Meinongobjects

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The Theory of Obiectsuv ALEXIUS MEINONG

(rneNsrerrD By IsAAcLEvI,D. B. TERRELL,NDRODERICK M. CHISHOLM

fne fneort ol Obiects"hesitatingly concede hat we are happy about something, nin something,and, at least in the majority of cases,do notintend without wishing pr or intendingsomething.To put itno one fails to recogniz-dhat psychological ventsso very cohave this distinctive"characterof being directed o somethietwas Gerichtetsein)as to suggest ery strongly (at least)should take it to be I characteristicaspectof the psycholopposed o the non-psychological.The purpose of the following remarks is, neverthelesexplain why I hold this way of looking at the matter to bestablished,despite the many difficulties confronting it. Tso many cases n which reference, ndeedexplicit directednrichtetsein), to that "something," or (as we say quite natuan object, unquestionably orces tself upon our attentionthif they alone were to be considered, he question would answered or anyone who investigated hese matters scieThe partitioning of whateverdeserves nd needs heoresideration nto difterent scientific ealms,and the careful delof these realms,may often be of little practical importancvancing the researchconnectedwith it. What matters inanalysis s the work that is accomplished, nd not the bannwhich it is done. However, obscuritiesas to the boundaridiverse areas of sciencecan become significant n two coways: either the areaswhich are actually nvestigated ncroone another, or they are separated rom each other, anquently leave an intermediate area untouched./The signifsuch obscurities, within the sphere of our theoretical inexactly the opposite of their significancewithin the spheretical affairs. n the latter, the "ieutral zone" is a guarantedesiredbut rarely capableof being reahzed)of amicablenrelations, while the overlapping of territorial claims pretypical caseof conflict of interests.But in the realm of thactivity, where such conflicts, at least, have no justificatiogain, objectively considered, f the frontier districts coincida result they are investigated rom different sides.A sepathe other hand, is always a disadvantage,he seriousnessdependson the size and significanceof the intermediateThe intent of the problem raised here is to call attentiosuch an area of knowledge,T hich is sometimes verlooketimes not sufficiently appreciated n its distinctive charaquestionconcerns he proper placefor the scientific nvest

l. Tne Pnosr.BM


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[78] ALEXIUS MEINONGthe Object (Gegenstand)aken as such and in general-we wish toknow whether,among the sciences hat are accreditedby scientifictradition, there is one within which we could attempt a theoreticalconsideration f the Object as such, or from which we could at leastdemand his.

2. Tnu Pnr.ruprcp rN FAvoR oF THBAcruar,It was no accident hat the foregoing account ook cognition asits startingpoint in order o arriveat the Object.To be sure,cognitionis not unique in "having" an Object. It has it in such a distinctivemanner, however, that whenever we are speaking of Objects, weare influencedto think first of all of the Object of cognition. For, tobe precise, he psychologicalevent we call cognition does not con-stitute the cognitive situation in and of itself: knowledge s, so tospeak, a double fact (Doppehatsache) n which what is knownconfrontsthe act of knowing as something elatively independent.The act of knowing is not merely directed toward what is known,in the way in which a false judgment may be directedtoward itsObject. In knowing, on the contrary, it is as though what is knownwerg seizedor graspedby the psychologicalact, or howeverelseone might attempt o describe,n an unavoidablypictorial way, some-thing which is indescribable. f one concentrates xclusivelyon theObject of knowledge, he problem about the science of Objectswhich was raised above s initially placed in a rather unfavorablelight. A scienceof the Objects of cognition: does this mean any-thing more than the demand that what is already known as theObject of cognitionbe now made the Object of a science,and thusthe Object of cognition for a second ime? In other words, are we

not asking or a sciencewhich either is made up of the sum-totalofthe sciencesaken together,or one which would haveto accomplishall over again what the recognizedsciences.ointly accomplishany-way?We should guard ourselvesagainst concluding rom thesecon-siderationshat the idea of a universal science, n addition to thespecialsciences,s abstrd. This understandingof the nature of theworld in its entirety and of its ulrimatefoundations,which the best

The Theory ol Objectsdiscipline which goes under the name of metaphysicshathought to be exactly such a science.No matter how manypointmentshave been associatedwith this name,and are asswith it, the responsibility or them lies with our intellectualties, and not with the idea of such a science.May one gotherefore,as to take metaphysics o be the sciencewhose egfunction is to deal with Objectsas such-or Objects n their to

I If we rememberhow metaphysics as alwaysbeenconceincluding n its subjectmatter the farthest and the nearest,heest and the smallestalike, we may be surprised o be told thaphysics cannot take on such a task. It may sound strange that metaphysicss not universalenough or a scienceof Oand hence cannot take on the task just formulated. For thetions of metaphysics ave been universal (a fact which has sbeen disastrous o its success).Without doubt, metaphysicsdo with everything hat exists.However,the totality of whatincluding what has existedand will exist, is infinitely small inparison with the totality of the Objects of knowledge. Theasily goesunnoticed,probablybecause he lively interest n which is part of our nature tends to favor that exaggeratiofinds the non-real a mere nothing--or, more precisely,whicthe non-real to be something or which sciencehas no appat all or at leastno application of any worth.How little truth there is in such a view is most easily shideal Objectss hich do indeedsubSistbestehen), ut whichby any means exist (existieren), and consequentlycannot sense e rcal (wirklicft). Similarity and difference re examobjectsof this type: perhaps,under certaincircumstances,hesist between ealities;but they are not a part of replity themThat ideas, as well as assumptions nd judgments, are neveconcerned with such Objects (and often have reason to bintimately concerned with them) is, of course,beyond quSimilarly,number doesnot exist n addition o what is numsupposing he latter doesexist; this we clearly know from ththat we can also count what doesnot exist. Again, a connectinot exist in addition\to what is connected, upposing he latteexist: That their existence s not indispensable s proven b

3. Concerning the sense in which I intend to\mploy the expression


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[80] IAIE)(IUS MEINONGconnectionbetween he equilaterality and equiangularityof a tri-angle. Moreover, where existing objects are concerned, such asatmosphericand thermometric or barometric conditions, the con-nectedness oes not unite theserealities themselves o much as itdoes heir beingor even heir non-being. n knowing such a connec-tion, we are already dealing with that special ype of Object (mitjenem eigentumlichenGegenstandartigen), hich, as I hope- haveshown,as related to judgment and assumptions Urteilen und An-nahmen) in the rvay in which the Object, in a strict sense,(dereigentlicheGegenstand)s related o presentations Vorstellungen).I haye recommended he name "Objective" (Obietkiv) for thistype of Object, and I have shown that the Objective itself canassume he functions of an Object in the strict sense. n particu-lar, it can become he Object (Gegenstand)of a new judgment,or of someother intellectualoperation, which is related to it as toan ordinary object (Obiekt). If I say, "It is true that the antipodesexist," truth is ascribednot to the antipodes,but to the Objective,"that the antipodesexist." But this existenceof the antipodes s afact (Tatsache) which, as everyoneseesmmediately,can very wellhave a subsistent tatus, but cannot be still another existent entityin its own tufn, as it were.* This holds, likewise, or all other ob-jectives,so that every cognitive act which has an Objective as itsObject represents hereby a caseof knowing somethingwhich doesnot exist.What has been stated here only in terms of isolated examplesis supportedby the testimony of a very highly developed cience-indeed the most highly developed one: mathematics.We wouldsurely not want to speak of mathematics as alien to reality, asthough t had nothing to do with what exists. ndeed,we cannot ailto recognize hat mathematicss assuredof an extensivesphereofapplication n practical ife no less than in the theoretical reatmentof reality.However,pure mathematical nowledge s neverconcernedwith anythingwhich must, in the nature of the cage,be actual. Theform of being (^Seiru) ith which mathematicsas such s occupiedis never existence(Existenz). In this respect, mathematicsnevertranscends ubsistenceBestand): a straight ine hasno more exist-ence han a right anglg a regular polygon, no more tlan a circle.It can be regardedonly as a peculiarity of the mathematicaluse

4. Uber Annahmen,chap. vii.* ld,ass ie zwar sehrwohl bestehen, ber nicht ihrerseitssozusagen och einmalexistieren ann.'l

The Theory of Objects [ 8of language hat this usagernakesquite explicit existence-claEven though the mathematicianmay use the term "existence,"cannotbut concede hat what we would otherwisecall "possibilis, in the final analysis, all that he requires of the objects of theoretical consideration; t is very noteworthy, however, thapositive urn is beinggiven o this ordinarily merelynegativeconcTogetherwith the prejudice n favor of our knowledgeof reaalluded to previously, he basic independence f nnathematicsrexistenceenablesus to understand a fact which would be fa-surprising f thesepoints were not considened. ttempts to systatizn the sciences s parts of a whole usually find themselvesnembarragsingposition in connection with mathematics, and tmust be extricated,with varying degrees f success, y more or lartificial expedients.This is in striking contrast o the recognitioone might straightaway say popularity-which mathematicsacquired or itself even in lay circles by its achievements. utorganization of all knowledge nto the science of nature andscienceof mind (Natur- und Geisteswissenschaft),ppearing oan exhaustivedisjunction, realtry akes into account only the sof knowledgewhich has to do with reality (Wirklichkeit). Csequently,when we look at the rnatter more closely,we shouldbe at all surprised to find that this organization does not dojustice to mathematics"

3. Sosew ANDNrcHTsErNThere is thus not the slightestdoubt that what-is supposed othe Object of knowledgeneed not exist at all. But our accounto now may seem o leave room for the conjecture hat whereexistence s absent, t not only can be but must be replacedsubsistence. ut even his restriction s inadmissable, s may bp sby contrasting he characteristic unctionsof judging and assuma distinction have attempted o maintainby contrasting he "th

and synthetic unction" of thought. n the former case, he acthoughtgraspsa Sein, n the lattera "Sosein." n eachcase,natnrait is an Objective that is grasped; t is reasonable o speak o5. Cf. K. Zindler: "BeitrZige zur Theorie der mathematischen ErkenntnSitangsberichte der l


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[82]{

ALEXIUS MEINONG [83

houseor the land doesexist, hasexisted,or will exist. However, he

light mightbe shedon domainswhich are especiallymportant for usto know.- But such thingsmay be alien to our natural way of thinking; itis even more instructive to recall this trivial fact, which does notyjt go beyondthe realm of the Seinsobjektiv.' ny particular thingthat isn't real (Nichtseiendes)must at least be c-apiUte f servingas the Object for tlose judgmentswhich grasp ts Nichtsein It doesnot matter whether this Nichtseln is neces$ary r merely factual;--Jllil-ro*i.nate. translations of the German terms in the text are the following.The sein of an object is its existing, or its being real; its Nichtseln is its not exisr-ing' or its being unreal; its ,sosein is its having characteristics. A seinsobJektiv isan objective consisting of sopething existing, or of something being reai; anaro-gously for Soseinsobjektiv and Nichtseinsobiektiv.l7, This principlt was first enunciated by E. Mally in his treatise which washonored by the Wartinger prize in 1903, and which appears in completely revisedform as No. III of tlese papers; see chap. i, $ 3, of Mally's paper. [Meinbng hererefers to thc volume in which his own essay originally appeared. Mally's paper isentitled "Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie des Messens."l

nor does t matter in the first casewhetherthe necessity tems rothe essence f the object or whether it stems rom aspectswhiare external o the Obiect in question. n order to know that theis no round square, mustmakeaIf physics,physiology,andpsycholideal characterof sense-qualities,about color as well as about sounmore than the other. Thosewho lsion could very well say: "There ithere are no suchobjects."The fais meantby this statementhrowsof objects to reality, or their relation to being, genglaly: thatsomewhat loser eximination of the matter,which is of fundamenimportance n its own right, is entirely n place n our presentstu

4. Tnr AussrnselN oF THE Pune OslncrA recourse o certain psychologicalexperiences uggests-lsas p natural way of resolving tre paradox which seems o lie bet

us.I have attempted o preJent he most essential oints pertainto this problem n anotherwork.8But, according 9 my-a:countheif we werenow to maintain the aforementioned ubjectivityof senqualities,we could speakof the objectof a Presentation f blue oin ttre senseof somethingwhich is a capacityof that presentatfrom which reality withholds, as it were, the opportunity. forrealization.considered rom the standpointof the presentation,still seems o me to touch on somethingof essentialsignificaHowever, I cannotconceal rom myself at present he fact that itno more necessaryo an object that it be presented n order nto exist than it is in order for it to exist. Further, even if there wa reference o it, the most that could result from its being presenwould be a sori of existence-"s;d5fsngsby way of idea (in dVorstellung)"-21d 5s, more precisely, "pseudo-existence"'.expresst more exactly: If I sayf "Blue doesnot exist," I am thining just of blue, and not at all of a pr,esentation nd the capacit -may have. It is as if the blue musi have$ing_ in .the first plabefore we can raise the questionof its being (sein) or non-be(Nichtsein). But in ordef not to fall into new paradoxesor ac

The Theoryol Obiects

8. t)ber Annahmen, PP. 98 ff'9. See "Uber Gegensiinde hijherer Ordnung," loc. cit', pp. 186 f'


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[84] ALEXIUS MBINONO The Theory ol Objects [8absurdities,_perhapshe following turn of expressionmay be ap_propriate:Blue, or any-other Oblect whatsoevlr, s somehLwgivenprior to our determination--of ts -beingor non-biing, io ; way"thatdoesnot Trry any prejudiceto its ion-being. we"'co-urduiJo a"-scnoe ne srtuation rom its psychological ide n this way: if I shouldbe able to judge that.a certainOtieit is not, then I upi.u, to havehad.to gra-sphe ObjecJ n someway befoieh*A, i"'iiJ"r-to ,uyanything about its non-being,or morl precisely, i orao io "mr-r to deny the ascriptionof non-being o^theObjectThis fact, despite ts commonplice charactlr, is seen o be ofre to do justice oit with somewhatrs of the following considerations.I a certain thing, A, is not-morest as much an Objective as is thetainty with which I am iustified indegreeof certainty that the Objective,above,thatithassubsistencef:,::itfffl#l",i3li;"ti"li#i',",ffi1f -i: u seinsobiektivor Nichiseinsobiiictiv, stands n relation to its9Uj"."l

(Obiekt), albe-it um grano salis,as the *n.f" t it, p".tr.But if the whole has being,so must its parts. This seems o iean,when t is extendedo theiase of the objective: if the objectivi hasbeing (rsl), so, in somesenseor other, must the object *rri.n u"-longs to it, even whel th9 Objective is an objectiveof non_being(Nichtseiwobiektiv). Furthermore,sincethe otjective rtri"tly pr"-ventsus from assuminghat A has being, (being, as we have si"n,can sometimes e understood sexistence; ometimes ssubsistence),it appears hat the requirement hat the object have beinj r*rri"nwas inferredfrom the beingof the Nichtseinsobiektiv)o,u[", ,ror"only insofar as the being in question s neither existencenor sub-sistbnce-only ihsofar as a third order of t"in!, it oo" t"1, ip""tthis way, is adjoined o existence nd subsistence.his rort of ueingmust belong, herefore, o everyObject as such.A Nichtseinof thesame ype cannotbe set in opposition o it, for a Nichtsein even nthis new-senserculdhave!g immediatelyproducedifrcultiesanalog-ous to thosewhich arisefibm Nichtsein in its ordinary sense,andwhichthe new conceptwas o haveeliminated.The teri "euasisein,seemedo me for a while to be a completelysuitableexpressionorthis rather oddly constitutedtypey'f being.

This designation, owever, ike others hat were approvedea(for instance,"Pseudoexistenz"and "Quasitranszendenz,"r) r

for such a postulate.Must we not take thought to avoid it in case also wherever t is possible?The considerationwhich seto force us to such a postulate s, to be sure, an experiencewis easilyobserved.As we have seen,A mustbe "given" to me n sway or other if I am to grasp ts non-being.This produces,howeas f have already shown elsewhere,l2an assumption (Annahpossessingffirmativequality: in orderto denyA, I must first assthe being of A. What I refer to, so far as the being of A iscerned,s thus somethingwhich is to a certainextentonly a claimto being (ein gewissermassenorgegebenesein des 4 . But ittfte essence f assumption hat it direct itself upon a being witself does not need to be.Without a doubt, t would be comforting o be able o say hastrange kind of being which belongs o that which does not hbeing (Sedndes Nichtseiendes)s just as absurdas it sounds'Sa view could recommendtself to us were t not for the fact thaObjective,whichhasbeing,alwaysseems o require n turn an Owhich has being. For the present, his requirement s basedson the analogy o the part-wholerelation: an Objective s thetreated as a complex of some kind and the Object belongingas a kind of component. n many:respectshis may be in accordwith our insight into the nature of an Objective,which is as yetexceedinglydefective.However,no one will deny that this anais only an initial expedient n our embarrassment nd that twould be no grounds or following this analogy igorouslyevepart of the way. Thus, nsteadof deriving he beingof an Objectthe being of an Objective,evenon tle basisof a questionable nawherethe Objective s an Objectiveof non-being, t would be bto conclude rom the facts with which we are concerned hatanalogl! doesnot apply to the Objective of non-being-i.e., thabeing of the Objective is not by any means universallydepeupon the being of its Object.


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[86] ALEXIUS MEINONGThis is a positionwhich speaks or itself without any further ado.If the oppositionof beingand non-being s primarily a matter of theObjectiveand not of the Object, then it is, after all, clearly under-standable hat neither being nor non-being can belong essentiallyto the Object in itself. This is not to say,of course, hat an Objectcan neitherbe nor not be. Nor is it to say that the question,whetheror not the Object has being, is purely accidental o the nature ofevery Object. An absurdObject such as a round squarecarries nitself the guaranteeof its own non-being n every sense;an idealObject, such as diversity, carries in itset the guaranteeof its ownnon-existence. nyone who seeks o associatehimself with modelswhich have become famous could formulate what has been shownabove by sayingthat the Object as such (without considering heoccasionalpeculiaritiesor the' accompanyingObjectire-clausewhichis alwayspresent) stands"beyond being and non-being." This mayalso be expressedn the following lessengagingand also less pre-tenticlusway, which is in my opinion, however, a more appropriateone: The Object s by nature ndifferent to being (aussersetend), l-though at least one of its two Objectives of being, the Object'sbeing or non-being, subsists.What one could thus call with propriety the principle of the in-differenceof pure Objectsto being (den Satz vom Ausserseindesreinen Gegenstandes)inally eliminates he appearance f a paradoxwhich was the immediateoccasion or the assertionof this principle.As soonas t is recognized hat, apart from specialcases, oth beingand non-beingare equally external to an Object, it is then under-standablehat nothingmore, so to speak,s involved n comprehend-ing the non'being of the Object than there is in comprehendingtsbeing.The above-mentioned rinciple of the hdependenceof Soseinfrom Sein now presentsa welcomesupplement o this view. It tellsus that that which is not in any way external to the Object, but.constitutes ts proper essence,subsists n its Sosein-the Soseinattaching o the Object whether he object has being or not. We arefinally in a position to see with sufficient clarity what confrontedus above as the prejudice n favor of the existence,or at least thebeing, of afl possibleObjects of knowledge.Being is not the pre-suppositionunder whi& knowledge inds, as it were, its point ofattack; it is itself such a point of attack. Non-being is equally as

The Theory ol Objects

5. TnB Tnsonv or Onrncrs ns PsvcnotocvWe now know that thoseObjectswhich exist, and ewhich have being,run fan short of the sum-totalof Objectsedge,and we can see hereforehow inaccurate t would be

a scienceof the actual, or a scienceof being in general,nhow comprehensivets scope,as a scienceof Objectsof ktakensimply as such.Moreover, n the prwious paragraphconsideredonly the Objects of cognition. But the questat the very outset of this exposition had to take into conthe fact that not only cognition but every case of judgpresentation as ts Object-not to mentionthe Objectivitystiindlichkeir)* of extra-intellectualexperiences. his all-eimportance of Objectivity for the psychical side of lifeindeed be precisely ts distinguishing haracteristic,as I hamentioned already-may now suggesto us that (owing toclusive attention to cognition) we permitted ourselvesdown a detour that might easilyhave been avoided.For tlrwhich most naturally would have to do with Objectsas sube the very one whose business t is to deal with this OThis task, in view of what I have ust touchedon once agato belong to psychology.In any event, t must be conceded hat the current dipsychologys not entirely opposed o such a conceptionoThere s, for example,a psychology f sound aswell as a pof color, within which by no rneans he least importanttaken to be the ordering of the diverse Objects belongisensorydomain concerned,and the investigationof their dnature.13 t is also natural that the scienceof psycholodraws into its range of investigation he distinctive activitpsychologicalsphere-in particular, intellectual activitiesbe an odd psychologyof judgrnent hat took no notice of acitf which (under sufficiently avorable circumstances) ebeyond itself to take possession f reality in sorne way.* [By "Objectivity" is meant here merely the characteristic of referrin


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[88] ALE)SUS MEINONG The Theory ol Oblects [8somethingbesides eality which can be known, and it is sometlfngwhich wg are n a position o know with the aid of certain ntellectualoperations.Psychology,herefore,certainly cannot refrain from con-sideringboth this capacity o know and also that somethingoutsideof reality (Ausserwirkliche) toward which these characteristicac-tivities are directed.To this extent, therefore, he Objectsof judging, assuming,andpresenting,as well as the Objectsof feeling and desiring,undoubt-edly gain entry into psychology.But everyonewill notice at oncethat this sciencedoes not take theseObjects nto consideration ortheir own sakes. n practice, both inside and outside of scientificpursuits, it is, frequently enough,quite an incidenql matter as towhat result s a primary-goal, and what is just acceptedas an acci-dental by-product . For example, t is certainlyuseful to archaeologythat what philologistsoften find necessarymerely for textual inter-pretation pbints to the "real things," yet is no proper part of classicalphilology, Otherwise, he latter sciencecould easily lay claims tobeing the most basic discipline, since work on 4ncient languageshas provided the starting point for all sorts of scientificactivity.Similarly, psychologicalnquiry can bear fruit for related areasaslong as they belong o scienceswhich are either lessdeveloped hanpsychologyor have not yet been formally recognizedas sePar,ateCciences t all. Nothing more clearly demonstrates hat this hashappened n the caseof theoreticalconsideration f Objects han theeximple of colors mentioned above, where investigation of thepsychologicalacts first led to the investigationof facts concerningObjects; an example s the investigationof the relationshipsamongcolors conceived n spatial terms (der Farbenkdrperauf den Far-benraum).raThe reference o linguistic science,already ntroduced,shows n another respect how little psychologY an qualify as thetrue scienceof Objects. n dealingwith the meaningof words andsentences,l6inguistic sciences necessarily lso concernedwith Ob-jects, and grammarhas done the spadework or a theoreticalgraspof Objects n a very basic way. Thus, in point of fact, the viewpointfrom which psychologywas to have been concededany prerogativein this matter is not apparent; ather, it is clearty seen hat neitherof these ko disciplings an be that science f Objectswe are seeking.


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Ie0] ALB)CUS MEINONOwhich, strange o say,has not yet entirelybeen orgotten.This argu-ment states hat if "esse"neednot be precisely percipii' it must atany rate be "cogitari"; for no one can think of an "essd' without-thinking of it. In any case, he effect of such considerationsmay bemore opposed o, than in accord with, their intent. If, for example,the ultrawhite mentionedabove s brought into the domain of theo-retical considerationust by meansof a conceptiondirected owardsit, then the novel psychologicaleventswhich come to ltfe couldengender ew work for psychology.To be sure, his is by no meansnecessary.n the caseof the examplewe are consideringhere, suchwork is scarcely o be expected, ince an abundance f similar con-ceptions s already available. However, the possibilty must cer-tainly be kept in mind, and if it is once actually rcaliz.ed,hen howlittle the conceptionof ultrawhite is a part of psychologywill be-come quite clear.By viitue of this conception, he work of the theoryof Objects is to a certain extent already completed,btrt that ofpsychologyhas yet to be done. It would be odd do consider theaccomplishedask a psychological ne just because f the task thatis still to be done.

6. Tns TnBonv or OsrBcrs ls e Tneony ortnB Os.recrs oF KNowrepcnWhat psychologycannot provide us might better be sought,therefore, n those areaswhere the very nature of what we investi-gate s constituted, n part, by Objects.On the basisof our previousdiscussion,t can hardly be doubted hat in cog3itionwe havebeforeus facts of this type. Cognition s not merely a jirdgrnent hat happensto be true; it is true by its own n4fiug-frus from within, as t were.A judgment is true, however, not insofar as it has an Object thatexists,or even one that has being, but only insofar as it graspsanObjective hat has being.That there are black swans,but that there

is no perpetuummobile, are both true judgments;but the first con-cerns an exfuent object, he seconda non-existent bject. n the onecase, he being of the Object in questionsubsists;n the other case,its non-beingsubsistsri ruth is alwaysbound up with the being ofObjectives and is therefore partially constituted out of it. Thejudgmentwould not be true if therp were no Objective o which itreferred. Nor would the judgmerrte true if it were constituteddif-ferently than it is and thereforedid not agreewith the facts. The

The Theoryof Obiectscoincidence f the one subjectiveand the other objective eqcan thus be entirely accidental: as when one draws a truesion from false premises.Now such an accidentalor external character s surelyto the relation betweenknowing and what is known. In tof knowing, it belongs o the nature of the judgrnent thatnot miss ts aim at what is to be known. This distinctive ecognitionachieves place n the forum of psychologicalnvethroughwhat we know as evidence Evidenz). However, thejudgment tself doesnot constitute he fact of cognition. It itial to graspthe Object with respect o the Objective, andthe beingof the latter is indispensable.n this respect, he centirely resembles he judgment which is true per accidewere. For this reason, t was possibleeven at the beginninpresent essayto call knowledge a double fact (DoppeltaAnyonewho wishesa scientifically loserview of this compomust not restrict himself to the psychologicalaspect of it; also ake into consideration, squite expresslya part of the pset before him, the other side, i.e., the Objective which haand the Object which is implicated n the Objective.With regard o our major problem,we have n somemeaturned to a standpointwhich we abandoned n the previougraphs, for we have appealed o the fact that objects beonly to cognition,but also to false udgment, o presentatiopsychological ctivities which are totally non-intellectual. rfclude hat the theory of Objects alls most naturally within thtific treatment of cognition, we are confronted with this qBy restricting ourselves o cognition and thus excluding othchologicalevents,do we not.cut ourselvesoff from certainand give up that universalitywhich is required in dealing wjects as such?The doubt is unfounded. rn order to see his, one musall, remember he characteristicdifferencebetweenpsycholthe scienceof knowledge. t is obvious hat psychologys coonly with real psychological ventsand not with the merelypA scienceof knowledgecannot set similar limitations on itscauseknowledgeas suchhas value, and thereforesomethinis not but could be may draw attention to itself as a desifor knowledge.Accordingly, not only are pseudo-objectsnand hence all objects which are actually udgedor presenteincludedas Objects of our scientiflcknowledge(Wissens),b


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lez1 ALE)CUS MBINONGall Objects which are Objects of our cognition only in possibility.However, here is no Object which could not at least in possibilitybe an Object of cognition; at any rate, we may saythis if we adoptthe instructive iction that the capacity or knowledges not impairedby limitations,such as stimulus hresholdsand thresholds f discrim-inations, which are laid down by the constitution of the subjectand are never entirely absent.Assuming an intelligenceof unlim-ited capacities, here is nothing unknowable; and what is know-able, is. Ilowever, since the preferredusage s generally o apply"it is" (es gibt) to things which have being, and particularly toexisting hings, t would perhapsbe clearer o say: All that is know-able is given-narnely, givento cognition.To this extent, all objectsare knowable.Given-ness s a most generalpropertycan be ascribedto Objects without exception,whether hey are or are not.The consequence f these considerationsor the relation of theObjects of cognition to the Objects of other psycho{ogical ctivitiesscarcelyneeds o be drawn more explicitly. Regardless f the othertypes of experience ne might have of Objects,all Objectsare,with-out exception, Objects of knowledge. Consequent ly,anyone whoundertakesa scientific reatmentof Objects rom the standpoint ofcognition need not fear that he rnightthus excludeany area rom thetotality of Objects.

,7. T'JinTnronv or Osrncrs As "PURELoclc"It is in accord with long-establishedrad$on to think of logicfirst, when consideringa scientific reatment of cognition.Actually,it is only very recently that problemshave been set for one of themain partsof logic, the so-calledpure or formal logic,18which agreeunmistak4blywith what must properlybe demanded f a theoreticaltreatmenC f Objects as such.lo have alreadyexpressed lsewheremy basic agreementwith E. Husserl'sattack against psychologism"in logic.2o did this at a time when externalcircumstances reventedme from obtaining r,nore han a preliminary and very incompleteacquaintancewith thb extensivework of this author. Today, whenI trust that through penetratingstudy I have done justice in some

18. S.. E" Husserl, LogischeUntrry*lr,ngrr, tnro volumes, (Leipzig and Halle,1900and 1901), Pure" and "Formal" Eogic are explicitly dentified n Vol. I, p, 252.19. In particular, Vol. I, pp. 241 ff,; also Vol. II, pp. 92 fr.,

The Theory ol Objectsmeasure o the merits of the publication in question,I capletely support my previous expressionof agreementandit still further to many anotherof those"problems." trt s, thhapsa dissentof relatively rninor importance hat I wotrld ntheseproblemsprecisely o "pure logic."I am influencedabove all by this fact: it is only with greculty that the notion of logic can be separated rom that of nology devoted o the advancement f our intellectualpowesequently, ogic alwaysremains a "practical discipline."zl Wsay at most that a transition can be made from the workpractical discipline to what tr have occasionally chancteriz"theoretico-practicaldiscipline."z When logic is thus calleIogic,"28 would prefer to say that the result is not logic at aI would refer tle probiemsset for "pure logic" to that thediscipline,or to one of those theoretical disciplines, o whiclike all otherpracticaldisciplines,must fina-llybe traced.I am in complete agreementwith the author of the LUntersuchungen,s I have ust mentioned, n insisting hat ris not to be made exclusively o psychology. ndeed, whensider the guiding idea to which our author returns again anin his polemic against"psychologism" n order to characteextra-psychologicalomain of knowledge, t is difficult foravoid the impression hat he was not entirely able to freefrom what he had opposedwith as much zeal as truth. "Purhas to do with "concepts," "propositions," "arguments," alike.* But are not concepts,after all, presentationswhichused for theoretical purposes,but which are neverthelesstions? If one disregards he. obtrusive grammaticalmeaningword "proposition" (Satz), bs is explicitly demanded, .8., bzano,will one then be able to disregard he psychologica(assumptionor judgment) expressedby the grammatical p

,1. I h"* tried to present this in greater detail in my work, tlberphische llissenschaJt und ihre Proprideutik (Vienna, 1885). See particul96 t.22. Loc. cit., p. 98.23. I find the equivalent term, "formal logic," objectionable in that itmind what used to be taught under tlis name and what has properly beenand apparently overcome. Is this objection based merely on a personal idiosWe must also give some weight to the fact that the term "form" cannot pclear picture of what it is supposed to mean.* [It is impossible to reproduce in English the full significance of Mremarks here and below. There is no English word or expression which d


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le4l ALEXIUS MBINONOtion? More precisely: If we do this, what will be retained hat canin some measureay claim to the name "proposition"? Still, thereis an extralogicalsensehere n which one can talk of a "law (Satz)of contradiction,"or the "Carnot law (Satz)" and so on,% although,to be sure, his has the feel of a rather extendedusageof words. Asfar as I can see, such an extralogical sense s completely lackingin the case of the word "inference" (Schluss). Even il one speaksquite naturally of "the" syllogism n modus Darapti, of "the" hypo-thetical syllogism,and the like, one means an intellectual event orthe possible resultsof such an event, ust as one means a physio-logical eventwhen one speaksof "the' circulation of the blood.To contrast "objective" inferencesand proofs with thory thatare subjective26 ight thus seem o obscure rather than to clarifythe facts of the matter. But the entire tenor of the LogischeUnter-suchungen, s well as many of the particular statementshat are con-tained in it, convincesone that, despitecertain differences n detail(at present navoidable), he author'sgoal s thesame as our own.It is a goal o which he hasbeen orced by mathematico-philosophicalstudies20nd by certaindistinctionswhich are in part genuinely,andin part only supposedly,psychological; refer to the distinctionbetween content (Inhalt) and Objectu and, what is even more tothe point, to that betweenObject and Objective.2sUnder such cir-cumstances,he commoncausewill be better served f I ceasedwell-ing on these considerations which may be largely terminologicalanyway) and, instead, ry to show briefly how, in my opinion, wemay deal more adequatelywith the danger of "psychologism"-2danger which, in spite of the attention devoted o it, may not yethave beenentirely avoided. \

8. TUB Tnronv or Os.recrs es EprstsnolocyBefore we-do this, however,we may draw an obviouspracticalconsequencerom the criticisms we have directed against he ex-pression "pure logic." There is no need to invent a name for atheory of scientifickq5rwledgeWissen) which sets tself no practical

The Theory ol Objectsgoals and accordingly represents a theoretical science. Onenot wish for a more natural name than the designation, T

remote."Psychologism,"as the name of a natural or considereency to solve problerns with predorninantlypsychologicalinvolves no blame in itself.2gHowever, within a certain sp

who neglects he secondside of this fact and so proceedtheory of knowledgeas if there were only a psychologicacognition, or one who would foist the viewpoint of psychevents on this second side, is not to be spared the repropsychologism.Can we make clear to ourselveswhy there is this dafalling into such a psychologism,a danger from which sanyonewho has concernedhimselfwith epistemologicalmatwithheld his tribute? The double aspect (Doppelseitigkeit) nition is so striking that hardly anyonecould overlook it only existing hings were to be known. However, as we havall of mathematics,and particulad geometry,dealswith threal. Thus, the prejudice in favor of reality that I have repcalled o attention eadshere to a dilemmawhich seems o billuminating and which is, nevertheless, asically very singube sure, we may not become explicitly consciousof it eas29. The proven objectivity of Uberweg-Heinze's presentation of factsme of this in my own case. They place my own scientific activity under th

24, What is involved here is, of course, the Objective; see Uber Annahmen,p.197.' Jntersuchungez,


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Ie6] ALE)CUS MBINONO The Theory ol Obiectsthat has being. And surely, whoever wishes to free himthis misconceptionneed not make it his task to keep pat a distance rom the theory of knowledge. The psyccognitionmust always constitute an integral part of theknowledge.The only thing againstwhich he rnust guardtaking for psychology hat part of the theory of knowleis and must remain the theory of Objects.

If the theory of the Objects of knowledgeor, more btheory of Objects, s presentedo us as an integral part of of knowledge,sohe answer o the initial questionof our pcussion an easily be found. The proper place for investijectsas such,we could then say, s the theory of knowlein fact, this result could be left standingwithout rnuch dthe theory of Objects. The more clearly the theory of kbecomes ware of its tasks, the more certainly it will beremain,by virtue of one of its fundamentalparts, a theowhich s to be known, of the "given" in the sensen whichwas employedabove, and consequently f the sum-total ogenerally.Often enough,epistemologicalnterestswill quiteprepare he way for an interest n the theory of Objects.less, f I see ightly, we must go one step further if we ardo justice to the claims which a theory of Objects is commake in virtue of its distinctive nature.

9. TUB Tusonv or Osrrcrs .4,s SppaRAreScrcNcThe position of psychology,which along with theObjectsmust be given a fundamentalshare n the theoryedge, oints o this fact. We havealreadyseent to be self-e

there can be no theory of knowledgewhich does not conwith the act of knowing and which is not to this extent achologyof cognition. However, no one would considercanceof psychology or the theory of knowledge o be ancharacterization f the position of psychology n the systences.No one would wish to regard psychologyas noththan a piece of episternology.Shall we be satisfiedwithanalogouscharccteization of the theory of Objects?Is it

it may be formulatedapproximately n the following manner: eitherthe Object to which cognition s directedexists n reality or it existssolely "in my idea" (more briefly, it "pseudo-exists',). erhapsnothingbearsmore eloquent estimony o the naturalness f this dis-junction than the use of the word itdeal.', According to modernusage,without regard for its historical meaning, he word .,ideal,'means the same as "thought of" or ',merely presented"; hence tpertains, apparently, to all of those objects which do not existor which could not exist. What does not exist outside of us,so one automatically thinks, must at least exist in us. Such anQbject, it is supposed, elongsbefore the forum of psychology;onethen makes room for the thought that the knowledgeof eiistingthings (and alongwith this knowledge eality itself) cin perhapsbetreated "psychologically."And perhap5 his prejudice in favor of what is actqal can betraced one step farther back by exhibiting the truth from which itcould haveoriginated. t would certainly be mi$taken o believe hatevery instanceof hnowledgemust concernexistenceor somethingexistent.But is it not correct to say that all cognition as such ul-timately has to do with something which has -being (mit einemSeienden)2That which has being, he "fact,', without which no cog-nition could count as cognition, s the Objective. t is the Objectivewhich is graspedby the relevant cognitive act and to which being(Sein) or, more precisely,subsistence Bestand) belongs,whetherit is positive or negative,whether t is an Objective of being (Sein)or of.Sosein Would it be too risky to suppgsehat the faciuality ofits Objective, which is unfailingty associatedwith any instance ofcognition,has undergonea sort of transferenceo the Object (whichis almost the only thing consideredby theory) and that it is thenexaggerated nto the tacit demand that everything that confrontsknowing be real?- The questionmay remain undecidedhere. Our problem is notthe psychologyof psychologism.This much, however, stands be-yond all doubt: psychologismn the theory of knowledge s invari-ably basedon the neglector misunderstanding f the Object side \of--the cognitive state,uthe word "Object,' being here taken in itswidest sense, n which it includes the Objective). One falls intopsychologismf onefails to grasp he significance nd the distinctive


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Ie8] ALE)CUS MEINONGfor our interest n the theory of Objects o proceed,as it were,byway of our interest n cognition?It seems hat anyonewho has involved himself closely with theproblemsof the theory of Objects has plenty of direct experienceto the effect that this is not the case.We may acknowledge hatepistemologymay utilize every detail which competent nquiry inthe theory of Objectshas producedand will produce, o afford somefurther information, perhaps ess directly, but no less clearly. Wecan fully appreciate the basic significance of what the theory ofObjectshas to show us concerningpsychologismn epistemology, swe have just done, and at the same ime admit that the theory ofObjects raisesproblems whose solutions are interesting for theirown sakes.This becomesparticularly clear when qe make an ,assumptionwhich may still involve much that is obscure,but concerningwhoseessentials have no fear of making any mistake. I have referredbefore to the fact that a suitableplace for mathematics ould neverbe found in the systemof sciences.f I am not mistaken, he anoma-lous position of mathematics ad its basis n the fact that the con-cept of a theory of Objectshad not yet been formed. Mathematicsis, in its essentialeatures,a part of the theory of Objects. say "inits essential eatures" n order to explicitly leaveopen the possibilityof a specificdifferentiationof mathematicalnterests which I believeis one of the unexplainedmatters mentionedabove).81Apart fromthat, it seemsquite obvious to me that both internal and externalfactors have secured or mathematicsan advantagewithin its owndomain, while the theory of Objects must set the entire domainof objects before itself as its task or hold this domain before itseyesas an unattainable deal. If.this consideration s justified, then,as soon as some account s taken of the more specific aspectsofthe theory of Objects we cannot fail to see how little our interestsin it are epistemologicalnterests.From what has been said,I draw the conclusion hat the theoryof Objectshas a claim to the statusof a discipline ndependent ven ^\of the theory of knowledge, and, accordingly, to that of an inde-pendentscience.Thh claim cannot be elevated o the level of anaccomplished act, but, on the contrary, is scarcely beginningtobe fulfilled, for the theory as a whqle is something o be developed,and not something eady to'be exhibited. The high stageof devel-

The Theory ol Obiectsrecognitionof its claims, which can hardly be overestimmathematicianmight well be disturbed by the suggestionis "really" a theorist of Objects (Gegerutandstheoretikeever,no one will demand hat a physicistor chernistconsidself to be a metaphysician.This is so becausea sciencewhready existscannot be either charactenzed r even named nof a sciencewhich is still merely an object of aspirationover, a relatively generalscience as such can and must segoalswhich are foreign to the relatively specializedsciencsecondpoint is somewhatobscured, n the case of the relamathematicso the theory of Objects, by the fact that in tmain of the theory of Objects mathematics represents n(of several) but, at least for the time being, the only specenceof its type which is known and recognized.A twofolperhapsquite dissimilar in its two aspecls, s, accordinglyascribed o the theory of Objects. On the one hand, the theObjectshas the problemsof a scienceof the highest degreeerality and comprehensiveness.n the other, it has, as if ing in the place of a whole group of specializedscienceproblemswhich so far have not receivedany specialconsidBecauseof the necessity or descending nto relatively spedomains which arises from this situation, its nature as ascience s unavoidably again obscured.Consequently, he sution of mathematicsunder the theory of Objects can easilyto threaten he distinctive characterand specialclaim of the fHowever, such external and accidental matters oughthamper insight into the essentialconnection between mathand the theory of Objects tg the extent that that connectioThis not entirely simple situation can, perhaps,best be gidue by saying: Mathematics s certainly not the theory of Obut is now as before a science n its own right. However, ts Oare ncluded n the domain which the Theory of Objects,alsoits own justification, must deal with as a whole.

10. TnB TnBonv oF OBJEcrs ,c,I.ro rHen ScrsNrcrs;GeNeRAr, NDSpncrArrzeo TueoRy oF OsrncrsThe theory of sciencecan adopt two approacheso its


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[1oo] ALEXIUS MEINONGthen the theory. The severalsciencesnust first be given. T'hen henecessityor examining more closely their nature and mutual rela-tionship may become ustified. However, science s also, at leastpartially, the resultof premeditatedactivity. In employingsuch ore-sightedness,he theory of science an also deal with scienceswhichdo not yet exist but should exist. It can find itself directedtowardrendering he idea and the tasks of such sciences s preciseas pos-sible in anticipation of them.In the precedingdiscussionwe found ourselvescompelledbyour interest n Objects o. considerationswhich belongto the theoryof science. n this connettion, it is incumben?upon the theory ofscienceo function in the secondof the two ways mentionedabove.The theory of Objects, which we must claim to be a proper sci-ence, s, in the main, a sciencehat for the time'beinghardly existsat altr-especially as a separatediibipline explicitly recognizedn itsown right. But, althoughno investigations ave been carried out inthe name of the theory of Objects, we must not suPposehat thissciencehas beenwholly neglected.trf we were to trace out in detail the numerousand intimaterela-tions which the sciencewe have just proposed bears to ways ofthinking that have been followed in the past, we would see hat itjustifies tself by what it has to offer. This is not the proper time totrace theseconnections; evertheless,n introducing his new scienceit is appropriate o make some mention of them, Thus, some noticecan be taken of necessitieswhich have been felt for a long timeand which have already ound expression n the r,nostdiverseways,necessitieswhich have arisen in consciouslyworking out intereststhat are very widespread,but which have often been unconsciousof their real goal.In fact, I believe hht no specialhistorical nvestigations actuallyrequired to establish hat, althoughthe theory of Objects may nothave been pursued "explicitly" heretofore, t has all the rnore fre-quently beenpqrsued"implicitly." To this I must add that, at leastin practice,the implicit status has degreeswhich smooth,fransitionto the explicit status. Anyone who wishes o pay attentionto suchtransitionsand their orsets should bear in mind that we have metwith interestsof two different types pertaining to the theory o\Objects: those questiofis certain specialdomains

The Theory of ObiectsWe have referred above to the faat that speciatrizedintain sense he most specialized) ttreory of Objec'r.s as fomathematicshe most splendid epresentationhat could beThis luster has long led to efforts to make the procedumathematico,accessibleo other sciences-I might say, otmains of Objects. We shall scarcelybe tripped unr by anycanterror if we add: wheneversuchatternptshave been und

then to that extent an effort has been naadealso to do thespecializedheory of Objects in areasoutside of rnatherncourse,not every application of mat"hernaticalroceduresnebe taken nto considera{.ion. hen the merchantor the engiculates,he has as little to do with the theory of Objects as wother theory. Flowever,certain presuppositionshaving to Objects ie naturally at the base of such practicanapplicais not otherwisewhen the application results n a theoreticest. In contrast with the technique of calculation which dcompleteattention,the nature of thesepresuppositions anfully in the background"This is ilinrstratedmost clearly by thof probability and the theory of probableerror, which even still not recognizedby everyoneas naturatrly elonging o Lpsychology.The nature of these assulroptionsan possiblycalculationsn questionat the serviceof the theory of Objwe can see n the case of the theory of combinations). Megeometryseernsbetter prepared than arithrnetic to extendbeyond ts narrow borders to discoveriesn the theory of trf one observes hat the domain of spatiatrquantities bearithmetic,then what is offered as the translation (so fameveryone) of the geornetricalview from space to tirne isextramathematicalnd, moreover,pertains o the theory ofIt pertains o the theory of Objects becauset is in no waywith the so-called eality, or more precisely, eal existenceIt is obvious that the analogy s valid for phoronorrnyo greater neasure;f-what seemso me to need no proof-,A.is correct in contending that tension is the "third fundphenomenonof rnechanics"along with spaceand time,82additionaldirection s indicated n which this science,withou


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theory of Objects hrough the most thoroughgoing priori treatment

chology to order the "perceptual Objects" ("Empfindungsgegens'tiinde')ts belonging o t}te difterent senses nd, where possible, ounderstand heir multifariousaspects n tep.s of spatial representa-tion are particular$ instructive. Even if, in regard to visual sensa-tion, where these effortl have brought forth the most tangibleresults,sahe name "color-geometry" mplies far more praise thanis actually deserved, t still becomesundeniablyaPparent hat thecharacter of the pertinent investi$tions belongsmuch more to thetheory of Objects han to psychology. trust that it is not excessivelypersonalfor me to report at this time that much of the essentialnature of the way in which the theory of Objects rames ts ques-tions originally occurred o me while I was engagedn supposedlyexclusivelypsychologicalaborstowardclarificationof thesematters.

What I have called the encroachmentof the mathematicalap-proachbeyond ts strictest imits has an instinctiveand unconsciousiharacter in comparison with the completelyexplicit attempts toexpand that domain and to generalize o the fullest extent possiblethat way of framing a problem.Thesehaveprobablyalreadyachievedsome mportanceunder the name of the general heory of functions;one cannot fail to see this in such designations s "the theory ofextension" and "the theory of manifolds," and even under the fre-quently misunderstoodcatchword, "meta-mathematics."From thepoint of view we haveaddptedhere, hesestrikingly significant nves-iigationsrepresenthe transition from the specializedo the generaltheory of objects.A similar statusmay be ascribed o the endeavorsand results customarilygroupedunder the generalnameof "mathe-matical logic," even though those endeavorsare in many respectsintended or an'entirely differentpurpose.On the o$er hand, it islikely that the treasureof valuableassertions nd suglestions,which(non-mathematical)ogi,q, pistemology, nd metaphysicsrom Aris-totle to the presenthave contributed o the area with which we are

33. A t** introduced by Witasek, o,h?"h ,""-. to me very useful. (Cf' hisGr.unillagen er allgemeinenAsthetik 1904],pp. 36 ff.)

tences.86 uweverdifferentthe two casesmay be on the wholeis 0emptedo say hat the general heory of Objects must earngrammar ust ai the specializedheory of Objects must learnmathematics.As this quick surveyshowsdespite ts somewhatcursory nthe theory of Objects is by no meanscompletely dependenwork which is yet to be performed. ndeed,one might ask whthe attempt to introduce a "theory of Objects" lneans anythan a new name for an old concern.One could easily gofind that it is indifferent o the investigationtselfwhether t is utaken by a mathematician,physicist, ogician, ot a student otheory of Objects.Nevertheless, misunderstandingwould luthis last move-a misunderstandingwhich was counteredexpat the beginningof this exposition. It is certainly immateriasolves heoreticalproblemsand under which name he solvesIf recognitionas a special disciplineshould be successfully bfor the theory of Objects, one would, now as before, alwayto be thankful to nnathematicians,hysicists, inguists,and the sentatives f other sciencesor their energetic urthering of tterestsof the theory of Objects, even when they do not mehavedeparted rom the legitimate erritory of their own sciencfor many, recognition of this sciencewould clarify the natthe problems o be solved-especially where (as is commoncase) he most relevantworks are not of the greatestmportanatural consequence f this is that old problemsare renderedpand new ones ntroduced.From the point of view of the theObjects, the problems and concernswhich we have just grtogether-and which at first glancewould seemso diverse-pthemselves s belonging ogether; he value of such a point ois thus confirmed.

The Theory of Obiects [1[102] ALE)SUS MEINONG


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[104]

11. Pnnosopr{y AND rnr Tlrsony on OnlBcrs

one must resolve, particularly if one endeavorsto start from tle

one cannot work in the theory of knowledgewithout also workingin the F.ory of Objects, or at least utilizingl the most importantdiscoveriesof the theory of Objects, seems o me beyond doubt.s?Therefore, f someofleshould claim that thesestudiei are properly-le. riloJoetails on this point u." 3 b, found in rpy work, uber phirosophischeWissenschaltund ihre Propiideutik,.chap. i. Squ, -*t recently, Utin.., :;Zu,gegenwiirtigen aturphilosophie,',oc. c4, pp. 123 (63) fi.37, Cf. alsoH:ilfler, oc, cr'l.,p. l5l (91).

pursuedonly in the nameof the theory of knowledge,his cla

existence hereforecan be inferred from the fact of the appI would certainly not deny that the things that thus appeainterest o the physicist.But I cannot maginehow the "phen

The Theory ol Obiects

38. Communicated n SuPplementgegenw?irtigen aturphilosoPhic." I of Hiifler's repeatedlycited u'

39. bid.,pp . 15a(94) ff .+0. Ct. ;ii, gegenwtirtigen aturphilosophie,"esp' pp' 131 (71) ff'

AIEXIUS MEINONO


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[ 106J ALEXIUS MEINONGof these (e.g., the "phenomena" hat come after the beginningandthe end 9f the appearing hing) can be excruded rom ihe d6mainof metaphysics.{l..gnnronriate evaluation of the importance of what Breuerand Hiifler suggstwould require me to digress oo far from themain therneof this study. Fof now, these ei hints -"V-U" "rougt,o show why it still seems o me to be most appropriut", in the

rcarm _or mvestlgatlon he inorganic as well as the organic andpsychological,n order to ascettainwhat has validity toi Eu"rytrringthat falls in suchdiverse ealms.of course, he emphasiswniJtr trrisdefinition placeson universarity enders he necess-ityor clarifyingthe relationsbetweenmetaphyiics and the tnrory oi o;jr.tr-;'re"-cially obvious.This is so because ur attentionhas utsoulen-aiu*r,9{ .th" exceptionalbreadth of the area pertaining to th" tfreoSyotObjects.But- perhaps t is preciselybV th" simultaneous onsidera_:t??_-ol he theory of Objects hat we are led to ,a standpoint romwnrchwe can perfectour characterization f metaphysicsnd therebysilen"",many of the doubts which may previousrynu* u."rr iui*aabout it.. - In this way, moreover, can fan back on what has been saidbefore and, to that extent,_cut my discussion nort. f, u, - *emay well believe,everything hat exisis n the world is either psycho-logical_or physical, then metaphysics, nsofar as it is conclrnedwith the psychologicalas welf ai the physical, is the scienceofreality in general (von der Gesamtheitdes wirktichen). To thisextent, then, to cite an example, both the fundamentai thesis ofmonism, which asserts he essential dentity of the physicar"oJ tn"psychological,and that of duarism,which asserts neii essentiar if-f:t"l:",. are metaphysical.But any one who knows miog, it U"rdenticalor different certainly knows sometflng about thes=ehings;yet his knowledge,however, also concerns dintity and/or differ-T"?, ."ld identity itsel-f s as far from beinga thing atrIs difference.Both dentity and differencestandgutside oi the disjunctionbetweenthe physical and the psychologicali sing they stand beyond rtre real--.it* philosophischelisserucha!t, ",, p. 7,

The Theory ol Objects(ausserhalbdes Realen). There is atrso nowledgeof whact:c,alvon Nichtwirklichem). No matter how generallylems of metaphysics re construed, here are questionswhichmore general; hesequestions,unlike thoseof metaphysicoriented exclusively oward reality. The questionsof theojects are of this kind.But one will immediatelyask: is it not forced, or at ltrary, to exclude n principle all ideal objectsa2rom thmetaphysical nvestigation? answer hat in the first placeby no means excluded n every sense.Our metaphysicawould certainly be in a sorry plight indeed, as the exmonism and dualism has just shown, if one couLd notmetaphysics f identity and difference,nor of cause,purpocontinuity, and many other objectswhich are either entiretially of an ideal nature. However, many Objects of thisalso discussedn physics,althoughno one would count thethe Objects of physical nquiry. In any case, he restrictirealm of metaphysics o reality is in tended with a very deervation. Fresupposingsuch a reservation, however, X bfact that this restriction is entirely compatible with thewhich metaphysics as been carried on both in ancientanern times, in accordancewith that natural.pre-erninencewhich has been repeatedly ouched upon. "Ontolory," thof categories,"and the other subjectsassignedmore or lemously o metaphysics ave occasionallyallowed a place oextendingbeyond he limits of the real; but this is an indicof the correctness nd unavoidabili ty of these nterests. trofar as I can see, here s no roorn for doubting hat the fuintention of all metaphysics as alwaysbeen directed towprehendingthe "world" in a strict, natural sense, .e.,of reality. This is so even when this comprehension eemthat what is to be comprehendedhas no claim at aXl oof a real object. But even if our presentview of the chmetaphysics p to this time should not convince everyoeven if it should be shown to be historically incorrect,concernsonly the definition "de lege ate," as it were, antitton "de lege ferenda"4swould remain open for conOn this assumption, he characterizattom f rnetaphysicabovewould be a proposal for a definition: the restrict

42, "Uber Gegensttinde dherer Ordnung," pp. 198 ff.43. Breuer, n Hiifler, oc, cit,,p. 189 (129),


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[108] ALE)SUS MEINONO The Theory of Objectsabsurdby nature, whether it subsistsor could equally wethese are questionswhich are actually of interest to theObjects and which are ultimately questionsabout being.therefore: even he restriction o Soseinprobably cannotbinto harmony with the essentialnature of the theory ofThere may be, however, a rather sirnpie source of here. It is a methodologicaldistinction, and one which, soconcerns he nature of the sciences, eoptre eretoforehato make with too much, rather than too little, ardor. As isknown, somecasesof knowledgeare justified in terms ofacteristics, he Sosein,of their Objects or Objectives.Agare other casesof which this is not so.aoThe first typeedgehas long been called a priori, and the latter, empiricdays we occasionallymeet with failure to recognize his dbut such failure no rnore affects he validity of the distindoes the fact of color blindness aftect the distinction bevariouscolors. (The stateof color blindness,however, s pcally much more interesting.) If we now make use of the betweena priori and empirical, we will have no difficultyto me, in making a satisfactorydifferentiationbetweenour plines.What can be known about an Object in virtue of hencea prioiri, belongs o the theory of Objects"This inthe first place, the Soseinof the 'ogiven."But it also inbeing (Sedn) nsofar as that can be known frorn i.ts Soseother hand, that which is to be determined about Oba posteriori belongs o rnetaphysics, rovided that the knoof a sufficientlygeneral character.That the domain of rnot be overstepped s long as the knowledge n questiontive in nature s assuredby the a posteriori characterof thedge. There are, therefore, preciselytwo sciencesof higerality: an a priori sciencewhich concernseverythingwhicand an a posteriori one which includes n its investigatithing which can be consideredby empiricatr nowledge, .in general"The latter science s metaphysics,he former isof Objects.The most striking feature of this definition is that mappearsas an empiiical science;yet the representatives

name "metaphysics" to the general scienceof reality would be justas desirable n the interest of a clear formulation of the problemsof metaphysics s it would be in the interestof its distinct delimina-tion in relation to the theory of Objects.

ist"aa n such a way that, whereasall existing things subsist, t isnot true that all subsistingentities (e.g., difference) also exist?Even n this case, he areawhich the theory of Objectscomprehends,as,we have seen,would not be included in its entirety; the non-subsistent,he absurd,would be excluded.To be sure, he nonsubsis-tent is of little concern o the natural nterest,and t providesan evensmallerpoint of purchase o intellectualunderstanding.aEut it doesbelong o the "given" (Gegebenen),after all, so that the theory ofObjectscanby no means gnore t.


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[110] ALEXIUS MEINONG

. If one_ bjects,however, hat the word ,,metaphysics"has oftenbeen used as a name for intellectual endeavorsor -evenfor results

The Theory ol Objectsof this division. Eut it would be unfair to demand n thiswhat has not been clearly achieved n any instanceof cosciences.A more important objection emerges pecifically rstandpointof the theory of Objects. We have treated thiswere simply a generalscience,even hough we had to makeexplicit distinctionabove betweena generaland a specializeof Objects. Here is an imperfection which cannot be remleast n the presentstateof knowledgeof nnatters ertainintheory of Objects; there are practical reasons or this. trt that mathematics, nsofar as it is a specialized heory of could be accompanied y still other specialized heories oftheir number scarcely o be determined.However, these aat presentso incompletelyknown to us that in studying heis not yet any need o specialize.The specializedheoriesofdivide at this time, therefore, into rnathernaticaland nonmatical. What can now be said about the second membewholly primitive division is so obvious that it easily finds within the limits of the general theory of Objects. T'o thisthere is at present no specialiZed heory of Objects othmathematics. f course, necannotpredicthow long this wiDevelopmentalong these ines will not be forestalled by thetion proposedabove. Jr.lstas specializedempiricatrscienceover against he generalempirical science,specializeda prencescan accompany he general a priori science. For tbeing, this possibility s realized only in mathematics; n surnathematicsunder the standpoint of the theory of Objehave placed it alongsideof disciplines which are not nowbut they are disciplineswhich at least are possible. n anrnathernatics eed no tronger ind itself in that odd isolatiwhich earlier theoretical conceptionsof mathematicssuffeI must finally return to placing he theory of Objectsamphilosophical sciences,which was accomplishedabove withpealing to a definition. Ou occasion, have attempted to asphilosophical hosescienceswhich are occupiedonly withlogical mattersor which are occupiedalso with psychologicaThe opinion has been expressed ery recentlt'8 that my wthe theory of relations and complexesmay have led me to ascribean essentially wofold object to philosophy: firs


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Ir r2] I ALEXIUS MEINONG The Theoryof Obiectssucha modificationwould destroycompletely he uniiy of the origi-nal definition is amply evident. One should be scandalized o findthe objectsof philosophy turning out to be a hodgepodge f left-overs rom the natural sciences, nlessone believed hat philosophyshouldgenerallybe characterized y reference o whatever he nat-ural sciences appened o leaveover.4oOn sucha view the functionremaining or philosophycould hardly be called worthy. And evenif the introduction of a scientific activity intended esientially forpjcking up left-overs could have some practical justification, thisshould scarcelyalter the theoretical facf that in ttremselveshese

science. f I may count metaphysics mong the philosophicaldisci-plines becauset conceivests problemsbroadly enouglr hat, alongwith the physical, he psychologicals also to be included n it, then

must be considered oo. The foregoingcan be said quite independ-ently of the fact that, in connectionwith ideal Objects (which bynatureare alwayssuperordinatesuperiusf), psychologicalObjectscan sometimesenter into considerationas indispensablesubordi-nates (inferiora).Of course, do not hesitate o admit that the parallelismwhichhas just been shown to holdrQetween he theory of Objectp andmetaphysics lso holds in othei matters which are fundamentdllyofmore practical than theoretical significance.From the fact thatmetaphysicss concernedwith the psychological,and not only wlththe psychologicalbut. dso with the physical, have concluded,onthe sideof metaphysics,hat the repr\sentativeof the psychological

some particular technique contributed by another sciencas mathematicsn partiiular can be regardedas a specializof Objects, t would be ungrateful o forget that researchowhich belongs o the theory of Objectsoften leads o splenwithout any thought for otber philosophical nterests.

12. CotqcrusroN


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[114] D\ ALEXIUS MEINONG The Theory ol Obiects

some utopia, but as a goal which we may clearly hold before oureyes,and which we have alreadybegunto use our best abilitiestoachieve.Accordingly,,if the presentexplanationsare to.function at thesame ime as a kind of specialprefaceto the p3rt of the presentbook which has to do with the theory of obiJcts, this is theLppro-

siders himself authorized (or under the present circums

of Objects s a young, a very young, science.Anyone who bhimself o its domain inds an immeasurable ealth of problemandpossible olutions. rIowever,evenwith the rnostcarefutr oation,he cannothope o fiit the correctanswerevery ime. Instmustexpect hat whai he believeso have beenestablishedirmoftentimes all victim to advancedknowtredgend to the deresearchechniques f the future. trt s alsoobvious hat in thening the individualityof the investigatormust play a more dettive role in the results han it does n tirnesof establishedra

vation.

sequently sometimes o go into ones tr have touched on.itself a signof the primitive stateof the theory of Objects.Onvery well reproachus for not havingsmoothedout our differeoral converiation in order that we might appearbefore thewith a firmly unified systemof harrnonious onceptsand terr

[ 11 6] ALEXIUS MEINONG The Theory ol Obiects [117]


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the principle of the greatestpossible reedomof convictionhordsatthe same ime; had we decidednot to allow individual views to be

If I am not mistaken, the reader will take no offenseat the greatnumber of new conceptsand terms,.of which many may appeir to-lZ. s.es.c. o.

be superfluous nd burdensome and insofar as they really are, theywill certainlynot endure). Nor will he take ofiense at the fact thatwe have decided o give this or that concepta name different fromthe one I have used n earlier works. .A.good term is as nnuchashatrfa discovery;and it is better to replacea bad term when a betterone has been ound than to continuedraggingalong the evil consequences f the old for the sakeof conservatisrn.- I may now summat'up. n the foregoing, an attempt has beenmade to demonstrate he legitimacy of the theory of Objects as aseparatescience n its own right. The two treatises hat follow-iniidentally and implicitly the other studiesassembledn this bookas well-are intended o make contributions o this science. n thisrespect, o demand completeness nd irrefutability can hardly bereaionableas things now stand. t is enough f we shouldhavebeenable successfullyo set forth a considerationand critique of ideasthat strive to go still further, and by this to show that the path wehave taken is worthy of confidence,and one by which anyonewhoresolves o take it will be advanced. t is to be hoped that what wehave been able to offer here will bring friends and recognition tothe new scienceof the theory of Objects.

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