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Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

MCWP 3-14

US Marine Corps

SEMPER FIDELIS

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-1775

17 September 2009

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-14, Employment of the Light ArmoredReconnaissance Battalion, addresses the tactical employment of the light armored recon-naissance (LAR) battalion by the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commanderand his staff.

This publication provides guidance for the MAGTF commander, his staff, and his subor-dinate commanders in planning, preparing for, and conducting operations involving theLAR battalion. It addresses the organization, fundamentals, and employment of the LARbattalion to include logistic and command and control considerations.

This publication supersedes MCWP 3-14, Employment of the Light Armored InfantryBattalion, dated 21 August 1992.

Reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

GEORGE. J. FLYNNLieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration

Publication Control Number: 143 000115 00

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Employment of Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion ___________________________________________________ iii

EMPLOYMENT OF THE LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE BATTALION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. FundamentalsLight Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1Fundamental Roles of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion . . . . . 1-2

Shape the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Provide Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2Preserve Combat Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Light Armored Reconnaissance in Operational Maneuver From the Sea . . 1-2Amphibious Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2MAGTF Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3

Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3Deep Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Close Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4Rear Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Chapter 2. Organization, Capabilities, and LimitationsOrganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Light Armored Vehicle Mission Role Variants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Light Armored Reconnaissance Scouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1Troop Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3Operational Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Strategic Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4Operational Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Tactical Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Firepower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Aerial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Restricted Terrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Water Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6Off Road Soil Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7Weather Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7Armor Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

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Chapter 3. OperationsFundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Unit Integrity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Task Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Forward Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Reconnaissance Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2Collection Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Reconnaissance Fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Reconnaissance Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3Security Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Defensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10Passage of Lines and Battle Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Chapter 4. Command and ControlCommand and Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Fundamentals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2Command Echelons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Tactical Echelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Main Echelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Rear Echelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Increments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Command and Control Organization and Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3Forward Command Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4Main Command Post. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5Combat Trains Command Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6Company Command Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Fire Support Coordination Center. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6Fire Support Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Air Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Artillery Liaison Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7Target Information Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Command and Staff Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8Battalion Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Subordinate Commanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Battalion Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9Liason Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11

Employment of Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion ____________________________________________________ v

Command and Control Reporting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11Commander’s Critical Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11Priority Intelligence Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11Friendly Force Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11Essential Elements of Friendly Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11

Command and Control Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-11Responsibilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12Means of Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-12

Chapter 5. IntelligenceIntelligence Preparation of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Counterreconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1Commander’s Critical Information Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Chapter 6. Fire SupportFire Support Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Tempo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Fire Support Coordination Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Fire Support Stucture . . . . 6-1Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Naval Surface Fire Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Marine Aviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Offensive Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Aerial Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2Assault Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Mortars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Chapter 7. Urban OperationsUrban Operations Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Assess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1Shape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Dominate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2Capabilities and Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Vehicle Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3Vehicle Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-425-mm Automatic Cannon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4Target Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4

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Burst Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5Weapon Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-5

Combat Service Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7Medical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-7

Chapter 8. Light Armored Reconnaissance Combat Engineer OperationsMobility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1Countermobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1Engineer Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1Light Armored Reconnaissance Combat Engineer Organization . . . . . . . . . 8-2Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

Appendix A. Passage of Lines and Battle Handover

Glossary

References

CHAPTER 1FUNDAMENTALS

The Marine Corps organizes for combat by form-ing Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs),which are combined arms warfighting organiza-tions tailored to accomplish specific missions.They are task-organized for rapid deployment byairlift and/or sealift. They include a commandelement, a ground combat element (GCE), an avi-ation combat element (ACE), and a logisticscombat element. They are readily available, self-sustaining, combined arms combat forces capa-ble of conducting amphibious operations anddefense of advanced naval bases in support of anaval campaign. The MAGTF is also capable ofsustained operations ashore in support of a landcampaign and can operate across the range ofmilitary operations.

Unless otherwise noted, all discussion of lightarmored reconnaissance (LAR) battalion employ-ment should be considered within the context of aMarine expeditionary force (MEF). The MEF, thelargest of the MAGTFs, is normally built arounda Marine division (MARDIV), Marine aircraftwing, and Marine logistics group all under a sin-gle commander as depicted in figure 1-1. TheLAR battalion is a separate battalion within aMARDIV. The LAR battalion and/or its subordi-nate elements can be task-organized and placedunder the command of the GCE commander. The

MEF is capable of conducting amphibious opera-tions and sustained operations ashore, and it canbe tailored to accommodate a wide variety ofcombat missions in any geographic environment.

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Mission

The LAR battalion performs combined armsreconnaissance and security missions in supportof the GCE. Its mission is to conduct reconnais-sance, security and economy of force operations,and, within its capabilities, limited offensive ordefensive operations that exploit the unit’s mobil-ity and firepower.

The LAR battalion may function as an indepen-dent maneuver element or as an element of alarger unit such as a regimental combat team, orits subordinate companies may support other tac-tical units in the GCE.

Fundamental Roles of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion

Shape the Battlespace

The fundamental role of the LAR battalion in theMARDIV is to shape the battlespace. The LARbattalion performs this by conducting reconnais-sance, security, and other operations. In doing so,the LAR battalion facilitates the supported com-mander’s ability to maneuver his forces, to con-centrate superior combat power, and to apply itagainst the enemy at the decisive point. The LARbattalion helps to reduce the “fog of war” bylocating where the enemy is, where he is not,where he is strong, and where he is weak.

MEFCommandElement

MarineDivision

MarineAircraftWing

MarineLogistics

Group

Figure 1-1. Marine Expeditionary Force.

1-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Provide Information

To successfully execute maneuver, the sup-ported commander must have a high degree ofsituational awareness. The LAR battalion pos-sesses a unique combination of systems and per-sonnel to gather and communicate information;i.e., digital and mobile high frequency (HF) com-munications, advanced thermal optics, scouts,and satellite communications capability. The sup-ported commander must make judicious, yetaggressive, use of his reconnaissance and intelli-gence assets. In building the reconnaissance andsurveillance (R&S) plan, the supported com-mander considers all collection assets at his dis-posal and assigns them tasks best suited to theirabilities to accomplish these tasks. By employ-ing the LAR battalion, the commander strives toreduce the enemy, terrain, and friendly unknownsof the battlefield to allow him to fight effectivelyand to operate within the enemy’s decision cycle.The successful execution of maneuver warfarecontinues to be the product of thorough recon-naissance and continuous security. Light armoredreconnaissance capabilities can be used to con-firm or deny information gained from other col-lection assets and, where required, fill in gaps inthe R&S plan. Light armored reconnaissancecapabilities provide the supported commanderincreased reaction time and maneuver spaceusing depth in zone.

Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space

The commander thinks and plans in terms of thetime and space that is required to maneuver andconcentrate subordinate units against enemyweaknesses. The distance the LAR battalionoperates from the GCE and the amount of com-bat power available determine how much timeand space the commander will have to react tothe enemy. The mobility that is provided by thelight armored vehicle (LAV) allows LAR units toseize or retain the initiative and to create orexploit opportunities as they occur in the courseof other operations.

Preserve Combat Power

The LAR battalion, by its role, can perform econ-omy of force missions. The flexible capabilitiesof the LAR battalion allow the GCE commanderthe ability to retain combat power of other tacti-cal units for engagement where he desires.

Light Armored Reconnaissance in Operational Maneuver From the Sea

The operational maneuver from the sea (OMFTS)is the maneuver of naval forces at the operationallevel, focusing on operational objectives that aresustained by sea-based logistics. Within this con-cept, OMFTS views the sea as the principalmaneuver space and provides the Marine Corpsthe capability to rapidly project naval forcesashore faster than the enemy can counter them.Requirements for OMFTS are as follows:

Forces that can rapidly maneuver from the shipto the objective.Forces that are highly mobile and can movegreat distances with little logistical support.Forces that can be employed across the rangeof military operations.

The LAR battalion is exceptionally well suited toexecute OMFTS. The moderate fuel consump-tion, deep projection potential, and relativelysmall logistical tail of the LAR battalion providethe MAGTF a highly flexible force capable of awide range of missions that can influence actionswithin the littorals when supported by sea-basedlogistics. As such, LAR units embarked aboardnaval shipping are ideal for conducting opera-tions in the STOM [ship-to-objective maneuver]concept, into and beyond the littorals.

Amphibious Operations

During amphibious operations, the LAR battalioncan enhance the success of the landing without

Employment of Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion __________________________________________________ 1-3

diversion of the assault forces from the mainlanding. The unit can form part of a separate land-ing group to participate in pre-assault operations,subsidiary landings, feints, demonstrations, orraids. The LAR battalion can support isolation ofthe landing area, reconnoiter coastal and inlanddefenses, deceive the enemy, neutralize or destroytargets protected from attack by other means, anddeny areas to the enemy. The LAR battalion canparticipate in the main landing, moving ashore inscheduled waves to protect an open flank, or itcan remain on-call to exploit success. Finally, anLAR unit can serve as part of the covering forceduring an amphibious withdrawal.

MAGTF Operations

Within the MAGTF, the LAR battalion normallyoperates as an independent maneuver element.The LAR battalion also operates as a part of theMARDIV or MAGTF to which it is assigned, oras part of a special purpose MAGTF. However,the LAR battalion may directly support other tac-tical units within the GCE as a battalion or withits subordinate companies.

Offensive Operations

The MAGTF conducts offensive operations todestroy the enemy’s ability and will to resist.While opposing forms, offensive and defensiveoperations are not mutually exclusive and cannotexist separately. The LAR battalion is well suitedto conduct offensive or defensive operationswithin the framework of a MAGTF’s offensivescheme. Within an offensive scheme, LAR unitsmay conduct a variety of missions:

Movement to contact.Hasty attack. Deception operations. Defend. Raids.Other special purpose operations.

As part of a MAGTF offensive operation, theLAR battalion, or one of its subordinate compa-nies, may perform a series of supporting mis-sions such as—

Reconnaissance operations (route, area, zone,deep).Security operations (screen, guard).Other operations (convoy security, raids).

Defensive Operations

The primary purpose of defensive operations is todefeat enemy attacks and thrusts through oraround a unit’s position. It may also be offensivein nature so as to draw the enemy into engage-ment areas. The defense is assumed as a tempo-rary state that creates the conditions for MAGTFunits to rest, rearm, refuel, or reinforce. TheMAGTF may transition to a defensive posture atits culminating point—when the offense losesmomentum. The LAR battalion, as part of theGCE, supports MAGTF defensive operations byproviding the MAGTF commander a wide arrayof employment capabilities. The speed, opera-tional mobility, and long-range communicationscapability of the LAV provide the MAGTF com-mander a force that can exploit opportunities andrapidly transition to the offensive.

The LAR battalion may perform a series of mis-sions within the defense. Security missions willpredominate. Initially, the LAR battalion mayscreen or guard forward of the GCE. It may alsoserve as part of a covering force. Alternatively,the LAR battalion may screen or guard anexposed flank. Subsequently, the battalion mayoperate in the MAGTF rear area performing avariety of tasks that augment the MAGTF com-mander’s scheme.

Finally, the LAR battalion may support commit-ment of the reserve. The battalion facilitatesmovement as a reserve repositions or moves.Upon commitment, the LAR battalion may con-tinue with the reserve, performing reconnais-sance or providing security.

1-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Deep Operations

MAGTF deep operations may be separated fromthe close battle in time and/or space and aredirected against enemy forces and functions toconduct operations beyond the close battle. TheMAGTF commander can execute deep operationswith the LAR battalion if he has dedicated, suit-able air, combat service support (CSS), and com-munications assets to sustain the battalion. Deepoperations affect the enemy by—

Neutralizing his forces.Disrupting his command and control.Disrupting the tempo of his operations.Destroying his forces.Preventing reinforcing maneuver.Destroying his installations and supplies.Breaking his morale.

Deep operations goals include the following:

Limiting the enemy's freedom of action.Altering the tempo of operations in favor of theMAGTF.Denying the enemy the capability to concen-trate his forces.Isolating the close fight.Destroying the enemy's will to fight.

Whether in the offense or defense, deep operationsperform one or more of the following functions:

Interdicting enemy lines of communications(LOCs).Preventing the enemy’s counterattack or hisemployment of follow-on forces.Destroying units and critical targets.Cutting off routes of withdrawal.Providing commander with information aboutenemy capabilities in depth.

Close Operations

MAGTF close operations include the battles andengagements of its major maneuver and fire sup-port units together with the required combat sup-port (CS) and CSS activities. MAGTF close

operations usually include the deep, close, andrear operations of its committed GCE units. Notall activities that are part of close operations nec-essarily take place near the line of contact. Closefights occur where, when, and against whicheverenemy units commanders choose to commitassault formations. Concentrating the effects ofcombat power in support of ground forcesbecomes the commander’s focus in close battles.Reconnaissance and security provided by theLAR battalion are critical to battles and engage-ments. The LAR units conducting reconnaissanceprovide a degree of security. Units conductingsecurity missions use reconnaissance techniques.

Reconnaissance is the precursor to engagementswith the enemy. Reconnaissance actions yieldinformation on the disposition of an enemy’sforce and intent as well as environmental condi-tions. Effective reconnaissance allows the com-mander to gain and maintain contact with theenemy as well as to direct friendly units into thefight. The LAR units orient their movement on thereconnaissance objective, which can range froman enemy force to the terrain. The LAR battalionand its subordinate companies may have to fightfor information, but avoid decisive engagement.

Security, on the other hand, protects and con-serves the combat power of friendly units. Secu-rity is an inherent part of all military operations.At the tactical level, security actions protect thecommand against surprise attack and hostile airand ground observation. All units conduct secu-rity actions while specific units may be tasked toconduct security missions.

Rear Operations

The MAGTF conducts rear area operations toensure freedom of maneuver and the continuity ofoperations, such as sustainment, clear commandand control (C2) arrangements, and dedicated firesupport. While MAGTF battalion or regimentoperations staff officers (S-3s) are responsible,overall, for terrain management, commanders ofrear command posts (CP) usually position sup-porting units in rear areas. Once in position, these


units become part of a base cluster (a missiongrouping of bases and/or security requirementsthat lack a clearly defined perimeter) or a base (aunit/multiunit position with a definite perimeter).

When the LAR battalion is tasked with rear areasecurity, they will conduct reconnaissance andsecurity missions as described earlier. Prior todedicating an LAR battalion to this role, theMAGTF commander assesses the threat levelspresent within the rear area to determine if itwarrants LAR augmentation. He does this by

evaluating the nature and scope of friendlyactions within the rear area needed to defeat theperceived threat.

Continuous reconnaissance, security, and timelyinformation collection, as well as disseminationby the LAR battalion are essential for successfulrear area operations. Rear area security operationsplanning for LAR should take advantage of thehigh mobility and optics capabilities inherent toall LAVs.

CHAPTER 2ORGANIZATION, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS

As with all military units, the LAR battalion has adistinct organization and unique capabilities andlimitations to consider during employment. Thischapter discusses the LAR battalion’s organiza-tion, capabilities, limitations, vehicle role vari-ants, and employment considerations.

Organization

The LAR battalion’s organization allows it toconduct the full range of command functions.The LAV’s mobility is maximized when the bat-talion is assigned independent missions for eitherthe GCE or any of its subelements. The LAR bat-talion may also be assigned missions that requireplacing it or its subordinate companies in supportof other MAGTF formations. The LAR battalionand each of its companies have an organic main-tenance and recovery capability as well as suffi-cient communications equipment for sustainedindependent battlefield operations. A task-orga-nized LAR company comprised of the elementsshown in figure 2-1, on page 2-2, and figure 2-2,on page 2-3, is the smallest LAR unit capable ofconducting sustained independent operations.

The 1st, 2d, and 3d LAR Battalions are assignedto the MARDIVs (see fig. 2-3, on page 2-3) ofthe operating forces and possess five line compa-nies (A, B, C, D, and E) along with a headquar-ters and service company (see fig. 2-1). The 4thLAR Battalion is a Reserve Component within4th MARDIV and differs from the Active Com-ponent battalions by maintaining a sixth linecompany (F Company).

Light Armored VehicleMission Role Variants

Currently, each LAR battalion is equipped withsix mission role variants (MRVs):

LAV-25 (light armored vehicle-25 millimeter).LAV-AT (light armored vehicle-antitank).LAV-M (light armored vehicle-mortar).LAV-C2 (light armored vehicle-command andcontrol).LAV-L (light armored vehicle-logistics).LAV-R (light armored vehicle-recovery).

Table 2-1, on page 2-4, depicts the variants of theLAV family and their key equipment assets.

Light Armored Reconnaissance Scouts

Marines who have the military occupational spe-cialty (MOS) 0311, rifleman are assigned to theLAR battalion as scouts. The scouts receive theirscout training from the LAR battalion. The LARscouts are not employed the same way as infan-try or mechanized infantry. Each LAV-25 carriesthree scouts, who are trained and organized foremployment in support of the LAV-25. The LARscouts should be thought of as an integral part ofthe vehicle’s employment capabilities. The vehi-cle/scout team is a complete system, with thevehicle and its scouts each dependent on the otherfor security, mobility, and firepower.

2-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

EPLRSRadiosSection

RefuelerSection

CommandVehicleSection

TruckSection

PlatoonHeadquarters

LightVehicleSection

AutomotiveRepairSection

CompanyMedicalTeams

BattalionAid Station2d Echelon

BattalionAid Station

DiningFacilitySection

SupplySection

PlatoonHeadquarters

LAVRecoverySection

ArmorerSection

Instrumentand Optics

Repair Section

LAV RepairSection

EngineerSection

PlatoonHeadquarters

DataCommunications

Section

Tactical AirControl Party

Section

RadioSection

WireSection

PlatoonHeadquarters

S-4Section

S-3Section

S-2Section

S-1Section

LAR Battalion

1124

USMC

50 994OFF ENL

3 77OFF ENL

USN

Headquarters andService Company

429

USMC

25 324OFF ENL

3 77OFF ENL

USN

LAR Company

LARPlatoon

WeaponsPlatoon

139

USMC

5 134OFF ENL

CompanyHeadquarters

74 LAV-2520 LAV-AT19 LAV-L10 LAV-M 9 LAV-C2 7 LAV-R139

14 LAV-25 4 LAV-AT 3 LAV-L 2 LAV-M 1 LAV-C2 1 LAV-R 25

BattalionHeadquarters

CommunicationsPlatoon

MedicalPlatoon

MotorTransportSection

ServicePlatoon

MaintenancePlatoon

LAR Company

KEY:OFF - OfficerENL - EnlistedEPLRS - enhanced position location and reporting system

Figure 2-1. Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Organization.


The scouts normally avoid decisive, closeengagement with enemy infantry. The LAR

scouts perform a wide range of tasks, includingthe following:

Providing local security for the LAVs.Manning observation posts.Conducting dismounted reconnaissance ofclose terrain that cannot be bypassed.Providing dismounted security at danger areas.Performing obstacle reconnaissance such as,locating and marking bypasses for follow onforces.Performing chemical, biological, radiological,and nuclear (CBRN) monitor/survey tasks.Marking contaminated areas and bypasses.Performing limited countermobility tasks andemploying demolitions.Conducting bridge/ford/route/area reconnais-sance and evaluation.Controlling supporting arms.

Troop Density

The LAV-25 carries three LAV crewmen andfour personnel (typically three scouts and either acorpsman, engineer, or mechanic) per vehicle.The LAR battalion table of organization (T/O)provides for 216 scouts. Operations requiring

WeaponsPlatoon

LARPlatoon

LAVAntitankSection

CompanyHeadquarters

LAVMortar

(81 mm)Platoon

2 LAV-M4 LAV-AT

4 LAV-25

2 LAV-25

1 LAV-R1 LAV-L

1 LAV-C2

Figure 2-2. Light ArmoredReconnaissance Company Organization.

MarineDivision

TankBattalion

Light ArmoredReconnaissance

BattalionHeadquarters

BattalionArtillery

Regiment

InfantryRegiment

CombatEngineerBattalion

AssaultAmphibianBattalion

XX

Figure 2-3. Marine Division Organization.

2-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

large numbers of infantry favor employing mech-anized infantry units due to their higher troopdensity. This limitation can be offset by planningfor reinforcements of LAR by helicopterborne ormechanized infantry units. The LAV should notbe viewed as an infantry fighting vehicle or as anarmored personnel carrier. This vehicle is anarmored reconnaissance vehicle that lacks suffi-cient armor protection and troop density to per-form missions normally assigned to a mechanizedinfantry unit.

Operational Capabilities

Like other units, the LAR battalion has certainoperational characteristics that have an impact onits employment. The LAR units are highlymobile, possess a high degree of firepower, and

yet are light in infantry. The LAR units possessthe firepower and mobility to fight for informa-tion to answer specified commander’s criticalinformation requirements (CCIRs) and priorityinformation requirements (PIRs). The LAR bat-talion’s flexibility allows the MAGTF com-mander to task-organize its assets to meet missionrequirements in the deep, close, and rear areas.For example, aviation in support of LAR candeliver sustainment, firepower, and reinforcementwith helicopterborne infantry. Conversely, theoperational characteristics of LAR units enhancethe capabilities and offset the limitations ofMAGTF aviation. Light armored reconnaissanceassets can develop situations on a battlefield thatpresent opportunities for rotary- and fixed-wingattack aircraft as well as provide more detailedinformation and maintain a continuous, all-weather presence on the battlefield.

Mobility

Mobility is a quality or capability of militaryforces that permits them to move from place toplace while retaining the ability to fulfill their pri-mary mission. (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02,Department of Defense Dictionary of Militaryand Associated Terms). Light armored reconnais-sance provides a very capable force that is mobileat the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.Due to limited armored protection on the LAV,mobility contributes to platform survivability forthe LAR battalion.

Strategic Mobility

Strategic mobility is the capability to deploy andsustain military forces worldwide in support ofnational strategy. (JP 1-02) Light armored vehiclesare strategically deployed by either airlift or sea-lift. Amphibious shipping can transport large num-bers of LAVs. Table 2-2 identifies the number ofLAVs transportable by various aircraft. Table 2-3identifies the LAV variant and quantity locatedaboard maritime prepositioning ship squadrons.

Table 2-1. LAV Variants.

Variant AssetsLAV-25 25mm auto cannon

7.62mm coax MG7.62mm pintle MG2 VHF radios1 HF rack available3 0311 scout teams

LAV-AT M901 TOW turret7.62mm pintle MG2 VHF radios

LAV-M 81mm mortar7.62mm pintle MG2 VHF radios

LAV-C2 7.62mm pintle MG4 VHF radios1 UHF radio1 HF radio1 SATCOM radioEnhanced position location and

reporting system5 networked workstationsAFATDSC2PC

LAV-L 7.62mm pintle MG2 VHF radiosLogistics

LAV-R 7.62mm pintle MG2 VHF radios30,000 lb winch recovery boom9,000 lb boom crane

C2PC - Command and Control Personal Computerlb - poundsMG - machine gunSATCOM - satellite communications system


Operational Mobility

Operational mobility is the ability to movebetween engagements and battles within the con-text of the campaign. (Marine Corps DoctrinalPublication 1-2, Campaigning) Operationalmobility may be affected by the weight or physi-cal dimension of the vehicle and/or the vehicle'scruising range, fuel consumption, and sustainedspeed over distances (see table 2-4). These attri-butes may also have an impact on strategic andtactical mobility.

Tactical Mobility

Tactical mobility is the ability to move within anengagement or battle. Tactical mobility is a func-tion of speed and acceleration over short dis-tances, which requires the ability to move cross-country over various types of terrain in moderateto severe weather conditions. The LAV is capableof performing the following:

Engaging 8-wheel drive for cross-country driv-ing.Operating on diesel fuel and JP-5 and JP-8.Climbing 60-percent slopes and obstacles thatare 19 inches high.Operating on 30-percent side slopes.Swimming 6.5 mph with preparation beforeswimming and maintenance actions after-wards.Running on flat tires for 25 miles at 30 mph.

Firepower

The LAR battalion has considerable firepowerwith its organic weapons systems’ Table 2-5, onpage 2-6, describes each vehicle’s weapons sys-tem, while table 2-6, on page 2-6, describes thevehicle’s sighting systems. Each vehicle has anM-257 self-screening smoke grenade launchersystem (eight ready and eight stowed). Theorganic capability of the LAR battalion to defeatenemy tanks rests exclusively with the LAV-AT.The 25mm cannon is effective against light armorsuch as BMP [Boevaya Mashina Pekhota] andBTR [Bronyetransportyor].

The LAV-25 is equipped with the ImprovedThermal Sight System (ITSS) and the electronic-drive turret greatly improves gunnery capabili-ties. The ITSS provides improvement to theMarine Corps day and night warfighting capabili-ties by increasing target acquisition and engage-ment ranges. The ITSS is a generation II systemequipped with an integrated laser range finder,target motion indicator, and a far target location

Table 2-2. Aircraft LAV Transportability.

Aircraft Number of LAVsC-130 1C-17A 5C-5A 6-9**Depending on fuel capacity and runway length.

Table 2-3. Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadron LAV Mix.

Variant QuantityLAV-25 14LAV-C2 1LAV-M 2LAV-AT 4LAV-R 1LAV-L 3Note: Maritime Prepositioning Ships Squadrons-1, -2, and -3 contain the same vehicle mix and quantity.

Table 2-4. LAV Mobility Impacts.

LAV-25 LAV-25 w/BPUP ArmorWeight 14.2 tons Weight 15.75 tonsCruising range 400 miles Cruising range 400 miles*Fuel 71 gal Fuel 71 galTop speed 60+ mph Top speed 60+ mphgal-gallons

*Cruising range will vary with additional BPUP weight.

2-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

capability. The ITSS also provides the LAV-25crew with a fire control system that includes aballistic solution. The LAV-AT equipped withthe AN/TAS-4, 12x thermal sight can engageenemy tanks during periods of reduced visibilityout to the range of the tube-launched, opticallytracked, wire-command link guided missile(TOW) (3750m).

Communications

The LAR battalion has a robust organic commu-nications capability. Each LAV is amplified witha minimum of two very high frequency (VHF)radios that can simultaneously monitor 2 nets andaccess up to 12 nets. Due to the dispersed natureof LAR operations, communications planningmust focus on HF selection, relay, retransmissionsites, satellite communications with the LAV-C2variant, friendly force tracker, or any other com-munications assets.

LIMITATIONS

The following limitations may affect one or moreof the different means of mobility.

Aerial

Although a single, noncombat-loaded LAV canbe transported externally by a Super Stallion(CH-53E), minor variations in weather and alti-tude may prevent lifting. Lifting LAVs in the ini-tial vertical assault may expose the aircraft to anunacceptable risk. There may not be enough CH-53Es to lift an LAR unit. Deck space, cycle time,and increased weight severely restrict the num-ber of LAVs that can be moved by the CH-53Eduring amphibious operations. This capabilityshould be viewed as administrative vice tacticalin nature. Aerial recovery of damaged or dis-abled platforms is a realistic aerial capability.

Restricted Terrain

In restricted terrain, the enemy will seek to cana-lize the LAR battalion along predictable routesthrough existing and reinforcing obstacles. Thevehicles are subject to close-in attack by enemyinfantry employing light armor defeating weap-ons such as antitank guided missiles, rocket-pro-pelled grenades, assault grenade launchers,improved explosive devices, and heavy machineguns. In restricted terrain, LAR units slow downto the speed of their dismounted scouts.

Water Operations

The LAV possesses a limited swim capability andcannot cross the surf line. The LAV is capable ofcrossing bodies of water with a current less than8.2 feet per second and is capable of crossingmany streams, lakes, and slow running rivers.Key limiting factors for the LAV include ingressand egress grades, soil composition, and under-water obstacles such as sandbars. The LAV sup-ports amphibious assault from ship to shore via a

Table 2-5. LAV Weapons Systems.

Type Weapon DefeatsAll LAVs 7.62 mm Troops at 900 mLAV-25 25 mm chain gun BMPs at 2000 m

Trucks at 2200 mLAV-M 81 mm mortar Troops/light vehicles

Fires HE, RPILLUM at 5650 m

LAV-AT TOW missile Tanks at 3750 mBMP-Boevaya Mashina PekhotaBTR-BronyetransportyorILLUM-illuminationBP-red phosporous

Table 2-6. Improved Thermal Sight System.

Gunner StationITSS 10x, 20x, 40x narrow field of view

3.3x wide field of viewITSS 1x unity (pericopes window)

Commander Station

DIM-36Day sight

7x

DIM-36 1x unity (pericopes window)


connector such as the LCAC [landing craft aircushion] or LCU [utility landing craft].

Off Road Soil Composition

The LAV may be unable to negotiate certaintypes of terrain traversable by tracked vehiclessuch as swamps, bogs, or soft sand. This factormust be considered when assigning routes, zonesof action, or task-organizing for combat.

Weather Effects

Other than climatic conditions that affect theMAGTF as a whole, arctic conditions may requirethe LAV to use snow chains to aid traction in ice,snow, and muddy terrain. Wet climate conditionscan seriously degrade off road trafficability.

Recovery

Light armored vehicles have an 8-wheel drivecapability and a 15,000-pound winch for self-recovery if they become mired. The LAR unitpossesses limited ability to recover or evacuate

inoperable LAVs with logistic and recovery vari-ants. These units are not ideally suited for per-forming long-distance towing. The LAVsdedicated as towing vehicles degrade the unit’smobility as well as its ability to perform tacticalmissions. The best platform for long-distancerecovery is a tactical battlefield evacuation low-boy trailer.

Armor Protection

The LAV possesses sufficient protection againstheavy machine guns and indirect fire fragmenta-tion. The LAV combines a base capsule armor ofhigh-hard steel with a composite add on ballisticprotection upgrade package (BPUP) armor. TheLAV relies primarily on stealth, speed, and agil-ity for its survival rather than on its armor protec-tion. The LAV should be employed in roles shortof decisive close combat, because it cannot sur-vive the fires of medium caliber automatic can-nons, antiarmor weapons, improvised explosivedevices or direct hits from indirect fire weapons.

CHAPTER 3OPERATIONS

The LAR battalion must be able to observe, andwhen necessary, fight the enemy across extremelywide frontages to shape the battlefield for the sup-ported commander. This chapter addresses theunique characteristics of LAR operations.

Fundamentals

The LAR unit is best employed not as a substi-tute for infantry and armor in the attack ordefense, but to perform reconnaissance and secu-rity missions that allow armor and/or infantry toclose with the enemy decisively. The followingfundamentals will assist the supported unit com-mander to employ assigned LAR units to theirbest advantage.

Unit Integrity

The LAR battalion should be employed as onecohesive maneuver element in support of theMAGTF. Task-organizing selected MRVs fromthe LAR battalion for attachment to otherMAGTF forces may make the battalion vulnera-ble to a particular enemy weapon system or tactic.

Task Organization

Company size or larger elements are the onlytask-organized LAR units capable of conductingindependent operations. Task organizationssmaller than company-size significantly degradetactical capability. This degradation is significantin terms of command and control, as well asmaintenance capability. Table 3-1, on page 3-2,depicts mission to LAR echelon relationships.While LAR platoons can perform the missionswith a “θ”symbol in table 3-1, they can only doso within the context of an LAR company. An

LAR platoon does not normally perform any mis-sion independently. Based on mission, enemy,terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T), the LAR battalion maybe supported by and/or reinforced with otherMAGTF assets, to include armor, aviation, infan-try, and engineers. Security operations in supportof the offense and defense may require additionalcombat power and mobility. This is particularlyapplicable against an enemy with a large mecha-nized force employing heavy armor. Attachmentsto an LAR unit must be of comparable mobility inorder to maintain maximum capability and tempo.It is important to note that the LAV, tank, andamphibious assault vehicle should not be thoughtof as competing weapons platforms, but should bethought of as complementary combat systems.

Forward Employment

Normally, the LAR battalion should be employedas far forward or to the flanks of the main body astactically appropriate to provide reaction time andmaneuver space for the supported commander.The LAR units often move back and forth acrossfire support coordination lines (FSCLs). Thismay require additional planning for the MAGTFand ACE to provide support out to and beyondthe MAGTF’s FSCL.

Flexibility

The LAR battalion relies primarily on mobility toaccomplish assigned missions. The key to LAVsurvivability is speed and mobility. The LARoperation should not be overly restricted by con-trol measures. These measures must be carefullyplanned and coordinated with adjacent units inorder to reduce risk and to establish the appropri-ate boundaries in support of LAR operations.

3-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Reconnaissance Operations

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or other detectionmethods, information about the activities andresources of an enemy or adversary; or to securedata concerning the meteorological, hydro-graphic, or geographic characteristics of a partic-ular area. (JP 1-02)

The LAR battalion differs greatly from dis-mounted reconnaissance units, offering certainadvantages in conducting reconnaissance with thecapability to further develop the situation aftergaining enemy contact. The LAR battalion iswell-suited for highly mobile ground reconnais-sance, counterreconnaissance, reconnaissance inforce, deep reconnaissance, and other reconnais-sance missions. The LAR battalion is designed tofight for or deny the enemy information and can

Table 3-1. Mission to LAR Echelon Relationships.

Mission Type LAR Battalion

LAR Company

LAR Platoon

Reconnaissance

Route θ

Zone θ

Area θ

Reconnaissance in Force θ

Security Operations

Screen θ

Guard * θ X

Cover θ θ X

Area θ

Route θ

Convoy θ


Hasty Attack θ

Deliberate Attack * * θ

Movement to Contact θ

Economy of Force

Defend from Battle Position θ

Defend Sector θ

Delay θ

= capable* = capable of augmentationθ = capable of a higher echelon operationX = not a platoon mission

Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion ______________________________________________ 3-3

support the MAGTF at the operational and tacti-cal level of war by providing information thatassists a commander to determine when andwhere to accept or refuse battle. The LAR unitperforms reconnaissance in accordance with theoverall collection plan and does not supplant thecontributions of other reconnaissance elements.The LAR unit operates overtly as part of theMAGTF, relying on mobility, maneuverability,firepower, and the mutual support of LAR MRVsto accomplish reconnaissance missions. Duringreconnaissance operations, LAR units may con-duct limited objective attacks to secure lightlydefended objectives such as bridges, road junc-tions, or mountain passes, and they may performsecurity missions (screen, guard, and participatein a cover operation) concurrently with recon-naissance operations.

Collection Plan

When the LAR battalion is tasked with conduct-ing reconnaissance missions, these missionsshould be integrated into the overall collectionplan to avoid duplication of effort, conflictingrequirements, and exchange of fire between sup-ported units. Control measures are essential formission accomplishment and, at a minimum,include lateral boundaries, contact points, routedesignations, limits of advance (if applicable),start and completion times, and reconnaissanceobjectives (normally given in the form of namedareas of interest [NAIs]).

Reconnaissance Fundamentals

There are six fundamentals common to many suc-cessful reconnaissance operations:

Obtain maximum reconnaissance forward.Orient on the location or movement of recon-naissance objective.Report information rapidly and accurately.Retain freedom to maneuver.

Gain and maintain enemy contact.Develop the situation rapidly.

Reconnaissance Planning

Complete, detailed reconnaissance instructionsmust contain the following:

Pertinent information about the enemy andsupported troops.Plans of the higher commander.Specific, prioritized information requirements.Type of reconnaissance; i.e., route, zone, orarea.How the LAR unit integrates into the R&Splan of the supported commander.Control measures.Time available.

Missions

Route ReconnaissanceA route reconnaissance is a directed effort toobtain detailed information of a specified routeand all terrain from which the enemy could influ-ence movement along that route. (Marine CorpsReference Publication [MCRP] 5-12A, Opera-tional Terms and Graphics) Route reconnais-sance may be oriented on a road, an axis, ordirection of attack. It is faster than zone recon-naissance because effort is concentrated along theroute and its controlling terrain. Route reconnais-sance critical tasks and planning considerationsare as follows:

Critical Tasks:Find, report, and destroy, within capability, allenemy forces that can influence movementalong the route.Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability ofthe route, to include locating and markingmines and obstacles.Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can useto dominate movement along the route.

3-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Reconnoiter all urban areas along the route.Reconnoiter all lateral routes.Inspect and evaluate all bridges on the route.Locate available fords or crossing sites near allbridges on the route. Inspect and evaluate all overpasses, under-passes, and culverts.Reconnoiter all defiles along the route withinthe unit’s capability; clear all enemy defilesand obstacles or locate a bypass.Locate; mark; and, when task-organized withengineers, clear the route of mines, obstacles,and barriers.Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles,bridges, and contaminated areas.Report route information as required. Prepare a sketch map or route overlay.

Planning Considerations:The LAR unit must know the start and termi-nation points and requirements for markingand clearing the route. An LAR company can reconnoiter two or threeroutes if enemy contact is unlikely. Otherwise,it should be assigned only one major route. An LAR battalion should be assigned no morethan three major routes if enemy contact isexpected. Time allotted to complete a reconnaissancemission will determine the level of detail inaccomplishing critical and optional tasks.Task-organizing LAR forces with aviationassets such as rotary-wing attack aircraft isespecially effective when time is critical andspeed is essential. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace(IPB).Information on the route and enemy situation.Integration of the LAR unit into the R&S plan.Engagement, disengagement, and bypass crite-ria.One critical task should be designated as thepriority.

Zone ReconnaissanceZone reconnaissance is a directed effort to obtaindetailed information concerning all routes, obsta-cles (to include chemical or radiological contami-nation), terrain, and enemy forces within a zonedefined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissancenormally is assigned when the enemy situation isvague or when information concerning cross-country trafficability is desired. (MCRP 5-12A) Itis a deliberate time-consuming process if not spe-cifically focused by the MAGTF commander.Zone reconnaissance critical tasks and planningconsiderations are as follows:

Critical Tasks:Find and report enemy in zone.Reconnoiter and determine trafficability of allterrain within zone.Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability ofall terrain within the zone, including urbanareas.Inspect and evaluate all bridges within thezone.Locate available fords or crossing sites near allbridges in the zone.Inspect and evaluate all overpasses, under-passes, and culverts.Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and bar-riers within the zone with inherent capabilities.Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles,bridges, and contaminated areas.Report reconnaissance information.

Planning Considerations:MAGTF commander identifies the reconnais-sance objective, control measures, and timeallotted to complete the reconnaissance mis-sion.The LAR unit must know the start and termi-nation points and requirements for markingand clearing the route.An LAR company can reconnoiter two or threeroutes if enemy contact is unlikely. Otherwise,it should be assigned only one major route.An LAR battalion should be assigned no morethan three major routes if enemy contact isexpected.


Time allotted to complete a reconnaissancemission will determine the level of detail inaccomplishing critical and optional tasks.Task-organizing LAR forces with aviationassets such as rotary-wing attack aircraft isespecially effective when time is critical andspeed is essential.IPB. Information on the route and enemy situation.Integration of the LAR unit into the R&S plan.Engagement, disengagement, and bypass crite-ria.One critical task should be designated as thepriority.

Area ReconnaissanceAn area reconnaissance is a directed effort toobtain detailed information concerning the ter-rain or enemy activity within a prescribed areasuch as a town, ridge line, wooded area, NAI, orother features critical to operations. An areareconnaissance is a specialized form of zonereconnaissance and proceeds faster than a zonereconnaissance since the effort focuses on spe-cific terrain features or enemy forces. Lightarmored reconnaissance forces may be requiredto reconnoiter one large area or several smallerareas. Area reconnaissance critical tasks andplanning considerations are as follows:

Critical Tasks:Find and report all enemy in area.Reconnoiter and determine trafficability of allterrain within the area.Inspect and evaluate all bridges within thearea.Locate available fords or crossing sites near allbridges in the area.Inspect and evaluate all overpasses, under-passes, and culverts.Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and bar-riers within the area with inherent capabilities.Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles,bridges, and contaminated areas.Report reconnaissance information.

Planning Considerations:MAGTF commander identifies the reconnais-sance objective, control measures, and timeallotted to complete the reconnaissance mis-sion.The LAR unit must know the start and termi-nation points and requirements for markingand clearing the route. An LAR company can reconnoiter two or threeroutes if enemy contact is unlikely. Otherwise,it should be assigned only one major route.An LAR battalion should be assigned no morethan three major routes if enemy contact isexpected.Time allotted to complete a reconnaissancemission will determine the level of detail inaccomplishing critical and optional tasks.Task-organizing LAR forces with aviationassets such as rotary-wing attack aircraft isespecially effective when time is critical andspeed is essential.IPB.Information on the route and enemy situation.Integration of the LAR unit into the R&S plan.Engagement, disengagement, and bypass crite-ria.One critical task should be designated as thepriority.

An LAR battalion will reconnoiter the area thor-oughly, including dominant terrain both withinand outside the area. An area reconnaissance thatis being conducted as a separate, exclusive mis-sion is usually a much faster mission, becausethe zone to the area or routes that lead to it maynot need to be reconnoitered or prior informa-tion has already been attained. For example,other collection assets, such as unmanned air-craft, have located where the enemy force is andthe LAR battalion is tasked to conduct furtherground reconnaissance to confirm or fix theenemy. The LAR battalion will try to reach thearea quickly; enemy situations encountered enroute are developed only enough to ensure thatreconnaissance elements can bypass. Normally,

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an LAR battalion or company is required to con-duct area reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance in ForceA reconnaissance in force is a limited objectiveoperation by at least a battalion-size force toobtain information in order to locate and testenemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions.Reconnaissance in force may be assigned whenlimited information about the enemy is available;when the commander desires more specific infor-mation on the enemy; and when the informationcannot be gathered by any other means. Lightarmored reconnaissance battalions and companiesconduct the mission as a zone reconnaissance oras a movement to contact.

Even though the commander is executing areconnaissance in force primarily to gather infor-mation, he must be alert to seize any opportunityto exploit tactical success. If the reconnaissancein force is to be conducted along a broad front, itmay consist of a series of strong probing actionsto test the enemy's reactions at selected points.The enemy reaction, or lack thereof, may reveal aweakness in his defenses. The commanderassigning the reconnaissance in force must care-fully weigh the risks involved. For instance,while the reconnaissance in force may reveal aweak point in the enemy’s defenses, it may leadto a general engagement under unfavorable con-ditions. The reconnaissance in force may alsoreveal future plans to the enemy. Advance plan-ning must be conducted for the extrication of theforce or the exploitation of success.

Critical Tasks:

Find and report enemy in zone.Reconnoiter and determine trafficability of allterrain within zone.Reconnoiter and determine the trafficability ofall terrain within the zone, including urbanareas.Inspect and evaluate all bridges within thezone.

Locate available fords or crossing sites near allbridges in the zone.Inspect and evaluate all overpasses, under-passes, and culverts.Locate and clear all mines, obstacles, and bar-riers within the zone within inherent capabili-ties.Locate a bypass around urban areas, obstacles,bridges, and contaminated areas.Report reconnaissance information.

Planning Considerations:MAGTF commander identifies the reconnais-sance objective, control measures, and timeallotted to complete the reconnaissance mis-sion.The LAR unit must know the start and termi-nation points and requirements for markingand clearing the route.An LAR company can reconnoiter two or threeroutes if enemy contact is unlikely. Otherwise,it should be assigned only one major route.An LAR battalion should be assigned no morethan three major routes if enemy contact isexpected.Time allotted to complete a reconnaissancemission will determine the level of detail inaccomplishing critical and optional tasks.Task-organizing LAR forces with aviationassets such as rotary-wing attack aircraft isespecially effective when time is critical andspeed is essential.IPB.Information on the route and enemy situation.Integration of the LAR unit into the R&S plan.Engagement, disengagement, and bypass crite-ria.One critical task should be designated as thepriority.

Security Operations

Security operations are conducted to obtain infor-mation about the enemy and to provide reactiontime, maneuver space, and protection to the mainbody. Security operations are characterized by


performing aggressive reconnaissance to reduceterrain and enemy unknowns, gaining and main-taining contact with the enemy to ensure continu-ous information, and providing early and accuratereporting of information to the supported force.The LAR battalion’s security forces may operateto the front, flanks, or rear of a moving or station-ary main body. Security operations include thefollowing operations:

Screen.Guard. Cover. Area security.

The LAR battalion conducts security operationsaccording to five fundamentals—

Orient on the supported main body. Perform continuous reconnaissance.Provide early and accurate warning. Provide reaction time and maneuver space.Maintain enemy contact.

ScreenA screen is a security element whose primarytask is to observe, identify, and report informa-tion, and which only fights in self-protection. (JP1-02) See figure 3-1 on page 3-8. The screen pro-vides the protected force with the least protectionof any security mission. This mission is appropri-ate when operations have created extended flanksor gaps that cannot be secured in force, or whenearly warning is required. A screen is performedfor a moving force to the flanks or rear of thesupported main body, and it may be performedfor a stationary force to the front, flanks, or rearof the supported main body. A screen mission isnot performed forward of a moving force. Zonereconnaissance, movement to contact, or advanceguard are missions more suited for operations for-ward of a moving force.

To achieve the intent of a screening mission thefollowing critical tasks are accomplished:

Maintain continuous surveillance of all battal-ion-size avenues of approach into the sectorunder all visibility conditions.Destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance unitswithin capability.Locate the lead enemy unit of each suspectedadvance guard formation and determine itsdirection of movement.Gain and maintain contact with the enemy andreport their activity.

The MAGTF commander provides the followingbroad guidance to the LAR battalion:

METT-T will dictate organic and nonorganictask organization.General trace of the screen.The time at which the screen should be estab-lished.Graphics indicating the width and depth of thescreened sector.The force to be screened.Control measures between LAR and adjacentunits.Fire support coordination with all adjacent firesupport coordinators (FSCs).Battle handover/passage of lines procedures.Any special requirements, constraints, andrestraints.

The requirements for observing specific NAIs ortarget areas of interest are identified during theIPB process. If the screened force is to engage orcontrol engagement of a threat at a target area ofinterest, the main body commander provides ade-quate resources.

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GuardA guard is a form of security operation whose pri-mary task is to protect the main force by fightingto gain time, while also observing and reportinginformation. Guard operations may be conductedby LAR units to the front, flanks, or rear of a sta-tionary or moving force. A guard operation is nor-mally conducted within artillery range of theprotected force. If not within range of artillery,the LAR unit must have dedicated close air sup-port (CAS). A guard force reconnoiters, screens,attacks, defends, and delays as required to preventenemy ground observation of and direct fireagainst the main body. A guard force will nor-mally be deployed along a narrower front than ascreen due to its requirement to fight and providephysical protection. Depending on the threat, theLAR battalion may require reinforcement witharmor or mechanized forces as well as receive

priority of fires for artillery and CAS. Unless oth-erwise directed, the guard force accomplishes allof the following critical tasks:

Performs reconnaissance along the supportedmain body’s axis of advance.Maintains continuous surveillance of all enemyavenues of approach.Destroys or repels enemy reconnaissance andsecurity elements.Defeats, repels, or fixes enemy ground forcesbefore they can engage the supported mainbody with direct fire.Reconnoiters the zone between the main bodyand the guard force battle positions.Maintains contact with the supported mainbody.

KEY:PL - Phaseline

Figure 3-1. LAR Company Screen.


The supported commander provides the follow-ing broad direction and/or assets in support of theLAR battalion:

Provides adequate combat and CS assets to theguard force.Ensures responsive fire support to the guardforce.Provides engagement, disengagement, andbypass criteria.Identifies duration of the guard mission.

CoverCover is a type of security operation that protectsthe force from surprise, develops the situation,and gives commanders time and space in whichto respond to the enemy’s actions. A coveringforce operates apart from the main body for thepurpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, dis-organizing, or deceiving the enemy before he canattack the force. It is an independent, tacticallyself-contained maneuver unit that operates at con-siderable distance to the front, flank, or rear of amoving or stationary force in an offensive ordefensive role. If it cannot defeat the enemyforce, then the covering force deceives, delays,and disorganizes the enemy until the main bodycan effectively react. A covering force impliesthe capability of close decisive combat. Itrequires significant firepower against a mecha-nized and mobile opponent and considerabletroop density against a dismounted opponent.Usually, the LAR battalion lacks the necessaryorganic firepower and troop density to functionindependently as a covering force. A task-orga-nized LAR force with its own attached tanks,artillery, and CSS and dedicated air in direct sup-port is usually necessary to operate as a coveringforce. A covering force’s critical tasks and plan-ning considerations are as follows:

Critical Tasks:Conducting reconnaissance along the sup-ported main body’s axis of advance.Denying enemy information about the size,strength, composition, and objective of thesupported main body.

Destroying or repelling enemy reconnaissanceand security zone forces within capability.Developing the situation to determine enemystrengths, weaknesses, and dispositions.Defeating, repelling, or fixing enemy forces asdirected by the supported commander.Exploiting opportunities until the supportedmain body forces are committed.

Planning Considerations:The LAR battalion normally requires rein-forcement to perform a covering force opera-tion.The LAR battalion can be teamed with theACE to act as a MAGTF covering force.The LAR battalion can operate beyond therange of the artillery of the main body.

Area SecurityArea security operations neutralize or defeatenemy operations in a specified area. The LARbattalion can conduct area security of designatedpersonnel, airfields, installations, unit convoys,routes, LOCs, equipment, and critical points. TheLAR battalion must be assigned a mission andintent in relation to an area of operations (AO).Area security operations critical tasks and plan-ning considerations are as follows:

Critical Tasks:Protecting installations and units.Protecting LOCs.Denying enemy access to critical areas.Finding, fixing, and destroying stay-behind,infiltration, and guerrilla forces.Countering enemy penetrations.Performing damage control operations, chemi-cal agent detection, or radiological monitoringsurvey.

Planning Considerations:Natural defensive characteristic of the terrain.Existing roads and waterways for LOCs.Control of avenues of approach surroundingthe area to be secured extending beyond that ofenemy indirect fire.

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Control of airspace.Proximity to critical sites.Movement of tactical units and civilian trafficshould be rigorously controlled to avoid confu-sion, obstruction, and fratricide.


LAR offensive operations are used to penetrate orenvelop the enemy, outflank his movement, dis-rupt and destroy his LOCs and logistics, disrupthis command and control, and also destroy anddisorganize remnants of an enemy force. TheLAR unit may conduct offensive operations aspart of a task-organized formation such as a regi-mental combat team. These units most often con-duct offensive operations in support of or as partof reconnaissance, guard, or cover missions.Offensive operations include deliberate attack,hasty attack, and movement to contact. They alsoinclude limited objective operations that are per-formed for a specific purpose, such as a raid orspoiling attack. Light armored reconnaissanceoffensive operations can be used to accomplishthe following:

Conduct reconnaissance in force.Identify or create a weak point.Suppress enemy fires.Isolate the enemy and maneuver against hisweak point.Exploit success.Pursue enemy forces.Deceive or divert the enemy.

Planning considerations are as follows:

Task organization based on METT-T.Position and commitment of the reserve.Allocation of fire support assets.Control measures must account for LAR’smobility.Deception plan.

Defensive Operations

Light armored reconnaissance defensive opera-tions are temporary measures used to identify orcreate enemy weaknesses to be exploited at theearliest opportunity by offensive action. Thedefense seeks to defeat enemy attacks by destroy-ing substantial parts of the attacking force whileholding friendly losses to a minimum. The LARunit most often conducts defensive operations insupport of or as part of screen, guard, cover, orarea security missions. Defensive operationsinclude defend from a battle position, defend insector, and delay. The LAR units in the defensecan be used to accomplish the following:

Gain time.Concentrate forces elsewhere.Attrite enemy forces in preparation for offen-sive operations.Control key terrain.Deceive the enemy as to the location and inten-tion of supported forces.


Proper engagement area development to delaythe enemy, disrupt his C2 systems, reconnais-sance units, CS, and vulnerable supportingforces.Allocation of weapons and space. Coordination of obstacles and fire support.Enemy avenues of approach.Length of delaying operations.Size of sector.

Passage of Lines and Battle Handover

A passage of lines is an operation in which aforce moves forward or rearward through anotherforce’s combat positions with the intention ofmoving into or out of contact with the enemy. Apassage may be designated as a forward or rear-ward passage of lines. (JP 1-02) A battle hand-over is a cooperative process between a stationary

Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion _____________________________________________ 3-11

and passing unit during a passage of lines inwhich one unit transfers to the other unit theresponsibility for fighting an enemy force. Thisevent normally occurs at a designated point onthe ground, normally depicted as a phase line des-ignated as the battle handover line (BHL). TheBHL is a control feature, usually following eas-ily definable terrain features, at which responsi-bility for the conduct of combat operations passesfrom one force to another. In fast-paced, mobileoperations on a nonlinear battlefield, LAR unitsmust frequently conduct forward and rearwardpassage of lines. MAGTF units that conduct tacti-cal missions must routinely plan, coordinate,rehearse, and execute this complex operation. Apassage of lines and/or battle handover are oftenintegral parts of MAGTF offensive and defen-sive operations. (See app. A for more informa-tion on passage of lines and battle handover.)


Coordination, liaison, and clear delineation ofresponsibilities between passing and station-ary units.Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) thatwill be used.Clear identification of control measures andtrigger for battle handover.Handover of fire support coordination respon-sibilities.Follow-on missions for LAR unit.CSS reconstitution for the LAR unit.As the stationary unit, LAR can reposition rap-idly to the flanks and open a wide lane for apassing unit.

CHAPTER 4COMMAND AND CONTROL

To be successful, the LAR commander must seethe battlefield and respond quickly; this can beachieved through an effective and responsive C2system. In order to see the battlefield, the com-mander positions himself where he can best influ-ence the battle and maintain as much situationalawareness as possible while still being able toexercise command and control. However, the rel-atively large size, dispersion, and mobility of theLAR battalion and its supporting units can poseC2 challenges for the commander. Some of thekey variables that determine how the C2 systemorganizes and functions include echelons of com-mand, desires of the commander, and METT-T.During operations, the commander normallymoves forward in order to observe and influencethe course of the battle. Normally, these are fluidreconnaissance and security operations where thecommander and his command group must bemounted in vehicles in order to position with themaneuvering subordinate units.

Command and Control System

A C2 system consists of the facilities, equipment,communications, procedures, and personnelessential to a commander for planning, directing,and controlling operations of assigned forces pur-suant to the missions assigned. (JP 1-02)

Command

Battle command incorporates two vital compo-nents: the ability to lead and the ability to decide.

Both components demand skill, wisdom, experi-ence, and moral and physical courage. Commandrequires the commander to—

Envision a desired end state.Translate—clearly and concisely—that visioninto a statement of intent, providing a singleand unifying effort.Formulate concepts.Provide the force of will to concentrate over-whelming combat power at the decisive point.

Control

Commanders use control to regulate forces andfunctions on the battlefield in order to execute thecommander’s intent. As such, control involvesthe following:

Defining limits.Computing requirements.Allocating resources.Describing interfaces.Monitoring status.Describing variances.Correcting deviations.Acquiring and applying the means to accom-plish the commander’s intent.Developing instructions from guidance.Measuring, reporting, and analyzing perfor-mance.Projecting change.

Control also has two vital components. First, con-trol conforms to the principle of unity of com-mand in which commanders typically control one

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echelon down and manage forces two echelonsdown. Second, control accounts for the dynamicsof the battlefield. This component requires areporting system to assess the situation routinelyand frequently, thus enabling the commander totake action as appropriate.

Fundamentals

The purpose of the C2 system is to implement thecommander’s will in pursuit of the objective. Thesystem must be reliable, secure, fast, and dura-ble. It must collect, analyze, and present informa-tion rapidly. It must communicate orders,coordinate support, and provide direction to theforce. It must function despite the friction of bat-tle, extraordinary stress, obscure situations, com-pressed time, competing demands, enemyinterference, destruction of command posts, orloss and replacement of leaders. The C2 systemmust be responsive and flexible enough to facili-tate freedom to operate, allow delegation ofauthority, and allow leadership to operate fromany critical point on the battlefield.

Light armored reconnaissance units are oftenrequired to begin their missions and to operatevery soon after (or even before) the receipt of anoperation order. A C2 system permitting suchflexibility and freedom to operate independentlyemphasizes certain specific operational tech-niques and command practices:

Optimizes the use of time by routine use ofwarning orders, situation updates, and parallel/anticipatory planning.Stresses standardized training in operationsand staff practices to ensure mutual under-standing between leaders and units.Eases execution of orders using standard lan-guage, symbols, and SOPs.

A responsive C2 system allows the commander toposition himself wherever the situation calls forhis personal presence without depriving him of

the ability to respond to opportunities or changingsituations. Light armored reconnaissance opera-tions occur across wide areas, and commandersnormally operate with significant freedom ofaction. The LAR commander cannot expect con-stant or close supervision by his higher com-mander. Close command direction is seldompossible, even when desired. Each commander, inturn, must provide his subordinates freedom ofaction for the same reason. Unity of effort isensured by the intent of the commander assign-ing the mission. Each subordinate commandermust understand the intent of the commander twolevels above him and the concept of his immedi-ate commander. The LAR commander exercisesinitiative within the latitude permitted to achievethe intent as battlefield conditions develop. Aneffective battle C2 system accomplishes its mis-sion through four interrelated components:

Command echelons.C2 organization and facilities.Command and staff relationships and responsi-bilities.C2 reporting and communications.

Command Echelons

To assist the commander in the continuous col-lection, processing, and dissemination of combatinformation and orders, the command can estab-lish command echelons. Control of the battle isfocused through only one command echelon at atime. Command echelons must have the requisitemobility to locate where the commander wishesand should be as mobile as the rest of the unit.

The echelon in which the unit or subordinatecommander is located or from which the com-mander operates is the CP. Depending on the sit-uation, the commander may establish as many asthree command echelons: the tactical echelon, themain echelon, and the rear echelon. Commandechelons may also be split into increments tofacilitate displacement and survivability.


Tactical Echelon

The commander normally collocates with themain effort during critical events and focuses onthe current operation of committed forces. There-fore, the tactical echelon provides the commanderfreedom of movement and the informationrequired to maintain situational awareness. TheLAR battalion commander normally moveswithin a section of LAV-25s, which enables thecommand to establish the battalion’s tactical CP.The LAV-25 allows the commander to positionhimself forward, stay mobile, and maintain thecommunications and situational awareness neces-sary to command and control the operation.

Main Echelon

The main echelon is designed, manned, andequipped to direct the actions of all organic,attached, and supporting units. The main echelonis responsible for monitoring and directing cur-rent operations and planning future operations.The main echelon includes a combat operationscenter (COC). When the commander is locatedforward of the main echelon during combat, hemonitors communications among the COC andhigher and subordinate units. The main echelonwill dictate a succession of command (designatedindividuals), normally the executive officer (XO)or S-3, in the event he is incapacitated or his com-munications with the COC are lost.

Rear Echelon

The principal function of the rear echelon is tosupport combat operations by providing com-mand and control of rear area operations. The S-1and S-4 are normally located in the rear echelon.The rear echelon must be capable of monitoringthe activities of the forward units and the othertwo echelons. Normally, the rear echelon is collo-cated with, or sited near, CSS units to facilitatelogistical efforts.

Increments

If a command element is split into increments, thecommander organizes both increments withnearly identical structure. Typically, these incre-ments are referred to as alpha and bravo com-mand groups. The alpha command group isusually composed of the S-2, S-3, FSC, and prin-cipal fire support liaison officers (LNOs). Nor-mal ly , the pr imary funct ion of the a lphacommand group is to command and control theoperation that is underway. The bravo commandgroup is usually composed of the assistants foreach of the functional areas: S-2A, S-3A, andassistant FSC. The bravo command group moni-tors the current tactical situation and is immedi-ately prepared to assume control in the event thatthe alpha command group becomes disabled or ifoperations become protracted.

The bravo command group may also be taskedwith conducting future plans, maintainingrecords, and submitting reports. If the force isextended, the bravo command group may be usedas a relay to higher and supporting units. Thealpha and bravo command groups may be consol-idated when required by the tactical situation.Consolidation allows full utilization of the entirestaff for planning and the establishment of a sin-gle watch section, and it also provides more timeto rest personnel.

Command and Control Organization and Facilities

The commander organizes his staff to accomplishthe mission. He develops an organization that isflexible enough to meet changing situations. Thefacilities from which the commander and his staffoperate are closely aligned with the C2 organiza-tion. They provide the orders, processing, andtransmitting of information that is necessary for

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effective command and control. They sustain theoperation through continuity, planning, and coor-dination of CS and CSS. The C2 facilities used ina tactical situation are listed below:

Forward command post (Fwd CP).Main CP.Combat trains command post (CTCP).

The command group is located well forward,with appropriate communications means, to seeand command the battle at the most critical point.The command group generally consists of the fol-lowing personnel:

Commander.Air officer.FSC.S-3.S-2.S-6.Engineer officer (as required).

The command group is organized and operatedaccording to the commander and the needs of thecurrent situation; it is not a permanent organiza-tion. The command group is highly mobile, dis-places often, and may move continuously. SinceLAR units frequently operate on wide frontages,the commander may place the S-3 at a secondcritical location on the battlefield. The commandgroup fights the battle and synchronizes the fightby arranging battlefield activities to achieve max-imum effect on the enemy. The command groupalso coordinates fires and movement in time andspace to concentrate at the decisive point. Thecommander positions himself so that he can seethe battle and issue the appropriate orders at criti-cal times. The air officer either positions himselfwith the commander or positions himself wherehe can see the priority target area requiring CAS.The FSC normally positions himself forward withthe commander in order to facilitate synchroniza-tion of fires. The vehicle commander remains onthe vehicle to assist with radio operations and

map postings; thus enabling the commander andthe S-3 to concentrate on the battle.

Forward Command Post

LAR units frequently operate over long dis-tances, wide frontages, or extended depths. Thecommander must maintain adequate internal com-munications over these distances as well as exter-nal links to the controlling headquarters. The FwdCP is the facility that supports the continuity ofcommand and control, and it may serve as a long-term or temporary facility. The command groupuses the Fwd CP as a base. The Fwd CP, in somecases, may be viewed as a forward echelon of theCOC. Requirements for long-term operations dic-tate that the Fwd CP cannot be formed at theexpense of the COC. The S-3 normally runs theFwd CP with the assistance of personnel from theS-2 and S-3 sections. Representatives of specialstaff officers may be present as required. The S-3positions the Fwd CP well forward on the battle-field. The Fwd CP is highly mobile and relies onfrequent displacement, small size, and compara-tively low electronic signature to provide security.

The Fwd CP maintains a battle map and providesthe commander with a reasonably secure place toplan operations and issue orders. The Fwd CPcontrols the ongoing operation, provides the com-mander with critical combat information, andcoordinates immediately available fire support.Additional functions of the Fwd CP are as follows:

Develop combat intelligence of immediateinterest to the commander.Provide priorities and planning guidance forCS and CSS activities to the XO located in theCOC.Maintain communications to receive, process,and pass routine reports while the COC dis-places.Serve as net control station for command fre-quency modulation (FM) net.Serve as an alternate CP.


Main Command Post

The main CP is composed of functional cells thatserve as the control, coordination, and communi-cations center for regiment/battalion combatoperations. These functional cells include theheadquarters cell, current operations cell, planscell, intelligence cell, fire support cell, and CSScell. The MAGTF normally provides the regi-ment with a variety of communications assets andintelligence system downlinks that become partof the main CP. Liaison officers from other head-quarters report to and perform their duties at themain CP. The XO is responsible for operations atthe main CP.

The location of the main CP varies according tothe type of operation in which the unit is en-gaged. The primary considerations in positioningthe main CP are communications, accessibility,and survivability. The main CP is arranged tofacilitate work, security, and smooth traffic flow;take advantage of cover; and permit quick dis-placement. When possible, the main CP is locatedin built-up areas using maintenance facilities,garages, or barns that can accommodate its size.

Support assets collocate at the main CP; however,their vehicles and communications equipment aredispersed and camouflaged to reduce the elec-tronic and visual signature. Where built-up areascannot be used, the main CP should be placed ona wooded, reverse slope to provide cover andconcealment from enemy observation and fires.Adequate road networks are needed to supportmain CP traffic.

Detailed unit SOPs outline main CP configura-tions and functions of the individuals that areassigned. The main CP configurations are flexibleto accommodate terrain, the situation, and lossesof equipment. Both hasty and long-term configu-rations are planned.

The COC is the largest cell of the main CP andthe principal planning organization for the unit.The COC contains future, current, and close oper-ations cells. When the Fwd CP is not deployed,

the COC controls close operations. Additionally,the COC ensures that CSS operations remainintegrated. The COC provides information andassistance to the commander and his subordinatecommanders. The COC anticipates future CS andCSS requirements and pushes assets forwardbefore needs are reported. Other functions of theCOC are as follows:

Collate information for the commander.Acquire and coordinate CS assets.Provide reports to higher headquarters.Provide intelligence to subordinate units.Plan for future operations.Provide terrain management.Maintain communications.Monitor CSS status.Provide target value analysis.Coordinate with adjacent units.

Combat Operations Center PersonnelThe XO controls the COC. It is composed of theS-2 and S-3 sections, the S-1 and the S-4 asappropriate, elements of the communications pla-toon, and the fire support element. It can alsoinclude other representatives, depending on themission of the unit. The nucleus of the COC isthe three functional areas of the S-2, the S-3, andthe fire support element. Other elements arearranged around this nucleus. Standardizing COCconfigurations facilitates rapid displacement,establishment, and efficient operations. Internalarrangements must facilitate staff coordination,provide adequate work space and communica-tions assets, and reduce the number of personnelphysically present inside the COC. Personnel inthe COC monitor operations on a 24-hour basis.They maintain communications with organic,higher, and adjacent units to stay abreast of thesituation, post maps, maintain records, and sendreports as required.

COC OperationsPersonnel are available to provide effective andcontinuous operation of the COC. Establishing

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shifts provides ample personnel with the requiredexpertise to operate the COC and make decisionson major issues. The standard shift evenly dividesavailable personnel based on staff function andexpertise. Adequate shift change proceduresreduce continuity problems and provide standard-ized teams, enhanced teamwork, and simplicity.Disadvantages to operating in shifts include abreak in the continuity of operations during shiftchange and possible absence of a key staff officerwhen needed.

The XO is second in command, and the XO is notplaced on a duty shift. Personnel who do notwork permanently in the COC are not integralparts of a duty shift. This includes LNOs and anyspecial staff officers who are unit leaders or com-manders. Additionally, members of the com-mand group and Fwd CP are not included; thesepersonnel integrate into the existing manningschedules when present at the main CP for anextended period.

The XO uses replacement officers and noncom-missioned officers as augmentation. Usingreplacement leaders on the staff initially inte-grates them into the unit with minimum disrup-tion. They may replace current staff officers whoassume leadership roles in subordinate units. Anymanning method used must retain flexibility toaccommodate personnel departing from the COCfor specific duties and to adapt to changing situa-tions and available personnel. Needlessly disrupt-ing the rest of the personnel rapidly degradestheir effectiveness.

Combat Trains Command Post

The CTCP is composed of portions of the S-1 andS-4 sections and is under the S-4’s control. Plan-ning logistic support and coordinating with subor-dinate units, higher headquarters, and theheadquarters of the supporting logistic unit are theCTCP’s primary functions. The battalion CTCPtracks the current logistic status of subordinateunits and may be located with the main CP, com-bat trains, or field trains serving as the field trains

CP or the alternate CP. S-1 and S-4 personnelprovide continuous operations by cross training induties and basic functions. An operations situa-tion map is maintained to facilitate logistical plan-ning and to backup tactical command and control.Continuous communications are maintained withsupporting and subordinate units.

Company Command Post

The company CP is controlled by the companyXO and is manned by members of the companyheadquarters. The company CP essentially per-forms command and support functions for theongoing operation. Limited planning may beaccomplished. The company CP maintains com-munications with subordinate organic and sup-porting elements, the battalion, and adjacentunits, and it plays a key role in coordinating airand ground company operations. The companyCP maintains close contact with the first sergeantin the company combat trains to coordinate ser-vice support operations.

Fire Support Coordination Center

The LAR battalion fire support coordination cen-ter (FSCC) is organized similarly to that of aninfantry battalion. The FSCC normally consistsof an air officer, an artillery officer FSC, and thebattalion S-3. While the battalion FSCC is builtaround this nucleus, the fire support coordinationcell is augmented with the personnel and equip-ment that are needed to conduct fire support coor-dination functions. Augmentation sources mayinclude Marine Corps and external sources; forexample, watchstanders may require individualswith specific skills such as electronic warfare,unmanned aircraft, air defense, or proficiency infire support coordination.

During an operation, FSCC staff members arerequired to plan fires, conduct targeting, and inte-grate fires simultaneously with maneuver ele-ments. The FSCC’s coordinating responsibilities


include the requirement to disseminate timely firesupport information; to institute coordinationmeasures as required; and to integrate fire supportactivities that affect two or more fire supportagencies, subordinate elements, or adjacent units.Key personnel in the FSCC include the fire sup-port coordinator, air officer, artillery liaisonofficer, naval gunfire liaison officer, and targetinformation officer.

Fire Support Coordinator

The LAR battalion’s FSC is structured by T/O fora MOS 0802, field artillery officer at the grade ofmajor. The FSC’s responsibilities include—

Supervising the operation of the FSCC, includ-ing organizing and training personnel.Advising the battalion commander on all firesupport matters.Developing the fire support plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,requests from subordinate units, and the avail-able fire support.Coordinating all fire support within the battal-ion zone of action.Processing of target information, including theshelling report.Ensuring the safety of friendly troops from ourown fire support.

Air Officer

The air officer is a pilot or naval flight officer andis normally a captain by T/O. The air officer’sresponsibilities include the following:

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allair support matters.Developing the air fire plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,assets available, and coordination with theFSC.Submitting air requests.Coordinating actions of forward air controllers.

Artillery Liaison Officer

The artillery LNO is normally a lieutenant pro-vided by a direct support artillery battalion. Theartillery LNO’s responsibilities include—

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allartillery support matters.Developing the artillery fire plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,assets available, and coordination with theFSC.Passing requirements for support to the appro-priate artillery fire direction center for action.Coordinating artillery unit requirements withthe battalion commander/FSC.Coordinating the actions of the artillery for-ward observers.

Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer

The naval gunfire LNO is normally a Navy lieu-tenant provided by the direct support artillery bat-talion. The naval gunfire LNO’s responsibilitiesinclude the following:

Advising the battalion commander/FSC on allnaval surface fire support (NSFS) matters.Developing the NSFS plan based on thescheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,assets available, and coordination with theFSC.Assisting in calling for NSFS.Coordinating the actions of the spot team.Passing requirements for support to the appro-priate NSFS ship.

Target Information Officer

The target information officer is normally the bat-talion S-2 officer. His responsibilities concerningtarget intelligence include the following:

Disseminating target information and intelli-gence to the FSCC.Advising the battalion commander/FSC onenemy weapons capabilities.Keeping appropriate records of targets.

4-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Command and Staff Relationships

Command relationships and levels of authority,although authoritative, must be adapted to meetthe mission’s requirements. Commanders musthave the flexibility to establish nonstandard rela-tionships when required by the situation. Collec-tively, command relationships and levels ofauthority provide the flexibility necessary to orga-nize forces to respond to all situations. Commandrelationships foster understanding and freedom ofaction and establish the basis for interactionamong unit commanders. When a Marine Corpsunit is under the command of a senior MarineCorps unit, the subordinate Marine Corps unit iseither organic or attached. If organic, a unit isassigned to and forms an essential part of a mili-tary organization. If attached, a unit or personnelare temporarily placed in an organization. When aMarine Corps unit is in a support relationship, oneelement or unit of the MAGTF provides arequired capability to another element. Units withLAR attachments must be aware of the logisticaland tactical challenges inherent with light armor.Unless the attachment orders qualify the degree ofcontrol involved, attachment of a LAR unit to aninfantry battalion or regiment implies that theinfantry battalion or regiment assumes fullresponsibility for the LAR unit’s logistics, admin-istration, training, and operations. The LAR unitis under the command of the unit to which it isattached. However, transfer and promotionresponsibilities normally remain with the com-mand to which the LAR unit is organic.

Command

Command is the authority that a commander law-fully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rankor assignment. Command includes the authorityand responsibility for effectively using availableresources and planning the employment, organi-zation, direction, coordination, and control of theLAR unit to accomplish assigned missions. Otherresponsibilities include the health, welfare,

morale, training, and discipline of the assignedMarines. The commander is responsible foreverything that his unit does or fails to do, and hecannot delegate this responsibility. The final deci-sion and responsibility remain with the com-mander. Success, however, requires a commanderwho delegates authority and fosters an organiza-tional climate of mutual trust, cooperation, andteamwork. The commander must also promote anunderstanding of procedures and a common basisfor action. The commander discharges his respon-sibilities through an established chain of com-mand and holds each subordinate commanderresponsible for the actions of his unit. When thecommander assigns a mission to a subordinate, healso delegates the necessary authority and pro-vides him with the resources, guidance, and sup-port needed to accomplish the mission. Thecommander must allow the subordinate com-mander freedom of action. The commanderremains free to address the unit as a whole and toanticipate future actions.

Staff

The staff is an extension of the commander and isorganized specifically to be a single, cohesiveunit. The staff assists the commander in decision-making by acquiring, analyzing, and coordinat-ing information. More importantly, the staffscreens the mass of information available andpresents only what is essential to the commanderwith a recommendation so he can make the bestdecision. The commander specifically delegatesauthority to the staff or particular staff officers.The authority he delegates is a factor of the com-mander’s leadership style, staff officer’s person-ality, mission of the unit, immediacy of theoperation, and the relationship of the staffofficer’s functional area to the unit’s primarymission. The commander delegates authority tothe staff to take final action on designated mat-ters. All staff members must know not only theirown functions and roles, but also the functions ofthe other staff members.


The staff establishes and maintains a high degreeof coordination and cooperation internally andwith staffs of higher, lower, and adjacent units.Staff efforts focus on supporting the commanderin the exercise of command and on helping himsupport subordinate commanders in the execu-tion of their mission. Staff activities center onfive common functions to assist the commander:

Provide timely and accurate information.Anticipate requirements and prepare estimates.Determine courses of action and make recom-mendations.Prepare plans and orders.Supervise execution of decisions.

Battalion Commander

The battalion commander analyzes and restatesthe mission, designs the concept of operations,organizes the forces, provides support to subordi-nate units, and issues mission orders with suffi-cient details for his subordinates to plan and leadtheir units. The battalion commander acknowl-edges the professional competence and expertiseof his subordinate commanders and allows themthe flexibility to accomplish their mission. Thebattalion commander relies on his staff and sub-ordinate commanders for advice and assistance inplanning and supervising operations, therefore hemust understand their capabilities and limita-tions. The battalion commander must train themto achieve his intent during his absence, over-come the failure of communications systems, orchanges in the situation.

Subordinate Commanders

Assigned company commanders answer to thebattalion commander for the discipline, combatreadiness, and training of the unit as well as themaintenance of its equipment. They must be pro-ficient in the tactical employment of their unitsand CS elements, and they must know the capa-bilities and limitations of their personnel andequipment. Subordinate commanders provide

current combat information to the battalion com-mander or higher headquarters and must remainflexible in order to execute missions that meetchanging situations on the battlefield.

Battalion Staff

The battalion staff consists of those officers andenlisted Marines who assist the commander inplanning and supervising tactical operations. Thebattalion staff reduces the demands on the com-mander’s time and assists him by providing infor-mation, making estimates and recommendations,preparing plans and orders, and supervising theexecution of orders issued by the commander.The battalion staff synchronizes CS and CSSoperations to ensure total integration of supportwith the commander’s concept. The battalionstaff assists subordinate commanders by antici-pating problems, providing informal staffresponses when appropriate, and providing assis-tance in functional areas. Organization of a typi-cal battalion staff is depicted in figure 4-1 onpage 4-10. The SOP defines the responsibilitiesof key personnel to preclude overlaps and tomake sure all functions are adequately super-vised. Detailed discussions of staff officer andsection responsibilities are in Marine CorpsWarfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-40.1, MarineAir-Ground Task Force Command and Control.

Executive Officer

The XO is second in command and the principalassistant to the commander; as such, he performsa variety of functions. The executive officer isresponsible for assignment of tasks and the effi-cient, coordinated, and prompt response of thestaff. The XO directs, supervises, and ensurescoordination of staff work except in those spe-cific areas reserved by the commander, therebyfreeing the commander from routine details. Dur-ing combat operations, the XO is positioned inthe COC where he is responsible for its operation.

4-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

COMM-ElecMaint Tech

Chief

S-6A

MaintenanceManagement

Officer

MotorTransport

Officer

ArmoryOfficer

S-4A

EngineerOfficer

BattalionGunner**

CBRNOfficer

Forward AirController

Forward AirController

Air Officer

Fire SupportCoordinator

S-3AS-2ASubstance

Abuse ControlOfficer

AdjutantS-1

IntelligenceOfficer S-2

CommunicationsOfficer S-6

LogisticsOfficer S-4

CommandingOfficer

OperationsOfficer S-3

SergeantMajor

Chaplain*

FamilyReadiness

Officer*

Staff JudgeAdvocate

SupplyOfficer

BattalionMaintenance

Officer

BattalionSurgeon

CareerPlanner

ExecutiveOfficer

Coordinating Staff

* Direct access to the commander.** The battalion’s structure determines who the gunner reports to, but he has direct access to the commander

KEY:COMM-Elec - communications-electronicsMaint - maintenanceTech - technicians

Figure 4-1. LAR Battalion Staff.

Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion _____________________________________________ 4-11

The XO directs and coordinates combat supportin consonance with the commander’s plan andensures continuous CSS. The XO, assisted by theoperations chief, watch officer, and watch chief,maintains routine reporting, coordinates the activ-ities of liaison personnel and is always planningahead, remaining current on the tactical situationand prepared to assume command on a moment'snotice. The commander trains the XO and allowshim to command during training exercises prepar-ing him to assume command in combat.

Liaison Officers

Liaison is that contact or intercommunicationmaintained between elements of military forcesor other agencies to ensure mutual understandingand unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02) Whendirected or required, LAR units will dispatch anLNO to the MAGTF COC and receive LNOsfrom other organizations.

Command and Control Reporting

Accurate and timely reporting of information tothe supported commander and his higher head-quarters is essential. Tasking an LAR unit to col-lect against the supported CCIRs will focus LARreconnaissance efforts on what the commandervalues as important. Reporting by the LAR bat-talion should be integrated into the MAGTF com-mander’s R&S plan.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

The CCIRs are elements of information requiredby commanders that directly affect decisionmak-ing and dictate the successful execution of mili-tary operations. Information regarding the enemyand friendly activities and the environment iden-tified by the commander as critical to maintain-ing situational awareness, planning futureactivities, and facilitating timely decisionmak-ing. The CCIRs are normally divided into three

primary subcategories: PIRs, friendly force infor-mation requirements, and essential elements offriendly information.

Priority Intelligence Requirements

A PIR is an intelligence requirement associatedwith a decision that will critically affect the over-all success of the command’s mission. (MCRP 5-12A)

Friendly Force Information Requirements

In order to develop plans and make effectivedecisions, the commander will need informationabout friendly forces. Depending upon the cir-cumstances, information on the unit location,composition, readiness, personnel status, andlogistic status could become a friendly forceinformation requirement. (MCRP 5-12A)

Essential Elements of Friendly Information

Essential elements of friendly informationinclude specific facts about friendly intentions,capabilities, and activities needed by adversariesto plan and execute effective operations againstour forces. (MCRP 5-12A)

Command and Control Communications

Communications are essential to LAR operations.The reporting of combat information is fundamen-tal to reconnaissance and security. This informa-tion is of interest to other maneuver units as wellas to higher headquarters staffs and requires thewidest dissemination possible. Light armoredreconnaissance operations frequently operate overlong distances, wide frontages, and extendeddepths and great distances from the controllingheadquarters. Communications must be redun-dant and long range to meet these internal andexternal requirements. Communications, particu-larly electromagnetic, are subject to disruption.

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Responsibilities

All levels of command gain and maintain com-munications with the necessary headquarters andpersonnel. The traditional communicationsresponsibilities are listed below, senior to subor-dinate. A senior unit is responsible for establish-ing communications with a subordinate unit. Atactical unit of any size is considered subordinateto the command to which it is attached.

Supporting to supported: a supporting unit isresponsible for establishing communicationswith the supported unit.Reinforcing to reinforced: a reinforcing unit isresponsible for establishing communicationswith the reinforced unit.Passing to stationary: forward passage of lines.Stationary to passing: rearward passage oflines.Lateral communications: responsibility forestablishing communications between adjacentunits may be fixed by the next higher com-mander or SOP.

If responsibility is not fixed by orders, the com-mander of the unit on the left is responsible forestablishing communications with the unit on theright. The commander of a unit positioned behindanother unit establishes communications with theforward unit. Regardless of responsibility, all unitstake prompt action to restore lost communications.

Means of Communication

The LAR units use the full range of availablecommunications means.

WireWire is normally used for internal communica-tions within the CP, support areas, and assembly

areas. It is the primary means of communicationswhenever the situation permits.

MessengersMessengers are used between the CP, trains, andhigher and lower headquarters.

Sound and VisualSound and visual signals are in the Signal Operat-ing Instructions or the unit SOP. The SOP mayestablish signals that are not included in the Com-munications-Electronics Operating Instructions.The battlefield will have many sound and visualcues. Commanders and staff planners carefullydetermine how sound and visual signals will beused and authenticated. Sound and visual signalsinclude pyrotechnics, hand and arm, flag, metalon metal, rifle shots, whistles, and bells.

Commercial LinesCommercial lines are only used when approvedby higher headquarters. If the unit is forced towithdraw, any existing wire lines, including com-mercial lines, are cut and sections removed sothat the enemy cannot use them.

RadioAn LAR operation normally depends on radio asthe primary means of communication, particu-larly during reconnaissance and security mis-sions. Net discipline and SOP minimize needlesstraffic. To avoid detection by enemy directionfinding equipment, LAR operations use all othermeans of communication to supplement the radio.Once in contact, the primary means of communi-cation will be FM voice. Radio communicationsinclude electromagnetic communications in FM,AM [amplitude modulation], ultrahigh frequency(UHF), and VHF spectrums.

CHAPTER 5INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence is the product resulting from the col-lection, processing, integration, evaluation, analy-sis, and interpretation of available informationconcerning foreign nations, hostile or potentiallyhostile forces or elements, or areas of actual orpotential operations. (JP 1-02) Combat com-manders are primarily concerned with combatintelligence, which is the immediate knowledgeof the enemy, weather, and geographical featuresrequired in the planning and conduct of presentand future combat operations.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace

The IPB is a systematic, continuous process ofanalyzing a threat and environment in a specificgeographic area. (MCRP 5-12A) Light armoredreconnaissance operations support and enhance thesupported commander’s staff estimate and mili-tary decisionmaking process. Light armored recon-naissance assets support the IPB process by—

Defining the battlefield environment. The LARunit can confirm or deny initial assumptions asit is tasked as part of the overall collectioneffort to fill in information gaps.Describing battlefield effects. The LAR unit iswell suited to determine how the battlefieldenvironment influences future operations andthreat courses of action. This includes clarify-ing knowledge of terrain that a map analysiscannot satisfy. The LAR unit can validate theeffects of weather on mobility, equipment, andpersonnel.Evaluating the threat. LAR is able to quicklylocate the enemy and fight for information,determine enemy size, location, and disposi-tion. Fighting for information is the act offighting through threat reconnaissance (de-stroying the threat’s “eyes and ears”) to gain

combat information needed by higher unitcommander. (MCRP 3-14.1A, ReconnaissancePlatoon) It is as equally important to determinewhere the enemy is and where he is not.Determining adversary’s course of action. AnLAR unit’s ability to fight for informationgives it a distinct advantage over other assets indetermining the adversary’s course of action.The LAR unit’s mobility gives it the ability tomaintain contact over long distances in order togive the supported commander a clear pictureof the enemy’s movement and intentions. LARis an integral part of the overall collectioneffort and is tailored to fight for information.

Planning Considerations

Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan

To be effective, the LAR battalion must be inte-grated into the MAGTF commander’s R&S plan.This ensures that all collection efforts are focusedand efficient.

Reporting

Both the MAGTF commander and the LAR bat-talion must ensure that pertinent information flowsin both directions. Future technologies will en-hance the timeliness and accuracy of information.

Counterreconnaissance

In order to be effective in counterreconnaissance,the LAR battalion must locate enemy reconnais-sance forces before they are able to find friendlyforces. The LAR battalion is capable of destroy-ing or repelling enemy mechanized reconnais-sance forces.

5-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

The CCIRs identify what the commander mustknow about the enemy, weather, and terrain inorder to accomplish the mission. The CCIRs

relating to the threat are PIRs. It is critical that theLAR battalion knows the CCIRs/PIRs in order toensure that they focus on finding and reportingthis information.

CHAPTER 6FIRE SUPPORT

Fire support is used to destroy, neutralize, sup-press, or influence enemy forces through lethaland nonlethal means. Fire support is a key com-ponent to LAR operations because of its rangeand flexibility in shifting and massing fires.

Fire Support Planning Considerations

Light armored reconnaissance operations oftenpresent the supported commander with uniquerequirements and conditions that are not commonto most GCE units. The success of LAR opera-tions often depends on the LAR battalion’s abilityto maintain contact with the enemy while avoid-ing decisive engagement. Use of supporting arms,when combined with the LAV’s mobility and fire-power, is essential for LAR battalion’s to retainfreedom of maneuver and accomplish its mission.

Location

Most LAR operations (especially reconnaissanceand security) begin with LAR units that arewidely dispersed to the front, flanks, or the rearof the main body. Initially, the supported com-mander may give LAR units priority of firessince they may be the first elements in contactand support target identification for shaping theenemy and/or providing the main body security.At times, LAR units will be out of range of artil-lery. In such cases, the MAGTF commander mustconsider alternate means of ensuring effective,responsive fires to LAR units.

Tempo

The LAR battalion’s mobility requires that allsupporting arms must be prepared to support afast tempo of operations. Planning must focus onproviding rapid, responsive fires across a widelydispersed battlefield.

Fire Support Coordination Measures

Planning is enhanced through the thorough under-standing and use of fire support coordinationmeasures (FSCMs) described in MCWP 3-16,Fire Support Coordination in the Ground CombatElement. The FSCL must be moved in advance ofLAR operations in order to prevent fratricide. Indeep operations, coordination must be made forrestrictive fire areas that can be moved in accor-dance with the LAR unit’s rapid maneuver. Thus,proper assignment and coordination of FSCMsand maneuver control measures between the LARunit and adjacent units is essential to mission suc-cess and the prevention of fratricide. Addition-al ly, use of priori ty targets increases theresponsiveness of ground and naval surface fires.

Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion Fire Support Structure

Currently, the LAR battalion’s FSCC consists ofone MOS 0802, FSC (major) and one air officer.The battalion also has two forward air controllers.When employing LAR units, the MAGTF com-mander should address the fire support architec-ture to be used, communications nets (both digitaland voice), FSCMs, and who coordinates andcontrols fires during each phase. The MAGTFcommander should also address support relation-ships between LAR battalions and supportingarms agencies as certain inherent responsibilitiescorrespond to these relationships.

Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System

With the fielding of Advanced Field ArtilleryTactical Data System (AFATDS), the LAR bat-tallion’s capability to conduct fire support coordi-nation, speed fire mission processing, and reportcombat information has increased dramatically.

6-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

The LAR battalion uses the AFATDS to link toits supported unit and to all supporting armsagencies. The AFATDS also allows the LAR bat-talion to link to intelligence analysis systems inorder to expedite accurate reporting.

Artillery

The use of field artillery in support of LAR oper-ations requires deliberate planning and appropri-ate prioritization of assets to synchronize firesupport with the LAR mission and scheme ofmaneuver. The HIMARS [High Mobility Artil-lery Rocket System] possesses the range andspeed of displacement to support LAR units inhighly mobile, fast moving operations.

Naval Surface Fire Support

Future battlefields will more likely be located inlittoral areas. The high volume of fire, accuracy,and destructive nature of NSFS make it an excel-lent fire support asset when terrain allows. There-fore, the availability and use of NSFS canenhance an LAR unit's mission attainment.

Marine Aviation

Light armored reconnaissance forces may oftenoperate at a significant distance from the otherforces of the MAGTF. During such operations,aviation may be the sole source of fire support. Itmay prove beneficial to provide dedicated airsupport to LAR forces. Marine aviation is able toprovide support without diminishing the speed,mobility, and operating range of the LAR battal-ion. The MAGTF commander should considerhow the following functions of Marine aviationcan contribute to LAR operations.

Offensive Air Support

Offensive air support is divided into two catego-ries, deep air support (DAS) and CAS.

Deep Air SupportDeep air support is air action against enemy tar-gets at such a distance from friendly forces thatdetailed integration of each mission with fire andmovement of friendly forces is not required. ADAS mission flies on either side of the FSCL; thelack of a requirement for close coordination withthe fire and movement of friendly forces is thequalifying factor. A DAS mission may be used insupport of LAR operations by attacking enemyformations or positions before they present adirect threat to the LAR battalion. The LAR bat-talion can move rapidly over long distances toassess the effectiveness of DAS.

Close Air SupportClose air support is defined as air action by fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targetsthat are in close proximity to friendly forces andthat require detailed integration of each air mis-sion with the fire and movement of those forcesdefines CAS. (JP 1-02) Preplanned or on-call,CAS is used to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, ordelay the enemy. During LAR operations, theplan may include dedicated strip alert aircraftwhen enemy contact is possible and dedicatedairborne alert aircraft when enemy contact islikely. Air strikes may be scheduled.

Aerial Reconnaissance

Integration of the onboard sensors of both fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft will complementLAR capabilities.

Assault Support

Given the distances at which LAR units mayoperate from friendly forces, aviation can be usedto provide casualty evacuation, refueling, andresupply support.


Mortars

The LAR companies consist of a section that isequipped with two, 81mm mortars mounted inLAV-Ms. The LAV-M improves the effective-ness and survivability of the mortar crew andequipment by providing increased flexibility,responsiveness, mobility, and protected transpor-tation. The primary role of the company mortarsection is to provide immediate, responsive indi-rect fires that support the maneuver of the pla-toons. An organic, company-level mortar sectionserves to enhance indirect fire responsivenesswith volume and provides the high-angle fireessential to effective engagement in urban andother complex terrain. The section’s fire direc-tion center controls and directs the mortar sec-tion’s maneuver and fires.

The mortar section provides the commander withthe ability to support the unit’s close fight withindirect fires that will—

Shape the conditions for maneuver.Provide a mark for supporting attack aviation.Provide close supporting fires for assaultingforces in restricted and severely restricted ter-rain.Destroy, neutralize, suppress, degrade, or dis-rupt enemy forces and force armored vehiclesto button up.Break up enemy troop concentrations(mounted and dismounted) and destroy theenemy’s synchronization.Fix enemy forces or reduce the enemy’s mobil-ity and canalize his assault forces into engage-ment areas.

Deny the enemy the advantage of defile ter-rain and force him into areas covered by directfire weapons.Provide standoff fires against LAVs. Optimize indirect fires in urban terrain.Improve the dismounted scout’s lethality andsurvivability against a close dismountedassault.

Each mortar system is capable of providing threeprimary types of mortar fires:

High explosive (HE) rounds are used to sup-press or destroy enemy dismounted infantry,mortars, and other supporting weapons and tointerdict the movement of personnel, vehicles,and supplies in the enemy’s forward area.Bursting white phosphorus (WP) rounds areoften combined with HE rounds to enhancetheir suppressive and destructive effects.Obscuration rounds are used to conceal friendlyforces as they maneuver or assault and to blindenemy supporting weapons. Obscurants can beused to isolate a portion of the enemy forcewhile it is destroyed piecemeal. Some mortarrounds use bursting WP to achieve this obscu-ration; others employ technology that is moreefficient. Bursting WP may be used to mark tar-gets for engagement by other weapons, usuallyaircraft, and for signaling.

Illumination rounds are used to reveal the loca-tion of enemy forces hidden by darkness. Theyallow the commander to confirm or deny thepresence of the enemy without revealing the loca-tion of friendly direct fire weapons. Illuminationfires are often coordinated with HE fires both toexpose the enemy and to kill or suppress him.

CHAPTER 7URBAN OPERATIONS

Urbanized terrain is complex and challenging. Itpossesses all of the characteristics of the naturallandscape, coupled with manmade construction,resulting in an incredibly complicated and fluidurban AO that influences the conduct of militaryoperations in unique ways. This chapter focuseson the tools necessary for understanding theurban AO and for planning and executing mis-sions, including reconnaissance, in the urban AOinvolved in the planning, preparation, and execu-tion phases of urban reconnaissance.

Military operations on urbanized terrain (MOUT)is defined as all military actions that are plannedand conducted on a topographical complex andits adjacent natural terrain where manmade con-struction is the dominant feature. It includes com-bat in cities, which is that portion of militaryoperations on urbanized terrain involving house-to-house and street-by-street fighting in townsand cities. (MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supple-ment to the Department of Defense Dictionary ofMilitary and Associated Terms) Military opera-tions on urbanized terrain effect the tacticaloptions available to a commander. An urban AOis a concentration of structures, facilities, andpopulations, such as villages, cities, and towns,that form the economic and cultural focus for thesurrounding area.

Although each urban AO encountered by theLAR battalio has its own distinct characteristics,urban AOs are the most complex. There are twoprimary factors that influence the complexity ofurban operations. One is the manmade terrain andsupporting infrastructure, the other factor is thedensity of noncombatants in close proximity tocombat forces. Noncombatants and the humandimension are the most important and, poten-tially, the most confusing to LAR units. A major

part of the MARDIV’s reconnaissance, surveil-lance, and target acquisition effort is human intel-ligence (HUMINT), which focuses on gaining anunderstanding of how the local populace feelstoward friendly and threat forces.

Urban Operations Framework

Divisions and above plan the operational level ofurban operations and have the primary responsi-bility of setting the conditions for tactical suc-cess. The following functions assist plannersvisualizing and conceptualizing urban operations:

Assess.Shape.Dominate.Transition.

The LAR battalion supports the MARDIV as itconducts each phase of an urban operation.

Assess

The LAR battalion conducts aggressive intelli-gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to providethe MARDIV with intelligence that influencescurrent operations. The LAR battalion identifiesthe relevant forces, strengths, vulnerabilities, andcritical nodes of the urban AO that provide lever-age if controlled. It identifies noncombatantsthrough HUMINT collection. This allows theMARDIV to determine whether or not a limitedcivil-military operations center should be estab-lished in order to plan and prepare to deal withnoncombatants, nongovernmental organizations,and international agencies. The LAR battalionanswers PIRs to enable MARDIV decisionmaking

7-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

and to conduct urban mapping. Examples of PIRsinclude the following:

Where are the threat’s critical C2 nodeslocated?What is the status of the key LOCs leading intoand within the urban AO?Where are the diplomatic embassies and mis-sions located within urban AOs?What is the location and status of tunnelswithin the urban AOs?What are the likely threat withdrawal routesand chokepoints?What are the potential vulnerabilities to infra-structure facilities?Where are the cross-mobility corridors withinthe urban AO located?Where are the cultural, political, and symbolicfacilities located?Are there any American citizens or third-coun-try nationals that need to be extracted?Are there any American citizens or third-coun-try nationals being detained against their will?If so, where?How do locals view us?What is the availability of maps and charts forthe AO or area of interest?What are the locations and status of hospitalsand key personnel?Are there obstacles impeding movement alongthe routes to and from assembly areas?Is there any opposition from the national crimi-nal enterprise?

Shape

The LAR battalion supports shaping operationsby providing accurate and timely intelligence,information, and situational awareness to theMARDIV. These inputs assist the MARDIVcommander in determining the extent and man-ner in which the outlying urban AO can be iso-lated. With its inherent mobility, the LARbattalion supports isolation by employing compa-nies and platoons along avenues of approach todetect threat forces as they attempt to enter or

leave the AO. Consistent with rules of engage-ment, the MARDIV can engage these forces withindirect fires, aerial fires, or a combination of thetwo. This technique may be effective in detect-ing and stopping large threat units from enteringor leaving the AO.

Dominate

Domination is achieved when all mission require-ments are achieved and preeminent military con-trol over the threat, geographical area, orpopulation is established. The LAR battalion pro-vides intelligence, information, and situationalunderstanding to the MARDIV, which assists theMARDIV commander in determining techniquesfor conducting urban operations, these tech-niques include the following:

Search and attack technique.Attack on a single axis. Attack on multiple axes.Cordon and attack.Fix and bypass.Multiple nodal attacks.

Transition

During the transition phase, the LAR battalionmay move from combat operations to stabilityoperations. Intelligence, surveillance, and recon-naissance operations continue during this phaseand may focus more on noncombatants and dis-placed civilians. The LAR battalion interacts withnongovernmental and private organizations dur-ing transition. The LAR battalion consolidates,reorganizes, and conducts area protection whilepreparing for follow-on missions.

Operational Considerations

The LAR battalion conducts reconnaissance inurban areas to gain critical intelligence, informa-tion, and situational awareness for the MARDIV.The LAR battalion must have a clear understand-ing of how its PIRs relate to the higher headquar-ter’s mission and intent. The LAR unit may focus


on using traditional techniques of informationgathering, as well as such methods as interactionwith the local society and tactical questioning. Onthe other hand, LAR scouts may focus on the iso-lation of an urban AO to support an infantryassault in a high-threat, urban AO. All LAR units,however, must be prepared to transition from oneextreme to another as the operational, urban AOchanges. No matter the focus, the main goal ofthe unit’s reconnaissance effort is to provide theMARDIV with a thorough and accurate under-standing of the urban AO. Crucial to planningoperations in urban AO is the urban IPB. Recon-naissance units must identify all relevant forces,along with their strengths and critical vulnerabili-ties, and be able to identify the critical nodes ofthe urban AO that may provide tactical leveragewhen controlled. The IPB effort must considernoncombatants, whose presence in the urban AOmay be substantial and dynamic. Determining theethnic and religious composition of the popula-tion and, if possible, their intent (for example, toflee or remain in the urban AO) may prove cru-cial. If combat operations in the urban AO arenecessary, the battalion’s mission focuses onachieving informational and situational aware-ness for the MARDIV. The LAR battalion mayperform other tasks for the MARDIV, such as,determining trafficability of routes and lateralroutes, identifying subterranean entry points andsystems, developing communications architec-ture, and providing a C2 framework.

During the preparation phase, the reconnaissanceplatoon determines reconnaissance objectives andconducts urban IPB. To begin developing the sit-uation, the LAR battalion collects and analyzesexisting map and aerial images (imagery intelli-gence), as well as all available HUMINT (fromsuch sources as special operations forces or theNational Security Agency). Without proper prep-aration and planning, entering or operating withinan urban AO poses a significant threat to Marines.The urban AO and the threat must be thoroughlyanalyzed before reconnaissance operations begin.This discussion describes characteristics unique tothe urban AO and the threat, as well as consider-ations that the LAR unit must take into accountduring planning and preparation.

Capabilities and Limitations

The infantry usually conducts urban combat oper-ations with LAR units providing support. TheLAR units can be employed in urban AO to assistdismounted forces in seizing and clearing streetsand buildings. Once the operational urban AOescalates to combat operations, these elements donot normally operate inside the urban AObecause of their lack of armor protection; how-ever, they may be used to secure the avenues ofapproach around the perimeter of the area and tosupport isolation.

Vehicle Capabilities

The LAV-25’s primary role during combat in theurban AO is to provide suppressive fire and toconduct limited breaching of exterior walls andfortifications. The LAV-25 brings the followingcapabilities to urban operations:

Provides 25-mm cannon and 7.62-mm coaxialmachine guns fire support.Provides 60-degree elevation, allowing it toengage targets on the upper floors of tall build-ings and a 7-degree depression below level lineof sight.Employs 25-mm armor piercing or high explo-sive incendiary-tracer (HEI-T) ammunition topenetrate buildings depending on the build-ing’s construction.Provides limited, light armor protection forcrew and passengers. When equipped with theBPUP, i ts survivabili ty is significantlyimproved against the ballistic threat, but it isstill vulnerable to antiarmor fires.Possesses multiple FM radios and when fittedwith an HF mounting plate can be fitted withHF radio communications.Assists in medical evacuation medical evacua-tion and casualty evacuation casualty evacua-tion operations.Assists in resupply operations.

7-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

The primary role of the LAV-AT is to destroyenemy armor assets with long range anti-armormissiles. It can also be employed in the breachingand destruction of buildings and fortified urbanstructures as outlined in MCRP 3-35.3C, Com-bined Arms Operations in the Urban Terrain.The LAV-AT brings the following capabilities tourban operations:

Capable of firing the entire family of TOWmissiles except for the improved TOW. Armed with a 7.62-mm pintle machine gun forlocal security. Capable of 35-degree elevation, allowing it toengage targets on the upper floors of tall build-ings and a 30-degree depression below levelline of sight. Capable of being ground-mounted outside ofthe vehicle. Provides limited, light armor protection forcrew and passengers. When equipped with theBPUP, its survivability is significantly im-proved against the ballistic threat, but it is stillvulnerable to antiarmor fires. Equipped with multiple FM radios and whenfitted with an HF mounting plate can be fittedwith HF radio communications.

The LAV-M can be employed in a similar fash-ion as a ground-mounted mortar system, and it isarmed with a single, M252 81-mm mortar and7.62-mm pintle-mounted machine gun. The mor-tar system can be employed in the vehicle andground-mounted outside the vehicle, and it iscapable of engaging and suppressing targets up to5680 meters and as little as 83 meters. Utilizingthe same ammunition DODIC, [DOD Identifica-tion Code] the LAV-M can fire HE, WP, redphosphorus, illumination, and infrared missions.The LAV-M offers increased protection of thevehicle crew and mortar section with its lightarmor but is still susceptible to antiarmor weaponsand does not have an organic security element.

Vehicle Limitations

The LAV-25 has the following vulnerabilitiesrelated to urban operations:

It is restricted primarily to streets and lacksmaneuverability inside the urban AO. There is dead space around the LAV intowhich the vehicle cannot fire its weapons. It is vulnerable to enemy infantry firing antiar-mor weapons from cellars, drains, and otherconcealed positions.It is dependent on its mounted or dismountedscouts for all-around protection.

25-mm Automatic Cannon

When mounted on the LAV-25, the 25-mm auto-matic cannon is an effective weapon duringcombat in the urban AO. The primary roles ofLAV-25 during combat in the urban AO is toprovide suppressive fire and to conduct limitedbreaching of exterior walls and fortifications.

The 25-mm cannon can produce its best urbantarget results when fired perpendicular to the hardsurfaces (zero obliquity). In combat urban AOs,however, finding a covered firing position thatpermits low-obliquity firing is unlikely unless thestreets and gaps between the buildings are wide.Most shots impact the target at an angle, whichnormally reduces penetration. With the armor-piercing, discarding sabot-tracer (APDS-T)round, an angle of obliquity of up to 20 degreescan actually improve breaching. The rounds tendto dislodge more wall material with each shot, butdo not penetrate as deeply into the structure.

Target Types

The LAV family of vehicles’ organic weaponssystems have different effects when fired againstdifferent urban targets.


Reinforced ConcreteReinforced concrete walls—12 to 20 inchesthick—present problems for the 25-mm cannonwhen trying to create breach holes. It is rela-tively easy to penetrate, fracture, and clear awaythe concrete, but the reinforcing rods remain inplace. These create a “jail window” effect by pre-venting entry but allowing grenades or rifle fireto be placed behind the wall. Steel reinforcingrods are normally 3/4 of an inch thick and 6 to 8inches apart and there is no quick way to cutthese rods. They can be cut with demolitioncharges, cutting torches, or special power saws.Firing with either APDS-T or HEI-T rounds fromthe 25-mm gun will not always cut these rods.

Brick WallsA brick wall is more easily defeated by the 25-mmgun regardless of its thickness, and it produces themost spall.

Bunker WallsThe 25-mm gun is devastating when fired againstsandbag bunker walls. Obliquity has the leasteffect on the penetration of bunker walls. Bun-kers with earth walls up to 36 inches thick areeasily penetrated. At short ranges, typical of com-bat in urban AOs, defeating a bunker should bereadily achieved, especially if the 25-mm gun canfire at an aperture.

Burst Fire

The 25-mm gun’s impact on typical urban tar-gets seems to be magnified if the firing is in shortbursts. At close ranges, the gunner might need toshift his point of aim in a spiral pattern to ensurethat the second and third bursts enlarge the hole.Even without burst fire, sustained 25-mm gunfirecan have effect on most urban targets.

Weapon Penetration

The penetration achieved by the three combatrounds (APDS-T, HEI-T, and TOW) differsslightly, but all are effective.

APDS-TThe APDS-T round penetrates urban targets byretaining its kinetic energy and blasting a smallhole deep into the target. The APDS-T roundgives the best effects behind the wall, and thearmor piercing core often breaks into two or threefragments that can create multiple enemy casual-ties. The APDS-T needs as few as four rounds toachieve lethal results behind walls. Table 7-1 liststhe number of APDS-T rounds needed to createholes in common urban walls.

When firing single rounds, the APDS-T roundprovides the greatest capability for behind-the-wall incapacitation. The APDS-T round can pen-etrate more than 16 inches of reinforced concretewith enough energy left to cause enemy casual-ties. It penetrates through both sides of a woodframed or brick veneer building. These roundseasily penetrate field fortifications.

The APDS-T round creates a hazardous situationfor exposed personnel because of the pieces ofsabot that are thrown off of the round. The dangerzone extends at an angle of about 10 degrees

Table 7-1. Number of APDS-T RoundsNeeded to Create Holes in Urban Walls.

Target Loophole Breach Hole

3-inch brick wall, 0-degree obliquity 22 rounds 75 rounds



8-inch reinforced concrete, 0-degree obliquity

22 rounds 75 rounds1


22 rounds 401 rounds1

Note: Obliquity and depth tend to increase the amount of wall material removed.

1 Reinforcing rods still in place.

7-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

below the muzzle level, out to at least 100 meters,and about 17 degrees left and right of the muzzle.

WARNINGPersonnel not under cover or forward of the25-mm gun’s muzzle and within the dangerzone could be injured or killed by these sab-ots, even if the penetrator passes overhead tohit the target.

HEI-TThe HEI-T round penetrates urban targets byblasting away chunks of material via explosiveeffect. The HEI-T round does not penetrate anurban target as well as the APDS-T, but it doesstrip away a greater amount of material for eachround. The HEI-T does more damage to anurban target when fired in multiple short burstsbecause the cumulative impact of multiplerounds is greater than the sum of individualrounds. Table 7-2 lists the number of HEI-Trounds needed to create holes in urban walls.

The HEI-T round does not provide single-roundperforation or incapacitating fragments whenused against any external masonry structuralwall. It can create first-round fragments behindwood framed and brick veneer walls. The HEI-Trounds cannot penetrate a bunker as quickly as

APDS-T rounds, but they can create more dam-age inside the bunker once the external earth hasbeen stripped away. Against a heavy bunker,about 40 rounds of HEI-T ammunition areneeded to strip away the external earth shieldingand breach the inner lining of concrete or timber.The HEI-T round is also used for suppressionagainst known or suspected firing ports such asdoors, windows, and loopholes.

Tube-launched, Optically Tracked, Wire Command Link Guided MissileAntitank guided missiles can penetrate anddestroy heavily armored tanks. They have largewarheads that employ shaped-charge principles.Because of their size, these warheads can achievesignificant penetration against typical urban tar-gets. Penetration does not mean concurrentdestruction of the structural integrity of a posi-tion. The shaped-charge warhead produces rela-tively little spall. Enemy personnel not standingdirectly behind or near the point of impact of anantitank guided missile may escape injury.

The basic TOW missile can penetrate 8 feet ofpacked earth, 16 inches of steel plate, or 4 feet ofreinforced concrete. The TOW II, TOW IIA, andimproved TOW have been modified to improvetheir penetration and they penetrate better thanthe basic TOW. All TOW missiles can defeat tri-ple sandbag walls, double layers of earth-filled55-gallon drums, and 18-inch log walls.

The TOW IIB uses a different method of defeat-ing enemy armor. It flies over the target and firesan explosively-formed penetrator down onto thetop of an armor vehicle, where the armor is thin-ner. Because of this design feature, the TOW IIBmissile cannot be used to attack nonmetallicstructural targets. When using the TOW IIB mis-sile against enemy armor, gunners must avoid fir-ing directly over other friendly vehicles, disabledvehicles, or large metal objects such as water oroil tanks.

Table 7-2. Number of HEI-T RoundsNeeded to Create Holes in Urban Walls.

Target Loophole Breach Hole





15 rounds 25 rounds


15 rounds 30 rounds


Combat Service Support

Resupply

To preclude compromise, LAR units conductingreconnaissance missions may carry required sup-plies into the urban AO on their vehicles, allow-ing them to avoid unnecessary movement in theAO. Some missions, however, may require addi-tional supplies that cannot be carried on the vehi-cles. During the planning phase, resupplyoperations for employed LAR units are plannedand coordinated.

When resupply is required, a drop point is estab-lished. It should be well away from the hide siteand the reconnaissance site, but in a position thatis available to all teams. Caches should be used inthese instances. Units should standardize the con-tents of caches so all teams understand what isavailable. An example of the items that should becarried in the cache include the following:

Emergency Class I items.Batteries for radios.Night vision devices.Class VIII items, to include IV [intravenous]bags.Nonsensitive mission specific items.

Maintenance

In the urban AO, self-recovery within the pla-toon will be necessary. Vehicles should have atow bar or towing cables and shackles attachedand configured for immediate recovery. Asecured maintenance collection point outside theurban AO is identified by battalion maintenanceor the supported unit during planning, and it isthen coordinated with the subordinate units formaintenance support. All vehicle crews mustknow this location. The primary vehicle used fortowing is the LAV-R. The secondary vehicleused for towing is the LAV-L. These are the onlytwo vehicles that are capable of towing becausethese variants have reinforced tow pintles that arecapable of pulling the weight of the LAV.

Medical

Each LAR platoon has one Navy corpsman. TheLAR company also has one company corpsman.Organic medical support in the LAR platoon islimited to self-aid, buddy aid, and Navy corps-man aid. Light armored reconnaissance units areoften employed over broad distances where pri-mary medical care is not readily available. Forthis reason, scouts receive advanced medicaltraining such as combat lifesaver and basic emer-gency medical technician training.

Additional medical support is requested asneeded. When possible, medical evacuation ofteam members can be delayed until the wholeteam is evacuated from the AO. Wounded teammembers are sent directly to the nearest medicalfacility that can provide definitive care and treat-ment. The nature of reconnaissance missions sub-jects the teams to stress in many ways.

Optical FatigueOptical fatigue can result due to operations thattake place in darkness, smoke, fog, rain, snow,ice, and glare and require the extended use ofnight vision goggles.

Disrupted Sleep CyclesPerformance suffers due to the disruption of thenormal sleep schedule, especially if the LAR unitis conducting reverse-cycle operations.

Mental FatigueMental fatigue can result from having to makedecisions of serious consequences in too littletime, with too little information, and whileexposed to danger.

Physical FatiguePhysical fatigue can result from conductingexcessive physical activity or maintaining physi-cal exertion at a strenuous level without rest.Combat stress, however, is not solely a medicalproblem; it is also a command problem that can

7-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

result in reduced performance and personnel lostfrom duty. It is a command responsibility to takeactions to increase the individual team member’sresistance to stress. This can be accomplishedthrough training under simulated combat condi-tions and by ensuring all personnel maintain a

high level of physical fitness. Proper nutrition isalso a major factor in coping with stress. Thisrequires Marines to have a healthy, balanced dietnot only during combat operations, but alsobefore the missions begin.

CHAPTER 8LIGHT ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE

COMBAT ENGINEER OPERATIONS

The LAR battalion has the organic capability toconduct limited mobility, countermobility, andengineer reconnaissance. The LAR unit mayconduct many of these missions without assis-tance from any other unit. However, most ofthese missions are completed in a hasty manner.Attachment of a combat engineer unit willgreatly enhance the LAR unit’s ability to accom-plish the mission.

Mobility

Mobility tasks allow the unit to obtain and main-tain the freedom of tactical maneuver and opera-tional movement. Usually, when encountering anobstacle, the LAR unit will attempt to find abypass. If a suitable bypass has been identified,LAR units will report to higher headquarters,mark the obstacle, and provide guides for follow-on units. However, if bypass is not possible, LARunits can perform the mobility tasks as shown intable 8-1.

Countermobility

Countermobility is mine warfare and obstacledevelopment designed to disrupt, fix, turn, orblock certain enemy formations. Light armoredreconnaissances units can perform the counter-mobility tasks shown in table 8-2, on page 8-2.

Due to Class IV constraints, a battalion canemploy obstacles across a company-sized avenue

of approach, while a company can cover a pla-toon-sized avenue of approach. This does notreflect the amount of actual terrain that an LARunit can defend (see chap. 3).

Engineer Reconnaissance

Light armored reconnaissance forces can providedetailed information on routes, roads, fords,bridges, and any other obstacles that the unit mayencounter. Additionally, LAR forces can providerecommendations on maneuver and the suitabilityof these areas to the supported commander.

Table 8-1. LAR Battalion Mobility Tasks.

Task Unit Capability

In-stride beach

Battalion Requires attachment from combat engineer battalion

Company Requires attachment from combat engineer battalion

Platoon No capability

Deliberate breach No capability

Assault breach All* Requires attachment from combat engineer battalion

Countermine All* Requires attachment from combat engineer battalion

Counterobstacle All* Requires attachment from combat engineer battalion

Gap crossing All* Water gap, LAVs only

*Denotes that task can be accomplished at battalion/compancy/pla-toon levels.

8-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

Light Armored Reconnaissance Combat Engineer Organization

A platoon from the combat engineer battalion,when available, attached to the LAR battalionprovides the best support. This attachment allowsthe LAR battalion to enhance their ability to com-plete combat engineer tasks. The attachment isusually best utilized in general support of thecompanies. The LAR battalion is authorized oneMOS 1302, combat engineer officer as part of theS-3 staff section. The battalion combat engineerofficer is an important link between the battalionS-3 and the supported unit commander’s opera-tions center on engineer reconnaissance, mobil-ity, and countermobility operations.

Planning Considerations

When employing LAR in engineer operations, thesupported unit commander must consider—

LAR unit typically performs combat engineermissions in support of their primary security orreconnaissance mission.If task organized, the LAR unit can coordinatebreaching missions. This requires attachment

of a combat engineer platoon, mine clearingsystems, and lane proofing vehicles (mineplows or armored combat earthmovers).If task-organized, LAR unit can conduct morecomplex obstacle construction. This requiresattachment of a combat engineer platoon, addi-tional Class IV materials, earthmoving equip-ment and operators, and additional mines.

Table 8-2. LAR Battalion Countermobility Tasks.

Task Capability

Employ mines Capable*

Employ wire obstacles Capable*

Disrupting obstacles Simple obstacle only (wire/mine combinations)*

Fixing obstacles Simple obstacle only (wire/mine combina-tions) and requires attachment*

Turning obstacles Simple obstacle only (wire/mine combina-tions) and requires attachment to reduce obstaclesI

Counterobstacles Explosive reduction of built up obstacles

Blocking obstacles Not capable (too complex/equipment intensive)

*Denotes that task can be accomplished at battalion/company/pla-toon levels.

APPENDIX APASSAGE OF LINES AND BATTLE HANDOVER

Light Armored Reconnaissance Commanders

Each commander has critical tasks that must beaccomplished in order to achieve a smooth andefficiently executed operation. The commonsenior commander orders the initiation of battlehandover. To sustain unity of command in theoperation, the passing unit is usually placed underoperational control of the stationary unit. Opera-tional control by the stationary unit commander islimited to those actions necessary to get the pass-ing unit through the stationary unit’s AO asquickly as possible.

Senior Commander Responsibilities

The senior commander must—

Ensure that command relationships, time, cir-cumstances, and procedures for transferring ofcontrol for the zone or sector are specified. Designate where battle handover will occur byestablishing a phase line forward of the for-ward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and indi-cating it as the BHL. (The BHL should belocated where combat maneuver forces of thestationary unit along the FEBA can effectivelyoverwatch and protect the passing unit as itwithdraws behind or advances forward of theFEBA. The distance forward of the FEBA islimited to available fields of fire or effectiverange of weapons.)

Designate a specific location (usually a linedesignated as the BHL) for responsibility shift. Establish boundaries where the passing andstationary unit coincide. Designate an adequate number of passagepoints and passage lanes. Designate contact points for rearward passageso that lead units of passing and stationaryunits know where to establish initial contact. Delineate responsibility for furnishing guides. Designate routes through stationary units andassembly areas, priority of route use, and othermovement control measures to preclude confu-sion and congestion. Establish a coordinated communications planthat includes call signs, code words, primaryand alternate frequencies, and authenticationprocedures as part of the overall passage order. Specify recognition signals and markings forboth daylight hours and hours of darkness. Specify coordination responsibility for firesupport during passage. Designate a follow-on mission for the LARunit withdrawing behind friendly lines. Develop and disseminate contingency plans inthe event of an enemy attack during the pas-sage. Designate contact points just forward of theBHL where stationary and passing units arerequired to conduct physical coordination(defensive operations). Ensure that the passing unit is provided indirectfire support during battle handover and passageof lines while its artillery is displacing.

GLOSSARY

SECTION I. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . aviation combat element AFATDS. . . . . . . . . . . . Advanced Field Artillery

Tactical Data SystemAO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .area of operations APDS-T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . armor-piercing

discarding sabot-tracer

BHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle handover lineBPUP . . . . . ballistic protection upgrade package

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and controlCCIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . commander’s critical

information requirementCAS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air supportCBRN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . chemical, biological,

radiological, and nuclearCOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat operations centerCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . command postCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .combat supportCSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service supportCTCP . . . . . . . . . . . combat trains command post

DAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . deep air support

FEBA . . . . . . . . . .forward edge of the battle areaFM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . frequency modulationFSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordinatorFSCC. . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination centerFSCL. . . . . . . . . . . .fire support coordination lineFSCM . . . . . . . fire support coordination measureFwd CP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward command post

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

HE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high explosiveHEI-T . . . . . . . . high explosive incendiary-tracerHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high frequencyHUMINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . human intelligence

IPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence preparationof the battlespace

ITSS . . . . . . . . . Improved Thermal Sight System

JP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication

LAR . . . . . . . . . . . .light armored reconnaissanceLAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . light armored vehicleLAV-25. . . . light armored vehicle-25 millimeterLAV-AT . . . . . . . . light armored vehicle-antitankLAV-C3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . light armored

vehicle-command and controlLAV-L . . . . . . . . .light armored vehicle-logisticsLAV-M . . . . . . . . . . light armored vehicle-mortarLAV-R . . . . . . . . light armored vehicle-recoveryLNO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . liaison officerLOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . line of communications

m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .metersMAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task forceMARDIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine divisionMCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publicationMCWP . . .Marine Corps warfighting publicationMEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary forceMETT-T . . .mission, enemy, terrain and weather,

troops and support available-time availableMRV . . . . . .mission role variants mmmillimetersMOS . . . . . . . . . . military occupational specialtyMOUT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . military operations

on urbanized terrainmph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . miles per hour

NAI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . named area of interestNSFS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .naval surface fire support

OMFTS . . . . . operational maneuver from the sea

PIR . . . . . . . . . . priority intelligence requirement

R&S . . . . . . . . . reconnaissance and surveillance

S-1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion or regimentmanpower staff officer

S-2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion or regimentintelligence staff officer

S-3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion or regimentoperations staff officer

Glossary-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

S-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion or regimentlogistics staff officer

S-6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battalion or regimentcommunications staff officer

SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . standing operating procedures

T/O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . table of organizationTOW . . . . . . . . . tube-launched, optically tracked,

wire command link guided missile

UHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ultrahigh frequency

VHF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . very high frequency

WP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . white phosphorus

XO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .executive officer

Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion _____________________________________ Glossary-3

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

area reconnaissance—A directed effort toobtain detailed information concerning the ter-rain or enemy activity within a prescribed areasuch as a town, ridge line, woods, or other fea-tures critical to operations. (MCRP 5-12C)

aviation combat element—The core element ofa Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) that istask-organized to conduct aviation operations.The aviation combat element (ACE) provides allor a portion of the six functions of Marine avia-tion necessary to accomplish the MAGTF’s mis-sion. These functions are antiair warfare,offensive air support, assault support, electronicwarfare, air reconnaissance, and control of air-craft and missiles. The ACE is usually composedof an aviation unit headquarters and various otheraviation units or their detachments. It can vary insize from a small aviation detachment of specifi-cally required aircraft to one or more Marine air-c ra f t w ings . In a j o in t o r mu l t ina t iona lenvironment, the ACE may contain other Serviceor multinational forces assigned or attached to theMAGTF. The ACE itself is not a formal com-mand. The ACE itself is not a formal command.Also called ACE. (MCRP 5-12C)

close air support—Air action by fixed- androtary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that arein close proximity to friendly forces and thatrequire detailed integration of each air missionwith the fire and movement of those forces. Alsocalled CAS. (JP 1-02)

command and control system—The facilities,equipment, communications, procedures, andpersonnel essential to a commander for planning,directing, and controlling operations of assignedand attached forces pursuant to the missionsassigned. (JP 1-02)

commander’s critical information require-ment—An information requirement identified bythe commander as being critical to facilitating

timely decision making. The two key elementsare friendly force information requirements andpriority intelligence requirements. Also calledCCIR. (JP 1-02)

cover—A type of security operation that protectsthe force from surprise, develops the situation,and gives commanders time and space in whichto respond to the enemy’s actions. (This term andits definition are proposed for inclusion in thenext edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

essential elements of friendly information—Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabili-ties, and activities needed by adversaries to planand execute effective operations against ourforces. (MCRP 5-12A)

friendly force information requirement—Information the commander needs about friendlyforces in order to develop plans and make effec-tive decisions. Depending upon the circum-s t ances , i n fo rma t ion on un i t l oca t i on ,composition, readiness, personnel status, andlogistic status could become a friendly forceinformation requirement. (MCRP 5- 12A)

guard—1. A form of security operation whoseprimary task is to protect the main force by fight-ing to gain time while also observing and report-ing information, and to prevent enemy groundobservation of and direct fire against the mainbody by reconnoitering, attacking, defending, anddelaying. A guard force normally operates withinthe range of the main body’s indirect fire weapons.(JP 1-02, part 1 of a 3 part definition)

intelligence—The product resulting from the col-lection, processing, integration, evaluation, analy-sis, and interpretation of available informationconcerning foreign nations, hostile or potentiallyhostile forces or elements, or areas of actual orpotential operations. The term is also applied tothe activity which results in the product and to theorganizations engaged in such activity. (JP 1-02)

Glossary-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-14

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—The systematic, continuous process of analyzingthe threat and the environment in a specific geo-graphic area. Also called IPB. (MCRP 5-12A)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-sance—An enabling operation that integrates andsynchronizes all battlefield operating systems tocollect and produce relevant information to facili-tate the commanderís decisionmaking. Alsocalled ISR. (MCRP 5- 12A)

liaison—That contact or intercommunicationmaintained between elements of military forcesor other agencies to ensure mutual understandingand unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02)

main body—The principal part of a tactical com-mand or formation. It does not include detachedelements of the command, such as advanceguards, flank guards, and covering forces.(MCRP 5-12A)

Marine air-ground task force—The MarineCorps’ principal organization for all missionsacross the range of military operations, com-posed of forces task-organized under a singlecommander capable of responding rapidly to acontingency anywhere in the world. The types offorces in the Marine air-ground task force(MAGTF) are functionally grouped into four coreelements: a command element, an aviation com-bat element, a ground combat element, and alogistics combat element. The four core elementsare categories of forces, not formal commands.The basic structure of the MAGTF never varies,though the number, size, and type of MarineCorps units comprising each of its four elementswill always be mission dependent. The flexibilityof the organizational structure allows for one ormore subordinate MAGTFs to be assigned. In ajoint or multinational environment, other Serviceor multinational forces may be assigned orattached. Also called MAGTF. (MCRP 5-12C)

Marine expeditionary force—The largestMarine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and theMarine Corps’ principal warfighting organiza-tion, particularly for larger crises or contingen-cies. It is task-organized around a permanentcommand element and normally contains one ormore Marine divisions, Marine aircraft wings,and Marine logistics groups. The Marine expedi-tionary force is capable of missions across therange of military operations, including amphibi-ous assault and sustained operations ashore in anyenvironment. It can operate from a sea base, aland base, or both. In a joint or multinationalenvironment, it may also contain other Service ormultinational forces assigned or attached to theMAGTF. Also called MEF. (MCRP 5-12C)

military operations on urbanized terrain—Allmilitary actions that are planned and conductedon a topographical complex and its adjacent natu-ral terrain where manmade construction is thedominant feature. It includes combat in cities,which is that portion of military operations onurbanized terrain involving house-to-house andstreet-by-street fighting in towns and cities. Alsocalled MOUT. (This term and its definition areproposed for inclusion in the next edition ofMCRP 5-12C.)

mobility—A quality or capability of militaryforces which permits them to move from place toplace while retaining the ability to fulfill their pri-mary mission. (JP 1-02)

operational mobility—The ability to movebetween engagements and battles within the con-text of the campaign. (This term and its definitionare proposed for inclusion in the next edition ofMCRP 5-12C.)

passage of lines—An operation in which a forcemoves forward or rearward through anotherforce’s combat positions with the intention ofmoving into or out of contact with the enemy. Apassage may be designated as a forward or rear-ward passage of lines. (JP 1-02)

Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion _____________________________________ Glossary-5

priority intelligence requirement—An intelli-gence requirement associated with a decision thatwill critically affect the overall success of thecommand’s mission. Also called PIR. (MCRP 5-12A)

reconnaissance—A mission undertaken toobtain, by visual observation or other detectionmethods, information about the activities andresources of an enemy or adversary, or to securedata concerning the meteorological, hydro-graphic, or geographic characteristics of a partic-ular area. (JP 1-02)

route reconnaissance—(Army/Marine Corps) Adirected effort to obtain detailed information of aspecified route and all terrain from which theenemy could influence movement along thatroute. (MCRP 5-12A)

screen—A security element whose primary taskis to observe, identify, and report information,and which only fights in self-protection. (JP 1-02,Part 4 of a 5 part definition)

strategic mobility—The capability to deploy andsustain military forces worldwide in support ofnational strategy. (JP 1-02)

supported commander—2. In the context of asupport command relationship, the commander

who receives assistance from another com-mander’s force or capabilities, and who is respon-sible for ensuring that the supporting commanderunderstands the assistance required. (JP 1-02, part2 of a 2 part definition)

tactical mobility—The ability to move within anengagement or battle. (This term and its defini-tion are proposed for inclusion in the next editionof MCRP 5-12C)

urban area of operations—A concentration ofstructures, facilities, and populations, such as vil-lages, cities, and towns, that form the economicand cultural focus for the surrounding area. (Thisterm and its definition are proposed for inclusionin the next edition of MCRP 5-12C.)

urban operations—A military operation con-ducted where manmade construction and highpopulation density are the dominant features.Also called UO. (MCRP 5-12A)

zone reconnaissance—A form of reconnais-sance that involves a directed effort to obtaindetailed information on all routes, obstacles, ter-rain, and enemy forces within a zone defined byboundaries. A zone reconnaissance normally isassigned when the enemy situation is vague orwhen information concerning cross-country traf-ficability is desired. (MCRP 5-12A)

REFERENCES

Joint Publication (JP)

1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDPs)

1-2 Campaigning

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-14.1A Reconnaissance Platoon 3-35.3C Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Currently FM 3-06.11, Combined

Arms Operations in Urban Environment, and will become MCRP 3-35.3C upon signature)5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics 5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military

and Associated Terms

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWP)

3-16 Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element 3-40.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control

MCWP 3-14 Employment of the Light Armored … 3-14 Employment of...Employment of the Light Armored...

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