Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China

Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China

Daniela StockmannDepartment of Political ScienceLeiden University

Media Marketization in Authoritarian StatesDeregulationCommercializationPartial PrivatizationGuang Niu/Getty Images

The PuzzleWhy does media marketization contribute to political liberalization in some countries, but not in others?

What is the role of the audience in explaining these outcomes?Media MarketizationRegime StabilityPolitical Liberalization& Regime Instability

A. Theoretical Framework and Research Design

State-Society Relations under AuthoritarianismAuthoritarian rulers stay in power by means of:Repression (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1965; Bellin, 2004)Exchange of economic benefits in return for political support (Ross, 2001; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005; Lust-Oskar, 2006)

Compliance not explained with regime support

A.1. Theoretical Framework

The Dictators Dilemma (Wintrobe, 1998)The use of repression makes citizens hesitant to state their true opinionsThe dictator suspects opposition

Distribution of rents as a solution


Marketized Media as a Solution to the Dictators DilemmaMarketized media provide information about citizen beliefsMedia marketization makes the state less reliant on coercive measuresMedia become more credibleMarketized media are attractive propaganda instruments

But: what happens, if market demands conflict with the official line?


Regime Type and Media MarketizationCondition for media marketization to work in favor of authoritarian leaders:Institutions in charge of editorial control of news content Single-party regimes tend to have this institutional capacityRegime type mitigates the effects of media marketizationA.1. Theoretical Framework

Media as Instruments of Regime StabilityA.2. Hypotheses

In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:

A.3. Research DesignChongqingFoshanShenyangBeijingWuxi

Research DesignInterviewsOpen-ended, semi-structured interviews with 46 media practitioners

Content AnalysisComputer-Aided Content Analysis of news reporting in Chongqing and Beijing

Public Opinion SurveysBeijing Area Studies of Beijing Residents (BAS)Survey of Legal Mobilization conducted in Chongqing, Shenyang, Foshan, and Wuxi (LLM)

ExperimentsNatural experiment of media management during the 2005 Anti-Japanese protestsExperimental vignettes (among citizens in Beijing)

Cross-country ComparisonCollection of macro-level data on authoritarian states in Africa, East Central Europe, and the Middle EastA.3. Research Design

Evaluations of Labor Law and Sentiment towards the United States1.Both issues are open, but related to regime stabilityMost-difficult test of counter-hypotheses2.Issues differ in terms of the relationship between the official line of the state and audience demandsObservation of the relationship between institutions and market forces

A.3. Research Design

Labor Law

United States

Official Line

Positive

Positive

(or Less Negative)

Audience Demand

Positive

Negative

Media as Instruments of Regime StabilityA.2. Hypotheses

In China and Other Single-Party Regimes:

B. Evidence from the 2005 Anti-Japanese Protests in Beijing

Media Management During Crisis

Nationalism as a source of state legitimacyNationalism poses pressures and constraints on foreign policy towards Japan (and the US)

Media as a tool to massage negative sentimentExcept during CrisisB.1. Background

Timeline Quasi-ExperimentB.2. Empirical Example

April 9

April 10

April 17

April 27

May 4

Protest

Machimuras visit

Lians visit

Soongs visit

Loose state control over news reporting

(Control Group)

Press Restrictions: News content is synchronized

(Treatment Group)

Newspaper Types in BeijingSpace for News ReportingOpenClosedDegree of Media MarketizationHighLowCommercializedSemi-OfficialOfficialB.2. Empirical Example

TreatmentB.2. Empirical ExampleB.2. Empirical Example

Media Credibility

Official papers are perceived as propaganda organs and mouthpieces of state units.

Commercialized papers are perceived to publish real news from the perspective of ordinary people.B.2. Empirical Example

Newspaper Types in BeijingSpace for News ReportingOpenClosedDegree of Media MarketizationHighLowCommercializedSemi-OfficialOfficialB.2. Empirical Example

Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617)

Statistical Models:

1. Media Selection ModelDV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable)2. Media Effects Model

Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100)B.2. Empirical Example

Media EffectsControlling for national identity, exposure to alternative media sources, travel to Japan, education, generation, and gender.B.2. Empirical Example

Positive Views of Japan

(Feeling Thermometer)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Independent Variables:

Exposure to Commercialized Messages

-14.33**

(7.1)

Exposure to Commercialized Messages * Post-April 9 Interview

6.33

(10.68)

Post-April 9 Interview

-9.62*

(5.85)

Intercept

50.66***

(13.19)

R-squared

0.11

Valid N

481

p-value * p

Media EffectsB.2. Empirical Example

Summary

Despite marketization, newspaper content tends to be uniform.At the same time, marketization boosts the credibility of newspapers, thus promoting the ability of the state to influence public opinion.

AppendixQuasi-Experiment

Assumption of Quasi-Experiment

Respondent Characteristics by Treatment Groups

Average

(s.d.)

Whole Survey

Pre-Protest

Press Restrictions

Years of Education

11.34

(3.17)

11.43

(2.79)

12.03

(3.04)

Personal Income

(RMB)

2,212.28

(5918.01)

2,212.92

(7,266.22)

2,548.68

(4,409.72)

Female

0.43

(0.5)

0.43

(0.5)

0.38

(0.49)

Age

47

(9.78)

48.3

(9.51)

45.21

(9.6)

Valid N

617

385

232

Official Paper Use(Raw Data)

Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling (response rate: 56.1 %, n= 617)

Statistical Models:

1. Media Selection ModelDV: Newspaper Consumption (dummy variable)2. Media Effects Model

Assumption: People were at least moderately attentive to news about Japan.DV: Feeling Thermometer toward Japan (continuous variable, 1-100)B.2. Empirical Example

Selection EffectsB.3. Selection EffectsControl variables are not displayed in the table.

Use of Official Papers

(Among Readers)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Use of Commercialized Papers

(Among Readers of Non-Official Papers)

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Press Restrictions

-0.47***

(0.15)

0.1

(0.17)

Official Visits

0.53**

(0.27)

-0.68**

(0.34)

Intercept

-1.51**

(0.62)

1.72**

(0.95)

Pseudo R-Squared

0.05

0.05

Valid N

492

314

z-value * z

Selection EffectsB.3. Selection Effects

Selection Effects (Controls)

Use of Official Papers

(Among Readers)

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Press Restrictions

-0.47***

(0.15)

Official Visits

0.53**

(0.27)

Control Variables:

Cadre

0.19

(0.21)

Party or State Unit

0.60***

(0.22)

Neighborhood Committee Worker

0.68*

(0.38)

Education

1.07

(0.73)

Personal Income

0.46

(0.31)

Intercept

-1.51**

(0.62)

Pseudo R-Squared

0.05

Valid N

492

z-value * z

Media Effects (Controls)

Positive Views of Japan


Coefficient

(s.e.)


Exposure to Commercialized Messages

-14.33**

(7.1)

Exposure to Commercialized Messages * Post-April 9 Interview

6.33

(10.68)

Post-April 9 Interview

-9.62*

(5.85)

Control Variables:

Watching TV News

-2.65

(3.64)

Reading the News Online

-8.44***

(2.71)

National Identity

-12.5***

(3.94)

Japan Threat Peceptions

-8.36***

(3.18)

Travel to Japan

10.14*

(5.94)

Education

3.73

(13.18)

Age 38 - 53

5.56***

(2.01)

Female

1.67

(1.99)

Intercept

50.66***

(13.19)

R-squared

0.11

Valid N

481

p-value * p

Effects of Exposure to More Commercialized Papers as Reading Additional Papers and Press Restrictions Change

Effects of Reading up Ten Papers as Exposure to Commercialized Papers and Press Restrictions Change

Credibility

Media Labels and BrandingMedia branding refers to marketing strategies by media outlets to establish themselves as distinctive players in the media market.Advertising We make a Paper that is close to YOU! The Paper that Responsibly talks about everything!Corporate identitiesSpecial columns and famous reportersDesignOverstepping of boundaries for news reporting(playing table tennis by the edge)

Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (I)

Beijing Readership Survey, 2002 (II)

Experimental Vignettes:Official Frame According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Wang Village Colemin owed Deng Pingjun and others, a group of 20 people, wages of more than 30000 Yuan. Approaching the spring festival the migrant workers wanted to visit home and asked several times for their wages, but the cole mine refused due to lack of money. The migrants had no alternative but to go to Beijing city court, demanding to be compensated for their work. To the benefit of the workers, the court took their case very seriously, speeded up the process, and waived the application fee. Under the hard work of the judges the case was resolved through mediation. The migrants received partial compensation on the same day and they had enough money to travel home for new years. According to statistics, since my countrys labor law was passed in 1995 the number of accepted cases in the whole nation was 425726. these disputes rightful, timely, and proper application had advantages for protecting the legitimate rights of the large working population. The court guided and shaped the complicated labor relations during the reform process, as well as solved the problems arising during reform and development of enterprises. (/)203 1995425726Original source: Peoples Daily, 21 March, 2002. :

Experimental Vignettes:Commercialized Frame According to (Beijing Evening News / Beijing Daily), Liu Dingwei, Li Demin and Chen Qian belong to a group of 19 farmers in the city of Nancheng in Sizhou. Between July and December 2005 they worked at a construction site of TongXin Company in Chengdu. Throughout the process, the company outsourced to Mr. Zou. After arriving at the construction site, Mr. Zou asked Liu Dingwei and the other 18 to hurry up. Working hours and wages were decided by Mr. Zou. While working at the site Mr. Zou only gave these migrant workers a small sum to pay for living expenses. Each migrants wages was delayed to a different extent. In total wages in the amount of 26050 Yuan were not paid. Liu Dingwei and the others asked several times for their wages, but without any result although Mr. Zou said he would inquire about the reasons for the delay. In February the workers asked the provincial legal aid center for help. Together with two lawyers and staff they contacted TongXin Company and after positive coordination and communication eventually received a compensation of 13000 Yuan. (/)192005722121191926050 200721223000Original source: Chengdu Evening News, 18 September 2007.

Experimental Vignettes (Gibson and Gows, 2003)Survey Question (asked in all conditions):Source: LLM, 2005.

Have you heard about the labor law? If yes, respondent was asked: In general, is the implementation of the labor law very effective, somewhat effective, not so effective, or not at all effective in protecting workers rights? Variable was coded one if respondent had heard about the labor law and thought it was somewhat or very effective, otherwise it was coded zero. 1

13 out of 138 participants had never heard about the labor law and were therefore not asked the second question. Among those 4 were sampled into the control group and 9 in treatment groups.

Experimental Vignettes:Results

Independent Variables

Perceived Effectiveness of the Labor Law

(Dummy Variable)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Commercialized Label

0.510*

(0.31)

Commercialized Frame

-0.026

(0.307)

Control Group

0.058

(0.331)

Constant

0.422*

(0.254)

N

118

Pseudo R2

0.02

z-value * z

Experimental Vignettes:Results

Institutions

Institutional Restrictions

Sponsoring InstitutionsState Publication and Press AgencyConglomerationAbsence of Media LawPropaganda Department

Institutions establish boundaries for news reporting

Attitudes toward the United States

News Reporting about the United StatesTopicsPositivity / NegativityB.2. News Content

News Reporting about the United States* Control variables are not displayed in the table.

Dependent Variable:

Tone of US

All Articles

Variables

Coefficient

(s.e.)

People's Daily

1.142***

(0.309)

Politics

-3.592***

(0.876)

Article on China and the US

1.199***

(0.238)

Constant

0.582**

(0.277)

N

2,272

R2

0.06

*** p

News Reporting about the United States

Sensitivity of News Reporting about the United States

Peoples Daily

Average

(s.d.)

Beijing Evening News

Average

(s.d.)

Total N

Political Leaders

China and US

0.57

(0.6)

0.47

(0.51)

110

Only US

0.54

(0.58)

0.31

(0.48)

269

No Political Leaders

China and US

0.36

(0.68)

0.2

(0.42)

202

Only US

0.26

(0.5)

0.18

(0.4)

221

Total N

420

382

802

News Reporting Over Time:Tone

Tone Over Time (Table)

Dependent Variable

Tone of News Reporting about the US

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Among All Articles

Peoples Daily


People's Daily

0.257***

--

--

--

(0.088)

People's Daily*2003

0.067

--

--

--

(0.103)

2003

-0.139**

-0.197***

-0.308***

-0.171*

(0.066)

(0.074)

(0.117)

(0.096)

China and the US

0.451***

0.374***

0.139

0.484***

(0.053)

(0.075)

(0.118)

(0.099)

China and the US * 2003

--

0.157

0.398**

0.061

(0.102)

(0.156)

(0.135)

Control Variables:

Politics

-1.381***

-1.192***

-1.101***

-1.530***

(0.189)

(0.185)

(0.275)

(0.26)

Sensitivity Over Time

-0.896***

-0.321*

-1.090***

-0.626*

(0.222)

(0.179)

(0.279)

(0.355)

Length

1.070*

1.074*

1.241*

0.778

(0.569)

(0.57)

(0.727)

(0.892)

Constant

0.404***

0.398***

0.806***

0.410***

(0.069)

(0.071)

(0.145)

(0.092)

N

2,272

2,272

945

1,327

R2

0.07

0.07

0.07

0.08

p-value * p

Data AnalysisData:Beijing Area Studies, conducted in the spring of 2005 based on PPS random sampling

Statistical Model:

Attitudes = Attention + AttentionSquared + Exposure + Attention*Exposure + AttentionSquared*Exposure + Controls + u

DV: Feeling Thermometer toward the United StatesB.3. Media Effects

Media Effects: Theory(Exposure +) Attention + Susceptibility = Effect

AttentionAttitude ChangeLiberalConservativeB.3. Media Effects

B.3. Media Effects

Positivity toward the United States


Variables

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Peoples Daily

-0.123

--

--

(10.935)

Attention

-38.950**

-43.303*

-35.013**

(15.726)

(23.749)

(16.767)

Attention2

43.749***

47.507**

40.509***

(14.919)

(23.896)

(15.552)

Peoples Daily*Attention

29.319

--

--

(44.185)

Peoples Daily*Attention2

-38.681

--

--

(40.273)


--

3.449

--

(6.896)

Beijing Evening News*Attention

--

12.115

--

(30.072)

Beijing Evening News*Attention2

--

-13.981

--

(29.27)

Official Papers

--

--

2.572

(7.811)

Official Papers*Attention

--

--

13.07

(34.887)

Official Papers*Attention2

--

--

-24.933

(34.463)

National Identity

-15.534***

-14.946***

-15.211***

(4.134)

(4.135)

(4.148)

Personal Contact

32.251***

34.170***

33.386***

(11.865)

(11.817)

(11.91)

Education

(logged)

15.6

16.255

15.149

(12.992)

(12.96)

(13.024)

Generation

4.530**

4.112*

4.298**

(2.131)

(2.139)

(2.136)

Intercept

38.375***

35.596***

37.695***

(11.955)

(12.173)

(12.177)

N

487

487

485

R squared

0.08

0.09

0.08

p-value *** p

Beijing Evening NewsB.3. Media Effects

Peoples DailyB.3. Media Effects

B.3. Media Effects

Positivity Toward the US

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Attention

-92.676**

(38.978)

Attention Squared

106.965***

(38.31)

Exposure to Official Messages

-10.54

(15.992)

Exposure to Official Message * Attention

127.604*

(71.822)

Exposure to Official Message*Attention Squared

-153.769**

(72.429)

National Identity

-17.751***

(4.127)

Personal Contact

34.129***

(11.718)

Generation

4.269**

(2.101)

Education (logged)

16.942

(13.692)

Tension

-9.119***

(2.144)

Constant

47.394***

(14.866)

N

482

R2

0.12

*** p-value < 0.01; ** p-value < 0.05; * p-value

Media Effects e More Paper: Medium AttentionB.3. Media Effects

One More Paper: High AttentionB.3. Media Effects

Official Papers

Views of the Labor Law

Labor Law and Labor DisputesLabor protests have been increasing in recent yearsLegal Reform: Building a Rule of Law- Increase its legitimacy- Channel worker grievances into legal institutions- Improve Implementation

Use the law as a weapon!(!)A.3. Issue Selection

Newspapers in ChongqingOpen Space for News Reporting ClosedCommercialized PapersOfficial Papers

The Official Line: Labor Law Protects Workers"The central government is very clear: Wen Jiabao said that migrant workers should get their salary on time. Those kind of problems are labor disputes. If the employer is from a private corporation, they should give salary on time; if the employer is from a state-owned enterprise, then he should even more do so."

(Interview # 7)

News Reporting on Labor Law: Tone

News Reporting on Labor Law:Selection This year in May Lao Du happily took the labor compensation.(Peoples Daily, 2005)"Filing a lawsuit is too exhausting, I no longer believe in legal channels. Chinese people do not have human rights. Zhu Rongji has really sacrificed our generation, especially since the beginning of the reform period. Justice in China is not real."(Interview with Lao Du by Mary E. Gallagher, University of Michigan) Happy endings: Articles do not address the problem of implementation

Media Effects: Theory(Exposure +) Attention + Susceptibility = Effect

AttentionAttitude ChangeLiberalConservativeB.3. Media Effects

Attentiveness and Views of the Labor Law (among media users)* Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies, 2011

Media Effects of Official and Non-Official Papers on Views about the Labor Law* Parallel regression assumption holds; Control variables not displayed in the Table


Coefficient

(s.e.)


Official Papers

0.393**

(0.19)

Attention

0.784***

(0.196)

Official Papers * Attention

-0.704**

(0.299)

Foshan

0.103

(0.085)

Wuxi

0.390***

(0.07)

Shenyang

0.181**

(0.071)

Cut 1

-1.812***

(0.296)

Cut 2

-0.278

(0.293)

Cut 3

1.464***

(0.294)

N

2,049

Pseudo R2

0.02

z-value * z

Media Effects of Official and Non-Official Papers on Views about the Labor Law

Likelihood to Perceive the Law as Effective / Coefficient

Applicability to Other Media Types

Newspaper Use (Raw Data)

Newspaper Use

Newspapers and News Websites* Forthcoming in Susan Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, 2010

Dependent

Variable

Independent

Variable

Newspaper Consumption

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Online News Consumption

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Press Restrictions

0.657(0.459)

0.497(0.520)

Negativity toward Japan

0.742**(0.335)

0.875**(0.401)

Press Restrictions*Negativity

-1.063*(0.608)

-0.627(0.673)

Cadre

1.053**(0.438)

-0.038(0.236)

Travel

-0.558*(0.291)

0.953***(0.274)

English

-1.462(1.166)

7.552***(1.422)

English Squared

2.177(2.028)

-9.505***(2.999)

Years of Education

3.101***(0.673)

3.898***(1.132)

Income

0.376(0.275)

0.918**(0.382)

Constant

-2.316***(0.601)

-6.054***(1.015)

N

603

597

Pseudo R2

0.09

0.27

*** z

Newspapers and News Websites* Forthcoming in Susan Shirk, Changing Media, Changing China, 2010

Media Sources, Attentiveness, and Views of the Labor Law(among frequent media users)* Forthcoming in Comparative Political Studies, 2011


Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

(s.e.)

(s.e.)

(s.e.)

(s.e.)

(s.e.)

(s.e.)

(s.e.)

Attention

0.136

0.242

-0.175

0.441***

0.456***

0.479***

0.460***

(0.207)

(0.261)

(0.431)

(0.169)

(0.161)

(0.172)

(0.175)

Frequently Watching Legal TV Shows

-0.335*

--

--

--

--

--

--

(0.2)

Frequently Watching Legal TV Shows * Attention

0.867***

--

--

--

--

--

--

(0.321)

Frequently Reading Newspapers

--

-0.229

--

--

--

--

--

(0.205)

Frequently Reading Newspapers * Attention

--

0.42

--

--

--

--

--

(0.327)

Frequently Watching TV

--

--

-0.441

--

--

--

--

(0.293)

Frequently Watching TV * Attention

--

--

0.788*

--

--

--

--

(0.463)

Frequently Listening to Radio*

--

--

--

-0.415

--

--

--

(0.297)

Frequently Listening to Radio * Attention

--

--

--

0.554

--

--

--

(0.472)

Frequently Listening to Legal Radio Show

--

--

--

--

-0.809

--

--

(0.517)

Frequently Listening to Legal Radio Show * Attention

--

--

--

--

1.575*

--

--

(0.884)

Frequently Reading Magazines*

--

--

--

--

--

-0.005

--

(0.279)

Frequently Reading Magazines * Attention

--

--

--

--

--

0.188

--

(0.441)

Frequently Surfing News Websites*

--

--

--

--

--

--

-0.064

(0.264)

Frequently Surfing News Websites * Attention

--

--

--

--

--

--

0.258

(0.411)

Constant

0.835**

0.874***

1.100***

0.767**

0.752**

0.756**

0.804**

(0.327)

(0.339)

(0.412)

(0.32)

(0.319)

(0.32)

(0.324)

N

2,309

2,309

2,309

2,309

2,309

2,309

2,309

Pseudo R2

0.04

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.03

0.03

*** z

GeneralizabilityChina

Regional Advertising Income in China

24 Chinese Provinces and MunicipalitiesNo data on dependent variable available for Jilin, Tianjin, Neimenggu,Sichuan, Xizang, Gansu, Qinghai, Hong Kong, Macao.

cases

Province/MunicipalityAdvertising IncomeInternet users

Beijing Shi345574646.6

Shanghai Shi298950545.8

Guangdong Sheng256719735.9

Jiangsu Sheng130538423.3

Zhejiang Sheng124667630.3

Shandong Sheng68955913.5

Fujian Sheng49741024.3

Liaoning Sheng39964418.3

Hunan Sheng33311310.9

Anhui Sheng3106099.6

Chongqing Shi29344212.7

Hubei Sheng28713212.4

Henan Sheng24140410.2

Jiangxi Sheng21299811.8

Heilongjiang Sheng19253512.5

Shanxi Sheng18626315.9

Yunnan Sheng1644656.8

Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu13424417.7

Hebei Sheng12745411.1

Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu10000011.9

Guizhou Sheng764196

Shaanxi Sheng3856613.9

Hainan Sheng3315617.2

Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu2719310.1

24 cases out of 34

2008

tianjin

Neimenggu

Jilin

Sichuan

Xizang

Gansu

Qinghai

Hong Kong

Macao

Taiwan

2008

GBCOUNTSUM_AREASUM_PERIMEADVERTISINGNAME_PINGYmediatrusttvtrustpapertrustinternetusersgdppercapitaruralpopminoritypopsizehighedupopabove6XY

1100001516631315696.00002374422.05903455746.0000Beijing Shi-0.02833180.09610390.088600346.65820415.595.714554421313984961354.40625646528.75000

1200001211720791040.00001732931.9140737137.0000Tianjin Shi26.74612223.6997.729896149895171056399.15625561517.18750

130000164187737100176.125024586790.8790127454.0000Hebei Sheng-0.08876440.02410350.01058211.11987759.759663501245459018994710.09375541936.38281

140000107156681356448.000019645420.0540186263.0000Shanxi Sheng-0.03061220.09501760.078911615.91694555.9799.7131069210529277641824.93750324515.01855

150000881131066998680.000046974794.821069434.0000Neimenggu Zizhiqu13.42539349.8579.24220661560209201049132.412321199865.60938

210000105146067771237.781015804747.8240399644.0000Liaoning Sheng-0.1329696-0.0463618-0.062182918.32572940.883.98393173765376661435878.81250813275.96875

22000052191266641960.000016689114.2400165187.0000Jilin Sheng15.91938346.8490.97250671790238981693960.812501122944.78125

23000088471247090208.000033075142.5490192535.0000Heilongjiang Sheng-0.1710692-0.0602883-0.07232712.51847846.194.98351932151336101678839.875001681706.25000

310000136681244452.00001427467.69802989505.0000Shanghai Shi0.05491070.18303570.172619145.86636711.399.38167083457161991545197.06250-292087.12500

32000090100839226564.938013973343.02901305384.0000Jiangsu Sheng-0.04384920.09523810.064484123.33392846.899.67695035355659881303640.12500-120131.19531

330000163101930972536.502015385867.13901246676.0000Zhejiang Sheng-0.1786436-0.0569358-0.078659630.33741142.899.15458443727433781480108.50000-535236.68750

34000082140106656776.000016653335.4140310609.0000Anhui Sheng-0.09703860.008915-0.00450139.61204561.399.37562472054522121145903.25000-261309.40234

350000119121503151039.190016796980.9290497410.0000Fujian Sheng-0.00201460.14200680.089847324.32590851.398.33327541741306991326013.62500-923737.90625

36000092167380979120.000020409930.8830212998.0000Jiangxi Sheng-0.181746-0.0400794-0.05105111.81263360.299.73399452638365341079269.96875-804731.34375

370000152154051467139.721021106446.9450689559.0000Shandong Sheng-0.04169920.07179940.084202613.52780753.2599.32856964652804661211253.56250249067.35596

410000130165241929580.000021949602.0830241404.0000Henan Sheng0.02680780.15234220.118165810.21601265.6698.7886460323780045774162.06250-82252.09375

42000080185817520024.000020324109.2870287132.0000Hubei Sheng-0.11681410.0123756-0.003620212.41620655.795.6652408.004057.0049735.00695378.10938-414362.03125

430000105211626418400.000025264414.8200333113.0000Hunan Sheng-0.08665490.05185190.003401410.91449259.5589.7958382.003384.0054867.00649867.92188-830547.40625

440000185177032179689.971023348861.74302567197.0000Guangdong Sheng-0.00563380.11454310.103286435.93315136.8698.5885649.005207.0080650.00850901.90625-1322830.50000

45000099235857063170.500025058157.0420100000.0000Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu-0.04562960.09965840.063703711.91255563.7661.6643442.001606.0040026.00334615.68164-1222139.65625

46000014335301210170.06405549050.848033156.0000Hainan Sheng-0.2170068-0.01924-0.112244917.21455552.882.717696.00447.007139.00519203.37500-1736691.43750

510000199566504259152.000054091855.4810450144.0000Sichuan Sheng9.91289364.495.0275201.002901.0070787.00-108422.90625-534149.65234

52000083175866891824.000020502298.373076419.0000Guizhou Sheng0.00257940.13305320.10466276691571.7662.1534587.001026.0031909.00157746.34375-899704.37500

530000126383475103296.000037258922.9890164465.0000Yunnan Sheng-0.0243590.0640590.07337536.81054068.466.5941269.001540.0038261.00-323230.16016-1080055.43750

540000781202978229248.000048482173.353020955.0000Xizang Zizhiqu12.71210971.715.532587.0029.002401.00-1510733.37500-256506.70313

61000098205962274232.000022223302.058038566.0000Shaanxi Sheng-0.12380950.0185748-0.025534813.91460759.3899.5034383.002525.0032678.00407516.7066185520.90625

62000089404120851480.000028877007.013036122.0000Gansu Sheng8.41034668.4191.3123990.00864.0022562.00-218655.24774314995.48438

63000043714827786784.000027292521.866020533.0000Qinghai Sheng111425759.9354.495045.00331.004679.00-784380.2265694017.10938

6400002051559928704.00005088046.796027193.0000Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu-0.129554-0.0120937-0.027966710.11464955.9865.475560.00380.005117.0085193.76758259802.08691

650000891636395596584.000054858769.5930134244.0000Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu-0.3510852-0.223194-0.234049217.71699960.8540.6118872.001567.0017464.00-1677290.90625952402.26563

7100004636280747747.43804555158.7520Taiwan Sheng1633790.31250-1131063.71875

810000191073646257.5630456765.4680Hongkong950501.56250-1360111.06250

820000115423141.000017897.9260Macao892430.46875-1382637.12500

293442.0000Chongqing Shi-0.4666666-0.3333333-0.333333312.71466051.6693.582585091824352

CH:situation as of the end of 2007

CH:situation as of 2007

CH:sitution as of 2007

CH:situation as of 2007

CH:diqu shengchan zongzhi from zhongguo tongji nianjian 2008 -> statistics refers to the situaion in 2007 in 100 mio yuan

Danie Stockmann:zhongguo tongji nianjian 2008 referring to situation in 2007; percentage of rural pop (1-percentage = urban)

Danie Stockmann:percentage of han chinese according to 2000 census data source:http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/index.htm

Danie Stockmann:not available on stats website -> internethttp://wenwen.soso.com/z/q100970018.htm

Danie Stockmann:based on zhonguo tongji nianjian 2008 referring to situation in 2007

Danie Stockmann:number of people who College and higher education as erported by china statistical yearbook 2008

Danie Stockmann:as reported in China statistical yearbook 2008

2005

GBCOUNTSUM_AREASUM_PERIMEADVERTISINGAD. INCOME RANKNAME_PINGYXY

1100001516631315696.00002374422.05902515576.00005Beijing Shi961354.40625646528.75000

1200001211720791040.00001732931.9140527801.000023Tianjin Shi1056399.15625561517.18750

130000164187737100176.125024586790.879087393.00009Hebei Sheng994710.09375541936.38281

140000107156681356448.000019645420.0540141259.000021Shanxi Sheng641824.93750324515.01855

150000881131066998680.000046974794.821038193.000026Neimenggu Zizhiqu1049132.412321199865.60938

210000105146067771237.781015804747.8240455363.00008Liaoning Sheng1435878.81250813275.96875

22000052191266641960.000016689114.2400131380.000018Jilin Sheng1693960.812501122944.78125

23000088471247090208.000033075142.5490171865.000015Heilongjiang Sheng1678839.875001681706.25000

310000136681244452.00001427467.69802664690.00003Shanghai Shi1545197.06250-292087.12500

32000090100839226564.938013973343.0290906323.00002Jiangsu Sheng1303640.12500-120131.19531

330000163101930972536.502015385867.1390956970.00004Zhejiang Sheng1480108.50000-535236.68750

34000082140106656776.000016653335.4140226023.000010Anhui Sheng1145903.25000-261309.40234

350000119121503151039.190016796980.9290360925.000012Fujian Sheng1326013.62500-923737.90625

36000092167380979120.000020409930.8830163354.000019Jiangxi Sheng1079269.96875-804731.34375

370000152154051467139.721021106446.9450611084.00006Shandong Sheng1211253.56250249067.35596

410000130165241929580.000021949602.0830229651.000014Henan Sheng774162.06250-82252.09375

42000080185817520024.000020324109.2870263469.000011Hubei Sheng695378.10938-414362.03125

430000105211626418400.000025264414.8200208724.00007Hunan Sheng649867.92188-830547.40625

440000185177032179689.971023348861.74302346230.00001Guangdong Sheng850901.90625-1322830.50000

45000099235857063170.500025058157.0420115448.000020Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu334615.68164-1222139.65625

46000014335301210170.06405549050.848032606.000029Hainan Sheng519203.37500-1736691.43750

510000199566504259152.000054091855.4810295371.000017Sichuan Sheng-108422.90625-534149.65234

52000083175866891824.000020502298.373076419.000024Guizhou Sheng157746.34375-899704.37500

530000126383475103296.000037258922.9890136536.000022Yunnan Sheng-323230.16016-1080055.43750

540000781202978229248.000048482173.353018456.000031Xizang Zizhiqu-1510733.37500-256506.70313

61000098205962274232.000022223302.058038883.000016Shaanxi Sheng407516.7066185520.90625

62000089404120851480.000028877007.013030359.000027Gansu Sheng-218655.24774314995.48438

63000043714827786784.000027292521.866011000.000030Qinghai Sheng-784380.2265694017.10938

6400002051559928704.00005088046.796023922.000028Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu85193.76758259802.08691

650000891636395596584.000054858769.5930107192.000025Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu-1677290.90625952402.26563

7100004636280747747.43804555158.7520Taiwan Sheng1633790.31250-1131063.71875

810000191073646257.5630456765.4680Hongkong950501.56250-1360111.06250

820000115423141.000017897.9260Macao892430.46875-1382637.12500

271022.000013Chongqing Shi

ChinaDataCenter

GBENAMEXY

11Beijing Shi0.004829000.03018100

12Tianjin Shi0.005610000.02934800

13Hebei Sheng0.005159000.02923400

14Shanxi Sheng0.001808000.02742600

15Nei Mongol Zizhiqu0.006201000.03537400

21Liaoning Sheng0.009133000.03145600

22Jilin Sheng0.011637000.03419400

23Heilongjiang Sheng0.011808000.03926000

31Shanghai Shi0.009636000.02184200

32Jiangsu Sheng0.007535000.02301000

33Zhejiang Sheng0.008609000.01923200

34Anhui Sheng0.006052000.02189100

35Fujian Sheng0.007233000.01578300

36Jiangxi Sheng0.005229000.01702400

37Shandong Sheng0.006869000.02623300

41Henan Sheng0.002846000.02362900

42Hubei Sheng0.001936000.02080800

43Hunan Sheng0.001345000.01698200

44Guangdong Sheng0.003049000.01251000

45Guangxi Zhuangzu Zizhiqu-0.001594000.01348000

46Hainan Sheng-0.000190000.00880500

50Chongqing Shi-0.001949000.01980300

51Sichuan Sheng-0.005815000.02011400

52Guizhou Sheng-0.003030000.01656600

53Yunnan Sheng-0.007434000.01519100

54Xizang Zizhiqu-0.017574000.02317300

61Shaanxi Sheng-0.000362000.02533200

62Gansu Sheng-0.005898000.02778300

63Qinghai Sheng-0.010971000.02602500

64Ningxia Huizu Zizhiqu-0.003148000.02707500

65Xinjiang Uygur Zizhiqu-0.018555000.03395400

71Taiwan Sheng0.010042000.01377500

81Xiangkong Tebiexingzhengqu0.003858000.01202900

Ranking

NAME_PINGY2005 RANK2006 RANK

Beijing Shi56

Tianjin Shi2324

Hebei Sheng99

Shanxi Sheng2122

Neimenggu Zizhiqu2625

Liaoning Sheng88

Jilin Sheng1818

Heilongjiang Sheng1515

Shanghai Shi33

Jiangsu Sheng22

Zhejiang Sheng44

Anhui Sheng1010

Fujian Sheng1214

Jiangxi Sheng1920

Shandong Sheng65

Henan Sheng1411

Hubei Sheng1113

Hunan Sheng77

Guangdong Sheng11

Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu2019

Hainan Sheng2927

Chongqing Shi1717

Guizhou Sheng2423

Yunnan Sheng2221

Xizang Zizhiqu3131

Shaanxi Sheng1616

Gansu Sheng2728

Qinghai Sheng3030

Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu2829

Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu2526

Taiwan

Hongkong

Macao

Sichuan Sheng1312

Area Directly under the Central Government25.2%

East Area44.4%

Middle Area20.2%

Western Area10.1%

Table8OA1

Province / Municipality20052008NAME_PINGY

Beijing25155763455746Beijing Shi

Tianjin527801737137Tianjin Shi

Hebei87393127454Hebei Sheng

Shanxi141259186263Shanxi Sheng

Neimenggu3819369434Neimenggu Zizhiqu

Liaoning455363399644Liaoning Sheng

Jilin131380165187Jilin Sheng

Heilongjiang171865192535Heilongjiang Sheng

Shanghai26646902989505Shanghai Shi

Jiangsu9063231305384Jiangsu Sheng

Zhejiang9569701246676Zhejiang Sheng

Anhui226023310609Anhui Sheng

Fujian360925497410Fujian Sheng

Jiangxi163354212998Jiangxi Sheng

Shandong611084689559Shandong Sheng

Henan229651241404Henan Sheng

Hubei263469287132Hubei Sheng

Hunan208724333113Hunan Sheng

Guangdong23462302567197Guangdong Sheng

Guangxi115448100000Guangxizhuangzu Zizhiqu

Hainan3260633156Hainan Sheng

Sichuan295371450144Sichuan Sheng

Guizhou7641976419Guizhou Sheng

Yunnan136536164465Yunnan Sheng

Xizang1845620955Xizang Zizhiqu

Shaanxi3888338566Shaanxi Sheng

Gansu3035936122Gansu Sheng

Qinghai1100020533Qinghai Sheng

Ningxia2392227193Ningxiahuizu Zizhiqu

Xinjiang107192134244Xinjiangweiwu'erzu Zizhiqu

Chongqing271022293442Chongqing Shi

Average456886.677419355561600.838709677

Media Marketization and Media Credibility in China

Newspaper Credibility

Television Credibility

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Commercial Liberalization Index

0.602***

0.591***

(0.159)

(0.164)

Ratio of Rural Population

0.647

0.545

(0.44)

(0.456)

Level of Economic Development

0.005

-0.042

(0.214)

(0.222)

Ratio of Han Chinese

0.195

0.205

(0.129)

(0.134)

Municipality

-0.196**

-0.222**

(0.086)

(0.089)

Constant

-0.564

-0.473

(0.334)

(0.346)

N

24

24

R-Squared

0.53

0.51


Generalizability: Single-Party States

37 Countries / 137 CasesCases were included if coded as partly free or not free according to FH or as authoritarian according to Polity

Sheet1

CountryYearRegime TypeSingle PartyIrex_Media MarketizationFreedom HousePolity 2

Armenia2008411.314.55

Ethiopia2007511.6451

Georgia2008411.7747

Kenya2007512.5937

Mozambique2007512.0136

Tanzania2007511.973.51

Tunisia2005511.35.5-4

Zambia2007411.953.55

Zimbabwe2007511.946.5-4

Azerbaijan2008301.545.5-7

Bahrain2007301.995-7

Belarus2008300.826.5-7

Burkina Faso2007301.3440

Burundi2007201.354.56

Cameroon2007301.296-4

Chad2007301.035.5-2

Egypt2005601.875.5-3

Guinea2007302.095.5-1

Jordan2007301.84.5-3

Kazakhstan2008301.395.5-6

Kuwait2007302.714.5-7

Libya2005300.097-7

Mauritania2007200.864.59

Morocco2007301.764.5-6

Oman2007301.755.5-8

Qatar2007302.275.5-10

Russia2008301.995.55

Rwanda2007102.015.5-3

Saudi Arabia2007301.676.5-10

Sudan2007201.347-4

Syria2007601.276.5-7

Tajikistan2008301.575.5-3

Togo2007300.845.5-4

Uganda2007302.124.5-1

United Arab Emirates2007302.56-8

Uzbekistan2008300.427-9

Yemen2007300.985-2

Sheet2

Sheet3

OLS Regression Results of Media Marketization on Diversity of Information as Regime Type Changes

Diversity of Information

Freedom House

Press Rating

Coefficient

(s.e.)

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Commercial Liberalization

3.780***

-43.588***

(0.365)

(8.116)

Single Party Regime

0.882**

-22.074***

(0.35)

(7.781)

Commercial Liberalization*Single Party Regime

-2.129***

31.741*

(0.797)

(17.741)


-0.178***

0.561

(0.053)

(1.18)

Length

0.478

-17.354***

(0.298)

(6.635)

Middle East/North Africa

-0.419**

8.915**

(0.183)

(4.078)

Sub-Saharan Africa

-0.037

-2.281

(0.132)

(2.929)

Constant

1.625***

89.578***

(0.42)

(9.351)

N

137

137

R-Squared

0.55

0.46


Partial Regression Plots

OLS Regression Results of Media Marketization on Media Credibility

Media Credibility

Coefficient

(s.e.)


Commercial Liberalization

1.862**

(0.294)

Single Party Regime

-0.346**

(0.058)


-0.184**

(0.031)

Length

-0.004

(0.03)

Constant

0.874**

(0.14)

N

7

R2

0.95


Partial Regression Plot

Dictators face a dilemma since the use of coercion increases the chances of a breakdown of the regime. As repression increases people become more afraid to speak out. As a result, the less the dictator knows about what they are really thinking or planning, and the more reason he or she has to fear them.

All conceptualizations of legitimacy share that legitimacy requires loyalty to the state or rulers, even when there is disagreement (Hallin, xxx)irrational attachment, because it becomes important precisely when the quality of governance declines (hirschman, x)This cannot be established by distribution of economic benefits and authoritarian rulers try to legitimate their rule by means of information control

Two-way relationship between media institutions, news content, and public opinionIn order to assess these three factors I combined multiple methods.

In order to assess media commercialization, three options: time series, compare media types, or newspaper types.-> time series data no available for developing countries-> for my dissertation I chose to focus on newspaper types-> for my book I would like to repeat the analysis for media types

Content AnalysisQuantitative to improve comparability across issue areasMeasure variation in terms of tone of news reporting-> Maryland data coded by trained chinese students-> yoshikoder: multilanguage program in chinese

Public opinionPPS for BAS -> residents which excludes migrant population-> designed after detroit area study at michiganGPS for Chongqing -> migrant population-> survey captures migrant population!!-> I am happy to talk more about these surveys and survey data in general from china in the discussio section

EP-3: collision of US surveillance plane with Chinese fighter -> emergency landing on hainan. Both parties blaimed each otherTaiwan: Japanese colony until 1945 (WW II). When the nationalist party lost the civil war the island became the refuge of the GMD. When the PRC was on the verge of taking control in 1950 the Korean war began (shift of Chinese troups to korea and US: defend taiwan)-> division blaimed at internal backwardness, military weakness, American imperialism-> incomplete sovereignty of the PRC

ROC Independence:strategic threat to china due to ally of ROC with the USPublic Opinion: leaders sell out the country -> collapse of the partyDomestic dominoe effect: separatist movements in Tibet, Uighur, Mongolia

The commercialized newspaper is always more negative / less positive than the official paper, most evident with respect to foreign domestic policy

Some variation, especially at the boundaries between the sensitive and the non-sensitiveMore commercialized papers are closer to public opinion

BUT: on the whole, the commercialized papers follow the lead of the official papers.

Mechanism is NOT coercion: strategic relaxationNo need for oppressive measures in areas where public opinion and state policy converge (for example, stories about US sports and entertainment)During international crises absence of political control can be instrumental=> appeasement of public outrage domestically=> boost of legitimacy of the states position internationallyIn recent years, political protests have been increasing in China, one kind of political protest has been organized by workers. The government has relied on legal measures to address these grievances and so the first issue area I look at are Chinese perceptions of the labor law.

Labor unrest in China has increased throughout the 1990s. The precise number of worker protests is unknown, but observers agree that these protests have been rising.

There is two types of labor protests, workers in state-owned enterprises and migrant workers. Both groups of workers feel that their treatment during the reform period stands in sharp contrast with Socialist state ideology.

Because of that, the central government has recognized that both groups of workers deserve protection by the state. The governments solution is to reform and develop a legal system that will protect the loosers of the reforms. With respect to labor issues the government has provided citizens with a National labor law.

The National Labor Law has been passed for the first time in 1995, and at the last NPC congress meeting in 2007 a new Labor Contract Law has been passed. The 2007 draft was passed in response to the black kiln scandal in which some workers had been kidnapped and forced to work in a brick factory. The new law signals that the state aims to punish government officials for abuse of office and dereliction of duty. The labor contract law also stipulates the labor contract system in more detail.In passing labor and employment law the government has several goals:

First, the state wants to increase its legitimacy among workers. click The National Labor Law enhanced the rights of workers on paper.For example, the law stipulated higher standards for working conditions - minimum wages, working hours and so forth - than is commonly practiced in many enterprises. The law thus signaled to workers that they were equal before the law and that the government did not support exploitation of labor. The Labor Law stipulates, for example, a 40-hour workweek, a maximum of 36 hours of overtime per month and at least one day off per week. According to a study by the Communist Party Youth League in six cities in Guangdong in 2001 most migrant workers worked 12 to 14 hours per day. About half of migrant workers said they rarely had any holidays or rest on weekends (cited in Lee 2007: 237).

Second, the government wants to channel worker grievances into administrative and legal institutions. ClickIn doing so, the state intends to split up collective grievances into individual ones and redirect conflict from being displayed publicly in the streets toward being controlled by judicial officials in the courtroom. Prior to the reform era, social conflicts and disputes were often resolved directly through state intervention. Conflicts at workplaces, which were virtually all state or collectively owned, were handled first by the firms party committee and management or if still intractable, by the next level of administrative oversight and control. During the reform period, a regulatory and legal framework have been created to enhance the governments ability to resolve workplace disputes in arbitration committees and court rooms.

Third, the government wants to strengthen implementation of key laws and regulations.

click In reality, many of the high standards of the labor law have not been implemented by local governments. For example, every emoloyee in China should have a labor contract, but in Chongqing only 41 percent of our survey respondents had signed a labor contract. Among migrant workers in Chongqing, 73 percent had not signed a labor contract. Now, the government hopes that if an increasing number of citizens claims their rights and protections in the legal system, workers own actions will expose firms and local governments who violate or ignore the law. This way the state hopes to improve implementation.

In order to achieve these three goals, the government has started a widespread "legal dissemination"() campaign that is supposed to create legal consciousness among citizens. ClickAs a vehicle of state propaganda the media assume an important role in this legal dissemination campaign.

In the specific issue area of labor and employment law, the state tries to mobilize citizens to use the law to protect their rights. One of the slogans is, for example:Click: Use the law as a weapon!

Media Commercialization and Authoritarian Rule in China

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