MENGZI AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS: COMMENTS ON VAN NORDEN'S MENGZI

jocp_1612 668..675

susan blake

MENGZI AND ITS PHILOSOPHICALCOMMITMENTS:

COMMENTS ON VAN NORDEN’S MENGZI

Bryan Van Norden’s love for the Chinese classics and his interest inopening them to readers are evident in the translation and commen-tary contained in the Mengzi, with Selections from Traditional Com-mentaries. Van Norden’s new Mengzi provides an indispensible toolfor students moving beyond the introductory level, and for thosecontinuing years of study. The importance of this new volume lies inits historical and contemporary commentary, illuminating the contextof discussion and Mengzi’s elliptical arguments, and providing anentrée into later interpretations of the text.

The carefulness of the English renderings manifests even in minordetails. On the first page, Van Norden translates xian as “had anaudience with” rather than “went to see” (the latter comes fromLau1)—he is right to emphasize Mengzi’s punctiliousness in visiting aruler only on appropriate occasions.Another passage where Van Nor-den’s translation has clarified the Chinese meaning, both for me andmy students, is at 4B19: Shun “acted out of benevolence andrighteousness; he did not act out benevolence and righteousness.”2

This translation also nicely preserves the near-parallelism of theChinese: .

For a number of obscure passages, the commentary provides sig-nificant insight. Zhu Xi’s commentary on 1B7, where King Xuan of Qi(Qi Xuan Wang ) defends his frequent hiring and firing of histop ministers, explains that the King implicitly claims that he hiredpeople only to find they were without talent—a detail concealed byMengzi’s politesse, but necessary to understanding Mengzi’s criticismof King Xuan. Another revealing detail, at 4B26, praises the way thesage king Yu used the nature of water to channel it, diverting thefloodwaters that troubled China. Given the significance of the com-parison between the nature of water and human nature, this informa-tion helps to explain Yu’s sageliness.

SUSAN BLAKE, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Indiana University. Spe-cialties: epistemology, early Chinese philosophy. E-mail: [email protected]

Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37:4 (December 2010) 668–675© 2010 Journal of Chinese Philosophy

In addition to many words of praise, I have two questions about thephilosophical stance that the commentary attributes to Mengzi.

My first concern regards the claim, stated in the commentary at1A1 and 3B1, that Mengzi rejected consequentialism outright. At3B1,3 the commentary states that Mengzi “paradoxically” makes ananti-consequentialist consequentialist argument. However, the air ofparadox seems to come from the idea, imposed from without, thatMencius rejects consequentialism altogether, rather than merelyrejecting the pursuit of certain ends.

Recent studies (by Manyul Im and Steven Geisz, for example4)point to some of the philosophical problems that would arise fromMengzi’s rejection of the idea of benefit. While it is clear that Mengziconsidered benefit something not to be pursued directly, it is far lessclear that potential benefits play no role for Mengzi in evaluatingactions or kinds of action.

Some passages suggest the importance of pursuing or avoidingcertain consequences, such as 7B7: “Mengzi said, ‘It is only now that Iunderstand the severity of killing someone’s parent. If you kill some-one’s father, he will also kill your father. . . . ’”5 On the surface, thisstatement evinces less concern for virtue (or the desire to do what isright), and more for the consequences of the action. Further, Mengzi’sconcern with the best way to outfit the people and organize their landmay embody benevolence, but this understanding of virtue does notseem possible except by reference to benefit.

Far from concern with benefit being foreign to the text, commen-tators have even found it there.The great Song Dynasty commentatorCheng Yi says about 1A1 that “[a] gentleman never fails to desireprofit, but if one is single-mindedly focused on profit, then it leads toharm,”6 and further suggests that profit comes from seeking benevo-lence and righteousness, not from seeking profit.

Rather than declaring Mengzi a consequentialist, or denying theimportance he places on virtue, I hope merely to question whetherMengzi’s rejection of the direct pursuit of benefit actually entails arejection of consequentialism.

My second concern, which relates to the presentation of Moists inthe text and commentary, takes more explanation to make clear. Thepassages in which Mengzi interacts with the Moists Yi Zhi andGaozi contain terse arguments, where Mengzi does not explicitlyengage with the Moist positions, making it difficult to pinpoint theidea being criticized.

One passage in which the views of Mengzi’s opponent go unex-plained in the text is 3A5, where Yi Zhi is criticized for providing hisparents with a lavish funeral, a practice condemned in the text of theMozi , in the “Moderation in Funerals” chapter, Jie Zang

669MENGZI AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS

. To illuminate Confucian funeral practices and the importanceof filial piety, the commentary refers us to the text of the Analects. Formore information on the Moists, we are referred to Mengzi 3B9.

Let us take as our first goal an elucidation of this passage, afterwhich we can assess the ways in which the Moists might respond toMengzi’s criticisms. The explicit criticisms of Yi Zhi that Mengzimakes here are (i) that “he served his parents by means of what hedemeans”;7 and (ii) that he gives two sources to “things” wu (here,presumably moral sentiments).The first criticism, when understood asa charge of hypocrisy against Yi Zhi, seems warranted—if he endorsesthe Moist position on funerals, but makes an exception for his parents,burying them with more pomp than he thinks right, he is morallyculpable. I think this complaint is unproblematic, and I will notaddress it further.

The second criticism is the topic of an article by David Nivison,elucidated in “Two Roots or One?”, his presidential address at thePacific APA thirty years ago.8 Nivison understands Mengzi’s “tworoots” criticism of Yi Zhi as a criticism of the moral psychology of theMoists. Nivison and Van Norden both take Mengzi to say that while YiZhi is right that the source of benevolence or compassion is within thefamily, he also thinks we are compelled by doctrine to offer love toeveryone equally, undermining the primacy of our parents.

Mengzi advocates beginning from where we are—starting with theemotions we already feel in some concrete situations—and extendingthose to situations we can be led to recognize as similar, but in whichwe do not yet have the appropriate emotional reactions. These innateemotions are the one root from which wisdom and moral feelingdevelop.

On the other hand, Nivison takes the Moists, or at least Yi Zhi, toadvocate a system in which we begin at the same place—with ourinnate feelings—but then, on the basis of doctrine alone, come to loveall people equally.9 This particular criticism is primarily a criticism ofthe means by which the Moists supposedly think we should developour moral sentiments, but it is secondarily (and as a result of the first)a criticism of the aims and ideals of Moist moral theory, which Mengzidid not take to be obtainable through development of our innatefeelings.

In the presidential address, Nivison primarily discusses theformer—how we can come to recognize what we ought to do, andwhether this recognition is enough to move us to act. He claims thathuman psychology necessitates that we do more than simply acknowl-edge what we ought to do—we must come to feel that we want to doit. Thus, it is not enough to propound a doctrine—and further, to actsimply on the basis of doctrine, against our inclinations, could be

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harmful. This is, I take it, an unproblematic description of Mencianmoral psychology.

Secondarily, the Moist doctrine is thought to be in itself problem-atic because it asks of us something that goes against our primaryinclinations—it asks that we should care as much for other people asfor our family. Van Norden identifies this as part of the first criticismof Yi Zhi—he is criticized for his funeral practices, but also for adopt-ing the Moist ideal of impartial caring; at issue is the Moist criticism ofthe Confucians, the scholarly class, for “differentiated love” (i.e.,partial caring), “car[ing] more for relatives than for strangers.”10

However, it is not clear to me that this is the point Mengzi wasmaking here, for two reasons—he does not say as much, and thisinterpretation seems to depend on a stronger reading of the doctrineof impartial caring than is consistently presented in the Mozi.

We should examine these two criticisms of Moism in light of thetext of the Mozi. There seem to be two ways of understanding theMoist moral program—the more demanding one requires both thatevery person go out and work to help every other person, and alsothat they have all of the same feelings for everyone else as they dofor their family members. The other one, the less ambitious moralprogram, is this: that we refrain from harming others for our ownbenefit, and that we provide material assistance as we can for somesmall group of people outside our family.11

Let me suggest some reasons that the latter reading seems the morecorrect, as well as the more attractive reading. In what follows, I’ll bereferring primarily to the chapter 16 version of Impartial Caring (JianAi ).

In the opening passage of the chapter, Mozi describes partiality asthe source of evils in the world. Partial caring leads to aggressive warsfor territory, which end in suffering and death; it leads to familiesseeking their own advantage at the expense of others; and it leads toindividuals robbing and stealing from others, or taking advantage ofthose at a disadvantage. Partial caring means seeking one’s ownadvantage, but also seeking benefit for one’s family, or for one’scountry.

Accepting impartial caring, on the other hand, means that a personwould regard (wei ) the states and cities and families of others as hisown.This may sound like the demanding reading, but is not: regardingthe state or city of others as one does one’s own, one would not attackit; regarding the families of others as one’s own, one will not stealfrom them.This is a low standard—refraining from harming others forone’s own benefit. Although this passage does not say that this is thefull extent of impartial caring, neither does it suggest that there ismore.


A second contrast between the partial and impartial person is thatthe partial person does not provide any material support for hisfriends or friends’ parents when they are in need. The impartialperson, who “regards his friend’s well-being as his own,” he feedsthem, clothes them, and nurtures them when they are in need. Con-sidering the well-being of others as his own, the impartial personprovides some physical care and material support. This displays arather lower standard than the demanding reading—it requires notthat we feel the same love for friends’ parents as for our own, but thatwe show concern and provide material support when needed.

Third, Mozi thinks that considerations of filial piety can lead peopleto be impartial. Because people desire that their parents be benefittedand cared for, they should not harm others or their parents, as thistreatment will cause harm to come to one’s own parents. A personshould be impartial because he is filial.

Read thus, impartial caring hardly sounds like an excessivedemand, nor a rejection of filial piety. Rather, impartial caring issupposed to be motivated by the same concerns the Confuciansemphasize. On the less ambitious reading, impartial caring includeslittle more than having sufficient regard for others that we do not dothings to them that we do not want done to ourselves or our families.This sounds, and is, in many ways like the Confucian ideal. For both,the only proper purpose of war is to free the people from suffering;rulers are responsible for the material well-being of their people, andshould not benefit themselves at the people’s expense.There are cleardifferences between the two schools, concerning the value of theextended mourning period and the emphasis on ritual, but I take thebasic requirements of impartial caring to be common.

The similarities move me to think that we should not read Mengzias criticizing impartial caring, per se, especially as he does notexplicitly attack the Moists on that point. Similarly, the criticisms ofpartial caring in the Mozi should perhaps be read as directed notprimarily against Confucians, but instead against the more profligatemembers of the scholarly ru class to which Confucius and Mengzibelong.

If we refrain from the demanding reading of “impartial caring,” theactions and feelings the Moists require of us seem within reach for all;understanding the Moists as endorsing a less ambitious moralprogram can help to defuse worries about their moral psychology,although it does not automatically defuse it. Let us look at the criti-cism that Nivison and Van Norden elaborate on Mengzi’s behalf—that, for the Moists, doctrine will cause us to see what is right, and thatthis recognition itself will cause us to act. I agree that the criticismMengzi makes in 3B5, as well as in 2A2, is a criticism of the Moist

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account of moral motivation—what I am not as certain about iswhether this criticism is merited.

The Mozi does not provide much of an account of moral motiva-tion, but examining the discussion in chapter 16 will help determinethe extent of the Moists’ trouble. This chapter contains the infamouspassages about charging onto a burning ship and starving oneself.“King Ling of . . . Chu was fond of slender waists.”12 This fondnesscaused his people to starve themselves to realize the king’s ideal.More graphic is the example of “Gou Jian, King of . . . Yue, [who] wasfond of bravery . . . he taught his soldiers and subjects to be brave.”13

To test their mettle, he set their ships aflame and ordered them toadvance onto them. They did, falling over one another in their haste.

This passage does not suggest that we should follow doctrine simplyfor the sake of it. Rather, it puts very strong emphasis on emulatingsuperiors, apparently claiming that the desire to please one’s superi-ors is strong enough to get people to do almost anything. In contrastto these feats, Mozi says, “impartially caring for and benefitting oneanother . . . are incalculably beneficial and easy to practice.”14

Although these claims may seem overstated, what would Mengzihave said about them? The emulation of one’s superiors and the sagekings is as important in Mengzi as in Mozi. Mengzi, as Mozi, must relyon the expertise of our moral superiors to improve us—in Mengzi’scase, to develop people’s inherent tendencies toward the good. But ifthe people “are full of food, have warm clothes, and live in comfortbut without instruction, then they come close to being animals.”15

Indeed, many of Mengzi’s recommendations to the rulers of his daydepend on the idea that the people will adopt the values and behaviorof the ruler, as at 1A1. Mengzi cannot be criticizing Mozi for consid-ering emulation a necessary part of moral development.

However, reference to the passage above—which suggests thatby emulating one’s superiors, one can develop any tendencywhatsoever—may seem to expose Mozi to another criticism, as thismodel of development seems to contravene Mengzi’s counsel todevelop only those feelings for which there is precedent in our hearts,and further, to do so in a way that does not ask more of us than we areready to do. Indeed, the cases given above show authority inspiringdevelopment in ways contrary to basic human tendencies.While thesepassages do not suggest that doctrine produces our moral responses,they do seem to require us to follow a source of moral response notfound in the heart. If the Moists asked this of us, it would indeed be aproblem.

However, if we accept the less ambitious reading of Mozi, we willsee that this criticism of Mozi’s moral psychology also misses itstarget. Mengzi’s insight—that we should only develop those feelings


for which we have natural tendencies—is consistent with what weknow about Moist moral psychology, at least from the text of theMozi. Given what Mozi says about impartial caring and human moti-vation, it seems that impartial caring could come from basic humantendencies—filial piety, concern for those near us, and perhaps anaversion to harming others for our own gain.

Mengzi cannot deny those tendencies, or he risks making the heartan ugly place, which harbors overweening self-interest and willingnessto harm others—and this would seem to undermine his own ideasabout moral development. Given this, it is at least unclear to me thatthe Moists generally, or Yi Zhi in particular, is guilty of giving tworoots to moral development, any more than Mengzi himself is.

In these comments, I hope to have presented a plausible defense ofimpartial caring and Moist moral development.At the least, I hope toshow that the case against the Moists is not as clear as it is sometimesthought to be, and to urge that the Moists deserve more discussionthan is given in this commentary. If what I have said here is plausible,then the commentary should explain Mengzi’s criticism of Mozi’smoral psychology, as it does, but should also refer readers to addi-tional information that they can use to more fully evaluate the matter.It should refer to the relevant parts of the Mozi, and where possible,also to current discussions of that text—one such locus is the Septem-ber 2008 issue of the Journal of Chinese Philosophy.16

Van Norden’s translation and commentary on the Mengzi providean important resource that has so far been lacking, one which will bea great aid in teaching and continuing to learn about the Mengzi.

INDIANA UNIVERSITYBloomington, Indiana

Endnotes

Many thanks to the International Society for Chinese Philosophy for providing a forumfor our discussion at the APA Eastern Meeting, 2009, and especially to Professor JiyuanYu for organizing the panel. I am in debt to Professors Jiyuan Yu and Stephen Angle fortheir thought-provoking comments, as well as to the audience members. Moreover, I amgrateful to the Journal of Chinese Philosophy for this opportunity to continue our discus-sion. Thanks above all to Bryan Van Norden, whose work was the occasion of our livelyconversation, and whose teaching over the years continues to stimulate me.

1. D. C. Lau, trans., Mencius (New York: Penguin Classics, 2004).2. Bryan W. Van Norden, trans., Mengzi, with Selections from Traditional Commentaries

(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008), 107.3. Here, Mengzi says, “those who bend themselves have never been able to make others

upright” (Van Norden, Mengzi, 77).4. Steven F. Geisz, “Mengzi, Strategic Language, and the Shaping of Behavior,” Philoso-

phy East and West 58, no. 2 (2008): 190–222. And Manyul Im, “Mencius as

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Consequentialist,” in Ethics in Early China, ed. Chris Fraser and Dan Robins (HongKong: Hong Kong University Press, forthcoming 2010).

5. Van Norden, Mengzi, 186.6. Ibid., 2.7. Ibid., 74.8. Available as David S. Nivison,“Two Roots or One?” Proceedings and Addresses of the

American Philosophical Association 53 (1980); 739–61.9. The Moist emphasis on doctrine is criticized by Mengzi also at 2A2.

10. Van Norden, Mengzi, 74.11. On this reading, actively helping others, as the Moists themselves did in lending their

defensive expertise to states under attack, can be understood as supererogatory.12. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, eds., Readings in Classical Chinese

Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001), 75.13. Ibid., 75–76.14. Ibid., 76.15. Van Norden, Mengzi, 71.16. Especially of note in this regard is “The Moists and the Gentlemen of the World” and

earlier work by Dan Robins, to which aspects of my account are indebted.


MENGZI AND ITS PHILOSOPHICAL COMMITMENTS: COMMENTS ON VAN NORDEN'S MENGZI

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