McK Rhetoric

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Rhetoric and Poetic nof Aristotle the Philosophy

IOf all the works ofAristotle, the Rhetor ic ndthe Poeticshaveeen most directlyand mostpersistendy nfluential on modern thought. Certain of his ogical doc-trines, or a t least he devicesand principles formulated in his logic, have had alonger continuoushistory of commentary and discussion; nd the spectacularrevolution worked n philosophic hought andexpression uring the thirteenthcentury under the influenceof his newly translatedworks ent verisimilitude othe ater criticism that the Middle Ageshad been subjugated o the physicsandmetaphysics,he ethicsand politics of Aristotle. Yet his theoriesand technicalterms contributed as much to the revolt against scholasticismas they did tomedieval 'i\ristotelianism, for the doctrines developed n commentaries onAristotle and the tenetsattributed to him in criticism or defense,were at manypoints distant from the geniusof the Aristotelian philosophy.The revolt againstAristotelianismwas accomplished n each ield by useofAristotelian doctrines,often applied as heterogeneous lys the theoriesandterms they replaced.Aristotle was at meticulouspains to dis tinguish his use offorms from the Platonic and to trace the errors which result in all fields ofknowledge from the conception that the forms are separated. Hellenisticcommentators gnored these efinementsand treated the Aristotelian philoso-phy as a Platonism;Cicero accepted his interpretation without comment andmade t available o the WesternLatin tradition; Augustine gaveChristian the-ology a Platonic formulation into which the interpretation of Aristotle was as-similated; many of the Greek commentators on the Aristotelian works wereNeo-Platonic n their philosophicalorientation. Aristotle'sworks were un-known in the West,except or a portion of the Organonixed by Boethius n acontext strongly nfluencedby Porphy ry, Cicero, and Themistius. The transla-tion of Aristotle'sworks,beginning n the twelfth century setproblemsof inter-

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r3B . CTTAPTERrxpretation and speculation which were worked out in a long series of debat es,centering on logic in the twelfth century, on metaphysics and the physical sci-ences, including biology, in the thirteenth century, on ethics and politics in thefourteenth century until the Rhetorit and the Poeticseventttally supplied in theRenaissance not only materials and subject for a doctrinal batde as bitter andas widespread as any medieval dispute, but also instruments by which to rcformsuspecteddoctrines, branded as Aristotelian, in all the previous subjects of in-quiry.

The influence ofAristotle is difficult to trace in any of the fields ofphilosophyin which his inspiration is acknowledged or opposed. The enthusiastic re-formulation of what he thought and the construction of what he should havesaid in exposition of what he thought frequently carry the defense of his doc-trines far from the evidence of his text and even into contradiction of his state-ments, while his distinctions and analyses sometimes continue influential,though unrecognized and unsuspected, in regions and inquiries other thanthose n which he first made them. Even those medieval philosophers who pro-fessed the greatest admiration for Aristotle were eloquent in declaring theirrecognition of his human susceptibility to error. Since they professed to followhis doctrines only when they were convinced of their truth and to modify themfreely when they found them erroneous or incomplete, and since the scopeof his discovered errors tended to increase during centuries following thetranslation of his works into Latin, the numerous commentaries and questionson Aristotle's scientific and logical treatises, onhis Metaphstsics,oliticsand Ethicsbecame more and more what they had been to some extent from the first,vehicle s by which to express philosophic differences rather than exegetical andphilological exercises.

All doctrines and attitudes. therefore. even those which Aristotle had at-tacked and, what were in many instances the same, those revised or renewedphilosophic methods which were set n operation against his position, were ex-pressed n his terminology. The basic problems disputed and the fundamentalemphases were often points on which Aristotle had been silent or brief; andwith the progress of discussion and attack, the doctrines which passed for Aris-totelian grew increasingly difficult to find in the works of Aristotle. The logic,which had been made the subject during the Middle Ages of metaphysical dis-pute concerning the status of universals, was in the sixteenth century to becriticized as concerned with purely verbal manipulations unsuited to the natureofthings and unrelated to the processes fthought, and the physics,which hadbeen a source oftheory and suggestionconcerning the whole scope ofthe phys-ical world was at last to be branded a remote exploration for occult qualities;in this eclipse of logic and scientific method, the devices of rhetoric were used toincrease the cogency ofproof, to broaden the scope ofinquiry and to institute amethod of discovery. Cicero had pointed out that Aristotle's logic treated bothdiscovery arrd proof, unlike the Stoic logic which was confined to proof. Medi-eval commentators on the logic, once the Topicswas available in translation,

Rhetoric and Poetic n Aristotle . rqqrecognized that the method of d iscovery is dialectic. The increasing influenceof Plato and Cicero in the transition to the Renaissanceassimilated he Aristo-telian method of dialectic to the Platonic dialectic of discovery and the Cic-eronian rhetoric of discovery. The merging of logic and dialectic and of dialec-tic and rhetoric produced from historical confusions influential insights inRudolph Agricola's De Inaentione ialectica, n Peter Ramus' works on logic, dia-lectic, and rhetoric, and in Francis Bacon's use of pro perplaces on the anal-ogy of the common pl aces o f rhetoric to develop the inductive method of theNouumOrganum.

When the use of logic and dialectic for the interpretation of Scripture andthe systematization of theological doctrine was thought inadequate and inap-propriate to the document and the truth it expressed, he Old and New Testa-ments were treated asworks of art; and Moses and Paul emerged as poets. PeterAbailard had argred that the method of rhetoric was essential or the properinterpretation of the Bible, and the enlarged method of dialectic can be de-tected in the use of topics in their dialectical rather than rhetorical sense, ndin a manner influenced by the Platonic dialectic, in works like Melchior Cano'sDe Incis Theologicis nd Philip Melancthon's Loci Communes ico della Mirandolabased his interpretation of Genesis in the Heptaplus on the understanding ofMoses as he poet, as he Idea of the writer, the exemplar of the prophet, andErasmus invitedJohn Colet to study Moses and Isaiah as he had studied Paul.The poetic interpretation of Scripture, however, used a poetic method bor-rowed from rhetoric, and the topics had been applied not only to science, heol-ogy, law, and political science, but to poetry and literary criticism in works likeAndrea Giglio da Fabriano's TopicaPoetica.Metaphysics was first adulteratedwith logic and devoted to the discussionof universals and categories, and lateranalogized to politics, since rational principles and natural laws govern the uni-verse much as an intelligent ruler governs his subjects; when the resultant for-mulations of problems seemed ost in subtleties hat exceeded human powersand ingenuity, questions of being and knowing were treated with a cautiousskepticism interrupted by equally cautious analogies to acting or making, orruling and politics and ethics in turn were made realistic and practical by useof the relativistic devices of rhetorical persuasion to manipulate means withoutresponsibility concerning ends. Mario Nizolius, in his De Veis Principiis et WraRationePhilosophandi ontraPseudophilosophos,inds the truths by which to combatpseudophilosophers n the principles of grammar and rhetoric, and the politicsof Machiavelli and Hobbes is developed by a method which has been influ-enced by the devicesofrhetoric.

The declining fortunes of Aristotle's doctrines coincided with the period ofgreatestconcern to translate his writings precisely, o paraphrase his works, andto determine by philosophical inquiry the meaning of what he had said. Eventhe critics ofAristotle are inclined to soften heir strictures of his doctrines whenhe treats problems that parallel their own interests. Rhetoric, in the termswhich Aristotle had used, but in an interpretation that owed much to Cicero


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and Quintilian, became in the Renaissance a discipline applicable to literature,to thought, and to life. It supplied the means by which to interpret poets, thecriteria to regulate demonstration, and the technique for scientific inquiry anddiscovery, political control, and practical application; even as late as the seven-teenth century Hobbes, who had little fa vorable to say.aboutAristotle's philoso-phy, thought his Rhetoricworth the labor of paraphrase, while he found use inhis political philosophy, as Machiavelli had before him, for the distinctions offorensic oratory. The Poetics f Aristotle, bolstered in like fashion by reminis-cences of Cicero and Horace, was erected into a standard of taste, and evenof morality, in which the artist competed with the statesman and philosopher.Rhetoric, which for Aristotle had a limited function, inadequate for the pur-poses of scientific demonstration and inappropriate as a substitute for politics,was made again to undertake the diversified tasks Roman rhetoricians had setit of proving instructing, and pleasing, while poetic, which Aristotle seems tohave conceived as an inductive study of works of art, was made to yield rulesto guide the making of art. The two disciplines tended to merge, moreover, andthe familiar analogies, drawn from one or the other which operated to thediscredit or distortion ofother portions ofthe Aristotelian philosophy servedto increase the reputation of their use and value, broadening both until therules of rhetoric applied to all knowledge and poetic embraced all the works ofnature and of man.rThe grounds in the works of Aristotle which permittedthese analogies, at once seminal in the reputation and interpretation of Aris-totle, isolate for later students the minimum requirements for the understand-ing of Aristotle's work and suggest, n general, disquieting lessonsconcerningthe influence of philosophic speculations.

Even the superficial differences between Aristotle's development of rhetoricand poetic and his conception of the other scienceswhich constitute his philos-ophy indicate both distinctions which made them independent and analogieswhich explain their numerous reductions to each other and to other scienceswithout the necessity of choosing between the alternatives of convicting Aris-totle of simple inconsistencies or making the influence of his doctrine a blankmysteDr Aristotle reports that reflection on philosophic method and the appli-cation of such considerations of method to the treatment of moral questionswere no older than the inquiries of Socrate s, but he makes no mention of thepioneer work of Socrates in analyzing rhetoric and the arts. On the contrary,he refers to no previous philosophic inquiries into that sub.ject n the Rhetoric,although he does criticize the writers of handbooks for neglecting to treat of

l. For a succinct statement ofsome ofthe c omplex interrelations set up and exploited in rheto-ric, poetic, and related disciplines, cl J. E. Spingarn, A Historl ofLiterarl CiticLm in the Renarsance(New York, l9l2), esp. pp. 3 I I fl Cf. also Maruin T, Herrick, The Fusion of Horatian and AistotelianLiterar;t Citicism ( Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, Vol. XXXII, No. I fUrbana, Ill.,1946]); Bernard \Aieinberg, A Histnrl of Literarl Citicism in the talian Rmaissance, 2 vols.; Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress, l96l) ,especial lyPart l ,chap. ivlor theconfusionofHoracewithAr is-totle.

Rhetoric and Poetic in Aristotle . ul

arguments and persuasions, hereby missing the essentialsof the art; 2 and onemight have the impression from his Poetics hat no previous philosopher hadtreated the nature and influence ofpoetry. We know that among his works, nowlost, was a Collection f Handbooks,3n which he seems to have traced the historyof rhetoric and to have summarized the characteristics of rhetorical systems.Since that collection doubtless serued, ike the outlines of the doctrines of hispredecessors which are prefaced to so many of his works, as a preliminarysketch of the subject and as ndication o f problems and plausible speculations,and since he often comments on and occasionally commends scientific doc-trines which were not in his opinion developed according to a scientific theoryhis effort in collecting and schematizing the arts of rhetoric does not standin contradiction to his contention that none ofhis predecessors reated rhetoricas an art.

Aristotle's historical interests in poetry seem to have followed the analogy ofhis historical interests in politics and to have been concerned rather more withthe history of the subject of inquiry than with previous theories, for his lostwork OnPoets+ as probably a fuller account of the history of literature similarto that adumbrated in the early chapters of the Poetics. ristode had not grownforgetful o f Socrates and Plato, or of the Sophi sts against whom Socrates sofrequently developed arguments bearing on art and rhetoric and their relationto virtue and knowledge, for the Socratic Dialogue is instanced with themime as an art-form inthe Poetics,s nd both Socrates and Plato are quoted forexamples and precepts of rhetoric.6 His silence concerning the treatment ofrhetoric and poetry in Plato's dialogues, notwithstanding his tendency to criti-cize Plato on all other subjects, is to be taken rather as a sign that he thoughthis own departure from previous methods to have been radical to the point ofmaking the example of his predecessors rrelevant to the problems of poeticand rhetoric as he conceived them. According to his organization ofphilosophyhe was able to find many early examples of metaphysical and physical doc-trines; speculation on politics and ethics did not, prior to the time of Socrates,take such form as o permit extensive citation or require systematic refutation;and the contemporary interest in philosophic method had yielded only a singlerelatively undifferentiated dialectical method. In his view, therefore, his ownlogic had first differentiated scientific demonstration from dialectic and, for

2. Rhetoic. I 1 54'I Nowthe ramers f the current reatisesn rhctoric tdq 61voq dvl6yorv]have onstructedut a smallpart of that art. The modes f persuasionoi nioterg] arethe only properly echnical artsof the art; everything lse s merelyaccessory.hesewriters,however,say nothing ab out enthymemes, vhich are the body ofpersuasion, but deal for the mostpart with things which are outside he subject.

3. DiogenesLae tius, v 24; Cicero, De namtitne i. 2. 6.; De Oratorei. 38. 160.;Brutu.;12. 46. CfE. M. Cope, 421n raductionoAistotlel R]rctoic London, I 8tj7),pp. 50 fl4. Diogenes aertiusv 22.5. t. t4+7b1\ .6. Cf. Rhetonc.9. l367bB; i.20. 1393b4;23.398'24; i i . 14. 4l5r'30; . 15. 1376 10;i. 23 .I 398 1 (?); ii. 4. 1406132, ndpusim.


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that very reason, had made possible or the first time a consideration of theseparatemethods and functions of art and rhetoric and their relation to themethods of history sophisticand dialectic.

Socrates reats rhetoric by arguing, against the pretensions of orators inthe Phaedrus,hat the good rhetorician must also be a dialecticianand, againstthe sophists n rhe Gorgiaq hat rhetoric is a sham 6rt, or rather no art, butexperienceand use which are substituted or justice.THe frequently employsthe example of artistsand artisansn the argumentsPlato records,usuallyrun-ning through a seriesofanalogies such as would connec t he poet in turn andin varying respectswith the physician, he carpenteq he cobbler,and the shep-herd, contrastingart with the irrational, the incalculable, he habitual, and theempirical, but requiring no fixed differencesamong the arts,nor even betweenthe arts and the sciences. he judgment of poetry attributed to Socratesn theRepublic,likehe later Platonic udgment expressedn the Laws if indeed suchdifferentiation betweenthe two positions s necessary),s based on consider-ation of educational,practical, and rhetorical effects,and it leads o moral dis-approval and political censorship.Like the orator, the poet finds himself incompetition with the dialecticianand the legislator,and no method or accom-plishment s disclosedn Plato sanalyses f rhetoric or poetry that would seemto Aristotle to involve problemsbeyond those of dialectic and morals or to re-quire new acknowledgments f Plato soriginality or additional criticisms of hiserrors. Among the independent sciences nstituted by Aristotle s philosophicmethod, on the other hand, rhetorical arguments could be consideredas de-vices ofpersuasion apart from considerationoftruth or falsity ofconclusions,accurate or candid presentation of the character and predilections of thespeaker, r preferableends or desiresofthe auditor, and poetry could be con-sidered n terms of the structure of the poem apart from its tendency o stimu-late moral or immoral conduct or to produce pleasureor other passions.Suchseparate consideration of things or disciplines depends on a philosophicscheme n which related questionscan be treated according to their properprinciples n their appropriate sciences. s applied to the arts, he accomplish-ment ofAristotle sphilosophic method was he separationofproblems nvolvedin the modeof existence f an object produced or of a productive power (whichmight properly be treated n physicsand metaphysics) swell as problems n-volved n the effectsofartificial objectsor artistic efforts(as reated n psychol-ogy,morals, and politics)or in doctrinal cogencyand emotionalpersuasivenes(as reated n logic and rhetoric) from problems which bear on the traits of anartistic construction consequentsimply on its being a work of art. As appliedto rhetorical persuasion, he samemethod permits the recognition hat rhetoricis a counterpart, or offshoot, or subdivisionof dialectic; that it bor rows fromsophistic; hat it is derivative from ethics; and that it is a sham substitute orpolitics when it is not made a proper part of politics; and at the same time

7. Phudrus265 D ff.; Gorgias 63 A tr, 501 A.

RhetoricandPoeticn Aristotle . r43it permits the examination of the peculiar devicesof persuasion apart fromconsiderationof those elations and analogies.

ilTo say hat Aristotle thought the arts n general, as well as particular arts ikerhetoric or poetry medicine or strategy, o be independent kinds of activitysusceptible f independent analysisand to involve kinds ofknowledge ndepen-dent ofother arts and ofother sciences,heoretic or practical, nvolves he state-ment of what might at first seem contradictory requirements. Such separateanalysisand statementof the arts s possibleonly by explicit recognition of thecomplex nterrelations of arts, and actions,and sciences, uch hat two or morearts may use ndependent echniqueson identical materials o different endsoron differentmaterials o comparableends,or such hat one art may be subordi-nate to the purposes of another (asmilitary strategy s to statecraft)withoutcompromiseor adulteration of its proper purposesand criteria. Evenmore, artis to be contrasted o scienceonly if the arts are recognized o be in a sensesciences nd the scienceso be in a sense rts; practical sciences an be distin-guished rom productive sciences, nd arts can be considered n terms of theirfunctions and their products only if provision is made in another analysis orthe fact that art has moral and political consequences nd that political pro-cesses nd moral actions are in their exercise hemselves rts; and finally theopposition of art to nature envisages n art which is natural in that it proceedsfrom natural powers and operates on natural materials as well as a naturewhoseprocesses re comparablewith those of art and whoseproductsmay besupplementedby art.

The distinctions depend on an overlapping classification, uchas Aristotlefrequently uses,n which the same situation,process, r entity is analyzedsuc-cessivelyn terms of different applications of the causesand, in the respectsisolated by successive nalyses, s without ambiguity or contradiction defineddifferently and evensubject o analysisn different sciences, s, or example, hepassionsare diversely conceivedand used n psychology,ethics,and rhetoric.Aristotle s reatment of the arts s set n four progressively arrowing contexts:(1) hey are particular instances f productive or poeticpowers 8uvdperq corq-trroQ and sharecharacteristicswhich are coextensivewith nature, yet are con-trasted o nature asa principle, (2) hey are nstances fthe rational productivepowers which are the sourcesof all human actions,practical and productive,and which as such are contrasted o irrational natural processes, nd (3) theyare conceivedas restricted o those ational productivepowerswhich result nsomeartificial product apart from the activity itself and are contrasted withmoral and political activities. n most arts a further step is then possible nwhich (4) he particular art is analyzed n the specificsubjectmatter and objectsproper to it. The delimitation of the arts, n other words, ike the definition ofthe virtues doesnot proceedby strict scientific definition through genus and


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proper differentia, but employs all four causes n progressive delimitation, andan art:may be considered for various purposes in its broader or narrower significations. The four conceptions of art (and the arts are still considered today inwhat might be viewed as the remnants of these ways) in the order of their in-creasingparticularity make use in turn, (1) of the efficient cause, n the sensethat art is conceived as a power directed to ends ccimparable to and yet dis-tinguishable from natural powers and to that extent analyzable in commonwith them by means of their ends, (2) of the formal cause, in the sense that artis an actuality of the mind comparable to and yet distingr-rishable rom otherpsychic habits and powers and to that extent analyzable in common with themby me ans of the p rocess of their acquisition or the potentiality and matter actu-alized in them, (3) of the final cause, in the sense that art is a preconceivedpurpose and so comparable to and distinguishable from other stimulations toaction which partake of reason and to that extent analyzable in common withthem by the means they employ and the ends they achieve, and (4) of the mate-rial cause, n the sense hat each art is a class of objects, comparable to anddistinguishable from each other, and so analyzable in common with other artsby the forms suited to the materials in which they are embodied in the arts.Some indication of the significance of this range of treatments to which art issusceptible may be found in the fact that of the tvvo arts concerning whichindependent treatises ofAristotle have survived, one, i.e., rhetoric, is defined inthe most general of the terms applied to art as a power, while the other, i.e.,poetic, is defined in the most particular of those terms as a composite whole(td orivol.ov).81.In its broadest context, as related to natural things and as an elicient causeproductive ofchange, art is at once (like science and virtue, or in general likeany action which participates in reason, and, at the other extreme, like chanceand fortune or in general like any cause whose indefiniteness and multiplicityremoves it from the scope of reason) a natural process and at the same timepossessed fcharacteristics opposed to nature and to what naturally happens.The theoretic sciences reat of nature and are themselvesconstructions due to

B. Rhetor it i .2.1355 26;Poeir l . l44T l6.Dif ferent iat ionoftheselevelsofanalysisofart ,u 'hich,it is hoped, are shown in the text which follows to have been clearly lormulated by Aristotle, hasthe further advantage of at once removing many of the ambiguities and simple confusions laid atthe door ofAristotle and disclosing the reasons why they seemed to his interpreters to be confu-sions. Cf. E. M. Cope, An Introduction o Aristotlel Rhetoic, pp. 22-23:. When it is said, as both Platoand Aristotle do say, that art implies a knowiedge of causes, which as Aristotle tells us again andagain is the characteristic ofscience or 6nto'r{pq properly understood, it is plain that the distinctionbetween t61vq and enrorrlpq is lost sight of, a confusion, which as I have already said is by nonreans uncommon with ancient Greek philosophers l cl also p. 33.

Rhetoric and Poetic n Aristotle . r45natural processes nd tendencies; he end ofscience is knowledge ofthe univer-sal, and yet knowledge and thought are themselves activities of the mind andso subject to scientific explanation.e Chance and fortune are irrational and in-determinate, yet they must be reckoned among the causes and as such betreated in the physical sciences.r0 rt is a principle of change like nature, andwhat is done by art might be accomplished by chance; at the same time art isa kind of knowledge concerned, lil


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or reason (l,6yoq), or nature (Q6orq).r3On the other hand, the physicalsciencesare concerned with the interrelations of things and the exercise by oneobject of actions which have effects in other objects: the power of a thing isconsidered, then, not in terms of the nature of which it is a power but in termsof the change which its action causes other things to suffer, and so consideredpowers are contrasted to natures, since nature is a principle of change internalto the thing while power is an external principle of change.ta The arts areinstances f such powers.r5

It is possible, then, to reason from power either back to the nature of whichthe power is a part and a sign (and such inference would yield informationrelevant to its definition or essence)or outward to the action in which the poweris actualized in external effects (and such inference would yield informationconcerning the relation between agent and patient, between makingand suffering ). Since power involves something which is acted on as well assomething which acts, and since action and passion, or making and sufferingusually occur respectively in different things or at least in distinguishable as-pects of the same thing, the power of making (roreiv) and suffering (ndolerv),although one and single in itse[ must be divided into two kinds, a poeticpower (brivcprg fiolntrrq) in the agent and a pathetic power or power ofsuffering (66vcprq no0rltrrfl) in the patient;'6 and indeed that distinction be-

13. Cl. DeAnima. I 402b9:Further f therearenot manysouls, ut manypartsof one soul,whichoughtwe o nvestigateirst, hewhole oulor tsparts?t is also ifficult o determine hichof these artsarenaturallydistinct romone another, ndwhether he parts rd p6pro]or theirfunctions td 6pyc] should e nvestigatedirst,as,e.g the process f thinl


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ers which are rational or sciences which are productive (errotrlpcr rcorqtrroi);and art and nature differ', therefore, in the status of the form or reason whichenters into their operation: in art it preexists in the mind of the artisan, innature it is in the constitution alike of that which generates and that which isgenerated. Nature and natural powers differ from art in the fashion in whichform enters nto change, but since nature and artare principles ofchange, thisformal difference constitutes a difference between them both as efficient causesor principles of change and as ends or final causes to which change is directed,for irrational powers can accomplish only a single end, while rational powersmay be employed to effect either of contrary ends.2oSince the distinction be-tween art and nature is a distinction between rational and irrational, the samedistinction is found between mind and nature and even between the powers ofthe soul itself. The soul, however, is itself a nature, and its powers should there-fore be treated in terms of their functions as well as n terms of their susceptibil-ity to reason. In the De Anitna, inquiry into the nature and functions of the soulis pursued as part of physical science and the effort is expressly to arrive atphysical definitions ;2r two powers (6uvdperg) are distinguished according totheir characteristic work or function (6pyov): judgment which is the work ofthought and sense, and local motion which is originated by practical thoughtand appetite.22 Considered in terms of principles of change and their ends thesoul is constituted of natural powers or parts distinguishable from other powersby their ends. The powers of the soul, on the other hand, may be consideredas directed to activity in accordance with virtue and rationaliSr, and the classi-fication of powers must then be reformulated, for morality and wisdom, thoughbased on natural powers, are determined, not by nature, but by habit or theinfluence of reason. In the Nicomachean thics, therefore, the parts, or pow-ers, or natures of the soul are distinguished into two kinds, one possessed freason (td l,6yov 61ov), the other irrational (rl),oyov), and both in turn aredistinguished by the same criteria into two kinds: the irrational part into onewhich is purely irrational and one which, though irrational, is responsive to

mahumti.1.734636:.. . . as s ikewise he case n those hingswhich are producedby art. Heatand cold make ftor el.] he iron soft and hard, but the movement of tools makes he sword, thismovementcontaining the principle ofthe art. For the art is the principle and form ofthe product,but existing n something else,whereas he movement of nature is in the thing itself, ssuing romanother nature which contains he form in actuality.

20. MAap|gtsits . 2. 1046'36: Since some suchprinciples are present n inanimate things, andothers n mimate thingsand in the soul and in the rational [],6 yov 1ov] part of the soul, t is clearthat some powers [6ov


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2.Art in this broadsense, sproductive r poetic science,s comparable ithscience in much the same fashion as it is compared with nature, for it is a kindof science, yet distinct from theoretic science. More over, as the differentiationof the form of art from that of nature requires consideration of the efficient andfinal cause, so the formal comparison of art and science involves not only theefficient and final causes of art and science as forms of knowledge but theirsubject matter or material cause as well. Art is midway between experienceand science like science it is concerned with the universal, but unlike scienceit is knowledge of becoming rather than of being; it is directed to actions andproductions and therefore like experience treats of individuals, although itsspeculation is of universals, for the artist, unlike the man of experience, knowsnot only what is the case, but why and the cause.26Notwithstanding theirnothing n our terresrial region could be the same. DeAnima i. 4. 4l5bl5: 'And it is clear hatthe soul is the cause n the senseof the final cause.For ust as mind acts fnotei] for the sakeofsomething,so n the sameway doesnature, and this is ts end. Specific analogiesofnature to artor ofart to nature and specificationsofthe operationsofone by means ofthe other are frequentin the scientifc writings of Aristotle: cf.Plq,six i.2. \94 2\ ff.; Meteorologicaiv.2.390b13;DePartibuAnimalium i. 9. 654 29; De Gennatinnenimaltum i.6. 743b23; ii. I I . 762'16; iv. 6- 775 20; Poliicsvii. 14.1333'2l.Thiscomparisonisindicatedfrequentlybythestatementthatnatureoperateslilan intelligent artisan consistentlywith reason eul61oq) in that nature chooses, r that nature tselfistheend; cf.Meteorokgicaiv.2.379b25;DeParibusAnimaliumil i .2.663'32;.665b20;v 10.686'8De Generationenimalium . 23. 731 24: i. 4. 740 28', . 2. 781b22.As final causenature is best; cf.Polttus .2. 1252b30:And therelore since he first communities are natural, so also s every state,for it is the end of those communities,and the nature of a thing is its end. For what each hing iswhen fully developed,we call ts nature, whether it be a man, a horse, or a family. Besides he finalcauseand end ofa thing is best,and self-sufficiencys he end and best. For much the same easonnatureisbeauti ful,asisapparentinthequotationsabove;f.DeParhbusAnimaliuml.5.645 46,esp. 22: . . . for in all there is something natural and beautiful. Absence of the fortuitous andadaptation to an end are to be found in the works of nature in the highest degree,and the endconstituted or generatedby nature s a place ofthe beautiful.

26. The evolution and derivation ofart and science rom sense-perception, emory, and experi-enceare identical; cf. Posteriornalttics i. I 9. I 00 3: So out of sense-perception omes o be whatwe call memory and out of frequently repeated memories of the same hing developsexperience;lor memories many in number constitute a single experience.From experienceagain, or fromevery universal established n the soul, the one beside he many which is in all those hings oneand the same,arises he principle ofart and science,of art if it is concerning becoming,ofscienceif it is concerning being Maaplysits . l. 980b28: And from memory experience s produced inmen; for many memories of the same hing produce the power of a single experience.And experi-ence seems o be almost ike scienceand art, but scienceand art come o men through experience;lor'experience made art,'as Polus ays, nd rightly, but inexperienceuck.'And art ariseswhenfrom many notions gained rom experienceone universaljudgment concerning ike things s pro-duced. . . . For purposes of action experiencedoes not seem o differ from art, and we even seemen of experience succeedingmore than thosewho have the rational principle p'61o9] withoutexperience.The reason s hat experience s knowledgeofindividuals, art ofuniversals, and actionsand generations are all concerned with individuals. .. . Yet we think that knowledge and under-standing belong to art rather than experience,and we suppose artists to be wiser than men ofexperience,since wisdom in aII caes depends ather on knowledge. But this is the case because

Rhetoric and Poetic n Aristotle . r4rdifferences in both respects, the arts and the sciences are thus associated intheir material causes (since they treat universals derived from experience) andtheir final causes (since all inquiries, arts, and sciences are directed to an endand a good), but in addition they are both accounted for by a single efficientcause, nstruction and the use of pre-existent knowledge 27n this first broadsense the arts include any inquiry into an y subject, for the scientist is to beclassified with the artist as productive of his science by discovery or instruction,notwithstanding the contrast between him and the artist in respect of the endsoftheir respective sciences. As art and nature are associated in the possessionor exemplification of a rational principle (l 6yoq) and so contrasted to chanceand the fortuitous, art and science are associated in their common derivationfrom instruction and their common dependence on a rational principle and socontrasted to the virtues which are acquired by habituation and involve a fixedcharacter rather than explicit knowledge.

Since this double relation of art to science is formal, it is stated best by dis-criminating the two senses of form which are involved. In relation to thethings on which it is employed art is the form as well as the principle ofchange,28 and in respect of their subject matters, art, since it treats of change,

the former know the cause,while the latter do not, for men ofexperience know that the thing isso, but do not know why, while the others know the why and the cause. Cf. Pior Anal2tics. 30.46 3 f.; Nicomacheanthics . 10. I l80bl 3 fl

27. Pohtusi i i .12.l292bl4: Inal lsciencesandartstheendisagood... ; ibid.vri .13.1331 37:In all arts and sciences oth the ends and the means should be in our control ; De Caeloii- 7.306'14: ... as ho ugh someprinciplesdid not require o be criticized rom their consequencesand particularly from their end. Now the end of productive science rorrltril dmotr]pq] is thework produced [rb 6pyov], ofnatural science he facts frd Qorv6pevov] as presentedconsistentlyand indubitably to sense-perception. Cf Nicomachemthis i. l. 1094'1. In their efficient causesthe two are so closely associated hat art or science is used indifferently to cover both; cf.PorteiorAnalsttics. I . 7 I : '1\ll instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds rompreexistentknowledge.This becomesevident upon a surveyofall species finstruction. The math-ematical sciences nd all other speculativearts are acquired in this way. . . Cl Mathematicalarts, Metaph2sics. 1.98It'23; demonstrative rt, DeSophisicisElenchu9.lT0'30,31;1. 172'28,29. The similarity of the arts and the scienceswith respect o their material cause,moreovet ex-tends beyond their common concern with universals; cf. Politir iv. l. 12BBbl0: In all arts andscienceswhich embrace the whole of any subject, and do not come into being in a fragmentaryway, t is the provinceofa singleart or science o considerall that appertains o a single subject ;Rhelorici. 10. I 392 26: That things which are the object of any kind of scienceor art are possibleand exist or come nto existence ;Maaph2sics i. 7. 1063r'36: Every science eeks ertain principlesand causes or each ofthe objects ofwhich it is science e.g medicine and gymnasticsand eachofthe other sciences, hether productive fnotltrrq] or mathematical.28. A11 he words signifying orm which were associatedwith or equated o power (cl above,note 13) are used o define art, with the exception of nature to which art is in these espectsbeing contrasted and analogized.For el6oq cf De Generationenimalium i. I . 735'2: For art is theprinciple and form [e16og]ofthat which is generated ; Metaph2sicsii. 9. 1034 23: . . . thus thehouse produced by reason s produced from a house, or the art is the form . . . ; i.bi.d.1.1032 32:. . . from art proceeds he things ofwhich the form is n the soul ofthe artist ; zDzl. 032t'9: Thenthe motion lrom thispoint, e.g. he process owards health, s called a making proiqorg]. 'Ihereforeit lollows hat in a sense ealth comes rom health and houses rom house. hat which is with matter


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is contrasted to sciencewhich treats of being and its invariable causes.Ab-stracted rom subjectmattet in the secondplace, art is a method which thescientistmust seek,discover, nd have 61erv),and science, ike every ationallydirectedpursuit, s an art in the sense f a methodpossessednd used, ndeedeachof the sciencesas tspeculiarmethodsuited o itsproper subjectmatter.2As method, art extendsbeyond he limitations imposed by subjectmatter, andthere are universal arts, ike dialectic and rhetoric, which may be brought tobear on any subjectmatter and which may even passover into the particularscience f the method is rendered too specific o a subject matter.3on this di-mension methodsare to be distinguished rom eachother by the principles orfrom that which iswithout matte for the medical art and the building art are the form ofhealthand ofthe house";cl ibid.xii.3. 1070"13 nd 4. 1070b33. or ,6yoq cf.DePartibusAnimaliumt..639b14: Art is the reason polog] of the work without the matter"; ibid.639"14: "For this is thereasonp,6yoq], and reason s the principle, alike n works ofart and n worksof nature";Metaphlsicsxii. 3. 1070'29: "For the medical art is the reason []"6yoq]ofhealth." For popQrlcf. DeGmuationeAnimaliumi. 4.740t'25:'And as he productsofart are generatedby meansofthe toolsofthe artist,or to put it more truly by means of their movement, and this is the activity of the art, and the artis the form [popQrq] f what is made in something else,so is it with the power [6rivoprq] of thenutritive soul."

29. In the Rlrctoriche artistic or technical method (6vte1voq p60o6oq) s contrasted o non-technical means ofpersuasionwhich do not belong to rhetoric; cf. Rhetorir. 1. 1355.4,where the"technical method" is used as a sponyrn for "rhetoric," and 2. 1355b35: Of the modesofpersua-sion some are non-technical (i.e.are not proper to the art) and some are echnical.By non-technicalI mean such things as are not supplied by us but are there from the outset, such as witnesses,evidence given under torture, written contracts, and so on. By technical I mean such as are con-structedby method and by us. The former has merely to be used, he atter has o be discovered";cf. bid. 1355b22 "Every art and method, li[


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pectsof methods.History,art, and sciences re determinedprimarily by thenature of things, since habits of thought and modesof expressionare adaptedin them to the requirementsof their proper investigationsamong things. His-tory as a methodof inquiry concerning articular hings ncludes oth the col-lection of information about kindsof things,as,e.g., n the history of animals,the history of natures, and the history of the soul, and the study of pro-cessesnd actions, arti cularly hoseof men,which s n modern usage ssociated with history.32 rt, which treatsof actions and productions, has a similardouble application; t is a method for guiding the processes f action and pro-duction and also, n the case f art in the narrowsense, methodof investigating the product.33n both historyand art there s an externalityof thing andidea, or experience f thingscauseshe deaswhich constitute istory, nd theideasof artist and statesman overn the actionsof each n his appropriate sub-ject matteq but in science hat externality is removed,and knowledgeand theknown are dentical.3ahe methodsof the sciences re concernedwith inquiryinto being into naturesand changesand into quantitative abstractions.Thecomplete history of any classof things would supply he principles or its scien-tific treatment,and conversely, orrectly established cientificprincipleswouldapply to any nstance r phenomenondisclosed y the historyof such hingsThe particularswith which art isconcernedare artificial thingsor, more gener-ally, voluntary acts, and therefore the method of art both controls ts appro-priate history in the construction of art objects and grasps ts appropriatecauses) ince he rulesofaction and constructionattain a universalitycorrrpara-ble to the laws of science.The statementsof history thus are singulars,whilethoseof poetry partakeof the nature of universals, nd poetry is thereforemorephilosophic nd graver han history.35he methodsyingon thisbase-history,art, and science-touch on existent hings n modeswhich range rom the par-ticularity of things better knovrm o us to the univeJsalityof things ',betterknown in nature, and it indicates he relations nvolved n Aristotle's requentappeals o constructive, nductive,and abstractiveprocesses.Apart from their application to things,methodsmay be constructedwith a

32. PiorAnaQticsi.30.46 24: For ifnone ofthe true attributes fthings havebeen omitted nthe history,we should be able to discover he proof and demonstrateeverything which admits ofproof, and to make that clear,whosenature does not admit of proof Hi:nrytoJAnimak. 6. 491 10:Then we must try to discover he causes fthese things, or it is thus that the investigation[p60o-6o6] is conducted [roteioOcr] according to natur, once the history of the particulars has beencompleted,and lrom them it becomesclear what the subjectsand premisses f the demonstrationmust be. Cf. DeCaeloii. l. 29Bt'32;DeAnima . l. 402 4;De Generaionenimatium ii. B. 757b35and758'3 where historically baseil nquiry ftotoptrdg) is conrasted to ignorance or lack ofexperr-ence (dnetpio); Rhetori 1. 4. 1359b32.The term is frequently used n the senseofthe history ofhuman actions and in gene al narrative history of changes;Rhetaric. 4. 1360 37; ii. 9. 1409 28;Poetics9.45lb3. 6: 23.1459 21.33. Poetics. 1447 12 :19. 456'334. DeAnima ti. 4. 429b4 f.: 7 431' :,43 bI6: B.43 b20.35. Poeics . 145165

Rhetoric and Poetic in Aristotle . r55

view to gen erality or with a view to the conditions of variouspossibleapplica-tions. One of the two remaining basesof the triangle-science, dialectic, andsophistic-consists f methodsof attainingand usinggeneral rinciplesor for-mulationswhich may take the place of general principles, and they are differ-entiated and treated as such n the last three books of the Organon6The otherbase-history, rhetoric, and sophistic contrariwise,derives ts cogencyor usefrom application to particularity: history by treating particular circumstancesas ts subject, hetoric by suiting ts arguments o the predilectionsof particularaudiences,sophistic by relying on the apparent and genuine implications ofparticular statements.Within the large triangle, rhetoric, dialectic, and sophis-tic are related n their common concern with words and statements, nd in thepurposeof the rhetorician and dialectician o refute he fallacioususeofwords.Art. rhetoric. and dialectic are related in their common concern with men'sthoughts;37istory rhetoric, and art in their common concernwith men'sac-tions and passions;:r8nd finally art, dialectic,and sciencen their commonconcernwith universals sophistic eing concernedwith pseudo-universals, ndrhetoric with statements hat are probable or true for the most part).3e3.In a broad sense,n which art includes all rational activity, even science,art iscontrasted o nature as an emcient causeof change. n a narrower sense,nwhich art includes questionsof practical action, art is contraste to theore icscience s an activity of the soul. That narrower conception of art is susceptibleof further specification n trvo steps, irst by distinguishing ends and so differ-entiating the arts from the practical sciences, nd secondly by distinguishingsubjectmatters and so differentiating the particular ar ts from each other.Thedifferentiation s progressive nd at each stage ilenessesas well as differencesare involved; consequently he whole classificationof the arts and sciences sreduced to confusion and contradiction if a single basis s sought for it, andAristotle then seems o have confounded, n his distinctions,making with do-ing, art with science,and knowledge with nature.a0Nature, power, and sci-

36. PosteiorAnafrzdri.9. BlblS;Tbpicsi.1. 100'25 r.;DeSlphisticisElenchi:2.65 28ff.37. Poetics9. 1456 34; . 1450b4; hetli( . 1. 1354 1; . 1356'30.38. Poetics23.\459^17;i . iL1447^28;l . l452bl l ;Rlrctoici .2. l356 l+;i i . l . l378'19flandin

generalchap ters2 l .39. Poetics. l45lt'5; Maaphlsicsiv.2. 004b17f.;Rlutoici.2. 1357'22tr.4O. Zeller(AritotleandtheEarl2PeripateticsfEng\ishtranslation;ondon, lB97],I, 180fi) summa-

rizes he conclusions f Ritter, Brandis, Teichmiller, and Walter concerning his confusion n whichtwo basesof clrosificationare hopelessly ntermingled, a twofold classification nto theoretic andpractical sciences, nd a threefold classification nto theoretic, practical, and poetic. Cf p. lB0: Ifwe follow out the development of these principles in the Aristotelian system,and seek or thatpurpose o take a generalview ofthe divisionshe adopted,we are met at oncewith the unfortunatedifFcuhy hat, neither n his om writings nor in any lrusrworlhyaccount of his merhod, s anysatisfactory nformation on that point to be found ; and pp. l8.t-85: If, however,we attempt toapply the suggested ivision to the contentsof the Aristotelian bools, we run at once nto manilold


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ence-productive, theoretic, and practical-are all distinct; yet all powers pro-ceed from nature, and the sciences are kinds ofpowers so interrelated that thetheoretic sciences reat of the materials and faculties from which art proceedsand on which virtue is exercised; the arts are employed in the construction of allthings made in accordance with reason, including scientific theories, politicalorganizations, and moral plans; and finally politics pronounces on all permis-sible pursuits including the cultivation of arts and sciences, and the virtues in-clude the arts and sciences n their number. Much as poetic power, taken in itsbroad sense as efficient cause, was delimited to art by differentiating twoforms of power, rational and irrational, so art, taken in its broad sense as pro-ductive science, is narrowed to productive or poetic art by differentiatingtwo varieties of final causes n which human action can be consummated: anobject produced by the action or the action itselfar That contrast ofends andthe correlative contrast of efficient causes constitute the difference betwccrr making and doing, production and action, between the productivesciences in the narrow sense and the practical sciences, for the actions per-formed by an agent are traced back to his character, choice, or will, while theproducts of art originate primarily in knowledge.a2 Art now appears in a thirdguise and context: as powers first are contrasted to powers, and in that contextart is a kind of power; and as rational powers secondly are contrasted in natureand mode of acquisition to irrational powers, and in that context art is a kindof science; so, thirdly, the effects of tho se processeson the mind and on itsfuture actions are contrasted to those transitory alterations which afford neithertraining nor habituation, and in that context art is a kind of habit ((rg).

Habit may be defined in terms of the two pairs of distinctions thus far em-ployed: it is midway between activity and power, partaking of certain aspectsof both, and it is midway between action and suffering. Like power it is a causetroubles. Cf O. Hamelin (hSystimedAnstoa fParis, 1920] pp. 8l 89) who defends he threefoldclassification gainst Zeller, attributing his error to a heretical attachment to the primacy ofthemetaphysicaldoctrine ofthe lour causes nd that ofpotency and act.

41. Nicomacheanthrrs . l. 1094'3: But a certain difference s apparent among ends, or someare activities,while others are works [ipyc] apart from the activities hat produce them. Poliics .4. 1254 1: Instruments so-calledare instruments for production [notrltrrd], but a possessionsan instrument for action [rpcrrrr6v]. Thus, something else s derived from the shuttle than onlyits use,whereasof a garment or of a bed there is only the use. Moreover sincemaking [noinotq]and doing [Tpd(tq] differ from each other in kind, and sinceboth require instruments, he instru-ments which they employ must necessarily iffer in the samemannen

42. Since there are two sourcesof movement n man, namely, appetite and mind (cl DeAnimaiii. 10.433'9), the moral problem consists n good part ofsubmitting the appetitivepart ofthe soulto the rationa.l c[.Nicomacheanthics. 1 3. I 102130;ii. 15. I 119b15). he problem ofart, on theother hand, turns primarily on the applicationofknowledge to the organization ofexternal materi-als, and therefore unlike virtue depends on the possession f knowledge and is capable of excel-lence; cf. Nicomacheankics ii.3. I 105'27; cf. alsoMetaplryics i. l. 1025 22: For the principle ofproduction [t6v norqtrrdlv] is n the producer-it is either reasonor art or somepower,while theprinciple of action is n the doer-viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are thesame ; nd bid.xi.7.1064 1.

Rhetoric and Poetic in Aristotle . 16?

of action, but unlike a power a habit is not productive of contrary results; likeactuality it is the principle and end of actions, for habits are the result of prioractivity as they are in turn the principles from which actions originate.+3Habitsare therefore qualities of the agent, contrasted to dispositions which are lessstable than habits, and to passions which are the consequence s of the activityof an external agent.aaThe prime example s of habit however are the sciencesand the virtues.as Art, as it was a power and a science in the previous classifica-tions, is in this classification a habit and a virtue. It is a virtue of the rationalpart of the soul and of the rational part which is concerned with variable thingsand which is called calculative in contrast to the scientific part by which invari-able causes are contemplated.a6 As in the case of all previous correlatives towhich art has been contrasted, art is distinct from each ofthe other intellectualvirtues and yet in a sense t is identical with or subordinate to each: it is subordi-nate, thus, to prudence, t he other virtue of the calculative part, particularly inthe form of statecraft which regrlates arts like other powers exercised in the

43. The relation f habit o actionand power n the analysis f Aristotle s well llusratedbyhis nquiry nto he nature ndcause fimagination, hichbegins y raisinghequestion hetherimaginations a power, abit,or activity DeAnimaii. 3. 428'1); habitsor powers are hereexemplifiedn the ist, sensation,pinion, cience,nderstanding.maginationseventually e-finedasa kind of motion,and t is specifiedhatmotionmakest possibleor its possessoro do(noreiv) ndsuffer ndolerv)many hings ibid. 28bl6). poweror sciences elatedo contraryobjects, hereas habitwhich soneoftwo contraries oes ot produce ontraryeffectsNicoma-cheanthics . I I 29'l 3),and t is a bad error o confuse abitswith activities r powers Topicsv.5.I25b5): Again,consider hether e has educedhabit' o activity' r activity' o habit,'as, .greducing'sensation'o motion hroughhebody,' or sensations a'habit,'whereas otio n s an'activity.'Similarly,lso,f hehas alled' memory''a abit etentivefa conception,'for emoryis nevera habit,but ratheran activity. heyalsomakea bad mistakewhoreducehabit' o the'power' that follows habit. . . . Habits are produced from like activities Qt{icomacheanthics i. l.1103b21;2. 103 30);onformitytohabit istheendofeveryactiviry(ibid. i i . 10. 1115 20) ;nd asinglehabit may give rise to many activities, vhereasa single activity can originate only its singleproper habit (Plgsics .+.228^12). Habit is a kind ofactivity ofthe haver and the had, comparableinthisrespecttoaction,making,andmotion(Metaph1smv.20. 1022b4),andevenaprivationmaybe a habit (ibid. 12. l0l9b6), although habit is also he contrary ofprivation (Categoies 0. 12 26);the kinds ofgood are activitiesand habi* (Nicomacheanthirsvii. 13. 1152b33).

44. Habit is one of the kinds distinguishedunder the category of quality; and having is one ofthe categories s well as one ofthe so-called ost-predicamentsCategories. Bb27;4. lb27;15.15b17). ll things are either substances r passions,dispositions,habits, or motions ofsubstances(Plqtsicsri. 193'23;Maaph2sicsi.3. 1061 8).Habitsmaybenatural(Nitomach eanEthicsvii.3.ll52b34; I I 53'l4); change ends owardnature,while nvariable epetition roduce s settled abit(Rhetoric. I I . I 37 '26); and one kind of power is he habit of insusceptibility o change Metaphysicsix. L 1046'13; 12. 0l9'26). The genus f virtue s ound by eliminatingamong he hree hingsthat virtue might be: passions, owers,or habits (Nicomacheanthicsi. 4. I I 05b 9), and the attributesofsensible hings seem o be exhaustedby habits and passions DeAnima ii. 8. 432 6).45. CategoiuB.Bb29;Politrcsiv..l2BBhlT;NiromacheanEthicsvi.3.139r'31; oswiarAnaltncsil.19.9901B,25,32;DePartibusAnimalium. 1.639 2;NicomacheanEthicsl i .4.l06'12; Plqtsitsvi i .3.246'10, 30; Politics. 13. 1259b25;i. 6. 1265 35;Rtutoric.6. l362hl3; ii. 12. l388b34; ii. 7.l408'29. The two habits corresponding o the two parts ofthe soul, rational and irrational, arereferred o as eason nd appetite;Politicsvii.15. 334b17.46. Nicomacheanthm vi. 2. I 139'6.


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r5B . Cr{APTERSrX

state,and excellencen art is an nstanceofwisdom which is the supremevirtueof the scientificpart of the soul. By the same oken, all the other virtues are artsinsofar as they exercisea method of construction or insofar asthey are influ-enced by the arts or affectedby knowledge.4.In a fourth and mostparticular sense, rt and making is definedby the materi-alsordered and formed by meansof the particular arts, andin that context artsare contrasted o arts. i\rt may be applied to what is artistic or to works ofart, as nature is applied to what is according to nature and natural.aT heterms poetic and making assume he sense f poetry as imited strictlyto the artwhich make suseof words as ts material and contrasted o pros easthe alternative manner in which words might be used.a8 he enumerationof the arts at the opening of the Poeticss in terms of the concrete objects(td otivo),ov) which constitute he art, and soconsidered he arts are modesofimitation, analyzable ike natural things which are also concrete objects,bymeansof their matter and form as well asby the causeof their generation,andthe arts are therefore differentiated and classified n terms of differences n themeans, bject,and manner of their mita tion.asThe schematismof the four causes etermines a schematismof four sensein which art is treated n the works ofAristotle.Art enters nto many interrela-tionswith other things andprocesses, etermining them and being determinedby them, and it has many likenesses nd many differences rom the thingswhich it is ike. Art is a power ike nature, n its irst sense sa causeof change; tis an object ike nature n its ourth sense san objectpossessedfindependentexistenceand intelligible characteristics.All arts may be analyzed as powerspossessedy the artist, but that manner of analysis s particularly well suited othose arts, Iike dialectic and rhetoric, which have no proper subject matter,while only the fine arts can be defined and analyzedcompletely n terms of thecharacteristics f their products. Art is a kind of knowledge ike science, n itssecond sense,generated rom experience and conversantwith causes; t is akind of habit and virtue ike prudenceand wisdom, n its hird sense, ossesse

47- Ph2sirsi. l. 193'31.48. Both noirlotg and norqtrrr1 are used n this strict sense hroughout the Poetinand the third

bookofthe Rhetoic.Cl.,forno(qorg oetirsl . l++7^10,14;1447t'14wherenoreivisusedintherestrictedsense f poetry ); 1447b26; . I4+8b23,24; 1449 3,23; 9. I 45 b6, l01, 2. l+58 20; 23.1459^37;25.46lbl0, l l ; Rhetnrici i ..1404'28;2.1405 4,34;3.14O6 12;7.40Bbl9;alsoMeteorologicai i .3.357 26;Poli t i tsiv.I.1296 20;v 7.1306b39.Cf.,fornorl trrf,Poeticsl.1447^8;4.1448t '4; . 1450r'lB; 5. 454bl6; 17. 1455 32; 9. 1456b14, 8; 25. 1460b14, 5;Rhetoic. 11.137 b7; lli. I . 1403b25; . l4O4b4;alsoDe ntnpretatione. 17 6.The terms zorrlcrd4, norrltrlg androfilpc are used n the same estricted ashion, while noteiv and t61v1 retain in the context theirbroader meanings.

49. Poetits. l+47 13

Rhetoric and Poetic in Aristotle . r5q

of a permanent status consequent on practice and instruction. All arts may betreated in terms of the processesand materials of their generation, and theproductive arts may be treated in terms of ends, not only the moral and politi-cal ends to which they contribute, but also the esthetic ends which knowledgeof the practical and theoretic sciences may be made to serve. Art has, withoutnecessity of confusion, all of these diversified significances: (l) it is a naturalfaculty or skill which initiates and guides production; (2) it is a psychologicalstage in education and a method in the development of knowledge; (3) it is, inthe moral interpretation, a virtue or habit of the mind, an end of human activ-ity, and an instrument of political action; (4) it is finally a class of objects to beknown, judged, and appreciated. Relative to objects, art is applied to eitherthe process of generation or the products for contemplation; both depend onknowledge, and as knowledge art is applied to the characteristic forms inwhich its materials may be assembled or the ideal ends which they may bemade to serve. Art is a natural power and as such is subject for scientific inquiryyet it is distinguishable, together with all proce sses hat depend on reason, fromnatural powers by the possession of a rational form and method. Art is a scienceand as such involves knowledge and the exercise of reason, yet it is distinguish-able, together with the practical arts or sciences, from science in the sense oftheory since science has only knowledge as its end, while art and the practicalsciences are directed to action or the results of action. Art is a virtue and assuch a habit of the soul, yet it is distinguishable, like the virtues of the scientificpart of the soul, from moral virtue since it is subject to analysis apart from thehabits and ability of the individual agent. Art, finally, is a concrete object andas such analyzable in terms of form and matteq but unlike natural objects itsform and definition are not determinate or natural but are determined ulti-mately not only by the potentiality of the artistic material but by the nature ofthe artist and the susceptibilities of the audience. Art is distinct from nature,and yet a natural power; it is distinct from science, and yet a productive science;it is distinct from virtue, and yet an intellectual virtue; it is distinct from naturalobjects, and yet a concrete object. Art has greater latitude of choice than mor-als, since the productions ofthe artist are not fixed by a natural end as are theactions of a moral agent, and it admits of le ss determinateness of knowledgethan physics since the objects produced by art are not fixed by a natural formand therefore cannot be treated, like natural objects, in strict definition or sci-entific demonstrations. While art has all four general senses, t is treated mostcharacteristically in the fourth and narrowest sense, or in that sense the artsare distinguished into particular arts composed of distinctive art-objects, andarts are compared and contrasted, as arts, with each other.

The treatment of the arts which results from the application of the fourcauses to their analysis is more elaborate and complex than the treatment ofnature, because form and matter are separable in the arts indeed separatearts may be concerned, one with the production of a matter, the other with its


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use-whereas function and end are inseparable rom matter in the productsof nature.soScientific knowledge, herefore, s based ultirnately on substancephysical definitions involve form and matter; and frequently only two of thefour causes re distinguishable n nature. Art as knowledge s either identicalwith the power of the artist, or it is a scienceconcerned with the products ofthe art. The power of the artist, which is ndeterminate, s particularized n hisperson, situation, and materials,while the definition of the art is generalizedfrom examination of the form and matter of its particular products.All four ofthe causes re distinguishable n art-indeed theyare distinguishablen natureonly by the analogyof art-and they enter n some ashion n fixing the matterof any discussion f art. Rhetoric, like medicine and political science,s definedas a power or faculty (66voprg)while poetic is defined as a concrete object(otivol,ov).When arts are defined as powers, heir mode of exercise r their useof rational principles rather than the outcomeof their exercises mportant, forsuccessn the arts depends on matter and circumstance,and their ends aredeterminedby another art. Arts like rhetoric and dialectic can be definedonlyin terms of power. When art is defined as concreteobjects, he goodnessorbadness ftheir form and the success r failure oftheir devices ather than therules ollowed for their construction are mportant. While the fine arts maybeconsidered n terms of the power of the artist or the potentialitiesof the matrer,or in terms of their proper ends or further extraneousendswhich they may bemade to serve,or in terms of related ideas and methods, they may also beconsidered n themselves, s esthetic entities and as matter and form. Otherarts {hll between hese wo extremes:medicine, ike rhetoric, is a power,but ithasa proper subjectmatter;politics, ike rhetor ic and medicine, sa power andlike medicine it has ts proper subject matter, but it also embracesand deter-mines he endsof the other arts.IIIOf all the arts there are two, dialecticand rhetoric, which are not confined toany classof subjects,and their treatment therefore s peculiarly dependent onconsiderationof the power from which they proceed. Since rhetoric is definedin terms of the power or faculty by which rhetorical argumentsare perceived,it should be treated apart from considerationofany actualpersuasionwhich itmay produce, for art is characterizedby its method, not its effects,and it maytherefore be unsuccessful ecauseof unfavorable circumstances,even whenproperly exercised.5rn this, rhetoric is like medicine and all other arts, but it

50. Cf. Physir i i .2. 194 33.51. Rhetoric1. I . I 355b7: It is thus evident that rhetoric is not of one separate class of subjects,

but, like dialectic, is of universal application; also that it is useful; and further; that its function[5pyov] is not so much to persuade, as to find out, in each case, the eisting means ofpersuasion,as is the cae also in all the other arts, for it is not the function of medicine to make [norfloor] thepatient healthy, but to contribute as much as possible [ev61ercr] to this, since even those whosereturn to health is impossible may be properly treated ; Topics .3. l0lb5: We shall have the

Rhetoric and Poetic in Aristotle . 16r

is contrastedo those ame rtspreciselyn termsof the subjectmatter o whichtheir powersand functions apply.t' The ends of all arts are determined by themost authoritative art and sciencewhose end is in the highestdegreea good,the political art in the sphere f practicalaction and wisdom n general.ss utthe artsare also mitative and they may thereforebe treatednot merely n termsof the ends sought n what we do but in the characteristicsof what is made.The technique of analysis elevant to art and the criteria to be employed njudging it are determined by these various forms under which art may betreated. First, art, though distinct from nature, s none the essa natural powet

method [p60o6oq] perfectly,when we are in a position like that which we occupy in regard torhetoric and medicine and powers f8tvdperov] of that kind. This means o do fnoteiv] what wechoosewith the materials available [6r trov iv6elop6vov]. For the rhetorician will not persuadeby every method [tp6nov], nor will the doctor heal, but ifhe omits none ofthe available means,we shall say hat he has he science efitorrlpl] adequately. Cf. ibi.d. i. 12. 149b24 or criticism ofa definition of rhetoric which depends on success n persuasion, and De Anima ii. 9. 433'4 forspecification hat knowledgealone s nsufficient o produce action according o knowledge.Rheto-ric and medicine are used as examples o indicate the character of deliberation; iromachean thi.csiii. 5. I I I2b I : We deliberate not about ends but about means.For a doctor doesnot deliberatewhether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall persuade,nor a statesmanwhether he shallproduce [norrloer] law and order, nor do the practitioners ofany ofthe other artsdeliberate aboutends. The pursuit of an end in m art is nfinite; it is delimited eitherby the meansavailableor bythe limitation imposed on the end by a superior art. This natura.l imitation of means and end iswell illustrated by the art ofgetting wealth (lprlpototrrrj): it too is a poetic art (i.e.,an art ofmaking); it is defined, not in terms of the function of making money (much as the definition ofrhetoric in terms of the power of persuadingwas avoided),but in terms of the power to discoverwhence wealth may be obtained; when it is made part of economics a limitation is placed on itsend and it is a natural art, and as such is to be distinguished rom the unnatural art of gettingwealth in which no end or limit is imposed. Cf. Politics. 9. 1257b5: For this reason he art ofgetting wealth seems o be concerned chiefly with money, and its unction [6pyov] to be the powerofconsidering whence here will be an abundance ofwealth, for it is the art ofmaking [not4trrrj]riches and wealth. . . . (23)And the riches rom this art of getting wealth are without limit. For ustas n the art ofmedicine there s no limit to the pursuit ofhealth and as n each ofthe arts here sno limit in the pursuit of their ends (for they aim to accomplish [roreiv] their ends o the utter-most),but the means o the ends are not infirite (for the end n all casess the limit), so, oo, in thisart ofwealth-getting there is no limit to the end, but the end s richesofthis sort and the possessionof wealth.

52. Rhetonc. 2. 1355r'26: Rhetoric may be defined as the power [66voptq] of obseruing neach case he available[td ev6el6pevov] means ofpersuasion. This is not the function [6p1ov] ofany other art- Every other art can instruct or persuadeabout its own particular subject-matter; orinstance,medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the p roperties ofmagni-tudes, arithmetic about number, and the same s true ofthe other arts and sciences. ut rhetoricwe look upon as he power ofobserving the meansofpersuasion on almostevery subjectpresentedto us; and that is why we say hat, in its technical character, t is not concerned with any specialordefinite classof subjects.

53. Politicsii. \2. 1282t'14; . 1 1252 1;Nicomacheantltics . 1 1094.26; vi. 7. l l 4 .20 and esp.28: It is evident that wisdom and the political art are not the same, or ifhabituation concerningthings useful o oneself s to be called wisdom, there will be many wisdoms; here will not be oneconcerning the good of all mimals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existingthings), but a different wisdom concerning the good of each species.


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and as power exercised by the artist is subject to strict scientific analysis. Sec-ondly, art, though distinguished from natural powers by the use of reason' isnone the less a poetic power, and such powers delimit appropriate fields ofactivity in which they constitute expertness; this is the reason why in rhetoricAristotle's chief emphasis is on determining the body s+ of that which is essen-tial to the art. Since the deliberation of art bears only on the use of means toachieve ends which are not themselves examined within the art, a third analysisis possible within the art of politics; and art, though not a moral virtue, is nonethe less a virtue and as such relevant to human happiness. Finally, art, as amode of imitation, may be considered in terms of the actuality of the art-objectas well as n terms of the power of the artist, for two natural causes are adde dto set art, conceived as a rational poetic power, in actual operation, a naturaltendency in man to imitate and a natural delight in imitation; and the analysisofthe objects ofthe fine arts therefore has an independence and completenessimpossible in other arts which have indeterminate ends, for it turns not merelyon powers or habits of artists nor on consideration of the materials susceptibleof treatment or the body of the art, but it is concerned with examination ofthe form or the soul of poetic production.ss

IVThe influence of Aristotle on later thought is complex, and any statementofthat influence s nvolved n paradoxes llustrated n alternative nterpretationsof major shifts n the courseof intellectualhistory as evoltsagainsthisoutwornauthority or as discovery of his forgotten methods. The story that his workswere made naccessible hortly after his death s plausiblesince here s ittle orno evidenceof their direct influence.After they were rescued rom the cellar nthe toad and edited in the first century a.o., only the Categorfusnd the OzInterpretationseemo havebeen available n Latin translation.The worksofAris-totle were unknown in the West rom the third century B.c. o the twelfth cen-tury A.D.,and as soon as hey were translatedduring the twelfth and thirteenthcenturies, hey were subject o radical new interpretations, djustments, ndrefutations.Since he Renaissance,is influencehas been accommodatedothe formula that the minds of men had been enslaved y his doctrines or twothousand years and that the rebirth of learning had been made possiblebyliberation from his authority in field after field. The errors consequenton hisdistinctionsare so well-known that the analyses n which they were basedandin which they were usedhavebeenbroken nto parts to be rearranged n chro-nologies fchanges n the evolutionofhis doctrines nd his styles:en catego

54. Rhetoic . 1. 1354 15. Since the enthlmeme is the body of proof, the importance ofplaces (r6not) as elements (otot26eic)of the enthlmeme is apparent from the analogy to theelements f naturalbodies;cf. bid. . 2. I 358'35; i. 22. I 396b2; 26. 403 l7 .

55. Poetbs . 1450' 38: plot is the principle and soul of the tragedy; 145O 22: t is the end oftragedy;7 I 450b23: t is the first and most important thing in tragedy

Rhetoric and Poetic in Aristotle . r6q

ries, four predicables (which became five after Porphyry and slx after Avi-cenna), hree figures of the syllogism which became our after Theophrastusor Galen), our causeswhich gaveprominence to the final cause), atural andviolent motion (which excluded he possibilityof action at a distanceor inertia),discreteand continuous quantities(which disjoinedarithmetic and geometry),and he thought that there are substances nd entelechies, nd that slavery snaturaland hat art s mitat ion.Yet the nfluenceof Aristotle s not in questionbecause f these aradoxes.On the contrary, he paradoxesprovide a sure guideto the nature of his influ-ence,and they suggesthe reason or the particular influence of thePoeticsndthe Rhetoic.Aristotle was at pains to differentiate terms according to theirmeanings, nd methodsaccording o their subjectmatters.Philosophers hoseekanalogies ather than literal distinctionsdeny he separationbecause om-mon propertiesare found in both t}te distinguished erms, or because ne is avariety subordinated o the other. A single method can then be substituted orthe plurality of methods.If physics s concerned with natural motion, scientific generality will beachievedby a scientific method distinct from the method of dialectic, whichfinds generality in the opinions of men, and the method of sophistic,which

encountersgenerality n the paradoxesofthought and expression. he begin-ningsof the studyof local motion in modern physicsderivemore directly fromthe studiesof sophisms concerning ocal motion56 r from studiesof propor-tionssT nd analogies two translationsof the singleword, ovol,oyio) than fromAristotle's tudy of natural motionsand natural places. f poetics s concernedwith artificial objects,scientificobjectivity will be achieved n the study of thenature and propertiesof a poem by a poetic method which seeks niry neces-sity, and probability in ways distinct from those used n the historical methodor the scientfficmethod. The beginnings of the study of occurrencesand ac-tions n modern history literary criticism, and physicsdependson no such dis-tinction: they are all poetic, or methods of discoverybut the method of discov-eryhasbeenassimilatedo common-places f rhetoricaldiscovery.58nce hattransformation hasbeen made, Aristotle's nfluence and his shortcomingsareboth easy o understand: the study of the poem as a concrete whole and its

56. Curtis r/{tlson, Wliam Heltesbury,Medieaal agic and he Rise f MathematiralPhlsits (Madison,Wis., 1956) s a study of Heltesbury's ReguleSolzmdiSophimatawhichreats ocal motion in one ofits chapters.The chapter s entitledDe Motu Locali n the edition of Venice, 1491.57. Cf H. Lamar Crosby,Jr., Thomas f Bradwardine, is TractatuseProportionibus,tsSignficanufortheDeaelopmmtfMathmaticalPlqtsicsMadison, Wis., 1955).58. We have become so unaccustomed o recognize he use of rhetorical commonplaces hatthe term has aken on pejorativeassociations hich deprive us ofa useful nstrument in the under-standing ofthe use ofconcepts in physical theory Niels Bohr makes a supple and shrewd use ofthem in Quantum Physicsand Philosophy:Causality and Complementarity, (Phitosop@n Mid-CaturI, ed. R. Klibansky fFlorence, 1958], I, 308 l0): The significanceofphysical science orphilosophy does not merely lie in the steady ncreaseof our experienceof inanimate mattet butaboveall in the opportunity of testing the foundation and scopeof some of our most elementary


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classificationn kinds determined by the object, means,and manner of imita-tion must be transformed into the study of the poem as the product of thecreative art of the poet and as productive of its proper effectsof pleasing, n-forming and moving in an audience.Thereafter the vocabulary of Aristotle isreadapted o the study of poetry in its circumstances nd its influencesas heyare found in content and style.This redefinition of terms dependson Rhetorirather than Poetics. oreover the relation of form and matter is involved, forthe commonplaces ecome hemes, hat is, matter, ather than sources farguments, hat is, organizing principles, and the tropes become igures ofspee h rather than modes of thought and being.The long history of the influ-enceofAristotle has arely produced an i\ristotelian dedicated o his diversityof methods,but the samehistory doessuggest hat there s a richness f methodin his distinctionswhich might be used o modulate the modern cold war be-tween he two unified methods which havebeen ormed by reducing all meth-ods either to the operationalismofa rhetorical poetics or to the organicism ofa dialectical oetics.

concepts. . . a new epoch n physical sciencewas naugurated, however,by Planck's discoveryofthe elemmtaryuantumof cion, which revealeda feature of wholmessnherent in atomic processesgoing far beyond the ancient idea of the limited divisibility of matter. Indeed, it became clearthat the pictorial description ofclassical physical heories epresents n idealization valid only forphenomena n the analysisof which all actions nvolved are sufficiently arge to permit the neglectof the quantum. . . . by the word 'experiment' we can only mean a procedure regarding which weare able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have earnt.

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