MBMC Public Goods and Tax Policy. MBMC Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All...

74
MB MC Public Goods and Tax Policy

Transcript of MBMC Public Goods and Tax Policy. MBMC Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All...

Page 1: MBMC Public Goods and Tax Policy. MBMC Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 15: Public Goods and Tax Policy.

MB MC

Public Goods and Tax PolicyPublic Goods

and Tax Policy

Page 2: MBMC Public Goods and Tax Policy. MBMC Copyright c 2004 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 15: Public Goods and Tax Policy.

Chapter 15: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 2

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Introduction

QuestionsHow big, exactly, should government be?What goods and services should

government provide?How should government raise revenue?

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Introduction

QuestionsWhat other powers should government

have to constrain the behavior of its citizens?

How should the various powers of government be apportioned to local, state, and federal levels.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsPublic Good

A good or service that, to at least some degree, is both nonrival and nonexcludable

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsNonrival Good

A good whose consumption by one person does not diminish its availability for others

Nonexcludable GoodA good that is difficult, or costly, to exclude

nonpayers from consuming

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsPure Public Good

A good or service that, to a high degree, is both nonrival and nonexcludable

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Pure public goods are provided by government because:For-profit private firms would find it difficult

to recover their costs of production.Since the MC of serving additional users is

zero once the good has been produced, then charging for the good would be inefficient.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsCollective Good

A good or service that, to at least some degree, is nonrival but excludable

Pure Private GoodOne for which nonpayers can easily be

excluded and for which each unit consumed by one person means one less unit available for others

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsPure Commons Good

One for which nonpayers cannot easily be excluded and for which each unit consumed by one person means one less unit available for others

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The Classification of Private, Public, and Hybrid Goods

Commons good

(fish in the ocean)

Public good

(national defense)

Private good

(wheat)

Collective good

(pay-per-view TV)

Low High

Nonrival

Nonexcludable

Low

High

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsA pure public good should be provided by

the government only when the benefit exceeds the cost.

The cost of the public good is the sum of the explicit and implicit costs incurred to produce it.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Public Goods versus Private GoodsThe benefit of the public good is the sum of

the reservation prices of all people who want the good.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Paying for Public GoodsNot everyone benefits equally from a public

good or service.Therefore, the most equitable way to pay

for the public good or service is to tax people in proportion to their willingness to pay.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleWill Prentice and Wilson buy a water filter?

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleScenario

Prentice and Wilson own adjacent property on Cayuga Lake

Zebra mussels require each to add chlorine to their water intake

They can buy and share a filtration system for $1,000

Wilson earns twice as much as PrenticeWilson is willing to pay $800 and Prentice $400The benefit, $1,200 > than the cost, $1,000

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleThe Outcome

Sharing is efficientBarriers to sharing the cost

o Cost of negotiationo Free rider problemo Reluctance to share information

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleWill government buy the water filter if there

is an “equal tax” rule”?

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleAssume

There is a “nondiscrimination” tax rule.A majority of the citizens must approve the

provision of a public good.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleThe Outcome

A head tax will collect $500 each from Prentice and Wilson.

Prentice has a $400 reservation price, and will vote against it.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

A head tax is a regressive tax.Head Tax

A tax that collects the same amount from every taxpayer

Regressive TaxA tax under which the proportion of income

paid in taxes declines as income rises.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

A head tax rule will rule out the provision of many worthwhile public goods.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleWill the government buy the filter if there is

a proportional tax on income?

Proportional Income TaxOne under which all taxpayers pay the

same proportion of their incomes in taxes

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

ExampleWith a proportional tax:

Wilson pays $667 and Prentice pays $333.Both amounts are below their reservation

prices.They would approve the filtration system.Economic surplus would increase:

o Wilson: $800 - $667 = $133o Prentice: $400 - $333 = $67o Total increase = $200

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Economic NaturalistWhy don’t most married couples contribute

equally to joint purchases?

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Economic NaturalistScenario

Hillary earns $2,000,000/yrBill earns $20,000/yr

ObservationWhat would happen if they choose to contribute

equally on all purchases?

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Economic NaturalistObservation

Different individuals are free to consume whatever quantity and quality of most private goods they choose to buy, but jointly consumed goods must be provided in the same quantity and quality for all persons.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Economic NaturalistIncome elasticity of demand for public

goods and services is greater than 1.A head tax would reduce the economic

surplus.A progressive tax increases economic

surplus.

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Government Provisionof Public Goods

Progressive TaxOne in which the proportion of income paid

in taxes rises as income rises.

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Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Private Good

Q1

Pri

ce (

$/u

nit

)

Q2

Pri

ce (

$/u

nit

)

24

D1

18

24 9

D2

+

+36

Market demand is the horizontal summation of the individual demand curves.

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Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Private Good

Q = Q1 + Q2

Pri

ce (

$/u

nit

)24

9

D = D1 + D2

=

=

60

Market demand is the horizontal summation of the individual demand curves.

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Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Public Good

Q

Price($/unit)

Q

Price($/unit)

8

36

D2

24

24

36

D1

18

24

A public good demand curveis the vertical summation of theindividual demand curves

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Generating the Market Demand Curve for a Public Good

Q

8

D = D1 + D2

42Price

($/unit)

36

A public good demand curveis the vertical summation of theindividual demand curves

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The Optimal Quantity of Parkland

Acres of parkland

$1,0

00s/

acre

200

A0 A*

140

80Demand

Marginalcost

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Advantages of Using Government to Provide Public GoodsCost of adding a tax is relatively lowMinimizes the difficulty in determining who

will bear what share of the tax burdenMay be the only feasible provider

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Disadvantages of Using Government to Provide Public GoodsOne-size-fits-all approach will not satisfy

everyone’s demand for public goods.Many people may oppose mandatory

taxation.

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Private Provision of Public GoodsAlternatives to using taxes to fund public

goods:Funding by donationDevelopment of new means to exclude

nonpayersPrivate contractingSale of by-products

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Economic NaturalistWhy do television networks favor Jerry

Springer over Masterpiece Theatre?

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Economic NaturalistAssume

Springer has 20% market shareMasterpiece Theatre has 18% market shareSpringer viewers are willing to pay $10 millionMasterpiece Theater viewers are willing to pay

$30 millionDetergent advertising pays for the show and

chooses the largest audience

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Economic NaturalistOutcome

The indirect financing of public goods may reduce the economic surplus

Public control of programming may be inefficient

The pay-per-view alternative limits the audience and reduces efficiency because the MC of another viewer is zero

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Private Provision of Public GoodsObservations

The mix in the public and private provision of public goods and services will vary by society and groups within society.

Technology for delivery and paying for public goods and services and people’s preferences will influence the mix of public and private financing of public goods.

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

ExampleBy how much is economic surplus reduced

by a pay-per-view charge?

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Lost surplus from $10 viewing fee

•Pay-per-view•Fee = $10•10 million viewers

•Broadcast TV•No fee•MC of additional viewers = 0•20 million viewers

•Loss in economic surplus•$50 million

The Loss in Surplus from a Pay-per-View Fee

Viewing households

Co

st (

$/ep

iso

de)

20

10,000,000 20,000,000

10

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The Optimal Quantityof a Public Good

Private Provision of Public GoodsObservations

Charging a positive price for a good whose MC = 0 will reduce the economic surplus.

The more elastic the demand, the greater the loss in economic surplus.

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Additional Functions of Government

Externalities and Property RightsTwo roles of government:

Regulation of activities that generate externalities

Defining and enforcing property rights

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Additional Functions of Government

Local, State, or FederalAdvantages of local and state government:

Better communication and response to the citizens

Local choices will reflect the unique preferences of the residents

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Additional Functions of Government

Local, State, or FederalAdvantages of federal government:

Economies of scale in defense spendingPositive and negative externalities may be

nationwide

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Economic NaturalistWhy does check-splitting make the total

restaurant bill higher?

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Economic NaturalistScenario

10 people going to dinner agree to split the check evenly

Sven is choosing between chocolate mousse (price = $6; reservation price = $3) and bread pudding (price = $10; reservation price = $4)

Price to Sven is $.60 for the mousse or $1.00 for the pudding

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Economic NaturalistEconomic surplus:

Mousse = $3.00 - $0.60 = $2.40Pudding = $4.00 - $1.00 = $3.00

All diners will order desert and have an economic loss of $6.00.

If they had paid individually, no one would have desert.

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Economic NaturalistWhy do legislators often support one

another’s pork barrel spending programs?

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Pork Barrel SpendingA public expenditure that is larger than the

total benefit it creates, but that is favored by a legislator because his or her constituents benefit from the expenditure by more than their share of the resulting extra taxes

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

LogrollingThe practice whereby legislators support

one another’s legislative proposals

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Economic NaturalistScenario

A congressional district with one-hundredth of the taxpayers

The local representative delivers a project that creates $100 million in benefits and costs $150 million

Districts share of the cost :o $150 million/100 = $1.5 million

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Economic NaturalistOutcome

Economic surplus to district residents:o $100 million - $1.5 million = $98.5 million

QuestionWhy would legislator A support a project in

legislator B’s home district?

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Rent-SeekingInefficiency occurs when:

The gains from a government program are concentrated in the hands of a few beneficiaries.

The costs are spread among many.

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Rent-SeekingAssume

Price support bill will raise sugar prices by $0.10/lb.

Average American consumes 100 pounds of sugar per year.

Demand for sugar is inelastic.

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Rent-SeekingOutcomes

Consumer expenditures on sugar will increase by slightly less than $10/year.

Revenues to the sugar industry will increase by $1 billion/year.

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

What Do You Think?Why don’t citizens vote out legislators who

support such bills?Hints

o Rational ignoranceo Free riders

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Rent-SeekingThe socially unproductive efforts of people

or firms to win a prize

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleWhy would anyone pay $50 for a $20 bill?

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleThe rules:

Initial bid of $0.50Succeeding bids must exceed the previous bid

by at least $0.50When bidding stops, the 1st and 2nd highest

bidders must pay their respective bidsThe highest bidder receives the $20The second highest bidder gets nothing

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleWho will make the opening bid?

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleHow much will cellular phone companies

bid for an exclusive license?

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleScenario

Wyoming will choose one of two companies to provide cellular phone service

o 1 year franchiseo Economic profit = $20 milliono The franchise will go to the applicant that spends the

most on lobbyingo Applicants cannot collude

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Chapter 15: Public Goods and Tax Policy Slide 65

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleOutcomes

If both spend the same, they have a 50% chance at $20 million or an expected profit of $10 million minus the lobbying cost.

If collusion occurred they would each bid the same small amount.

When each spends $10 million, their expected profit = 0.

o (.50 x $20 million) - ($10 million)

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

ExampleAn alternative:

Pick the company based on the price they promise to charge for their services

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Sources of Inefficiency inthe Political Process

Starve the GovernmentWhat do you think?

Is it efficient to reduce government waste by reducing tax collections?

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What Should We Tax?

The objectives of the tax system are to:Raise sufficient revenue to finance public

goods and services.Minimize the side-effects of the taxes.

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What Should We Tax?

ObservationsFrom 1969 to 1998 the federal government

ran a budget deficit.The federal government finances the

deficits by borrowing.The borrowing may crowd out private

investment spending.

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What Should We Tax?

Crowding OutGovernment borrowing leads to higher

interest rates, causing private firms to cancel planned investment projects

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4

S + T22

•Taxes may reduce economic efficiency.•Assume

• Supply and demand embody all relevant costs and benefits• Equilibrium is socially optimal• Impose $2,000 tax, the equilibrium is not socially optimal

The Loss in Surplus from a Pay-per-View Fee

Quantity (miilions of cars/year)

Co

st (

$1,0

00s/

car)

S20

6

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What Should We Tax?

ObservationsThe economic loss of a tax may be offset

by the surplus created from the public good or service.

Minimize the deadweight loss from a tax by taxing goods and services with an inelastic demand and supply.

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What Should We Tax?

ObservationsIf production creates negative or positive

externalities, a tax may increase the economic surplus.

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