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    Session 3-09 Prof Augustine H H Tan Econ MBA Global Economy1

    Session 3B: Protectionism

    The Political Economy of Protectionism II

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    Other Barriers To Trade

    Non-tariff Barriers

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    Non-Tariff Barriers 1996

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Import Quota Physical restriction on the quantity of imports during

    a specific time period (Table 5.1) Import licenses

    Quotas on manufactured goods outlawed by W.T.O

    Global quotas

    Permit a specified number of goods to beimported each year

    Selective quotas

    Import quotas allocated to specific countries

    May lead to domestic monopoly of production

    Accusations of favoritism

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    Allocating Quota Licenses

    Limited imports; allocation by governments

    Issue of import licenses on the basis of historicalshare of the import market

    Discriminates against first-time importers

    Issue of import quotas on a pro rata basis

    Auctioning process

    Few nations use auctions, as competitiontransfers revenue effect to the government

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    Sugar Import Quotas

    U.S. sugar industry

    Earlier: Subsidies in the form of price supports

    1982 sugar price crash

    Response

    Raise import tariffs to the legal maximum

    Nation-by-nation import allocations based on

    average sugar exports to the United States Transferred the cost of sugar support from the

    taxpayer to the consumer

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    Quotas Versus Tariffs During periods of growing demand, an import quota is

    a more restrictive trade barrier (Fig 5.2) Tariff increases the domestic price, but does not

    limit the number of goods that can be imported

    Tariffs allow for some degree of competition

    Degree of protection is determined by themarket mechanism

    Quota is more restrictive and suppressescompetition

    Quota forecloses the market mechanism

    W.T.O and tariffication

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    Tariff-Rate Quota: A Two-Tier Tariff

    Tariff-like and quota-like characteristics A specified number of imports at one tariff rate

    Any higher imports face a higher tariff rate

    Has three components: (Table 5.2)

    Import-quota threshold

    A within-quota tariff

    An over-quota tariff

    Many over-quota tariffs are prohibitively high

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    Tariff-Rate Quota .

    Techniques for the administering tariff-rate quotas:

    License on demand allocation

    First-come, first-served

    Historical market share

    Auctions

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    Voluntary Export Quotas Used to restrain trade

    Voluntary export restraint agreement (orderlymarketing agreement)

    Moderate the intensity of internationalcompetition

    Allow less efficient domestic producers toparticipate in world markets

    Identical economic effects to equivalent importquotas, except for being implemented by theexporting nation

    Conclusion from the viewpoint of the U.S.economy: Voluntary export restraints tend to bemore costly than tariffs

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    Japanese Auto Restra nts Put Bra es on .S.Motorists Fall in domestic auto sales (1981)

    Voluntary restraint pact with the Japan Unpopular with smaller Japanese automakers

    Record profits for Japanese auto majors

    U.S. consumer paid higher prices

    44,000 jobs saved in the U.S.; consumer cost perjob saved being $100,000

    By 1985: Japanese companies open plants inthe U.S.; decline in imports coupled with declinein market share for U.S. firms

    Japan exported bigger, higher value cars to US

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    Domestic Content Requirements Stipulate the minimum percentage of a products total

    value to qualify for zero tariff rates Purpose: Limit outsourcing

    Pressurizes firms that sell products in the countryto use domestic inputs in production

    Often used by developing countries to fosterdomestic automobile production (Table 5.3)

    Welfare effects of an Australian contentrequirement on automobiles (Fig 5.3)

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    Subsidies

    Granted to producers to help improve trade positions

    Governmental subsidies assume a variety of forms(Table 5.4)

    Outright cash disbursements Tax concessions

    Insurance arrangements

    Loans at below-market interest rates

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    Subsidies.

    Domestic subsidy: Granted to producers of import-competing goods (Figure 5.4)

    Unlike tariffs and quotas, subsidies do not distort

    choices for domestic consumers Burden financed out of tax revenues

    Often in return for accepting governmentconditions on key matters

    May not be as superior to other commercialpolicies

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    Subsidies. Export subsidy: Granted to producers of goods that

    are to be sold overseas (Fig 5.4) Encourage exports by reducing price paid by

    foreigners

    Yields direct effects for the home economy:

    Terms-of-trade effect Export-revenue effect

    Consumers in the exporting nation suffer as theinternational terms of trade move against them

    Domestic consumers pay higher prices

    Tax burden

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    Dumping

    A form of international price discrimination

    Charging foreign buyers lower prices thandomestic buyers; selling below cost

    Forms of Dumping

    Sporadic dumping: Disposal of excess inventories

    Predatory: Temporary price cuts to eliminatecompetition

    Persistent: Indefinite dumping to maximize profits

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    International Price Discrimination

    A profit-maximizing firm would benefit frominternational price discrimination

    Charge a higher price at home, where competitionis weak and demand is less elastic

    Charge a lower price for the same product inforeign markets to meet competition

    Demand and cost conditions example

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    Antidumping Regulations

    Under U.S. law, antidumping duty is levied when

    Commerce Department determines foreignmerchandise is sold at less than fair value (LTFV)

    ITC determines that LTFV imports are causing orthreatening material injury to a U.S. industry

    Margin of dumping: Amount by which the foreignmarket value exceeds the U.S. price

    Priced-based definition

    Cost-based definition

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    Antidumping Regulations Process

    Complaint from an import-competing industry Evidence of dumping; supporting data

    Commerce Department conducts preliminarydetermination, estimate of margin

    Special tariff imposed immediately, if evidenceis found

    Final determination, estimate of margin

    Rebate, if ruling is against dumping

    ITC determines material injury

    Rebate, if ruling is against dumping

    Imposition of permanent tariff if both bodies rule infavor of the dumping petition

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    Antidumping Regulations.. Smith Corona - Hollow victories

    1980: Japanese typewriters Product evolution by Brother Industries (Japan)

    to circumvent ruling

    1990: Assembling of typewriters in U.S. itself

    1991: Japanese word processors

    Ruling ineffective as these were assembled inU.S.

    Components not sourced from Japan

    Washington apple producers

    Canadian government impose duties (Table 5.5)

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    Is Antidumping Law Unfair? Supporters: Ensures level playing field by offsetting

    artificial sources of competitive advantage Critics: Consumers of the protected good and the

    wider economy typically lose more

    Average variable cost as yardstick for dumping? (Table

    5.6) Economists: Fair value should be based on

    average variable cost rather than average total cost

    Antidumping law is unfair as it uses average total

    cost

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    Anti-Dumpinga. WTO allows trade restrictions to counteract

    predatory dumpingb. Difficult to determine dumping

    c. Trigger-price mechanism to activate traderestrictions

    d. Used as protectionist weapon: threats of anti-dumping measures

    e. Examples: 1981-1994

    US 618

    EU 490

    Canada 537

    Australia 690

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    Is Antidumping Law Unfair?..

    Antidumping law and currency fluctuations

    Antidumping law does not account for fluctuations

    Does the antidumping law redress unfairness or

    create it?

    Are antidumping duties overused?

    Disturbing trend of backdoor protectionism

    For U.S. producers, it is easier to obtain relief in theform of antidumping duties

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    Other Non-tariff Trade Barriers Government procurement policies

    Buy-national policies: Barrier to free trade

    Social regulations

    To correct undesirable side effects that relate to

    health, safety, and environment

    Corporate average fuel economy standards(CAFE) - U.S. energy conservation policy

    Hormones in beef production - European

    Unions ban on hormone-treated meat

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    Other Non-tariff Trade Barriers..

    Sea transport and freight restrictions

    Restrictive practices at Japanese ports

    Delays and costs of loading/unloading

    U.S. decision to bar Japanese ships from U.S. ports

    Agreement to liberalize port services in Japan

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    Other Non-Tariff BarriersInternational Cartels

    a. Organization of suppliers located in different nations[or a group of governments] that agrees to restrictoutput and export of a commodity

    b. Aim: to increase price, maximize profits

    c. Outside individual countrys control/jurisdiction

    d. E.g. OPEC, IATA

    e. Free riders: non-member suppliers

    f. Success: if good substitutes not freely available

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    Other Non-tariff Trade Barriers..

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Industrial Policies..

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    Other Non-tariff Trade Barriers..

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Government Procurement..

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Corruption & International Trade

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Corruption Index 2006

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Economic Sanctions

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Economic Sanctions..

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Labor & Environmental Standards

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

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    Labor & Environmental Standards

    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

    Labor & Environmental Standards

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    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

    Labor & Environmental Standards

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    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

    Labor & Environmental Standards

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    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

    Labor & Environmental Standards

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    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson

    Labor & Environmental Standards..

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    Sawyer, 3rd ed, Pearson