On the philosophical positions of

Dharmottara and Jitari

Shiro Matsumoto

I. It seems that the philosophical positions of Dharmottara and Jitari can be

made clear by investigating their interpretations of the reason sahopalambha-

niyama (the necessity of being perceived together) which is applied in the Pra-

manaviniscaya as follows: blue and the cognition of blue are not different

from each other, because they are necessarily perceived together (sahopalambha-

niyamad abhedo nilataddhiyoh/)1).

We have already investigated Dharmottara's interpretation2). According to his

opinion, the non-difference (abheda), the property to be proved by the reason

sahopalambhaniyama, implies not the identity (ekatva or tadatmya) but the mere

negation of the difference (bhedapratisedhamatra). In other words, the negation

expressed by the prefix a- in the word abheda is interpreted by him not as

paryudasa (the negation which affirms the contradictory of what is negated) but as

prasajyapratisedha (the negation which does not affirm the contradictory of what

is negated). This interpretation of Dharmottara seems to rest on his understa-

nding that, if the non-difference between the cognized and the cognizing were

construed as their identity, the cognition (the cognizing) would become unreal

because of the unreality of the form (akara) of the object (the cognized)3). Thus,

because it is clear that Dharmottara regarded the form as unreal, it seems pos-

sible to consider that he is a scholar of the Vi jnanavadins who hold that the

form is unreal (Sems tsam rnam rdsun pa). This assumption seems to be confirm-

ed by Tson kha pa's statement that the property to be proved by the reason

sahopalambhaniyama is the mere negation of the difference for the Vijnanava-

din who holds that the form is unreal, and the identity for the Vi jnanavadin who

holds that the form is real (Sems tsam rnam bden pa)4), and also by the Tibetan

traditions that Dharmottara interpreted the intention of Dharmakirti in the

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On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara (S. Matsumoto) (10)

Pramanavarttika as explaining the theory of the Vijnanavadin who holds that

the form is unreal5).

The aim of this paper is to verify this assumption concerning the philoso-

phical position of Dharmottara6) and to determine Jitari's philosophical position by investigating Jitari's interpretation of the reason sahopalambhaniyama. For

the sake of convenience, the theory that the form is real is called Satyakara-

vada, and the theory that the form is unreal is called Alikakaravada in this

paper. II. Jitari, in his Sugatamatavibhangabhasya (SMVBh, D. ed., No. 3900) ad Su-

gatamatavibhangakarika (D. ed., No. 3899), k. 7, critcisied the Yogacara philo-

sophy. The synopsis of the criticism is as follows:

(a) Introduction (a, 46b4-5)

(b) Criticism by the reason ekanekasvabhaviyoga (a, 46b5-49b2)

1) Introduction (a, 46b5-7)7)

2) Criticism of Satyakaravada (a, 46b7-47a5)7)

3) Criticism of Alikakaravada (a, 47a5-49b1)

(c) Criticism of Alikakaravada by the reason asatyahetuvattva(?) (a, 49b2-51a3)

(d) Explanation that the reason ekanekasvabhavaviyoga is free from the three

kinds of fallacy, i. e. asiddhata, viruddhata and anaikantikata (a, 51a3-52b6)

(e) Criticism of the four kinds of Yogacara philosophy (a, 52b6-60a4)

(f) Criticism of the Yogacara theory that samvrti does not exist without the

[real] locus (a, 60a4-5)

(g) Conclusion (a, 60a5-60b2)

Section (c) starts with the following passage :

Then, how can we say that the formless cognitions (nirakarajnana) such as pleasure

etc. are unreal ? Whatever has an unreal cause is unreal, just as a sprout. Pleasure

etc. have an unreal cause. [Therefore they are unreal.] This inference rests on the

svabhavahetu (reason of self-essence). (SMVBh, a, 49b2)

In order to show that that the reason applied here is free from the logical

fallacy of inadmissibility (asiddhata), Jitari employs the reason sahopalambha-

niyama in the following passage:

Although the cognition appearing as the corporeal objects (murti) is the cause

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(11) On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara (S. Matsumoto)

[of pleasure etc.], the unreality of the cause of pleasure etc. is proved in the f ol-

lowing way. If the corporeal objects are unreal, the cognition appearing as them

is unreal, because the non-difference between the corporeal objects and the cogni-

tion is proved by the necessity of their being perceived together (sahopalambhani-

yama). [The inference is as follows:] When the two things are necessarily percei-

ved together, they are identical, just as the cognition and its self-essence (svarupa).

The corporeal objects and the cognition appearing as them are necessarily perceived

together. [Therefore they are identical. ] Here their non-difference is proved by the

svabhavahetu. Thus is stated [in the Pramanavinifscaya] as follows: blue and the

cognition of blue are not different, because they are necessarily perceived together.

(SMVBh, a, 50a1-3)

Here Jitari clearly states that the property to be proved by the reason saho-

palambhaniyama is the identity, and in the following passage rejects Dharmot-

tara's interpretation that the property is the mere negation of the difference.

There is an opinion as follows: "The property to be proved by the necessity of be-

ing perceived together is not the identity but the non-difference (i. e. the mere

negation of the difference). [It is stated in the following inference.] (8-When A

is necessarily perceived together with B, A is not different from B, just as the first

real moon is not different from the second moon-8). The object is necessarily

perceived together with the cognition of that object. [Therefore the object is not

different from the cognition.] This inference rests on the perception of the

contradictory of the pervading (vyapakaviruddhopalabdhi). This is the intention

of the Master (Dharmakirti). In other words, (8-the difference (bheda) is pervaded

by the absence of the necessity of being perceived together (asahopalambhaniyama?),

because of loss of the connection. The necessity of being perceived together is the

contradictory of the absence-8)." This interpretation is not correct.......9) It is the

great intention of Dharmakirti (Varttikakara) that the one who knows logic is the

advocater that the cognition has the form (sakarajnanavadin). (SMVBh, a, 50a3-7)

Here Jitari considered the philosophical position of Dharmottara to be AlIka-

karavada as opposed to his own position, i. e. Satyakaravada. Therefore it se-

ems possible to consider that the difference of the interpretations of the reason

sahopalambhaniyama indicates the difference of the philosophical positions of

the interpretors, as is shown in the following table.

III. By investigating Jitari's criticism of Dharmottara's interpretation of the

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On the philosophical positions of Dharmottara (S. Matsumoto) (12)

reason sahopalambhaniyama, it seems possible to attain following conclusions.

i) Dharmottara should be considered to be a Vi jnanavadin who advocates

Alikakaravada.

ii) Jitari should be regarded as a Madhyamika who advocates Satyakaravada.

1) On the different interpretations of this inference, cf. Matsumoto S.: Sahopa- lambha-niyama, Journal of Soto Sect Research Fellows, 12, 1980, pp. (1)-(34).

2) Cf. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. (18)-(22).

3) Cf. Pramanaviniscayatika (PVin T, P. ed., No. 5727), dse, 183a1-3; Matsumto:

op. cit., pp. (18)-(19). 4) Cf. gSer phren (P. ed., No. 6150), na, 255a6-7; Matsumoto: op. cit., p. (19).

5)Cf. Hakamaya N.: 「唯 識 の学 系 に関 す る チ ベ ッ ト撰 述 文 献 」(The texts written

in Tibet concerning the schools of the Vijnanavadins), Journal of Buddhist Stu-

dies of Komazawa University, 6, 1976, pp. 254, 249, 241. 6) Although the prevalent opinion that Dharmtotara is a Sautrantika seem to rest

on the fact that he interpreted the qualifier abhranta, added by Dharmakirti to

the definition of pratyaksa, from the view-point of a Sautrantika in the Nyaya- bindutika (Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, p. 7), we think that this fact is not ade-

quate to characterize Dharmottara as a Sautrantika. 7) It should be noted that the passages corresponding word for word with each other are found in SMVBh (a, 46b6-47a4) and Tarkabhasa (Iyengar ed., p. 70,

1. 14-p. 71, 1. 8), as is reported in Shirasaki K.: rJitari L MoksakaraguptaJ

(Jitari and Moksakaragapta), JIBS, XXV-I, 1976, p. 421. 8) This passage corresponds word for word with Dharmottara's passage. Cf. PVin T

(dse, 189b7-190a1). 9) The content of Jitari's criticism is not investigated in this paper.

10) On the different examples (drstanta), cf. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. (20)-(21).

(Graduate Student, Tokyo University)

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