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    MBA Global Economy

    Session 7A

    Exchange rate Practices

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    Introduction Exchange-rate practices

    Nature and operation of actual exchange-ratesystems

    Economic factors that influence the choice ofalternative exchange-rate systems

    Operation and effects of currency crises

    Exchange Rate Unions & Common Currencies

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    Session 7A-09 Professor Augustine H H Tan MBA Global Economy 3

    Fixed Vs Floating: Dog Wagging Tail or Tail Wagging Dog?

    Collie

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    Exchange-Rate Practices Floating or Fixed? IMF principles for member nations:

    No manipulation to prevent effective balance-of-payments adjustments or unfair competitive gains

    Act to counter short-term exchange market disorders When members intervene in markets, they should take

    into account the interests of other members.

    Exchange-rate practices of IMF members (Table 15.1)

    Choosing an exchange-rate system (Table 15.2)

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    Bretton Woods and After Postwar economic system negotiated at Bretton Woods

    (1944) included adjustable pegged rates

    In practice, countries were reluctant to adjust theirexchange rates, causing stresses that ended the system by1973

    In 1973, the adjustable peg system was replaced with amanaged float system, which used governmentintervention in exchange markets to stay close to a targetexchange rate

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    Fixed Exchange-Rate System Anchor to a single currency

    Developing nations with a single industrial-country partner

    Anchoring to a group or basket of currencies

    Developing nations with more than one majortrading partner

    Helps to average out fluctuations

    Anchoring to the special drawing right (SDR)

    Basket of four currencies (Table 15.4)

    Increased stability

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    Special Drawing Rights

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    Fixed Exchange-Rate System Par value and official exchange rate

    Governments assign their currencies a parvalue in terms of gold or other key currencies

    Determining official exchange rate

    Exchange-rate stabilization fund

    Set up to defend the official rate

    Purchases and sales of foreign currencies toiron out short-term fluctuations (Figure 15.2)

    Fundamental disequilibrium

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    Fixed Exchange-Rate System

    Devaluation Home currencys exchange value depreciates,

    counteracting a payments deficit

    Revaluation

    Home currencys exchange value appreciates,counteracting a payments surplus

    Decisions to be made before implementation

    Necessity of the step

    Timing of adjustment Magnitude of adjustment

    Advantages and disadvantages of fixed rates (Table15.5)

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    Fixed Exchange Rates: Pros & Cons

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    Bretton Woods System of Fixed Exchange Rates

    Adjustable pegged exchange rates (1946-1973) Currencies tied to each other

    Disequilibrium: Re-pegging up to 10 percent allowed

    Par value fixed in terms of gold or the gold content of

    the U.S. dollar in 1944 Band limits

    Operational difficulties

    Conflicting objectives

    Magnitude of adjustments Difficulties in estimating equilibrium rates

    Speculation

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    Floating Exchange Rates Currency prices established in the foreign-

    exchange market

    Without restrictions imposed by governmentpolicies

    Equilibrium exchange rate equates the demandfor and supply of the home currency

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    Floating Exchange Rates Achieving market equilibrium

    Example: Foreign-exchange market in Swissfrancs in the United States (Figure 15.3)

    Market equilibrium will be established at apoint where the quantities of foreign exchangesupplied and demanded are equal

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    Floating Exchange Rates

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    Floating Exchange Rates Trade restrictions, jobs, and floating exchange

    rates

    Import restrictions will gradually shift jobsfrom other industries to the protected industry

    No significant impact on aggregateemployment

    Short-run employment gains in the protected

    industry will be offset by long-run employmentlosses in other industries

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    Floating Exchange Rates: Pros & Cons Advantages

    Simplicity

    Continuous adjustment in the balance of payments

    Adverse effects of prolonged disequilibria are minimized

    Partially insulates the home economy from external forces

    Freedom to pursue policies that promote domestic balance Disadvantages

    Unregulated market leads to wide fluctuations in currencyvalues

    Prohibitively high cost of hedging

    Flexibility to set independent policies leading to inflationarybias

    Summarized in Table 15.5

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    Managed Floating Rates Informal guidelines established by IMF (1973)

    Based on two concerns Nations intervening in exchange markets

    Clean float and dirty float

    Disorderly markets with erratic fluctuations

    Under managed floating, a nation: Can alter the degree of intervention

    Can intervene to reduce short-term fluctuations:Leaning against the wind

    Should not act aggressively with respect to theircurrency exchange rates

    Can choose target rates and intervene to supportthem

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    Managed Floating Rates: Short-run & Long-run

    Under a managed float Market intervention is used to stabilize

    exchange rates in the short run

    In the long run, a managed float allows marketforces to determine exchange rates

    Example: Theory of a managed float in atwo-country framework (Figure 15.4)

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    Trend & Fluctuation

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    Exchange-Rate Stabilization and Monetary Policy

    Stabilization requires the central bank to adopt: An expansionary monetary policy to offset

    currency appreciation

    A contractionary monetary policy to offsetcurrency depreciation

    Example: Exchange-rate stabilization andmonetary policy (Figure 15.5)

    Long-run effectiveness of using monetarypolicy to stabilize the exchange value of thecurrency is limited

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    Is Exchange-Rate Stabilization Effective?

    Volatility of foreign-exchange markets Intervention by central banks

    Intervention supported by central bank interestrate changes

    Coordinated intervention

    Proponents of intervention:

    Useful when the exchange rate is under

    speculative attack

    May be helpful in coordinating private-sector expectations

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    The Crawling Peg Small, frequent changes in the par value of currency

    Correct balance-of-payments disequilibria

    Used primarily by nations having high inflation rates

    Proponents

    Flexibility of floating rates with stability of fixed rates

    More responsive to changing competitive conditions

    Avoids changes that are frequently wide of the mark

    Frustrates speculators with their irregularity

    IMF view

    Hard to apply this system to industrialized nationswhose currencies serve as a source of internationalliquidity

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    Currency Crises

    Currency crises or speculative attack A weak currency experiences heavy selling pressure

    Indications of selling pressure include:

    Sizable losses in the foreign reserves held by a

    countrys central bank Depreciating exchange rates in the forward market

    Widespread flight out of domestic currency intoforeign currency or into goods

    Examples of currency crises (Table 15.6)

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    Currency Crises Crisis ends when selling pressure stops

    Ways to end pressure

    Devalue the currency

    Adopt a floating exchange rate

    Currency crashes: Crises that end in devaluations oraccelerated depreciations

    Avoiding a currency crash

    Impose restrictions on the ability of people to buy

    and sell foreign currency Obtain a loan to bolster the foreign reserves

    Restore confidence in the existing exchange rate

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    Currency Crises: Causes

    Budget deficits financed by inflation Over-borrowing short-term from abroad

    Weak financial systems

    Mismanaged banks are guaranteed bail-outs

    Faltering economy, raising doubts about the course ofmonetary policy (pressure for inflationary stimulus)

    Political crises and uncertainty

    External shocks

    Contagion: tom-yam effect Fixed exchange rate regimes are particularly vulnerable

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    Currency Crises: Speculative Attack

    Southeast Asian currency decline led by the ThaiBaht

    Resistance offered to the depreciationpressure and raising interest rates to make the

    Baht attractive Abandoning the dollar peg in July 1997

    Long-term effects of abandoning the fixed rate

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    Currency Crises: Capital Controls

    Government-imposed barriers To foreign savers investing in domestic assets

    To domestic savers investing in foreign assets

    Also known as exchange controls

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    Capital Controls: Advantages

    Government can influence its paymentsposition

    Encourage or discourage certain transactionsby offering different rates for foreign currency

    for different purposes Can give domestic monetary and fiscal

    policies greater freedom in their stabilization

    roles

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    Capital Controls: Disadvantages

    Disadvantages of capital outflows Outflows may increase since confidence in the

    government is weakened

    Restrictions often result in evasion

    False sense of security for officials

    Controls on capital inflows often receive moresupport

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    Should Foreign-Exchange Transactions Be Taxed?

    Proponents Tax would give traders an incentive to look at

    long-term economic trends

    Increased cost of transactions

    Dampen excess volatility

    Drawbacks

    Difficult to determine excesses

    Burden on countries that are quite rationallyborrowing overseas

    Difficult to implement

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    Currency Boards Currency boards

    Issues notes and coins convertible into a foreign anchorcurrency at a fixed exchange rate

    Backing of the domestic currency must be at least 100percent: Monetary policy on autopilot

    Benefits of a currency board system (next slide)

    Concerns

    Prevents a country from pursuing a discretionarymonetary policy

    Susceptible to financial panics - lacks a lender of lastresort

    Creates a colonial relationship with the anchorcurrency

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    Currency Board - Argentina

    Shift to fixed exchange rate and currency boardfollowing hyperinflation in 1970s and 80s

    Economy hit during the late 1990s

    Appreciation of the dollar

    Rising U.S. interest rates

    Falling commodity prices on world markets

    The depreciation of Brazils real

    Borrow to finance deficits

    Defaults ended convertibility of pesos intodollars

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    Dollarization

    Usage of the U.S. dollar alongside or instead ofthe local currency

    Partial dollarization and full dollarization

    Why Dollarize?

    Credibility and policy discipline

    Avoiding capital outflows that often precede oraccompany an embattled currency situation

    Decrease in transaction costs Lower inflation

    Greater openness

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    Dollarization Effects of Dollarization Ecuador

    Accepting the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve

    Risk that business cycles might not coincide

    Federal Reserve is not their lender of last resort

    Loss of seigniorage

    Freedom to decide how to spend its tax dollars

    Ecuador could establish its own tariffs, subsidies,and trade policies

    Constraint: No recourse to printing local currency

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    Dollarization Implications of Dollarization for the U.S.

    For each dollar sent abroad, Americans enjoy a one-timeincrease in the amount of goods and services they areable to consume

    Effect of opting to hold dollars rather than debt:

    An interest-free loan from Ecuador

    Use of U.S. currency abroad might hinder theformulation and execution of monetary policy

    More pressure on the Federal Reserve to conduct policyaccording to the interests of Ecuador

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    INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGNEXCHANGE MARKET

    Pegging the Exchange Rate with Monetary Policy

    A country may be willing to sacrifice domesticmonetary policy for a fixed exchange rate

    Suppose two countries are very closely relatedand there is extensive trade between them

    There is a high correlation between changes inthe GDPs of the two countries with onecountrys being substantially larger than the

    other

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    INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGNEXCHANGE MARKET

    This may lead to the smaller country fixing its

    exchange rate to the larger country in nominalterms

    The smaller countrys monetary policy may haveto be sacrificed to keep the exchange rate fixed

    as the smaller country may not be able toinfluence the domestic economy with monetarypolicy

    A recession in the larger country would mostlikely lead to a recession in the smaller country

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    INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGNEXCHANGE MARKET

    Passively following the monetary policy of the

    larger country may be the most sensible policyfor small country

    There would not be much of a loss in doing so,and exchange rate stability is maintained

    It may require occasional intervention in theforeign exchange market to maintain the fixedexchange rate, but whether the intervention is

    sterilized or not is irrelevant

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    INTERVENTION IN THE FOREIGNEXCHANGE MARKET

    The smaller country will have a growth

    rate of the money supply and an inflationrate that is nearly identical to that of thelarger country

    Intervention is simply a way for theexchange rate to be made sufficientlystable in the short run

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    CURRENCY UNIONS If maintaining a fixed rate is such a headache,

    why not do away with the problem? If two countries really want to keep exchange rate

    stability between them, it might be more logical tomerge two currencies into one

    This is called a currency union

    There are a number of benefits and costsassociated with this decision

    While the factors are relatively straightforward,the weights of these factors are not

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    CURRENCY UNIONS Before the creation of the Euro, Austria had

    pegged its currency to Germany The first benefit from creating a common

    currency is monetary efficiency gains, the gainsderived from not having to change currencies

    when conducting trade between the countries

    This would a considerable savings when twocountries trade heavily between themselves

    The largest loss to both countries would be theloss of autonomous monetary policy

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    CURRENCY UNIONS At some point in time, the joint monetary policy

    for the two countries would be less than optimalfor each individual country

    With a currency union, there would be aneconomic stability lossdue to the currency union

    because of the inability of a country to conductan independent monetary policy

    Whether or not a currency union is a good idea

    depends on the magnitude of the monetaryefficiency gains versus the potential losses interms of economic stability

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    CURRENCY UNIONS The greater the amount of trade between the

    countries, the larger the monetary efficiencygains will be if the countries move to a commoncurrency

    The difficulty is that economists cannot precisely

    determining how much trade is required betweenthe countries to make a union profitable

    This rule remains a useful generalization

    There is not a precise cutoff point where acurrency union is a good idea

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    CURRENCY UNIONS Common currency will ease transaction of capital

    flows across countries and increase theefficiency of the financial markets in bothcountries

    Similarly, would be easier to make direct

    investments (FDI) if currency did not have to beconverted across borders and would eliminatesome uncertainty with respect to the return onthe investment

    Investors in both countries would be more likelyto invest across borders

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    CURRENCY UNIONS There are several factors that influence the

    economic stability losses each country mightincur

    If labor can and does move across borders whenone country has a recession, the effects to the

    recession are reduced It would not be necessary for the country

    experiencing the recession to pursue

    expansionary monetary and fiscal policies inorder to stimulate domestic demand

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    CURRENCY UNIONS If the two countries have similar average rates

    of inflation, there is less chance that a jointmonetary policy would be undesirable in eithercountry

    If the taxation and spending systems of the

    two countries were somewhat integrated, acommon fiscal policy, economic stabilitylosses would be diminished

    The economic stability losses will be smallerthe higher the correlation of GDP between thetwo countries

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONALMONETARY REFORM

    Businesses dislike floating exchange

    rates since volatility increases risk In the short run, they can choose between

    taking risk or protection through hedging

    but neither are costless The current system forces businesses to

    implicitly forecast exchange rates whether

    they want to or not

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONALMONETARY REFORM

    Volatile exchange rates make international trade

    and investment more risky and activities thatentail more risk command a higher rate of return

    Since volatile exchange rates make internationaltrade and investment more risky, fluctuatingexchange rates also implicitly make internationaltrade more costly

    Thus volatile exchange rates lower the total

    volume of international trade and investment

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

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    MONETARY REFORM Governments have similar views to business

    Overvalued currency can hurt the tradable goodssector and undervalued currency can create aboom that cannot be sustained

    A collapse in the currency can cause a

    macroeconomic crisis

    Though the current system is disliked, there havebeen no serious multilateral moves toward a

    more stable system There are good reasons for the current lack of

    motivation for a new system

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

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    MONETARY REFORMAn Exchange Rate Map

    Rules

    Cooperation

    Discretion

    Noncooperation

    Gold Standard

    United States

    Bretton Woods

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

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    MONETARY REFORM Any new international monetary system would

    presumably include a movement toward morestable exchange rates and would include at leastone of two things, more rules or morecooperation

    The most likely move is toward more cooperation G-7 countries, a group of the seven largest

    industrial countries, made such moves in the late1970s and the 1980s

    Countries tried to achieve more exchange ratestability by increasing the level of cooperation

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

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    MONETARY REFORM There were few, if any, rules

    There was more cooperation, but since itbasically was voluntary cooperation theseagreements invariably failed

    In terms of a workable internationalmonetary system, this arrangement doesnot seem to be very promising

    Countries do not seem inclined to go backto a system with a lot of relatively rigidrules

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    OPTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL

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    MONETARY REFORM Countries tend to focus on their internal balance

    first and consider external balance and theexchange rate only after the fact

    Thus any move toward more cooperation isunlikely

    The current system is messy with costs for boththe private and the public sector

    But given the preferences of most governments

    for autonomy in fiscal and monetary policy, itmay be all that is feasible at this point

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    European Monetary Union (EMU)

    Lowers the costs of goods and services

    Facilitate a comparison of prices within the EU

    Promotes more uniform prices

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    Economic Costs and Benefits of a Common Currency

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    When Italy adopted the euro as its currency:

    Gave up option of changing its exchange rateto improve competitiveness of its exporters

    Lira converted to euro at too high a rate,

    resulting in uncompetitiveness? Effects of euro strengthening against the

    dollar:

    Italian firms lost competitiveness in U.S.markets

    Realization of the downside of joining theeuro club

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    Euro Gained in Value

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    A region that has a single official currency

    Advantages and disadvantages (Table 8.2)

    Various reactions to economic shocks:

    Mobility of labor

    Flexibility of prices and wages

    Automatic mechanism for transferring fiscalresources to the affected country

    To improve success chances, countries should have:

    Similar business cycles Similar economic structures

    Affect all the participating countries in the samemanner

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    Optimum Currency Area

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    Global Economy 67

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    Advantages of forming a EMU:

    Improves economic efficiency

    Facilitates genuine comparison of prices

    Elimination of exchange-rate risk

    Stimulates competition

    Facilitates broadening and deepening offinancial markets

    Disadvantage of the EMU: Loss in use of monetary policy and exchange

    rate as a tool in adjusting to economicdisturbances

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    Europe as a Suboptimal Currency Area

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    Difficulty in determining interest rates due to wide

    difference in economic growth rates among EMUcountries

    Avoidance of excessive budget deficits

    Structural reform in European countries

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    Challenges for the EMU