Mesut Okumuş -- The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on al-Ghazzālī in Qur'anic Hermeneutics

8/12/2019 Mesut Okumu -- The Influence of Ibn Sn on al-Ghazzl in Qur'anic Hermeneutics

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The Influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal inQuranic Hermeneuticsmuwo_1373 1..22

Mesut Okumus*

Hitit Universityorum, Turkey

AbstractAl-Ghazzal criticized Muslim philosophers in general and Ibn S na in particular in anumber of matters notwithstanding, he was deeply influenced by philosophy and IbnS nas views as to some issues. Of the contexts in which al-Ghazzal is under the clear

influence of Ibn Sna are the interpretations of some Quranc chapters and verses whichare related to the demonstration of the existence of God and the explanation of somedivine attributes and names. In many of his works, al-Ghazzal reproduces Ibn Snasinterpretation of the verses in harmony with the ontological proof. One can observe IbnSnas influence on al-Ghazzal in relation with the hierarchy of beings, too. However,the context in which Ibn Snas influence is most obvious is the interpretation of the 35th

verse of the Surah Nur. Ibn Snas interpretation of the terms occurring in this verseas symbols of the human faculties exercised a profound impact on the thought ofal-Ghazzal, which manifests itself in his interpretation of the verse inMishkat al-Anwar.

Another of such contexts is the topic of human psychology and the interpretations of theverses related wherewith. Immensely influenced by the psychological views of Ibn Sna,al-Ghazzal adopted Ibn Snas notion of the simultaneous creation of soul and body,interpreting some Quranic verses in harmony with this notion. This article is intendedto illustrate that al-Ghazzal , who is opposed to the blind imitation of any school ofthought, did not make a wholesale denouncement of the views of philosophers; on thecontrary, he made an extensive use of Ibn S nas ideas in conformity with his generalattitude of benefiting from all schools of thought.

Key words:

IbnSna,

al-Ghazzal ,

Qur

anic exegesis,

hermeneutics,

Islamic Philosophy

Born around twenty years after the decease of Ibn S na (d.428/1037), al-Ghazzal (d. 505/1111) points out in his al-Munqidh min al-Dalalthat he had from hischildhood onwards endured every kinds of hardships in his quest of truth,

striving to examine all schools of thought without any discrimination.1 He set accounts

* Mesut Okumus holds a PhD in the Science of Quranic Exegesis and is presently teaching at TheologyFaculty of Hitit University, in orum, Turkey.1Al-Ghazzal , al-Munqidh min al-Dalal, inMajmuatu Rasail al-Imam Ghazzal, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr,1996), 537.

2011 Hartford Seminary.Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148USA.DOI: 10.1111/j.1478-1913.2011.01373.x

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with his contemporary currents of thought that he categorized into four groups as theTheologians, the Philosophers, the Esoterics, and the Sufis. Putting each of them throughthe sieve of criticism, he wrote separate books of critical character on their views. During

his office of teaching at the Nizamiyya Madrasa, he dedicated his three years to theexamination of the views of the philosophers, two years for learning their views and one

year for cogitating them. Afterwards, he first composedMaqasid al-Falasifain which hedescribed their views and thenTahafut al-Falasifain which he criticized them. In thelatter one, he leveled serious criticisms at Muslim philosophers in general and atal-Farab and Ibn Sna in particular, who are the greatest representatives of thePeripatetic philosophy in the Eastern lands of Islam. In the conclusion, he is held tohave charged the Muslim philosophers, though without mentioning their names, ofinnovation in connection with seventeen issues and of infidelity in relation with three

issues.2

Al-Ghazzal s criticism of the philosophers has long been conceived of as a hostilitytowards and a war on philosophy. For instance, Salomon Munk (d. 1867), wrote thatal-Ghazzal dealt a fatal blow to philosophy in the East.3 Then Ernest Renan (d. 1892),characterized al-Ghazzal as a foe of philosophy.4 But the recent studies have shown thatthis judgment is incorrect, and that though al-Ghazzal opposed some philosophical

views, he did not denounce philosophy as a whole. For instance, Griffel states thatthough al-Ghazzal tried to refute some philosophical views, he had no hostility towardsphilosophy, neither did he refuse it as a whole; on the contrary, he adopted and

championed the philosophical method.5

The scholars who have recently studied the works of Ibn Sna in a serious way holdthat al-Ghazzal was greatly influenced by Ibn Sna, building his own teachings on IbnSnas ontology.6 The realm and extent of this influence is yet to be studied notwith-standing, it is now a fact that al-Ghazzal was deeply influenced by the Muslimphilosophers in general and by Ibn Sna in particular, whom he criticized to the extentof declaring to be unbeliever. Even in his works in which he criticized philosophy,al-Ghazzal acknowledged that the writings of al-Farab and Ibn Sna are the best interms of explaining the Aristotelian philosophy, stressing that the works of the writers

2Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, ed. by Sulayman Dunya, (Beirut: Dar al-Maarif, 1987), 307309;Filozoflarn Tutarszlg, Turkish translation by Bekir Karlga, (Istanbul: agr Publishing, 1981),212.3 Salomon Munk,Melanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, (Paris: Librairie A. Franck, 18571859), 382.4 Ernest Renan,Averroes et lAverroisme, (Paris: Librairie Auguste Durand, 1852), 133, 135.5 Frank Griffel, The Relationship Between Averroes and al-Ghazali as it Presents Itself in AverroesEarly writings, Especially in his Commentary on al-Ghazalis al-Mustasfa, inMedieval Philosophy andthe Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity, edited by John Inglis, (Richmond: Curzon

Press, 2002), 52.6 Richard Frank, Creation and Cosmic System: Ghazali and Avicenna, Abhandlungen der HeidelbergerAk. Der Wisp. Heidelberger, 1992, 5262; Bekir Karlga, Ibn Sin, Trkiye Diyanet Vakf IslamAnsiklopedisi, (Istanbul: TDV, 1999), XX, 346.

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other than these two did nothing but distorted and further obscured the philosophicalmatters.7 This shows that he did justice to the two at least in this regard.

A study of al-Ghazzal s works in which he addressed the views of the philosophers

in both descriptive and critical terms show that he is a very careful and meticulous readerof Ibn Sna. HisMaqasid al-Falasifais like an Arabic translation of Ibn Snas PersianDanishnama-i Alawith brief annotations. He also made an abundance of quotationsfrom Ibn Snasal-Najatwithout giving credit to him.8 The same books chapter on thedefinitions is taken from Ibn SnasRisala f al-Hududwith minor changes of the placesof the passages. Again the lengthy chapter on the discussion of praiseworthy traits ofal-Ghazzals Mzan al-Amal is totally taken from Ibn Snas al-Akhlaq with minorchanges of the places of the passages. The summarized version of the same chapter isincluded in Ihyau Ulum al-Dn, too.9 All this proves that al-Ghazzal is immensely

influenced by Ibn Sna, making a large use of Ibn S nas works in composing his ownbooks.

Richard Frank has illustrated that al-Ghazzal made use of the philosophical ideas ofIbn Sna and established his ontology and other philosophical teachings on hisphilosophical system.10 The influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal is not limited to thephilosophical matters. On the contrary, as Binyamin Abrahamov has demonstrated, thisinfluence extends to the non-philosophical issues and realm.11 Similarly, Jules Janssenshas established that al-Ghazzal built his system of thought on the texts of Ibn Sna andmade an extensive use of his ideas.12

In the same line with these findings, this present study aims at illustrating that IbnSnas influence on al-Ghazzal holds true in connection with the understanding andinterpretation of the many of the Quranic concepts and verses. We will also try to showthat Ibn Snas interpretation of the Quranic concepts and verses influenced, supplied afoundation for, and inspired al-Ghazzal by comparing their interpretations of the same

verses and concepts in their various works and by citing examples of al-Ghazzal semployment of the explanations of Ibn S na. When doing so, we will depend only on the

works that are certain to belong to al-Ghazzal , excluding the works whose authorshipby al-Ghazzal is dubious. And we will make use of all their authentic works, regardless

of their being philosophical or not. When comparing their interpretations, we will, as a

7Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 7778; H. Ziya lken, Gazzl ve Felsefe, Ankara niversitesiIlahiyat Fakltesi Dergisi, (AIFD), III-IV (1995), 105.8 Cf. Ibn Sna, Risala f al-Hudud in Tisu Rasail, (Cairo: Dar al-Arab, no date), 72102; Al-Ghazzal ,Miyar al-Ilm, (Egypt: Matbaatu Kurdistan al-Ilmiyya, 1329), 161175.9 Karlga, Ibn Sina,DIA, XX, 346; For similar views, consult lken, Gazzl ve Felsefe, AIFD, 105;agrc, Gazzl,DIA, XIII, 496.10 Richard Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, Revue des Etudes Islamiques, LV-LVII,(198789), 271285.11

Binyamin Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Influence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, Abr-Nahrain,Peter Press, Louvain, XXIX, (1991), 117.12Jules Janssens, Al-Ghazzali and His Use of Avicennian Texts in Problems in Arabic Philosophy,(Piliscsaba: Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, 2003), 3749.

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rule, take into account the meaning, and not the word, as al-Ghazzal emphasized in hisworks13 for he most of the times does not clarify the sources of which he made use andreplaced the terminology of Ibn Sna with a religious counterpart. By coining religious

equivalents to the philosophical terms, he intended to earn a religious legitimacy for theappropriated terms and concepts.14

Interpretation of the Verses Associated with the Notion ofthe Necessary Being

Inspired by al-Farab, Ibn Sna builds his ontology on the categorization of beingsinto a threefold grouping as the necessary, the contingent, and the impossible.15 But oneshould clarify that this is a conceptual division, not actual, for an impossible thing can

never come into existence or be thought to exist. What cannot be thought to exist cannotthus be predicated of existence.16 So the actual things are divided into the necessary andthe contingent in the ontology of Ibn Sna.

Ibn Sna defines the necessary as the being whose existence is necessary and whosenon-existence entails a contradiction in the mind. Furthermore, the necessary being isthe real being and the ontological principle of the contingent beings. As for thecontingent being, it is that whose existence and non-existence is equal, like the twoempty pans of a scale. So, in order to exist or not to exist, it needs a preponderator that

would prefer one of the two options.17 For him, to assume the existence or non-existence

of the contingent beings creates no contradiction in the mind.18Termed asWajib al-Wujudin the Arabic philosophical terminology, the Necessary

Being forms the foundation and beginning of Ibn Snas philosophy for It is the sourceand principle of all other beings.19 He holds that Its essence is the same as Its existence,andvice-versa. Since Its existence is necessary in Itself, It can never be thought to existnot. When explaining the divine name Real (al-Haqq), Ibn Sna explains this point asthe following: From the name Real, the being itself and everlasting being isunderstood . . . The Necessary Being is that which is everlastingly Real in Itself. Whilethe contingent being is real by other than itself, it is false in itself. So, save the Necessary

Being, who is one, everything is false/perish in itself.20

13Al-Ghazzal ,al-Mustasfa, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1993), 46, 53;al-Arban, (Beirut: Daral-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1988), 151; Iljam al-Awam inMajmuatu Rasail al-Imam Ghazzal, (Beirut: Daral-Fikr, 1996), 321.14 Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 275276.15 Mehmet Bayrakdar,Islm Felsefesine Giris, (Ankara: TDV Publishing, 1999), 196.16 Hseyin Atay, Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, (Ankara: Gelisim Matbaas, 1983), 130131. For thephilosophical consequences of the character of this distinction, see Tahir Ulu, ShreverdninIbn SnFelsefesine Ynelttigi Elestiriler, (Konya: Ideal, 2009), 181 and on.17

Atay,Ibn Sin

da Varlk Nazariyesi, 128, 134.18 Bayrakdar,Islm Felsefesine Giris, 196.19Atay,Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 159160.20 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa, al-Ilahiyyat, (Tehran: no date), 48.

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In comparing the Necessary Being and the contingent beings, Ibn Sna makes thefollowing remarks: A group of people asserted that the sensible things are existent andnecessary in themselves. But if you remember and consider our remarks on the

conditions of the Necessary Being, you recognize that they are not necessary, reciting theverse of God, But when it set, he said: I love not things that perish21, for an entity whichlies in the realm of contingency is subject to a certain kind of perishing.22

Ibn Sna thus puts in the contingent category all the beings apart from the NecessaryBeing, i.e., the beings whose quiddity and existence are not the same, viewing them asperishable when compared to the Necessary Being. The verse that he mentions as proofis one of the verses that tell of the Prophet Abrahams debate with his people. These

verses relate that when reasoning about the existence of God, Abraham first saw a starat night and said, This is my Lord. But because they set soon, he moved towards God

by saying I love not things that perish.23

In his al-Maqsad, al-Ghazzal adapted Ibn Snas explanations on the NecessaryBeing, the contingent as well as the name Real of the Necessary Being to a way consistent

with the Asharite doctrine.24 He explains the name Real of God as follows: The nameReal is opposite of the false. Things appear with their opposites. Everything is eitherabsolute false or absolute real or real in one respect and false in the other. That whichis impossible in itself is false in the absolute sense. That which is necessary in itself is realin the absolute sense. That which is contingent in itself while it is necessary by the otheris real in one respect and false in the other. With respect to itself, the contingent has no

existence and is false, receiving its existence from the other. The contingent is real in therespect that it receives existence from the Necessary Being while it is false with respectto itself. Therefore, Everything will perish save His Face.25 This is so pre-eternally andpost-eternally, and not conditionally. For nothing in itself save the Real deserves to existpre-eternally and post-eternally. So all other things are real in relation to that from whichthey receive reality as they are false with respect to themselves. From this is known thatthe Absolute Real is that which exists really by Itself and from which everything that isreal has received its reality.26

In hisal-Maqs

ad al-Athna, a middle-length work, that he composed as a commen-

tary on the Ninety Nine beautiful names of God, one can observe the influence of theexplanations of the earlier authors. There one can find his conformity to the Asharitetradition, the passages quoted from al-Takhbrby al-Qushayr on one hand and the

21 The Sura al-Anam, 6/76.22 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat wa al-Tanbhat, (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, no date), III, 103.23 Fakhr al-Dn al-Raz finds no problem with Ibn Snas interpretation of the verse I like not things thatset. See, Fakhr al-Dn al-Raz,Mafath al-Ghayb, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 1990), XIII, 45.24

Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 277.25 The Sura al-Qasas, 28/88.26Al-Ghazzal ,al-Maqsad al-Asna Sharh u Asmaillah al-Husna, (Egypt: Matbaa-yi Taqaddum, 1322),9192. For similar explanations, seeMishkat al-Anwar, 275276.

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explanations quoted as passages from al-Shifa and Risala al-Arshiyyaby Ibn Sna.27

Al-Ghazzal thus rests largely on the explanations of Ibn Sna when elucidating severalbeautiful names of God.

Al-Ghazzal falls back on Ibn Sna in connection with the arguments set forth inrelation to the existence of God. For instance, Ibn S na remarks that he exclusively relieson the concept of existence in his exposition of the existence of the Necessary Being as

well as Its freedom from attributes, totally ignoring the beings as proof with relation tothe demonstration of Its existence.28 He tries to set forth the existence of God in aphilosophical way on the analysis of the notion of existence itself.29 He holds that whenbeing itself is considered, being as being first indicates It, and only after Him those whichfollow It in terms of existence. Ibn Sna holds this way of demonstration to be morereliable and superior. Stating that the Quran also designates this point, he mentions the

following verses as proof: We shall show them Our proofs on the horizons and withinthemselves until it will be manifest unto them that He is the Real. 30 I am saying that this

verse is a ruling given for a certain group of people. Does not your Lord suffice, sinceHe is Witness over all things?31 I am saying that this verse is a ruling given not for those

who seek proof for Him, but for the veracious people (siddqun) who take Him as thevery proof for His existence.32

Thus, Ibn Sna depends merely on the clarity of the concept of existence,demonstrating the existence of God on the basis of the notion of existence itself, andseeking no proof from the physical world. This is called the ontological proof in

philosophical terminology.33 Ibn Sna is held to be the founder of this proof but he didnot develop it further.34 It is also claimed that Ibn Sna is the first in the Muslim world toemploy the method of moving from the cause to the effect, namely, from the NecessaryBeing to the universe.35

In his various works, al-Ghazzal entirely adopts this ontological proof of Ibn Snaas well as his interpretation of the verses he cited in connection with this proof. Posteriorto al-Ghazzal , this notion was taken and worked out mostly by the Sufis who embracedthe doctrine of the oneness of being (wah dat al-wujud). In this process, the part ofintermediacy between the philosophers and the Sufis was also played by al-Ghazzal .

Al-Ghazzal dresses Ibn Snas ontological proof and interpretation of the involvedverses in a Sufi clothing, couching them in the following way:

27 Frank, al-Ghazalis Use of Avicennas Philosophy, 277.28 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, III, 5455.29 Bayrakdar,Islm Felsefesine Giris, 197.30 The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.31 The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.32 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, III, 55.33

Atay,Ibn Sin

da Varlk Nazariyesi, 161, 164; Bayrakdar,Islm Felsefesine Giris, 196197; T. J. deBoer,Islmda Felsefe Tarihi, Turkish translation by Yasar Kutluay, (Ankara: 1960), 97.34 Hilmi Ziyalken,Islm Felsefesi, (Istanbul: Cem Publishing, 1993), 110.35Atay,Ibn Sinda Varlk Nazariyesi, 168, 200201.

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The Sufis mostly recollect the name Real of God due to their regarding themselveswith respect to their own ontological status as perishable. For they view the actualentities with respect to their own ontological status as non-existent. But since the

Theologians are occupied with the least useful actions in terms of demonstration, theymostly utter the divine name al-Bar, meaning creator in their respective languages.Most of the creatures first see everything other than Him and take them as proof for Hisexistence. So, they are the addressee of the verse, Have they not considered thedominion of the heavens and the earth, and what things Allah has created?36 But sincethe veracious people see nothing other than Him, they take Him as proof for the otherthings. So these are the addressee of the verse, Does not your Lord suffice, since He is

Witness over all things?37

In his explanations, al-Ghazzal employs the terms theologians (mutakallimun)

and the veracious (siddqun), calling those who take the creatures as proof for theexistence of God the theologians while referring to those who view God as proof forthe existence of the creatures as the veracious, just as did Ibn Sna. He makes similarexplanations in hisMishkatand Ihya, too.

Know that the people of insight see nothing but see God at the same time. Some ofthem went further and said, I saw nothing but saw God before seeing it. For some ofthe people of God see the things through Him, while some others see the things and Himtogether. To the first group is pointed by the following words of God: Does not yourLord suffice, since He is Witness over all things?38, while to the second is pointed by the

verse, We shall show them Our signs on the horizons and within themselves until it willbe manifest unto them that He is the Real.39 The first is the people of witnessing whilethe second is the people of demonstration through the proofs of God. The first is the rankof the veracious whereas the second is that of the scholars who are firmly-rooted inknowledge. Next comes the rank of the veiled and unaware people.40

As is seen, in the Ihya, only the verses cited in connection with the people ofdemonstration changes whereas in the Mishkat, the second part of the verse isemployed. The term veracious (siddqun) is kept as the same in both works of Ibn Snaand al-Ghazzal , while the people of demonstration are mentioned by al-Ghazzal first

36 The Sura al-Araf, 7/185.37Al-Ghazzal ,al-Maqsad al-Asna, 9293;Mishkat al-Anwar, 279, 292.38 The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.39 The Sura al-Fussilat, 41/53.40Al-Ghazzal ,Mishkat al-Anwar, 279;Ihyau Ulum al-dn, (Egypt: Daru Nahr al-Nl, no date), IV, 238.The term shahd occurring in the verse is interpreted in the exegetical sources as Gods seeingeverything including the human acts, rather than in the sense of proof. Consult al-T abar, Jamial-Bayan, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), XXV, 5; Al-Zamakhshar , al-Kashshaf , (Beyrut: Darul Kitabil

Arabi, 1987), IV, 201; Raghib al-Isfahan, al-Mufradat, (Istanbul: Daru Kahraman, 1986), 394. As

different from his explanations above in connection with the divine name al-Shah d, al-Ghazzal inal-Maqsadexplains this term as Gods knowing and awareness. He adds that God is called al-Shah din relation to His knowing the outward affairs while He is called al-Khab r with respect to Hisknowing the inner and unseen issues. See al-Ghazzal ,al-Maqsad al-Asna, 91.

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as the theologians and then as the scholars firmly-rooted in knowledge. It follows thatboth Ibn S na and al-Ghazzal combined the Sufi epistemology and general epistemol-ogy and both claimed for the Sufi epistemology a relative supremacy over other

epistemologies, and last but not least, Ibn Sna is al-Ghazzal s source of inspiration inthis line of thought.41

Ibn Sna thinks that the Necessary Being knows all things in an absolute anduniversal manner. He knows all things through their causes. Since the things undergo acontinuous change, the knowledge attained from them will also change. But Hisknowledge of things is not dependent on the things. On the contrary, He knowseverything by Itself. Sharing this view of Ibn Sna, al-Ghazzal also maintains that theobjects of knowledge are posterior to the knowledge of God, and notvice-versa.42 Godsknowledge of the forms of the things is the cause of their coming into existence in reality.

This view of Ibn Sna is completely adopted by al-Ghazzal.43

Ibn S na thinks that both things and their causes stem from Him. He is wise in thissense. His wisdom is at the same time His knowledge. The Necessary Being is that from

whom everything receives its existence. He gives everything its concomitants. Thismeaning occurs in several contexts in the Quran: Our Lord is He Who gave untoeverything its nature, then guided it aright,44 He measured, then guided,45 It is He

who created me, and guides me.46 The philosophers refer to His act of creation as thefirst perfection and to His continuation of the creation as the second perfection. TheNecessary Being is therefore the Absolute Wise.47

Although Ibn S nas notion of the Necessary Being is in conflict with the Islamicnotion of God and his views on the divine attributes are not consistent with theestablished interpretation of the Ahl al-Sunna, he tried to express the perfection of theNecessary Being in the best way possible to him in the final analysis. In doing so, hehowever suffers the failure of explaining Him as in perfect terms as is He. Havingdifficulty in finding right words to describe the Necessary Being, the philosopher says inal-Shifaas the following: We have no other names to express these meanings. If onefinds the statements we have used ugly, he can replace them with the better one.48

Another similarity between Ibn Sna and al-Ghazzal appears in the interpretation of

the beautiful names of God. The former explains the divine attributes First and Lastin harmony with his philosophical system. He holds that by the First is meant that HisEssence is unitary, and not compounded, and that He has no cause, and that beingsoriginate from Him. By the Last is meant that the rise of beings and the spiritual voyagers

41Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Influence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 3.42 Ibn Sna,al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 9.43Al-Ghazzal ,al-Maqsad al-Asna, 52, 5859.44 The Sura Ta-ha, 20/50.45

The Sura al-A

la, 87/3.46 The Sura al-Shuara, 26/78.47 Ibn Sna,Danishnama-i Ala,Ilahiyyat, (Tehran: Danishgah-i Tehran, 1331 (Solar Hijri), 100.48 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa,al-Ilahiyyat, 369.

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are back towards Him.49 Al-Ghazzal interprets these two divine names in the sameterms. In his book on the most beautiful divine names, he makes the following remarksin association with the two names above: He is the First with respect to beings for the

whole emanated from Him one by one in order. He is the Last with respect to thespiritual voyagers for they keep rising through one spiritual stage after another until theyreach His presence, which is the end of their voyage. He is the Last in terms of being

witnessed and the First in terms of being.50

Ibn Sna thinks that all beings emanated from the Necessary Being. Since He is onein all respects, only one can emanate from Him. The first thing to emanate from Himcannot be corporeal body, for all the corporeal bodies have two essential or relativecauses, i.e., matter and form. So these two cannot emanate from Him. Thus, the firstthing to emanate from Him is an incorporeal being, i.e. the First Intellect. This is

expressed in Law by the Prophet as The first thing God created is the intellect51 andThe first thing God created is the Pen.52While the verse You will find no substitutionin Gods course of action53 points to the continuity of creation, the verse You will findno change in Gods course of action, either54 signifies the continuity of the divinecommand. Considering the fact that God acts through the angels, al-Ghazzal interpretsthe word His hand occurring in the saying of the Prophet, God squeezed the clay of

Adam by His hand for forty mornings as an angel. Then he quotes the two sayings ofthe Prophet cited above by Ibn Sna, namely, The first thing God created is theintellect and The first thing God created is the Pen, claiming that the intellect God

created first is not an accident, as opposed to the claim of the theologians. So heinterprets the intellect as an angel, who is called the Pen, too.55 The influence of IbnSna on al-Ghazzal in these interpretations is obvious. The only difference is that

while Ibn Sna refers to the first created thing as intellect, al-Ghazzal describes it as anangel. Al-Ghazzal takes up Ibn Snas statements in this context with some changing,as the case with the context of the interpretation of the divine name Real. Even ifsome of his explanations are in consistence with the early Asharite doctrine, one cannotice the trace of the Neo-Platonist theory of emanation in his interpretation of thedivine names First and Last.56 Al-Ghazzal inserts God in the chain of beings and

49 Ibn Sna,al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 13.50Al-Ghazzal ,al-Maqsad al-Asna, 98;Ihya, IV, 233. Huwa al-awwalu bil-id afati ila al-mawjudati, idhsadara minhu al-kullu ala tart bih wah idan bada wah idin. Wa huwa al-akhiru bil-id afati ila sayrial-sair n ilayhi.Ihya, IV, 233.51 Ibn Taymiyya claims that the scholars of had th agreed that this saying is fabricated. See IbnTaymiyya, al-Raddala al-Mantiqiyyn, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-Lubnani, 1993), 198. Consult also Ajlun ,Kashf al-Khafa, (Beirut: Muassasat al-Risala, 1985), I, 309.52Abu Dawud, al-Sunan, Sunna, 16; Tirmidh, al-Sunan, Qadar, 17; Tafsr-i Sura 68; Ah mad binHanbal,al-Musnad, V, 217.53

The Sura al-Fatir, 35/43.54 The Sura al-Ahzab, 33/62.55 Ibn Sna,al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 15.56Al-Ghazzal ,Faysal al-Tafriqa, 242.

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presents Him as the source towards which the Sufi Gnostics aspire to return and rise.So, though his explanation of the creation of beings and their return seems to be inharmony with the Asharite and Sunnite Sufi doctrine, his notion of the chain of being

occurring in some of his works disagrees with the established Sunni conception of theuniverse.57

In connection with the interpretation of the verse And eight will uphold the Throneof your Lord that day,58 Ibn Sna asserts that many Scriptures inform that God isoverthe Throne (al-Arsh), but the Mushabbiha, namely, the Muslim anthropomorphists,believe that God isset onthe Throne, suggesting a touch between Him and the Throne.Saying that the corporeal beings end with the ninth sphere, the all-encompassing sphere,Ibn Sna argues that the meaning of the verse is that God isoverthe Throne without atouch, just as Aristotle explained at the end of hisSimaul-Kiyan (Physics), and that the

spheres are referred to as angels in religion. So he interprets the verse along the lines ofthe emanationist cosmology. Though al-Ghazzal does not adopt the doctrine ofemanation, he however tends to interpret Gods being set over the Throne as Godsgoverning all the universe from the heavens down to the earth through the Throne, andbrings into existence no form in the universe till He creates it first in the Throne.59 Hecompares Gods governing of the universe to the painters and calligraphers first formingthe figures and writings in their minds and to the men controlling their bodies throughtheir minds. He states that God governs the universe through His Throne and ProtectedTablet (al-Lawh

al-Mahfuz

).60

To recognize that al-Ghazzal is influenced by Ibn Sna in the contexts above, itsuffices to take a cursory look at classic exegetical works which they do not interpret thenames First and Last like al-Ghazzal . For example, Ibn Jarr al-T abar (d. 310/923)explains the name First occurring in the verse He is the First and the Last, and theOutward and the Inward; and He is Knower of all things61 as He is infinite and prior toeverything and explains the name Last as He is infinitely posterior to everything. He citesas proof for this explanation the verse Everything will perish save His Face62 andexplicates that For when Hewas, nothing elsewasand He willbeafter all things haveperished. Similarly, the way al-Tabar interprets the names Outward (al-Z

ahir) and

Inward (al-Batin) differs from that of Ibn Sna and al-Ghazzal . For him, the Outwardmeans His witnessing everything, His ruling over everything, and that nothing is superiorto Him, while the Inward means that He is immanent to everything and that nothing is

57 Mahmud Qasim points out that no one at that time including al-Ghazzal could remain immune to theinfluence of philosophy and the emanationist cosmology in particular. See Mahmud Qasim, al-Aql waal-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , inMihrijan al- Ghazzal f Dimashq, (Cairo: 1961), 201.58 The Sura al-Haqqa, 69/17.59

Ibn Sna,Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, ed. by Michael Marmura, (Beirut: Dar al_Nahr, 1968), 5354.60Al-Ghazzal ,Iljam al-Awam, p. 308;Kimya, 4041.61 The Sura al-Had d, 57/3.62 The Sura al-Qasas, 28/88.

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closer to anything than is He. The verse We are nearer to him than his jugular vein 63

points to this meaning, too.64

Interpretation of the Verses Associated with theLevels of Being

In his philosophical system, Ibn Sna ranks the beings in the superlunary andsublunary world in accordance with a hierarchical order. He situates the NecessaryBeing, the first and most perfect being, on top, while he puts the matter, the least perfectone, in the bottom, ranking the rest according to their perfection in the descendanthierarchy. He set a hierarchy for the sublunary beings that begins from the matter, theleast perfect being, ascending towards the more perfect ones, and ending with the

Acquired Intellect (al-aql al-mustafad). So consider how being descends graduallyfrom the Most Perfect Being to the less perfect ones, ending with the matter, and howbeing similarly ascends gradually from the least perfect back to the more perfect ones,i.e., to the rational soul and the Acquired Intellect!65

In his various works, al-Ghazzal adopts this ontological hierarchy of Ibn Sna as thesame. While this adoption appears only implicitly in some of his works, it is explicit inthe Mishkat: God brought the generated and created things into existence in accordance

with a certain order. God is so first that nothing is before Him. The generated andcontingent things all generated from Him. Then, this hierarchical order of creation goes

downwards to the less perfect, ending with the matter, the least perfect of things.Beginning from the matter, the least perfect of things, this hierarchy goes upwards backto the more perfect till it ends with the human being. Thanks to the purification of hislower soul, man assumes the character described as Return unto your Lord, content inHis good pleasure!6667

On the top of both philosophers gradation of the sublunary beings, namely, thosewhich are subject to generation and corruption, is situated the Prophet, in other words,the holy prophetic soul. The three faculties that Ibn Sna thinks to be essential to theprophets, i.e., the rational power, the imaginative power, and the effective power

(al-quwwa al-aqliyya, al-quwwa al-mutakhayyila, al-quwwa al-muaththira) occur inthe works of al-Ghazzal, too.68

The conception of the universe is another context in which al-Ghazzal wasinfluenced by Ibn Sna to the extent that he diverged from the Asharite tradition. For IbnS na, the present universe is the best of the possible universes. He also thinks that God

63 The Sura Qaf, 50/16.64Al-T abar,Jamial-Bayan, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1988), XXVII, 215.65 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, III, 241242; For similar remarks, seeal-Shifa,al-Ilahiyyat, 435436;al-Najat,

334336;al-Mabda

wa al-Ma

ad, 9192.66 The Sura al-Fajr, 89/28.67Al-Ghazzal ,Mishkat al-Anwar, 277.68 Ibn Sna,Risala f al-Fil wa al-Infial, 35; al-Ghazzal ,Kimya, 29.

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laid down each natural law for an objective. There is no flaw, dysfunction and randomin the universe.69 Ibn Snas approach to the perfect nature of the universe stems from hisconception that good prevails the universe and evil has no essential existence or more

precisely, it is the lack of perfection. The notion of theodicy, i.e., the justice of God, isclosely related to Ibn Snas theory of emanation and the doctrine of provision (inaya).70

The philosopher explains this doctrine as the following: It must be known thatprovision (inaya) means that the First knows by Itself how beings should be in the goodorder and He is the cause of what is good and perfect as far as possible and is content

with the way they are, just as described. So the First conceives the best possible order inthe best way and thus that which He conceives as order and good in the best possible

way overflows from Him in the best manner to His knowledge. This is the meaning ofprovision.71 The same approach can also be seen in al-Isharat: The provision means

that the knowledge of the First encompasses everything and how everything should bein accordance with the best order. This is necessary to Him and implied by the compassof His knowledge. Everything occurs in the best way according to His presentknowledge without the will and intention of the First Real.72

In conclusion, Ibn Sna holds that the First knows the best possible order in the bestpossible way and that which He knows as such emanates from Him in the best possiblemanner.73 For him, the beings thus have come into existence in the best possible way.Similarly, nothing possible of His perfection has remained unfulfilled. For, if it werepossible for the beings to be better than they are, they would absolutely be that way. 74

Its rudiments going back to al-Farab and Ibn Sna, this doctrine was later reducedinto a shorter rhymed formulation: Laysa fi al-imkan abdau min-ma kan(Nothing canbe more wondrous than it presently is).75 Ibn Snas conception of emanation andprovision was not welcome by the doctors of religion for it leads to determinism in theuniverse and rules out the will of God in particular.76 Al-Ghazzal quotes this notion ofthe philosophers as the same in his Maqasid.

77 But in the post-Maqasidwritings, headopts Ibn Snas notion that the present universe is the best possible universe, asopposed to the established Asharite notion of God as possessing will and acting as He

wills (faalun l-ma yurd).78 While he quotes this view of Ibn Sna only in descriptive

terms, he explicitly adopts it in his other works. In his Kimya-yi Saadatandal-Arban,

69 IbnSna, al-Risala al-Arshiyya in Majmuu Rasail, (Deccan: Dar al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1353), 10;Risala f Ajram al-Ulwiyya inTisu Rasail, (Cairo: Dar al-Arab, no date), 43.70 Mehmet Aydn,Din Felsefesi, (Ankara: Seluk Publishing, 1992), 121.71 Ibn Sna,al-Shifa,al-Ilahiyyat, 415.72 Ibn Sin,al-Isharat, III, 298299.73 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, IV, 298299; al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 10.74 Ibn Sna, al-Risala al-Arshiyya, 16.75Aydn,Din Felsefesi, 121122.76

Atay,Ibn Sin

da Varlk Nazariyesi, 204.77Al-Ghazzal ,Maqasid al-Falasifa, 296.78According to the Asharite doctrine, God acts just as He wills. Consult al-Ash ar , Kitab al-Ibana,(Deccan: Dairat al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1948), 5152.

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he points out that the universe is like a person whose all parts are in harmony with, andcomplimentary to, each other. The parts of the universe are in such good and strong amanner designed that if the design changes, the whole system collapses. This are all the

manifestation of Gods name Designer (al-Musawwir).79

It is Him who created everything in the universe. He created His creatures in sucha way that nothing can be thought to be better and finer than its present state. If all thereasons of the rational beings come together and think hard to find a better manner forthis kingdom or seek a way better than its present way of governance or want to add orremove something from it, they fail. It is wrong to think that there can be better than this.One who fails to understand the mystery of His wisdom and action is like a blind person

who enters into a room where everything is as should be but cannot see. When hebumps or hits something down, he says, Why is this on the way? In fact, it is not on the

way, but he cannot see the way. God created everything with justice, wisdom, and in thebest way possible. If it were possible that there be better than that which He created andHe did not create it, He would be either incapacitated or stingy, neither of which can besaid of God. So all things that He created like hardships, sickness, poverty, ignorance,and misery are in conformity with justice. It is impossible that He do injustice becauseinjustice is to dispose over the domain of another person.80

As obvious in these examples, al-Ghazzal appropriated Ibn Snas views andinterpretations in connection with the ontological hierarchy and cosmological order,incorporating them into his own system.

Interpretations of Some Quranic TermsWe find that al-Ghazzal is under the influence of Ibn S na in relation with the

interpretation of some ambiguous metaphysical terms, known as mutashabihat in thetradition of the Quranic exegesis, making an extensive use of his explanations. Ibn Snainterprets some Quranic terms, which were left in vagueness and whose precise imports

were not explained by Law (shara), in line with his own philosophical system.81 Forexample, one can mention such Quranic terms as the Pen (qalam), the Protected Tablet

(al-Lawhal-Mahfuz ), the Command (amr), and the creation (khalq). He interprets theseterms in accord with his own conception of predestination and fate:Do not think that the Pen is a tool, that the Tablet is a broad surface, and that the

writing is writing with letters. On the contrary, the Pen is an incorporeal angel, and theTablet is an incorporeal angel, and the writing is the figuring of things. The Pen receivesthe meanings that lie in the Command and commit them unto the Tablet in anincorporeal manner of writing. The fate stems from the Pen while the predestinationcomes from the Tablet. The fate contains the import of His command while the

79

Al-Ghazzal ,al-Maqsad al-Asna, 51.80Al-Ghazzal ,Kimya, 81;al-Arban, 13.81 Hammuda Ghuraba, Ibn Sna bayn al-Dn wa al-Falsafa, (Egypt: Dar al-T ibaa wa al-Nashral-Islamiyya, no date), 137138.

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predestination contains the contents of the sending-down in measure. Something ofthese two is presented to the angels in the heavens. Then, it comes down upon theangels on the Earth. Finally, what is written in the fate takes place in actuality . . . Every

occurrence has a cause . . . The external causes go back to the order, which goes backto the fate, which goes back to the predestination, which stems from the command. Inresult, everything occurs with a measuring-out.82

Ibn Snas view of the natural world relies on the chain of causes. He startseverything from the Necessary Being and extends down to the physical world and thentraces the same chain back to its origin. In doing so, he interprets the related Qur anic

verses in conformity with his conception of predestination and fate as implicated by hisphilosophical system. The interpretations of the Quranic concepts of which Ibn Snamakes mention when explaining the issue of predestination and fate are found in the

works of his predecessor, al-Farab , too.Do not think that the Pen is inanimate, that the Tablet is a broad tool, and that the

writing is writing with letters. On the contrary, the Pen is an incorporeal angel, and thewriting is the figuring of things. The Pen receives the meanings that lie in the Commandand commit them unto the Tablet in an incorporeal manner of writing. The fate stemsfrom the Pen while the predestination comes from the Tablet. The fate contains theimport of the command of the One while the predestination contains the contents of that

which is sent down in measure. Some thing whereof is presented to the angels in theheavens. Then, it flows down upon the angels on the Earth. Finally, that which is written

in the fate takes place in actuality.83

In theal-Maqasid, al-Ghazzal says that the philosophers take the Protected Tabletas the souls and as intellects of the heavens, explaining their views on this issue as thefollowing: What is meant by the Protected Tablet is the celestial souls. The engraving ofthe particulars in the world wherein is like the imprinting of the memorized data in thehuman memory. But this does not entail that it be a flat solid body on which the thingsare written like the writing of a child on a blackboard. For this entails that it be multipleand that the things that are written on it be possible to be encompassed. If those whichare written are infinite, those on which are written have to be infinite, too. But it is

impossible to imagine an infinite body.84

Al-Ghazzal explains the philosophers views of angels as the following: Thephilosophers hold that the heavenly angels are the celestial souls whereas the angels,

who are attendants of God, known as the Cherubim, are the substantial incorporealintellects which self-subsist, and are non-spatial, and do not act on the bodies. Particularforms are diffused from them over the celestial souls. These are superior to the heavenlyangels for the former is benefactor as the latter is beneficiary, and the benefactor issuperior to the beneficiary. Therefore, the superior party is called the Pen. The verse

82 Ibn Sna, Risala f al-Quwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatiha (in Tisu Rasail), 6768.83Al-Farab ,Kitab al-Fusus, (Deccan: Dairat al-Maarif al-Uthmaniyya, 1345), 16.84Al-Ghazzal ,Tahafut al-Falasifa, 226227.

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reads, Who teaches by the pen85 for God is like an engraver who is benefactor. Godcompared the one who teaches to the Pen whereas He likened the one who isbeneficiary to the Tablet.86

In the same work, al-Ghazzal points out that the philosophers think that it ispossible to get connected with the souls above. For them, we cannot get connected withthe heavenly angels when we are awake because our senses and desires distract us atthat time. But since the distraction of our senses disappears when we are asleep, ourability to get in connection with them appears. Al-Ghazzal adds that the philosopherscontend that the prophets attain the knowledge of the Unseen in this way and theirspiritual powers are strong enough to see when they are awake what the ordinarypeople see when they are in dream. If all the things were not fixed in the ProtectedTablet, they could not know the Unseen (al-ghayb) when they are awake or asleep.87

After quoting the interpretations of the Muslim philosophers on the Pen, theProtected Tablet, and the angels in the Tahafut, al-Ghazzal remarks as the following:There is no proof that requires to understand the Pen and the Protected Tablet occurringin Law as those of you [i.e., the philosophers] understand for the people of Law definitelydid not understand from the Pen and the Protected Tablet what those of you haveunderstood. So those of you have no footing in Law.88

Leveling such criticisms at the philosophers, al-Ghazzal, however, sets forth similarinterpretations in his Faysal al-Tafriqa, Kimya-yi Saadat, and al-Mad nun al-Saghr.This shows that he is influenced by the interpretations of the philosophers to some

extent.89 One of his explanations on this issue is as follows:The divine predestination of affairs takes place in this way: They are first planned

and drawn on the Protected Tablet by the Pen, which performs this drawing accordingto a knowledge. The Tablet is a thing that is capable of the forms being written on it,

while the Pen is the thing from which the forms flow onto the Tablet. So the Pen isdefined as that which draws the forms. The Pen and the Tablet are not necessary to bemade of reed and wood . . . On the contrary, they are conditioned not to be of corporealbody . . .90

In his Qanun al-Tawl, al-Ghazzal makes the following remarks on a frenzied

person informing of the Unseen: As for the frenzied person informing of the Unseen,this is due to the fact all the things that occurred and will occur are fixed in written formin the knowledge of God. This is sometimes referred to as the Tablet as in the verse, Allthings We have kept in a clear Register91 and at other times is called Book in the verse,

85 The Sura al-Alaq, 96/3.86Al-Ghazzal , Tahafut al-Falasifa, 226; Ibn Sna, Risala f al-Quwa al-Insaniyya wa Idrakatiha,6768; al-Farab,Kitab al-Fusus, 16.87Al-Ghazzal ,Tahafut al-Falasifa, 228.88

Al-Ghazzal ,Tahafut al-Falasifa, 229.89 Cf. al-Ghazzal,Faysal, 242;Kimya, 2526, 628;Qanun al-Tawl, 585;Ihya, IV, 459460.90Al-Ghazzal ,al-Madnun al-Saghr, 367.91 The Sura Ya-S n, 36/12.

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It is noted in a clear Book.92 Things lie in it as the Quran lies in the mind of the personwho memorized it.93Al-Ghazzal repeats similar explanations on the Tablet and the Penin hisKimya-yi Saadat.94

All this demonstrates that al-Ghazzal is under the clear influence of Ibn Sna inconnection with the interpretation of some Quranic terms. In addition, though he rejectsthe theory of emanation as set forth by the philosophers notwithstanding, he appropri-ates the philosophers interpretations of such Quranic terms as the Tablet and the Penthat are related to the belief of predestination and fate.

Interpretation of the Verse of LightIbn Sna seems to have inspired al-Ghazzal in connection with the interpretation of

the 35

th

verse of the Sura al-Nur. The former is of the opinion that this verse symbolizesthe degrees of the perception of the human soul.95 In his al-Isharat and Ithbatal-Nubuwwa, he explains this verse in similar terms.96 Inspired by the commentaries ofIbn Sna, al-Ghazzal makes use of the same verse in his system of thought with minorchanges.

God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The similitude of His light is as a nichewherein is a lamp. The lamp is in a glass. The glass is as it were a shining star. (This lampis) kindled from a blessed tree, an olive neither of the East nor of the West, whose oil

would almost glow forth (of itself ) though no fire touched it. Light upon light. God

guides unto His light whom He will. And God speaks to mankind in allegories, for Godis Knower of all thing.97

Ibn Sna maintains that the term light (nur) occurring in the verse above is anequivocal word. As one of its two meanings is essential, the other is analogical. Theformer meaning, as pointed out by Aristotle, is the perfection of transparency ofsomething transparent whereas the latter has two aspects: it is either the good itself orthat which leads to the good. As with the meaning intended in the verse, it is theanalogical meaning in both aspects. The same holds true of the essential andnon-essential meanings. The heavens and earth occurring in the verse are nothing other

than the whole being.

98

So, Ibn Sna interprets the term light occurring in the first phrase of the verse as Godin harmony with his philosophical system. For in his system, the Real Being is that whoseexistence is necessary and whose nonexistence cannot be thought of, i.e., the Necessary

92 The Sura al-Anam, 6/59.93Al-Ghazzal ,Qanun al-Tawl, 585; To compare with Ibn Sna, see Ibn S na,al-Isharat, IV, 121124.94Al-Ghazzal ,Kimya-yi Saadat, Turkish translation by A. Faruk Meyan, (Istanbul: Bedir Publishing,1979), 628.95Al-Raz , Mafathal-Ghayb, XXIII, 203205; A. Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on

Intellect, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 130.96 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, II, 389392;Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4952.97 The Sura Nur, 24/35.98 Ibn Sna,Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4950.

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Being. In fact, the term being itself suggests Him. As for the contingent beings, they arein need of Him in their being a fact that places them in the category of the shadowbeing, i.e., the quasi being. What is meant by the words heavens and earth are the

whole beings who are contingent in themselves, depending in their existence on theReal Being, wich is good in Itself and named Light, too. The contingent beings arenon-existent with respect to themselves and existent with respect to the Light. They mayalso be referred to as contingent in themselves and necessary by others.

Ibn Sna explains the remaining terms in the verse on the grounds of the theory ofintellects. He holds that the human soul has some powers through which it develops itssubstance. By making use of these, it can attain to the level of the Active Intellect. Thefirst of these powers prepares the soul for perceiving the intelligibles. Some call thismaterial intellect (al-aql al-hayulan). This power is like the niche.99 There is a

superior power that the soul obtains once it acquires the primary intelligibles and it thusbecomes ready to receive the secondary intelligibles. The soul obtains the secondaryintelligibles through its intuitive power (h ads) if it is strong enough, and if not, throughits cogitative power (al-quwwa al-mufakkira). The former is symbolized by olive tree(al-shajar al-mubarak) and the latter by olive oil (zayt).100 In either case, the soul thathas reached the second level has attained to the level of the intellectus in habitu(al-aqlbil-malaka), which is like the glass. As for the exalted soul that has the holy power, toit corresponds the symbol of whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself) though nofire touched it. Once passed through this stage, the soul obtains such a power that

through which it perceives the intelligibles in actuality. The engravings of the intelli-gibles become like light upon light in his mind. Next to this is such a power thatthrough which the intelligibles, that the soul has already acquired and no longer needsto re-acquire, become present to it and it beholds them whenever it wishes. This power,being like glowing forth (of itself), is analogous to the lamp. This level of perfectionis called the acquired intellect (al-aql al-mustafad) as this power is called the intellectin actuality (al-aql bil-fil). Once passed through all these stages, the intellect becomeslike the fire (nar) that gives off light.101 That which brings the intellect from potentialityinto full actuality and from materiality into the state of being in habitu is the Active

Intellect (al-aql al-faal), which is symbolized by the fire.102

In theMishkatthat he composed as a commentary on the verse of light, al-Ghazzal interprets the analogies related to the terms in the verse in a manner similar to that of IbnS na.103 To recognize the influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal in connection with theinterpretation of this verse, it suffices to look at the exegetical literature written beforeal-Ghazzal. For his interpretation of the verse differs from the explanations of the Sufi

99 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, II, 388389.100

Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, II, 390.101 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, II, 391392.102 Ibn Sna,al-Isharat, II, 392.103 Davidson,Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect, 130.

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exegetes. In relation to the interpretation of the verse, al-Ghazzal is thus under theinfluence of Ibn Sna, rather than such Sufi exegetes as al-Tustar (d.283/896), al-Sulam(d.412/1021), and al-Qushayr (d.465/1073).104 For he, just like Ibn Sna, takes the terms

occurring in the verse as symbolizing the perceptive powers of the human soul.105

In theMishkat, al-Ghazzal mentions five faculties of the human soul in the contextof the interpretation of the verse in question. The first of them is the sensitive soul (al-ruhal-h assas), which receives the sensual perceptions. The second is the imaginative soul(al-ruh al-khayal), which saves the sensual perceptions, keeping them available to thecontinuous use of the third soul. The third is the rational soul (al-ruh al-aql), whichperceives the meanings that are inaccessible to the perception of the senses and theimaginative soul. The objects of the perception of the rational soul are the self-evidentknowledge of universal character. The fourth is the cogitative soul (al-ruh

al-fikr). The

function of this soul is to produce new knowledge by making comparisons between thesimple constituents of knowledge. The fifth faculty is the holy prophetic soul (al-ruhal-quds al-nabaw), which is special to the prophets and the saints. By this soul isobtained the knowledge related to this world and the Hereafter that cannot be acquiredthrough the rational and cogitative soul. In other words, this soul attains the knowledgeof revelation and inspiration.106 Al-Ghazzal suggests the possibility of the existence ofanother realm that are beyond and inaccessible to the reason. The level of the holyprophetic soul is called intuition (dhawq) and inner experience (wijdan). That thefifth level is taken as the level of intuition and inner experience that transcends the

reason suggests that al-Ghazzal regards it as a mystical experience, distinguishingit from the other levels.107 Ibn Snas symbolic explanations of the verse of lightare undoubtedly more refined and more philosophical than those of al-Ghazzal .

Al-Ghazzal appropriates the terms used by Ibn Sna, in particular such terms as thecogitative soul, the theoretical soul, and the holy faculty. Al-Ghazzal s parallelism to IbnSna in terms of using Ibn S nas general philosophical scheme and terminology is theresult of his earlier acquaintance with the works of Ibn S na.108

In the Mishkat, al-Ghazzal employs the concept of light as an equivalent of theconcepts of intellect and being.109 He also explains such terms as spirit, intellect, heart,

and soul in the same meaning.110 If we follow in the footsteps of al-Ghazzal by focusingon the meaning rather than the words, we can conveniently say that these two

104Al-Tustar , Tafsru al-Tustar, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2007), 111; Al-Sulam, Haqaiqal-Tafsr, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyya, 2001), II, 5051; al-Qushayr, Lataif al-Isharat, (Egypt:Markazu Tah q q al-Turath, 1981), II, 612613.105Al-Raz ,Mafath al-Ghayb, XXIII, 203205106Al-Ghazzal ,Mishkat al-Anwar, 285286.107Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Influence on al-Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 89.108

Abrahamov, Ibn Sinas Influence on al Ghazalis Non-Philosophical Works, 1112.109Al-Ghazzal , Mishkat al-Anwar, 271; al-Arban, 151; Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes onIntellect, 132.110Al-Ghazzal ,Kimya, 18;al-Arban, 151, 155.

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explanations make a common point, proving that al-Ghazzal is influenced by IbnS na.111 But one should add that this influence is expressed in allusive language. Asrightly put by Davidson, Mishkat al-Anwar is simply a new version of the Ibn S nan

system adapted to al-Ghazzal s system of thought, partially disguised in allusivelanguage.112

Al-Ghazzal sets forth a gradation in which the sensitive soul is posterior to theimaginative soul, and it is posterior to the cogitative soul, and it is posterior to the rationalsoul, and it is posterior to the holy prophetic soul. This gradation reminds of Ibn Snasgradation of the intellects.113 The scheme below that shows both Ibn Snas andal-Ghazzal s allegorical interpretations of the same verse of light more clarifies theinfluence of the former on the latter.114

Ibn Sna al-Ghazza lNiche: Material Intellect Sensitive SoulGlass: Intellectus in Habitu Imaginative SoulOlive Tree: Cogitative Power Cogitative SoulOlive Oil: Intuition Lamp: Intellect in Actuality Rational SoulGlowing if not touched by fire: Holy Power Holy SoulFire: Active Intellect GabrielLight upon light: Acquired Intellect Prophet with revelation

So it is clear that in his interpretation of the verse of light, al-Ghazzal rested largelyon Ibn Snas analogical interpretation of the verse, rather than the earlier Sufiinterpretations whereof.

Interpretation of the Verses Associated with theConception of the Human Soul

Al-Ghazzal makes an extensive use of the explanations of the Muslim philosopherslike al-Farab and Ibn Sna in connection with psychology, too. In this context, he takes

up both their psychological views and their interpretation of some Quranic verses in

harmony with their system.115 As pointed out by Uthman Najat, it is al-Ghazzal whoincorporated the psychology of Ibn Sna into the Asharite theology.116Adopting most of

111 Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , 201202.112 Davidson,Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averoes on Intellect, 180.113 IbnS na points out that the holy intellect is the final end, and that the material intellect, the intellectusin habitu, and the intellect in actuality serve it. Ibn S na,al-Shifa,al-Ilahiyyat, 168.114 Ibn Sna, al-Isharat, II, 388392; Risala f Ithbat al-Nubuwwa, 4952; Al-Ghazzal , Mishkatal-Anwar, 286287.115

M. Uthman Najat ,al-Dirasa al-Nafsaniyya inda Ulama

al-Muslimn, Cairo: Dar al-Suruq, 1993,p. 167.116 Frank Griffel, al-Ghazalis Concept of Prophecy: The Introduction of Avicennan Psychology into

Asharite Thelogy, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, 14 (2004), pp. 101144.

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Ibn Snas psychological views, al-Ghazzal makes use of the texts and examples of IbnSna as the same.117 He reproduces his predecessors interpretations of the variousQuranic verses that are ascribed with philosophical connotations.

In line with the Aristotelian physics and psychology, Ibn Sna defines the soul as theentelechy (kamal) of natural body. In consistence with his system, he defines the humansoul as a substance that moves the body to attain its own entelechy. He divides the soulinto three kinds, as the herbal, the animal, and the human soul, setting forth a numberof proofs to establish the existence of the last.118 He acknowledges that the human soul,referred also to as the rational soul, has two powers, knowing and acting, calledcollectively reason. This division of Ibn S na takes place in al-Ghazzalsal-Mzanasthe same.119

It is from Ibn Sna that al-Ghazzal took some of his argumentations in relation with

the existence of the soul. For example, Ibn Sna mentions two proofs for the soul. Oneis the natural proof (al-burhan al-tab), and the other is the proof of continuation. Thelatter proof is built on the fact that though all the cells of a human being change andrenew, he remains the same person. He also makes mention of his famous analogy of theflying man (al-rajul al-tair) to establish that a man, who is isolated from all physicalthings, including his own body and limbs, is to be aware of his own soul. All thesepsychological argumentations of Ibn Sna occur in the works of al-Ghazzal as thesame.120

Al-Ghazzal adopts the way Ibn Sna explains the creation of the human soul,

interpreting the Quranic verses in harmony with this way. For instance, after mentioningthe stages of the formation of human embryo described in the Quran, the Peripateticphilosophers argue, relying on the verse And then We produced it as anothercreation,121 that the soul is created after body. They take another creation (khilqaukhra) occurring in the verse as the blowing of soul (ifad at al-ruh ) into the embryo thathas the capacity of receiving it.122 Accordingly, Ibn S na suggests the idea of thesimultaneous creation of soul and body.123 In the same way, al-Ghazzal in hisTahafutpoints out that Ibn Sna and the Enlightened Sufis (muhaqqiqun) preferred the view thatthe soul came into existence at the same time with the body.124

Influenced by this view of Ibn Sna, al-Ghazzal, in hisal-Madnun al-Saghr, whichhe composed as a commentary on the 75th of the Sura Sad, interprets the 172ndverse of

117 Qasim, al-Aql wa al-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , pp. 200.118 Ibn Sna, Risala f al-Saada wa al-Hujaj al-Ashara ala anna al-Nafs al-Insaniyya Jawharun,pp. 511.119Al-Ghazzal ,Mzan al-Amal, pp. 202203.120Al-Ghazzal ,al-Arban, p. 167;Kimya, p. 18, 19, 59;al-Maqsad al-Asna, p. 101; Qasm, al-Aql waal-Taql d f Madhhab al-Ghazzal , p. 200.121 The Sura al-Muminun, 23/14.122

Semseddin Gnaltay,Felsefe-i l, Istanbul: Insan Publishing, 1994, p. 230.123 Ibn Sna, al-Najat, pp. 222223; al-Risala al-Ad h awiyya, pp. 8990; al-Mabda wa al-Maad,pp. 157158.124Al-Ghazzal ,Tahafut, p. 275.

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the Sura al-Araf in a way different from the classic and Sufi exegetes who advocate thepreexistence of the souls. In contrast to the Sufi approaches, al-Ghazzal in this workfollows in the footsteps of Ibn S na by claiming that the human soul is not preexistent but

created together with body. So he explicitly interprets the verses at issue in parallel to theview of Ibn S na.125 So al-Ghazzal takes up Ibn Snas psychology, interpretingthe related Quranic verses in line with this, and diverging from the notion of thepreexistence of soul, held by the classic and Sufi exegetes.

ConclusionExamining the views of almost all the schools in his age, al-Ghazzal is a careful

reader of Ibn Sna in philosophy. He composed works to criticize and refute the views

of the philosophers notwithstanding, he was influenced by philosophy in general and bysome of Ibn Snas views and interpretations of various chapters and verses of the Quranin particular. The influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal in the interpretation of the versesassociated with the demonstration of the existence of God and in the explanation of thedivine names and attributes is obvious. Al-Ghazzal reproduces the interpretation of the

verse that Ibn S na suggests to establish the ontological proof of the existence of God.Another context in which the influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal is clear is the

interpretation of the verses associated with the notion of the gradation of beings. Thoughhe does not adopt Ibn Snas theory of emanation completely, al-Ghazzal however

appropriates his gradation, interpreting some verses and sayings of the Prophet alongthis line.

One can observe the clear influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal in the interpretationof the 35thverse of the Sura Nur, too. Ibn S nas interpretation of the terms in the verse,known as the verse of light, as symbolizing the levels of the perceptive powers of maninfluenced al-Ghazzal deeply. So he interpreted the verse of light inMishkat al-Anwar,

which he dedicated to the exposition of the verse involved, in terms parallel to theinterpretation of Ibn Sna.

Al-Ghazzal is influenced by Ibn Sna in his psychological views and in his

interpretation of the verses associated therewith. He adopted Ibn Snas claim of thesimultaneous generation of soul and body, and not the former existing before the latter.He took some verses of the Quran as proof for this view, carrying them beyond thetraditional Sufi lines and closer to the psychology of Ibn S na.

All this shows that al-Ghazzal , who refuses to follow any school of thought blindly,did not oppose the views of the philosophers as a whole; on the contrary, he made useof them in his own system of thought. Though he conformed to the conception of the

Ahl al-Sunna in the form of Asharism in most cases, he however went off the Asharite

125Al-Ghazzal , al-Madnun al-Saghr, pp. 359360; Mzan al-Amal, p. 143. For more information,consult Mesut Okumus, Kurann ok Boyutlu Okunusu: Imam Gazzali rnegi, Ankara: Ankara OkuluPublishing, 2006, pp. 223232.

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track at times. His notion that the present universe is the best possible universe and hisview that soul and body are created simultaneously form two conspicuous and palpableinstances of this.

The influence of Ibn Sna on al-Ghazzal in connection with hermeneutics appear inhis works on both the Islamic rules on transactions and on spirituality. The influence ofIbn S nas interpretations of the Quranic verses on al-Ghazzal is quite obvious in hissuch works as Mishkat al-Anwar, Mzan al-Amal, Kimya-yi Saadat, al-Arban, andal-Maqsad al-Asna. This influence is far more conspicuous in his al-Madnun al-Saghr

which he wanted to be prevented from the public circulation. As for the views occurringinMaarij al-Qudsthat is attributed to al-Ghazzal , they are set forth entirely along thelines of Ibn Sna. However, since al-Ghazzal s authorship of this work is doubtful, weignored the views and interpretations in it.

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Mesut Okumuş -- The Influence of Ibn Sīnā on al-Ghazzālī in Qur'anic Hermeneutics

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