon and continued trying to get throughand inform higher headquarters andCompany D of the oncoming Iraqiforce.72 Finally, at 2030, he made radio

contact and informed Company D that alarge mass of Iraqi vehicles, tanks, and ar-mored personnel carriers, were advanc-ing on Observation Post 4. CaptainPollard informed Task Force Shepherdand prepared his company to face thethreat.73

At the observation post, there ap-peared to be some confusion within Ross'platoon. Rather than simply retreating tothe U-shaped berm as planned, one of theteams opened fire on the oncoming Iraqiarmor with machine guns and antitankweapons. At the ranges involved, therewas very little chance that the Marineswould do any damage to an Iraqi vehicles

Ministry of Defense, United Kingdom, 199!, Modified by W Stephen Hill

with their light antitank weapons. How-ever, the fire startled the oncoming Iraqis,who slowed or stopped as they heard the"ping" of machine gun fire on their tankhulls. In response to the reconnaissanceplatoon's fire, the Iraqis began to fire back.Their fire was random and inaccurate, butthe volume was impressive. At the sametime, Iraqi communications jamming ap-peared to have stopped and LieutenantRoss was able to re-establish radio contactwith all three of his teams. He promptlyordered everyone to fall back to the U-shaped berm as previously arranged.74

To cover the reconnaissance platoon'swithdrawal, Captain Pollard led his 2d

16 The Battle of al-Khafji

Platoon's light armored vehicles forward,along with half of the LAV-ATs. The planwas for 2d Platoon to advance in line toaid the reconnaissance platoon, while theLAV-ATs conducted a "bounding over-watch." The LAy-AT had to stop whenthey fired. In order to provide cover forthe advancing LAV-ATs and LAV-25s,half of the LAV-ATs would stop, ready tofire, while the others advanced a shortway. The second group would then stopand cover the first group as they ad-vanced, and so on. During the advance,after receiving permission, one of theLAV-ATs fired its antitank missile onwhat it believed to be an Iraqi tank. In-stead, the missile hit "Green Two:' one of

its fellows, a few hundred yards to itsfront.75

The missile penetrated the rear hatchof the armored vehicle and detonated the16 missiles stored in the rear compart-ment, completely destroying it in a hugefireball and killing its crew.76 "It camethrough the bottom, right, troop hatch onthis one," Lieutenant David Kendall ofCompany D later said. It "hit all the othermissiles, I guess, and it was all a sponta-neous detonation. There were no sec-ondary explosions. Nothing. This wholething just went up."77

There was confusion at this point, withsome Company D Marines believing thevehicle had been destroyed by Iraqi tank

fire and others not certain the vehicle hadactually been destroyed. The explosionobliterated it so completely that there wasnot enough wreckage left to register onnight vision devices. The crew did not re-spond to radio calls, but it was commonfor a radio to cease working. The fate ofthe LAy-AT would not be confirmeduntil the next morning.78

Captain Pollard and his 2d Platooncontinued forward, leaving the LAV-ATsbehind. He was finally informed thatRoss' platoon had sufficient vehicles towithdraw. Pollard's platoon halted andbegan firing on the Iraqi vehicles withtheir 25mm guns. The reconnaissanceplatoon had observed the incident and

Photo courtesy of LtCol Charles H. Cureton

During the fight at Observation Post 4, LAy-AT "Green Two" was struck in the rear by an antitank missile fired by one of its fellows,causing the armored vehicle's magazine of 16 missiles to detonate with catastrophic results. Four Marines were lost with the vehicle:Cpl Ismael Cotto, PFC Scott A. Schroeder, LCpl David T Snyder, and LCpl Daniel B. Walker.

Two LAV-AT5 from 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion drive across the Saudi desert. The LAy-AT provided the heavy fire power ofthe battalion with its antitank missiles.

History Division Photo

The Battle of al-Khafji 17

Lieutenant Ross was convinced thatCompany D would soon fire on his troopsby mistake as well. He ordered the pla-toon to mount its vehicles and withdrawfrom the battlefield.

After Ross' platoon had completed itswithdrawal, Company D's 1st Platoonshifted south of the 2nd Platoon in orderto support 2d Platoon's fire against theIraqi forces advancing on the now-aban-doned observation post. Pollard's com-pany then backed away from the borderbut continued to engage the Iraqi armorwith missile and 25mm cannon fire. Al-

though the fire had little hope of damag-ing the Iraqi vehicles at the ranges in-volved, it served to disorient the Iraqitanks, which stopped and buttoned up asthe rounds ricocheted off their armor.The fire was also useful for marking Iraqivehicles for incoming aircraft. The com-pany's executive officer, First LieutenantScott P. Williams, and Corporal Russell T.Zawalick, acted as forward air controllersfor a series of air strikes against the Iraqiforces, using this method of marking theenemy.79

The battle at the observation post was

now under control as Coalition air sup-port arrived in large numbers. "At thatpoint, everything was going pretty welL"Lieutenant Kendall later noted, "Westarted getting the air in. It was hittingthe tanks down there, and we were justmarking for the air by firing our mainguns at the tanks and they were followingthe tracer rounds to them and hittingthem with the air'8° Hearing reports ofsome Iraqi tanks attempting to cross theberm further south, Captain Pollardwithdrew the company approximately5,000 meters from the observation post.

A section of Air Force A-b Thunder-bolts then arrived over the battlefield.Corporal Zawalick was controlling airsupport with live ammunition for the firsttime, but under Lieutenant Williams'guidance, he directed the incoming air-craft to their targets. But the A-lOs werefinding it difficult to identify the Iraqis.After two failed attempts, a Thunderboltdropped a flare, which landed next to"Red Two:' one of the company's LAy-25s. Corporal Zawalick informed the A-10 the flare had marked a friendlyposition, and directed him toward theenemy from the flare. Meanwhile, a rifle-man jumped from "Red Two" to bury theflare, but as he did so the A-b fired anAGM 65 Maverick air-to-ground missilewhich struck the LAV-25, destroying itand killing all of the crew that remainedinside save the driver, who was ejectedfrom the vehicle.8' The investigation con-

18 The Battle of al-Khaf3i

DVIC DF-ST-92-07825

An Air Force A-i OA Thunderbolt patrols over the desert during the Gulf War. The aircraft carried AGM 65 Maverick air-to-groundmissiles and was one of the primary providers of close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji.

An American flagflies from the burnt hulk of "Red Two," which was destroyed by a mal-functioning air-to-surface antitank missile during the fight at Observation Post 4. SevenMarines were lost with the vehicle: LCp1 Frank C. Allen, Cpl Stephen E. Bentzlin, LCplThomas A. Jenkins, LCp1 Michael E. Linderman, Jr., LCp1 James H. Lumpkins, Sgt GarettA. Mongrella, and LCp1 Dion I. Stephenson.

Photo courtesy of Sgt Mark S. McDonnell

Map by W. Stephen Hill

ducted by I Marine Expeditionary Forceafter the battle determined that the mostlikely cause of the incident was a mal-function by the Maverick missile.82

Again there was confusion as Pollardtried to determine if "Red Two" had beendestroyed by friendly or enemy fire."That's the first time, the first time I gotscared:' he later remembered. "I didn'tknow what had happened. I didn't knowwhere the bad guys were."83 There wassome worry that the Iraqis had penetratedthe berm and succeeded in out-flankingthe company. As a result, Pollard reor-ganized the company into a screen lineand pulled it back slowly.84

"The Marines, of that company, as thewhole battalion, were calm:' said thecommander of Task Force Shepherd,Lieutenant Colonel Clifford 0. Myers III."All of my conversations with CaptainPollard... were extremely calm and intotal control. Even after the Maverick hit

Despite the calm demeanor that Lieu-tenant Colonel Myers observed, Pollard'scompany had lost one vehicle to fire from

its own air support and another was miss-ing. With massive amounts of air supportmoving to the border, and other compa-nies ready and able to move into contact,Lieutenant Colonel Myers ordered Com-pany D to withdraw to the west and linkup with Task Force Shepherd's CompanyA, commanded by Captain Michael A.Shupp. Company D accomplished themaneuver shortly after midnight on the30th. The remaining six LAV-ATs weretransferred to Company A, and CompanyD was reorganized and resupplied behindShupp's company, which moved forwardto screen Observation Post 486

The Iraqi perspective on the battle'soutcome at the observation post differedconsiderably from the American view."Now this small [enemy] force consistedof armored vehicles equipped with a largenumber of the antitank weapons and thebrigade informed us they had destroyeda number of tanks, stopping the brigadeconvoy:' General Salah Aboud remem-bered. "So, I ordered those fighting theenemy, to stop the enemy forces and letthe brigade pass this resistance to the east,

and to move towards the brigade targetwithout stopping. [The] 6th ArmoredBrigade moved deep into Saudi Arabiaand the small resisting force was rolledover and the brigade caused a largeamount of damage:' 87 There is no evi-dence that the flanking movement Gen-eral Salah described penetrated morethan a few hundred meters into SaudiArabia, and the 3d Armored Division'scommander did not mention it. "Al-

though, our troops continued by movingtowards the targets, we faced a verystrong ground resistance at al-Zabr sup-ported by the Air Force and helicoptersfrom the enemy:' As Brigadier GeneralHussan Zedin reported: "At 8 o 'clock on29 January, we executed our duty and westayed in the area until the forces of Mo-hammad Al Qasim completed their dutyand mission to occupy al-Khai."88 *

Whether or not it had entered intoSaudi Arabia, the 6th Armored Brigadehad accomplished its primary mission.

* "Mohammad Al Qasim" was the honorific namefor the 5th Mechanized Division.

The Battle of al-Khafji 19

"All the airplanes of the enemy were overthe brigade convoy and attacking thearea," as General Salah explained. "Thebrigade had succeeded in capturing com-pletely the attention of the enemy. Andthe enemy didn't observe any movementof our troops to occupy al-Khafji so atmidnight, I instructed the 3d ArmoredDivision to order the 6th ArmoredBrigade to go back towards Al Wahfraand their original positions:'89

Supported by air, the Marines of a lightarmored vehicle company and a recon-naissance platoon had stopped the attack

of an Iraqi armored brigade in its tracks.The two units suffered 11 casualties, noneof which was from enemy fire. TheMarines at Observation Post 4 had notexperienced combat before the attack on29 January.

While the fight at Observation Post 4was taking place, a brigade of the 5thMechanized Division attempted to crossinto Saudi Arabia through the berm nearObservation Post 1, then screened byCompany A, 2d Light Armored InfantryBattalion, commanded by Captain Den-nis M. Greene. At 2115, it observed "60-

100 BMPs [armored personnel carri-ers]. . . moving south with arty."* The com-pany called in air, reporting that AV-8sand A- lOs engaged the Iraqi forces.9° Thecompany then observed a 29-vehicle col-umn of Iraqi armor arriving at the berm.At 2320, Corporal Edmund W. Willis IIIknocked out one of the Iraqi T-62 tankswith an antitank missile.9'

Greene's company continued to act asforward air controllers for strikes on theIraqi forces moving across the bermthroughout the evening. It received a sig-nificant amount of air power: five A-6s,two F-16s, two A-lOs, and eight AV-8s,and reported 11 destroyed vehicles. Cor-poral Willis fired another missile at 0157,hitting the same T-62 as the Iraqis at-tempted to move it to the rear.92 Ataround the same time, the Iraqis haltedtheir attack and retreated back intoKuwait.93

Further north, Company C, 1st LightArmored Infantry Battalion established ascreen between Observation Post 6 andObservation Post 5. Commanded byCaptain Thomas R. Protzeller, it had asection of LAV-ATs attached, similar toPollard's company at Observation Post 4.But unlike Company D, it had a sectionof General Dynamics LAV-Ms (a light ar-mored vehicle variant armed with anM252 81mm mortar) attached. Origi-nally, Protzeller's company screen linecentered on Observation Post 5, but earlyon the evening of 29 January, the com-pany had fired its mortars at suspectedIraqi forward observers. As a result,Major Jeffrey A. Powers, Task Force Shep-herd's operations officer, ordered thecompany to withdraw from the berm inorder to forestall any retaliatory Iraqi ar-tillery fire.94

Protzeller's company observed the* Most sources confuse Observation Post 1 and Ob-servation Post 2, but according to both the 2d LightArmored Infantry Battalion's command chronology,and the 1st ANGLICO's after action report, Obser-vation Post 1 was in 2d Light Armored Infantry Bat-talion's area of operations and Observation Post 2was in the Joint Forces Command-East area of op-erations. Most likely, this confusion resulted fromthe use of two conflicting methods of numberingthe border observation posts. Originally, U.S. ArmySpecial Forces teams numbered the observationposts as they occupied them, in chronological se-quence rather than geographic sequence. TheMarines later attempted to regularize the observa-tion post designations, but the new system did notstick and only served to confuse the issue.

20 The Battle of al-Khafji

Photo courtesy of MGySgt Gregory L. Gillispie

The remains of two of the 6th Armored Brigade's T-62 tanks, destroyed on the night of29 January 1991, lie abandoned on the sand in front of Observation Post 4. The Iraqissuffered severe materiel and equipment losses during the four-day Battle of al-Khafji.

A Marine LAy-AT is positioned behind the sand berm that separated Saudi Arabia fromKuwait. Built to control the wanderings of nomadic Bedouin tribesmen, the berm of-fered a convenient demarcation of the border between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Ob-servation Post 5 can be seen in the background.

Photo courtesy of Cpl Kenneth J. Lieuwen

fighting taking place to the south aroundObservation Post 4, but did not take partin the fight until around 2230 when it wasordered to occupy Observation Post 5 asa blocking force. Shortly thereafter, thecompany was informed that approxi-mately 70 enemy vehicles were movingtoward Observation Post 6, and it was or-dered to block that position. Travelingalong the berm, Protzeller's company ad-vanced north cautiously; each platoontook turns covering the other. As it ad-vanced the company fired antitank mis-siles at a group of Iraqi vehicles it spottedon the Saudi side of the berm. Once thecompany reached Observation Post 6,around 0100, it settled in and calledairstrikes on the Iraqi infantry, who hadoccupied the post and on their vehiclesthat had retreated back to the Kuwaiti sideof the berm. In the morning, many of thedemoralized Iraqi soldiers surrenderedwith little fuss, others having apparentlywithdrawn.95

The 2d Light Armored Infantry Battal-ion's fight at Observation Post 1, andCompany C, 1st Light Armored InfantryBattalion's fight at Observation Post 6

both ended early on the morning on 30January, but the enemy made one lastgasp at Observation Post 4 just after thesun rose at 0720. There Task Force Shep-herd's Company A, under Captain Shupp,called in airstrikes from Air Force A-lOsand Marine Corps FIA-18s. The air at-tack smashed this final Iraqi advance atthe outpost. 96

At dawn, Company A established ascreen on the berm while Company D re-covered its dead and secured Iraqi pris-oners. The morning light revealed fullythe destruction caused in the previousevenings fight. Pollard's company and itsattached LAy-AT section had lost 11Marines and two vehicles in the five hourbattle at Observation Post 4, but de-stroyed approximately 22 Iraqi tanks andarmored personnel carriers and killedscores of Iraqi soldiers. When the recov-ery effort was complete, Company Awithdrew and Company D reestablishedits position at Observation Post 4, whichit was to hold for another 10 days.97

At Observation Post 2, Captain David

W Landersman and his air-naval gunfireteam heard a large number of vehiclenoises approaching their position. Keenlyaware of the fight at Observation Post 4 totheir west, they requested air support butabandoned the outpost before the air sup-port could be diverted from the fight atthe western observation post.98 Mean-while, Iraqi artillery began firing on Cap-tain Kleinsmith and his team at

Observation Post 7, as well as south alongthe coast road. The two teams reportedthat the artillery fire was a combination ofillumination and high explosive rounds.99

As Captain Kleinsmith's team wasbeing shelled by the Iraqis, a mechanizedIraqi force attacked Observation Post 8and Lieutenant Lang's team with "intensedirect machine gun, recoilless rifle, andtank main gun fire."°° Three differentgroups were stationed at ObservationPost 8: Lang's fire control team team; aU.S. Navy SEAL detachment; and a teamfrom 3d Force Reconnaissance Company."After numerous illumination rounds,pop-up flares, and mortar rounds FireControl Team 9 [FCT], south of OP-8,was overrun by APCs [armored person-

The Battle of al-Khaf3i 21

Photo courtesy of Cpl Kenneth J. Lieuwen

Iraqi prisoners of war huddle near afire to keep warm, while Marines of Task Force Shepherd examine the prisoner's weapons, an AK-74, RPK-74, two pistols, and two grenades. Although some prisoners were captured by Marine and Saudi forces during the Battle ofal-Khafji, they did not surrender in the vast numbers taken during the later advance into Kuwait.

nel carriers] with the SEALs from OP-8retreating just in front of the enemyAPCs' °' Despite the heavy fire, all threeteams managed to evade the Iraqi assaultand fell back without suffering casualties.The SEAL and reconnaissance teamspulled back to al-Mishab, and LieutenantLang's team joined 1st Surveillance, Re-connaissance, and Intelligence Group atthe desalination plant. 102

Three Saudi battalions had formed ascreen along the Kuwaiti border in JointForces Command-East's area of opera-tions. Their orders, according to GeneralKhaled, were clear: "to observe the move-ment of Iraqi troops and report the ap-proach of hostile columns. They were notto engage the enemy or risk being takenprisoner. I did not want to give Saddam apropaganda victory. If the Iraqis crossedthe border, they were to rejoin our mainforce further south"°3

The 5th Mechanized Battalion of the2d Saudi Arabian National GuardBrigade, commanded by LieutenantColonel Naif, had responsibility for thecoast road and the surrounding area. Theroad itself was not covered; the vehicle as-signed to it was repositioned closer to therest of the unit, and the battalion was notin communication with the variousAmerican forces stationed in al-KhafJiand the border observation posts. As thebattalion advanced down the coast road,it came under enemy artillery fire, andpulled back before the Iraqi advance

without offering any resistance. Two bat-talions from the 8th and 10th Saudi Ara-bian National Guard Brigades, screeningfurther inland, executed similar move-ments.'04 Unopposed by ground forces,the Iraqi 15th Mechanized Brigade drovesouth into al-Khafi, although it wasstruck by an Air Force Lockheed AC-130Spectre gunship and Marine AH-1WSuper Cobras.'°5

"As the APCs overran the forward po-sition tank main gun and mortar roundsbegan impacting in the area of the de-salinization plant that SALT 5 [Support-ing Arms Liaison Team 5] and SRIG[Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Intel-ligence Group] forward occupied," Cap-tain James R. Braden of 1st ANGLICOexplained. "SRIG [Surveillance, Recon-naissance, and Intelligence Group] for-ward ordered all teams in the city to pullout and head for the 'safehouse' in al-Khafji. A hasty meeting was held justsouth of the desalinization plant betweenFCT 9 [Fire Control Team 9] and SALT 5Supporting Arms Liaison Team 5] toconduct a head count and confirm therendezvous at the safehouse in the south-ern part of the city of Khai."°6

Lieutenant Colonel Barry's group andLieutenant Lang's team withdrew fromthe desalination plant to the southernoutskirts of al-Khafji and established anobservation post in a water tower, but theadvancing 15th Mechanized Brigadeforced the units to withdraw again.

Barry's group headed south to al-Mishab,while Lieutenant Lang's team rejoinedother 1st ANGLICO teams with theQatari brigade.'07

Stationed on the east side of al-Khafji,near the beach, was a unit of SaudiMarines. Designed to emulate U.S.Marines, this newly formed Saudi forcelacked equipment and their AmericanMarine advisors who had not yet joinedthem. As Captain Molofsky later ex-plained, they were "camped out—basi-cally functioning at very low ebb"°8JointForces Command-East ordered the unitto withdraw just after midnight to al-Mishab and they took no further part inthe battle.'°9

At this point in the battle, some bitter-ness arose on the part of the Saudis con-cerning the amount of air support beingallocated to Joint Forces Command-Eastforces. In the face of the Iraqi advance,Major General Sultan "repeatedly calledon the U.S. Marine Corps for air strikesto stop them." As General Khaled later re-counted: "He was in close touch with theMarines because they shared a sector.They had trained together and an Amer-ican liaison officer was attached to hisheadquarters. But in spite of his pleas, noair strikes had taken place. Coalition air-craft had not moved."0 The resentmentcan be attributed in part to poor commu-nications. Shortly after midnight, MajorGeneral Sultan had called for airstrikesagainst the 15th Mechanized Brigade as it

During exercises prior to the beginning of the war, Marines rush to load antitank missiles onto an AH-1 W Cobra of HMLA 369. TheCobras provided extensive close air support during the Battle of al-Khafji, both at the observation post battles and in the town proper.

History Division Photo

22 The Battle of al-Khafji