MBL 3: MINI-DISSERTATION

MBL3 Mini Thesis 72224657 Final

Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P -2011

MBL 3: MINI-DISSERTATION

Student Name: Fatima Bebe Shaik

Student Number: 72224657

Work Tel: 011 996 7204

Cell: 082 902 8147

Email: [email protected]

Postal Address: P O Box 1518, Crown Mines, 2025

Internal Supervisor: Dr Douglas Boateng

External Examiner:

Title: The critical success factors for the practical implementation of a safety culture improvement initiative in South Africa.

Short description: The thesis focuses on practical success factors including the

need for appropriate organisational change and implementation of behavioural change methodologies for the building and sustainability of a generative safety culture that will lead to improvements in HSSE performance in organisations in South Africa.

mailto:[email protected]



THE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS FOR THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF

A SAFETY CULTURE IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by

FATIMA BEBE SHAIK

submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree

MAGISTER SCIENTIAE

in

BUSINESS LEADERSHIP

in the

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS LEADERSHIP

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

SUPERVISOR: Dr Douglas Boateng

SEPTEMBER 2011



ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation is the product of the assistance and contributions of many people from front line employees, colleagues, industry experts, senior Shell SA management, friends and family and many others. It is with sincere gratitude that I acknowledge your meaningful contributions.

Fatima B Shaik September 2011


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT v

LIST OF FIGURES vi

LIST OF TABLES vii

LIST OF APPENDICES viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED viii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Statement of the problem 1

1.3 Research objectives 2

1.4 Motivation and importance of the study 3

1.5 Contribution of the study in relation to the existing body of knowledge 4

1.6 Study area 4

1.7 Research methodology 5

1.8 Assumptions 5

1.9 Limitations of the study 6

1.10 Summary 6

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 8 2.1 Culture 8

2.2 Organisational culture 9

2.3 Organisational climate 10

2.4 Safety Culture 12

2.5 Safety Climate 15

2.6 Safety culture change and safety behaviour change 18

2.6.1 Safety culture change 18

2.6.2 Behavioural change 20

2.6.2.1 What is behavioural based safety (BBS)? 20

2.6.2.2 What does a BBS programme include? 21

2.6.2.3 BBS success factors? 22

2.7 The integrative approach 25


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 ii

2.8 Psychological concepts that contribute to organisational safety performance 27

2.8.1 Perceived organisational support 28

2.8.2 Theory of social exchange 28

2.8.3 Leader member exchange theory (LMX) 28

2.8.4 Organisational citizenship behaviour (OCB) 29

2.8.5 Fairness 29

2.8.6 Empowerment 30

2.8.7 Trust 30

2.8.8 Critical reflection 30

2.8.9 Social interaction and communication 31

2.9 Organisational change 31

2.9.1 Lewin‟s three-step change model 34

2.9.2 Other fundamental theories and models in behavioural change 37

Theory of reasoned action

Planned behaviour theory

Transtheoretical model

The spiral model for stages of behavioural change

2.9.3 The cycle of change 41

2.9.4 Change fatigue 43

2.10 The role of national culture on safety performance 44

2.11 Measuring safety culture 46

2.12 Critical success factors in culture and behavioural based safety programmes 46

2.13 Positive safety culture 49

2.14 Organisational indicators of safety culture 50

2.15 Agents of organisational change 51

2.16 Summary 52

CHAPTER 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 55 3.1 Background 55

3.2 Issues with implementation in a multinational 56

3.3 Motivation 59

3.4 Model for creating lasting change 60

3.5 Support of senior leadership 61

3.6 The tools 62

3.7 Programme design criteria 63

3.8 Implementation strategy 63

3.9 The tactics 64

3.10 Multinational in developing countries 66


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 iii

3.11 Safety culture in the South African context 66

3.11.1 Background 66

3.11.2 Political and social environment 67

3.11.3 Economic environment 68

3.11.4 South African HSE legislative framework 70

3.11.5 Safety culture in South Africa 71

3.11.5.1 Road transport fatalities as a measure of safety culture 75

3.11.5.2 Safety culture in the petroleum sector in South Africa 76

3.12 Summary 80

CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 81 4.1 Introduction 81

4.2 Rationale 81

4.3 Qualitative design methodology 81

4.4 Practical steps in research design and data collection 82

4.5 The sample size 84

4.6 The semi-structured interview questionnaire 85

4.7 Reliability and validity of data 88

4.8 Summary 88 CHAPTER 5 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 89

5.1 Introduction 89

5.2 Analysis of results 89

5.2.1 Heart and Minds pre and post implementation review 89

5.2.2 In-depth interviews 95

5.3 Learning’s from Shell Global Businesses on safety culture 100

5.4 Learning’s from Woolworth’s & Rainbow Chickens in South Africa 100

5.5 Discussion 101

5.6 Summary 116

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION 117

6.1 Introduction 117

6.2 Limitations of the study 117

6.3 Conclusions 118

6.4 Recommendations 119


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 iv

REFERENCES 122

APPEN DICES 128

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 131


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 v

ABSTRACT

Safety, health and environmental issues in recent years continue to make headlines across the world and

indeed are on the forefront of the agendas of corporate citizens as part of the long-term sustainable

strategies and there licence to operate. The loss of human life, injury, disabilities, acute and chronic

health impacts, impacts on communities, environmental impacts, accidental costs, reputational damage

and increased legislative requirements amongst others, have forced organisations lagging in this

discipline to increase the momentum in bridging the divide not only from an economic perspective, but

because it is simply the right thing to do!

It is recognised that as with any other risk; health, safety and environment issues require an integrated

management system to comprehensively and sustainably manage the risks in the workplace. However to

move beyond the paper based systems, ultimately require a behavioural change that can only be

achieved through a culture change that continually re-invents itself and that motivates staff (human

beings) to intrinsically do the right thing every day, every time and without any overseer.

This study focuses on the critical success factors for the practical implementation of a safety culture

improvement initiative in South Africa.

Chapter one focuses on the on the problem under investigation, the objectives of the study, the benefits

and the overall contribution of this study to the academic world and operational environment. The sample

area is defined, including the research methodology to be used. A high-level framework on the study is

also presented.

In chapter two a detailed literature review on the key aspects governing the problem is carried out. A

global and local perspective on existing literature is provided. Minimal literature is available on safety

culture initiatives and practices in South Africa, let alone in the oil sector.

Culture and its application in the organisational context are explored. This is then followed by a description

of safety culture and climate in the context of organisational culture. Key models and theories are

considered in the existing body of knowledge. Safety culture change and behaviour change programmes

are also explored. Different safety management models are also discussed. Psychological theories and

behaviour change models are also considered. Organisational change and behavioural change

management as a key discipline in embedding safety culture change is discussed followed by critical

success factors, the role of national culture, leadership and commitment and measurement tools.

Chapter three starts to explore the problem in the organisational context and sets the theoretical

framework for discussion. Safety culture in the South African context is also discussed.

In chapter 4 the data collection methodology is described followed by a critical analysis and discussion on

the findings and outcomes in chapter 5. Conclusions and recommendations are discussed in chapter 6.


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 vi

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Diagrammatic framework for the study .......................................................................................... 7 Figure 2: Dimensions of organisational climate (after Koys and De Cotis, 1991) .......................................11 Figure 3: Organisational culture and organisational climate (Glendon and Stanton, 2000) .......................11 Figure 4: Bandura, Bandura and Bandura model of reciprocal determinism (Cooper, 2000) ....................13 Figure 5: Reciprocal safety culture model (Cooper, 2000) .........................................................................13 Figure 6: The HSE Culture Ladder (Parker and Hudson Model) (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004) ............................................................................................................................................................16 Figure 7: Practical descriptions of HSE Culture Ladder (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004) .......16 Figure 8: The sequential or stage-based model of safety management (DeJoy, 2005) .............................24 Figure 9: Modes of culture change associated with behaviour-change and culture-change approaches to safety (DeJoy, 2005) ....................................................................................................................................26 Figure 10: Key features of the integrative approach to safety management (DeJoy, 2005).......................27 Figure 11: Seven phase change model and methodology (Carter, 2008) ..................................................36 Figure 12: Planned behaviour theory model of Godin and Kok, 1996 (Boudreau, 2002) ...........................37 Figure 13: Transtheoretical model for stages of change of Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcoss, 1992 (Boudreau, 2002) .........................................................................................................................................38 Figure 14: Spiral model for behavioural change stages by the Communication Initiative, 2002 (Boudreau, 2002) ............................................................................................................................................................39 Figure 15: Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's 6-step approach to overcoming resistance to change (Swanepoel, et al. 2003) ..............................................................................................................................41 Figure 16: The Dance of Change by Senge, 1999 (Janse van Rensburg, 2009) ........................................42 Figure 17: The behaviour-based safety success triad (DePasquale and Geller, 1999) .............................47 Figure 18: Leadership behaviour: Seven Es for Establishing Safety Excellence (Blair, 2003) ..................49 Figure 19: Generic key success factors themes for safety culture change interventions ...........................54 Figure 20: HSE Management framework, Anon (Shaik, 2011) ...................................................................57 Figure 21: HSE Performance over time (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004) ................................57 Figure 22: The Swiss cheese model (Downstream HSSE, 2008) ..............................................................58 Figure 23: The HSE Culture Ladder (Parker and Hudson Model) (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004) ............................................................................................................................................................60 Figure 24: The change model based on the transtheoretical model of Prochaska and DiClemente, 1983 (Hudson, 2007) .............................................................................................................................................61 Figure 25: The full set of Hearts and Minds tools (Hudson, 2007) ..............................................................63 Figure 26: The Hearts and Minds logo -SIEP, EP - HSE (Hudson, 2007) ..................................................64 Figure 27: Employment according to gender and population groups, 1993-1995 (Statistics South Africa, 2000) ............................................................................................................................................................67 Figure 28: Level of education by race and gender amongst those 20years + (Central Statistical Service, 1996) ............................................................................................................................................................68 Figure 29: Components of real gross domestic final demand (Lizamore, 2011) ........................................69 Figure 30: Road traffic accident distribution per month 2001-2006 (Statistics South Africa, 2009) ...........76 Figure 31: Age specific road accident deaths 2001-2006 (Statistics South Africa, 2009) ..........................76 Figure 32: SA Petroleum Industry Safety performance Indicators (SAPIA, 2011) ......................................77 Figure 33: SA Petroleum Industry total recordable rate (SAPIA, 2011) ......................................................78 Figure 34: SA Petroleum Industry fires (SAPIA, 2011) ...............................................................................78 Figure 35: SA Petroleum Industry occupational illnesses (SAPIA, 2011) ...................................................79 Figure 36: SA Petroleum Industry security incidents (SAPIA, 2011) ..........................................................80 Figure 37: Royal Dutch Shell key HSE indicators for the period 2001- 2010 (Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2011) ..........................................................................................................................................................102 Figure 38: SOPAF HSSE MS Self Assessment scores for the period 2004 - 2008 (Anon, 2008) ...........104 Figure 39: South Africa HSSE MS Self Assessment scores for the period 2007/8 (Shaik, 2008) ............104 Figure 40: Shell South Africa Total recordable cases and Loss time injuries for the period 2006 -2010 (Shaik, 2010) ..............................................................................................................................................105 Figure 41: Direct correlation between literature survey and outcomes of the study on the critical success factors for a generative HSSE culture ........................................................................................................115 Figure 42: Integrated HSSE Management system, Anon (Shaik, 2011) ..................................................116


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 vii

LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Three models of organisation culture (Glendon and Stanton, 2000) ............................................10 Table 2: How different organisations respond to information concerning safety (Westrum, 1996) ............15 Table 3: Summary of safety climate dimensions from six studies (after Litherland, 1997) .........................17 Table 4: Summary comparison of culture-change and behaviour-based approaches to safety management (DeJoy, 2005) .........................................................................................................................25 Table 5: Main drivers for change (Oakland and Tanner, 2007) ..................................................................32 Table 6: Scales of change adapted from Dunphy and Stace, 1993 (Swanepoel, et al. 2003) ....................33 Table 7: Common enablers and barriers to change (Oakland and Tanner, 2007) ......................................34 Table 8: Individual and organisational level factors relating to resistance to change (Swanepoel, et al. 2003) ............................................................................................................................................................40 Table 9: Kotter and Schlesinger's six methods to overcome resistance to change (Swanepoel, et al. 2003) ......................................................................................................................................................................40 Table 10: The detailed change model with 14 stages by Hudson and Parker, 1999 (Hudson, 2007)........62 Table 11: Summary of key aspects of the Hearts & Minds culture change strategy ..................................65 Table 12: Key Economic indicators, July 2011 (Lizamore, 2011) ...............................................................69 Table 13: Occupational Health and Safety framework in South Africa (Jeebhay and Jacobs, 1999) .........70 Table 14: Most common occupational diseases reported to the Compensation Commissioner in terms of the COID Act (Jeebhay and Jacobs, 1999) ..................................................................................................72 Table 15: Occupational diseases certified under the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act in South Africa (Jeebhay and Jacobs, 1999) ...................................................................................................73 Table 16: Occupational accidents per region (CIDB, 2009) ........................................................................73 Table 17: Health and safety statistics from the Department of Labour accident fund (CIDB, 2009) ..........74 Table 18: Distribution of deaths as per transport mode and year (Statistic South Africa, 2009) ................75 Table 19: Practical steps in research design and data collection methodology .........................................82 Table 20: Semi-structured interview questions (Janse van Rensburg, L., Nombewu, Z., Gorbatov, S., Botes, S. & Shaik, F., 2009) .........................................................................................................................86 Table 21: Summary comparison between the intended Hearts & Minds safety culture programme and philosophy versus the actual implementation in South Africa ......................................................................90 Table 22: High level outputs from interviews captured as strengths and challenges. ................................96 Table 23: Trust & Leadership elements of employee satisfaction survey results expressed as a percentage (Gerrard, 2007 and Daniels, 2011) ........................................................................................113


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 viii

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Detailed description of HSE Culture ladder (Shell E&P, 2004) ................................................. 128 Appendix 2: Environmental Data 2001 -2010 (Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2011) ............................................ 129 Appendix 3: Social Data 2001 -2010 (Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2011) ........................................................... 130

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED

BAPP - behavioural accident prevention process

BBBEE - broad based black economic empowerment

BBS - behavioural based safety

BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CIT - cash in transit

CPI - consumer price index

e.g. - example

etc. - etcetera

E&P - Exploration and Production

FIM - Fountain Incident Management

GDP - gross domestic product

GPA - goal and performance appraisal

HSE - health, safety and environment

HSSE - health, safety, security and environment

HSE- MS - health, safety and environment management system

HSSE & SP - health, safety, security, environment and social performance

HSC - UK Health and Safety Commission

i.e. - that is

KPI - key performance indicator

LMX - leader-member exchange theory

OCB - organisational citizenship behaviour

OGP - International Association of Oil and Gas Producers

OSHE - occupational, safety, health and environment

SA - South Africa

SCHAZOP - safety culture and hazard operability

SH&E or SHE - safety, health and environment

SMS - safety management system

* Safety, HSE, HSSE, SHE and OSHE are used interchangeably.


Fatima B Shaik: 72224657 MBLREP-P 2011 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The concern of safety culture has become one of the main issues of the modern epoch

following the disasters of Chernobyl, space shuttle disasters, and other major accidents.

The underlying assumption is that the “best and safest organisations have a culture of

safety”. (Hudson, 2007) There are two differing approaches to workplace safety

management. These include behavioural change and cultural change approaches. This

research is intended to focus on the key success factors for the implementation of a

safety culture improvement programme in South African organisations. This will include

a post implementation review of a safety culture programme implemented in local

multinational entity.

Behavioural change approaches as an enhancement will also be included as both

approaches are complementary. (DeJoy, 2005) Key to this study is the realistic,

practical, non-technical elements of implementation in the South African context. These

would include culture, organisational change, language, and behavioural change,

amongst others.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Safety, health and environmental issues have indeed been on the forefront of the

agenda of many organisations. The loss of human life, injury, disabilities, acute and

chronic health impacts, impacts on communities, environmental impacts, accidental

costs, reputational damage and increased legislative requirements amongst others have

forced organisations lagging in this discipline to increase the momentum in bridging the

divide.

Those organisations that have been on this journey for some time now, have realized

that to bring down the incident/accident and fatality rates requires more than legislation.



Legislation is compliance driven and, in South Africa, it is clearly recognised that the

South African legislative framework is amongst the best in the world. Regulatory

vigilance by the authorities is poor and hence the continuance to break the law and a

non-compliant culture.

The oil and gas industry in particular due to the wide range of hazards, have traditionally

been associated with technical integrity. After the Piper Alpha disaster this multinational

successfully implemented an integrated health, safety and environment management

systems (HSE-MS). Soon after, the company wanted to develop a “workforce

intrinsically motivated for HSE”. The HSE culture ladder became the model as the

industry standard accepted by the OGP (International Association of Oil and Gas

Producers). (Hudson, 2007)

To prevent incident/accidents from occurring requires change; behavioural change that

is self driven rather than compliance driven which creates a generative HSE culture. It

implies that we „do the right thing‟ every day at work and at home when the employer is

not watching. Over the years many interventions have been implemented across various

organisation yet incidents/accidents and it consequences still continue to occur.

Changing behaviour implies people; hence the study aims to identify the key success

factors that are required to practically implement safety culture initiatives which moves

beyond the technical aspects of HSE to include the „softer issues‟.

1.3 Research objectives The study aims to:

a) Review and collate existing research on the success factors for the practical

implementation of a safety culture programme.

b) Expand on the non-technical aspects for the practical implementation of a safety

culture.

c) Conduct an „interim‟ review of the safety culture programme in a local

multinational organisation using qualitative methodology

d) Capture the outcomes and learning‟s.



e) Include recommendations to expand on existing frameworks for the practical

implementation of safety culture programmes in SA.

1.4 Motivation and Importance of the study

The author has approximately fifteen (15) years experience in the field of HSE in the

public and private sectors. In high risks environments like the chemicals, petroleum and

mining industries, there is no room to mistakes, as mistakes result in fatalities.

Significant resources are spent on implementing behavioural based safety and culture

change programmes, yet incidents/accidents and fatalities still continue to occur. While

in certain industrial sectors significant successes have been achieved in radical

reductions in HSE incidents, incidents still occur. Existing employees move on and

performance deteriorates. Why is this so if we have embedded these programmes

effectively, or have we really? HSE personnel are technically competent people. Do

they have the necessary interpersonal and other „people‟ skills to deliver these

programmes as effective change agents and should they be leading the change?

Hence, the benefits of the study could include:

a) Identify the correct „change agents‟ required for the implementation of culture

change programmes.

b) Awareness of the skills required for the facilitators to be effective as this is a

change management process

c) Effective culture change implementation is not only about the technical aspects,

so how does one drive the „softer‟, non-technical agenda through highly technical

people.

d) Importance of local culture, socio economic conditions, language, etc. and its

impact on practical implementation locally.

e) Finding local solutions to local challenges. European programmes need to made

fit-for-purpose.

f) Establishing long-term change programmes, rather than once-off “tick the box”

type initiatives.

g) Understanding the role of leadership in implementation and embedding.

h) Moving HSE beyond HSE practitioners.



i) Understanding the context of where the organisation is at a point in time, before

„overloading‟ initiatives

1.5 Contribution of the study in relation to the existing body of knowledge The intended contribution is that for a safety culture change to be effective in South

African organisations there needs to be a paradigm shift from training to applying the

cultural and behavioural change principles and the consideration of local cultural value

systems to contribute to overall organisational effectiveness and improve HSE

performance. There is limited research in safety culture implementation in the South

African context.

1.6 Study area

Royal Dutch Shell (referred to as Shell) is a global multinational of energy and

petrochemical companies operating in over 90 countries and employing over 100 000

employees. Shell has an Upstream Business which focuses on exploring and recovering

oil and gas from reserves while it‟s Downstream Business refines, supplies, trades and

ships crude worldwide, manufactures and markets a range of products, and produces

petrochemicals for industrial and retail customers. It also focuses on sustained cash

generation from existing assets and selective investments in growth markets. Shell

produces 2% of the world‟s oil and 3% of the world‟s gas. It produces 3.1 million barrels

of gas and oil daily. Shell sells 145 billion litres of fuel through its 44 000 Shell Service

stations worldwide. (www.shell.com, 2011)

The study area is restricted to a Shell South Africa. Shell began trading in South Africa

in 1902. It employs nearly 1,400 people in South Africa and operates about 750 retail

service stations, with a market share of approximately 20%. It operates seven

downstream businesses, of which four will be sampled. These will include Fuels and

Bitumen, Retail, Supply & Distribution and Aviation classes of Business. Two contractor

partners supporting the Supply and Distribution Business will also be sampled. For a

holistic perspective external companies and Shell international organisations will also be

interviewed.

http://www.shell.com/



1.7 Research methodology

The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research lies in the quest for in-

depth understanding. In quantitative research “the focus is on the control of all

components in the actions and representations of the participants – the variables will be

controlled and the study is guided with an acute focus on how the variables are related.”

The focus in on quantities rather than on the qualities of phenomena. (Henning, 2004)

In this research study a qualitative methodology will be used. In qualitative research the

variables are not controlled. “It is exactly this freedom and natural development of

action and representation” that is intended to be collated. (Henning, 2004) In addition,

the understanding, argumentative descriptions using evidentiary data and literature will

be captured. In this qualitative study a hybrid of methodologies will be used. In-depth

interviewing using a semi-structured format, observations and an element of

ethnographic studies as we evaluate a culture change amongst a group of individuals as

the author journeys over a period of time through different levels in the organisation.

1.8 Assumptions

The following assumptions have been made in this study:

a) All employees are aware and were exposed to the Hearts and Minds Safety

culture programme.

b) Implementation of the Hearts and Minds safety culture change programme

was implemented in the context it was designed for.

c) When employees were interviewed their responses were based on their level

of exposure, application and understanding of HSSE procedures, processes,

systems, initiatives, etc. within their work environment.

d) Employees and contractors at all levels responded openly, confidentially and

without any fear of reprisal in the interview process.

e) There is an expectation from the interviewees that their concerns are

addressed.



f) The primary reason for the safety change programmes being implemented

was that HSE performance was starting to plateau.

1.9 Limitations of the study

The following limitations of the study must be noted:

a) The outcome of the study will be based on the authors personal reflection on

the collation of the perceptions of the participants sampled.

b) The data sample is representative of a point in time and the culture of the

organisation will evolve over time.

c) The comparisons and arguments will be discussed in terms of the Heart and

Minds safety culture programme implemented globally in this multinational.

Although benchmarked with external companies on a similar journey, the

outcomes are discussed in this context.

d) There is limited/no data with regard to safety culture in South Africa.

e) There is limited reputable data available on the latest available HSE statistics

in South Africa. Data primarily focuses on issues such as road traffic

accidents, crime and were reporting is required by law e.g. death notification

f) This study is not intended to analyse the national culture of South Africa. It

however does recognise that national culture does impact on safety culture

and in the way we as a society interact in the global environment.

g) This is not a quantitative study and therefore conclusions are based on

themes, trends, observations and direct knowledge and experience of the

environment.

h) The impact of repeated organisational change in the South African context is

not examined in detailed, although its role in the outcomes is acknowledged.

1.10 Summary

This chapter focussed on the problem, the objectives of the study, the benefits and the

overall contribution of this study to the academic world and operational environment.

The sample area was introduced including the generic boundaries and the research



methodology to be used. In the next chapter, a detailed literature review on the key

aspects governing the problem will be conducted. A global and local perspective on

existing literature will be provided. Minimal literature is available on safety culture

initiatives and practices in South Africa, let alone in the oil sector. Literature that does

exist in some cases is irrelevant or obsolete. Figure 1 is a high-level diagrammatic

representation of the research report.

Figure 1: Diagrammatic framework for the study



CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter focuses on existing literature that covers key aspects governing the defined

problem. This will be conducted from a fairly elevated level and will then gradually

transition to the problem in the local context. The intention is to provide a broad

overview on the key concepts and demonstrate the interface of these concepts with

safety and the impact on safety culture from a South African perspective.

This literature study will initially attempt to explain culture and its application in the

organisational context. This will then be followed by a description of safety culture and

climate in the context of organisational culture. Key models and theories will be

considered in the existing body of knowledge. Safety culture change and behaviour

change programmes will also be explored. Different safety management models are also

discussed. Psychological theories and behaviour change models are also considered.

Organisational change and behavioural change management as a key discipline in

embedding safety culture change is discussed followed by critical success factors, the

role of national culture, leadership and commitment and measurement tools.

The intention of the literature review is to provide a high-level understanding of the key

concepts and does not attempt to cover every subject in explicit detail unless required.

2.1 Culture

Culture is often related to some kind of sharedness: symbolic meaning systems, ways of

thinking, meanings and identities, common ways, etc. Mind and culture is often

described as the “necessity for human nature”. Geertz (1973) described culture as the

“fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide

their action”. Culture is a process, it is dynamic and evolving not a “noun” i.e. a static

perspective. (Tharaldsen and Haukelid, 2009) In this very early stage one can already

start to conceptualize that in the context of safety, safety culture cannot be established

instantaneously or over a short-time period.



2.2 Organisational culture

Zhou, Fang & Wang (2008) refer to Schein‟s (1992) definition where organisation culture

is referred to as a “pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learns as it solves

its problem of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough

to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way

to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems.” Glendon and Stanton (2000)

reference, that the prime function of an organisation‟s culture, as described by Graves

(1986) and Williams, et al. (1989), is to “contribute to an organisation‟s success”. An

organisational culture, irrespective of how it‟s defined, is directly linked to the success or

the failure of that organisation.

Helmreich and Merritt (1998) define organisational culture as “a complex framework of

national, organisational, and professional attitudes and values within which groups and

individuals function”. Reason (2000) expanded stating that part of this culture in

hazardous industries relates to safety and is defined as “the ability of individuals or

organisations to deal with risks and hazards so as to avoid damage or losses and yet

still achieve their goals”. (Parker, Lawrie & Hudson, 2006)

In his paper „towards a model of safety culture‟, Cooper (2000) makes reference to

William et.al. (1989), where the notion that organisational culture reflects shared values,

beliefs, attitudes, etc. are challenged, as they argue that not all members in an

organisation respond in the same way to any given situation. As an example one

department may put safety before production while another may put production before

safety.

Glendon and Stanton (2000) in their paper „Perspective on safety culture‟ refer to two

broad contrasting perspectives to organisational culture. The functionalist approach that

assumes organisational culture exists as an ideal to which organisations should aspire

to and that it can be manipulated (by management) to serve the organisations needs

while the interpretive approach assumes that organisation culture is a complex

interaction of social groups within an organisation where it is created and owned by all



rather than one particular grouping. Schein‟s (1990) developmental approach to

organisational culture is aligned to the interpretive perspective.

The main feature of organisational culture is captured in table 1. According to Glendon

and Stanton (2000) the most accessible levels refers to behaviours and norms. The

intermediate levels are attitudes and perceptions which are not directly observable as in

the most accessible levels and therefore are acquired through questioning or are

inferred. The deepest levels are the core values which required more in-depth analysis.

Table 1: Three models of organisation culture (Glendon and Stanton, 2000)

2.3 Organisational climate

The terms climate and culture have often been used interchangeable resulting in

confusion. While there is a relationship and some overlap, organisational climate refers

to “the perceived quality of an organisation‟s internal environment”. Furnham and

Grunter (1993) also describe it as an “index of organisational health but not a causative

factor in it”. (Glendon and Stanton, 2000) Figure 2 is a simple illustration of an eight

dimensional scale of an organisations climate. Safety and risk would typically be

included in a safety climate scale.



Figure 2: Dimensions of organisational climate (after Koys and De Cotis, 1991)

Figure 3 attempts to describe the relationship between organisational culture and

organisational climate. It identifies the different dimensions of organisational culture

represented at different levels as per Schein (1995), it has breadth (sharing of cultural

elements or localized) and a time progression (past, present and future). Organisational

climate measures some dimensions of organisational culture within a limited range.

(Glendon and Stanton, 2000)

Figure 3: Organisational culture and organisational climate (Glendon and Stanton, 2000)



2.4 Safety culture

As with organisation culture a range of meanings can arise for safety culture. Glendon

and Stanton make reference to three reviewed by the Institute of Occupational Safety

and Health (1994). The first includes those aspects of culture that affect safety. The

second “refers to shared attitudes, values, beliefs and practices concerning safety and

the necessity for effective controls” and the third relates to a combination of individual

and group “values, attitudes, competencies and behaviour that determine the

commitment to an organisations safety programme.” (Glendon and Stanton, 2000).

Another well known definition used is by Clarke (1999) who defines safety culture as the

subset of organisational culture where the beliefs and values refer specifically to health

and safety. Clarke elaborates to state that the use of safety culture in the reduction of

accidents in high risk industries has emphasized the role played by “social forces within

an organisation” that impact on employee behaviour and attitudes with respect to

safety.”(Parker, et al., 2006)

The UK Health and Safety commission‟s (HSC, 1993) definition referred to in Cooper

(2000), “…the product of individual and group values, attitudes, competencies, and

patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency

of, an organisations health and safety programmes. Organisations with a positive safety

culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual trust, by shared

perceptions of the importance of safety and by confidence in the efficacy of preventative

measures.” According to Cooper (2000) this definition takes into account both the

functionalist and interpretative views as explained earlier.

Cooper (2000) proposes the Bandura reciprocal model (figure 4) as the ideal framework

to analyse organisational safety culture since the psychological, behavioural and

situational elements mirror accident causation relationship, the dynamic nature of human

and organisational systems and it provides a „triangulation methodology‟ where a

number of methodologies can be used to study the same phenomenon with multiple

reference points.



Figure 4: Bandura, Bandura and Bandura model of reciprocal determinism (Cooper, 2000)

Cooper (2000) proposes the reciprocal safety model (figure 5 building on from figure 1)

as it is consistent with a goal-setting paradigm, accident causation research and the

triangulation methodology which allows for a more holistic and multi-faceted approach to

safety culture analysis.

Figure 5: Reciprocal safety culture model (Cooper, 2000)

It is suggested that culture permeates equally throughout an organisation and exerts a

“consistent effect”; therefore changing culture is more effective than changing

procedures. Reason (2000) stated that an organisations safety culture “takes on a

profound effect when an organisations accident rate starts to “plateau” and this often

happens when the barriers and procedures are in place (Cox and Cox, 1991). To move

the organisation beyond this plateau safety culture needs to be addressed or as Lee

(1998) states, “the hearts and minds of the management and workers”. (Parker, et al.,

2006)



Reason (1997) proposed that for an organisation to achieve the goal of “maximum

operational safety” one must continue to respect potential hazards and remain in a state

“chronic unease”. An organisation with an effective safety culture, as described by

Reason (1997):

“has a safety information system that collects, analysis and disseminates

information from incidents and near misses, as well as from regular proactive

check on the system;

has a reporting culture where people are prepared to report errors, mistakes

and violations;

has a culture of trust where people are encouraged and even rewarded to

provide essential safety-related information, but also in which there is clear

distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour;

is flexible to reconfigure the organisational structure in the face of a dynamic

and demanding environment;

has the willingness and competence to draw the right conclusions from its

safety system and is willing to implement reform when it is required,”

(Parker, et al., 2006)

Parker, et al., (2006) make reference to three key issues regarding safety culture that

must always be considered. One that safety culture is multidimensional, two that

communication plays a key role in the development of safety culture and the perceptions

about management and that lastly the extent to which research on safety culture is

“amenable to change”.

Westrum (1996) suggested that one way of distinguishing between organisations safety

cultures was according to the sophistication of the way safety–related information was

handled in the organisation. He developed a typology of cultures as described in table

2, with each level representing specific characteristics and increasing levels of maturity.

(Parker, et al., 2006)



Table 2: How different organisations respond to information concerning safety (Westrum, 1996)

The objective of the work conducted by Parker, et al., (2006) was to develop a theory-

based self assessment tool to measure safety culture by organisations in the oil industry.

Reason (1997) proposed two additional levels, reactive and proactive as an extension to

Westrum‟s typology. The term bureaucratic was also replaced with the term calculative

(engineers would find it hard to accept the term bureaucratic) as described in Hudson

(1991).

Detailed descriptions of the HSE culture ladder is described in Appendix one. An

organisation‟s safety culture is an evolutionary process as described earlier and can be

divided into five distinct categories as described in figure 6 with practical descriptions in

figure 7. Each level has its unique characteristics and is a progression on the one

before. The ultimate aim is to reach a „generative‟ HSE culture.

2.5 Safety climate

As with safety culture being a subset of organisational culture, safety climate can be

described as a subset of safety culture. Glendon and Stanton (2000) summarize the

dimensions that are intended to capture the essence of safety climate in an organisation

(Table 3).

Pathological Bureaucratic Generative

Information is hidden Information may be ignored Information is actively sought

Messengers are “shot” Messengers are tolerated Messengers are trained

Responsibilities are shirked Responsibilities are compartmentalised Responsibilities are shared

Bridging is discouraged Bridging is allowed but neglected Bridging is rewarded

Failure is covered up Organisation is just and merciful Failure causes inquiry

New ideas are actively crushed New ideas create problems New ideas are welcomed



Figure 6: The HSE Culture Ladder (Parker and Hudson Model) (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004)

Figure 7: Practical descriptions of HSE Culture Ladder (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004)



Table 3: Summary of safety climate dimensions from six studies (after Litherland, 1997)

Author Zohar (1990) Brown and

Holmes (1986)

Glendon et al. (1994)

Coyle et al. (1995)

Coyle et al. (1995)

Dedobbeleer and Beland (1991)

Country/ Industry

Israel/ Production

USA/ Production

UK/ Electricity

Australia/ Medical 1

Australia/ Medical 2

USA/ Construction

Factor: Management Attitude

Management attitudes towards safety

Employee perceptions of management concern with their well being. Employee perception of management response to this concern.

Relationships Maintenance and management issues

Management commitment to safety

Training Importance and effectiveness of training

Communication and training

Training and management attitudes

Personal authority, training and enforcement of policy

Procedures Incident investigation and development of procedures. Adequacy of procedures.

Policy / Procedure

Company policy

Risk Perception

Level of risk at workplace

Employee physical risk perception

Safety Work environment

Work environment

Work pace Effects of work pace on safety

Work pressure

Worker Involvement

Status of safety committee

Workers involvement in safety

Other Effects of safe conduct on social status. Effects of safety conduct on promotion. Status of safety officer.

Personal protective equipment. Spares

Accountability

DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg & Butts (2004), in assessing the determinants and

role of safety climate concluded that “environmental conditions, safety policies and

programmes and organisational climate each made significant contributions to safety

climate”. These factors accounted for about 55% of the variance in safety climate. In

terms of relative importance “partial correlations showed that safety policies and

programmes, communication and organisational support respectively, where the three

strongest contributors to employee perceptions of safety climate”.



DeJoy, et al., (2004), also stated that these results were similar to those by Diaz and

Diaz-Caberra (1997) where safety policies and programmes is the single, largest

contributor to safety climate. This is further supported by Cohen (1977), showing that

clear safety policies and integrated actions at an organisational level are linked to safety

performance. (DeJoy, et al., 2004)

Wang, et al. (2008), when looking at safety behaviour in developing economies (China),

concluded that safety behaviour was more sensitive to safety climate factors such as

management commitment and workmate influences (team and work environment also

related to organisational culture) and less sensitive to personal experience factors such

as work experience and education.

2.6 Safety culture change and safety behaviour change

Culture change and behavioural change are two very divergent approaches to incident

causation and workplace safety management. However on closer analysis, the two

approaches are actually complementary and if integrated the “respective strengths can

be merged into a more balanced and comprehensive approach in managing workplace

safety”.

2.6.1 Safety culture change

The safety culture in any organisation is a dynamic concept involving organisational

systems, attitudes and perceptions. (Marshal, 2011b) By applying technology and

standards, incidents can be reduced. However, HSE management systems are needed

to ensure that these are consistently applied. “High technology and standards and HSE

Management Systems are not sufficient for achieving GoalZero (zero incidents).

Motivating people to want to work safely requires a culture where behaviours and

attitudes are safety focused.” Refer to figure 21, chapter 3. (The Energy Institute and

Shell E&P, 2004)



Culture change approaches to safety, predominantly come from “management and

organisational behaviour theory” and include elements of “anthropology and

ethnography”. According to Schien (1990), organisational cultures are influenced by the

behaviours and expectations of the people. Organisational cultures are governed by

their fundamental values, artefacts, rituals, myths and legends. The organisations safety

culture approach is “that the organisations basic values or assumptions about safety

broadly influence the level of effort and the specific plans and initiatives used by that the

organisation to manage safety. These activities then shape the perceptions held by

employees regarding the importance of safety and their expectations regarding the

importance of safe work practices, hazard control, incident reporting and so on.”

(DeJoy, 2005)

Culture change approaches are top-down as it is leadership that drives the change in

values and beliefs of the organisation, determine policies and programs, fund and staff

initiatives and change how things take place in the organisation. To ensure that safety

culture initiatives are effective and sustainable, the existing culture needs to be

understood and changed. Culture change approaches to safety require management to

evaluate the importance of safety in their organisation and then to make the required

organisational changes that demonstrate the importance of safety in the organisation.

Prior to the implementation of a culture change intervention, an assessment followed by

a critical analysis of the organisation is required. Qualitative methods are generally used

to study organisational cultures change. This is then followed by a planning and

implementation process that focuses on the values, vision, levers for change, priorities

and strategies, amongst others, for implementation together with measurement tools to

assess change track implementation. (DeJoy, 2005)

In his paper „Behavioural change versus culture change: Divergent approaches to

managing workplace safety‟, DeJoy (2005) describes 3 reasons for the current interest

in safety culture:

a) Safety decisions and behaviours are being driven by the leadership of

organisations,



b) The growing recognition that there are limits to the safety benefits that can be

achieved through engineering controls, policies and procedures and the

c) Assessment of the safety culture provides leading indicators that can be used to

benchmark organisational safety performance.

2.6.2 Behavioural Change

Behavioural based safety management is an “extension of applied behaviour analysis or

behaviour modification” and makes use of “operant conditioning and reinforcing theory”

that focuses on “producing systematic changes in objectively defined behaviours”.

(DeJoy, 2005)

Behavioural based safety management is a bottom-up approach that is specifically

directed at behavioural change of frontline employees. The process is data driven and

analytical. Critical behaviours are “objectively identified and targeted for change” and

performance is systematically observed and tracked. Feedback is provided for

continuous improvement and support. Behavioural based safety management is “setting

specific” and a continuous process. Positive reinforcement increases the correct

behaviour but removal thereof will result in behaviours reaching baseline levels. (DeJoy,

2005)

Any behavioural based programme has four well defined steps as describe by DeJoy

(2005):

1. Identify a set of safety critical behaviours for frontline staff.

2. Performance goals for the behaviours are determined.

3. Feedback or contingent reinforcement.

4. Track performance and provide feedback for continuous improvement.

Behavioural Based Safety (BBS) as an example of behavioural based safety

management is discussed in the next section.



2.6.2.1 What is Behavioural Based Safety (BBS)?

Behavioural based safety is a methodology that looks to changing culture via behaviour

and attitude modification. BBS has become the latest „buzz word‟ yet its roots date back

to 1930‟s. It is said to have originated with Herbert William Heinrich who worked for

Traveller‟s Insurance Company. Heinrich reviewed thousands of accidents reports and

then concluded the most accidents, illnesses and injuries in the workplace resulted from

unsafe acts or “manfailures”. (Pullen, 2011) In 1979, Dr. Tom Krause, a psychologist,

and Dr. John Hidley, a physician pioneered the application of behavioural methods in

industrial settings with the emphasis on practical issues facing management. This later

became known and widely accepted as BBS. The integration of practical best practices

resulted in the Behavioural Accident Prevention Process (BAPP). (BBI, 2010)

According to Marsh (2011a), BBS is a “process that reduces unsafe behaviours that can

lead to incidents occurring in the workplace. The process works by reinforcing safe

behaviour and identifying the causes of unsafe behaviour.”

Pullen (2007), take this definition one step further to include the „psychology of

prevention‟. He further elaborates that BBS is based on organisational behaviour

analysis. In addition to changing the behaviour of the frontline employees, it includes

“indentifying the barriers to safe behaviour and designing and implementing a strategy

for ensuring that work environment, practices and policies support behaving safely.”

Wikipedia describes BBS as “the application of the science of behaviour change and

focuses on what people do, analyses why they do it and applies research supported

intervention strategies”

2.6.2.2 What does a BBS programme include?

Marsh (2011a) describes 3 generic approaches to BBS namely:

Top-down: process is management driven. Supervisors measure behaviour,

provide feedback and relay recommendations to management.



Bottom-up: process is employee driven and encourages frontline participation.

There is peer-to-peer review with feedback to the workforce BBS team and

recommendations are made to management for implementation.

Collective: combination of the top-down and bottom-up approaches with both

managers and frontline staff participating in reviews. Root cause analysis and

recommendations are done jointly to improve safety performance. All

organisations should aim towards adopting the collective approach.

DeJoy (2005), describes BSS management as essentially a bottom-up approach and

although widely applicable to different work situations, each application must be

customized to its setting.

2.6.2.3 BBS success factors

In his paper Pullen (2007) stated that BBS interventions result in improvements of about

30% in safety performance if implemented correctly. He also stated that in the USA,

there is a 70% probability of failure of BBS initiatives. The success of BBS lies in

“creating an environment that has a culture in which each individual feels directly

responsible for his/her own and his/her colleague‟s safety.” The other critical point that

is made is that in BBS “a fundamental principle of behavioural science is that (a shift in

desired) behaviour will not be sustainable unless it continues to be reinforced over time.”

One of the challenges of BBS and often abandoned, is the „Hierarchy of controls‟. The

„hierarchy of controls‟ is one of the fundamentals in implementing hazard controls.

Without this, BBS will fail as behaviour alone will not rectify the physical environment as

an example. The „hierarchy of control‟ in order of preference:

1. Elimination of the hazard.

2. Employ engineering controls to limit exposure to the hazard.

3. Use of warning systems.

4. Training and procedures.

5. Use of Personal Protection equipment.

(Pullen, 2011)



In his paper, „Behavioural Based Safety – A worker perspective‟, Mullins (2007),

encourage companies to move away from BBS. He stated that companies move to BBS

when their HSE performance has reached a plateau. This was also supported by

Pullen, 2011. Mullins elaborates that for an unsafe behaviour to cause injury, a hazard

must be present and that all injuries and illnesses are a result of an exposure to a

hazard. Therefore elimination of a hazard eliminates the risk of exposure. He

concludes that BBS is in total contravention to the „hierarchy of controls‟.

Most BBS programmes require frontline staff to carry out safety observations on their

colleagues. This information is fed back (one-on-one or group), which then leads to the

development of recommendations or „safe/model‟ behaviours.

There are number of short-comings to behavioural safety observations:

a) Observation focuses on the end chain of events yet it is known that accidents

result from a series of events.

b) With observation, no questions are asked.

c) Observations focus on repeated activities, yet an unusual event may be missed.

d) Observation does not necessarily provide information about inherent risks e.g.

observations of fumes will not tell you that benzene will cause cancer.

e) Observation at frontline can only affect decision making at lower levels. Without

asking „why‟, higher level decision making is difficult to influence.

f) Time consuming and costly. Resources should be spent on elimination of

hazards.

g) BBS can crowd or take the effort away other key interventions.

h) Observation of Managers and Board is not included.

i) Observation of workers with clients do not provide information on the causes of

stress e.g. fatigue.

j) Observation may lead to blame.

k) Could lead to „worker against worker” – tensions in the work place.

l) The focus on individual behaviour prevents looking beyond the person.

m) Worker observation does not help intervene on actions of the decision makers.

(Mullins, 2007)



The limitations of behavioural based programmes is further supported by the work done

by Hopkins (2006) where he concludes that safe behaviour programmes run the risk of

assuming that unsafe behaviour is the only cause of accidents but the reality is that the

unsafe behaviour is the last link in the causal chain and therefore not the most effective

link to focus for the purpose of prevention.

In the authors opinion therefore that for HSE incidents to be eliminated it has to be a

combination of „fixing the workplace‟ and „fixing the behaviours‟.

The six pillars of Behavioural based safety are:

1. Increased understanding and awareness.

2. Leadership and commitment from management.

3. Ownership in the process.

4. Leading key performance indicators (KPI‟s).

5. Feedback mechanisms.

6. Analysis of root causes of unsafe behaviour (Marshal, 2011).

Table four provides a comparative summary between the two approaches. “Behaviour

based safety targets employee safety behaviours and thus intervenes at the exposure

level, while culture change purports to intervene farther back in the sequence at the

culture level” as described in the figure 8.

Figure 8: The sequential or stage-based model of safety management (DeJoy, 2005)



Table 4: Summary comparison of culture-change and behaviour-based approaches to safety

management (DeJoy, 2005)

Characteristic Culture Change approach Behaviour-Based approach

Background/origin Operant psychology / behaviour modification

Organisation behaviour / anthropology

Key Aspects “Bottom-up” approach “Top-down” approach

Analytic / data driven Intuitive / ethnographic

Setting specific Setting specific

Continuous process Self sustaining

Typical implementation

Identify and define critical behaviours

Assess aspects of culture (values, belief, assumptions, etc.)

Set performance goals Devise alternative vision

Observe / sample behaviour Work with leadership (and employees) to implement change

Provide contingent feedback / reinforcement

Principal Strengths Specific Technology Emphasizes organisational change

Objective / empirical Focuses on basic causes

Shop floor focus Participatory (often)

Participatory (usually) Comprehensive

Positive

Principal Weaknesses Victim-blaming Diffuse Technology

Minimizes environment Subjective / Intuitive

Focuses on immediate causes Indirect

Therefore while both approaches agree on the benefits and have much in common they

differ how a positive supportive safety culture can be achieved. Figure 9 depicts the

modes of culture change as the “bubble up” (behaviour-based safety) and “trickle-down”

(culture-change) approaches. Behaviour-based is focuses on the frontline safety

behaviours producing a positive impact that diffuses or bubble upwards while the

culture-change approach seeks to produce change at the leadership level that trickle

down into the organisation.

2.7 The integrative approach

It is important to note that both approaches are intended to improve safety performance.

Both approaches require systematic or strategic approach to managing safety. Both

argue that is has to be a continuous improvement process. Both recognise the

importance of involving employees in safety management. Both also recognise that

organisational culture is important. (DeJoy, 2005)



Figure 9: Modes of culture change associated with behaviour-change and culture-change

approaches to safety (DeJoy, 2005)

Both approaches are actually complementary to each other. Focusing on the strengths

of the two approaches eliminates the weakness of the other. The strength of

behavioural based approaches is the “availability and the specific use of technology that

allows for objective and empirical analysis of critical safety behaviours” while with

culture-change approaches the strength lies on the emphasis of organisational change

and a more comprehensive approach to safety management. (DeJoy, 2005)

In his attempt to create an integrated framework, DeJoy developed the framework below

(figure 10). The central feature is a multi-level problem solving process that includes

management and the employees. The framework is also explicit in the culture change

process that is linked to the problem solving process. Several auxiliary process key to

culture change have also been included.



Figure 10: Key features of the integrative approach to safety management (DeJoy, 2005)

2.8 Psychological concepts that contribute to organisational safety performance

Torner (2011) refers to a good psychological climate (as defined by Jones and James,

1979) as conditions that enable the individual to perform his or her work and would

result in employees feeling supported by the organisation.



2.8.1 Perceived organisational support

“Defined as employee‟s global belief that the organisation values their contribution and

cares about their well being”, therefore if this is supplemented by policies, procedures,

practices and behaviours that emphasize the importance of safety, this will then create a

positive safety climate. (Torner, 2011)

2.8.2 Theory of Social Exchange

In this theory (Blau, 1986) postulates that in any “social interaction where one party acts

in a manner that benefits another, a mutual expectation will emerge that obligates the

second party to reciprocate.” In an organisation where the employee perceives the work

environment to be supportive it will create the motivation for the members to contribute

to the organisational goals. (Torner, 2011)

2.8.3 Leader-member exchange theory (LMX)

LMX theory describes the “role making processes between leaders and each

subordinate and the exchange relationship that develops over time.” (Yukl, 1994:235)

Torner (2011) also make reference to the LMX theory developed by Liden and Maslyn

(1998) where the quality of relationships at the dyadic level (e.g. line manager and

employee) and the dimensions of contribution, loyalty and affect, lead to the formation of

mutual relationships and obligations arising from the interactions. LMX once again

identifies the relationship between high quality leader–member exchange relations and

high organisational performance including safety.

Management attitudes and behaviour are thus critical for the development of

organisational culture and climate but even more so their personal involvement. We

know that culture is shared and developed thus implying social interaction and

integration. Management safety standards and goals, management safety commitment,

communication and personal involvement directly impacts on the organisational safety



climate and safety motivation then in turn impacts safety behaviour. (Cheyne, et al.1998)

(Torner, 2011)

DeJoy, Della, Vandenberg & Wilson (2010) in their work on social exchange and safety

concluded that occupational safety and health programmes impacted both safety climate

and organisational commitment. Their study recommended that organisations striving to

“augment safety at work” should focus on “developing a strong foundation of committed

employees through the implementation of policies and procedures that consistently

demonstrate management‟s commitment to employee safety and health”. Therefore any

new safety initiatives will then be perceived as an extension of the organisation ongoing

work in safety and is more likely to be accepted by the employees. (DeJoy, et al., 2010)

2.8.4 Organisational Citizenship Behaviour (OCB)

Organisational Citizenship behaviour (OCB) is defined (Organ, 1997:86) as “individual

behaviour that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal rewards

system and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organisation.”

Podskoff, et al. (1990) recommended five OCB behaviours i.e. altruism, courtesy,

sportsmanship, conscientiousness and civic virtue. (Torner, 2011)

2.8.5 Fairness

Fairness is an important dimension and perceptions of fairness and just treatment are

positively correlated, therefore where employees are treated fairly then organisational

procedures are perceived to be just and employees will then act in manner to ensure the

smooth functioning thereof. (Torner, 2011)

Moorman (1991) concluded a positive relationship between the perceptions of

interactional justice and OCB, and concluded that perceived fairness may result in an

employee redefining his employment contract from an economic contract to a social

exchange one. The OCB behaviours defined earlier are relevant to safety. In an

organisation where employees are treated fairly and where safety is valued and



rewarded, safety behaviour can be elevated beyond the prescribed rules and in this

case will be defined as organisational citizenship safety behaviour. (Torner, 2011)

2.8.6 Empowerment

Empowerment and encouraging participation implies relinquishing line manager

authority which then contributes to confidence and felt trust. Empowerment also

promotes autonomy and it allows for choice in decisions. Empowerment and autonomy

could therefore be perceived as a social reward and an obligation to reciprocate - social

exchange theory, thereby contributing to the achievement of organisational and safety

goals and hence promote safety behaviour that result in a generative spiral and the

action replicates across the organisation. (Torner, 2011)

2.8.7 Trust

“Mutual trust may promote safety through participation and social norms.” Trust has

been identified as a crucial component of social interaction and core to high performing

organisations. Trust defined in Torner (2011) as “representing the willingness to take a

risk in a relationship and to be vulnerable to the other party.” (Mayer, et al., 1995) Trust

in management together with appropriate safety climate, safety knowledge, safety

motivations and safety behaviour contributed to lower safety incidents. Furthermore

there is a positive relation between trust and safety behaviour in high reliability

organisations. (Cox, et al., (2006) in Torner, 2011)

2.8.8 Critical reflection

Organisational culture provides its members with a sense of belonging, togetherness,

order, cohesion, etc. The key components that formulate the culture are kept to

preserve the success of the organisation. However what that happens, is organisations

tend to become conservative and insular limiting autonomy, creativity, introspection, etc.

leading to cultural denial (Pidgeon, 1998). This is particularly damaging when hazards



are allowed to “incubate” in an organisation without being detected for a long period of

time or only at the time of an incident. (Torner, 2011)

Torner (2011) refers to Avolio and Bass (1988), who suggest that “intellectual

stimulation” (a dimension of transformational leadership) is required to reappraise the

current circumstances and business environment, which will help contribute to a high

level of safety performance. Research also shows that those leaders that promote

intellectual stimulation are less trusted as they are perceived as less predictable and

less dependable. The challenge therefore is how does one maintain objectivity and self

appraisal without losing trust? Empowerment and participation are possible options to

counteract cynicism. (Torner, 2011)

2.8.9 Social interaction and communication

Social interaction and communication are key tools for “attaining and sustaining high

quality social relations.” Good, open two-way communication is critical to create a good

safety climate and to build trust. Openness and transparency also help remove any

negative perceptions or „hidden agendas‟. Good communication is a key enabler to

organisational success and hence safety performance. (Torner, 2011)

2.9 Organisational change

Change is often described as a “change or passage from one state to another and is

synonymous with modification and transformation” while behavioural change is

associated with a change in behaviour or change in action. (Boudreau, 2002)

Organisational change is more than routine, evolutionary or accidental changes. It can

take the form of a small policy change to large scale change affecting numerous

organizational subsystems. It can vary from something gradual to something that

suddenly appears without warning. This is the multi-dimensional nature of change in the

organisational context. (Swanepoel, Erasmus, Van Wyk & Schenk, 2003)



Important to consider are the types of change: hard change situations are easier to

define as they are easier to identify, they are specific, have timelines, structured, etc.

while soft change situations are less concrete. They are often referred to as „messy‟ or

„fuzzy‟ as timelines are unclear, objectives and priorities are uncertain and may evolve

with the process, resource implications are unclear, etc. (Swanepoel, et al. 2003)

Table 5 covers some of the drivers of change in organisations. Many of the internal

drivers are ultimately due to external strategic drivers. Therefore it is important to note

that to manage change successfully, it is essential to focus on both strategic and

operational issues and managing the links between them.

Table 5: Main drivers for change (Oakland and Tanner, 2007)

External drivers Internal drivers

Customer requirements Improving operational efficiency

Demand from stakeholders e.g.

Government

Need to improve the quality of products

and services

Regulatory demand Process improvement

Market competition

Shareholders/city

Economic environment (added)

Table 6 summarizes the magnitude of the different types of organisational changes.

(Swanepoel, et al. 2003). The scale of the change will then determine the planned

approach to managing organisational change as explained later.

Kurt Lewin‟s (1951) „field-force theory‟ approach suggests that an individual‟s behaviour

is a function of the individual and the environment. Both the individual and the

environment are interdependent variables. The ease of introducing a new behaviour is

the product of the interplay between the forces that drive behaviour change and the

forces that oppose change. Change represents a disruption to the current steady state

or equilibrium. (Gershwin, 1994 and Yukl, 1994)



According to the „field-force theory‟ change can occur in the following ways:

(1) Increasing the magnitude of a driving force can induce change.

(2) An addition of a new driving force can induce change.

(3) The identification and removal or reduction of restraining forces can induce

change.

(4) The conversion of restraining forces into driving forces can induce change.

(Gershwin, 1994, and Yukl, 1994)

Table 6: Scales of change adapted from Dunphy and Stace, 1993 (Swanepoel, et al. 2003)

Scale Description Fine tuning Ongoing process of adapting and refining aspects such as

policies, procedures, processes and methods to ensure

that it is applicable to the current situations and fit for

purpose. Example: revising and implementing a study

policy.

Incremental

Adjustment

Distinct changes to strategies, structure or business

processes in response to changes in the macro-

environment. Example: establishing a new division to meet

stakeholder needs.

Modular

Transformation

Involves major re-alignment and/or radical change of large

significant parts of an organisation. Example: downsizing

of departments

Corporate

transformation

This is a major or revolutionary change that occurs across

organisation. Example: total change in business strategy

and vision with new mission and core values after a

merger.

Table 7 summarizes some of the enablers and barrier to changes, also referred to as

„forces‟. (Oakland and Tanner, 2007)

Lewin‟s action research noted that “a change toward a higher level of group

performance is frequently short-lived; after „a shot in the arm‟ group life soon returns to

the previous level” and therefore proposed that the time-period should be stipulated in

the maintenance stage of the new level. (Gershwin, 1994)



2.9.1 Lewin’s three-step change model

Step 1 – Unfreezing

The unfreezing steps involve the recognition of the need to change, awareness of the

benefits of the change, understanding of the issues and the forces or factors that will

enable or hinder the change, plan for change and building the required commitment.

Table 7: Common enablers and barriers to change (Oakland and Tanner, 2007)

Enablers to change Barriers to change

Data-led analysis – facts Changes in the organisation e.g. redesign, departure of the MD

Cross functional teams with high performers and the right skills

Lack of communication

Disciplined project management General issues based on resistance to change and project management issues e.g. silo thinking, delays, etc

Clear accountability and goals Too little top management involvement

Stakeholder management

Process thinking

Communication

Staff involvement

Senior management commitment

Learning from past experiences (added)

Step 2 – Change

This step involves the actual change. This is the stage where a programme rolled out or

instruction is give to facilitate the change. In the workplace, the change can be

strengthened if strategies include: the involvement of managers, conducting the exercise

during work hours in the environment and having a support system to assist staff with

the change.

Step 3 – Re-freezing

Lewin recognised that there is a fundamental difference between knowing what to do

and doing it on a continued basis (long term). For long term sustainable change

behaviour has to be practiced, new habits have to be entrenched and reinforced



consistently. This is not only a decision process, but other structural changes also need

to be embedded.

(Gershwin, 1994 and Yukl, 1994)

Building on Lewin‟s model, Armenakis and Bedeian (1999) refer to Judson‟s (1991) five

phase model of change, Kotter‟s (1995) eight steps and Gaplin‟s (1996) nine wedges in

organisational change.

Judson‟s (1991) model (Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999):

(1) Analyzing and planning of change.

(2) Communicating the change.

(3) Gaining the acceptance of new behaviours.

(4) Changing from the status quo to a desired state.

(5) Consolidating and institutionalizing the new state.

Kotter‟s (1995) 8 step change model:

(1) Establishing a sense of urgency but referring to environmental challenges,

potential crises and opportunities.

(2) Form a „coalition‟ of individuals who embrace the need for change and rally

support.

(3) Create a vision to accomplish end-result.

(4) Communication of vision via different channels.

(5) Empower individuals to act to achieve the vision via the required implementation

goals.

(6) Plan for and create short-term win. Publicise success and keep the momentum.

(7) Consolidate improvements and change the systems, processes, procedures, etc

to align to the vision.

(8) Institutionalise new approaches by showing the link between the past, the change

and the organisations success.

(Armenakis and Bedeian, 1999)



Gaplin‟s (1996) nine wedge model for implementing successful change included:

(1) Establishing the need to change.

(2) Develop and disseminate a vision of the change.

(3) Diagnose and analyse the current situation.

(4) Generating recommendations.

(5) Detailing the recommendations.

(6) Pilot testing recommendations.

(7) Preparing recommendations for roll-out.

(8) Roll –out.

(9) Measuring, reinforcing and refining change.

Carter (2008) expanded on the traditional change management model incorporating

strategy, skills and structures as pillars to successful change. His methodology is

depicted in figure 11. Carter (2008) expands on Lewin‟s three-stage model of

organisational change.

Pater (2006) also concluded that building skills sets and motivation (creating movement)

will inspire behavioural change to the levels required to achieve high levels of safety

performance.

Figure 11: Seven phase change model and methodology (Carter, 2008)



2.9.2 Other fundamental theories and models in behavioural change

These include:

The theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) – people factor in

consequences of their actions before they decided to act, therefore in this theory

“the intention of acting is an indicator that behaviour is more important that

attitudes. Attitudes interact with subjective norms to influence the intention of

acting.” (Boudreau, 2002)

Planned behaviour theory. (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1988) – modified the reasoned

action theory by adding in the element of „perceived behavioural control‟ i.e. an

individual‟s personal belief that adopting a certain behaviour will be easy or

difficult. This theory can then be summarize as follows: individuals are unlikely to

develop a strong intention of acting or behaving in a particular way if they don‟t

believe they have the necessary resources or opportunities even if they possess

a positive attitude towards the behaviour. See figure 12. (Boudreau, 2002)

Figure 12: Planned behaviour theory model of Godin and Kok, 1996 (Boudreau, 2002)

The transtheoretical model (stages of behavioural change). Prochaska and

DiClemente (1982) suggest that behavioural change occurs in following stages:

precontemplation, contemplation, preparation, action, maintenance and

termination (figure 13).



Also included are the nine mechanisms for process change such as “increased level of

awareness, emotional awakening, social liberation, personal re-evaluation, commitment,

reinforcement management, helpful relationships, counter-conditioning and stimulus

control.” (Boudreau, 2002)

Figure 13: Transtheoretical model for stages of change of Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcoss,

1992 (Boudreau, 2002)

Description of the stages

The stages suggest that people change their behaviours progressively and that different

interventions are required to internalise the change at the different stages:

Precontemplation - Individuals have no intention to change high risk behaviour at least

for the next 6 months.

Contemplation - Individuals have the serious desire to change their behaviour over the

course of the next six months, however they can remain in this stable phase for up to

two years.



Preparation - Individuals have the intention of creating change in the near future –next

month. They generally have an action plan and have already take some action in the

last 12 months to change their behaviour to a certain point.

Action – Change modification has occurred over the last 6 months. This is the least

stable phase – risk of relapse to original behaviour.

Maintenance – commences six months after attaining the goal and lasts until the

subject no longer risks relapse.

During termination the individual is no longer tempted to relapse. (Boudreau, 2002)

Figure 14: Spiral model for behavioural change stages by the Communication Initiative, 2002

(Boudreau, 2002)

The spiral model for stages of behavioural change - in the transtheoretical

model the components were arranged in a linear format. Prochaska, DiClemente

and Norcross (1992) after observing behavioural modification concluded that the

stages were not linear but cyclic and if the individual relapsed, the individual



returned to the prior stage and did not lose previously acquired stages or

knowledge. Stages are captured in figure 14 and will vary amongst different

individuals. (Boudreau, 2002)

Table 8 is a high-level summary of resistance to change factors, both at the individual

and organisational level while table 9 offers methods to overcome resistance to change.

Table 8: Individual and organisational level factors relating to resistance to change (Swanepoel, et

al. 2003)

Individual level factors Organisational level factors

Fear of the unknown Structural inertia

Habit Cultural inertia

Self-interest Work group inertia

Economic insecurity Threats to existing power relationships

Failure to recognise the need for change Threats to expertise

General mistrust Threats to resource allocation

Social disruptions Previously unsuccessful change efforts

Selective perceptions

Table 9: Kotter and Schlesinger's six methods to overcome resistance to change (Swanepoel, et

al. 2003)

Method Description

Education and communication Explaining the logic behind the change may make the transition

easier

Participation and involvement Involving participation in the design of the change allows for

ownership and eventually these people become the drivers for

the change.

Facilitation and support Easing the change process with support structures and system

support help overcome resistance. Retraining maybe required.

Negotiation and agreement Certain situations may require negotiation with employee

structures such as trade unions so that a win-win result can be

achieved with compromise.

Manipulation and co-option Managers sometimes implement a specific strategy to target a

highly influential person that can impact the change by placing

the person is a role that creates or designs the change.

Explicit and implicit coercion Managers may force the change by making threats of jobs

losses, etc. This can hinder future change efforts.



Figure 15 sequentially demonstrates Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's, six-step model to

overcoming resistance to change.

Figure 15: Beer, Eisenstat and Spector's 6-step approach to overcoming resistance to change

(Swanepoel, et al. 2003)

2.9.3 The cycle of change

In an interview with Executive Excellence (1999), Peter Senge, responding to a question

about the challenges learning organisations face and how to overcome these challenges

and sustain momentum. He made a profound statement when he responded by saying,

“I hesitate to use the word overcome. These challenges are not merely hurdles to jump

over. If we start to take it seriously the notion that our organisations are alive, we see

learning and growth as very natural responses of a living organism. It is important to

see our organisations as this, and not as obstacles that are resistant to change – the

classic framing of ego-orientated managers..........” (Executive Excellence, 1999)



Figure 16: The Dance of Change by Senge, 1999 (Janse van Rensburg, 2009)

The Dance of Change focuses on a particular type of organisational change, „profound

change‟, which combines the inner change is people‟s values, aspiration and behaviours

with outer shifts in processes, strategies and systems, not only is there change, there is

learning (Senge,1999). The Dance of Change depicts some other crucial elements:

change is perpetual, it develops over time, cultures will evolve, it requires investment of

time, energy and effort and that the results are not instantaneous but there is a lag

before any change is observed and that the goal post is always moving as we are

indeed in a dynamic environment (figure 16).

In a recent interview Edgar Schein was asked, “How are employee motivation and

organisational culture linked? What are the ways in which leaders can effectively

manage change?” (American Society for training and development, 2010)

Edgar Schein responded by saying, “When managers say they want to create a culture

of motivation and commitment that indicates that they don‟t understand culture. Culture

is not something that you can create or want. Culture is the residue of your history so



far. If the organisation has been autocratic, low trust, how you change that, is by

slowing identifying real problems and new behaviours, train people in the new

behaviours, and if the business problem is solved then employees begin internalise it

and eventually they believe it is a good way to work . . . . . . . . . Motivation and culture

are linked through this complicated process of identifying problems, building new

behaviour and then enforcing it. We have to see change as a process.” (American

Society for training and development, 2010)

2.9.4 Change Fatigue

In today‟s global economic environment, leaders and organisations face unprecedented

level of stress from the macro and micro-environment. These include impacts of

globalization, technological advancement, itinerant work forces, different cultural values

and national systems, legislation, economic pressures, competition, increased paced,

diversity challenges, increased pressure from external stakeholders, etc. This demand

then implies that organisations have to change and adapt to meet the demand of its

stakeholders and as a result organisations are subject to perpetual change and change

initiatives. This continuous impact of stressors and the required change is referred to as

„Change Fatigue‟. (Dool, 2009)

As Dool (2009), explains, organisational stress comes at a price. Signs include

absenteeism, accidents, high turnover of staff, low morale, job dissatisfaction, lower

productivity, interpersonal conflicts, errors in judgment, resistance to change and in

some extreme cases, workplace violence. Dool (2009) references Sikora et al. (2004:6)

stating that “the cumulative impact of multiple and sometimes conflicting change

initiatives eventually overwhelm the cognitive appraisal and coping mechanisms.”

In his study on „Change Fatigue‟, Dool (2009) concluded that job stress and job

satisfaction is significantly related. The study also validated the concept of „Change

Fatigue‟, by directly linking change initiatives to job stress and job satisfaction. (1234

subjects across hundreds of small, medium and large organisations were sampled).

Clearly one way to reduce the impact is to reduce the number of initiatives – but history



proves otherwise. Current research into „adaptive enterprises‟ is a possible option to

help organizations adapt in a rapidly changing environment. (Dool, 2009)

Dool‟s (2009) work highlights some key aspects with regard to safety. When employees

are under stress, accident rate increase, there are errors in judgment, loss in

concentration, interpersonal conflict, resistance to change, etc. One can infer that when

an organisation is undergoing Change Fatigue, the safety culture and performance will

be negatively impacted.

Flouris and Yilmaz (2009) concluded that change management must be included as part

of the Safety management system (SMS) or the HSE-MS in managing risk and ensuring

operational effectiveness in their work, in the aviation industry.

2.10 Role of National culture on safety performance

The euro-centric versus afro-centric leadership approaches in the African context is

currently subject of intense debate in Africa and particularly in South Africa as we

continue our transformational journey. Meyer and Boninelli (2004: 109) states “that

organisational and management philosophies typically evolve in harmony with cultures

within which they function. The environment and culture of Africa is different from the

West. Therefore Western management theories and practices have limited application,

and yet the way theories are implemented or applied in most organisations in Africa is

still predicated on the Western value systems”

With reference to Hofstede‟s (1980) definition of national culture, Meyer and Boninelli

(2004) conclude that it is “absurd to assume that Western or Eurocentric leadership

approaches would be applicable and effective in an organisation based in Africa with

African employees.” Meyer and Boninelli (2004) also make reference to Adele (1998)

where Adele claims that there is “no empirical basis for propositions that African culture

and values should be incorporated into South African business practices.” Adele (1998)

does however acknowledge that there is some way to go to be able to envision the

„African manager”.



Globalisation can potentially influence attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of different

groups of employees working across the globe for the same multi-national company.

Mearns and Yule (2009) work specifically focus on the global oil and gas industry.

Mearns and Yule (2009) explain that as per Maslow‟s (1943) „Hierarchy of needs‟, the

basic physiological needs, need to be fulfilled before safety and other needs are fulfilled.

Global culture is based on Individualism (free market economy and democracy) which

are essentially western values that are associated with the oil and gas industry. This is

likely to conflict with traditional decision making and traditional cultural processes i.e.

Collectivism where cohesive groups protect and support each other. (Mearns and Yule,

2009)

Extremes of Collectivism (group think) and Individualism can be detrimental to safety.

Speaking directly and openly about safety on the other hand will improve safety culture.

Further expanding on Hofstede‟s (1994) cultural values framework Mearns and Yule

(2009) also refer to masculinity (people value money over other people and

relationships) conflicting with femininity (people and relationships are valued over

material possessions). Furthermore, in high power distance cultures superiors are

dominant and exercise power, decentralised decision making and the organisation is

hierarchical with subordinates expected to be passive while in low power distance

cultures there are closer relationships between different levels in the organisation with

flatter structures. (Mearns and Yule, 2009)

National culture is defined by Hofstede (1991), “as the collective programming of the

mind acquired by growing up in a particular country.” Proponents of the convergent

approaches argue that globalization, industrialization and economic development lead to

the convergence of attitudes and beliefs with inherent cultural values remaining despite

globalization as opposed by those that support the divergent approaches. (Mearns and

Yule, 2009).

Mearns and Yule (2009) concluded that the “relationship between cultural values and

perceived management commitment to safety and risk taking behaviours are not uniform

between cultures. However senior management commitment is a more proximal



predictor of self-reported safe and unsafe behaviours than aspects of national culture.

As perceptions of senior management deteriorate, workers are more inclined to take

risks and break rules. The opposite also holds true. Management and leadership have

emerged as significant determinants of safety performance and not national culture.

(Mearns and Yule, 2009).

2.11 Measuring Safety culture

Traditionally organisational culture has been measured through the application of

qualitative methods e.g. interviews, observations, etc. However the psychological,

situational and behavioural dimensions can be measured through a combination of

qualitative and quantitative methodologies. (Cooper, 2000 and Choudhry, Fang &

Mohamed, 2007)

The situational aspects include policies, procedures, management systems, etc. The

behavioural aspects can be measured through observations, self reporting and outcome

measures. The psychological aspects can be measured by safety climate

questionnaires. Other methods include Safety Culture and Hazard Operability

(SCHAZOP) by Kennedy and Kirwan (1998), Safety assessment toolkit by Cox and

Cheyne (2000) and the triangulated methodology of Glendon and Stanton (2000)

discussed earlier. “The measurement of safety culture is categorized under proactive

approach to safety performance.” (Choudhry, et al., 2007)

2.12 Critical success factors in culture and behavioural based safety programmes

What are the critical success philosophies and principles in safety?

As described by Grzebielucha (2002: 29)

All incidents and injuries are preventable.

Management is responsible and accountable for safety.

Working safely is a condition of employment.

All operating exposures can be controlled.



The co-operation of the entire organisation is needed.

Employee involvement is essential.

Employees must receive safety training.

Management audits are a must.

Deficiencies must be corrected.

Good safety is good business.

It is critical to integrate safety as a core business and personal value.

DePasquale and Geller (1999) summarized their assessments from 31 focus group, 701

perception surveys (from 15 different organisations) into the BBS safety success triad

where on the people side, interpersonal trust, on the environment side, management

support and on the behaviour side, employee participation/involvement, were the key

determinants of success. (Figure 17) Training remains the core; hence it is in the

centre.

Figure 17: The behaviour-based safety success triad (DePasquale and Geller, 1999)

Blair (2003:78) concluded that there are seven key points for improved safety

performance:



Key Point 1: The concept of safety culture must be practically defined to be of

value. Here Blair (2003), refers to the reciprocal determinism triad

referred to earlier (figure 1), where safety culture can be visualized.

Key Point 2: Safety culture is an integral part of a larger organisation. Blair (2003)

adds that the safety function is not an island but is influenced by the

broader organisational culture and therefore must be understood in this

context.

Key Point 3: Safety culture can be quantitatively measured. Blair (2003) once again

refers to the Bandura triad, where person, situation and behavioural

elements can be quantitatively measured. This was also discussed earlier

in the work by Choudhry, et al., 2007.

Key Point 4: Leadership must share a vision for establishing safety culture.

Leadership is viewed as a key determinant for organisation success and

leadership and culture are inextricably linked. “Management deals with

maintaining status quo, leadership deals mostly with change” Kotter (1996)

in Blair (2003).

Key Point 5: Leaders must focus on specific behaviours to strengthen safety

culture. Here Blair (2003) refers to the seven E‟s for establishing safety

excellence. See figure 18 - adapted from text into a circular format as

these are ongoing actions.

Key Point 6: Leaders need both “ Want to” and “Know how” to establish excellent

cultures. Blair (2003) raises an important issue here, i.e. leaders must

have the desire to act and understand the required behaviours that lead to

generative safety cultures.



Key Point 7: The SH&E professional role – Influence the right people to take the

right actions. SH&E professionals need to competently advise and

influence both site staff and leaders to establish a safety culture. It is the

leaders that are required to drive the change. (Blair, 2003)

Figure 18: Leadership behaviour: Seven Es for Establishing Safety Excellence (Blair, 2003)

2.13 Positive Safety Culture

Developing and maintaining a positive safety culture is key to improving safety

performance within organisations. Elements for a good safety culture as described by

Hale (2000) include: involvement of workers at all levels, role of safety staff, caring, open

communication, belief in safety improvements, and integration of safety into the

organisation. (Choudhry, et al., 2007)

According to Vecchio-Sudos and Griffiths (2004) in Choudhry, et al., (2007), promoting a

positive safety culture requires:

Changing attitudes and behaviours.



Management commitment.

Employee involvement.

Promotional strategies such as mission statements, published materials, media.

Training and Seminars.

Special Campaigns to reinforce.

Choudhry, et al., 2007 concluded that a positive safety culture comprises 5 components:

(1) Management commitment to safety.

(2) Management concern for the workforce.

(3) Mutual trust and credibility between management and employees.

(4) Workforce empowerment.

(5) Continuous monitoring, corrective action, review of system and continual

improvements to reflect the safety at the worksite.

2.14 Organisational indicators of safety culture

Wiegmann, Zhang, Thaden, Sharma & Gibbons (2004) conclude that there are 5 global

organisational indicators of safety culture:

Organisational Commitment – where organisational leadership for a long time

has been playing a critical role in promoting organisational safety culture. It is

also evident when safety is a core value in the organisation. The safety culture is

evident in senior management behaviours, attitudes, visible leadership and is

consistently applied across the organisation. The safety culture is reflected in

every aspect of its operations on and off-site.

Management Involvement – Upper and middle management communicate their

concern for employee safety and well being on a daily basis. There is visible

intervention and engagement, walks, inspections, audits, reviews, where senior

management is involved or lead the process. Evidence that management are

aware of the high risks associated with their operations and the key controls in

managing them.



Employee empowerment – Employees and more so, frontline employees are

the last line of defence to prevent and accident or incidents in critical activities.

(Refer to Swiss cheese model – chapter 3, figure 22). Employees need to be

empowered to intervene in unsafe conditions and stop activities if required. They

should also feel empowered to report all incidents including near misses without

fear of reprisal. Employees when empowered will also find creative solutions to

managing risks in the work place and contribute to overall safe operations.

Reward systems – This is another key component of an organisations safety

culture: where there are positive consequences for compliance, exceeding

expectations, reaching milestones, and etc. but equally, negative consequences

for rule breaking. Furthermore, an advanced organisation safety reward system

will have the reward mechanisms documented, structured and consistently

applied in the organisation.

Reporting systems – reporting is one of the foundations of an advanced safety

culture where weakness or potential threats can be identified and corrected

before the results in incidents and accidents. Furthermore, employees must feel

free to report on a day-to-day basis in their own personal capacity and

proactively, not because they have reporting targets. A formal reporting system is

required, that provides timely feedback to prevent high risk incidents from

occurring.

2.15 Agents of organisational change

While management is directly responsible for creating and leading organisational

change, very often middle management and HSE professionals are the drivers of safety

culture change at the frontline. HSE professionals are ideally placed to support and

assist management from a technical HSSE perspective but they are not necessarily

competent in or in some cases even have the basic knowledge with regard to

organisational design, organisational culture and change management process. Very



often safety culture change programmes and behavioural based safety programmes fail

in their implementation as alluded to by Pullen (2007) earlier on.

These interventions are often run as once off programmes, yet these are soft change

interventions that are intended to drive culture change not only in the present but setting

the foundation for the future, a task that is ongoing and does not have a time limit. The

soft skills required around interpersonal relationships and emotional intelligence,

delivering through others, managing conflict, diversity, etc. are the some of the critical

areas that are often overlooked.

Swuste and Arnoldy (2003) point out that the role of OSHE professionals is changing

due to the complexity of OSHE management. In addition to the required OSHE

technical competence, these professionals require additional skills in organisational

theory, company structure and function, planning, budgeting, negotiation skills,

understanding the psychology of people, management of change, getting things done

without authority, understanding the competitive environment, human decision making,

coaching, working in high pressure environments, etc. They are agents of organisational

change. Unless one is self aware and is open to feedback to areas of development and

is constantly looking to improve, these learning‟s are often missed as many assume that

one has the necessary skills to provide a professional HSE service.

2.16 Summary

In this chapter some key aspects applicable to the research study were covered. Clear

perspectives on culture and in particular safety culture change programmes and

behaviour change programmes have been discussed. Deliberate attention was given to

these concepts as very often these terms are used interchangeably without the

individual or the programme facilitator understanding the core difference in their

applicability and their implementation strategy. Of relevance, is that both these

approaches are complementary and if the benefits are harnessed effectively, the

negative aspects are eliminated.



The required skills-set for individuals that facilitate these programmes on the ground

were also discussed. Often a technocratic approach is taken as the professional or

manager does not have the required understanding and skills in organisational change

management, culture and other „softer skills‟ required when interfacing with people.

The psychological perspectives that are essential in understanding human behaviour

have also been examined. If leveraged effectively these can then be used to negotiate

and change attitudes towards safety and move towards a generative HSSE culture.

Important issues of trust, empowerment, communication, social exchange and other

aspects were discussed.

Focus was also given to organisational change processes starting from Lewin (1951) to

some of the later models of Judson‟s (1991), Kotter (1995) and Gaplin (1996).

Behavioural change models were also considered in detail. The transtheoretical model

of the stages of change of Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcoss (1992) and the next

generation spiral model of change was also discussed. The application of the

transtheoretical model will be discussed in the next chapter.

Change fatigue was given its due attention and will also be picked up in the discussion

later with respect to the sample organisation. Measuring safety culture other than using

the culture ladder was also explored. The critical success factors for safety culture and

behavioural change programmes including the indicators of a positive safety culture was

highlighted. The intention here was not to go in-depth, but rather extract the key

outcomes from these research studies. These key success factors are the expected

outcomes of this research from a South African perspective. Some of the key themes

are captured in the figure below and will be discussed later.



Figure 19: Generic key success factors themes for safety culture change interventions

Lastly attention was also given to the role of national culture in organisational and hence

safety culture. While Mearns and Yule (2009) concluded that management and

leadership have emerged as significant determinants of safety performance and not

national culture, this is an area for further study in the South African and African context.

Hudson (2007) makes reference to this and the resulting impact on the Hearts and

Minds programmes in the next chapter. Meyer and Boninelli (2004) argue that

organisational and management philosophies of the African culture are different to the

West and therefore Western management theories and practices have limited

application. This is particularly true when one looks at the collectivistic cultural practices

amongst most traditional groupings in Africa and indeed South Africa.



CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter 2 provided the theoretical foundation based on the literary efforts of a number of

subject matter experts in the fields of OSHE, change management, organisational

change, culture, etc. Key themes and models were also discussed and these will aid in

discussions moving forward. In this chapter the theoretical framework from the

perspective of analysing the problem in the organisational context as described in

chapter 1 is examined. Safety culture in the South African environment is also

discussed.

The details explained in the coming pages set the framework, design and

implementation strategy of the Heart and Minds safety culture change programme

implemented across Royal Dutch Shell globally. Hudson played a key role in this

process and his papers have documented these pre-implementation strategies,

rationale, issues, etc. The pre-implementation framework will be used as the model

against which a post-implementation review will be conducted.

The actual analysis will be captured in Chapter 5.

3.1 Background

Hudson (2007), in his paper „Implementing a safety culture in a major multinational‟

provides the framework, the methodology and the intended output that was anticipated

with the implementation of the Heart and Minds safety culture change programme. It is

has been approximately 7 years since its implementation in the same multinational oil

and gas company in South Africa. The „model‟ proposed by Hudson will be compared

against the actual implementation locally and the successes and challenges shared.

Hudson proposed that the best time to evaluate progress will be about 2010, where the

research started in 1998 and implementation in 2003.



3.2 Issues with implementation in a Multinational

Hudson (2007) recognised that implementing a safety culture change programme in a

multinational oil and gas company across different geographies is different from

implementing such a programme in a single, distinct location. Some of the problems

that he highlights include:

With smaller organisations one can have a single, clear vision, and „single-

minded commitment” to that vision from the leadership but, larger

organisations are harder to steer even with the required commitment.

Smaller organisations are restricted in its range of activities and structure but

with many vertically integrated oil and gas companies there are a wide range

of operations such as exploration, production, refining, chemicals, aviation,

lubrications, marketing and retail, distribution, storage, etc each with its unique

range of hazards and risks.

With larger multinationals people are spread across different continents,

operating in different time zones, speaking different languages, etc. These

pose considerable challenges to the parent organisation.

Each sub-organisation in different parts of the world will also then have its

own unique local culture. There is further impact from the national culture on

the organisational culture and with it comes a wide range of influences:

beliefs, values, identity, norms, traditions, attitudes, etc which can either

supplement or be in direct conflict with the organisational culture.

From the discussion above, Hudson (2007), in the early stages already recognised the

tensions around leadership/vision and strategy, tensions between organisational and

national cultures, diversity, complexity and differences in operations, etc.

Prior to the implementation of a safety culture programme there are certain prerequisites

that enable a sustained culture change in HSSE. These include the required

technologies and standards and an integrated HSE management system (figure 20) that

is operational and effective. In the 1990‟s this multinational realised that a plateau in

HSSE performance was about to be reached and that focussing on the same measures



will not create the step-change required in safety performance. As discussed earlier this

often results in organisations turning to behavioural and culture change programmes.

Figure 20: HSE Management framework, Anon (Shaik, 2011)

With reference to figure 21, Hudson (2007) refers to this as “the developmental line,

where culture becomes the next wave after safety system”.

Figure 21: HSE Performance over time (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004)



Hudson (2007) refers to the Swiss cheese model (figure 22) as the model developed to

understand incident causation and the use of the Tripod Beta tools in root cause

analysis in accident investigation. According to the Swiss cheese model, each barrier or

defence has weaknesses and gaps and because each defensive layer and its

associated gaps (holes) are not static. Several layers of defensive barriers need to be

developed and maintained to prevent accidents from happening. (Olsen, Bjerkan &

Naevestad, 2009)

Figure 22: The Swiss cheese model (Downstream HSSE, 2008)

These tools continue to be used in the organisation today. It also became evident that

certain HSE tools worked, and others did not and as Hudson (2007) describes

“problems associated with safety culture and national culture” was highlighted for the

first time. It became clear that certain safety tools were only effective in specific

environments where the levels of safety culture were advanced. This was further

complicated by the national culture demands as the tools did not yield the same benefits

in different environments.

Around 1998, an advisory group was setup. The group felt that the people component

was missing. The group also felt that is was time to “redress the balance” – move away

from the blame culture and the focus was to create a workforce that “was intrinsically

motivated for safety”. The proposal was framed without dealing with the problem of

motivation which Hudson states is more difficult than to create a culture. (Hudson, 2007)



3.3 Motivation

Lewin‟s (1951) work on „field theory‟ demonstrates that motivation alone does not

produce the change. The motivation has to be linked to a decision and the required

actions for the outcome to be achieved. (Gershwin, 1994)

Hudson (2007) makes reference to Hudson, et.al, (1998), where he surmises some

underlying concepts and theories on motivation:

“Highly motivated people feel in control or feel powerful, competent and high

on self-efficacy. These people are intrinsically motivated to do their job. The

downside is that the feelings may be biased („unrealistic optimism‟; „illusion of

control‟).

Less motivated people don‟t feel in control or feel powerless, less competent

and low on self-efficacy. These people show less initiative. These feelings

maybe biased as well. („Learned helplessness‟).

Extrinsic rewards can move the locus of control from internal to external,

praise and reward for quality of performance may increase the internal locus

of control.

Under certain circumstances rewards and incentive may change behaviour,

but it is also true that intrinsic motivation maybe hampered. Simple

attachment of rewards may be attached to the wrong behaviours.

Although behaviour may be changed, underlying beliefs may remain

unchanged. This suggests that reversion to old behaviours is likely.

Belief is a crucial factor in determining how and why people behave. Values

may be acceptable but expectations will be driven by beliefs.” (Hudson, 2007)

Hudson (2007) also states that any “system to increase intrinsic motivation for HSE will

actually be changing the way people behave” hence their behaviour change is attributed

to intrinsic motivation. He claims that the term intrinsic motivation is unclear in academic

literature (while Shell claims differently) and using a behaviourist definition would then

mean that people are intrinsically motivated for HSE when they consistently behave

safely without external influence.



When considering what an intrinsically motivated workforce would look like and what

would be required to create such a workforce the answer was “that in an advance safety

culture, individuals would be intrinsically motivated and to get there will require that

people change their attitudes and behaviour, such that they wanted to become, what

they were changing to.” (Hudson, 2007)

3.4 Model for creating lasting change

The culture ladder (figure 23) as described in the previous chapter will be the model for

„creating lasting change‟. It was recognised while understanding the required journey

alone will not make the change happen. To this effect the transtheoretical model (figure

24) of Prochaska and DiClemente (1983) was used. The primary drivers for this choice

were that it covered the essential elements of change and that people must have a

personal desire to change. Special emphasis is placed on acquiring awareness and

once behaviour change is achieved, the focus will be on maintaining the change. The

detailed change model is summarised in table 10. (Hudson, 2007)

Figure 23: The HSE Culture Ladder (Parker and Hudson Model) (The Energy Institute and Shell E&P, 2004)



Figure 24: The change model based on the transtheoretical model of Prochaska and DiClemente,

1983 (Hudson, 2007)

It must be noted that the revised version of the transtheoretical model, the spiral model

for behavioural change by Prochaska, DiClemente and Norcross (1992) was not used at

the time by Hudson.

When assessing the safety culture in petrochemical companies in Brazil, Filho, Andrade

& Marinho (2010) concluded that the safety maturity model proposed by Hudson (2001),

was useful as it enable organisations to establish their current level of safety culture

maturity and identify actions to improve their culture.

3.5 Support of senior leadership

The senior leadership at the time fully supported the project with their personal

involvement in interviews of the current culture and their future expectations.

Management realised that compliance alone will not create the step-change required in

HSE. Management also requested that the tools be simple to implement. (Hudson,

2007)



Table 10: The detailed change model with 14 stages by Hudson and Parker, 1999 (Hudson, 2007)

Pre-contemplation to contemplation – AWARENESS

1. Awareness Simple knowledge of a „better‟ alternative than the current state

2. Creation of need Active personal desire to achieve a new state

3. Making the outcome believable

Believing that the state is sensible for those involved

4. Making the outcome achievable

Making the process of achieving the new state credible for those involved

5. Personal vision Definition by those involved of what they expect the new situation to be

6. Information about successes

Provision of information about others who have succeeded

Contemplation to preparation – PLANNING

7. Plan construction Creation by those involved of their own action plan

8. Measurement points Definition of indicators of success in process

9. Commitment Signing-up to the plan of all involved

Preparation to action – ACTION

10. Do Start implementing action plan

11. Review Review progress with concentration upon success outcomes

12. Correct Reworking of plan where necessary

Maintenance – MAINTENANCE

13. Review Management review of process at regular(and defined in advance) intervals

14. Outcome Checks on internalization of values and beliefs in outcome state

3.6 The tools

A small range of micro tools were developed (figure 25). The intention was that the tool

be simple, single sheet of paper, an hour in use and not requiring consultants for

specialised training. Tools would also have to support the journey up the culture ladder.

Hudson adds that “a well-researched product will often be cast aside for a well

packaged product that looks as if it will solve the problems”. This is the reason he states

why the work on Violations and Rule-breaking never achieved the required results.

Such tools are selected on the basis of face validity as those selecting them have little or

no training in human factors. (Hudson, 2007)



Figure 25: The full set of Hearts and Minds tools (Hudson, 2007)

3.7 Programme design criteria

Any tool developed should be a micro tool that can alter behaviour and attitude,

documented on one page and take a maximum of one hour.

The tools should fit day-to day activities.

Tools are designed to be used by supervisors as facilitators with their crews.

The programme should run itself, no consultants and minimal external facilitation

Tools should be based on facts about human behaviour.

Tools should be fun, effective and naturally encouraging.

3.8 Implementation Strategy

The HSE culture ladder and the change model both determine:

(1) Where an organisation might go on the culture journey and

(2) How the organisation can get there.

These two steps then formed the basis for the implementation strategy in the

multinational oil and gas organisation of approximately 100 000 employees and over

250 000 contractors. With this number of people it became clear that this will have to be

driven by intrinsic motivation and while help was available it would not be “major project

driven top-down by conventional means.” (Hudson, 2007)



As the trials began it became clear that developing an advanced safety culture in an

organisation of this magnitude was not going to be easy and because of its design

requiring those within the organisation to take ownership and raise themselves up. The

use of external service providers was not the preferred option. Since the programme

was intended to be a „pull‟ rather than a „push‟ programme, a marketing strategy was

employed using “industrial strength theory where the concepts and understanding of

human behaviour and attitudes could stand the test of implementation without

continuous oversight. The major advantage of pull management is that not everyone

needs to be targeted. „Early adopters‟ were targeted and then the „believers‟ will run

with the programme. The product was branded with the Heart and Minds logo (figure

26) (Hudson, 2007).

Figure 26: The Hearts and Minds logo -SIEP, EP - HSE (Hudson, 2007)

3.9 The tactics

Pull rather than push

Follow the strategy. Trained facilitators should not cascade their skills more than

one level down – to avoid dilution of understanding.

Make the tools fit for the local environment. Language, individualistic versus

collectivistic societies.

Both top-down and bottom up strategies are required. Seeing yourself as other

see you is a top-down tool while the rest are predominantly bottom-up tools.

“Cognitive dissonance as a mechanism to induce change”. Some fake their

commitment but because their behaviour needs to be consistent with their

behaviour, this will eventually force change. In addition, when people are in

public they have no choice but to behave in the correct manner, therefore once



people set their own targets they should be held accountable to them. (“I-

statements”)

(Hudson, 2007)

Table 11: Summary of key aspects of the Hearts & Minds culture change strategy

Issue Mechanism to address

Larger organisations harder to

steer

Leadership commitment

Complexity of operations Tools will be simple and generic enough to apply in any

situation.

National culture vs Organisational

culture

Tools converted to local languages. Issues picked up as some

countries do not have advanced safety cultures. Some tools did

not yield the same results in different environments. Some

materials could be customized to reflect local circumstances.

Collectivistic societies versus individualistic societies

Pre-requisites : HSSE MS,

Technology, standards,

procedures, risk management,

reporting systems, etc.

Existing as different levels of maturity.

Motivation Intrinsic motivation – unclear on how this will be instilled

Model for lasting change Culture ladder and the change model will be the transtheoretical

model. Cognitive dissonance will be the mechanism to induce

change.

Senior management support Supported and involved in design stages

Change model Making change last module.

Tools Micro tools, 1 sheet of paper, max 1 hour, that would change

attitude and behaviour, based on human behaviour and fun

Forum Day-to-day activities – no special sessions

Facilitators Supervisors, engineers – run itself, no external consultant,

minimum facilitation – organisation takes ownership and raises

itself. Trained – should not cascade skills more than one level

down to prevent dilution

Strategy Primarily pull rather than push. „Seeing yourself as other see

you‟ tool – push strategy. Marketing strategy employed. Early

adopter and believers will drive the momentum.



Table 11 provides a high-level summary of the Heart and Minds safety culture

programme rationale, design and implementation strategy. Seven years on, we will look

to see how far we have come on this journey and it the programme is achieving the

desired outcomes. Before we consider the research methodology and data collection

steps we will now consider safety culture in South Africa to provide some local context to

the discussion.

3.10 Multinationals in developing countries

With the onset of globalisation, a multitude of organisations and multinational

corporations are seeking to expand their commercial footprint in search of untapped

opportunities and access to resources in developing markets. Host countries welcome

these opportunities for economic development as governments are required to meet the

basic needs of their constituents. The technologies, new installations, operating

facilities, competence and much-needed investments come, in some cases, at the

expense of human exploitation and other atrocities for which multinationals have been

criticized. Thus as globalisation continues multinational corporations have come under

scrutiny with an increasing need for adequate governance. (Baram, 2009)

With regard to safety, this heightened transfer of technologies is accompanied by the

use of best practices to ensure safe operation. Baram (2009) cautions, that these new

technologies and best practices could be problematic in host nations if it conflicts with

traditions, indigenous cultures and aspirations of host countries.

3.11 Safety culture in the South African context 3.11.1 Background South Africa has a population of approximately fifty one (51) million, of which twenty five

percent (25%) of the population is unemployed. (Refer to table 12). There are four (4)

main racial classifications are African, White, Indian and Coloured and eleven (11)

official languages.



3.11.2 Political and Social environment

There were one (1) million or seven and a half percent (7.5%) fewer jobs in 2010

compared to 2009, with the unemployment rate of twenty four percent (24%) of the

population in 2011. Significant disparities exist between male and female employment,

particularly amongst those classified as Africans (Refer to figure 27). The 1995 October

household survey revealed that that the only six percent (6%) of African male and

females received higher education (beyond Standard Ten), while thirty percent (30%) of

white males received higher education. (Refer to figure 28) In the context of safety such

information becomes relevant when one recognises that front-line employees, often

have not received formal education and often Africans have been the source of manual

labour.

Figure 27: Employment according to gender and population groups, 1993-1995 (Statistics South

Africa, 2000)



Figure 28: Level of education by race and gender amongst those 20years + (Central Statistical

Service, 1996)

Wealth inequality between the rich and poor remains high. There is an increasing fiscal

demand for infrastructure, social investment/employment, industrial policy, etc. Key

issues include: job creation, security of supply (liquid fuels), electricity, sanitation, water

resource management, housing, climate change, bio fuels, Broad Based Black

Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) etc. (Lizamore, 2011)

3.11.3 Economic environment The South African economy is a stable, growing and an emerging „BRICS‟ market.

However emerging markets continue to be impacted by the financial crises of the

developed world. Gross domestic product was three percent (3%) in 2010/11 and

expected to grow to four percent (4%) per annum by 2012. This is being led by mining

at five percent (5%) and manufacturing at 10 percent (10%) per annum. Gross domestic

expenditure has recovered strongly and together with export growth is contributing to

steady recovery (as at July 2011). Domestic spend recovered to over four percent (4%)

per annum. (Lizamore, 2011)



Figure 29 looks at domestic expenditure while table 12 covers some of the key

economic indicators as at July 2011. The 2011 focus is on the „New Growth Plan‟ with

the plan to create five million new jobs. Industrial policy is aimed at infrastructure and

focuses on the agriculture, mining, green economy, manufacturing and tourism sectors.

(Lizamore, 2011)

Figure 29: Components of real gross domestic final demand (Lizamore, 2011)

Table 12: Key Economic indicators, July 2011 (Lizamore, 2011)

Key Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

GDP Growth (%) 5.4 5.1 3.1 -1.8 3 3

CPI (ave % change p.a.) 4.6 6.5 10.6 10.3 5 5

Exchange Rate (Usd) 6.75 7.04 7.75 7.5 7.5 7.8

Unemployment Rate(%) 25.5 24.2 23.1 24.3 24 2433.7 33.7

Population (' mln) 47.9 48.3 48.7 49.3 50.2 51



3.11.4 South African HSE legislative Framework

There are a number of legislative frameworks governing health, safety and the

protection of the environment. This starts with the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of

South Africa. Table 13 captures some of the main occupational health and safety

legislation. The National Environmental Management Act 108 of 1999 is an overarching

environmental framework legislation which encompasses the Waste Act, Air Quality Act,

Biodiversity Act, etc.

The custodian of the occupational health and safety legislation is the Department of

Labour, medical and health-related matters are the Department of Health and

environment has been managed under the National Department of Environmental

Affairs. In recent times we have also seen the “Green Scorpions” handle high profile

cases of environmental mismanagement. In a broader sense, the Road Traffic Act

governs road use, rules, behaviour, yet this remains one of the leading causes of deaths

in South Africa.

Table 13: Occupational Health and Safety framework in South Africa (Jeebhay and Jacobs, 1999)



3.11.5 Safety culture in South Africa

Data with respect to HSE in the South African context is limited. With the information

that does exist, data quality, different interpretations, different definitions and lack of

reporting incidents are some of the challenges that exist. The only available source of

data albeit limited, is the compensation paid with respect to the Compensation for

Occupational Injuries and Diseases (COID) Act No 103 of 1993. These apply to only

those cases that have been reported.

Furthermore in a developing country safety culture has not evolved to the levels of our

developed counterparts. With socio-economic pressures safety performance has lagged

in many sectors. Very often the multinational corporations were amongst the first to

implement and monitor compliance to safety measures. While South Africa has

historically had safety legislation, enforcement as with many other pieces of legislation

has been lacking. This together with corruption, crime and other socio-economic issues

has not put safety on the forefront. In more recent times, mining fatalities, pollution, road

deaths, etc., certain sectors within the HSE space is receiving attention, albeit a slow

process. This is also due to increased public awareness and public outcry.

Table 14 captures the most common occupational illnesses reported to the

Compensation Commissioner for the period 1996-1998, while table 15 captures

occupational diseases in terms of the Mines and Works Act. Occupational illnesses and

diseases stem from workplace exposure to harmful agents that are inhaled, adsorbed,

absorbed, ingested, etc. Injuries, occupational illnesses and diseases, accidents, etc.

can be directly linked to a poor HSE culture and an ineffective HSE management system

as described earlier in chapter 2. While the necessary control measures may exist in an

organisation, employee behaviour can still contribute to the exposure. One of the pillars

of safety culture is employee behaviour.

In some instances engineering and administrative controls are ineffective and do not

limit exposure and hence personal protective equipment (PPE) is used to supplement

the existing controls. Where the organisation accepts a culture where staff are unaware

of the PPE‟s application and maintenance, where incorrect PPE is issued to save costs



(e.g. dust masks for chemical exposure), where compliance to correct legislative

requirements are only adhered if the client requests it and is prepared to pay for it, greed

for profit at the expense of employee, etc; these behaviours exhibit poor safety culture

underpinned by poor leadership and commitment. Such behaviours result in incidents

and may even be considered acceptable as the HSE KPI is within the target set for the

year.

This is a demonstration of a poor safety culture ethos in many organisations in South

Africa and there is some way to go before this mindset is reversed, bearing in mind that

these are only the reported cases. Businesses are often only shut down following

serious incidents where there has been loss of life.

Table 14: Most common occupational diseases reported to the Compensation Commissioner in

terms of the COID Act (Jeebhay and Jacobs, 1999)



Table 15: Occupational diseases certified under the Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works

Act in South Africa (Jeebhay and Jacobs, 1999)

The most recent available statics from the Department of Labour have been prior to

2000. Table 17 captures the health and safety statistics per industrial sector. All

industries and the chemicals sectors have 11.4 and 10.9 fatalities per 100 000

respectively. The high rates of fatalities and permanent disabilities are a clear indicator

of the country‟s safety culture. Under reporting and the lack of reputable data is further

indicative of this. In comparison to the rest of the world, Africa rates second highest

while South Africa rates third highest in the world in terms of fatalities and accident per

100 000 workers. (Refer to table 16)

Table 16: Occupational accidents per region (CIDB, 2009)



Table 17: Health and safety statistics from the Department of Labour accident fund (CIDB, 2009)



3.11.5.1 Road traffic fatalities as a measure of safety culture

In total, 3 280 931 deaths were recorded in South Africa between 2001 and 2006 of

which nine and a half percent (9,5%) were due to non-natural causes (Statistics South

Africa, 2009). Table 18 refers to death per mode of transport indicating that the majority

of deaths occur on South African roads. As per figure 30, the majority of these incidents

occur during December and is associated with the peak holiday seasons in South Africa.

More concerning is that the age distribution of these fatalities. These are adults

between the ages of 25 and 49 that are collectively contributing to the highest numbers

(figure 31). These are also the ages of our very economically active populations in South

Africa.

Table 18: Distribution of deaths as per transport mode and year (Statistic South Africa, 2009)



Figure 30: Road traffic accident distribution per month 2001-2006 (Statistics South Africa, 2009)

Figure 31: Age specific road accident deaths 2001-2006 (Statistics South Africa, 2009)

3.11.5.2 Safety culture in the petroleum sector in South Africa

The petroleum sector was one early adopters of an HSE management system as part of

improving HSE performance. Many of these being multinationals adopted the global



policies set forth by their parent companies and were amongst the first to introduce this

in South Africa. When looking at the petroleum industry statistics (excluding refining) as

this is most relevant to the research overall there is a minor decline in fatalities with a

few sporadic spikes in the data. (Refer to figure 32).

The total recordable rate (TRR) used by SAPIA, is probably a more realistic indicator as

it takes into account the number of hours worked in relation and the number of incidents

within a specific time period. Figure 33 indicates and increasing trend with a decline

only in 2010. Once again, this demonstrates no sustainable improvements in safety

performance.

Figure 32: SA Petroleum Industry Safety performance Indicators (SAPIA, 2011)



Figure 33: SA Petroleum Industry total recordable rate (SAPIA, 2011)

Figure 34 indicates an overall declining trend in the number of reported fires, however

2010 performance is less than ideal. Figure 35 indicates that occupational illnesses

have been stable over the last seven years.

Figure 34: SA Petroleum Industry fires (SAPIA, 2011)



Figure 35: SA Petroleum Industry occupational illnesses (SAPIA, 2011)

Security incidents is one of the major challenges facing the sector. As negative

economic impacts are felt, the industry has seen an increase in robberies on retail site

forecourts with the maximum number experienced in 2008. See figure 36. The trend is

on a downward spiral as the oil companies put in measures to combat crime. One of the

major issues with criminal activity on the forecourts is the violent nature of the crimes

often resulting in fatalities. While these statistics mostly involve the public, they are

considered to be part business, and consequently deemed to be occupationally-linked.

The number of hijacking incidents and Cash in transit (CIT) heists have not radically

improved reflecting a plateuing trend for the last six years.



Figure 36: SA Petroleum Industry security incidents (SAPIA, 2011)

3.12 Summary

In this chapter, the theoretical framework, design and implementation rationale of the

Heart and Minds safety culture change programme implemented across Royal Dutch

Shell globally was presented including the framework for discussion in the local context.

The role and how multinationals are viewed in developing countries was also covered.

A review of safety culture in South Africa was also completed and its impact on HSE

performance. Reference was made to different environments and the high rates of

incidents and fatalities. South Africa was also compared to the developed and the

developing markets and this reflected the enormous divide in safety performance

between the two which is indicative of the amount of work required to reverse the trend

of unsafe workplaces.



CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION

This chapter primarily focuses on the research methodology used and the associated

data collection process employed to collect the required data in this study

4.1 Introduction

The distinction between qualitative and quantitative research lies in the quest for in-

depth understanding. In quantitative research “the focus is on the control of all

components in the actions and representations of the participants – the variables will be

controlled and the study is guided with an acute focus on how the variables are related.”

The focus in on quantities rather than on the qualities of phenomena. (Henning, 2004)

4.2 Rationale

This project was requested by management as it was felt that the current Hearts and

Minds programme was not adequately addressing the issues of culture and behaviour

within the organisation. An assessment of the current systems and programmes was

required prior to any new intervention being designed and implemented.

4.3 Qualitative design methodology

In this research study a qualitative methodology will be used. In qualitative research the

variables are not controlled. “It is exactly this freedom and natural development of

action and representation” that is intended to be collated. (Henning, 2004) In addition,

the understanding, argumentative descriptions using evidentiary data and literature will

be captured. A hybrid of methodologies will be used. In-depth interviewing using a

semi-structured format, observations and an element of ethnographic studies as we

evaluate a culture change amongst a group of individuals as the author journeys over a

period of time through different levels in the organisation.



4.4 Practical steps in research design and data collection

Table 19 summarises the key steps in the research design and data collection

processes. It also covers some of the reasons for such interventions to be included.

This being a qualitative design methodology, the primary mode of data collection is

focussed on in-depth interviews. In discussions however, other measures will also be

used to support the evidence presented.

Table 19: Practical steps in research design and data collection methodology

STEP ACTIVITY

1 Establish theoretical framework. Completed in Chapter 3.

2 Establish the pre-implementation methodology and philosophy for safety culture

implementation programme in local multinational organisation. Completed in

Chapter 3.

3 Qualitative research design methodology to be used. Consider reliability and

validity. Chapter 4

4 Set up project team. Project team to carry out groundwork. Project team will

comprise organisational design staff, external consultant and two (2) human

resource focal points. Internal human resource lead from organisational design

is a specialist and has the appropriate psychological training and competence.

The design team with be cross functional. This will also be an opportunity to

build capacity within the organisation.

No HSSE staff to be included. HSSE will provide indirect support and guidance.

This was done to:

To eliminate bias

Maintain objectivity

Allow participants to respond freely without any intimidation

HSSE staff were being interviewed as well



5 Obtain leadership commitment and support.

Executive, senior and middle management

Leadership needs to be empowered to guide project implementation

Ensure that resistance is effectively dealt with

Critical to ensure that HSSE is integrated with business

Address challenges in a systematic and planned manner

Manage project

6 Establish Steercom.

Steercom members:

Country Chair of the Company

General Managers of Supply and Distribution, Fuels and Bitumen and

Retail Businesses

Country HSSE Manager

Human Resource Manager

General Manager for HSSE (Africa)

7 Establish role of Steercom:

Provide strategic guidance

Sponsor project

Cross-functional and multi-levelled approach

Own HSSE Balanced Scorecard

Address strategic barriers

Administer reward and recognition

Address issues of resistance

Country HSSE manager will provide additional technical support and

provide the necessary theoretical information, terminologies, frameworks,

etc. on existing HSSE management system. Guidance on questions and

their appropriateness will also be provided.

8 Design Questionnaire. Semi-structured in-depth interview framework to be

used. Observations and personal narratives where applicable will also be

captured.

9 All interviewers to undergo training and orientation.



10 Participants (key roles) will be selected via consultation with business leaders.

11 Internal stakeholders to be interviewed. All interviews will be detailed and in-

depth.

12 Project team to meet and discuss results and compile key findings.

13 External stakeholders (contractors) to be interviewed.

14 Project team to meet and discuss results and compile key findings

15 Project team to benchmark against Shell entities and other South African

companies

16 Project team to meet and discuss results and compile key findings.

17 Team to clarify any uncertainties and consolidate findings.

18 Additional interviews to be conducted by the HSSE manager on the

implementation of Heart and Minds specifically amongst 6 HSSE professionals

and staff. Elements of the method of implementation, customisation of

materials, facilitators, training of facilitators, measurement, roles of leaders

amongst other will be discussed. These elements are very specific and HSSE

professionals were later mandated to deliver this locally.

19 Analysis of results. Identification of key themes, trends, findings, etc.

20 Comparison of process to pre-implementation philosophy.

21 Consider reliability, validity and that ability to generalise of data.

22 Conclusion and presentation of results to management for further action.

23 Distribute findings for wider learning.

4.5 The sample size

The project team after considering the mandate provided by senior leadership primarily

focused on what was known at the time as the Shell Oil Products Africa (SOPAF)

Classes of Business. These comprised the Supply and Distribution, Fuels & Bitumen

and Retail businesses. These businesses were not fully integrated with their Global

counterparts. Supply and Distribution was experiencing HSE challenges with regard to

competence, performance, asset integrity, etc and was the primary driver. It was

decided that the study be expanded to include the other classes of business. The



outcomes will be piloted in Supply and Distribution and will later be cascaded into other

businesses.

In order to provide some objectivity and as a benchmark the Shell Aviation class of

business, contractors and external companies were also sampled.

In summary the sample size included:

• Twenty eight (28) Individual interviews, using a Semi- structured interview

questionnaire in Fuels & Bitumen, Retail, Supply and Distribution and Aviation

Businesses.

• Six (6) additional interviews on the local implementation of Hearts and Minds

specifically will be conducted by the HSSE manager.

• Two (2) external road transport contractors - Unitrans & Fuelogic

• Global Shell-Shell Singapore (Aviation), Shell UK (Supply Chain Management),

Shell Australia (Aviation) – for comparative purposes and learning (does not

impact findings)

• External South African companies - Woolworths, Rainbow Chickens – for

comparative purposes and learning for future development. (does not impact

findings)

4.6 The semi structured interview questionnaire

The semi structure questionnaire served as an interview framework tool to ensure

consistency in questioning. Participants were required to complete the questionnaire.

This was followed up with a detailed interview by the respective HR personnel.

The questions were specifically chosen to establish the level of safety culture maturity

over time. This included the processes and procedures, the technical issues and

assets, the HSSE management system and then finally establishing the level of safety

culture and behavioural elements relevant to progressive HSSE culture including the

barriers to this process. The terminology used was deliberate in that elements of the

culture ladder such as generative culture was not mentioned, neither was it an option.



This was done to establish if the respondents actually understood the culture journey the

organisation had embarked on. In addition the questions employed were open ended to

allow the respondents to further indicate their understanding of HSSE in the

organisation.

Another important element was that these questions were not being asked by HSSE

personnel in the organisation. This took away the technicalities associated with HSSE

as a subject and rather started to build on the initial intention that this was not „just

another‟ HSSE initiative, but if we want to change this we needed to intrinsically motivate

ourselves to change our behaviour. It also removed any fears of respondents that may

otherwise not respond honestly if asked directly by someone that measures their

performance.

Twenty three (23) questions were asked and are listed below:

Table 20: Semi-structured interview questions (Janse van Rensburg, L., Nombewu, Z., Gorbatov,

S., Botes, S. & Shaik, F., 2009)

Introduction

In Shell we group Health, Safety, Security and Environmental management together

and refer to it as HSSE. This interview focuses on the health, safety and

environmental issues.

No. Question

1 How do you refer to this broad field [HSSE] (not applicable to Shell interviews)?

2 How would you describe your approach to managing HSSE?

3 How do you gauge your success, or what yardsticks do you use to measure your

success in the field?

4 Was there any “step change” in the HSSE performance of your

organisation/business/division (both positive and negative)? Please describe.

5 According to you what are the critical success factors and key focus areas

needed to manage HSSE effectively?



6 What interventions launched in your organisation/business/division/ have

contributed to HSSE positively? Why?

7 What interventions launched has had little impact on the management of HSSE?

8 What is your organisation/business/division‟s approach to the measurement of

HSSE related indicators?

9 How do you define and categorise incidents?

10 How did you inculcate a positive culture to report HSSE incidents?

11 Do you have a reporting/measurement system in place that assist you to

proactively indentify risks and what management mechanism do you use to

ensure this type of information is responded to timeously?

12 How do you manage the alignment between the organisation/ business/division‟s

needs/objectives and HSSE requirements/imperatives?

13 How do you manage non-compliance?

14 What consequence management systems do you have in place (positive and

negative)?

15 How is HSSE structured and resourced (both in terms of people and systems)?

16 What HSSE competencies are you looking for when you appoint staff (formal

qualifications, experience and skills/competencies)?

17 What is your approach to establishing the HSSE competencies needed: a)

internal staff b) external staff?

18 In terms of the management of HSSE, how do you approach and manage

contractors?

19 How do you manage the interface between your organisation /business/division

and the environment/clients/customers?

20 According to you and your organisation/business/division‟s views, what are the

critical leadership behaviours that are pre-requisites to effectively manage

HSSE?

21 How do you ensure that HSSE forms part of the cultural fabric of the company?

22 How do you use communication in HSSE (what type of messages do you

communicate, do you segment target markets, what media or channels do you

mostly employ?

23 In summary: What are the main challenges in terms of managing HSSE?



Interviews on average were approximately 1.5 hours. The questions were initially

responded to in writing followed by the in-depth interview. Depending on the response

additional clarity questions were asked as appropriate.

4.7 Reliability and validity of data

Issues of bias were identified in the conceptual stages and where practical eliminated as

indicated in table 19. Face validity was also eliminated due to collaborative evidence

produced in the in-depth interview process. Recurring themes and findings were

consistent across the different classes of business. Interview findings were discussed

by the project team confirming the validity of the findings.

There is a high-level of certainty that the data is corresponds to the reality. This is

further collaborated by the logic and consistency in the statements. The outcomes of

this study will be actioned to ensure the necessary gaps are addressed. This pragmatic

consequence of this body of knowledge also assists in confirming validity.

4.8 Summary

This chapter summarised the rationale, the research design steps and data collection

methodology. Practical implementation issues were identified, the appropriate

supporting frameworks established including the issues of bias being appropriately

addressed. The results and outcomes are discussed in the next chapter.



CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on the critical analysis and discussion on the findings and

outcomes of the data collected. These will be discussed in the form of key themes,

trends or findings.

In addition a direct comparison will be made between the intended design and

implementation rationale of the Hearts and Minds safety culture programme as

described under the theoretical framework by Hudson (2009) versus the post

implementation reality in the South African environment.

This will then be followed by a discussion on the findings integrated with the in-depth

literature survey conducted earlier and some key conclusions on the critical success

factors for the practical implementation of safety culture initiative in the South African

context in the last chapter.

5.2 Analysis of results

5.2.1 Hearts & Minds Pre and Post implementation comparison

Hudson (2009) had a very specific methodology in the Hearts and Minds design

philosophy. He highlighted key issues such as the norms values, traditions of a unique

local culture, language, the impact of national culture, many work streams and activities,

the difficulty in maintaining a single clear vision in larger organisations spread across the

world, etc. Hence the tools required a certain degree of customisation at the local level

and the correct delivery.

In addition, as discussed earlier a specific change management philosophy based on

the transtheoretical model was employed. This was key to identifying the need for



change, planning for change implementation and embedding of the change. He also

referred to the intrinsic motivation to change.

Table 21: Summary comparison between the intended Hearts & Minds safety culture programme

and philosophy versus the actual implementation in South Africa

Issue Mechanism to

address

Actual Implementation

Larger

organisations

harder to steer

Leadership

commitment

The first roll-out session was held in 2003 where international

facilitators came to South Africa and rolled out the programme to

the Country Chair and his leadership team and other Country

Chairs from other Southern African countries. The intent was

that these leaders were to train their management teams and/or

roll out the modules themselves as per the Business needs and

the current status on the culture ladder.

Overall verbal commitment however there is no evidence of

Heart and Minds sessions being led by leaders or training their

management teams to lead these sessions. The management

teams have significantly changed since 2003.

As a result of this, HSSE professionals for the SOPAF classes of

Businesses (study area) were trained and mandated to roll out

the Hearts and Minds modules in 2004. Hearts & Minds as a

term is used frequently but the ownership and the commitment to

actually understand, make the time and to use the tool is

minimal. Measurement not on quality but rather quantitative i.e.

number of sessions tracked per class of business. Programme

is HSSE driven – top-down. Pull mechanisms not employed. Not

self perpetuating – no early adopters or believers.

Complexity of

operations

Tools will be simple

and generic

enough to apply in

any situation.

The general one hour rule was not consistently applied. Special

sessions for Hearts and Minds were held – staff compelled to

attend. The shortest session was that of the „Rule of Three”

module which was approximately thirty (30) minutes long. The

remaining sessions took between 1.5 – 3.5 hours depending on

the module and the audience.

Materials localised but too detailed. In some cases – over sixty



(60) PowerPoint slides. Sessions not integrated as part of

normal activities i.e. tool box talks, etc. Modules were

compressed due to resource constraints e.g. driving safely

modules.

The ability of facilitators in their capacity to deliver these

sessions and the required preparation is also questionable.

National

culture versus

Organisational

culture

Tools converted to

local languages.

Issues picked up as

some countries do

not have advanced

safety cultures.

Some tools did not

yield the same

results in different

environments.

Some materials

could be

customized to

reflect local

circumstances.

Collectivistic

societies versus

individualistic

societies

Tools were only customised in the sense of local examples,

pictures, etc. The language was not amended to address the

low education levels of staff in the frontline. There were no

interpreters used. Due to the length of these sessions there were

conflicting priorities i.e. job versus „training‟.

The fact that SA is a non-compliant safety culture environment

was not considered. Slides not converted to local languages

and presentations were done in English. Safety versus issues of

hunger, poor housing, sanitation, crime (socio economic issues

in the country). In the South African environment basic

necessities precede the need to comply (Maslow‟s Hierarchy of

needs) unless the link between working safely and sustained

income and livelihoods can be demonstrated. No mechanism to

identify with the frontline staff in the delivery, content and

language format – no creative solutions employed.

Local culture does not encourage reporting – referred to as

„impimpi‟ (informer). Decisions in the African cultures are made

collectively after discussion and consultation. Therefore the

individualistic top-down approaches are not readily supported as

employees are not part of the design process.

Certain work environments, young recruits – tendency to

challenge the system – „try and get away with incorrect

behaviours‟

Slides are not the best mode of delivery for frontline staff. This

was not considered. If integrated as practical sessions as part of

normal work as per the design, results may have been different.

Pre- Existing as different The HSSE-MS not a living process/document in all areas.



requisites :

HSSE MS,

Technology,

standards,

procedures,

risk

management,

reporting

systems, etc.

levels of maturity. Documentation is long and detailed. Staff do not necessarily

understand their role in the management of HSSE risks in the

frontline. Typical document is kept in the manager‟s office or in

soft format.

Engineering controls are non-existent or ineffective due to aging

assets in certain parts of the organisation – increased burden on

staff and additional procedures.

High workloads, high staff turnover in critical roles.

Organisational change annually impacting on staff morale, stress

levels, workloads. Retraining is required. Not moving to higher

levels in the HSSE culture ladder.

Poor HSSE and functional competencies amongst critical

positions.

HSSE is not line driven in all Businesses or at operational levels.

HSSE viewed as additional burden.

Motivation Intrinsic motivation

– not clear on how

this will be instilled

Staff not intrinsically motivated. Compliance driven.

Consequence management for non-compliance. Non-

compliance will return instantly if no monitoring is done.

It was agreed that actions from Heart and Minds sessions will be

discussed at performance appraisal sessions. If not completed

there will be no negative consequences as this needed to be self

driven by design. Actions not consistently followed up.

Model for

lasting change

Culture ladder and

the change model

will be the

transtheoretical

model.

Making change last

module. Cognitive

dissonance will be

the mechanism to

The culture ladder tool is referenced frequently but the detailed

analysis is less frequently used. The change management model

was not used effectively. Its implementation was high-level and

seen as just another module. Non-compliant behaviours have

returned within a short space of time as the change was not fully

embedded and employees are not intrinsically motivated to

change.

Cognitive dissonance mechanisms failed as the action plans



induce change. were not publicised and tracked openly and as a result people

did not hold themselves accountable to their commitments.

High staff turnover at all levels has impacted on sustainability of

the programme. Annual organisational changes are impacting on

sustainability – „change fatigue‟.

Senior

management

support

Supported and

involved in design

stages

Local senior management not involved in the design process.

SA is located far South from most other hubs. Impacts on

ownership and the success of the programme. Viewed as a

Group initiative.

Tools Micro tools, 1 sheet

of paper, max 1

hour, that would

change attitude and

behaviour, based

on human

behaviour and fun

The sessions were long and laborious in some cases. The

audience were not engaged fully at certain times. Almost always

had a serious, morose tone (fatalities, injuries, etc) – not fun.

Forum Day-to-day

activities

Not applied - Special training sessions held. The Heart and

minds programme was seen on the ground as a series of

training programmes that will move the organisation up the

culture ladder.

The fundamentals of culture change management in an

organisation of over 1.500 employees locally were not applied.

Facilitators Supervisors,

engineers – run

itself, no external

consultant,

minimum facilitation

– organisation

takes ownership

and raises itself.

Trained – should

not cascade skills

more than one level

down to prevent

dilution

This was not adhered to since its initial roll-out in 2003. Due to

limited/no action from management and non-HSSE staff, HSSE

professionals were trained in 2004 and expected to take

ownership and drive implementation in the Business.

Businesses were then measured against the numbers of

attendees for the different modules delivered. This was totally

against the design philosophy and probably one of the biggest

contributors to what some refer to as the failure of Heart and

Minds programme in the local context.

With organisational changes, the Heart and Minds facilitators

were no longer there and the burden was then placed on other

individuals who merely attended a sessions to continue the roll-

out. The training was indeed diluted. Key steps in its



implementation were missed. Certain high risk areas had a

committed individual but this was from the HSSE team e.g. Road

Transport however upon the departure of this individual, a gap

was created.

Heart & Minds was viewed and another top-down HSSE

initiative.

Facilitator skills were also questioned – while some maybe

technically competent their interpersonal skills were poor and

hence the sessions became procedural. The value gained was

minimal and therefore there was no desire to participate in other

sessions or to market the programme.

Upon personal reflection, one of these sessions attended was

purely procedural, the audience were not fully engaged,

attendance was not negotiable, the rationale, process and the

link between this journey and how it will impact one‟s life-

decision was never explained or understood. The personal

actions or commitments (“I-statements”) were never referred to

by anyone thereafter. This was viewed by the author as

“another HSSE initiative”, leaving the author neither convinced

nor excited to embrace the change. Feedback from the author

was given, but no corrective action was implemented

Strategy Primarily pull rather

than push. „Seeing

yourself as other

do‟ tool – push

strategy. Marketing

strategy employed.

Early adopter and

believers will drive

the momentum.

Push strategy employed. One would argue that initially an

element of push or a „nudge” maybe required by Business

leaders in how they market this programmes, their personal

involvement, description of what success would mean for the

employees, Business and the organisation as a whole,

communities, families, etc. However this is different to when

attendance is not negotiable. Top-down and compliance driven.

Marketing strategy failed as employees were not intrinsically

motivated. Early adopters and believers did not keep the

momentum going, while HSSE professional were mandated to

deliver the required sessions in their Class of Business.



Table 21, very clearly demonstrates the how a well defined programme with a very

simple and clear strategy can go awry. The outcomes based on discussions with peers

from the developed world would differ from that of the developing world. This is however

not the scope of this research, but this demonstrates that the developing world, with its

own cultures, socio economic and other issues, do require customised strategies that

address issues in the local context.

It was rather concerning that during these interviews; each person had a slightly

amended version of the programme, its intentions, its methodology, etc. The change

management element was not even considered as such and viewed as optional.

Some of the respondents also concluded that possible benefits of the Heart and Minds

programme included:

Greater HSSE awareness.

The need to change behaviours being not only in the workplace but at home.

Appreciation expressed by the contractors on the materials shared and the

sessions held to uplift the contractor HSSE awareness and commitment.

Recognition that HSSE is not on paper but has to be in the heart.

Although there are too many HSSE initiatives, Shell cares about the health

and safety of its employees and its communities.

Leadership commitment to Safety e.g. on Safety Day (a day dedicated to

HSSE annually across Shell globally) making resources and time available

and dedicated to HSSE.

A detailed analysis is carried out in the discussion section later in this chapter.

5.2.2 In-depth Interviews

The high-level themes from the in-depth interviews are captured in the form of strengths

and challenges or opportunities in the table below. Items that are similar are grouped

together and are a consolidation from all classes of business in the sample and

contractors. Where applicable the strength and the corresponding challenge are



captured on the same line item. It must be noted that the responses that are captured,

is a representation of the view/perception of the interviewee at a point in time and

may/may not reflect all systems or processes that do exist. Certain themes recurred

across the different classes of business and are indicated in brackets as (repeated).

Certain items are repeated as strength and a weakness. This is due to the fact that the

statuses on these items differ within the different classes of business.

These interviews provided a view on the current HSSE management systems,

programmes and initiatives and its effectiveness, safety climate factors, organisational

climate factors, organisational culture, employee and leadership behaviours and the

impact of change on safety culture in the organisation as perceived by the organisation

at a that point in time. The themes and the findings from the Hearts and Minds

comparative analysis will be discussed jointly in the next section.

Table 22: High level outputs from interviews captured as strengths and challenges.

Themes Strengths Challenges

HSSE covered in client inductions,

on boarding, etc.

Contractor training.

Security training.

Supervision for safety course

HSSE competency model: “Wings”

HSSE training accreditation.

HSSE learnerships.

Revise HSSE materials – retraining.

Lack of HSSE training on HSSE processes.

HSSE is complex – not simplified. (repeated)

Limited front line capacity (repeated)

HSSE training to all staff.

Compliance and good performance

is rewarded e.g. Batho Pele Awards.

„What‟s in it for me culture‟ if one reports.

Focus on benefits from good HSSE not only

the risk.

Not applying negative consequence

management – conflict avoidance (repeated).

Identify positive mechanisms to induce positive

behaviours.

Align rewards to key performance indicators

(KPI‟s) in goal and performance appraisals.

(GPA‟s).

Punishment culture – threaten people.

TR

AIN

ING

C

ON

SE

QU

EN

CE

MA

NA

GE

ME

NT



Breaking the rules – „it‟s cool‟ – attitude and

mindset.

Share successes.

Reward successes (repeated).

HSSE specialists improve integration

and relationships.

Health is adequately covered.

HSSE requirements viewed as

operational requirements.

HSSE is a line function. (repeated)

Greater support is required at the front line

supervisory level

Interventions not targeted at the right level –

operational level.

Everybody needs to comply.

Clarify HSSE roles and responsibilities.

Slow response to changes in the HSSE

environment.

HSSE staff seen as policemen (repeated).

Career path for HSSE professionals. (repeated)

HSSE professionals needs to have the right

qualities in addition to competence e.g.

credibility, communication, empathy, change

agent.

Change management capabilities of HSSE

professionals – don‟t have the competence.

Less focus on Health and Environment –

impacts are less visible in the short –term

(repeated)

HSSE portfolios -perceived as „career dumping

ground‟.

Lack of trust between HSSE and

operations/business.

Audits – even at nights.

Geographical extent of operations.

Retail interventions to curb retail

robberies incidents.

Increased reporting by safety reps.

Incidents not shared and not followed up

rapidly and closed out. (repeated)

Incidents continue despite awards.

Limited reporting – fear of punishment.

(repeated)

Limited reporting – splitting on your buddy.

HS

SE

SU

PP

OR

T A

ND

AC

CO

UN

TA

BIL

ITY

A

UD

ITS

IN

CID

EN

T

MA

AN

GE

ME

NT



HSSE reporting perceived as additional admin.

Fountain Incident Management (FIM) too

complex (repeated).

Increased reporting burden. (repeated)

Special events e.g. safety days.

Special programmes implemented

e.g. red card system & quality

marshals to manage non-

compliance.

S&D turnaround programme and a

series of interventions.

Contractors embarking on culture

change programmes e.g. Unitrans

Successful initiatives e.g. hospital

visits and family days

Goal Zero, Life Saving rules, Golden

rules have had a positive impact.

Seasonality of campaigns.

Too many campaigns and initiatives. (repeated)

Contractors not keen to share best practices

(competitive edge).

SOPAF road transport initiative and Life saving

rules are ineffective.

Hearts and Minds ineffective and did not deliver

the desired outcome (repeated).

Materials not customised for local conditions –

emotional, language, facilitator materials, etc.

Use of storytelling.

Not learning and reviewing of initiatives.

Co-create solution with contractors.

Create an action orientated HSSE culture

change programme

Top-down global approaches do not work.

Toolbox talks is the wrong approach for certain

interventions

Additional HSSE resources. Lack of resources.

Budget constraints.

Lack of HSSE budget.

Staff competence and capability (repeated).

Common understanding of HSSE guidelines

and requirements.

Global materials not customised.

Too many tool based interventions. Simplistic

models oversimplify HSSE.

Lack of coherent HSSE framework.

Over analysis of reports.

HSSE MS, HEMP – too much admin

Too few mechanisms to communicate HSSE.

More time required to talk HSSE (repeated).

Use personal engagements rather than printed

RE

SO

UR

CE

S

HS

SE

MA

NA

GE

ME

NT

SY

ST

EM

H

SS

E I

NT

IAT

IVE

S



media.

Improved engagement with stakeholders.

Information overload. (repeated)

HSSE messaging must be authentic and

holistic.

Messaging too controlling – top-down.

Messaging to high-level.

HSSE KPIs not measured in GPAs.

KPIs do not include behaviours. (repeated)

Include more personal / cultural stories of

success into measures of success.

No proactive measurement and reporting.

(repeated)

Different HSSE KPIs for staff and contractors.

HSSE KPIs must be included in all roles and

levels.

Bureaucracy of SOPAF governance structure.

No alignment between the different classes of

Business (repeated).

HSSE skills not utilised cross functionally.

Improvements in plant maintenance

and contractor management.

Increased ownership of HSSE by

contractors.

Contractor management. (repeated)

Focus on high risk factors only.

Contractors are only complying because we

require them to – how do we change this

culture?

Building stronger partnerships with contractors.

Conflict between stakeholders.

Some leaders walking the talk. More visible HSSE leadership by senior

management (repeated).

Leadership effectiveness is questionable.

Leadership is not living the values, not listening

enough, not consistent, etc

No trust between employee and employer.

HSSE not lived at operational level (repeated).

Poor operational risk management.

Leaders don‟t walk the HSSE talk.

Complacency in HSSE.

HS

SE

ME

AS

UR

EM

EN

T

HS

SE

CO

MM

UN

ICA

TIO

N

LE

AD

ER

SH

IP &

CO

MM

ITT

ME

NT

CO

NT

RA

CT

OR

S

GO

VE

RN

AN

CE



Mindset that private life and nothing to do with

Shell HSSE.

Lack of emotional commitment.

HSSE leadership and role modelling –

everyone‟s responsibility.

5.3 Learning’s from Shell Global Businesses on safety culture

These include:

• Step change. Move towards a risk based approach, Identify most critical sites,

appoint owners, consistent engagement by senior leaders

• Supervisors must change the work habits of staff (Helsinki)

• Share key learning‟s

• Get rid of blockers and non-compliance

• Messages must be emotive. Tailor the messages (attach meaning)

• Use the Sebastian-360 structured feedback process

• Consequence management – use positive psychology

• Involve the front line staff in interventions

• Choose your contractors well.

• Be firm on HSSE.

(Janse van Rensburg, 2010)

5.4 Learning’s from Woolworth’s & Rainbow Chickens in South Africa

These include:

• Change process is “marathon not sprint”

• The concept of a “journey” is helpful to focus on both short term steps and long

term direction, as well as to allow acknowledgement for the distance already

travelled.

• The journey has a slow upstart, but gain momentum over 4 years, small

beginnings, but a sustainable approach. “Less is more”

• 10% policies and 90% culture

• The use of the language on an emotional and symbolic level is critical.



• Successful change initiatives align business and Safety initiatives

• “Safety” clearly defined as intrinsic part of brand

• Visible and demonstrated involvement from Leadership.

• A well developed measurement system. Visual tracking of progress-Barometer.

• Reward and recognition(especially socially) for progress not outcomes initially

• Build measurement systems around positive progress.

• Break down of complex behavior in succinct elements („Let‟s talk‟, 3 PPP-

punctual, professional and present). Delivered in phased approach. Not all at

once.

• Resolution approach to non-compliance. Work together to close gap

• Lifetime partnerships with suppliers. Invest in people- if they get it right so do we.

Suppliers exit only when their strategies necessitate it.

(Janse van Rensburg, 2010)

5.5 Discussion

Royal Dutch Shell‟s key HSE performance indicators over the last ten years have

demonstrated a continuous decline (positive trend) over this time period (figure 37).

Much of this success is due to amongst others, prioritizing HSSE, leadership and

commitment, specific interventions in high risk areas, safety culture change programme

– Hearts and Minds, other initiatives such as HSSE golden rules, Goal Zero, Safety

days, Talk not tick interventions, Life Saving Rules, simplification of the HSSE MS,

development of the HSSE control framework, etc. There is no single solution but rather

a combination of interventions to help save lives, protect people and the environment.

There is no room for complacency and it‟s the „chronic unease‟ that has resulted in the

constant desire to improve and to push the boundaries to achieve zero harm. Other

indicators are included in the appendices.



Figure 37: Royal Dutch Shell key HSE indicators for the period 2001- 2010 (Royal Dutch Shell PLC,

2011)

Effective integrated HSSE Management system

In assessing the effectiveness of the Heart and Minds programme in South Africa a

number of indicators can be used and as described earlier. Implementation of the

Hearts and Minds programme or any culture change or behaviour based programme

alone will not change the HSSE culture of an organisation. The fundamental basis for

any HSE culture change programme is a sound HSSE management system at its

foundation. This has been demonstrated in figure 20 (page 57) and by a number of

scholarly works as discussed earlier. Any culture change or behavioural change

programme will fail if there is no effective HSSE management.

Integration is required between all elements of risk. Having a safety culture change

programme only for safety is not preferred and in this context, health, security and

environment are also included as part of the integrated HSSE management system.

Culture change versus behavioural change

This is a fundamental concept often overlooked by organisational change experts,

management and HSSE professionals alike. In order to find a „quick fix‟ in deteriorating

HSSE performance or when HSSE performance has started to plateau, the latest

exhortation in the industry is „behavioural change programme‟. True behavioural

change with the intrinsic motivation to change can only be achieved through culture

change, where the core of the individual‟s value system is challenged. The difference



between behavioural based safety and safety culture change programmes was

deliberately explained in the literature study due to the careless use of the terminology

without the necessary understanding of the specific methodologies. Furthermore it is

not an either or situation. It is indeed about drawing on the benefits of both

methodologies to enhance the existing HSSE management system and improving

HSSE culture. This requires the merging of the technical abilities of HSSE professionals

and organisational culture change experts to design programmes that meet the

requirements of the local organisation in the local context.

The elements of the HSSE management system will be discussed later.

HSE culture status prior to implementation

It must also be noted that every business, let alone every individual is at a different level

on the HSSE culture ladder and hence the programme starts with this very assessment.

In trying to establish some type of overall benchmark, an HSSE MS self assessment is

conducted annually to assess the effectiveness of the management system. This tool

will be used to give us an indication of the culture level. Figure 37 is an indication of the

scores for Africa of which two-thirds of the exposure was in South Africa. The scores

indicate that HSSE had not transformed fully from the head to the heart with a significant

decline in score in 2008.

The South African specific scores for 2007 and 2008 also reflect HSSE in the heart.

Although this was on paper, the management team challenged the scores at the annual

management review and felt that HSSE was still in the head rather than in the heart,

from a country perspective. See figure 38. This would rate between the reactive and

calculative stage, with pockets of proactivity on the culture ladder. (Culture ladder - page

60)



Figure 38: SOPAF HSSE MS Self Assessment scores for the period 2004 - 2008 (Anon, 2008)

Figure 39: South Africa HSSE MS Self Assessment scores for the period 2007/8 (Shaik, 2008)

Local HSSE performance as an indicator

Using a very simple indicator and without having to justify the numbers using exposure

hours (as one injury is one too many), Figure 39 captures the South African HSSE

performance indicators for total recordable cases and loss time injuries for the last six

years indicative of a reactive / calculative culture. The Heart and Minds programme

started to be implemented in 2003. It is clear based on the incidents alone, that unlike

Royal Dutch Shell as a global entity, the local organisation was not achieving the same

level of continuous improvement, year on year despite the same programmes and

initiatives being implemented locally.



Figure 40: Shell South Africa Total recordable cases and Loss time injuries for the period 2006 -

2010 (Shaik, 2010)

This begged the question why? – This then prompted an in-depth review, with the initial

stages partially covered in this research report.

On the contrary road transport of fatalities, rated high risk in the local organisation,

recorded nine (9) recordable fatalities in 2006 alone. However since 2007 to date

(September 2011), the organisation has recorded zero (0) recordable fatalities. Why is

this so? Was it accidental?

These results are a consequence of deliberate interventions. These interventions did

not involve a safety culture change programme or behavioural based problem alone.

This risk area was prioritised. A dedicated focal point was appointed to drive the

interventions and monitored by the Group. The country leadership is mobilised on a

monthly basis to deal with challenges. The programme went back to the HSSE

fundamentals in road transport risk management. Management systems, journey

management issues, driver management issues, the local environment, defensive

driving, proactive and reactive measurement tools, contractor management issues,

positive and negative consequence management, vehicle management, leadership

engagement with haulier managing directors and chief executive officers, amongst

others were reviewed and are continuously improved. Although still top-down, this is one

area where the Hearts and Minds Modules continue to be rolled out by contractors.



Some of the hauliers are developing their own culture and behaviour change

programmes. Road transport risk management is also not isolated to a class of

business. The approach is consistently applied across the entire local organisation

through the dedicated focal point and the local road transport forum. The approach is

different to management of other high risk areas in the different Class of Business silos.

An incident is recordable if after an thorough investigation using the „Tripod

methodology‟ into the root causes, the investigation based on the evidence reveals that

the incident was as a result of management failure (e.g. driver behaviour, rules not

followed, vehicle standards not upheld, etc). Third party behaviour remains one of the

major challenges facing the organisation in managing road transport risks. This is

indicative in the countries road death toll illustrated earlier and continues to this day.

Hearts and Minds does not deliver

Upon comparison, the Hearts and Minds philosophy, design and strategy appeared

sound and reasonable on paper and in some countries appear to be successfully

implemented. In the South African context, the implementation failed. The race was lost

even before it started. This was not another HSSE initiative; this programme would have

fundamentally changed an organisation and the fundamental ethos if implemented

correctly. The top down, non negotiable stance did not create the pull that was required.

The intended marketing strategy failed as there were no early adopters and believers

and even if they were, their desire was soon dampened.

Change journey became a marathon

Rather than treating this as a change journey, it indeed became a marathon – a

numbers games i.e. number of sessions and number of attendees.

Tharaldsen and Haukelid (2009) referred to culture as a process that evolves over time

– not a „noun‟. Peter Senge (2009) referred to the Dance of change. Change is a

process that evolves over time, requiring significant effort, time and energy. There is a



lag before any results are seen and just when you believe you have reached your

destination, the goal post is shifted further.

This is one of the first learning‟s that this journey highlights. HSSE professionals with all

good intention intervened as requested as it was believed that that is what was required

to get this programme of the ground and accelerate the momentum. If the sessions

were conducted, this will serve as an indicator of success. The indicator of success

however could not be determined by the sessions alone and this was not a programme

whose success could be measured by numbers but rather employee behaviour over

time i.e. where employees intrinsically motivated to the right thing at all times.

HSSE professionals – ‘softer’ skills required

In addition, the qualitative aspects of these sessions or the ability of the facilitators to

effectively deliver these modules were never technically assessed. One must recognise

that being an HSSE professional that does not necessarily make one a professional

trainer or facilitator.

HSSE professionals are generally competent in risk identification and management or

specialists in specific areas of HSSE. They are not human resource professionals with

an understanding of organisational culture, change management processes,

interpersonal awareness skills yet they have by default become change agents. There

is a radical difference between technical HSSE skills, change management and

organisational culture change skills required. This leans to the softer interpersonal skills,

self awareness, conflict management, diversity and having the correct level of emotional

intelligence to be effective as a change agent.

Change agents

Culture change requires someone who is passionate and excited about the new offering

– the early adopters and believers that „evangelise the gospel‟ and reinvent the journey

due to their passion. The strategy would have enabled long-term sustainability if the



roll-out was not handed to HSSE professionals. HSSE is part of daily operations;

therefore the change agents need to come from the business. The entire programme

turned to „another HSSE‟ training session and „another‟ HSSE initiative.

The facilitators delivered these modules as best as they could, customising the material

to what was felt as appropriate, but it was the same faces, the same technical tone and

in some cases going through the motions. The issue of facilitator „skills‟ are extremely

critical in culture change programmes. The passion and simple approaches in many

cases supersede the technical requirements. In addition having the right mechanisms to

ensure sustainability is just as important. The training of facilitators became diluted over

time due to organisational changes –something not planned for.

Swuste and Arnoldy (2003) point out that the role of OSHE professionals is changing

due to the complexity of OSHE management. In addition to the required OSHE

technical competence, these professionals require additional skills in organisational

theory, company structure and function, planning, budgeting, negotiation skills,

understanding the psychology of people, management of change, getting things done

without authority, understanding the competitive environment, human decision making,

coaching, working in high pressure environments, etc. They are agents of organisational

change. Unless one is self aware and is open to feedback to areas of development and

one is constantly looking to improve, these learning‟s are often missed as many assume

that one has the necessary skills to provide an HSE professional service.

Change management process

The next issue is around the change management process itself. The change

management module „making change last‟ covered the 14 steps of the transtheoretical

model described earlier. (Pages 61&62) However to effect the change, the documented

actions had to be implemented when supervisors and managers left the room. There

was no ownership and the actions were never followed up on, so the newly acquired

knowledge/awareness was not embedded, revisited or actioned in the organisation.



National culture versus organisational culture

While Mearns and Yule (2009) concluded that management and leadership have

emerged as significant determinants of safety performance and not national culture,

Meyer and Boninelli (2004) argued that organisational and management philosophies of

the African culture is different to the West and therefore Western management theories

and practices have limited application. This is particularly true when one looks at the

collectivistic cultural practices amongst most traditional groupings in Africa and indeed

South Africa. Hudson (2007) makes reference to this when he states that there if further

impact from national culture on the organisational culture and with it comes a wide

range of influences: beliefs, values, identity, norms, traditions, attitudes, etc which can

either supplement or be indirect conflict with the organisational culture.

This element was not truly addressed in the South African context. The inclusion of

local pictures and incidents in an existing slide show does not necessarily create the

desired impact. While some engagements were more interactive and people discussed

issues openly, this was not consistent in all sessions.

South Africa has eleven official languages, four race groups, and a myriad of religious

and cultural beliefs and value systems. In the developing world, the HSSE culture in the

country itself is in direct conflict to that of the local multinational. South Africa as with

many other developing nations is plagued by a number of socio-economic challenges,

therefore feeding ones family is top on the priority list and everything else is far below.

This can only be changed by personal engagement when the link between safety and

sustaining ones livelihood is created, when bread-winners of household are made to

understand that their reckless behaviour may leave them potentially injured or dead

resulting in no incomes for their immediate and extended families, no food, no homes

and leaving their children without a father/mother amongst other negative impacts.

Non-compliance is accepted as the norm e.g. speeding taxi drivers that break the rules.

There is an acknowledgement to some extent locally that these taxi commuters have

awoken at 04h00, to walk kilometres to get a taxi and then get to work 1.5 hours



thereafter and in the late evening these actions are repeated making other road users

more tolerant to taxi drivers. The poor safety culture and non-compliance to the laws of

the country is clearly indicated in the safety statistics and the road related fatalities in the

country. (Pages 74-76)

Language, especially on the front line is a barrier. For many English is not their first

language. Between 45-50% of the African population have only had an education up to

a standard five (5) or a grade seven (7) level. (Page 68) The reality we face is that

most of our frontline employees are African.

Cultural barriers

Reporting on the other in the African culture context is unacceptable. You will be

referred to as an „impimpi‟ (informer) and treated as an outcast. In younger population

groups, breaking the rule is seen as „cool‟.

The traditional African decision making process is not individualistic but rather a

collaborative process where the elders are consulted. When the local population is

excluded from the design of such programmes and the approach is top-down, there is

no buy in from the local employees, the programme is not fully embraced and the

desired outcome is never reached.

African story-telling has been the traditional way in which customs, traditions, rules,

behaviours, etc. are communicated. The appropriateness of the materials, brochures,

language, level of English, etc. then brings into forefront the appropriateness of these

materials in the local context.

The programme was also criticised for its technical, compliance and theoretical

approach, while the human care element was not deliberate in its design.

Having the required insight into local cultures, national culture and its impacts and how

to bridge areas of conflicts, requires a specialised skill set with the necessary sensitivity



and awareness of such issues locally. In addition, customisation of materials is not

necessarily a skill that is readily available.

Leadership and commitment failure

Although after the initial management training session, there was the necessary verbal

commitment, the actual visible, demonstrable leadership was not evident. Follow-up

actions and discussions were not consistently held. The change processes was not

implemented effectively. HSSE stepped in to run the modules as neither the leadership

nor the management teams actually rolled-out the Hearts and Minds programme as

designed. This theme is clearly picked up in the interviews as well. Leadership does

not „walk the talk‟; HSSE is not fully integrated in the line, leadership paying lip-service to

HSSE, etc.

Organisational change

The local organisation has undergone a series of large scale organisational change.

This has taken the form of head office relocations, staff reorganisation, new system

implementation, cost cutting measures, downsizing, rightsizing, etc. on an annual basis

over the last six (6) years. The management team itself has significantly changed in

many cases with 75% of new staff in some businesses. There have been approximately

six (6) different Country Chairs (CEO equivalent) over the last eight (8) years. This has

had a significant impact on the organisation resilience, staff morale, staff turnover,

HSSE, training and other measures required to sustain high performance organisations.

These organisational changes have impacted HSSE performance in the organisation.

Training and retraining is ongoing and has become difficult to move up to the next level

of empowerment, due to staff turnover. Sustainability of initiatives such as Hearts and

Minds and others have proven onerous. Competence development has become a key

focus area due to staff turnover and skill shortages in the market. Due to the large

numbers of staff being affected, this has resulted in a step–down, rather than year on

year progression up the HSSE culture ladder.



When such initiatives are rolled out globally, no consideration is given to the

circumstances of existing organisations. There is a possible „fear‟ of disclosure and very

often challenges are framed in a manner that they are being addressed. The potential

„fear‟ possibly stems from Royal Dutch Shell‟s Downstream re-organisation, significantly

downsizing its portfolio in recent years.

Change fatigue

The organisation is experiencing what is now referred to as „change fatigue‟. Dool‟s

(2009) work highlights some key aspects with regard to safety. When employees are

under stress, accidents rate increase, there are errors in judgment, loss in concentration,

interpersonal conflict, resistance to change, etc. One can infer that when an

organisation is undergoing Change Fatigue, the safety culture and performance will be

negatively impacted.

Trust and empowerment

Over-time, the lack of stability and the concerns of job security in a very difficult

economic environment impacts on personal health and well being, the trust in the

organisation, its leaders and every new change is questioned and embarked on very

cautiously. Reflecting on the Shell people survey results for 2004 and 2006 (figure

below) indicates high levels of fear, mistrust and no confidence in the organisations local

leadership. This is the time when the Hearts and Minds programme was implemented in

the country. Any culture change programme is highly likely to fail under these

circumstances. It is clear the significant effort has been put in to redress the leadership

issues the local organisation faced and to start to restore faith in its employees. The

fruits of these efforts are evident in the 2011 results. However, this is a journey as

described earlier.



Table 23: Trust & Leadership elements of employee satisfaction survey results expressed as a

percentage (Gerrard, 2007 and Daniels, 2011)

Question 2011 2006 2004

F N U F N U F N U

Free to speak my mind without fear of negative consequences

61 17 21 52 19 29 48 20 32

Decisions leaders in my org. make concerning employees are fair

64 25 11 43 32 25 51 26 23

Overall, I think my organisation is well-led.

83 13 4 51 29 20 51 27 22

Leaders in my org tell the truth 63 27 10 46 30 24 45 30 26

For 2011: Number of participants =334 F - Favourable N - Neutral U – Unfavourable Results expressed as a percentage (%)

Directly linked to trust, is empowerment. When employees feel that their Leadership

have their best interests at heart and that they are treated fairly, they then feel

empowered to act and reciprocate the employee-employer relationship (social-

exchange theory, LMX exchange theory, OCB behaviours explained earlier). This is

one of the foundations for organisational change and hence any HSE culture change.

Initiative overload

The HSSE department has been criticised repeatedly for too many initiatives. It is

acknowledged that we are in a dynamic world and the ability of organisations to rapidly

adapt will determine its resilience and longevity in the market place. In the HSSE space

however, culture change is a process and very often, having just explained the series of

organisational changes experienced, this does reset the clock, forcing the organisation

to stop, reflect and go back to the basics if required.

In a multinational, however the pace of change and the need to deliver top quartile

performance is relentless, putting additional burdens on the local organisation. This is

once again where leadership is critical to take decisive actions on what it will take on

and what it will not. This requires courage. Historically Leadership may have not



challenged this initiative overload, but in recent times this has changed. Less is more as

reflected in the external benchmarking exercise.

Other criteria for success

The high-level themes extracted from the in-depth interview can be categorised into:

HSSE management system, leadership and commitment, governance, incident

management, training, auditing, resources, HSSE professional support, accountability,

consequence management, measurement, communication, contractor management and

HSSE initiatives.

It was established earlier that there are some key critical success factors that would

impact on creating a positive or the generative HSSE culture we aspire to. The in-depth

interviews show a direct correlation between the literature and issues raised by the

sampled participants. These factors directly match the generic success factors

expressed in the wheel (figure 40 below).

Many of these themes have already been discussed; however the remaining elements

form part of the elements of the HSSE management system. (Figure 41 below) This re-

emphasis the point the HSSE MS system has to be the foundation of managing HSSE in

the operations. The culture and behavioural aspects are the next phases in the journey.

However if the fundamentals around risk and risk management are not addressed using

the hierarchy of control no culture or behavioural change programme can prevent harm

to people in the environment. The practical tools are captured in the HSSE

management system of the organisation which is determined by the Business itself. The

annual HSSE Management review process is aimed at addressing what‟s changing,

what‟s not working, continuous improvement, etc.



Figure 41: Direct correlation between literature survey and outcomes of the study on the critical

success factors for a generative HSSE culture

Therefore the challenges highlighted are indicative of the HSSE Management system

failure which needs to be urgently addressed. The scope of this study is not to conduct

an analysis of the HSSE MS in place, however at a high level the actual operational

elements within each location is covered in the HSSE MS of that specific location and is

far more comprehensive in comparison to the framework presented in Figure 42.

It is clear that the visible demonstration of Leadership‟s commitment to HSSE cannot be

understated. This underpinned by an effective, „living‟ HSSE management system to

manage HSSE risk serves as the foundation for improving the HSE culture in an

organisation. This can be further enhanced with an HSE culture improvement

programme and a behavioural based programme that complement each other. Safety

alone cannot be targeted, but an integrated programme is required.



Figure 42: Integrated HSSE Management system, Anon (Shaik, 2011)

5.6 Summary This chapter focussed on the collation of the findings of both the actual Heart and Minds

pre and post implementation review and the key themes from the in-depth interviews

conducted. The findings were subsequently discussed with collaborative evidence from

the literature survey and key performance indicators from the organisation itself.

Being in the organisation over the last 6 years, the author has learned more about the

Hearts and Minds programme, its philosophy, design and intended outcomes during this

research when compared to the information received from the organisation itself.

The next chapter will provide concluding remarks on the qualitative research conducted.



CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

6.1 Introduction

Chapter one provided a contextual framework including reasons and potential benefits

of the research study. This was followed by comprehensive literature review. Chapter

three then set the theoretical framework around the HSE culture programme

implemented in the sampled organisation namely, The Hearts and Minds Programme.

This was then supplemented by a discussion on the HSE culture in South Africa and the

oil industry locally. Chapter four summarised the research methodology and the data

collection strategy. A detailed analysis and discussion then followed in Chapter five.

This chapter will focus on conclusions and other concluding statements.

6.2 Limitations of the study

Any research study of this nature has limitations and these have been recognised during

the evaluation process. The following limitations were identified:

This not a study on organisational culture although it is acknowledged that

organisational culture is inextricably linked to the safety culture.

This is not a study on national culture although it refers to possible impacts of the

national culture on the organisational culture.

The study is not an assessment of the HSSE management framework,

effectiveness of other local HSSE initiatives and campaigns, management style

and other related issues but rather the indicators of critical success factors.

Study area is a sample of only one region in the Royal Dutch Shell global

footprint and may or may not reflect similar issues in developing markets.

The outcome of the study will be based on the authors personal reflection on the

collation of the perceptions of the participants sampled.



The data sample is representative of a point in time and the culture of the

organisation at that point in time.

The comparisons and arguments have been discussed in terms of the Heart and

Minds safety culture programme implemented globally in this multinational and

the generic key success factors identified in the literature survey.

There is limited/no data with regard to safety culture in South Africa.

There is limited reputable data available on the latest available HSE statistics in

South Africa. Data primary focuses on issues such as road traffic accidents,

crime and were reporting is required by law e.g. death notification

This is not a quantitative study and therefore conclusions are based on themes,

trends, observations and direct knowledge and experience of the environment.

The impact of repeated organisational change in the South African context is not

examined in detailed, although its role in the outcomes is acknowledged.

6.3 Conclusions

The following can be concluded based on the comprehensive literature review, research

findings, analysis and discussions from the preceding chapters:

To become a top performing organisation, even in HSSE, requires leadership.

Achieving top quartile HSSE performance can only be achieved through effective,

visible leadership in every aspect of HSSE.

The integrated HSSE management system forms the foundation for HSSE risk

management in the organisation to achieve the goal of zero harm.

The effectiveness of such a system is critical to the HSSE performance of the

organisation. The system has to be a „living‟ system with continuous

improvement.

HSE culture change and behavioural based programmes can be used to

supplement existing effective integrated HSSE management systems to further

improve behaviour and culture and ultimately sustained HSSE performance.

These programmes should not seek to replace the risk management frameworks.



HSE culture change programmes designed for developed countries with

advanced safety cultures do not necessarily produce the same degree of success

in developing economies.

The design and implementation of HSE culture change programmes must take

into account the local organisational culture and the impacting national culture.

European cultures differ radically to African cultures.

Any HSE culture change programme requires a supporting change management

intervention to embed and sustain the change. This change process is a journey

that is perpetual.

HSSE professionals need to be developed in the areas of interpersonal

awareness, diversity, emotional intelligence, conflict management, psychology of

man, change management, etc. These are the „softer‟ skills required to become

effective change agents in the organisation.

The local organisational dynamics cannot be underestimated. These include

organisational change, culture, leadership transition and trust amongst others.

6.4 Recommendations

The following organisational recommendations are proposed:

Leadership has to visibly demonstrate their commitment to HSSE by „walking the

talk‟.

The organisation has to establish a „stable state‟ and systematically start to

address the HSSE issues starting with fundamentals.

Significant effort has to be placed on capacity building and retention of competent

staff.

A risk-based approached should be applied targeting high risk areas. The

learning from the Downstream Road Transport Programme should be adopted in

other high risk areas.

The integrated management system must be made fit for purpose and should

address the deficiencies from the findings.



A fit for purpose culture change intervention should then be designed considering

the local organisational and national culture.

The culture change initiative must be underpinned by a robust change

management programme.

HSSE initiative/programmes must not be led by HSSE professionals but rather

line management.

Appropriate feedback is provided to Group in terms of the outcomes of this

research so that the same mistakes are not repeated.

The following recommendations in terms of further research are proposed:

a) Culture:

• The impact of South African national culture on organisational culture.

• Methodologies for effective implementation of HSE culture change

programmes in South Africa.

• Best practices in terms of culture change programmes in developing markets.

• Incorporating local cultural traditions into the workplace to improve HSSE

performance.

• Develop simple qualitative tools for culture assessments in organisations.

• Simplified culture change programmes that are aligned to the rapid change

experienced by organisation due to globalisation.

• The role that social media can play in the improvement of a HSE culture

nationally or in an organisation.

• The current research was a cross sectional study at a point in time. A

longitudinal study is recommended.

b) National HSSE reporting

• Definition of common parameters for HSSE reporting nationally.

• The development of a central repository of HSSE related statistics in South

Africa.

• The appropriate mechanisms to address the poor safety culture and high in

HSSE related incidents in South Africa.



c) Development of cost effective tools and mechanisms to assist the new developing

BBBEE contractor‟s workforce to uplift HSSE in the workplace.

d) Additional research on the actual competence required by HSSE professionals to

be effective change agents and improve the HSSE culture in the workplace.

The objectives of the study described in the inceptions stages of the research project

have been achieved. The outcomes of this study are being implemented in the local

organisation.

Safety, security, health and environmental issues have indeed become a licence to

operate issue in many parts of the world, and South African being no different. It

continues to make the headlines on a daily basis. The loss of human life, injury,

disabilities, acute and chronic health impacts, impacts on communities, environmental

impacts, accidental costs, reputational damage and increased legislative requirements

amongst others have forced organisations to pay attention.

While accountability in the broader scheme of things, lie with the operators to keep their

employees safety, legislators for enforcement, etc. the final accountability lies with each

of us. It is about that „intrinsic‟ motivation to do the right thing, every time and every day

and when no one is looking. Its starts with us and the examples we set for our children.

Children will only repeat what they are taught. It starts with one person. Its starts with

putting on the safety belt in the car every day, it starts with not talking on the cell phones

while driving, its starts with cleaning the clutter in the garage that will prevent someone

tripping and it starts with using the right protective equipment when mowing the lawn. It

starts with you and me! We can make a difference in improving our HSE culture and

help save lives.



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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Detailed description of HSE Culture ladder (Shell E&P, 2004)



Appendix 2: Environmental Data 2001 -2010 (Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2011)



Appendix 3: Social Data 2001 -2010 (Royal Dutch Shell PLC, 2011)



GLOSSARY OF TERMS

The terms below are defined by the sample organisation. (Royal Dutch Shell, 2011)

Culture

The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and

patterns of behaviour in an organisation. The HSSE & SP Culture of an organisation

determines the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, its HSSE & SP

management.

Hazard

An agent with the potential to cause harm to people, damage to Assets, or an Impact on

the environment or reputation.

Hazards And Effects Management Process (HEMP)

HEMP - A structured Risk analysis methodology that involves Hazard identification, Risk

Assessment, selection of Controls and Recovery Measures, and comparison with

tolerability and As Low As Reasonably Practicable criteria.

Hierarchy of Control

A league table of Control options giving the order in which Controls are to be applied,

based on their effectiveness for managing a Risk; it is, with the most effective at the top.

Management System

Describes what an organisation does to manage its processes or activities so that its

products or services meet the Objectives it has set itself. It is based on the Plan–Do–

Check–Act model.

Mitigation

In the context of Impact Assessment the actions to prevent, minimise or compensate for

negative Impacts or Effects



Monitoring

The process of regularly observing or measuring the condition of a product, process,

item of equipment, structure or system.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

PPE - A generic term for control devices worn by workers to protect them from external

Hazards. Examples are respirators, eye protection, earmuffs and earplugs, and

protective clothing.

Risk

The combination of the Consequence of a specific Hazard being released and the

Likelihood of it happening.

Risk Assessment

The process of identifying the Consequences of the Worst Case Credible Scenario

arising from the release of a Hazard, and estimating the Likelihood of that scenario.

Worst-Case Credible Scenario

An Event that could realistically occur and that has the worst outcome from release of a

Hazard if Controls fail.

MBL 3: MINI-DISSERTATION

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