May - Foucault Now

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f oucau l t s tud ies Todd May, 2005

ISSN: 1832-5203Foucault Studies, No 3, pp. 65-76, Nov 2005

ARTICLE

Foucau l t Now ?1

Todd May, Clemson University

Ithasbeen twentyoneyearssinceFoucaultsdeath.Think foramomentof

whatthismeans.In1984,therewasnointernet,therewerenoDVDs,nocell

phones,CDswerejustcomingintoexistence,TIVOwasadistantdream,and

wecoulddrivearoundwithouthaving todealwithsportutilityvehicles. It

was,manywouldclaim,adifferentworld.Mychildrenmakethatclaim,and

theyexpresswonderat the fact thatweweresomehowable toconductour

livesunderthoseconditions.

Andyet,nearlyagenerationafterFoucaultsdeath,we return to this

thinker, this historian, this philosopher, as though he still speaks to us, as

thoughwe had not yet exhausted themeanings of hiswords. So,we are

confronted with the question: what do wemake of Foucault now?What

remainsfor

us

to

learn

from

him?

What

remains

for

us

to

think

about

and

to

actuponinthewakeofhiswritings?

Tobegintogetagriponthesequestions,allowmetostepbackandask

anotherone.Itisaquestionassociatedwiththedisciplineofphilosophy,but

it oughtnot tobe.Or at least it oughtnot tobe associated solelywith the

discipline ofphilosophy. It ought tobe associatedwith alldisciplines, and

with our lives. It is a question thatwill notbe foreign to anyonewho is

readingthis.Thequestionis:Whoarewe?Itisaquestionthat,inFoucaults

hands,will turn into another question,but for reasons itwouldbeworth

pausingover.

Considertheanswertothequestionofwhoweareofferedbyaclassic

philosopher,RenDescartes.Descartestellsusthatweareacombinationofa

mentalsubstancethatthinksandaphysicalsubstancethatacts,amindanda

body: twoseparate typesofentities thatmeet forsomereason in thepineal

gland.ForDescartes, tobewhoweare isessentially tobeacertainkindof

being,acertainkindofontologicalarrangement.Thereareother things that

1 ThispaperwasfirstgivenasanaddresstotheinauguralconferenceoftheFoucault

SocietyattheNewSchoolinNewYorkonMay13,2005.Mythankstotheorganizers

of theconference for theopportunity,especiallyYunusTuncel,DavidCarlson,and

MartinParkins,topresentthepaper.

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foucault studies, No 3, pp. 65-76

areperhaps relevant tous,but theessential lieshere: inour constitutionas

mental/physicalbeings.

Orconsideranother thinker,closer toourown time:SigmundFreud.

Freudalsooffersusananswertothequestionofwhoweare.ForFreud,we

areaset

of

conflicts,

more

or

less

successfully

resolved.

To

be

ahuman

being

is to face theseconflicts, to face the fractured inheritance that isour lot, the

legacy of internal disharmony that hasbeen passed down to us through

generationsextendingbackatleasttoMoses,andinalllikelihoodwellbefore

that.

Descartes and Freud offer very different answers to the question of

whoweare.What they convergeon,however,andwhat somany thinkers

thathaveprovidedtheframeworkforourthinkingaboutwhowearefrom

Plato and Aristotle through the history of Christian thought to modern

philosophers

like

Jean

Paul

Sartrewhat

they

converge

upon

is

that

the

answer to this question lies in some essential character that we possess.

Whoeveritisthatweare,itmustbediscoveredinsomethingtimelessabout

us, something that gives each of us in this room a deep affinitywith the

medievalpeasantortheancientGreekwarrior.Toputthepointanotherway,

toanswerthequestionofwhoweare,oneneednot,andperhapsonecannot,

appealtothecontingenciesofourhistory.This,ofcourse,ispreciselywhere

Foucaultsthoughtbecomesrelevanttous.

To appeal to the contingencies of history is notmerely to appeal to

history.Manythinkershavedonethat.KarlMarx,forinstance,seeshistoryas

theunfoldingofourhumanessence.ForMarx,at least inhisearlywritings,

andperhapsunderlyingthelateronesaswell,ourabilitytobefullyhuman,

tobewhatwe are, to expresswhat he calls our speciesbeing, requires the

passagethroughatumultuoushistory.Thatpassagewilleventuallycreatethe

conditions that allowus to reveal thehuman character.Wewereborn to a

scarcitythatrequiresthemechanismsofhistory,thetackingbackandforthof

thedialectic, toovercome.Without thathistory,wewouldbenothingmore

than primitive huntergatherers, animals incapable of achieving our full

nature.

Marxtakes

history

into

account,

to

be

sure.

He

is

wedded

to

it,

to

its

necessityandtotheinescapabilityofitsmakingusintowhoweare.Butitis

preciselytoitsnecessitythatheiswedded,nottoitscontingency.Totakeusas

beingsthataretheproductsofacontingenthistory isnotmerelytosaythat

ouressenceunfoldsinourhistory,thatourhistoryrevealswhoweare.Tohold

that we unfold or reveal ourselves through time does not take history

seriously enough. ForMarx and for others like him, history itselfbecomes

hostagetoouressenceorsubordinatetoanunderlyingprinciplethatdrivesit

inthedirectioninwhichwefinditgoing.Ifwearetotakehistoryseriously,

andto

take

ourselves

seriously

as

historical

beings,

we

must

recognize

the

contingencyofhistory.Wemustcometogripswiththefactthathistorydid

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named imprudently,but itsaspects, its correlations, and its effectsmustbe

pursueddownto theirslenderestramifications:ashadow inadaydream, in

imagetooslowlydispelled,abadlyexorcisedcomplicitybetweenthebodys

mechanicsandthemindscomplacency:everythinghadtobetold.3

With

the

telling

of

everything,

ones

thoughts

and

particularly

ones

desires, a persons sexual character gradually displaced the acts one

committed as the heart of confession. Ones acts, after all, were simply

expressionsofonescharacter.Itwaswhoonewasinthedepthofonesbeing

thatcounted.FromthegradualrevisionoftheCatholicconfessionaltoFreud

thecriticofreligion there isastraight line tobedrawn,a line that involves

sexualdesireas thekey tounlock themysteryofonesnature.Onceupona

time therewere only acts tobe told. Then something happened and there

weredesirestobeconfessed,desiresthatrevealednotonlywhatonedidbut

who

one

was.

This isnotall.There isnotasinglestory tobetold,astorysimplyof

the confessional.Stories arealwaysmultiple and intersecting.Onceupon a

time,therewasfeudalism.Thencapitalismdeveloped,andwithittheneedto

monitorpopulationssoastoutilizetheminthemostefficientway.Withthe

riseofcapitalismcame theriseofpopulationstudies.Andwith theconcern

aboutpopulation came the concernwith sex, this time fromanother angle.

Who we are as a confessing being and who we are as participants in

capitalismbeingbegan to intersect. This iswhy, as Foucault tells us, the

sexualrevolutionofthe1960sdidnotliberateusfromarepressedsexuality.

Sexualityhasbeenwithusforhundredsofyears,discretebutpervasive.The

sexual revolution, the call to expressones sexuality, is simply theCatholic

confessionalandthepsychoanalystscouchbyothermeans.

Andthenagain,alongsidetheconfessionalandcapitalism,onceupona

timemedicine,inasmuchasitwaspsychiatricmedicine,wasconcernedwith

delirium.Then,withtheriseoftheconfessionalofdesiresandtheincreasing

concernwithsexuality,itbecameconcernedwithinstincts.Inthisconcern,it

was above all sexual instincts that provided the key to abnormality. The

flesh of concupiscenceprovides a model for the conceptualization and

analysisof

instinctual

disorder.4

Onceupona timewewerenot sexualbeings,beingsdefinedbyour

sexualcharacter.Nowweare.Whatdoes itmean tosay thatwearebeings

definedbyour sexual character?Hashistoryunfolded in suchawayas to

reveal to us who we are, as though finally, aftermissing it for all these

3 Michel Foucault,TheHistory of Sexuality,Vol. 1:An Introduction, tr.RobertHurley.

(NewYork:RandomHouse,1978),19.

4 Michel Foucault,Abnormal: Lectures at the Collge de France 19741975, tr.Graham

Burchell.(NewYork:Picador,2003),224.

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May: Foucault Now?centuries,we recognize thatwearebeingsdefinedbyourdesire?Werewe

suchbeingsallalong,onlynowithasbecomecleartous?Hardly.

Arewe sexualbeingsat thismoment inourhistoryor, forwewill

return to this,werewe sexualbeings in1976,whenFoucaultpublished the

firstvolume

of

his

History

of

Sexuality?

Yes,

we

are,

or

at

least

we

were.

We

are

othertypesofbeingsaswell,for instancedisciplinaryones,asFoucaulttells

usinhishistoryoftheprisons.Thereisnotasinglestorytotell,butinstead

manystories.AsJohnBergerremindsus,Neveragainwillasinglestorybe

toldasthoughitweretheonlyone.5

Butweareindeedalsosexualbeings.Thekey,however,isthatweare

sonotbynecessity,neitherbyanessentialnaturethathasmadeusthatway

and thatwe have only recently come to discover, norby a historywhose

inevitable unfolding has revealed touswhowe are.We are sexualbeings

because

a

contingent

history,

one

that

has

been

different

and

that

indeed

couldbecomedifferent,has, for thismoment,depositeduson theseshores.

Wearesexualbeingsbecausewearehistoricalbeings,becausewhoweareis

theproduct of ahistory thatjusthappened to take this course rather than

another one. This iswhy, as Imentioned earlier, in Foucaults hands the

questionofwhoweareisturnedintoanotherone.Forus,thequestionisnot

somuch,Whoarewe?asitis,Whoarewenow?,or,asFoucaultsometimes

asksit,Whatisourpresent?

Whenwe askwhowe arewemust not ask after a nature that lies

behindusorthathasmadeuswhatweare.Neitherarewetoaskafteratelos

that liesbeforeusanddrawsus toward it.Wearenot toaskwhatwehave

beenrevealedtobe.Weare,instead,toaskhowwehavecometobewhowe

are,howthemultiplestrandsofourhistoryhaveledustobethisbeingand

notanotheratthisparticularmoment.Forthoseofuswhoarephilosophers,

approaching ourselves thisway is difficult.We havebeen taught that the

questionofwhoweareisnotahistoricalonebutratheratranscendentalone.

The appeal to empirical facts, to an understanding of the (often petty)

practices thatmake uswhowe are violates our philosophical instincts. If

Foucaultisaphilosopher,itisbecauseheisahistorian.

Butit

is

not

only

philosophers

who

find

his

approach

difficult.

Many

historians as well balk at Foucaults project. It is, for their taste, too

philosophical.Foucaultdoesnotjustgiveus the facts.Hedoesnotwriteas

though history were merely an accounting of the past, the recitation of

parchmentsthatbelongtoanothertime.IfFoucaultisahistorian,itisbecause

heisaphilosopher.Hisstudiesarereflectionsonthequestionofwhoweare,

evenas theyshift theground forasking thatquestion from therealmof the

eternalandimmutabletothatofthecontingentandchangeable.

5 JohnBerger,G.(NewYork:Pantheon,1980;orig.pub.1972),133.

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It isFoucault, then,Foucaulthimselfwho leadsus to thequestionof

FoucaultNow.Itisaboveallhisownwritingsthatrequireustoaskwhether

thehistoriesofthepresentthathehasofferedusarestillhistoriesofourown

present, or whether the present we inhabit requires other histories, other

stories.If

we

are

to

take

Foucault

seriously,

not

merely

to

turn

his

works

into

anexerciseofacademicinterpretationbuttoseeinthemtherootsofourvery

character,ofthestructureofourpresent,thenwemustfacethequestionhis

ownworksraise:whatremainstousofFoucaultNow?

Surely,onewillrespond,Foucaultisasrelevantnowashehasalways

been.Afterall,itisonlytwentyyearssincehisdeath.Academicfashionsmay

comeandgointhistime,buthasthecharacterofourpresentreallychanged

somuch?Arewenotstillthesexualbeingswewere in1976;arewenotthe

disciplinarybeingsFoucaultdescribesinhisbookontheprisons?Theanswer

to

this

question

is

not

obvious.

Foucault

himself

delineates

sharp

breaks

in

history,pointswherewhowe arebegins toveeroff fromonepath toward

another. There are periods of nomore than twenty or thirty years during

whichtransitionsfromonesetofpracticesconstitutingwhowearetoanother

are, ifnotcoalesced,at leastbegun.For instance, inTheBirthof theCliniche

tracesthechangeinmedicalviewsofdisease,andthusoftherelationoflife

and death, from an essentialistmodel to one of lesions. This change takes

place from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the

nineteenthinaperiodoflittlemorethantwodozenyears.

Arewe insuchaperiod? Isourhistoryatanothercrossroads,where

whatwewillbecomedivergessharplyfromwhatwehavebeen?Wecannot

respond to this questionby parroting Foucaults analyses; his ownworks

havebarred this path to us.Wemust look closely at ourselves and at the

history thathas intervened in theseyears, askingourselveswherewehave

beenandhowthatmayormaynothavemadeusdifferentfromwhowewere

when Foucault writes his histories of sexuality, the prisons, madness, or

medicine.

And to thequestionofwhetherwe indeedoccupyanotherhistorical

space,whetherweareindeedbecomingsomethingotherthanwhatwehave

been,many

would

answer

in

the

affirmative.

We

have

indeed

entered

anew

historicalperiod,onethathasalreadyalteredthetextureofourbeingandwill

continue todo so.This new historicalperiod, although nascentduring the

periodofFoucaultswritings,hasemerged tochallenge theportrayalofour

present that he offers. Consider, for a moment, three approaches to

understanding ourworld that tell us thatwe have gonebeyond Foucault,

that, inessence,we canno longer turn toFoucault foranunderstandingof

ourpresent,ofwhowearenow.

ThefirstcomesfromhiscolleagueGillesDeleuze.Deleuzetellsusthat,

incontrast

to

the

disciplinary

society

Foucault

delineates,

we

have

now

enteredasocietyofwhathecallscontrol.

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May: Foucault Now?Weremoving towardcontrolsocieties thatno longeroperatebyconfining

peoplebut through continuous control and instant communication.New

kindsofpunishment,education,healthcarearebeingstealthily introduced.

Openhospitalsandteamsprovidinghomehealthcarehavebeenaroundfor

sometime.Onecanenvisageeducationbecoming lessand lessaclosedsite

differentiatedfrom

the

workspace

as

another

closed

site,

but

both

disappearing and givingway to frightful continual training, to continual

monitoringofworkerschoolkidsorbureaucratstudents.6Deleuze argues that we are no longer bound by the disciplinary model

Foucault portrays in his book on the prisons, a model that sees people

confinedwithinspecificspaceswhere theyaremonitored, intervenedupon,

and normalized. Instead, we are inserted into open networks of

communication and relay, networks that do not determine usby discrete

periods of training that takesplaces at specific sitesschool, thenmilitary,

thenworkbut

by

adigital

web

that

is

woven

around

us

as

we

are

woven

intoit.

Adifferentbutnotentirelyunrelatedviewofourpresentisofferedby

JeanBaudrillard.HechallengesFoucaultsviewthatwhoweareisaproduct

ofintersectingpractices,eachwithitsownpowertocreatedifferentaspectsof

us.Inparticular,theideaofpowerproducingusis,inhisview,anachronistic.

Whenonetalkssomuchaboutpower,itsbecauseitcannolongerbefound

anywhere.The same goes forGod: the stage inwhich hewas everywhere

camejustbeforetheoneinwhichhewasdead.7ForBaudrillard,themodel

ofpower

and

production

is

an

industrial

one,

inadequate

to

the

post

industrial societywenow inhabit. Ifweare tounderstandourpresent,we

mustlookinsteadtothevirtualrealitiesarisingaroundus,immaterialworlds

thathave come to replace thematerialworld asour living reality. It is the

images of television rather thanwhat those imagesmay ormaynotdepict

that is the fabricofourworld.History itself is lost toapresent thathasno

moreuseforitthanfortherealityitpretendstoportray.Weliveinanageof

whatBaudrillardcallshyperreality,wheretheonlyfunctionofaplacelike

Disneylandistogiveustheillusionthattheworldoutsideitsgatesisactually

real.

Finally, there aremanywhowould argue that thenewagewehave

entered is one of globalization. It is an age where instantaneous

communication has changed the economic structure of societies and the

relation of individuals to those structures. No longer is our identity

determinedby the factofourbeingproducersofgoods; it isdeterminedby

the fact of our being consumers of them. No longer are we bound to

6 Gilles Deleuze, Control and Becoming, in Negotiations 19721990, tr. Martin

Joughin.(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),1745.

. JeanBaudrillard,ForgetFoucault,tr.NicoleDufresne.(NewYork:Semiotext(e),1987),

60.

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companies that, in return forour labor,promiseusa steady ifmonotonous

career;we arenow subject to shiftingmovements of capital andwork that

maybenefitusonedayandleaveusbereftthenext.Nolongerarewecitizens

ofanationstateforwhichcompaniesareamongtheresourcesofthatnation;

thenation

state

is

ending

its

short

lived

reign

and

we

are

now

becoming

directlysubjecttocapitalitself.

These threeaccountsofourpresenthavemuch incommon.Theyare

rootedinthetechnologicaladvancesofthepastthirtyorfortyyears.Theysee

ourrecenthistoryasbreakingwithitsslightlylessrecentpast.Theyascribea

determiningpowertotheintertwiningoftransnationalcapitalismandtherise

ofadigitalculture.Forthem,1976isalongtimeago.Asaresult,theywould

account Foucaults histories of sexuality, of the prison, and ofmadness as

belonging toanotherage,anepoch thatprecedesrather thancoincideswith

our

own.

These accounts have something else in common aswell, something

that renders themasmuchpre aspostFoucaultian.Theyareaccounts that

approachourpresentfromfarabovetheground.Theylookdownuponour

present from a great height, and as a result each sees in it a single hue.

Whetherwearedescribedasrelaysinadigitalnetwork,consumersofhyper

reality,orsubjectsofglobalcapital,weareaccountedasonething,assingle

somethingthatlendsitselftoaparticularexhaustiveperspective.Attimes,of

course,Foucault is readas reducingeverything: tosexuality, to thecarceral

society, to Reason.However, he isbadly read thisway. To approach our

presentasthoughitwerereducibletoaunitaryexplanationistoapproachit

sloppily,withoutconcern fordetail,without responsiveness to thepractices

andthearchivesamongwhichwelive.Neveragainwillasinglestorybetoldas

though it were the only one. Thosewho hold to each of these stories forget

Bergerslesson.TheyhavenotyetreachedFoucault,muchlessgonebeyond

him.

AsFoucaultremindsusinafamousessayonNietzsche,Genealogyis

gray,meticulous,andpatientlydocumentaryitmustrecordthesingularity

of events outside anymonotonous finality; itmust seek them in themost

unpromisingplaces,

in

what

we

tend

to

feel

is

without

historyGenealogy,

consequently,requirespatienceandaknowledgeofdetailsanditdependson

a vast accumulation of source material.8 What the three rejections of

Foucault lackispatienceandarecognitionofthesingularityofevents.They

flyoverourworldratherthanrummagingthroughit.Ratherthangray,they

see black and white. Rather than offering us a history, they offer us a

snapshotandanaerialoneatthat.

8 Nietzsche,Genealogy,History,inLanguage,CounterMemory,Practice,ed.DonaldF.

Bouchard, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. (Ithaca: Cornell University

Press,1977),139140.

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May: Foucault Now?In this, theseapproaches toourpresent, towhowearenow,arenot

unlike thewaymanyofus thinkaboutour current situation.We treatour

worldasthough itwerewithoutapast,aworldfullysprungjustamoment

beforewebegantoreflectonit,andconsequentlyaworldthatdoesnotcease

toshock

us

in

its

arbitrary

and

sometimes

idiotic

character.

And,

indeed,

it

wouldbenavetodenythatrecenttechnologiesreinforcethistendency.Here

the analyses of Baudrillard and others like him have the ring of truth.

Television,theinternet,themovies,seemoftentocompressourworldintoa

singlemoment,amomentthatsqueezesoutthelegacythathasdeterminedit

andthefuturetowhichitcontributes.

Itispreciselythistendency,however,thatmakesFoucaultsapproach

moreurgentrather than less. Ifweare told that therearenomomentsother

thanthisone,ifwearecaughtupintheurgencyofourpresentattheexpense

of

understanding

how

we

arrived

at

it,

then

perhaps

this

is

not

because

the

contingenciesofourhistoryhavebecome irrelevant tousnowbutbecause

thosecontingencieshaveledushere.And,becausetheyarecontingencies,we

canunderstand thepath thatbroughtushereand, in theirwake, construct

pathsthatmayleadusout.Recallingandextendingtheremarkcitedearlier,

Foucaulthimselftellsus,

somany things canbe changed, fragile as they are,bound upmorewith

circumstances than necessities, more arbitrary than selfevident, more a

matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with

inevitableanthropological

constraintsto

say

that

we

are

much

more

recent

thanwe think isnt away of taking thewholeweight of history on our

shoulders. Its rather to place at the disposal of theworkwe can do on

ourselves thegreatestpossibleshareofwhat ispresentedas inaccessible to

us.9

Andperhapsthatis,ultimately,theproblemwiththethreeanalysesthatseek

to leaveFoucaultsstudies to thepast.In looking fromonhigh, in failing to

see the specific contingencies of our history, each in its ownwaypresents

changeasinaccessibletous,leavingitattoofararemovefromourgrasp.Itis

notthat

they

are

fatalists:

Deleuze

tells

that,

Its

not

aquestion

of

worrying

or hoping for the best, but of finding new weapons.10 For his part,

Baudrillardoutlines an elusive strategyof seduction and silence.However,

theserecommendationsareasgeneralas theiranalyses;theydonotofferus

the framework for resistance that amorenuanced approach toourpresent

might.

Theproblem isnot that theseapproaches toourpresent lackspecific

formsofguidance.Foucault isnotoriouslyreluctant toprescribe.In the first

9 MichelFoucault,PracticingCriticism,,156.

10 GillesDeleuze,PostscriptonControlSocieties,inNegotiations,178.

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volumeofhishistoryofsexuality,theonlyadviceheoffersisthesuggestion

thatresistancetothecurrentregimeofsexualityoughtnottobeconceivedin

termsofsexanddesirebutintermsofbodiesandpleasures.Thatishardlya

finegrainedprogram foraction.The issue isnotoneofguidancebutof the

properlevel

of

analysis.

In

approaching

the

question

of

who

we

are

now

from

so farabove,wecannotseewellenough tobeable to thinkaboutresistance

andchange.Wedonotneedthesethinkerstotelluswhattodo;asFoucault

alwaysknew,we can figure that out for ourselves.Whatweneed is some

assistance in understandingwherewe are and howwe got here. In this,

Deleuze and Baudrillard and those who cast our world in terms of

globalization tellussomething,but theydonot tellusenough.And, for the

purposesofassessingtherelevanceofFoucaultsworksforwhowearenow,

theytellusverylittle.

None

of

this

is

meant

to

insist

that

Foucaults

work

on

sexuality,

on

the

prisonsandonmadnessare indeedasrelevantastheyhavealwaysbeen.It

would be striking if, given the changes our world has undergone, these

constitutiveareasofwhowearehaveretainedtheircharacterintact.Instead,I

amurging that ifweare toask thequestionofFoucaultNow, ifweare to

ponder the relevance of hisworks for our lives,wemust approach these

workswith amoreFoucaultianmethodology.Wemust look around rather

thanlookingdown.

Howmightthiswork?How,forinstance,mightweaskabouttherole

ofsexualityinconstitutingourlivesoverthepastthirtyyears?Byengagingin

a work that is, as he describes it, gray, meticulous, and patiently

documentary.Letuslookatthehealthmanualsforthepastseveraldecades,

andaskhowsexandsexualityfiguresinthem.Letusresearchtheplaceofsex

inmovies and television and on the internet. Let us peruse the selfhelp

manualstodiscoverhowwearesupposedtotalkwithoneanother,whatwe

are tosayandwhat toconfess. It is true that, incontrast toFoucaults time,

when the sexual revolution and the centrality of Lacanian thoughtmade

peoplethinkofthemselveslargelyintermsofsexuality,thefocusonsexhas

lessenedsomewhatinpublicdiscourse,oratleastthepublicdiscourseofthe

left.But

does

this

mean

it

has

lost

its

power

in

forming

who

we

are?

It

was

Foucault himself who pointed to the fact that sexuality was a pervasive

determining factorofwhowewereevenwhenwewerenotovertly talking

aboutit.Isthediminishingoftalkaboutsexualliberationasignofadeclinein

the role that sexualityplays inmakinguswhoweare,ormerelya shift in

howthatmakingoccurs?

At thevery least it shouldgiveuspause that somuchof the talkof

moral values these days relies on explicit references to sexuality: gay

marriage, abortion, pornography, sex on television. Coming as I do from

SouthCarolina,

Ican

tell

you

that

at

least

in

my

part

of

the

country

we

are

awash in sexuality.Many of our localpastors and other luminaries cannot

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May: Foucault Now?stoptalkingabout it.Whatdoesthismeanforwhowearenow?AlthoughI

donothaveananswer for this, I suspect that,globalization aside, it isnot

entirelyirrelevant.

Andwhatof thecarceralsocietythatDeleuzeargueswehavemoved

beyond?He

is

surely

right

to

say

that

something

important

has

changed

here.

We rely less on confinement and more on a network of decentralized

communication thanweused to.Buthas thisundercutsurveillanceand the

projectofnormalizationthatarosefromit?Iswhatweareseeinghereashift

inwhowe are now from one epoch to another, ormerely a shift of the

operation of surveillance and intervention from closed sites tomore open

ones?And ifpsychology isno longercentral toassessingus in termsof the

normal and the abnormal, is this because normalization is no longer a

constitutivefeatureofwhoweareorbecausethemarkethasfulfilledtherole

once

allotted

to

therapists,

because

what

is

normal

no

longer

lies

in

our

actions as producersbut as consumers,because normality is no longer a

matterofworkingbutoneofshopping?

Again, the answer to thesequestions isnotobvious.And that is the

point. We cannot tell who we are simply by noting large, if important,

changes our society has undergone. We must do the spade work of

investigatingtheunfoldinghistoryoftheworldwehavereceived.Wemust

lookwherehistoriansoftenforgettolookandwherephilosophersalwaysfear

totread:ontheground,inthespaceswherepeoplelivetheirlives.Toputthe

pointanotherway,ifwearetoaskaftertherelevanceofFoucaultswritings

tousnow,wemustbecomemoreFoucaultianratherthanless.

In this, as in much else, Foucault anticipates us. In defending his

tracing ofour lives indailypractices rather than large institutions,he says

that,

Idonotmean inanyway tominimise the importanceandeffectivenessof

Statepower.Isimplyfeelthatexcessiveinsistenceonitsplayinganexclusive

roleleadstotheriskofoverlookingallthemechanismsandeffectsofpower

whichdontpassdirectlyviatheStateapparatusInSovietsocietyonehas

theexampleofaStateapparatuswhichhaschangedhands,yetleavessocial

hierarchies, family life,sexualityand thebodymoreor lessas theywere in

capitalistsociety.11

Wearetoldbymanythatwehaveenteredanewphaseofhistory,thatweare

caughtup inanovelsweepofevents, that the internetchangedeverything,

thatglobalizationchangedeverything,that9/11changedeverything.And to

theseclaimsFoucaulthasalwaysoneanswer.Letus look,patiently,clearly,

andvigilantly.Andwhyshouldwelook?Whatistheimportanceofwhatwe

11 MichelFoucault,QuestionsonGeography, inPower/Knowledge:Selected Interviews

andOtherWritings19721977,ed.ColinGordon.(NewYork:Pantheon,1980),7273.

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12/12


mightsee?Perhapswecanofferanaccountofwhowearenow,anaccountof

ourpresent.Ofwhatusemightthisbe?Whereinliesitsvalue?

Again,and finally,Foucaultstands in theplace towardwhichweare

groping.Inhispreface tothesecondvolumeofhishistoryofsexuality, ina

remarkmany

of

you

will

be

familiar

with,

he

tells

us

that,

Asforwhatmotivatedme,itisquitesimpleItwascuriositytheonlykind

ofcuriosity, inanycase, that isworthactingonwithadegreeofobstinacy:

not thecuriosity thatseeks toassimilatewhat it isproper forone toknow,

butthatwhichenablesonetogetfreeofoneself.Afterall,whatwouldbethe

valueofthepassionforknowledgeifitresultedonlyinacertainamountof

knowledgeablenessandnot,inonewayoranotherandtotheextentpossible,

intheknowersstrayingafieldofhimself?12

We

must

approach

Foucaults

work,

both

as

we

read

it

and

as

we

seek

toextendittounderstandwhowearenow,notsimplyasasetoftextstobe

deciphered,commentedupon,researched,psychoanalyzed,annotated,cited,

and,forthoseofuswhoteach,assignedtoundergraduatestudentsaspartof

a new, improved canon.Nothingwouldbemore abetrayal than to treat

Foucault as a newlyminted member of the DeadWhiteMale Academy.

Instead,wemusttreathisworksastheancientstreatedtheirphilosophy;we

must take themupas spiritualexercises.For theGreeks,and especially for

Hellenisticphilosophy,thepointofaphilosophicaltextorateachingwasnot

tooffermoreknowledgeablenessbuttoorientonetowardawayofliving.As

such,onereturned to those textsorthoseteachingsnotbecauseanuanceof

thoughthadbeenforgottenoraninferencenotwellunderstood,butbecause

oneneededtoberemindedofwhoonewasandwhatonemightbecome.

It is thesame, Isuggest,withFoucaultswritings.We return to them

not to discover, for instance, whether the penal regime of torture ever

overlappedwith thatof rehabilitation,but to recall thecontingenciesofour

ownhistory,andtoremindourselvesbecausewesooftenforgetthatour

history is indeedcontingent.Wereturn tohiswritingsbecausehespeaks to

us, fromoutofourpastand,perhapsstill,outofourpresentofwhowe

havebeen

and

who

we

are,

and

he

does

so

in

ways

that

allow

us

to

imagine

whowemightbecome.We return toFoucaultNow, andwewill return to

him in the future,because the freedomhesought inhis lifeand freedomof

whichhegivesusaglimpse inours is, contrary toall those inpowerwho

wouldprefer thatwe not know it, a set ofpossibilities that remains intact

beforeus.Ourtask,thetaskthatremainstous,istolivethosepossibilities.

12 MichelFoucault,TheUseofPleasure,tr.RobertHurley.(NewYork:Pantheon,1985),8.

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