NATIONAL & KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS

FACULTY OF LAW, ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC

ADMINISTRATION

MASTER’S DEGREE IN SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

MASTER’S DEGREE THESIS

CYPRIOTISM

AS AN IDEOLOGY IN BETWEEN TURKISH AND GREEK NATIONALISMS

Supervisor StudentDr. Pantelis Lekkas Mertkan Hamit

Athens, September 2009

ABSTRACT

CYPRIOTISM IN BETWEEN TURKISH AND GREEK NATIONALISMS

HAMIT, Mertkan

M.A., University of Athens, Department of Political Sciences, Economics and Law

Supervisor: Dr. Pantelis Lekkas

September 2009, 71 pages

Nationalism in Cyprus constitutes the touchstone of its recent history. Ethnic clashes

which took place from 1963 to 1974 ended up with the Turkish intervention; however the

settlement of the issue had never realized. This thesis aims to make the discussion of

Cypriotism, which represents the discourse which emerged after the 1974 intervention within

both Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot societies. However, each society has had their

respective motivations while developing their Cypriotist discourse. This resulted in the rise of

Cypriotism with different facets within each respective society. The present study aims at

showing the different facets of Cypriotism within the two communities by focusing on the

public opinion through the newspaper analysis and proving that Cypriotism represents a

nascent ideology developing in between Turkish and Greek nationalisms.

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ACKNOWLEGEMENT

First of all I want to express my deepest gratitude’s to my supervisor Dr. Pantelis

Lekkas for his continuous efforts to deal with my thesis and his efforts in order to motivate

me. In addition to this, I would like to add my sincere regards to Assoc Prof. Caesar

Mavratsas of the University of Cyprus for his valuable contributions and encouragements.

I owe special graduate to my sister Meltem Hamit, for her endless efforts and her

suggestions. For sure without her, this thesis could never reach to this point. In addition to her

I am thankful for Cansu Kurnaz for her assistance throughout the mess in old newspaper

archieves. Also I am thankful for Dogkan Eninanc, Hazal Yolga and Janan Kuyucuoglu for

their efforts in order to improve the level of language. I am also thankful for Assoc Prof. Dr.

Ahmet Sözen and Asst. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Ergil for their technical support especially their

efforts in order to help me to reach the Eastern Mediterranean University’s library.

I am also thankful for my mother Şükran Hamit for her psychological support. For me

she is the working class hero who dedicated her life for our family. I am also thankful for my

father who gave me the chance to live this awesome life, but unfortunately he passed away so

early that I have never had an opportunity to share all these experience with him.

Finally I would like to add my special thanks to all academic staff in University of

Athens South East European Studies department for their valuable contributions for my

vision. Also I am thankful for all my friends in the SEE 2008-2009 group for the friendly

atmosphere. Especially I am thankful for my friends Akis, Christos, Marina, Serkan, Zekiye

and Miltos for their precious friendship.

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To My Working Class Hero: My Mum…

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CONTENTS

ABSTRACT...................................................................................................................2

ACKNOWLEGEMENT..................................................................................................3

CONTENTS...................................................................................................................5

PART A: INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................6

Chapter I. Literature Review and the Methodology__________________________________6

PART B: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ..................................................................8

PART C: BRIEF HISTORY OF CYPRUS ..................................................................14

PART D - CYPRIOTISM: JUST IDENTITY OR NEW FACE OF NATIONALISM? . .17

Chapter I: Faces of Nationalism within Greek Cypriot Society________________________18

i.The Rise of Greek Nationalism within Orthodox Community___________________________18

ii.Emergence of Cypriotism within Greek Cypriot Society____________________________19

3- Deeper Analysis of Cypriotism: Disjunction to Greek Nationalism_______________________22

Chapter 2: Faces of Nationalism within Turkish Cypriot Society ______________________33

i.Adoption of Turkish Identity as Counter Nationalism________________________________33

ii.Evolution of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots _________________________________36

iii.Deeper Analysis of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriot Society __________________________38

PART E – CONCLUSION.....................................................................................................51

PART F: BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................55

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Part A: Introduction

Nationalism would be seen as one of the main reasons for all the violence in Cyprus.

Two main people -Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots- existing in the island are differing

from each other in many aspects. However, in the wake of the violent history in 1974, new

discourse ‘Cypriotism’, which emerged right after the 1974 Turkish intervention as a leftist

discourse represented both people –Turkish and Greek Cypriots- as undividable parts whole

society. Differently put, Cypriotism constitutes a disjunction with the motherlands’

nationalisms, yet ‘Cypriotist ideology’ also constitutes itself in between Turkish and Greek

nationalisms.

Nationalism is a dynamic ideology that transforms itself depending on the day’s facts.

While nationalism becomes one of the reasons of the violence, Cypriotist ideology also

represents nationalist character. Looking back from 1974, it is possible to argue that

Cypriotism within two societies follows different pathways. In the same vein, while the

rhetoric of Cypriotism, such as ‘Cyprus belongs to its people’ or ‘Cyprus belongs to the

Cypriots’, remain unchanged, the elements of Cypriotist discourse have been changed

according to day’s necessities. These realities force me to claim that Cypriotism represents the

ideology which is antagonist to the motherlands’ nationalisms yet its bi-communal character

has smoothly been eroded. However, in order to make the long story short, the main

hypothesis of this study is that Cypriotism or simply ‘Cypriot’ has different meanings and

different paths of evolvement within Greek and Turkish Cypriot societies.

Chapter I. Literature Review and the Methodology

The literature on Cypriot identity is relatively small and there is generally a lack of bi-

communal approach. For the analysis of respective identities of societies, I benefited largely

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from the studies of Mavratsas (2000) , Peristianis & Papadakis (2006) and Anastasiou (2006)

for Greek Cypriots and for the Turkish Cypriots I benefited from Kızılyürek (2002) , Hasgüler

(2007, 2008), Hamit (2008). Out of the ones that I have benefited there are many other

published articles and books related with the single society level by An (1997), Beratlı (1999),

Trimikliniotis (2003) and Hatay (2008). It is obvious that one of the latest published study on

the Cypriotism by Hasgüler which is called “Cypriot identity: Differentiations between

Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots” (Hasgüler 2008 p.1-43) represents the comparative

analysis of Cypriotism in respective communities.

Instead of re-writing the ideas that already published, I prefer to discuss my hypothesis

through the analysis of the public opinion. For this reason, I decide to analyze newspapers as

they are particularly influential in shaping public opinion. Hence, the sample of this study is

the main Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot newspapers of the last ten years. At this point,

this research on Cypriotism could be seen as the first study on newspaper analysis in both

sides. From Greek Cypriot press I have benefited from the newspapers that are Fileleftheros,

Haravgi, Alithia, Tharos and Simerini. In the same way, from Turkish Cypriot press I have

benefited from Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, and Afrika – Avrupa-, Demokrat Bakış, Güneş and

Volkan.

This thesis divided into seven main parts. First part includes introduction and the

chapters related with the introduction of the hypothesis, literature and the methodology.

Second part includes the theoretical framework on nationalism and identity. Third part

includes the brief historical analysis of Cyprus. Fourth part focuses on the core issue of

nationalism in Cyprus focusing on each community separately. First chapter in the fourth

parts analyzes the rise of nationalism within Orthodox community and further chapters

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includes its further evolvement to the Greek nationalism and then Cypriotism and same

applies for the Turkish Cypriot society. In the sixth part final conclusion includes the main

findings and the evaluation of the working hypothesis. Last part includes wide list of

bibliography.

Part B: Theoretical Framework

In order to have a successful discussion on nationalism and identity issue, elaboration

of the general theories on nationalism is required. This chapter elaborates the main concepts

and ideas from the pioneering modernist intellectuals on nationalism which includes Elie

Kedourie, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.

Elie Kedourie accepts nationalism as a modern phenomenon originating from Europe.

He stresses that “Nationalism pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit

of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of

power in the state, and for the right organization of a society of states.” (Kedourie 1960 pp.1)

He rejects the approach on nationalism which accepts that humanity is naturally

divided into nations, however; he claims that nations are known by certain characteristics

which can be ascertained. Additionally, the strength of the doctrine is perceived to be coming

from national self government. He focuses on the historical roots of nationalism and heavily

criticizes the perspective that defines nationalism only with an emphasis on language and

religion.

Kedourie’s discussion on nationalism is based on the historical background paving the

way for the nationalist ideology. Starting with the conceptual analysis of nation and

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sovereignty, he discusses the historical roots of state traditions and nations in order to

determine the origins of nationalism. While doing this, he discusses self determination with its

philosophical roots and based his thoughts on nationalism through the principle of national

self determination.

The diversity in languages is perceived by many philosophers as the way of forming

the nation, which ought to constitute a state. However, this idea is criticized by Kedourie on

the grounds that “linguistic criterion also makes extremely difficult the orderly functioning of

a society of states.” (Kedourie, 1960 pp.63) Than he suggests “nationalism emphasizes

language as the test of nationalist, because language is an outward sign of a group’s peculiar

identity and a significant means of ensuring its continuity.” (Kedourie, 1960 pp.66)

In the final analysis, Kedourie points out the fact that, what remain in the doctrine is

an affirmation that men have the right to and on their differences from others, be there

differences what they may, fancied or real, important or not, and to make of these differences

their first political principle.

Kedourie ends his analysis with pointing out the fact that, politically, nationalism is

neither left nor right wing doctrine. Left and right concepts arose in the course of struggle

between aristocracy, middle class and working class, and are unintelligible apart from this

particular history. “To nationalists, such aim is national self determination, and the lasting

fulfillment which comes to man when he lives as a member of sovereign nation.” (Kedourie

1960 pp.85)

On the whole, Kedourie believed that nationalism is a doctrine with its historical

reality, and the major determinant of the spread of this doctrine is national self-determination.

Nationalism is a powerful set of ideas, which is to say a complexity of the relations of man,

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society and politics. Nationalist doctrine is the creation, appearance and expression of national

identity. It is a reality coming from combination of reflections of interests of certain groups,

social practices, and industrialism without belonging either to left or right ideas, but at the

same time includes both of them.

In addition to Kedourie, Gellner believes that “nationalism is primarily a political

principle which holds that the political and national units congruent." (Gellner 1983 pp.1)

Gellner indicates that historical origins of nationalism start from the agrarian society.

Transition to the industrial society dissolves the existing structure and creates the motivation

for more egalitarian structure. That is to say, nationalism becomes the tool in order to realize

the industrial society through constituting a homogenized society.

Gellner suggests that “together nations and the states form the idea of nationalism.”

(Gellner 183 pp.3) However, the effect of culture is crucial for understanding nationalist

ideology. At this point, Gellner divides the history of culture into two periods that are agrarian

and industrial periods. The emergence of literacy and of a specialized clerical class or estate

was two important points in agrarian society. Literacy and establishment of standardized

scripts were the first steps towards building the national identity. Industrial society is the only

society ever to live by and rely on sustained and perpetual growth, on an expected and

continuous improvement.

In order to have perpetual growth there is a need of certain roles either optional or

instrumental. In this sense, nationalism is rooted in a certain kind of division of labor, one

which is complex and persistently, cumulatively changing. (Gellner 1983 pp.24)

Additionally, starting with the transition to the industrial society which was marked with

the rise of literacy, the effective use of language gained significant role. Under the

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circumstances of this period, homogenization and equalization of differences between

different sections of the society was the prevalent tendency.

These bring new kind of mobility and a kind of egalitarianism. Agrarian man tolerates

inequalities, because some of them are hallowed by custom. However, the mobile industrial

society has no time for any customs.

Industrial society may by most criteria be the most highly specialized society ever;

but its educational system is unquestionably the least specialized, the most universally

standardized that has ever existed (Gellner 1983 pp.27).

Monopoly of education makes the human knowledge universal and standardized. Its

expansion, in order to bring the social order within the boundaries of the state led by

nationalism, ended up with organized human groups into large and culturally homogeneous

units.

Under these circumstances, with the help of expansion of trade relations, nationalism

diffused from Europe to the rest of the world At this point, it is important to stress that not all

groups was able to make their own culture as a basis of their national identity

For every effective nationalism, there are n potential ones, groups, defined either by

shared culture inherited from the agrarian world or by some other link which could give hope

of establishing a homogeneous industrial community, but which nevertheless do not bother to

struggle, which fail to activate their potential nationalism. (Gellner 1983 pp.44-45)

Taking aforementioned characteristics into account, it should be noted that the strength

and continuity of nationalism has to do with industrial society, which helps the formation of

central education system. Thence, who socializes within the standardized high culture keeps

his place in the new labor division.

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In addition to its social effects, nationalism also represents the political principle.

Nationalism is the theory of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy constitutes itself from

nationalist principle and realizes itself as a state. From this perspective, we can say that

“neither nations nor states exist at all times and in all circumstances. (…) nationalism holds

that, which were destined for each other.” (Gellner 1983 pp.6)

To sum up, Gellner points out the relation between economic development and the

nationalism. When the transition from agrarian life to the industrial life took place, the society

aimed to re-allocate the accumulate capital. At this point, nationalism plays the role for

legitimating the new structure. Furthermore, in order to strengthen the new structure, state

takes the monopoly of education and promotes homogenized high-culture. As such, Gellner

links new institutional structure of the state with perpetual growth of industrial society.

Finally, Benedict Anderson tries to understand national consciousness with

considering the effect of culture and imagination of the society. He defines nation as “it is

imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”

(Anderson 1983 p.5) Than he explains the nation as “delineated as imagined because the

members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, yet in the

minds of each lives the image of their communion.” (Anderson 1983 p.6) According to him

nation is limited because

No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind, and it is limited because the

concept was born in an age in which enlightenment were destroying the legitimacy of the

divinely and it is community because, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal

comradeship. (Anderson 1983 pp.13-15)

Anderson also stresses on the importance the enlightenment that the religion did not

eroded, however; the secular transformation created new way of state understanding which is

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related with the culture. While discussing the cultural roots of national identity, Anderson

indicated two cultural systems which are effective religious community and dynastic realm.

Religious community imagination was also a part of the identity. “One crucial difference was

the older communities’ confidence in the unique sacredness of their languages, and thus their

ideas about admission to membership.” (Anderson, 1983 pp.20) Another difference was

groups in the religious communities which were hierarchical, on the other hand; as Anderson

indicates; modern imagined communities marked with horizontal comradeship.

Imagination of nation was linked with the end of the penetration of empty time. To put

it differently the life-cycle measured by calendar and clock has been based on the

understanding of continuity. “Two forms of imagining flowered in Europe in eighteenth

century: the novel and the newspaper.”(Anderson 1983 pp.30)

The stories in novels embedded in societies and everything that indicated in a novel is a

reflection of a sociological organism, moving calenderically through homogeneous, empty time. This is

a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving

steadily down history. (Anderson 1983 p. 36)

Finally, newspaper serves also for the nation’s imagination. First, the date on the

newspaper provides the essential connection – the steady onward clocking of homogeneous,

empty time. That is to say, as Anderson stresses, the newspaper is the extreme form of the

book, a book sold on every day’s top seller. In this perspective, “reading the newspaper is a

ceremony which replicated simultaneously by thousands or others of whose existence is

confident, yet of whose identity has not the slightest notion.” (Anderson 1983 pp.37-39)

In summary, with the decline of the sacredness of the languages and the emergence of

vernacular printing the bases for national consciousness were laid. “Readers were connected

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through print formed the embryo of nationally imagined community.” (Anderson, 1983 pp.47)

In addition to these developments, progress in print capitalism made it possible for rapidly

growing numbers of people to imagine about them. Nationalism was supported by the

increase in literacy and expanded by the spread of printed newspapers and novels. This chain

paved the origins of national consciousness.

Part C: Brief History of Cyprus

This section aims to provide a general framework on the history of Cyprus. Hence, this

section will provide the necessary information on the history of Cyprus and on the current

political structure in a descriptive way.

Today Cyprus is de facto divided into two ethnic parts. Southern side has been

controlled by Greek Cypriots with 80% of the whole population. Northern side has been

controlled by Turkish Cypriots with 20% of the population. In addition to these two major

groups, there are small minority of Latinos, Marionettes and Armenians in the island.

It is possible to claim that the crucial rupture in the history of Cyprus started with the

Ottomans’ conquest of the island from the Venetians. Until the end of the Ottoman control,

because of the theocratic structure of the island, Muslim community in Cyprus was better off.

However, because of strategic and economic reasons, the island was rented to the British

Empire. With the emergence of the First World War in 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus and

governed it until the establishment of Republic of Cyprus.

In the British era, several anti-colonialist movements were observed. Riots in 1931

ended up with outstanding results. Oppressive measures which are taking by colonialists gave

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way to instigation of nationalism and the anti-colonialist movement. In 1955 EOKA (Εθνική

Οργάνωσις Κυπρίων Αγωνιστών), an armed organization, was established by the Greek

Orthodox Community against British Colonialists and for the ENOSIS.

Muslim Turkish Community accepted this as a threat and, in 1958, TMT (Türk

Mukavemet Teşkilatı) was established against ENOSIS and for TAKSIM- which is a contrary

ideology against Greek nationalism means partition of Cyprus and unification with Turkey

and Greece; that is to say, it is possible to indicate that TAKSIM means double Enosis.

(Kızılyürek 2002 p.132)

In concurrence with aforementioned developments, starting from 1950s, political

tension and violence became significant elements in the island’s history. In 1960, Cyprus

became independent and the Republic of Cyprus was established.

Nonetheless, the mass from both communities did not embrace the new

republic. For Greek Cypriots, the eventual solution for the political tension was

realization of Enosis; and for Turkish Cypriots the ultimate solution was the

partition of the island and its unification with the ‘motherlands’. (Trimikliniotis 2000

p.67)

Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop and President Makarios did not pay attention to

Turkish Cypriots and he pushed for constitutional amendments in 1963. Turkish Cypriots

leadership tried to benefit from it in order to open the way for partition with establishing their

Cyprus Turkish Authority.

In the meantime, from 1967 to 1974 Greece was governed by the colonels. Colonels

controlled the state and aimed to reach μεγάλη ιδέα. For this reason Greek Junta government

helped the establishment of EOKA-β, made a coup for the Makarios and started violence

against the Turkish Cypriot community. Starting from here, Turkey took its right to intervene

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from the guarantee agreement in order to re-establish the impaired structure, and made

operation launched a military operation in Cyprus in 20 July 1974. On the contrary,

interventions ended up as a reason for the justification of invasion.

“From 1974 until today, the number of violent attacks has been very low; many

attempts had been made for settling the political problem, however; all were unsuccessful.”

(International Crisis Group 2006 p.5) In 1983, TRNC was promulgated and none of the

countries, except Turkey, recognized it. In 1994, with the decision of European Court of

Justice, all exports from TRNC were blocked and gave way to economic and social embargo.

This made a big impact on the economic life in the northern part of the island. While Northern

part has been isolated from the world, despite the existing political problem, Republic of

Cyprus became EU member-state in 2002.

Apart from these, in the year of 2001, Northern part of Cyprus faced a big economic

crisis and this heavily affected the Turkish Cypriots. Economic reconstruction after the crisis

also had an impact on the transformation of political choices. Solution of Cyprus issue,

accession to the EU and unification of Cyprus became the first point in political agenda.

In this period, one of the significant developments in the northern part of the island

was the formation of a frontier called ‘This Country is Ours’ that was marked with its

opposition against the motherland and baby land relations and with its struggle for federal

solution to the Cyprus Problem. This transformation represented a milestone in Turkish

Cypriot identity and politics. In 2003, gates on Green line opened and for the first time

Cypriots from both sides had a chance to visit ‘the other side’. In 2004 people of Cyprus

voted for their future in order to establish a federal state. However results show that Cypriot

people don’t have a mutual will for establishing a federation.

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After the results in the referenda, presidential elections in TRNC took place and anti-

solution figure Rauf Raif Denktas was replaced with Mehmetali Talat. Yet, from 2004 until

2008, inter-communal talks have not moved forward. In 2008 Demetris Christofias won the

president's seat in Republic of Cyprus, this gave a new dimension for the inter-communal

relations; and first Peace talk and negotiation took place on 3rd September 2008.

Even though positive steps have taken place starting from 2008, in last parliamentary

elections in TRNC right wing Nationalist Unity Party (UBP) which supports con-federal

rather than federal solution received 44,04% of the votes.

To sum up, starting from the Ottoman legacy and British colonialism until today

Cypriots have never shared the experience of a common will for their country. However

further attempts continuing in order to change the nature of Cyprus problem. In the next

chapters, I will try to identify the evolution of Cypriotism within respective communities and

then I will analyze the Cypriotist discourse within the last decade’s newspapers.

Part D - Cypriotism: Just Identity or New Face of Nationalism?

Starting with the emergence of Greek national consciousness and establishment of

Greek nation state, Greek nationalism influences the Orthodox community in Cyprus. “When

the seeds of nationalism first appear in Cyprus, Cyprus Muslims start to constitute their

national identity as a counter nationalism.”(Kızılyürek 2002 p.147) On the other hand

Cypriotism as a political concept or as an ideology extensively starts to occupy political arena

after the events of 1974.

In this part I will try to emphasize the emergence of Cypriotism and its further

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evolution. In order to have a well structured discussion, I will divide this part into two

chapters. First chapter includes the discussions about the evolution of Cypriotism as an

ideology within the Greek Cypriot community and I will try to prove my hypothesis that

Cypriotism emerges as a political ideology which is in between Greek and Turkish

nationalism with a deeper analysis of newspapers. Second chapter will include a similar

discussion for the Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriot community.

Chapter I: Faces of Nationalism within Greek Cypriot Society

i. The Rise of Greek Nationalism within Orthodox Community

Starting with the Ottoman’s conquest of Cyprus in 1571, “Cyprus Orthodox Church

got the title of ethnarch and benefited it effectively in order to gain economic and political

power.” (Kızılyürek 2002 pp.73) After the establishment of the Greek state, the Greek

nationalism expanded and aimed to unify all the Greek Orthodox community around the

motherland.

Starting from 1821, the Greek state’s Megali Idea doctrine was getting popularized

within the Orthodox Community of Cyprus. “However in this time period, there was no

strong Enosis movement recorded. (…) In the meantime stiffen Orthodox middle class

improve their position in the governance and trade.” (Katsiaonis 1996 p.81)

Another motivation behind the rise of Greek national consciousness within Greek

Cypriots was the continuous wars which took place between Greece and the Ottoman Empire.

“Starting from the Crete Uprising in 1896, Crete Solidarity Committee and ‘Agabi tu Lau’

organizations were established in Cyprus by the Greek nationalists.” (Kızılyürek 2003 p.78)

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Those two organizations aimed to awaken the Greek Nationalism within the Orthodox society

in Cyprus.Development of print capitalism and renovation of the education in the British colonial

rule marks as another source for the Greek nationalist movement within the Orthodox

community of Cyprus. “In the late 19th and early 20th century a number of primary schools

doubles and the independent high schools establishes by the Orthodox community.”(State

Planning Organization Datasheets 2009) One of the tools to reach Megali Idea becomes the

mobilization of education. “Pankiprian Gymnasium receives supports from the Greek

Monarchy and courses include necessary information in order to educate supporters for

Megali Idea.” (Katsiaonis 1996 p.84) As the level of education increased print media also

developed. “In the beginning of 20th century seven Greek language newspapers exists and the

main themes originate from the Greek Nationalism.” (Kızılyürek 1996 p.79)

From the early 20th century towards the 1960s which is the end of the British colonial

rule, Greek nationalism and Enosis get much tense and become the core political issue within

Greek Orthodox community. Earlier Greek state defines “liberation of Exo-Hellenes” as

primary foreign policy goal, however after the Minor Asia Catastrophe this policy changed as

keeping Greek state’s interests. (Mavratsas 2000 p.63) This becomes another turning point for

the Greek Orthodox community in Cyprus which paves the way for Cypriotist ideology.

ii. Emergence of Cypriotism within Greek Cypriot Society

Turkish intervention to Cyprus represents the touchstone in politics. After the

intervention, Greek Cypriots’ attitude toward Turkish Cypriots had tremendous change.

“Greek Cypriots blame coup d’état in Greece as one of the sources of all those violence. For

the Greek Cypriots ‘motherland’ behave themselves as a ‘stepmother’.”(Kızılyürek 1996

p.134) This belief leads the replacement of Greek nationalism with the ideology of

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Cypriotism.

“Cypriotism ideology constitutes itself through the independent and sovereign state of

Cyprus which also objects to Greek nationalism.” (Mavratsas 2000 p.57) In this period,

Enosis supporters and fanatic Enosis rhetoric accepted as a cause of the devastating effects of

1974 intervention. Most of the activities which relates with Enosis redefined.

In addition to these, after 1974 celebrations takes place on the anniversaries on the

establishment day of the Republic or state symbols such as the flag of Cyprus Republic

becomes more common in public places. After all, failure in Enosis project strengthens the

Cyprus Republic with the strong citizen’s support. (Mavratsas 2002 p.63)

The enemy image before the Turkish intervention for Greek Cypriots was anyone who

prevents and/or against Enosis. However after the intervention this enemy image replaces the

enemy as “Turkey and chauvinists leaders within the Turkish Cypriot community who

prevents the Cypriots to live together.” (AKEL 1975 p.140) Left wing political party AKEL,

which previously supported Enosis, put one step forward on Cypriotist ideology as:

Cypriots, Greeks or Turks, lets come together and wipe all the passions and hatred.

Let’s come together in order to remove all foreign troops in our island. Let’s form a bi-zonal

federation, with a strong central government and bring peace to our island. (…) Let’s re-

establish democracy, welfare and happiness for all Cypriot brothers. (Akel 1975 p.141)

From this perspective one might say Cypriotism for Greek Cypriots starts to constitute

itself as an ideology that is anything but not Greece and Greek Nationalism. Starting with

1974, Cypriotism gets more popular without strong definition. “Mainly Cypriotism

understood as independent statehood of Cyprus identified by Cypriot identity without

referring to the motherlands.” (Mavratsas 2000 p.61) In addition to this, Cypriotism rejects

the idea that the island is the continuation of Greece or Turkey.

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New Cyprus Association, which was an effective organization established by liberal

intellectuals, improves Cypriotism ideology. According to the New Cyprus Association:

“Individual be as feel and as they are and in Cyprus people can live as Hellenic, Turk,

Marionette or Armenian.” (New Cyprus Association 1980 p.13) After this, they add the fact

that “As Hellene’s of Cyprus we might have similar cultural elements with Greece. However,

we do not have similar political elements and the same vision. As Cypriots, we have our own

constitution and independent foreign policy” (New Cyprus Association 1980 p.13)

In Cyprus, nationalism denotes the right and left division. These two groups have the

main division according to their nationalist lines coming from Greek and Cypriot

nationalisms. On the one hand, Cypriotism criticizes the ‘Turkish occupation’ as a threat to

Cypriots. On the other hand, it supports the federation with Turkish Cypriots. Cypriotism

represents nationalist discourse which has its imagined community; however it is inconsistent

with the imagined land.

Erosion of bi-communal character of Cypriotism and its transformation to the Greek

Cypriot centric ‘Cypriotism’ starts from 1980’s government change in Greece. After the

elections in Greece, Papandreou government has populist and nationalist rhetoric. For the

Greek Cypriot society Greece returns back to its real position from being stepmother to the

mother. Papandreou also aims to improve the ties of trust between Greeks and Greek

Cypriots.

New understanding paves the way for Greece and Cyprus approachment in order to

stand against possible threats coming from Turkey. Joint defense doctrine comes into

existence in this period. Doctrine not only satisfies the fears, but it also plays a crucial role for

strengthening the Greek centric character in Cypriotism.

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A decade after Papandreou’s populist policies, Kostas Simitis take the control of the

governance in Greece. “It is obvious that Simitis became the first Greek prime minister to

forge a clearly post nationalist Greek government and foreign policy.” (Anastasiou 2008 p11)

In the mid 1990’s, Kostas Simitis put the Greek politics on the track of Europeanization.

“Modernist rhetoric and heavy critics to the populist policies of Papandreou makes Cypriots

to revise their stance toward Greece.” (Anastasiou 2008 p.15) Pragmatic perspective of

Simitis toward Turkey reflects for the Greek Cypriots as feeling of selling Cyprus down to the

river. From this point, Cyprus centric Greek Nationalism re-shapes and Cypriotism becomes

dominant character.

3- Deeper Analysis of Cypriotism: Disjunction to Greek Nationalism

Cypriotism within Greek Cypriot community has different phases. From 1974 to early

1980’s it was the era of the emergence of Cyprus nationalism. It has bi-communal character

and strong disjunction with Greece. Second phase covers the next decade starting from early

1980’s. In this era, bi-communal character erodes, evolves into more Greek-Cypriot centric

Cypriotism that is another facet of Greek nationalism which signifies the return of

motherland. The next phase from the early 1990’s until 2004 referenda Cypriotism within

Greek Cypriot society becomes the nationalism which is more Greek Cypriot oriented, aware

of Turkish Cypriots however practically it does not include them and has strong antagonism

toward Greek politics. The last phase of Cypriotism emerges after the results of the Annan

Plan referenda. Starting from 2004 with the membership of the Cyprus Republic into EU,

Cypriotism transforms into full Greek Cypriot centered ideology. Practically Cyprus centric

22

Greek nationalism and Cypriotism intermingle with each other. After the crisis with the

Annan Plan, Cypriotism represents the ideology of state focusing on possible threats toward

the integrity of Cyprus Republic.

In this part I will try to figure out the last two phases of Cypriotism. From this

perspective, this section is based on analyses of the print media for the last decade. I will

make a deeper analysis and try to figure out the effects of the issues in the last decade and

represent the conjunctions and disjunctions of Cypriotism versus Greek nationalism regarding

to the reflections on the press.

Starting from late 1990s, the end of the populist era in Greek politics, Kostas Simitis

chooses a new path for the Greek state. This period signifies the milestone in Greek politic

experience toward Europeanization. For example, the Cyprus issue becomes foreign policy

matter rather than a national issue and Greek approach for the Cyprus problem become more

pragmatic. In the meantime, European Union perspective makes Greece adopt policies

empowering good neighborhood relations with Turkey.

Greece has no interest in isolating its great neighbor or in excluding from the

European political structures. On the contrary, Greece has only to gain from the

Europeanization of Turkish society and the dissemination and further strengthening of

European civil values inside Turkey. A stable, democratic and peaceful Turkey with a market

double the size of that of all the other Balkan countries combined and with strong cultural ties

to Greece would be the best partner for the joint construction of the new European, Balkan

and Near Eastern order.(Keridis 2001 p.14)

Main issues in Cyprus and Greece relations appear around the Joint Defense Doctrine.

It is certain that ‘Joint Defense Doctrine’ means much more than a military agreement. In the

Greek Cypriots eyes, after Greece play the role of ‘stepmother’ within the failure in Enosis,

the Joint Defense Doctrine hallmarks another approach for keeping the Hellenism in Cyprus.

23

After all joint defense doctrine fails to satisfy the expectations. One of the crucial turning

points in this doctrine was the S-300 crisis.

Within Joint Defense Doctrine, the Republic of Cyprus attempts to get Russian S300

missiles. S300 known as one of the long range scouts which threatens the Turkish air raid

protection. This threat make Turkey to react on this issue, cooperating with USA they do not

let Russian missiles to threat the NATO land. Pressures coming both from Turkey and USA

make Greece to make a tactical change and settle the missiles to Crete.

After Greece decided to move back and settle the missiles in Crete most of the Greek

Cypriots accepted it as Greek inevitability against Turkey. They assume Greece as not

capable to deal with the honor of Hellenism.

Klerides and Greece governance behaves in a rush. Canceling the S300 missiles

project is a decision taking by only Greece. All responsibility is because of weak governance

of PASOK against Turkey and unfaithful politicians who do not care about the unity of

Hellenism. Cyprus as the furthest castle of Hellenism will stay solid. (Simerini 02 January

1999)

While the right wing newspaper Simerini announces the S300 issue, as the issue of

unfaithfulness of Greek politicians; in the same column Archbishop Hrisostomos react such as

“Protecting the invader -Turkey- and letting them to decide for the future of island.

Everybody should unite against the traitors who give such a chance.” (Simerini 2

January1999)

On the other hand, ideological brotherhood between PASOK and EDEK had the first

shock after the decision. Yannakis Omiru, minister of defense in those years announces his

reaction after this decision as “Greece has the biggest role in the cancellation of S300

missiles. This decision damages the Cypriots trust to Greece.” (Fileftheros 03 January 1999)

24

It is certain that reflection of this crisis make bigger shock in the right wing. Far right

wing newspaper Mahi announce it as an embarrassing result and continues as “diving

backward to the emptiness makes re-think about the reality and honor of Hellenism. Both of

them turn to ‘rag’. Enemy laughing on us and Greece supports them. This is the worst thing

ever happened.” (Mahi 5 January 1999)

In the same way, leader of Anti Occupation Movement in Cyprus (PAK) Aris

Hadjipanayotu makes another announcement on this issue:

Greek Prime Minister is responsible from the S300 crisis. We are feeling ourselves

as sold out. We want them to be respectful for their debt. I believe that Cyprus and Greece

relations should not have any problem but it’s a fact that there is no sustainable strategy on

this issue. We have to look for the roots of the mistakes. (Fileleftheros 11 January 1999)

In the same way, education minister of Cyprus Republic Oronios Yoannides expressed

his idea on this issue as:

“Education is much more important than the defense. Greek Cypriots sustain their

culture in Cyprus up to three thousand years. It is the glory of education. We have the same

culture and education with Greece for centuries. Now Greece decides to establish ‘Peace’.

But they should not forget that they desire ‘peace’ and Cypriots ‘desire’ liberalization.”

(Simerini 29 January 1999)

A few months after S300 crisis, Greece and Cyprus face with another political

inconsistency. In this case, Greece assisted Turkey in order to capture Abdullah Öcalan who

is the leader of the Communist Party of Kurdistan (PKK). Turkish intelligence officials

cooperated with Greece in order to find Öcalan. The successful operation lets Turkey to

become stronger in his fight against terrorism on the other hand it helped Greece and Turkey

relations to improve; however, the Cyprus Republic reacts on this issue. After this event,

youth branches of AKEL, DIKKO, DISY, EDEK and ONED makes a joint press release

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pointing out that they are sad because of the assistance of Greek intelligence. (Fileleftheros

Alithia Mahi Haravgi 5 March 1999)

In 1999 December, Greece canceled its veto to Turkey for the European Union

candidacy. Alithia said that the Helsinki summit's decision opened a new chapter in Greek-

Turkish relations which would affect the Cyprus peace efforts.

Greece's strategy for improving relations with Turkey was put on firm foundations

and opening up new prospects. Athens was determined to pursue this strategy further and

Prime Minister Kostas Simitis was hoping to be the first Prime Minister of an EU member-

country to visit Turkey after the Helsinki summit (Alithia, 14 December1999)

Above mentioned step of Greece landmarks the end of a period in Turkish-Greek

relations. At the same time Fileleftheros indicates this transformation as

Athens had abandoned the old thinking, which dictated that any improvement in

Greek-Turkish relations depended on the situation in Cyprus. Simitis' strategists had decided

that relations with Turkey should improve first, because this would have a positive effect on

the Cyprus issue. (Fileleftheros 14 December 1999)

With the steps toward Europeanization of Greek foreign policy and the policy of

establishing peaceful relations with Turkey in order to solve Cyprus problem, makes Cypriots

face the fear of staying alone. Starting from Simitis and Papandreou –not as his father- the

foreign policy of Greece take the path of Europeanization. Changing foreign policy of Greece

sentimentally affects Cypriots. The period from 1999 to 2004 systematically increases the

antagonism toward Greece.

For example, during a meeting of EOKA veterans, the minister of education and

culture Uranios Yoannides points out the EOKA struggle against British colonialism and said

“Now I am feeling that we are again living the days of EOKA struggle. We are again alone in

a critical phase of our country.” (Simerini 20 March 2000) In the same direction Alithia

26

announces the dissatisfaction as “Today the increasing pressure coming from Turkey makes

Greece to stick in the corner. As Cypriots, we have to come together, empower the rights of

Hellenism in Cyprus and bring the end of occupation to continue our life with honor.” (Alithia

19 June 2000) In the same way Fileleftheros criticizes the Greek foreign policy.

“Papandreou’s theory for Turkish friendship in order to solve Cyprus problem is not efficient

at all. They put Hellenism into a cage. Papandreou has to follow the policy that his father

followed previously.” (Fileleftheros 27 January 2001) Last but not least, Simerini marks the

dissatisfaction of Papandreou visit to Turkey and announces it with the headline ‘Cyprus is

without support’ and continue as “Greek government’s policy makes Cyprus alone and

without support” (Simerini 8 April 2001) to its readers.

Not only Greece’s peaceful relations with Turkey affect Greek Cypriots sentimentally.

Every attempt which de-nationalizes Greek foreign policy causes reaction. For example, 11

September is a touchstone for the re-organization of international relations. Greek foreign

policy also needs to restructuring. After the meetings of Greek Foreign Relations and Defense

Council the decision indicates that the number one enemy of the nation as ‘terrorism’. After

this decision major Greek Cypriot press complains about Greece, that they do not include

‘Turkish threat’ to the list. “Joint Defense Doctrine designed to cope with the Turkish threat.

If it is not the primary enemy, than it means Joint Defense Doctrine is not important as it was

before.” (Haravgi, Simerini, Fileleftheros 22 September 2001)

Another complaint on Greece about its relations with Turkey comes up from the

DIKO parliament Covalas. Covalas’s interview in Haravgi includes the idea of failure in the

possible solution.

Simitis’s and Papandreou’s attempts to establish peaceful relations with Turkey do not help

27

for the justice and real solution. Certainly it will not serve for prevent the national interests and rights.

Greek rapprochement toward Turkey just creates the duality in Greece and Cyprus relations. (Haravgi

30 March 2002)

In addition to this pragmatic Greek approach on the relations with Turkey, Cypriot

elites openly talk about their dissatisfaction on the path of the Greek foreign policy. With the

announcement of Annan plan in 2002 and the period afterward until the year 2004 to the

Annan Plan referenda, most of the Greek political elites1 favor the plan. As it is discussed

until here, starting from 1999 the relations start to get tense. Announcement of Annan Plan

and afterward antagonism between the Cyprus Republic and Greece reach to the peak. The

fact is Greece interests steps on the finalization of the Cyprus Problem. However for Cypriots,

‘saving the Cypriotism’ becomes more important. For the Cypriot politic elites in the long

run, the amount of settlers that going to stay in the island and the existence of Turkish army

might cause the end of Cypriots and they find Greece careless about their fears.

Annan’s Plan for comprehensive settlement of Cyprus problem becomes the top topic

for long time in Cyprus politics. President of Greece, Stephanopoulos announces his idea

about the plan as “It has some absences for certain issues. I believe certain fears could be

satisfied by small changes. But it is important for the Cypriot people and they have to keep in

mind that rejection of this plan will cause painful results.” (Haravgi 02.12.2002) While Greek

president put his support also the political elites share the same view. Major political parties

in Greece accepts Annan Plan’s first version as a good base for the settlement of issue.2

Political tension between Greece and Cyprus increased with Greek political elites’

support to the Annan plan and with Papandreou’s announcement about the Greek support to

1 All political parties excluding far left KKE and far right LAOS supported the plan. New Democracy acted

natural about the plan. Rest of the political parties openly put their support for the Annan Plan.

2 According to the survey made by the Greek newspaper Kathimerini 70% of SYN, 67.8% of PASOK, 52.5% of

New Democracy, 45,1% of KKE accept this plan as a good base for the settlement of Cyprus problem.

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Turkey for the date in order to start the accession negotiations to European Union in

Copenhagen Summit. The day after Papandreou’s announcement, “Haravgi Newspaper marks

imbalances between Athens and Nicosia and criticizes the Papandreou.” (Haravgi 7 December

2002). Similarly, Fileleftheros warns Greek Prime Minister: “Simitis have to keep in mind the

possibility of encountering with the Cypriots if he tries to impose solution based on Annan

plan.” (Fileleftheros 24 December 2002) Papadopoulos also complains about Papandreou:

According to the interview in Ta NEA ministry of exterior in Cyprus and Greece has

completely different perspectives on settlement of Cyprus Problem. Deep differences exist

between Papadopoulos and Papandreou. While Papandreou believes Annan Plan as most

realistic chance for the settlement of the issue, Papadopoulos talks about defending the

furthest castle of Hellenism against Turkish imperialism without help of Hellenes in Greece.

(Alithia 1 March 2003)

Days approaching to the Annan Plan voting, politics represents the arena that Greece

and Cyprus clashes. Before the national elections in Greece, before New Democracy’s victory

the discussion on Cyprus, the party announces “Cyprus problem is considerably far and much

less important than Greek national issues. Geographically, it is far from Greece and it is one

of the issues for the ministry of foreign relations.” For this announcement socialist EDEK’s

President Lissaridis reacts as “I believe it won’t be the policy of Greece towards Cyprus in

case of New Democracy victory. Nobody could reject the 3000 year Hellenic past of

Cypriots.” (Alithia 11 January 2004)

Up coming days to the Annan Plan’s referenda Greece starts for the decisive steps to

convince Cypriots to approve the plan. Alithia announces it as “Greece is trying to prevent the

Cypriots possible mistake to say ‘No’ for the plan. Both the government and opposition

(excluding KKE) built a consensus on a joint action group in order to visit Cyprus.” (Alithia

05 April 2004) In the same time Paphos Metropolite Hrisostomos make announcement to the

29

Fileleftheros about the joint action group. “If you are coming in order to support the idea of

people of Cyprus you are welcome, but if you are planning to cheat Cypriots please do not

come.” (Fileleftheros 6 August 2004)

With the dynamics starting from 1999 until the 2004 referenda,, Cypriotism becomes

as an ideology which represents Greek Cypriot needs and interests rather than bi-communal

ones. Before the strong rejection of Annan Plan, Cyprus Republic President Papadopoulos

talks about his position as:

Me as the President of Republic, take this position with the votes of Cypriots. People

make me president of an independent sovereign state. Outsiders are shouting at me when I

said I am against Annan Plan. People make me the leader of an independent republic, I

would not make such a sin to reduce it position as a ‘constituent state’. (Kıbrıs 22 April 2004)

Right after the rejection of the referenda, Papadopoulos makes his speech about the

results. While there was a clear disjunction with Greece, additionally, it is clear that he

doesn’t mean Turkish Cypriots when he speaks about Cypriots’ interests.

The people of Cyprus, having full and objective information, faithful to their

democratic traditions, freely exercised their right. Interventions aimed at influencing the

outcome of the referendum did not originate from within Cyprus, but from abroad through

statements calculated at instigating sentiments of fear, insecurity and uncertainty among the

voters. It was also sad to see Greece opposing to the Cypriots will. I want to underline with

emphasis that the non acceptance of the Annan plan is not the end of the road. There will be a

continuation. There will necessarily be new prospects and new possibilities. Everybody

should know, however, that when we say yes it will be for Cypriots true interests. (Haravgi 25

April 2004)

Annan Plan and the results of referenda mark the new dimension of Cypriotism within

the Greek Cypriots. The strong rejection of the Annan Plan represents for the leaders as

keeping the state alive and showing the strength of Cypriots against all outsiders. After the

mess in the Annan Plan, Papadopoulos answers the Turkish Cypriot leadership

30

People construct the history. People’s determination in the rejection of Annan Plan

makes Cyprus issue into the new way. The problem can not be solved with communicating

only the Turkish Cypriot leadership because Republic of Cyprus leadership represents all

Cypriots. (Fileleftheros 25 December 2005)

Rejection of the Annan Plan supports the idea within Greek Cypriots that the people

stand against the external threat that will bring the end of Cyprus Republic. Opposing results

in the referenda makes Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot societies to alienate from each

other. For the Greek Cypriots ‘No’ in the referenda means defending the Cypriotism, on the

other hand; for Turkish Cypriots ‘Yes’ means the same thing.

In this era, politically, Cypriotism within the Greek Cypriot society again reaches its

top level. While Greek Cypriot, Cypriotists accepts themselves as victorious about the result

in the referenda, on the other hand; this paves the way for the Cypriotism as an ideology

which represents only Greek Cypriot society. From now on, every step from Turkish Cypriots

for their rights for their society and the positive attitudes from major European countries

toward Turkish Cypriots face with big reaction from Greek Cypriot leadership.

Both the left and right wing in Greek Cypriot society perceives every attempt for the

end of isolations for Turkish Cypriot society as partitionist desire of Turkey against unity of

Cyprus Republic. While leftist newspaper Haravgi explains attempts to end the isolations as:

Turkish side creates and still continues the myth of isolations. (…) Direct trade with

the occupied area will not bring development for the Turkish Cypriot society. Contrary

dispositions of Cyprus Republic to support Turkish Cypriots will promote the target of

unification. This target has more priority than exalting the ‘fake state’. Turkish Cypriot

leadership has to keep in mind the fact that Cyprus Republic represents all Cypriots.

(Haravgi 29 May 2007)

In the same way, right wing Simerini reacts for Ban Ki Moon’s report on Cyprus.

According to the columnist Yannos Haralambidis, Moon’s embracement of the isolations on

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the Turkish Cypriot society represents his attitude toward the ‘Taiwainisation’ process.

Ban Ki Moon indicates isolations in his report in order to glorify the presence of the

‘fake state’. In addition to this he is trying to change the fundamentals in order to solve the

Cyprus issue. From now on occupied area becomes ‘Turkish Cypriot’ state. He hides the

essence of the problem. The reason of isolations originates from the illegality and invaders.

As Annan did, Moon also cooperates with Attila and Turkish Cypriot leadership joins the

game with Turkish side. Isolations issue does not serve for the unification. Isolations issue

does not serve for the Cypriots. (Simerini 11 June 2007)

The post-referenda period in Cypriotism represents the continuous antagonism within

the Cypriot societies. The Greek Cypriots keep an antagonist approach to the Turkish Cypriot

leadership in order to prevent the possible ‘Taiwanisation’ of Northern part of the island.

Attempts from the European Union for improving Turkish Cypriots’ conditions receives

blockage from the Cyprus Republic leadership which increases the polarization.

From this point until the election of Christofias as president of Cyprus Republic

antagonism within the societies increased. When Christofias is elected as president, a new era

for the Cypriotist discourse comes into existence. While leaders begin on 3rd April 2008 for

the bi-communal talks, this obviously shows the existence of different approaches within

Cypriotist discourses in each respective society. While Christofias intends ‘One Cypriot

people divided into two communities’, he is unable to find correspondence from the Turkish

Cypriot leadership.

“A solution based on a bizonal, bicommunal federation was a major concession

made by President Makarios in 1977, and due credit should be given to this concession (…)

Greek Cypriot side has exhausted its limits and can not go any further. Neither confederation,

nor a new partnership of two states through virgin birth can be accepted. The federal solution

will be a partnership of the two communities. (…)As the leaders of the societies, we have to

unify the people of Cyprus we have to keep in mind that there is one and only Cypriot

people.” (Haravgi 2008)

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To sum up, the evolution of the Cypriotist discourse reaches to the point which is not

contrary to Turkish Cypriots; however, clearly it is talking about the Greek Cypriot’s needs

and interests. Obviously Cypriotism represents the ideology which is antagonist to Greek

nationalism however, by the time; its bi-communal character erodes. It is clear that as all other

nationalist ideologies Cypriotism also has many facets, however throughout the time Greek

centric Cypriotism becomes the dominant character. From these points, several devastations

mentioned previously constitute the new Cypriotism. After all Cypriotism within the Greek

Cypriot society, represents keeping the status quo through supporting the integrity of state of

Cyprus.

Chapter 2: Faces of Nationalism within Turkish Cypriot Society

i. Adoption of Turkish Identity as Counter Nationalism

Starting from 1571, Cyprus became a province of empire which had both Christian

and Muslim communities. In the early 17th century, agriculture was the main economic

activity within the island. By the end of Ottoman sovereignty in Cyprus, traditional society

was experienced by the phases of dissolution. When Britain acquired the governance of

Cyprus, the pace of modernization increased. Capitalist class and tradesman became stronger.

In this case, Muslim ‘ruling people’ tried to cooperate with Britain, in order to keep their

exclusive position.

In the early 20th century for the Turkish nationalists; ‘Jeune-Turks,’ Cyprus became

the place to hide, from the Sultan Abdulhamid II. There were influences from the Young

33

Turks. The threats coming from Enosis, demanded Greek Cypriots to make Muslim Cypriots

feel, the Turkish nationalist consciousness. In the meantime “some of the newspapers

transformed themselves from the Ottoman ideas to Turkish Nationalism.” (Beratlı 1999

p.100)

The incomplete identification process, within the Muslim Cypriot community,

encouraged them to search for pragmatic solutions, to deal with their problems related with

governance. “In this era Muslim Cypriots turned to Britain against Greek threats, which made

Orthodox Cypriots become antagonists towards Britain.” (Berkes 1997 p.27)

Intellectuals, who were influenced by Young Turks, established an influential group,

which was supporter of Atatürk and Kemalist thought. Against the Greek nationalism and

Enosis rally, Muslim Cypriots internalized the Turkish Nationalist thoughts. Starting from

here toward the mid 1930s, Kemalist Cypriots organized the first ‘National Congress’ and ask

for reforms which took place in Turkey such as the reforms in alphabet, handcrafts and

education.

The wave of Turkish Nationalism also represents the pragmatic approach within the

Turkish Cypriots. “Necati Bey was the first representative who broke the British – Muslim

cooperation and talked about the Turkish community’s needs and interests.” (Kızılyürek, 2005

p.218)

Necati Bey was so reluctant when he voted in the same way with the Greeks of

Cyprus and he broke the British – Turkish cooperation. With the Turkish loyalty, Britain

easily controls the Greek Cypriots. This is not possible any more. (…) From now on the

constitution depends on worthless man Necati Bey. (CO67/238/14.f.143441 Government

House 1931)

“Cyprus cannot be Greek was the belief of the youth at my age. In this era we were

34

proud of our Turkish blood. Against Enosis and being threatened by the Greeks, it was our

only armor to protect ourselves.” (Denktaş 2000 p.138) This proves the fact that Turkish

nationalist consciousness within Turkish Cypriots, comes into existence, as a result of Greek

Nationalism. “They were stating ‘We can die for enosis’ and we would die in order to prevent

Enosis. We all knew that, one day if Enosis came into existence, we would all be dead.”

(Denktaş 2000 p.139)

In this era, Britain supports counter nationalism of Turkish Cypriots, against the rising

Enosis demands of Greek Cypriots, in order to keep its strong position. Associations like

Cyprus is Turkish, Cyprus Cultural Association, and Defending Cyprus Association, actively

work in order to put the issue; of Turkish political agenda forward. In the mid 1950s, Turkish

foreign policy had changed its attitude towards Cyprus. From now on; the “Cyprus issue does

not represent, only the claim of hundreds of thousands of Turkish Cypriots, it is the claim

which directly influences, the security of the Turkish state.” (Bora 1995 p.75)

Starting from mid 1950s, Turkish nationalism in Cyprus and the idea of Taksim

reaches to the peak level. Nationalists started the campaigns such as ‘From Turk to Turk’

which aims to promote trade relations within Turkish Cypriot community, ‘People speak

Turkish’ which aims to make every Muslim Cypriot communicate the Turkish language,

changing the names of the villages into Turkish names etc…(Hasgüler 2000 p.34)

The comment of Denktaş, for the Declaration of the Cyprus Republic, in 1960 was;

“There is no Cypriot nation. You cannot create a nation with a constituting a state. The one

and only Cypriots might be donkeys in Karpasia.” (Kızılyürek 1999 p.145)

Starting with the ethnic clashes from 1963 to 1974, Denktaş had total support from

Turkey. “Victory in Turkish intervention, makes Turkish Cypriots become loyal to Turkey.

Turkish soldiers became known as the heroes. Having marriages with Turkish soldiers

35

became something to feel proud of.” (Hasgüler 2008 p.78)

In the meantime, Denktaş was following populist rhetoric, on the issues relating with

land and sovereignty. Right after the intervention establishment, the Cyprus Turkish

Federative State, was representing Turkish Cypriots, and giving signals for the future re-

unification of the island. The establishment of the Cyprus Turkish Federative State and the

further announcements of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983, were further steps

forward, for the partition and Turkification of the island, and establishing Denktaş’s complete

power over the society.

ii. Evolution of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots

Turkish Cypriot official history marks 1974 as the liberation of Turkish Cypriots from

their compatriots’ atrocities. “While Turkish Nationalism was at its peak level, anything

related with Turkey became a kind of religion within Turkish Cypriots.” (Killoran 1998

p.167) Starting from the early 1980's, Cypriotism became more widely expressed within the

society; mostly within the leftists. This ideology constitutes itself from the point as the

disjunction to the Turkish Nationalism. Even though there are many reasons, behind this

contrariness with the current social and economic structure, one must indicate, two of the

effective motivations behind the rise of Cypriotism.

The first reason starts with; the population exchange of Turkish Cypriots, from

Southern enclaves to the North. All peasant societies living on the Turkish Cypriots land,

owned the most precious property. When they transferred to the North, most of the

individuals felt vulnerable, because of the unfair re-distribution of wealth. This paved the way

for the opposition, toward Turkish Cypriot leadership and especially Rauf Raif Denktaş who

36

held the major power in his own hand.

Another motivation comes up with the population transfer from Turkey. When the

partition of the island takes place, people were required, who could work the lands and

factories, left behind by fleeing Greek Cypriots. There were initially no protests, when Turkey

and the Turkish-Cypriot administration, entered into an agreement to facilitate the migration,

of several thousands of people from rural Turkey. Immigrants, who were part of this policy,

received empty Greek-Cypriot properties and citizenship, in the Turkish Cypriot ‘state’

almost upon arrival. This facilitated migration, ended by the late 1970s. (Hatay 2008

p.150)

The population transfer summarized above, indicates that Turkish Cypriots identified,

‘other Turks’ having different values, compared to what they have. “Most of the immigrants

were from rural areas, lack of education. In addition to this dressing of immigrants, it didn’t

fit both with Kemalist principles and Turkish Cypriots’ style.” (Hatay 2008 p.151)

In addition to this, the social and cultural differences between the Turkish immigrants

from Anatolia, versus Turkish Cypriots, resulted in the Turkish Cypriot society becoming

aware of the fact that, they did not want to belong to the imagined Turkish peoples’ category.

Just after a few years of the population transfer, the previous Turkish Cypriot leader

Dr. Fazıl Küçük criticizes the Turkish immigrants as such:

Thus an ‘Eastern sultanate’ has been established in many villages. (…) The earlier

[mainland Turks,] those who have such bad manners and little civilization that they would

even spit in the face of the policeman on duty are sent back to their villages, the earlier they

could reach the freedom they desire, and Cypriot Turks and the people who settled on the

island could live in peace. Those coming from the western provinces [of Turkey] are as

unhappy as we are. (Halkın Sesi Newspaper 1978)

While the old leader was complaining about the Turkish immigrants and Turkey, new

leader Denktaş represents hard line Turkish Nationalism. Contrary, the opposition was

37

gathering under the umbrella of Cypriotism in this era. However, opposition to Denktaş and

Turkey’s assimilationist policies toward Turkish Cypriots, constitute the main rhetoric of the

Cypriotist discourse within Turkish Cypriot society.

As the times went on, Turkish nationalist rhetoric became emptier, with the political

and economic defeats. Asymmetric relations with Turkey affected Turkish Cypriots

sentimentally. This made Cypriotism an ideology, in order to constitute Turkish Cypriots’

within the given territory. In addition to this structural long-run of unemployment, existing

economic isolations and economic downturns in Turkey, and its high cost for the Turkish

Cypriot society, strengthened the Cypriotist discourse.

To sum it up, Cypriotist discourse has facets, within Turkish Cypriot society and

occasionally, its dominant character changes. In case of an attempt to constitute the political

will, rally takes place against Turkey and Turkish nationalist. When it goes beyond the further

imagination on state-building with all Cypriots, Cypriotist discourse within Turkish Cypriot

society constitutes the imagined political community limited with Turkish Cypriots. The next

section will include the Turkish Cypriot press analysis, in order to show the fact that the

evolution of Cypriotist discourse within Turkish Cypriot society constitutes itself, as the

disjunction to the Turkish nationalism.

iii. Deeper Analysis of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriot

Society

The struggle between left and right wing in Turkish Cypriot politics is mainly based

on the opposition between Cypriotists and Nationalists. It is possible to claim that Cypriotist

discourse is getting more popular between Turkish Cypriots, within the last decade. Fears of

38

assimilation within Turkish Cypriots and economic downturn with the banking crisis -starting

from Turkey spreading to North Cyprus economy- made Turkish Cypriots become critical

toward Turkey. On the other hand, increasing political tension caused more suppression by

President Denktaş and strengthened the Cypriotist discourse.

1999 marks the Cypriotists will, to determine their future, demanding first of all

provision of balanced relations with Turkey. In this era, the secretary general of Republican

Turkish Party, Ferdi Sabit Soyer, openly criticizes the situation as such:

There is an unhealthy economic relation with Turkey and Turkish Republic of

Northern Cyprus. We have to discuss the trade relations seriously. This is not like the normal

relations of two states; it’s more likely a colonial relation. (Kıbrıs 1 April 1999)

Similar to asymmetric relations with Turkey, the issue of Turkish migrants, increased

tension between nationalists and the opposition. Obviously, disjunction with the attitude of

Turkish state on Cyprus increases the attachment on Cypriot identity.

TRNC and Turkey signed another protocol related with import and export relations.

From now on TRNC can not export alcoholic beverages to Turkey. If we can not sell our

products to a state that recognizes us which we suppose that it is our motherland, than how

can we talk about being a state and about state relations. A Turk comes to Cyprus with little

money. Here is like a road house. They come and they commit robberies. They attack and

rape our people. After all, our ‘leaders’ give them citizenship. (…) Cypriots are fleeing to the

UK. Turks are coming to Cyprus. Turkey and Denktaş smash us. (Avrupa 9 November 1999)

It is a fact that the unrecognized structure of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

(TRNC), economic isolations starting from 1994 and the end of the Greek Cypriots’ trophy,

make the social and economic life unsustainable, as such; opposition unites under the same

idea that: “Turkish politics are not serving for the Cypriots. Turkey only cares about the

protection of its military power in the Mediterranean.” (Altan, 2003 p.95)

Distribution of TRNC citizenship, high corruption on the Greek Cypriot properties and

39

the lack of economic sustainability, made the Turkish Cypriot society become skeptical about

the legitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot state. To-illustrate, the ex-minister of agriculture Kenan

Akın’s letter to a private company, created a big reaction and discussion on the statehood of

Turkish Cypriot state:

I, the Minister of Agriculture of TRNC, am happy to confirm and recommend this

immigration consultant group to represent our country to promote the investor program

overseas.(…) We guarantee to get the TRNC passport within 1 month after the investment is

transferred. (Kıbrıs 9 May 1999)

One of the strong opposition newspapers, Avrupa (Europe), brought criticism against

the asymmetric relations with Turkey on its headline, stating: “This country’s people

exhausted its hopes long years ago. Why? Because within that time what they had was only

faithfulness, again and again. They lost their feelings of trust. It is like Caesar and Brutus.”

(Avrupa 2 November 1999) The day after, the same newspaper gave a recipe for the problems

of the country as such:

“We have to get rid of this swamp. Turkey’s inflation, Turkey’s interests, Turkey’s devaluation,

Turkey’s people. (…) The solution is obvious; change the currency, change the status quo, constitute a

country for the Cypriots.” (Avrupa 3 November 1999)

In the same way, the will of political self determination and the deficiency of

statehood were clearly pointed out in the oppositional press, on the anniversary of the

establishment of the Turkish Cypriot state:

Today is the anniversary of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. It’s been 16 years up to now

and as Cypriots we have to remember all those.

We do not have our own money currency and our national anthem.

We do not have a right to govern our police.

We do not have a right to have a Turkish Cypriot general for our army.

We do not have a right to have Turkish Cypriot president for the Central Bank.

It seems like we are a city in Turkey when we receive anything as a post.

We do not know the percentage of the population who are Turkish Cypriots. We do

40

not know the amount of soldiers per capita. (Avrupa, 15 Kasım 1999)

Right after this announcement, Denktaş put the newspaper on trial. The court decided

to banish Avrupa newspaper. This issue was not perceived as a problem between the

newspaper and Denktaş, as more likely it was between two clashing ideologies. Opposition in

Cyprus and many foreign media representatives, started for a campaign supporting this

newspaper. The situation got tenser especially after the support letter from Athens Journalists

Community on the one hand; and the election of Denktaş as the “man of the year by Turkish

Journalists Associations” on the other. (Yenidüzen Kıbrıs 11 January 2000)

Additional to the leadership and statehood crisis, economic downturn affected the

society. Economic crisis in Turkey directly influences the Turkish Cypriot economy. When

Turkey unilaterally imposed an economic package, Turkish Cypriot opposition reacted and

the reaction continued, with the occupation of the Turkish Cypriot state’s parliament, by the

people. In the same vein, press carried the issue to the newspapers as “Turkish government

persists for the enforcement of the economic package. This will bring the end of Turkish

Cypriots.” (Kıbrıs 1 November 2000)

In 28 October 2000, Avrupa newspaper was sabotaged by the Turkish nationalists, just

two days after the strong criticisms, for the unilateral decision of Denktaş. This was as a result

of stopping the bi-communal talks. For the opposition, “it will definitely wipe out the Cypriot

identity.” (Kıbrıs, Yenidüzen, Ortam, Avrupa 26 November 2000) Right after the end of

political turmoil, Presidential elections took place in TRNC. Ex-comrades Rauf Raif Denktaş

and Dr. Derviş Eroğlu split up in that election. After the direct voting of the society, no one

won in the first phase, and the elections continued to the second phase. Even opposition

supported Eroğlu in the second period, to prevent Denktaş’s victory. However, just two days

41

prior to the second phase of the election, Eroğlu announced that he withdrew because of the

pressures. This created a big reaction and undermined the state’s legitimacy and the belief in

democracy, through citizens’ eyes.

After all that political turmoil, civil society organizations; political parties; and labour

unions came together and formed an umbrella organization called; ‘This Country is Our

Platform’ to struggle for peace and democracy.

The one in the presidential palace assumes that there is nothing called Cyprus

culture. He wants us to dance, as in Ankara Havası3. They want us to eat Lahmacun4. Let’s

gather here altogether and shout to the palace: ‘We are Cypriots and this country is ours. We

will sing Dillirga5 and eat Şeftal6i forever’. We have our culture. People of this country have

a right to govern. (Yenidüzen 1 December 2000)

While Turkish Cypriot opposition got stronger, Turkey decided to make an urgent

action plan, empowering the Turkish existence on the Northern part of the island, and

announced “if the European Union decides to accept Cyprus as a full member, then we will

annex the Northern part to Turkey.” (Avrupa 3 January 2001). This caused a huge political

strife.

We are going to be the 82nd province of Turkey. Turkey decides to let Turkish Cypriot

teams, play in the Turkish league. The Navy will use only the Turkish flag. TRNC citizens, will

have the right to get Turkish citizenship in a day any many more. The Turkish state doesn’t

pay attention for the Turkish Cypriot existence. They want to let us to extinct. I can only say

that in order to satisfy strategic benefits of Turkey, they constitute ‘Cypriotless’ Cyprus

(From the speech of Mehmetali Talat 4 January 2001)

In the same way, Patriotic Unity Movement secretary general İzzet İzcan, reacted

3 Turkish traditional dance.

4 Traditional Turkish food.

5 Traditional Cyprus music.

6 Traditional Cyprus food.

42

towards this decision, stating; “This land is ours, we will govern it” (YBH Speeches: İzzet

İzcan 4 January 2001). Turkish nationalists in Turkey and Cyprus reacted against the

increasing political tension and opposition.

“They are the bastards of Greeks. Europeans and Americans are paying money for them in

order to create political tension. There are Greeks and Turks in this island, and Greeks and Turks have

their own state and we are the pieces of those states.” (Volkan 8 January 2001)

It is obvious, that the rising economic, political and social strife within the Turkish

Cypriot society strengthened Cypriotist discourse, whose motivation came from opposition to

Denktaş and Turkish nationalism. On 30th of January 2001, the Cyprus Turkish Teachers

Union made a declaration and sent it to the newspapers as a press release, which screamed at

Ankara and Turkish Cypriots:

“Ankara: We do not want neither your money, neither your economic package,

neither your people nor your servants. Turkish Cypriot compatriot: We have our knowledge,

ability, potential and proficiency in order to govern by ourselves. We do not want to be slaves

in our homeland.” (Ortam, Yenidüzen, Avrupa, Kıbrıs 30 January 2001)

Continuous polarization takes place, between Turkish nationalists and Cypriotist.

Cypriotist rhetoric supports the end of status quo and establishes the new federal state in

Cyprus, with the Greek Cypriot compatriots. Demonstrations for ‘Peace and Democracy’ took

place in this period. With the influence of the mass demonstrations, nearly all columnists with

different political backgrounds started to complain about the status quo, and stressed the

increasing welfare difference compared to the Greek Cypriots in the south.

The governance in the southern part of this island has a GDP per capita up to

15.000 USD and we have 3.000 USD. Starting from 1974, we just consumed without

producing and they have never let to discuss the source of it. Turkey, patriots, high level

bureaucrats and nationalists; you all establish this status quo. Unfortunately the guilt is us -

Turkish Cypriots. (Kıbrıs Gazetesi 11 July 2001)

43

Cypriotist discourse became stronger after 11 November 2002, with UN Secretary

General Kofi Annan’s proposition of plan, for the re-settlement of the Cyprus conflict. As it is

mentioned in the previous sections, this was the turning point for the Cypriotist discourse.

Opposite to the Greek Cypriot Cypriotist discourse, Turkish Cypriots embraced the

Annan Plan starting from the beginning, and perceived it as a way to declare their

independence from Turkey and Turkish nationalism. “Support to the Annan plan represents

continuation of Cypriot generations.” (Afrika 13 November 2002). “People claimed to own

their destiny.” (Kibris 13 November 2002) For the most of the Cypriots “Annan Plan would

not be the best plan, and it probably has some lacking points, but at the end of the day it

represents the earliest and best possible solution for the issue.” (Yenidüzen 2004) It could be

claimed that, with the introduction of Annan Plan, Cypriotist discourse within the Turkish

Cypriot society, clearly indicates the unified fate of all Cypriots in the island. “The island is

so small to divide and Cypriots are so less to keep them apart” (Özgür 1992 p.14), was the

motto of nearly every Cypriotist in that period.

The newspapers stressing the miserable fate of Cypriots also indicated that all would

be changed once approving the Annan Plan. “Every single Cypriot who voted ‘Yes’ in the

plan – even if they have some security dilemma’s- convinced that maybe not for them, but for

their children’s future, it is the only way to survive.” (Kıbrıs 14 January 2003). “Many more

believe that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are just the same people, who speak

different languages. They all are Cypriots and there is no problem to live together.”

(Yenidüzen 21 March 2002)

Because of the status quo in TRNC, one of the top selling opposition newspapers

Avrupa-Europe- changed its name as Afrika-Africa. This newspaper strongly represented the

44

emigration of Turkish Cypriots and incoming Turkish migrants, in order to shape the public

opinion. While doing this, Afrika newspaper modified the rhetoric of Denktaş “The one that

leaves is Turk and the one that is coming is Turk” as “The one that leaves is ‘Cypriot’ and the

one that is coming is ‘Laz, Turk, Kurd’.”(Afrika 9 April 2003). This suggests that Cypriot

nationalism is referring to racist comments.

On April the 23rd 2003, Denktaş’s leadership unilaterally decided for the opening of

the borders, from North to South. By this way, Cypriots from both sides gained the chance to

visit the other side, for the first time after 1975. While the bi-communal relations entered into

a new path, obvious economic differences took attention.

“Yesterday I drove to Larnaca where I was born. Let’s forget about the rest and just

compare the roads which are the reflection of development. Until now we make comparison

with the numbers. Yesterday, I had a chance to compare with my eyes. Denktaş who locked

Cypriots in this cowshed, thankfully opened us the gates of cowshed, in order to see what we

missed with empty nationalist rhetoric, and to prove the fact that every single Cypriot will

hate him.” (Afrika 25 April 2003)

The closer the date of 2004 referenda, the more popularized the Cypriot identity and

the main sign of Cypriotism, became towards the reaction against Turkey and Turkish

nationalist discourse, in Cyprus. Nationalist epigrams such as ‘Happy is who says I am a

Turk’ or ‘Turkey belongs to the Turks’- transformed into the mottos as; ‘Happy is who says I

am a Cypriot’ or ‘Cyprus belongs to the Cypriots’.

Until the day of referenda, debates for the unification of the island took place

continuously. The result of the referenda- Turkish Cypriot’s 65% decisive support to the

Annan Plan, while Greek Cypriots had around 25%- had a shocking effect within Cypriotist

and pro-solution groups within Turkish Cypriots.

45

At this juncture, Turkish Cypriot politicians blamed AKEL for being against the

Annan plan, despite its image of pro-Turkish Cypriot political party in the South. Adding

these EU’s promises on the ban, of the political isolations, and on the financial aid to the

Turkish Cypriot society, Cypriotist discourse started to be transformed, into a more Turkish

Cypriot centric approach, which is still antagonist to Turkey. From one of the interviews in a

newspaper a woman at the age of 45, talks about the differences with the Turks, and the new

wave of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots.

As we–Turkish Cypriots – are European, others from Anatolia are much more

backward than us. Look at their clothes and the way that their lifestyle is. Okay it is not like

Iraq, but for sure they are not European as we are. (…) I do not mind about the Greek

Cypriots ‘No’ in the referenda. Europeans understand that as Cypriots we are different than

the people from Turkey. Greek Cypriots don’t want to constitute a state with us, than the rest

of the world has to recognize here as separate state. They have to ban the embargoes and let

us to govern ourselves. (…) For me unification of the island is not only the solution, but for

sure none of the Cypriots could accept the unification to Turkey.(…) Our face is looking to

the west, but the Turkish state has too many faces, and obviously they are not looking to the

side of Europe. (Personal Interview with N.K 14 August 2009)

Right after Denktaş, when Mehmetali Talat got into the presidential office and

announced; “I am holding out my hand, towards Greek Cypriot people for peace. My hand

will stay there until the time that they hold it.” (Kıbrıs 17 April 2005)

However, Talat didn’t find a correspondence for his announcement. Greek Cypriot

leadership accepted it, as Talat was trying to get benefits from the ‘Yes’ in the referenda, and

understood it as an attempt towards the Taiwanisation of North Cyprus, or an attempt, which

was a threat upon the integrity of the Cyprus Republic.

Obviously, Post-Annan Plan period, lead to the continuous polarization of the Greek

Cypriots leadership. In addition to this continuous antagonism, toward Turkish nationalism

46

and Turkish immigrants, it became the main determinant, of the Cypriotist rhetoric. After all,

while Cypriotism expanded, the bi-communal character of Cypriotism was eroded within

Turkish Cypriots.

In this period, especially after the referenda results and with Turkey’s guidance, the

construction sector achieved the biggest boom, compared to other sectors. As the construction

sector needs a huge amount of labor force, big construction firms preferred to bring cheap

workforce from Turkey.

When the need for construction workers created by the growing

construction sector, came together with the Turkish Cypriots’ lack of willingness to

work ‘for nothing’, an unskilled labour force began to flow from Turkey’s

undeveloped areas, in the east and southeast toward Cyprus. The accommodation

need of these ‘guests’ were first met in the half-finished construction sites, but as

their numbers multiplied, the old houses that Cypriots had begun to abandon in

Nicosia’s side streets, began to be turned into workers’ boarding houses. These new

residents of Nicosia’s side streets began to produce anxiety in its old residents and to

accelerate their move into the suburbs. (Bizden Birikim 2007 p.79-91)

Dynamic social change, in North Cyprus caused a reaction. Reflection of public

opinion, related to this, appeared on the newspapers, stating:

I do not remember the last time; I strolled through old Nicosia’s streets. It must have

been two, maybe five months since I have walked there. (…) A woman in a shop that sells

coffee and nuts asked, ‘Did you notice how much the number of Cypriots has decrease?’ ‘I’m

aware of it’, I said. But afterwards I interpreted this awareness. The basic problem of the

walled city that is Nicosia’s heart is the existence of people who don’t take responsibility for

that fabric, or who don’t seem to care about taking responsibility. (Kıbrıs 23 September

2007)

Similarly, it is emphasized that “there is no scent of molohiya or kolokas. New

residents of old-Nicosia, have not yet become accustomed, to these authentic foods.”

(Yenidüzen 15 December 2007) Obviously, increasing amount of Turkish immigrants results,

47

in fear of the possible extinction, of Turkish Cypriots.

While Turkish Cypriots, represent middle and upper classes, most of the Turkish

immigrants mostly populate in poor classes. While the Turkish immigrants do not hold big

economic power, because of the existing structure of Turkish Cypriot state, political decision

mechanisms, shape according to Turkey’s foreign policy. “Turkish immigrants have less

economic power but respectable population so they can easily affect the election

results.”(Durduran 2007 p.6) In the final analysis, it would be stated that while Turkish

Cypriots, represent the dominant classes in the society, they are unable to hold the total

control, of political determination.

The results of the elections, in Greek Cypriot society, could be perceived as a

landmark for Cypriotist discourse. Demetris Christofias became the new president and after

his election, Talat and Christofias, decided to start the direct talks. On 3rd September 2008,

after the first meeting, the Turkish Cypriot society’s leader Talat, made his call to the nation

as:

Turkish Cypriots, do not want to live under your [Greek Cypriot] administration.

(…) The Cyprus problem originated, and has been continuing since you, Greek Cypriots, did

not want to accept the political identity, of the Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot people

would like to be their own masters. (…) The only and most important thing we cannot discuss,

is the will of the Turkish Cypriots for self determination, and their struggle to that end. You

have to accept this fact. In spite all the problems the Turkish Cypriots experience, even if the

others are not, you are aware that, Turkish Cypriots will not accept the rule of other people.

So as to make Cyprus our common home, you must be ready to share the sovereignty of this

island with us. (Kıbrıs 4 September 2008)

Mehmetali Talat, who represents Cypriotist discourse, exactly put the new face of

Cypriotism, within Turkish Cypriot's imagination. Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots,

represents an ideology that is marked with antagonism to Turkish nationalism, and with its

48

eroded bi-communal character, as a result of the disappointment after the end of referenda for

Annan Plan.

Another significant point, about the transformation in Cypriotist discourse, came into

sight in the last national elections. In the campaigns of the election, held in 19 April 2009,

nearly all political figures both in left and right included Cypriotist parlance into their

rhetoric. Main group representing Turkish Nationalism – National Unity Party (UBP) – got

44.19% of the votes with the motto of “I am Cypriot, I am Turk, I am Democrat, I am UBP”.

(Güneş 12 April 2009). On the other hand, Republican Turkish Party (CTP) -the biggest party

with the ideology of Cypriotism and previous governing party- tried to catch all the votes

from different groups for continuing its rule, but got 29.53% with the motto “Do not return

back” (Yenidüzen 11 April 2009). There are also many other parties which are competing for

getting in the parliament with the election mottos such as “We are in” (Demokrat Bakış 12

April 2009), “I am from here” (Ortam 12 April 2009) and “We will take our jasmines back’”

(Afrika 12 Nisan 2009). This proves the fact that, in one way or another, all political groups

accept the existence of Cypriot identity.

On the other hand, they made some policy changes perceived as ‘assimilationist

policies’ by Cypriotists. Policies which are currently taking place, such as compulsory

religion education and letting Quran courses legal, are making Cypriotists fearful. Cypriotists

perceive it as an attack, to the secularity of Turkish Cypriot identity. Apart from this, building

huge monuments of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Bülent Ecevit, for promoting Turkish

nationalism, is another significant step taken by UBP government recently.

Reaction of Cypriotists for this development, displays the new illustration of old

tensions in the Turkish Cypriot politics. That is to say, these steps could be seen as the re-

49

emergence of strong antagonism between Turkish nationalism and Cypriotists.

As Cypriots UBP government’s policies, in order to promote Turkish nationalism

and certain branch of Islam is not acceptable. As we are Cypriots, we have our own

understanding and approach to the religion. This country’s people are democratic and

secular. We will not give a way for assimilation. We are against redrogadation, bigotry and

Shari’a” (Yenidüzen Kıbrıs 15 August 2009)

Right after the announcement made by the political parties and civil society

organizations, people who are mainly from Turkey and who support the compulsory religion

courses and legalization of Quran courses, made a demonstration asking for ‘freedom of

expression,’ and criticized the ones who were against it. This event took up space in

newspapers, with the headlines stating; “First the ones with combat boots now the ones with

clog”, and continued with the mottos such as ‘Ankara leave us alone’, ‘End for the

occupation’ and ‘Ankara we are not your puppet.” (Afrika, Ortam, Yenidüzen 26 August

2009) It is obvious that with these headlines, newspapers want to warn the threats coming

from Turkish Nationalists and Turkish religious fanatics.

To sum up the rise of Turkish nationalism within Turkish Cypriots, started from the

early 20th century, and changes its character, gradually after the 1974 military intervention. In

early 1980s, Cypriotism was supported by a small group, yet in contrast to Turkish

nationalism, it became more popular. Starting from the early 1980s, Cypriotism represents an

opposition against Denktaş governance and against population movement from Turkey. The

economic downturn, by the end of the 20th century, became another touchstone for the

Cypriotist discourse, since TRNC, is perceived to be unable to satisfy, the needs of the

society. Continuous rise of political tensions between the opposition and the government

reached to its highest level, with the introduction of Annan Plan in 2002. At this juncture, the

50

main rhetoric of Cypriotist discourse within Turkish Cypriot society becomes as such: the will

to determine Cypriots’ own will is possible through the settlement of the Cyprus problem. As

settlement signified the unification of Cypriots, Turkish nationalists rejected and Cypriotists

accepted the plan. Even though the majority of the Turkish Cypriot society accepted the plan

as a way to ‘maintain’ their Cypriot identity, they could not get the same answer from Greek

Cypriots, for their will of forming a federal state of Cypriots. Right after the referenda,

Denktaş lost his position and Cypriotist leader Mehmetali Talat took the leadership. However,

with the disappointment after the referenda, the bi-communal character of Cypriotism

weakened, and transformed into a more Turkish Cypriot centric, and a widely accepted

approach, despite the fact that antagonism to Turkish nationalist discourse will continue.

PART E – CONCLUSION

First wave of nationalism appeared in Cyprus, after the birth of Greek nationalism,

which influenced Orthodox Cypriots. On the contrary, Muslim Cypriots attached themselves

to Turkish nationalism. Evolutions of these two nationalisms continue to determine the fate of

the island.

Starting with the 1974 intervention, construction of Cypriotist discourse takes place.

Firstly within Greek Cypriots and after a while within Turkish Cypriots, Cypriotism emerged

as the disjunction to the Greek and Turkish Nationalisms, which has become the

distinguishing aspect of the ideology.

According to the theory, nationalism represents the modern and secular ideology. This

can be observed in the case of Turkish nationalism; for the Greek nationalism however,

51

“Orthodoxy represents the spiritual defender of Greeks national demands.” (Mavratsas 2002

p.39)

In the light of the discussions in this study, it could be claimed that Cypriotism

represents another kind of nationalism, constituting itself from the exclusion of two

nationalisms in Cyprus. At this juncture, Cypriotism has different characteristics in each

respective society.

Aforementioned Cypriotism has different faces within both societies, and dynamically

they are changing their facets. The path of Cypriotism within Greek Cypriot society starts

with the strong bi-communal character and strong antagonism toward Greek Nationalism. The

new face of Cypriotism has strong antagonism against Greek nationalism and its bi-communal

character is eroded. With the introduction of the Annan plan and during the referenda period,

Cypriotist discourse found itself under a big pressure.

Greek Cypriots believe that the Annan Plan represents the biggest threat for

Cypriotism. On the contrary, it represents the only way to maintain ‘Cypriotness’ for Turkish

Cypriots. This breaking point makes the Cypriotism within Greek Cypriots, critical towards

Turkish Cypriots because of the inconsistency in each respective society’s imagination for the

future.

To sum up, for the Greek Cypriot Cypriotists’, imagined community represents the

Greek Cypriot society and the imagined land limited with the boundaries of Republic of

Cyprus, which means the whole island. Any attempt which violates this rationale, such as

threats related to the state integrity, unites left and right wing on the basis of ‘horizontal

comradeship.’ This is the reason why we can say the Cypriotism within Greek Cypriot society

represents much mature nationalist project.

52

The evolution of Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots also has particular

characteristics. Following the Turkish intervention, Denktaş preferred co-operation with

Turkey rather than with the Turkish Cypriot society. From the early 1980's, Cypriotism has

represented the antagonism toward the immigrants from Turkey. As the Turkish Cypriots did

not feel that they belonged to the imagined Turkish society, they tried to keep and shield their

Cypriot identity against Turkish assimilation. Therefore, from early 1980's through early

2000's, Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots had a bi-communal character and strong

antagonism toward Turkish nationalism. In the event that Turkey’s foreign policy changes

with the AKP government, this would never influence the Cypriotist vs. Turkish nationalist

confrontation, since Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots also represents the fear from a threat

toward Turkish Cypriot identity.

To sum up in a Turkish Cypriot case, Cypriotism represents a much pragmatic

approach, for the settlement of their problems. For the Turkish Cypriot Cypriotists, more than

talking about the imagined community or deep horizontal comradeship, the issue of

Cypriotism represents the issue related to the will of determination, and fear of assimilation.

From this point of view, Cypriotism within Turkish Cypriots represents an ideology in

disjunction with Turkish nationalism, in order to gain their own power to impose their will of

determination, and keep their culture alive.

This study shows that Cypriotism is an ideology, which is in disjunction to the Greek

and Turkish nationalisms. As I briefly indicate in the introduction, my working hypothesis,

that; Cypriotism or simply ‘Cypriot’ has different meanings and different paths of

evolvement, within respective societies of Greek and Turkish Cypriots; is proved in the above

sections.

53

The findings in this paper are significant, in terms of displaying the fact that it is

impossible to construct a pure Cypriot nationalism, or Cypriot nation including both

communities. As Hasgüler suggests

The nationalisms in Cyprus don’t represent the underdeveloped country

nationalisms. Turkey and Greece, currently represent developing countries, however both

nations see themselves as the continuation of the empires, which directed the history and

humanity. (…) Expectations relate with the emergence of national consciousness, which is

based on land and patriotism, as a result of Cyprus being a British colony. Isn’t it so far from

real? (…) Today’s nationalism, has the references from the values, related with ethnicity and

religion. It is impossible to expect success, from a nation (alist) project such as Cypriotism in

Cyprus, whilst disregarding these. (Hasgüler 2008 p.17)

Sticking to this point, it is possible to argue that promoting Cypriot nationalism for the

solution of Cyprus problem will not bring the deep peace for the societies. Rather than putting

Cypriotism on top of the agenda, focusing on the issues, which will strengthen the relations

between the two societies, and bring mutual trust, would be beneficial.

From my point of view, there should be unification in the island in order to satisfy the

needs of the people of Cyprus, which are related to the concerns of security and of continuity

of their future. However, it is obvious that any kind of nationalism, including the Cypriotism,

will neither be adequate for reaching this goal nor promote a better future for the people.

From this point of view, further discussions on Cypriotism should be conducted on the

excluded people in Cyprus, such as; Turkish settlers in the north and immigrants in the south.

Within the last three decades, Cypriotism focused only on native Cypriots in order to create a

Cypriot nation, with two ethnos. In this way, Cypriotism in a concealed manner has become

more ethno-centric and less tolerant for ‘others’. For this reason, I suggest making further

discussions about the facets of nationalism and tolerance, in order to avoid future clashes in

54

Cyprus.

PART F: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Akel. (1975). Kıbrıslıtürkler ve Kıbrıslırumların Ortak Mücadeleleri, Nicosia.

Altan, A. (2003). Kıbrıs Diye Bir Ada. Gündem Yayınları, İstanbul.

An, A. (1995). Kıbrıslılık Bilincinin Geliştirilmesi. Galeri Kültür Yayınları, Nicosia.

Anastasiou, H. (2008). The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the

Quest for Peace In Cyprus. Syracuse University Press, New York.

Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

Nationalism. Verso, London.

Beratlı, N. (1999). Kıbrıslı Türklerin Tarihi. Galeri Kültür Yayınları, Nicosia.

Berkes, N. (1997). Unutulan Yıllar. İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Bizden,A. (1999) Kolektif Kimliklerin inşasında Siyasal Ritüeller ve Medya: Kıbrıs

Örneği. Ankara: Masters Thesis, Ankara Üniversitesi.

Bryant, R. (2002).Tebaadan Vatandaşa: Kıbrıs’ta Modernite ve Milliyetçilik. Translated by

Seyhan Özmenek, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul.

Cağla Güngör (2002) Kıbrıslıtürk Gençleri Konuşuyor. İstanbul, Metis Güncel Yayınları, p.

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